THE UNITED STATES AND RUSSIA INTO THE 21ST CENTURY

R. Craig Nation
and
Michael McFaul

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FOREWORD

In late April 1997, the U.S. Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute hosted its Eighth Annual Strategy Conference. The topic for this year's conference was Russia's Future as a World Power. The concluding panel for this conference, The United States and Russia into the 21st Century, included the following two papers. In the first essay, Beyond the Cold War: Change and Continuity in U.S.-Russian Relations, Dr. R. Craig Nation argues that, for the United States, the primary challenge is to adjust to a post-Cold War world where it is difficult to justify traditional exercises of power in the absence of any imminent threat. But, for the United States, the trauma of readjustment has been mostly confined to the American defense industry and the military services themselves; and the adjustments that are being undertaken have occurred in the midst of an economy enjoying an exceptionally long and steady growth. For Russia, however, the demise of the Soviet Union was an event of unparalleled historical precedent. In the span of a few years, what was once an awesome empire, one whose interests were defended by armed forces of tremendous size and quality, fractured. Left was a truncated state, undergoing massive economic upheaval. With the exception of its armed forces and nuclear capabilities, Russia poses dangers to only a very few immediate neighbors. Dr. Nation traces the attempts of both states to come to terms with Russia's new status and to establish a new relationship. He concludes that neither a purely cooperative nor inevitably antagonistic pattern will characterize their turn-of-the-century interaction. Instead, we should anticipate a hybrid model as Russia defines its national interests through its own prism.

In the second essay, American Policy Towards Russia: Framework for Analysis and Guide to Action, Dr. Michael McFaul maintains that, while Russia may be temporarily in decline, its sheer size, natural resources, educated populace, and strategic location
between Europe and Asia make it virtually certain that Russia will reemerge as a major power. The only question is whether Russia will join the community of nations as a responsible member or whether it will become a rogue nation. Dr. McFaul contends that Russia could still develop into a democracy with a free market economy and, if it does, its place in the community of nations may be sanguine. If not, Russia has the potential to be horrendously troublesome. The West, especially the United States, should do all that it can to encourage the better angels of Russia's nature.

Predictions by very astute observers about Russia's future course cover a wide spectrum, and all had their advocates during the Eighth Annual Strategy Conference. But on two things there was clearly agreement: that the transformation in Russia opens possibilities for radically different futures, and that whatever fate runs with Russia runs with us all.

RICHARD H. WITHERSPOON
Colonel, U.S. Army
Director, Strategic Studies

Institute
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES OF THE AUTHORS

R. CRAIG NATION is Director of Russian and Eurasian Studies at the U.S. Army War College and a Fellow at the Clarke Center of Dickinson College, both located in Carlisle, Pennsylvania. Dr. Nation has published extensively on Soviet and Russian foreign and security policy. He is the author of Black Earth, Red Star: A History of Soviet Security Policy, 1917-1991.

MICHAEL McFAUL is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at Stanford University. He earned his B.A. and M.A. in Slavic and East European Studies from Stanford and his Ph.D. in International Relations from Oxford University. Dr. McFaul has edited numerous monographs including Privatization, Conversion and Enterprise Reform in Russia. His articles have appeared in Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, and World Politics.
BEYOND THE COLD WAR:
CHANGE AND CONTINUITY IN U.S.-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

R. Craig Nation

The End of the Bipolar World Order.

Russia can be counted as a European great power from the battle of Poltava in 1709, several generations prior to the American Declaration of Independence. Throughout the 18th and 19th centuries, the Americas were of only modest interest to the huge, autocratic Eurasian land power, and relative neglect was fully reciprocated by the New World's rising maritime republic. A sensitive 19th century observer like Alexis de Toqueville was able to discern the seeds of future rivalry, but his insights were only hypothetical. Russia was pleased to sell all of Alaska to the Yankees for a pittance in the 1860s. Washington mediated an end to the Russian-Japanese war with the treaty of Portsmouth in 1905, but its concern was with a fledgling Japanese rival rather than the floundering Russian colossus. Though some contemporary observers, in an attempt to cast the Russian-American relationship in as positive a light as possible, have sought to portray an historical legacy of active collaboration (including Russian support for American independence and sympathy for the cause of the North in the U.S. Civil War), prior to the 20th century the two states operated in distinct spheres of geopolitical interest, and their mutual relations were marginal at best.

The First World War and the Russian Revolution changed the situation in two ways. First, intervention in the war represented a commitment to engagement in Europe that the United States was thereafter incapable of shaking off. The revival of isolationist sentiment in the 1920s tempered that engagement but did not end it, and, as the crisis of the 1930s deepened, U.S. concern with the course of events in Europe became ever greater. Second, after 1917, traditional geostrategic
interests were complicated by ideological rivalry. The first of several U.S. "Red Scares" in 1920 made clear how volatile that rivalry could be, and set the stage for the intense clash of values that would define U.S.-Soviet relations in the decades to come. If one chooses, like Andre Fontaine, to define the Cold War primarily in terms of ideological competition, it is appropriate to date its origin from the First, rather than the Second World War.

The United States and the USSR nonetheless concluded the Second World War as allies, though perhaps more by accident than design. Both were drawn into the war as a result of surprise attacks launched by allied rivals, and both were constrained by the exigencies of total war to cooperate strategically. There was always an element of incongruity about the wartime alliance, and, with the cement of a common enemy removed, it was no surprise that underlying rivalry should reassert itself. In some ways both Washington and Moscow made a game effort to retain the spirit of wartime collaboration during the transition years of 1945-47, an effort that was frustrated more by the underlying, structural sources of hostility that had come to divide two great nations, than by the tactical choices or personal proclivities of their respective leaders.

The result was the Cold War system, which provided a relatively stable context for U.S.-Soviet relations for over 40 years. That system was defined first and foremost by bipolarity. The United States and the USSR emerged from the war as the world's dominant powers, and, even if cumulative U.S. assets greatly outweighed those of the Soviets, the USSR was strong where it counted--with its military forces threateningly deployed in the heart of Europe and with an emerging nuclear strategic arsenal. "Russia had never experienced such an immense reinforcement of its role in world politics," writes A. A. Kokoshin retrospectively, "neither at the pinnacle of its glory in the age of Peter the Great and Catherine II, nor
after prevailing over Napoleon, which resulted in the Russian army's march into Paris in 1814." Most other salient dimensions of the Cold War were attributes of bipolarity which affected but did not fashion the core rivalry defining the system as a whole. Cold war competition, pursued within an international state system where Carl von Clausewitz's famous premise concerning the political instrumentality of armed force maintained all of its relevance, was highly militarized, but it was not a product of militarism. Superpower rivalry was intensified by ideological polarization, with the two protagonists committed to the defense of radically different if not mutually exclusive world futures, but U.S.-Soviet relations had taken a very different form during the interwar decades when ideological motivation was even more intense. Bipolarity was the foundation of a pattern of world order, and it imposed vigilance not only along the interfaces where the armed forces of the protagonists confronted one another directly (in Europe, East Asia, and the Northwest Pacific), or in the realm of institutions and ideals, but pervasively and globally. Nearly all of the postwar "regional conflicts" pursued with varying degrees of intensity in the world's least developed and most inaccessible regions included a significant dimension of great power engagement.

U.S. policy during the Cold War has been interpreted in retrospect as having been inspired by a grand strategy for the defeat of Soviet power, spelled out in the famous NSC 68, drafted in the spring of 1950 on the eve of the Korean War, and applied consistently over several decades on the basis of a "doctrine of containment." Such an interpretation is in many ways suspect--the gestation of U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union in the difficult postwar years was considerably more acrimonious than is sometimes assumed and at no point through the decades of Cold War rivalry was an unambiguous consensus over policy options in place. The Cold War, as its name suggests, implied pitched competition, but it also defined a system of order with a cooperative and, even on occasion, a collusive
dimension. The superpowers were ready to accede to the establishment of mutual spheres of influence, their nuclear strategic rivalry was carefully monitored and from 1969 subjected to the scrutiny of an arms control process, an ever more refined and institutionalized process of communication and consultation was crafted to ward off surprises, and steps were taken to ensure that rivalry by proxy in Third World regional conflicts would not escalate to the point where it could threaten a direct confrontation.

The end of the Cold War was occasioned by a crisis of Soviet power that unfolded over many years and culminated in the dismantling of the Soviet state in the course of 1991. Leonid Brezhnev's detente policy, though it was justified in the name of an elaborate ideological formula that blithely asserted a continuing shift in the global correlation of forces to the USSR's advantage, was in part a reaction to the first signs of that crisis, an attempt to stabilize relations with the United States in order to concentrate upon shoring up the foundations of national strength. But Brezhnev's foreign policy failed to achieve almost all of its stated and unstated goals. Detente was intended to stabilize the strategic arms race at levels of approximate parity, but in the aftermath of the INF deployment controversy of the early 1980s Moscow found itself forced back into an open-ended strategic competition that it could not hope to win. Brezhnev sought to use a reduction of East-West tensions in order to draw upon the economic dynamism of the West and relaunch Soviet economic growth, but, in the end, little was achieved. The 1975 Helsinki Pact satisfied one important Soviet demand by formally recognizing postwar European borders, but its "Basket Three" commitment to a human rights agenda only stimulated what was already chronic unrest among the Soviet Union's restive Warsaw Pact satellites. In Asia, the logic of detente aimed at blocking the emergence of a U.S.-Chinese strategic axis with an anti-Soviet character, but by the late 1970s, the United States had played its China card, leaving Moscow effectively
isolated in the region. Even the Soviets' aggressive Third World activism had gone awry, bleeding into the sands of a series of open-ended and unproductive local wars including the traumatic intervention in Afghanistan.

