Over the last several years, European security has confronted major new challenges. Russia’s land grab in Ukraine and Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)-inspired transnational terrorism are two of the most obvious, but climate change, destabilizing migration, insufficient energy resources, a weakened European identity, and manipulation of the information space greatly complicate an already threatening security environment.

Two of the most powerful, most successful intergovernmental security institutions—the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU)—have each taken steps to ameliorate insecurity in Europe. NATO’s Readiness Action Plan and the EU’s Action Plan for Military Mobility are just two examples of how the transatlantic community and the countries of Europe have sought to leverage their collective strength to achieve security gains for all.

Although these and other initiatives that were undertaken to date have been necessary, they have nonetheless proven insufficient in mitigating the aforementioned security challenges. This monograph identifies political divisions, a lack of shared threat perceptions, inadequate resourcing, insufficient capabilities and capacity, tedious decision-making procedures, insufficient interoperability, an incomplete operational picture, and inadequate maneuverability as the most problematic of the institutional shortcomings that collectively frustrate the ability of NATO and the EU to meet their security-related goals.

These institutional shortcomings are critically important to the United States, given how prominently Europe sits within the United States’ vital national security interests. The 2017 U.S. National Security Strategy is clear on how a strong and free Europe is vital to the United States, on how NATO in particular forms one of America’s great advantages over its competitors, and on how a fractured NATO and a weakened EU only benefit U.S. adversaries.

Unfortunately, several of the institutional challenges identified in this monograph seem stubbornly persistent—for instance, disagreements over adequate resourcing of NATO are nearly as old as the alliance itself. Moreover, many of these problems might appear to sit beyond the influence of the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) or the U.S. Army.

Nevertheless, this paper makes a number of recommendations in four broad areas where DoD and Army engagement can help to overcome the thorny problems identified in this monograph and thereby drive a more coherent security response from NATO and the EU. First, the monograph identifies needed improvements in NATO and wider European capability development, particularly in Central and Eastern Europe. In particular, the monograph recommends that the United States refocus foreign military sales, reinforce EU defense consolidation, and build capacity in both the military sphere and in Europe’s ability to respond to natural and man-made disaster relief operations.

Second, the monograph recognizes the key role that the Chief of Staff of the Army plays on the Joint Chiefs of Staff, encouraging Army leadership to use its influence to press for structural and policy changes within NATO. Specifically,
this monograph recommends the Army and DoD use their influence in the interagency to address NATO’s unwieldy decision-making process, foster greater commitment to the NATO Defense Planning Process (NDPP), and promote the development of a division of labor strategy that would reduce duplication of effort between Europe and the United States.

Third, the monograph identifies critical improvements necessary in European infrastructure that would improve mobility and a rapid reinforcement in the event of a crisis in Europe. Here the United States should continue to pressure European countries toward implementing the initiatives already put forward in the NATO Security Investment Program (NSIP) and the extant Readiness Action Plan. Washington should also consider earmarking more European Deterrence Initiative (EDI) funding for infrastructure projects to improve redundancy and resilience in European transport networks, especially those that connect ports and airports with pre-positioned stocks.

Fourth, the monograph recommends that Washington consider a number of steps that would reduce risk, generate a more robust deterrence, and enable greater cohesion among its European partners. Additionally, the monograph suggests that the United States should reframe the intelligence classification process to emphasize sharing among allies, station additional forces in Europe to strengthen deterrence, and prepare to unilaterally deploy forces forward in advance of any decisions made by the North Atlantic Council (NAC).

Throughout, what sets this monograph apart from other analyses produced for senior Army and DoD leadership is that it is largely based on the informed assessments, research, and analysis of America’s allies and partners. The team that authored this monograph includes military officers from some of America’s closest security and foreign policy partners—Austria, Canada, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom. The officers that comprise the research team collectively offer a unique perspective on the topics examined in this monograph, a perspective from which senior DoD and Army leadership do not typically hear. Given the importance that the United States has long placed on leveraging its alliance and partner relationships to address the most pressing security challenges of the day, it is vital to consider and heed the perspectives of those allies and partners.