The post-Brezhnev call for "New Thinking" in international relations thus fell upon fertile ground. The Soviet state which Mikhail Gorbachev and his generation of reformers inherited was isolated internationally, overextended strategically, and socially fragile. The Kantian premises of Gorbachev's international theory—increasing international interdependence, the irrationality of war, the need for cooperative solutions to existential, ecological, and developmental threats—are often criticized in Russia today for their excessive idealism or naivete. They were nonetheless appropriate responses to the Soviet Union's objective need for a major reorientation of international priorities. Gorbachev's initiatives pulled back the USSR from its Third World imbroglios, reanimated the nuclear disarmament process, built a foundation for rapprochement with China, forged a new climate of cooperation with the West, and generated the possibility for a decisive (though ultimately unsuccessful) engagement with the challenge of domestic reform. Gorbachev's goal was not to transcend bipolarity but to reestablish it by renewing the foundations of Soviet power. This helps to account for the skepticism with which his program was originally greeted in the West, though in fact the real goal was not hegemonism but rather positive cooperation in a framework of common security. For a brief moment, projects for Soviet-American co-management and condominium arrangements, a pax Gorbacheviana under the twin stars of the born-again superpower partners, were able to flourish.

The image of a new world order defined by superpower cooperation quickly proved to be a mirage. Gorbachev's turn away from the illusory threat perceptions of the Cold War era served to clear the ground for a confrontation with the real social,
economic, and political sources of the Soviet malaise, but it was a necessary rather than sufficient condition for regime transformation. In the end the Soviet order was not destroyed by external pressures (these pressures may actually have served artificially to prolong it by offering the regime an enemy image as a source of legitimization). Soviet power was eroded by the process of modernization itself--by the globalization of world markets which made the highly autarkic Soviet command model hopelessly outdated, by the revolution in telecommunications which made an enforced isolation of the Soviet peoples impossible to maintain, by the homogenization of aspirations born of a universalized image of the good life, and by the evolution of Soviet society including the dynamics of urbanization, higher educational standards, and greater self-awareness. It was in attempting to address these types of dilemmas that Gorbachev's reform program, the "nearly utopian project of an attempt to affect a revolutionary transformation via reformist means," was swept off the rails.

The failure of Gorbachev's project, the destruction of the Soviet federation, and the corrupt and ineffective character of the Russian successor state created under the aegis of Boris Yeltsin brought an end to Cold War bipolarity not by recasting its spirit but by imploding one of its pillars. The Cold War did not culminate as an armed confrontation, and attempts to interpret its outcome in the context of theories of hegemonic war risk serious distortion. The Soviet Union had never been strong enough to assume the role of aspiring hegemon, and it was not external pressure but the sudden maturation of a domestic crisis under the weight of an aggressive reform agenda that precipitated events. The USSR was not defeated strategically by a purposeful rival--it disintegrated from within due to its inability to confront systemic change. As a result, the United States was as surprised by the tragic fate of Gorbachev's perestroika as was its originator, and lacked a well thought-through and consistent strategy for reacting to and exploiting the
new realities created by the Soviet collapse.

The Illusion of Partnership.

In crafting a foreign policy strategy Gorbachev called together many of the Soviet Union's most sophisticated and experienced internationalists. Those elements of the foreign policy community that choose to join with Boris Yeltsin in opposition were usually lower on the professional ladder and often less prepared for the responsibilities of leadership. Andrei Kozyrev, with a background as a second-level Soviet diplomat, became foreign minister of the newly independent Russian Federation in December 1991 without a fully developed appreciation for the new situation created by the disbanding of the USSR and the weakening of Russia itself. Yeltsin had not built his reputation as a foreign policy critic, and in power he essentially associated with a more extreme and inflexible variant of the New Thinking approach, an approach that was firmly anchored in the context of bipolarity. The rhetoric of universal human values was, if anything, intensified, and the goal of attachment to the Western security and economic communities articulated emphatically. Soon after assuming control, Kozyrev wrote:

We resolutely reject a policy of force, and we strive for a qualitative shift in our approach to the problems of humanity. Promotion of political interactions between Russia and the leading countries of the world, the development of partnerships and major progress in disarmament will be the foundation for new global relations characterized by stability and predictability. This will enable us to direct enormous material resources and human potential to raising standards of living and providing social security and health care. It will allow us to undertake significant,
urgently needed measures to prevent the imminent environmental crisis; it will pave the way for creative solutions to other global problems—especially those of developing countries; the eradication of mass starvation and poverty, the consequences of overpopulation and natural disasters.¹

The U.S. foreign policy establishment, which had been so cautious in reacting to Gorbachev's revolutionary initiatives, embraced the heady prospects evoked by such rhetoric "without reserve, in the naive belief that the new Russia would be transformed overnight into a democratic, loyal, and, above all, unquestioning, supporter of Western policy."² The result was an agenda for strategic partnership which would come to dominate perceptions of the new Russia-U.S. relationship on both sides during the first phase of Russia's post-communist transition.

The partnership agenda rested upon a series of misperceptions. These included the conviction that Russia's transformation was decisive and irrevocable, that movement toward the goals of democratization and marketization could precede in linear fashion according to a preconceived blueprint and with good prospects for success, that the new Russia had crossed a threshold by choosing association with the community of developed post-industrial states, and that, as a result of that choice, the underlying contradictions that had plagued U.S.-Soviet relations in the past would no longer weigh upon the future. Such assumptions were encouraged in part by the high drama with which the breakup of the USSR and "end of communism" was invested, in part by the reigning cult of the unregulated free market, and in part by a chronic overvaluing of the ideological component of the former U.S.-Soviet rivalry. The core assumption was that the Soviet apocalypse had literally changed all, negating the sources of traditional strategic rivalry and opening a door toward the brave new world order of the global marketplace and the democratic peace. The United States, it was presumed,
stood to benefit from these transformations in tangible ways—from the reinforcement of national values that would result from the victory over totalitarianism, from the peace dividend attached to post-Cold War demilitarization, and from engagement in Russian markets as they gradually opened to Western penetration. It was also implicitly suggested that a special relationship with Russia would enable Moscow to continue to play its historical role of Ordnungsmacht in post-communist Eurasia, but in support, rather than in defiance, of Western interests.

The agenda for partnership quickly became the declared foundation for a new U.S.-Russian association. Its premises were spelled out in a series of formal documents, including the Camp David Declaration of February 1992, the Charter of Russian-U.S. Partnership of June 1992, and the Vancouver Declaration of April 1993, and were reiterated repeatedly by responsible foreign policy spokespersons for both sides. During his visit to Moscow in January 1994, President Clinton went so far as to commit to a "mature" strategic partnership, imparting a degree of stability and predictability to the relationship that was far from having been put into place.¹⁰

Russian perceptions of the partnership agenda were characterized by a combination of euphoric enthusiasm, willful self-abasement, and self-interested calculation. The Cold War had accustomed Soviet elites to think of the United States on a basis of equivalency, and there was a strong tendency to perceive the American system as a model for emulation as well as a source of support. "America," writes Sergei Rogov, "as the undisputed leader of the West, was seen as a 'natural' ally of a new, reformed Russia."¹¹ Partnership, in this context, meant acceptance for Russia as a full-fledged member of the club of leading post-industrial democracies accompanied by generous material support for internal reform.

In 1993 the inevitable disillusionment generated
by these exaggerated hopes became manifest. From the American side, the failure of a real Russian market adapted to the needs of Western investors to take form was patent. Democratization in Russia had made little progress toward anything resembling Western norms, an outcome exposed dramatically by the armed confrontations in the heart of Moscow during October 1993 and the disputed elections which followed in the immediate wake of the bloodletting. The strong showing of Vladimir Zhirinovskii's Liberal Democratic party in these elections, where it won 22 percent of the seats to the State Duma by party list and became the single largest party in the Russian parliament, gave rise to fears of a "Weimar" scenario in which a defeated and humiliated Russia risked to be transformed into "a monstrous garrison empire, a hundred times more dangerous than today's expiring USSR." It also gave impetus to a more autonomous Russian international policy, self-assertive and less attuned to the interests of the West--to a Russia which "had learned to say no." Russia's aggressive role in the post-Soviet space, in particular, was increasingly perceived as neo-imperial in character, defiant of international norms, and inimical to Western hopes to preserve the new Eurasian status quo.

On the Russian side, the sources of disillusion were more complex and also more deeply rooted. The real consequences of the break up of the USSR, including a severe decline in living standards, reduced international prestige, and the criminalization of governance and economic life under an ineffective successor regime soon began to make themselves felt. Hopes that economic restructuring could be propelled by a "new Marshall Plan" built on U.S. development assistance were disappointed. The original Marshall Plan committed a full 2 percent of U.S. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) to European reconstruction (a total of $17 billion, equating to about $150 billion today), while U.S. aid to post-communist Russia has never risen above .005 percent of GDP. The hoped-for combination of Western investment and Russian resources proved to be
stillborn; U.S. investment in democratic Russia has not exceeded $5 billion, compared to over $50 billion invested in an unreformed Communist China during the same period. Russia was not welcomed into Western multilateral institutions as a full partner, and occasional U.S. triumphalism concerning its "victory" in the Cold War generated considerable national resentment—the Russians argued that the dismantling of the cold war system had been initiated by themselves and realized cooperatively. The tendency of Western elites to understand the end of the Cold War primarily in the ideologically charged context of the "collapse of communism" may in fact have created a perceptual gap between themselves and their Russian counterparts, for whom the geopolitical consequences of the transition quickly became a primary concern.

Disillusionment over the consequences of partnership was manifested by a protracted public debate over national identity and foreign policy options, widely publicized and pitting "Westernizer" and "Eurasianist" camps one against the other in a replay of one of the classic themes in Russian intellectual history. In 1993 the cutting edge of that challenge became Russia's policy toward the Yugoslav conflict, interpreted by the opposition as the epitome of the sacrifice of abiding national interest on the altar of partnership, and as a "betrayal" of the Russian idea. The issue should have been peripheral to the larger scope of Russian diplomacy, but Moscow's inability to assert its own agenda in the Balkans, a region where it had traditionally been a significant actor, became a kind of catharsis. The foreign ministry's attempt to bend with the wind and coopt the nationalist challenge by affecting a modest course correction was too little, too late. From 1994 onward Foreign Minister Kozyrev was on the defensive, and his replacement by the old Soviet foreign policy hand Evgenii Primakov in January 1996 only culminated an evolution that had long been underway. A variant of the "Eurasianist" position in the Russian foreign policy debate had triumphed, on behalf of an agenda that on
the surface seemed to be much less congenial to U.S. national purposes. Henceforward, Russian national interests would be defined in terms of the country's unique status as "both a bridge and barrier between Europe and Asia." 

The new Russian foreign policy assembled under Primakov's guidance made a sweeping critique of Kozyrev's failures its point of departure. The new and inexperienced Russian foreign ministry, it was argued, had been operated unprofessionally if not incompetently. Kozyrev himself was accused of never clarifying what Russia's core national interests were perceived to be, and failing to specify the ways and means that were required to pursue them. Particular emphasis was placed upon the failure of the choice of deference toward the West to lead beyond a pattern of unilateral concessions made at Russia's expense without commensurate rewards. These concessions ranged from the trivial to the essential, but all were deemed to be detrimental to specific Russian national interests—Russian support for U.N. sanctions against potential allies such as Yugoslavia, Iraq, and Libya; the terms of the START II treaty (signed by Yeltsin in January 1993) presumed to place Russia at a strategic disadvantage; reduction under Western pressure of missile technology exports to India and of nuclear cooperation with China; toleration for discrimination against Russian and Russian-speaking minorities in Latvia and Estonia; acceptance of Western interference in Russian relations with its neighbors; patience in view of Western reluctance to renegotiate the CFE treaty; and so on. The Kozyrev foreign ministry, it was suggested, had in particular failed to develop a coherent policy toward Russia's single most important international challenge—the need for a consistent and effective policy toward the "Near Abroad" where vital national interests were unambiguously in play. Because Kozyrev's foreign policy was not convincingly grounded in national interests, it could never construct a secure democratic foundation. Instead, disorderly procedures were allowed to facilitate decisionmaking.
out of the public eye by the Yeltsin inner clan, powerful corporate interests were encouraged to define an agenda on their own behalf that often conflicted with larger national goals, and the Duma was effectively marginalized, thus insuring that the public's voice was neither heard nor heeded. The most basic of all flaws in the Kozyrev strategy, according to the indictment, was its naivete concerning the real goals of U.S. policy, characterized by one source as a "strategy of supremacy" aimed at "securing American military domination on a global scale." A strong Russia capable of standing up for its own interests, it was asserted, represented an intolerable challenge to American preeminence that Washington would do all in its power to prevent.

These arguments reflect a fixation upon Cold War competition, and a certain preference for conspiracy theory explanations of the Soviet Union's sudden collapse. They also tend to echo extremist evaluations in the West, where nearly every Russian foreign policy gesture is interpreted as part of a grand strategy of imperial reassertion. The new synthesis developed under Primakov's guidance was a logical response to the failings of the Kozyrev leadership, but, on both sides, critiques of partnership cast on the level of state attributes and national strategic goals failed to grasp the larger systemic context that will inevitably make the U.S.-Russian relationship beyond Cold War bipolarity something qualitatively different from what it has been in the past. Disillusion with the partnership agenda was produced neither by a disguised American intention to keep Russia down, nor by a willful Russian policy of neo-imperial expansion. It was a inevitable consequence of the fact that the presumptions of the strategic partnership model did not corresponded to reality. By seeking to perpetuate the ideal of a special relationship between equals as a central pole of international relations, that model rested squarely upon a pattern of bipolarity that was not in accordance with the new global balance of power.
Beyond Bipolarity.

The central problem for the United States in adjusting to post-Cold War realities has been to find a justification for the exercise of power in a world that no longer presents imminent threats to national well-being. For the Russian Federation, the poles of the dilemma have been exactly reversed. Measured by almost every traditional attribute of national power, the consequence of the end of the Cold War and the demise of the USSR has been a catastrophic and historically unprecedented decline. The key determinant in the new U.S.-Russian relationship is not Moscow's ambition, but rather its radically diminished stature.

The only area in which today's Russian Federation can even pretend to equivalency with the United States is that of nuclear policy. Russia remains the only state in the world that has the technical capacity to destroy the United States, and, for that reason alone, its strategic arsenal and the arms control regime constructed to constrain it are and will remain of central concern. Even in the domain of strategic deterrence, however, the larger context has changed. Russia has rejected the competitive Soviet model of world politics that once seemed to give its strategic doctrine a particularly aggressive cast, it has abandoned the extraordinarily secretive and centralized decisionmaking model that lent Soviet policy an aura of unpredictability, and it has lost the dynamic of research, production, and deployment that kept its weapon systems competitive. Though Russia can still use the nuclear option as a source of leverage, the intense and multidimensional rivalry that once made nuclear strategic competition between the superpowers so extraordinarily dangerous has become a thing of the past.

The decline of Russian conventional military capacity is a story unto itself. On one level, relative military decline has been an inevitable consequence of
the collapse of the USSR, which overnight reduced the population pool and base of conscription from 289 to 150 million, occasioned the loss of significant numbers of modern weapons to other successor states, and forced the surrender of critical facilities for training, military education, and defense production. In the decade between 1987 and 1997, the number of men at arms under the aegis of the Ministry of Defense dropped from 5.2 to 1.7 million, the number of ground divisions from 211 to around 60, the tank park from 53,000 to 27,000, and the defense budget by approximately 80 percent. These figures must be understood against the background of the Soviet Union's exaggerated militarization. They nonetheless represent a significant decline in power assets, and the impact of quantitative reductions has been magnified by a host of related factors; budget shortfalls, limited training and weapons procurement, supply shortages, insufficient maintenance, a decline in mobilization capacity, and severe morale problems, to name just a few. The impact of these problems upon military effectiveness was dramatically exposed in Chechnya. Any reversal of adverse trend depends upon the progress of the reform agenda associated with Minister of Defense Igor Rodionov, but, for the time being, that initiative has stalled in the face of bureaucratic resistance and political paralysis at the top.21

In respect to all other instruments of national power, the effect of the Soviet collapse has been a radical reduction in Russian capacity. The formula of "democratization, marketization, and cooperation," far from imposing a new sense of order and meaning derived from the material civilization of the West, has instead created what is widely perceived as a kind of anarchical void in which Russia's entire history as a political civilization threatens to be swallowed up, a "phase of tragic schism and anarchy."22 The Soviet economy once counted as the world's second or third largest. The economy of the Russian Federation, in free fall since 1992 and still declining, no longer ranks among the world's top ten. A deep crisis of Russian
society, manifested in historically unprecedented declines in public health statistics, life expectancy, levels of literacy, and the like, has left the population at large listless and demoralized. Not least, the sense of purpose once imperfectly imparted to Soviet policy by the logic of communism has not yet been replaced. Without a consensus over national values or purposeful vision to give its policies cohesion, Russia has been condemned to aimless and debilitating drift. Under these circumstances, the pretense of partnership could only be pursued on the basis of de facto subordination, a situation that Russia was bound eventually to come to resent and seek to reject.

The crisis of the partnership agenda has forced both sides to adapt their policies and attitudes to the exigencies of a post-bipolar world. Both have produced a number of formal pronouncements and academic explorations intended to fix the parameters of a new era in global security affairs, but the results to date have been unconvincing. Lacking the structure that Cold War bipolarity imposed on the theory and practice of international relations and given the volatility inherent to periods of systemic change, attempts to codify a long-term vision or grand strategy have remained preliminary or provisional at best.

The Clinton administration's 1994 *National Security Strategy of Enlargement and Engagement* begins with a sonorous invocation of systems in change:

> A new era is upon us. The Cold War is over. The dissolution of the Soviet Empire has radically transformed the security environment facing the United States and our allies. The primary security imperative of the past half-century--containing communist expansion while preventing nuclear war--is gone. We no longer face massive Soviet forces over an East-West divide nor Soviet missiles targeted on the United States and ready to fire. Yet there remains a complex array of
new and old security challenges America must meet as we approach a new century.\textsuperscript{23}

This document proclaims the United States to be the world's "preeminent power," and proceeds to outline a policy of global engagement designed to defend and extend that preeminence.\textsuperscript{24} The vague terms in which the substance of policy is cast, however, call attention to a basic dilemma. As the undisputed world leader, the United States is committed to the pursuit of intrusive regional policies. It is obligated to maintain a robust military establishment capable of meeting the challenge of force modernization, maintaining a sizeable overseas presence and force levels sufficient to win two "nearly simultaneous" major regional conflicts, and contributing to an enlarged agenda of international peace operations. It is pledged to the aggressive pursuit of economic advantage and a demanding program "to enlarge the community of democratic and free market nations."\textsuperscript{25} Altogether this constitutes an ambitious and multifaceted strategy that combines concern for the traditional elements of national power with a sensitivity to new kinds of concerns in the economic, ecological, and cultural domains. The core challenge is that of selective engagement on behalf of global leadership and benign preeminence, with targets for intervention determined according to the type and intensity of interests perceived to be at stake. By asserting engagement \textit{touts azimuts}, however, the Clinton strategy risks the failure to establish clear guidelines for managing and allocating inevitably limited power resources.

Despite the rhetoric of partnership, the place of the Russian Federation in this ambitious strategic vision is curiously circumscribed. Russia is in many ways the critical test of the core assumptions upon which enlargement and engagement rest (that democratic empowerment combined with transition to a free market and opening to the world economy is the best recipe for ensuring positive and peaceful interstate relations). Russia's progress in pursuing these goals is praised in
no uncertain terms; its economic transformation is described as "one of the great historical events of the century." But democratic empowerment is referenced more cautiously as "the work of generations," and in general the place of Russia in the larger spectrum of U.S. policy is reduced. Of the three specific interests which are used to define U.S. intent toward the new Russia (democratic transformation, transition to the market, and regulation of the nuclear threat), only the third is expressed in association with a tangible end state attached to a hard and unambiguous agenda for guided change.

The 1996 edition of the National Security Policy of the Russian Federation, prepared as a presidential report and intended to cover the period 1996-2000, is modeled closely on its American equivalent and has in many ways been crafted as an alternative to the vision of Pax Americana outlined in the Clinton administration document. The text begins with references to the relationship between the goals of democratic transition and national security that establish a degree of continuity with the immediate past. "The idea of national security," it is asserted, "is closely tied to the conception of responsible democratic development, is an integral part of such development, and simultaneously a condition for its realization." The illusions of New Thinking are dismissed as irrelevant, however, and the Westernizers' agenda for partnership with a triumphant West is sharply rejected. Instead, Russia is urged to cultivate its "unique geopolitical role in Eurasia," the only orientation which can "create the possibility for Russia to play a significant stabilizing role in the global balance of power." The document makes no attempt to deny Russia's precipitous decline. Its goal is to outline an agenda for redressment based upon a clear articulation of national interests and the patient cultivation of traditional sources of national strength.

The overarching concept that informs Russia's new foreign policy doctrine is multipolarity, a theme that
has been aggressively developed in international fora by Foreign Minister Primakov. The essential meaning of the end of the Cold War, it is asserted forcefully, is movement "from a confrontational bipolar to a multipolar world." The active vector propelling this evolution is not only the Soviet breakdown; the United States, too, is perceived to have suffered from the cumulative costs of Cold War rivalry. Washington is constrained to act multilaterally to be effective, and, without the discipline imposed by a common enemy, its alliance relations and international leverage will be harder to maintain. A Europe that is no longer strategically dependent will eventually seek to pull away from its transatlantic anchor, it is argued somewhat hopefully, and both Japan and China have already emerged as independent centers of political authority in East Asia.

Current Russian foreign policy thinking suggests that although the collapse of the bipolar model has meant a qualitative transformation in the texture of world politics, it has been accompanied by an "inertia" in political thought:

The stereotypes rooted for over 40 years of the Cold War in the consciousness of several generations of government leaders have as yet not disappeared together with the dismantling of strategic rockets and the destruction of thousands of tanks. The new realities of a multipolar world demand what is in fact presented as a slightly altered variant of new thinking: the rejection of the mentality of "winners and losers," the transcending of old lines of demarcation inherited from a confrontational past, a "democratization" of international economic relations, and a commitment to the cooperative regulation of international problems on a basis of equality.

Though there is clearly an important degree of wishful thinking here, the larger implications of the
concept are significant. Russian definitions of multipolarity imply a clear preference for cooperative great power management and collective security options as global security models. They demand a rejection of unipolar or hegemonic alternatives however they might be packaged or phrased. They refuse to accept integration with a Western community that is pledged to perpetuate U.S. leadership, or partnership models that relegate Russia to the status of junior partner at best. According to the multipolarity scenario, U.S. preeminence is neither a desired nor a sustainable alternative. One of the key challenges for a new Russian foreign policy must therefore be the search for leverage to block or frustrate U.S. pretensions.

In order to achieve this goal, the Russian Federation is urged first of all to cultivate its own garden. The basis of national strength is the unity of the Federation itself, and preserving national integrity is designated as the most vital of all national interests. With its 89 federal units (21 of which are defined as the homelands of their titular, non-Russian nationalities), vast extent (Russia is still, and by some margin, the largest country in the world), and considerable regional variation, Russia has the potential to be chronically plagued by the kind of centrifugal pressures that overwhelmed the USSR. Though the 1992 Federation Treaty and the 1993 Constitution attempt to define a new federal order, they are incomplete, and patterns of association continue to rest importantly upon a series of bilateral agreements and informal understandings. The Russian constitution, approved by referendum in the aftermath of the October 1993 violence, was supported by only 48 of Russia's federal units; in 24 units, a majority of voters opposed the text; and in the remaining 16 units (excluding Chechnya), participation was under the required 50 percent. It is moreover probable that even these meager results were falsified in order to ensure the 50 percent overall participation required to validate the outcome—a situation one commentator has described as "a veritable institutional time bomb."
The popular election of provincial governors has also had the effect of bolstering the self-confidence of local leaders and widening their space for autonomy. The unsuccessful attempt to suppress Chechen separatism by force has highlighted the issue, and the ceasefire currently in place in the rebellious province has left the issue of independence completely unresolved.

Russia has reason to be concerned about the stability of the federation, but also realistic prospects to achieve the minimum goal of territorial integrity. Great Russians remain dominant within the federation as a whole, with 80 percent of the total population and over 50 percent in all but 14 of the individual federal units. All of the units to some degree depend upon Moscow for infrastructure and economic support, and many confront external threats or internal instability from which only Moscow can shield them. "Complete separation from Moscow," write Susan L. Clark and David R. Graham with some reason, "is not feasible for most areas and likely only in the extreme case of a political or economic catastrophe."

Moscow's aspiration to preserve the unity of the Russian Federation has been strongly supported in the West. The second major foreign policy goal presented by the Russian National Security Policy is, however, considerably more contentious. For the leading Western powers, the disbanding of the USSR was the major strategic benefit derived from the outcome of the Cold War, and there has been something like a consensus in support of policies designed to resist pressures for reassociation and ensure that geopolitical pluralism remains the basis of the new Eurasian political order. Russia's current foreign policy thinking sharply refutes such aspirations and asserts the need to regather the former Soviet republics within a Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) subject to effective Russian control. Russian national security programs make the goal of reassociation explicit, evoking
the creation of a stable union of sovereign governments, integrated economically and politically, capable of aspiring to a respected place in the international community, and possibly to the status of an independent subject in the world economic and political order.  

Concern for Russia's role within the former Soviet space is, in part, a product of the aggravated nationalism born of the rigors of transition, but it is also the result of careful geopolitical reflection. The rhetoric of partnership has only partly disguised vested U.S. interests in preventing Russia from reestablishing the contours of the former Soviet Union and reemerging as a legitimate peer competitor. Vladimir Baranovskii speaks for a large number of his fellow citizens in noting the "deepening suspicion that, behind the encouraging and supportive rhetoric of the West, there is a strong pragmatic desire to downgrade Russia to the position of a second-rank state (or to keep it there)." For Aleksei Bogaturov, the real U.S. concern is with neither democratization nor modernization, but rather "the weakening of Russia's strategic and economic position in Eurasia." On the basis of evaluations of this nature, Russia has become highly sensitive to issues such as the status of the approximately 25 million Russians living within the borders of the former USSR but outside those of the Russian Federation (about 20 percent of the Russian population of Eurasia), to the real and potential instabilities that plague border zones, to the exposure of its wide and often undefended state border, to the stakes at issue in geostrategic rivalry with competing regional powers, and to its own complex imperial heritage.

The Russian state is a product of steady imperial expansion. Paul Goble is correct to note that, as a consequence, "the Russians have never been forced to define precisely who is a Russian and what the proper limits of Russian territory should be." This question
has yet to be definitively resolved. On March 17, 1991, nearly 80 percent of the Soviet population voted in a referendum to perpetuate a reformed and democratized union. By way of contrast, the act of dissociation promulgated at Belovezhskaya Pushka (near Brest) in December 1991 was drawn up by the three nationalistic leaders of Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus acting outside the public eye without consultation and with questionable legality. Today the call for reassociation is not only voiced by extremist demagogues like Vladimir Zhirinovskii—it is a widely shared aspiration, albeit usually expressed with the condition that the process should be peaceful and voluntary. Offended Russian nationalism is the driving force of such aspirations, and it has become a force to be reckoned with. "The Zhirinovskii phenomenon," writes one recent account, "is interesting not only in its own right, but also as an example of the tremendous potential energy of the 'Russian factor,' its huge mobilizing potential."

Substantial arguments can be adduced in support of the creation of something like a classic Russian sphere of influence in its so-called "Near Abroad." Many of the newly independent states are weak and in need of external sponsorship. Regional conflict along the Russian periphery has been chronic, and it is clear that the international community will not rush in to put out fires. Russia has assumed a heavy peacekeeping responsibility in the post-Soviet area almost by default, and it cannot be expected to stand aside while armed conflicts along its borders threaten to spin out of control. Economic interdependence and cultural interpenetration after generations of common existence within a single state are also strong.

Not all Russian incursions in the near abroad have been benign, and doctrinal formulations concerning "peacemaking" often seem to have more in common with classic interventionism than peacekeeping as it is defined in the West. By any definition there is a strong imperial element in Russian policy towards its
immediate neighbors, but there are also limits to the extent of influence that Moscow can realistically hope to achieve. Russia is too weak to use military force as a decisive instrument of reintegration and too poor to offer compelling economic concessions. A sharp decline in inter-republican trade has been characteristic of Eurasia's post-communist experience; during 1993-1994 Russia's trade with former Soviet republics dropped by over 50 percent, and its trade turnover with the European Union is now considerably higher than with members of the CIS." In attempting to influence its neighbors, Russia also confronts countervailing pressure. Elites in power in the newly independent states, in most cases authoritarian leaders intolerant of real political opposition, are committed to consolidating their power under the banner of sovereignty and national interest. China, Iran, and Turkey offer alternative poles of attraction for the emerging states of Central Asia, and the oil and natural gas reserves of the Caspian Sea have made it a magnet for international investment. The consolidation of Ukrainian independence has become a major U.S. strategic goal, and it has been fully reciprocated by the government of Leonid Kuchma. These examples may corroborate the Russian nationalist argument that geopolitical pluralism is, in fact, nothing more than a euphemism for a weak and dependent Russia. Countervailing pressures are in the event quite real, and Russia can hope to overcome them only with difficulty and in the long term.

The former Soviet space also contains one of the famous civilizational faultlines immortalized by Samuel Huntington's clash of civilizations thesis. Huntington lists an "Orthodox-Byzantine" culture among his eight or nine major civilizational groupings, and the line of demarcation between this area and the great arc of Islamic civilization cuts through the heart of Eurasia. There is a large Muslim presence inside the Russian Federation (nearly 20 million citizens), within major cities, and along a belt of approximately contiguous territories stretching from the Crimea and northern
Caucasus along the Volga and into the Russian heartland. Russia has made containing Islamic radicalism a high foreign policy priority and argued that its efforts to contain the Islamic factor make an important but unacknowledged contribution to the security of the West as a whole. But its efforts to reintegrate the post-Soviet space also risk being thwarted by the cultural divide between zones of Orthodox Christian and Islamic civilization.

Huntington's article was published in translation in the Russian journal Polis and accompanied by an extended discussion in which the thesis was addressed sympathetically and interpreted as a plea to cultivate Russia's own cultural specificity. For some, this means the assertion of a "Russian Idea" as defined at the turn of the century by thinkers such as Nikolai Berdiaev and Petr Struve, a multicultural ideal relevant to "all those who participate in Russian culture." In practice, however, the "Russian Idea" has always been associated with an imperial idea, and that is one of the most prominent ways in which it continues to be manifested today.

The term empire is rarely defined and chronically misused. If we make use of Michael Doyle's definition ("empires are relationships of political control imposed by some political societies over the effective sovereignty of other political societies"), we may speak without fear of contradiction of a Russian imperial tradition in Eurasia, and of a contemporary dynamic of neo-imperialism as well (the attempt to reestablish "relations of political control"). Such efforts need not take the extreme form of the reassertion of some variant of the Russian or Soviet empire as a centralized, unitary state. They are more likely to unfold as a long series of manipulations, negotiations, compromises, and linkages that will inevitably increase Russia's leverage in its relations with its formally sovereign but chronically dependent neighbors. More dramatic scenarios are also imaginable—one recent account notes that the most relevant
historical model for post-Soviet Russia is not that often cited of the gradual dismantling of the British Empire, but rather the early American national experience culminating with the U.S. Civil War, "the clearest available example of the 'gathering' and preservation of a federation by all means necessary, including military means."\textsuperscript{51} There is relatively little that the United States can do to redirect such a process if Russia is determined to pursue it. An agenda for imperial reassertion can only be pursued as a long-term aspiration, however, and even if fulfilled to the letter would not serve to recreate the context of Cold War bipolarity.

The third of Russia's new foreign policy priorities is focused upon regional engagement, and asserts the need to cultivate allies in the search for leverage against U.S. hegemonism.\textsuperscript{52} In practice, this means the resumption of regional policies resembling those of the Soviet era, dominated by the attempt to cultivate special relationships with influential local powers in order to balance America's global reach, assert Russia's identity as a great world power, and extend influence in areas where specific national interests are deemed to be at stake. Russia's geostrategic location gives it considerable weight in this regard. As an integral part of Europe historically, culturally, and geographically, Russia is too important an actor for the major European powers to ignore, no matter how attached they might be to the ideal of transatlantic partnership. At the same time, it is capable of cultivating special relationships with aspiring regional powers in Asia such as Iran, India, or China. Foreign Minister Primakov is committed to exploiting these possibilities to the extent possible, and to pursue an active global diplomacy as a means for expanding Russia's options and reinforcing multipolarity.\textsuperscript{53}

Russia's new security doctrine asserts the need to discard the constraints of the partnership agenda and distance policy from American tutelage. It does not
identify an open clash of major interests between the United States and Russia nor seek to regenerate a competitive model of foreign policy interaction in the image of the Soviet concepts of peaceful coexistence or a shifting correlation of forces. All of contemporary Russian foreign policy discourse is haunted by the realization that "an analysis of the resource base of Russian foreign policy indicates clearly that the economic possibilities for its realization are extremely limited." Russia cannot afford an open clash with the leading world power, and it is not in its interest to provoke one. What it can do, at least according to current orthodoxy, is to define its interests independently, be aware of the ways in which they clash with Western interests, and craft a realistic strategy for pursuing them within the confines of the state's severely limited means. The new Russian foreign policy thus demands distancing from the West, but simultaneously seeks to avoid complete alienation. Strategic partnership assumed a coincidence of interests that the asymmetries built into the U.S.-Russian relationship made highly unrealistic, but the alternative cannot be a return to the systemic rivalry of the Cold War period--the systemic foundation for such a rivalry is no longer in place.

**Russian-American Relations Recast.**

Foreign policy is usually an extension of domestic policy, and at present Russia is weak, ineffectively led, and in the midst of an open-ended crisis. It nonetheless retains all the objective attributes of a great world power. The Russian Federation inherited about 80 percent of the territory of the former USSR and remains the world's second ranking nuclear power and largest repository of strategic resources. Russia also assumed the Soviet Union's status as a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council, including the veto right. Its imposing geostrategic location and remaining military capacity give it considerable leverage as a regional power in both Europe and Asia, and it is a
major world civilizational center with a great power
tradition and legacy of achievement.

These assets cannot be brought to bear so long as
the Russian state remains paralyzed by a crisis of
transition. The depths of that crisis have yet to be
plumbed, and worst-case outcomes are still within the
realm of the possible. Pessimists note that Russian
elites are psychologically incapable of accepting
partnership with the West on the basis of subordination
but lack the means and the will to pursue unilateral
alternatives. The resultant paralysis is perceived to
be leading toward irreversible decline and
marginalization. Russia, according to this scenario, is
condemned to assume the status of an India or Brazil,
large but insignificant in the global calculus of
power, a subject rather than object of world history. 55

Such conclusions are in part a product of the
sheer despair occasioned by Russia's rapid and
precipitous secular decline. There are many reasons why
they remain unlikely--despite the depths to which it
has fallen, Russia retains the capacity to stabilize
its institutions and begin what will be a long and
painful process of reconstruction. Equally unlikely,
however, is the reemergence of a Russia capable of
playing the role of the former USSR as a dominant world
power. The Russian Federation has inherited a
subordinate status from the wreckage of the USSR, and
it is its inevitably reduced stature that will be the
key element in determining relations with the United
States. 56

The consequences of Russia's weakness were clearly
demonstrated in the case of Bosnia, where

Russia wanted and attempted to take on part
of the initiative for a peaceful regulation
of the crisis, but in the final analysis was
forced to step back, having been completely
preempted by the initiative of the United
States. 57
The best example of Russia's subordinate status at present, and the one with the most significant long-term implications, is the strange case of NATO enlargement. Association with NATO is clearly advantageous from the perspective of the new democracies of central and eastern Europe, who have just escaped from Soviet domination and who share a legitimate aspiration to integrate with the West. Enlargement is arguably advantageous for the leading western European powers, and first of all for Germany, which will as a consequence gain a security buffer to the east. Selective enlargement may also be represented as beneficial to American interests to the extent that it helps NATO adapt to the realities of a post-Cold War security environment and reinforces the Alliance's relevance. It is, however, difficult to imagine how enlargement could be made palatable to any leadership representing the interests of the Russian Federation. NATO is a potent military alliance originally crafted as an instrument to contain Soviet power. Its expansion into the security cordon that Stalin created after the Second World War symbolically reinforces a perception of historic defeat, and in traditional geostrategic terms will reduce Russian leverage in Europe as a whole. Russia will accept NATO enlargement and make the best of it, but only because it must—it does not possess the means to block the initiative or to oppose it effectively. The great danger is not Russia's immediate reactions, which are bound to be futile. It is the potential for enlargement to reinforce a sense of isolation and encourage a strategic perspective dominated by revisionism, the "risk of creating a consensus within Russia that not only this particular measure, but also the entire post-Cold War settlement is arbitrary, unfair, and anti-Russian."

As a subordinate power, Russia cannot afford to pursue unilateral policies in defiance of vital American interests. It also cannot expect the United States to react to Russian cautions and concerns with the same alacrity that was demonstrated in a context of
bipolarity. The asymmetrical character of the new Russian-American relationship assures that Russia will no longer carry the same weight in U.S. policy, as either partner or antagonist, that it did during the Cold War. At present, the Russian GDP is only 13 percent that of the United States, and commercial relations between the two states are insignificant. Bilateral relations are not grounded upon a solid socio-economic foundation, Russia is preoccupied with its domestic dilemmas, and the small Russian diaspora inside the United States is negligible politically. In the presidential elections conducted in both Russia and America during 1996, the issue of bilateral relations had remarkably little resonance with the electorate, and, in the Russian case, electoral debate made clear how little leeway is available to pursue alternatives. Despite a considerable amount of verbal jousting, the two major electoral blocs shared, and continue to share, a large consensus over major policy options, including support for a mixed economy with an important regulatory role for the state, multiparty democracy, reinforced federative association, encouragement for a process of reintegration among the former Soviet republics, and, not least, stable relations with the United States. In the United States, where there has been a willful refusal to think strategically about alternatives to the Yeltsin regime, the Russian president's reelection removed any political motivation to develop critical alternatives to the Russian policy of the Clinton team. Lacking such an alternative, U.S. Russian policy is likely to remain fixated on a handful of key issues and essentially reactive to developments within Russia itself.

Russia's current security policy attempts to distinguish between coinciding interests where cooperation is possible and mutually beneficial, and antagonistic interests where unbridgeable differences exist and where contained rivalry is the only realistic alternative to confrontation. Russia and America do share important coinciding interests, and have much to gain by pursuing them cooperatively. The first in order of priority is a continued commitment to a positive
arms control dialogue aimed at systematic reductions in the size of their respective arsenals and a reinforced nonproliferation regime. Both parties' interests would also be well-served by cooperation on behalf of enhanced regional security in Eurasia and by the inclusion of the Russian Federation in some kind of overarching pan-European security structure. If the Russian economy begins gradually to revive, expanded economic interaction will also become a common and mutually beneficial goal. A Russia that is firmly bound to the West by shared values and aspirations could be an important force for stability in Eurasia, and Russian sources argue strongly that, in its own best interests, the West should support Moscow's attempts to reduce the role of organized crime in the region, block narcotics trafficking out of Afghanistan and Central Asia, and contain the rise of an aggressive politicized Islam. The institutionalization of a Russian-American policy discourse in the form of the Gore-Chernomyrdin commission rests upon an acknowledgement of these coinciding interests and a commitment to pursue them jointly.

Unfortunately, it is possible to draw up a list of antagonistic interests that is no less imposing. By any objective measure, Russia stands to gain from the vigorous pursuit of an arms control agenda, but, in this critical issue area, objective measures are not always applied. General resentment of American tutelage and the perception that the nuclear arsenal provides Russia with its last remaining leverage as a great power has made Moscow a much less cooperative partner. With or without a Russia-NATO charter defining the parameters of a cooperative European security order, NATO enlargement will be viewed negatively and understood as "an attempt to push Russia out of Europe, to deprive Moscow of its legal right to participate in the formulation and realization of the all-European process." Confronted by the fait accompli of enlargement, Moscow can be counted upon to work diligently and consistently to neutralize its long-term consequences (in the same way that imperial Russia once
resisted the demilitarization of the Black Sea in the decades following the Crimean War). Perhaps most fundamentally (because it directly touches upon Moscow's perception of its vital interests), Russia and America have adopted diametrically opposed positions concerning Russia's role and the texture of political order within the post-Soviet space. These issues are sufficiently weighty to ensure that, despite Russia's relative weakness and the United States' relative indifference, an antagonistic element will remain a part of the Russian-American relationship for the foreseeable future.

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In the U.S. debate over relations with Russia, three alternative paradigms can be distinguished. The first is the strategic partnership agenda, which assumes that Russia has irreversibly chosen the path of association with the West, argues that transition is proceeding more or less as required, and projects the absence of vital issues dividing the new global associates. This scenario defines a highly desirable end state (the democratic peace) for which, however, the objective prerequisites are not in place. It has been tried and effectively found wanting. On the opposite extreme, one may identify an agenda for neo-containment, according to which Russia in any guise represents a potential threat to Western interests, and particularly the frustrated Russia that is emerging from a process of transition that must be presumed to have failed. The only realistic way to deal with an unrepentant Russian imperialism is to contain it by building sound regional alliances and ensuring that, when Russia exerts pressure, the means for calling up counterpressure are at hand. This scenario has affected American judgements concerning Russia but has yet to be applied. It defines a highly undesirable end state (a Russia isolated, alienated, and permanently at odds with the West) and, by basing policy upon worst case assumptions, threatens to conjure up the very evils it seeks to avoid.
The middle ground alternative, which broadly defines U.S. Russian policy as it has been shaped by the Clinton administration, may be characterized as a policy of limited engagement. Russia's transition, it is realistically acknowledged, is a complex and historically unprecedented process that will move through ups and downs toward unpredictable outcomes. Russian and American interests cannot be presumed consistently to coincide; allowance must be made for inevitable differences and all the instruments of power used purposefully to encourage positive movement when possible and discourage unacceptable behavior when necessary. Under no circumstances, however (perhaps short of a dramatic reversion to policies dominated by aggression and defiance), should the goal of closer association between a new Russia and the West be altogether abandoned.

What are the limits of U.S. engagement? One is certainly the integrity of an arms control regime that insures the United States, to the extent possible, against any and all nuclear strategic threats. Another is the integrity of Western institutions, including first and foremost the North Atlantic Alliance—security cooperation with the Russian Federation should not be purchased at the price of assigning second-class citizen status to new NATO members. The point of NATO enlargement in the frame of a policy of limited engagement is not containment but rather opportunity—the evolution of Western institutions beyond the Cold War should include an open door that leads towards ever more ambitious Russian engagement. But this will not happen if the institutions themselves are dismantled in an effort to make them appear nonantagonistic. Finally, some attention should be paid to core Western values and the Russian willingness to acknowledge and respect them. The Russian transition is sufficiently challenging to ensure that traumatic political shocks and major regression remain possible. If some variant of a "Weimar scenario" should actually come to pass, the limits of Western engagement would be modest
indeed.

Fortunately, worst-case scenarios are not the most likely. It is more probable that for some time to come U.S.-Russian relations will play out in the grey area between clearly coinciding and unambiguously antagonistic interests, where the force of diplomacy, rather than the diplomacy of force, will have much to do with deciding outcomes. Russia has no choice but to adapt its aspirations to the realities of its subordinate status. It will seek to cultivate multipolarity with the available means: that is, with subtle gestures and stratagems applied to the pursuit of limited goals. Distancing rhetoric, balancing alliances, consolidation of an autonomous sphere of influence--these are typical patterns of resistance by weak states confronted with the real and imagined pretenses of the powerful. The United States can live very comfortably with this kind of Russia to the extent that it, too, ceases to think within the outmoded categories of the Cold War, abandons the illusions of a special relationship whose day has passed, avoids the trap of exaggerated threat perceptions, and agrees to work with Russia on the basis the pragmatic pursuit of joint interests.

ENDNOTES


5. Roger E. Kanet and Edward A. Kolodziej, eds.,

6. Andrei Grachev, Dal'she bez menia...Ukhod prezidenta, Moscow, 1994, p. 254.

7. See Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Stein, We All Lost the Cold War, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993; and Boris Martynov, "Byli li 'pobediteli' v 'kholodnoi voine'," Svobodnaia mysl', No. 12, 1996, pp. 3-10.


21. See Igor' Rodionov, "Kakaia oborona nuzhna Rossii?," Nezavisimaia gazeta, Voennoe obozrenie, No. 22, November 26, 1996, pp. 1 and 4, for an outline of
the reform agenda; and for an evaluation, Michael Orr, Rodionov and Reform, Royal Military Academy Sandhurst: Conflict Studies Research Centre, Study No. 92, January 1997.


24. Ibid.

25. Ibid., pp. 18-19.

26. Ibid.


30. Ibid.


36. "The West has . . . developed a consensus on basic interests and goals in Russia, despite differences of accentuation," writes Angela Stent: "it should promote a democratic, market-oriented Russia that accepts its loss of outer and inner empires [the "outer" empire refers to the state-members of the former Warsaw Pact] and can offer both its population and the outside world stability of expectations, refraining from abrupt changes in policies." Angela Stent, "Russia's Economic Revolution and the West," Survival, No. 1, Spring 1995, p. 124.


38. Vladimir Baranovsky, "Russian Foreign Policy Priorities and Euroatlantic Multilateral Institutions," The International Spectator, No. 1, January-March 1995, p. 39. A more intemperate, but no less widely shared, sentiment is expressed by A. A. Zinoviev, who calls the
destruction of the Soviet Union an "historical crime" and the prelude to "the destruction of Russia and the Russian people as an historical nation." A. A. Zinov'ev, "Gibel' 'imperii zla', ocherk rossiiskoi tragedii," Sotsiolosheskie issledovaniia, No. 1, 1995, pp. 93, 100.


44. Stent, "Russia's Economic ReVolution and the West," p. 135.


56. "In general," asks Sergei Kortunov, "how can we speak of partnership between a victorious and defeated power?" S. Kortunov, "Rossiia-SShA: Put' k partnerstvu," Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhduarodnye otnoshenii, No. 7, 1996, pp. 70.


58. The Russian contingent to a commission representing the Russian Institute for the World Economy and International Relations and the US Atlantic Council notes in its preface to a joint statement on US-Russian relations that "the only foreign policy question which elicits general agreement within Russia is the question of the unacceptability of NATO enlargement." "Rossiisko-amerikanskie otnoshenii v pluralisticheskom mire," Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhduarodnye otnoshenii, No. 6, 1996, pp. 61.


Since the collapse of communism and commensurate disappearance of containment as the organizing principle of American foreign policy, U.S. foreign policymakers have lacked a unifying framework for interpreting the international system or a grand strategy for guiding U.S. actions in this system. Lacking a grand strategy, American motivations and objectives in international affairs often seem ambiguous, confused, if not slyly sinister, to outside observers.

Outside U.S. policy circles, no new "X" has penned a comprehensive yet parsimonious analysis of the new nature of power either within Russia or the international system that is more generally accepted by all or at least most concerned with international affairs. Consequently, the absence of a shared conception about the nature of the international system and Russia's place in it has spawned several competing visions of American foreign policy regarding Russia. The list of new frameworks is long and includes such diverse strategies as isolationism, neo-containment, limited engagement, enlargement, and world policeman.

Strikingly, proponents of these competing visions do not fall neatly within party lines. Buchanan Republicans have teamed up with AFL-CIO leaders on several isolationist issues, neo-conservatives and "new democrats" have allied to promote democracies abroad, while realpolitik Republicans of the Nixon and Bush ilk clash with the more ideological Reaganites over responses to human rights violations in China and Russia. Even within the current administration, one can identify different "game plans" and alternative motivations behind a shared policy. NATO expansion is illustrative. Some see NATO expansion as a policy of containment; others see it as a policy of integration.
Ambiguity is not always bad, and grand strategy is not always good. In fact, lots of ill-conceived and tragic foreign policies in American history have been cloaked and legitimized in the name of grand strategy. Moreover, the development of foreign policy strategies on the scale of containment takes time to emerge, as did containment itself. Finally, the world today does not resemble George Bush's "New World Order" or Frank Fukuyama's "end of history," but neither is it one threatened by antisystemic ideologies such as fascism or communism. In this transitional setting, the Bush and Clinton administrations may have focused quite rightly on the specific foreign policy issues of their time, and wisely avoided constructing sweeping agendas, making lofty new commitments, or pontificating about new foreign policy philosophies.

However, the first administrations since the collapse of communism also may have been lucky. Few Americans died in Bosnia, Boris Yeltsin won reelection, and China did not invade Taiwan. President Clinton's next 4 years may not be so trouble free. Over time, ambiguity regarding grand strategy and incongruence between means and ends will prove increasingly costly to American national interests. Perhaps most importantly, the lack of clarity and transparency regarding intentions will fuel uncertainty, suspicion, and doubt both in Moscow, Russia and Moscow, Idaho. To foster international trust and maintain support for American foreign policy at home require a clearer assessment of the nature of the international system and America's role in it.

This paper seeks to provide such a assessment, followed by an application of this assessment with respect to U.S.-Russian relations. The paper begins with an interpretation of the nature of the international system since the collapse of the Soviet Union, and then traces the evolution of new political and economic institutions within Russia. Based on these assumptions about the international system and Russia's
reform efforts, an outline of a set of principles regarding American policy towards Russia follows. The next section spells out how these principles might reshape the specific policies, or at least the motivations behind the policies, that currently dominate the U.S.-Russia agenda. A conclusion ends the paper.

The Nature of the International System.

For four decades after World War II, the international system was dominated by two superpowers anchoring two antagonistic political and socio-economic subsystems. Conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union and their respective transnational socio-economic systems--capitalism versus communism--defined the central drama within the international system for this period. Several features of this system distinguished this period in international relations from previous ones. First, this system was bipolar, not multipolar. The logic of bipolarity meant that every change in the balance of power in the world, however incremental, was seen as a gain for one side and a loss for the other.

Second, the two great powers in this system were organized internally in radically different ways. The United States had a democratic polity and a market economy, while the Soviet Union had an totalitarian polity and a command economy. Because both countries believed that their respective systems were superior, they actively promoted the replication of these political and socio-economic systems in other countries, while also resisting the expansion of the other's system in other countries. This ideological divide drove the competition between these two states. In other words, the Soviet Union and the United States were rivals not because they were the two greatest powers in the international system, but because they were two powers with antithetical visions about how domestic polities and economies should be organized.
Third, a new component in the international system after World War II was the balance of terror that accompanied the introduction of intercontinental missiles and nuclear weapons into the arsenals of the United States and the Soviet Union. This new condition had eliminated international war as a foreign policy option for either side vis-a-vis the other. This nuclear stalemate in turn pushed competition between the United States and the Soviet Union into the periphery.

In 1991, one pole within this bipolar, ideologically divided system collapsed. For the first time in the history of the modern world, the balance of power within the international system changed without a major war. The impetus for this systemic reconfiguration, as described in the next section, resulted from revolution within the Soviet Union and only tangentially from power shifts between states.

In the aftermath of the Soviet collapse, competing interpretations of the future of the international system emerged. The realist approach to the post-Cold War posited that the collapse of one great power would produce a multipolar balance of power in the international system again. According to this interpretation of international politics, the new multiple powers in the system would be compelled to balance against each other by forming shifting alliances akin to the international system in the 19th century. This new balance of power between the great powers also would influence alliance relationships with weaker countries, which would be compelled to balance against or bandwagon with these greater powers to ensure security. The predictions about order and stability that followed from this realist interpretation were dire, as they posited that multipolar systems were inherently more unstable than bipolar systems. The most dire of these realist analysts predicted war between the great powers.
To date, realism has offered only a partial road map for navigating the post-Cold War order. Balance-of-power politics has remained a central component of international relations in the "periphery," but has played only a minor role in shaping relations between states in the "core." Germany, Japan, and the United States have not begun to balance against each other as predicted by realists. There have been no arms races, spiralling threats, or even trade wars between these core powers. At the same time, military conflict in the periphery has not subsided with the end of the Cold War, but continued. Wars in the former Yugoslavia, central Africa, and the continued standoff in the Middle East provide rich (and tragic) examples where realist balancing still plays a central role in shaping international relations.

Realism has provided poor predictions about the post-Cold War international system because realists have focused and continue to focus only on the first feature of the international system described above—the balance of power between states. More important to understanding the Cold War order and its collapse is the second characteristic noted above—the degree of ideological homogeneity regarding the organization of domestic polities and economies. Before the collapse of the Soviet Union, there were two antithetically opposite ideologies. After 1991, there is only one that holds any legitimacy within the great powers of the international system—markets and democracies. Of course, within the core states, there are different kinds of democracies and different kinds of market systems, but these differences pale in comparison to the range of political and economic systems available to states just 20 years ago. When states are organized in similar ways (that is, with the same set of political and economic institutions), cooperation is more likely while the cost of conflict is greater. Consequently, relations between states in the core are driven by a different dynamic than balance-of-power politics. In the language of Hedley Bull, relations between states in the core exhibit features of an
"international society" in which shared internal features of members help to generate shared norms of behavior between members."

The homogeneity of domestic institutions, both economic and political, and the institutionalization of shared norms governing interactions between states found in the core stands in sharp contrast to many of the highly heterogenous and conflictual neighborhoods outside of the core. In the Middle East, authoritarian regimes in Muslim states still balance against the democratic and Jewish state of Israel. The shared set of norms and institutions found in the core are not present in this region. Likewise, religion and ethnic cleavages divide peoples in the former states of Yugoslavia. In Central Africa, the meltdown of authoritarian regimes in Somalia, Burundi, Ruanda, and Zaire have created the genuine environments of anarchy as predicted by realist theories. In Asia, the peace has been maintained not through homogenization, but by classic balance-of-power balancing.

So where is Russia? Is Russia in the core or periphery? Obviously, the collapse of communism in the Soviet Union created this new international system just described, but the kind of political and economic system that emerges in Russia to fill the void left by the Soviet implosion is still uncertain. Russia could return to the international arena as a "new" member of the international society found in the core, or Russia could emerge (remain) a menacing outsider to this community. To understand the factors that influence which course Russia takes requires a careful assessment of the nature of the Russian revolution.

The Russian Revolution.

Though it has been 6 years since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Western scholars and analysts of this part of the world still have not agreed upon a common definition, description, metaphor, or framework (let
alone an explanation) of what we witnessed when the USSR dissolved. For many, this event represented the collapse of the last great colonial empire. For these scholars, the Soviet collapse should be compared to other instances of empire collapse such as the Ottoman empire, the Hapsburg empire, or the English empire. For others, these changes have been framed as a transition to democracy, making the Soviet collapse one of the last places where the "third wave" of democracy splashed. For these scholars, the comparative set is southern Europe and South America. Still others have labelled this tumultuous decade of Soviet and Russian change an instance of "economic reform." For these analysts, the comparative set is other developing countries that have undergone macroeconomic stabilization and structural adjustment in the 1980s.

Without denying that all of these comparisons and metaphors have some heuristic value, the analogue adopted in this essay is Russia as revolution. Revolutions are rare and distinct moments in history characterized by "a sweeping, fundamental change in political organization, social structure, economic property control, and the predominant myth of social order, thus indicating a major break in the continuity of development." This definition emphasizes the simultaneity of radical change in both the polity and socio-economic structure, distinguishing revolutions from situations in which the polity and/or government changes without altering the organizing principles of the socio-economic structure, or historical developments when the socio-economic structure changes without altering the basic organization of the polity.

The Soviet/Russian world has undergone monumental political, economic and social change in the past several years, rivalled only by the French Revolution or the Bolshevik Revolution in scope or consequence. The breakdown of the state, the emergence of two groups claiming sovereign authority over the same territory, and the subsequent attempt by the revolutionary victors to destroy the political and economic institutions of
the ancien regime and replace them with new forms of political and economic organization constitute the classic attributes of a revolution. The old Soviet polity, consisting of a state subordinated to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, has been destroyed. In the vacuum, new political institutions are emerging including elected parliaments and executives, a separation of power between the legislature and the executive, and a political party system. Though the final endpoint of this political transformation is still uncertain, thus far the Soviet dictatorship has been replaced by an emerging (albeit weak, unstable, and unconsolidated) Russian democracy. Likewise, the old Soviet command economy in which virtually all production and distribution was controlled by the party-state also has collapsed. It is being replaced by a system based on private property, free prices, and market forces. In short, Soviet communism is being replaced by a Russian market economy. Of course, what kind of capitalism and what kind of democracy will emerge in Russia remain to be seen.

Institutional Legacies. Several dynamics of this revolution have important implications for whether Russia becomes part of the core or periphery of the international states system described above. First, unlike most revolutions, this revolution has been relatively peaceful. If typically revolutionaries use violence to imprison or extinguish the opponents within the ancien regime, Russia's revolutionaries have sought (or, at least portended to seek) revolutionary transformation of the Soviet system through peaceful, cooptive means. This peaceful method of change has magnified the influence of the old on the new in the transformation process. Consequently, institutions created during the Soviet era continue to influence politics and economics in the post-Soviet era, be they formal institutions such as the Communist Party or the welfare system, or informal practices such as the organization of property rights or the absence of a rule of law. By definition, these old institutions
influence, if not impede, the emergence of new practices, new cultural norms, and new "rules of the game." As Kenneth Jowitt has remarked,

... any substantial analysis of democracy's and market capitalism's chances in Eastern Europe must interpret the maelstrom itself, and that means coming to analytical grips with the cultural, political, and economic "inheritance" of forty years of Leninist rule. For Western analysts to treat the Leninist legacy the way Leninists after 1948 treated their own East European inheritance—namely as a collection of historically outmoded "survivals" bound to lose their cultural, social, and psychological significance—would be an intellectual mistake of the first order.  

Ideological Ambiguity. Second, like most revolutions, the "ideology of opposition" that unified Russia's revolutionary movement was not necessarily a set of ideas deeply internalized either by Russia's revolutionary leaders or the population more generally. All revolutionary movements need a clearly defined enemy and an alternative "ideology of opposition" to rally the troops and win domestic support. Without a coherent and viable opposition framework, it is difficult to construct what Przeworski has called an "organization of counterhegemony: collective projects for an alternative future." In the Soviet/Russian context, concepts such as "democracy," "the market economy," and Russian "sovereignty" defined the basic contours of "ideology of opposition" for Russia's revolutionaries. Yet, to what extent Russia's revolutionaries either believed in, understood, or were committed to these concepts was not obvious when they suddenly came to power after the aborted coup attempt in August 1991. In his words and actions, Boris Yeltsin, the leader of Russia's revolutionary movement, demonstrated real ambiguity regarding this revolutionary agenda.
Regarding the economy, Yeltsin selected a team of young reformers lead by Yegor Gaidar to implement radical market reform. Only 3 months after they initiated their plan, however, Yeltsin tacitly withdrew his support by appointing three leaders from the Soviet ancien regime into his government. By the end of the year, one of them, Viktor Chernomyrdin, was prime minister, and Gaidar was unemployed.

Regarding political reform, Yeltsin was even more indecisive after assuming power in the fall of 1991. He postponed elections for regional heads of state, he refrained from pushing for the adoption of a new constitution, he ignored calls for new elections to a national parliament, and he refrained from building a political party. Building a democratic polity obviously was not high on Yeltsin's agenda at the time.

Even on the question Russian sovereignty, Yeltsin's position was not firm. After all, only days before the August 1991 coup attempt, Yeltsin and his entourage were negotiating with Gorbachev the "9 + 1" agreement, a document that tried to carve out a middle ground between full sovereignty for nine of the republics and full subordination. When the coup attempt forced Yeltsin to choose between fighting for sovereignty or accepting a unified Soviet state, he opted for the former and won. And yet, the signing of the Belovezhkaya Accords in December 1991 between Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus was a secret and somber event that sought another new middle ground between complete sovereignty and confederation by attempting to create a Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). It did not work. With time, most Russian elites have attempted to distance themselves from the decision to dissolve the USSR. Retrospectively, Yeltsin has said that he had no choice and would have preferred to preserve the Soviet Union. Subsequent attempts to reincorporate Belarus suggest that this issue has not been resolved.
Outside of Yeltsin's political circles and in society more generally, the commitment to this revolutionary project was (and may continue to be) even more ambiguous. Leaders and organizations that benefitted from the ancien regime, including first and foremost the Russian Communist Party and its supporters, rejected all aspects of this revolutionary agenda. Party members were suspicious of markets and rejected private property altogether, they distrusted "bourgeois" concepts of democracy, and they refused to accept the dissolution of the USSR. Likewise, nationalists rejected the agenda of Russia's revolutionaries, claiming that they were importing Western ideas that were antithetical to the "Russian way." Opinion polls conducted 5 years later still reveal a profound divide within society regarding many aspects of the revolutionary ideology outlined above. For instance, when asked in November 1996 about the most optimal economic system, only 35 percent cited the market, while 42 percent believed that a planned economy was best. In 1996, over two-thirds of all Russians still believed that the breakup of the Soviet Union was a tragic event. As a demonstration of this divide, an amazing 30 million people voted for Gennady Zyuganov in last year's presidential election, the candidate most clearly representing a rejection of this post-communist revolutionary agenda.

The combination of lingering institutions from the Soviet era and ambiguity regarding commitment to a new set of ideas regarding the organization of Russia's economy and polity suggests that the endpoint of Russia's revolution is still uncertain. In other cases, revolutionaries often have attempted to fill the power vacuum of state collapse by following idealistic blueprints and morally righteous principles, but then ended up violating these ideas and principles to end anarchy and/or avoid political defeat. All too often, periods of revolutionary euphoria end in the assumption of power by radicals, dictators, and generals. Will contemporary Russia follow a similar trajectory?
In comparing Russia's current revolution to other "great" revolutions of the modern era such as France after 1789, Russia after 1917, or even Weimar Germany after 1918, one fundamental difference stands out. If all these other revolutionary situations were created by revolutionaries armed with an ideology that fundamentally challenged the order of the international system, the ideology and aims of Russia's current revolutionaries do not challenge the status quo within the international system. On the contrary, the "ideology of opposition" advocated (to varying degrees) by Boris Yeltsin and his entourage is the very same set of beliefs and institutions that structure the economies and politics of the "core" states. Rather than seeking to rebuff the status quo powers, Yeltsin seeks to join them. This unique feature of Russia's revolution offers the West, and the United States in particular, an opportunity to influence the course of Russia's revolution, at least in the margins. To what extent can or should the United States play this role?

**American "Grand Strategy".**

As alluded to earlier, the United States lost its organizing principle for conducting foreign policy after communism collapsed. In the aftermath, several competing visions have dominated discussion about America's role in the new post-Cold War order, isolationism, neo-containment, and engagement/enlargement. Each of these offer rational strategies with tangible benefits. However, if (and only if) the framework for understanding both the nature of the international system and the nature of domestic politics in Russia outlined above is correct, then the strategy of engagement offers the best approach for pursuing American national interests. As long as the core set of countries in the international system have similar internal political and economic institutions, and as long as Russia seeks to join this core by developing and consolidating this same set of institutions, American foreign policy interests are
best served by facilitating both the consolidation of these domestic institutions within Russia and the incorporation of Russia into the "core" of the international system.  

A "grand strategy" of promoting democratic and market institutions abroad must be guided on several basic principles. First, the United States must lead by example. A growing market economy and a robust democracy in the United States provide the best arguments for adopting capitalism and democracy in other countries. Foreign policies which weaken American market and democratic institutions are incompatible with a strategy of engagement. 

Second, engagement or enlargement requires a sustained and unwavering commitment to the principles of free markets and democracy. When American foreign policymakers are willing to sacrifice these goals for the sake of "balance-of-power" objectives, they undermine their own legitimacy and reputation. When American leaders promote market institutions at the expense of democratic institutions, they also undermine this grand strategy. Like doctrines from other eras in American foreign policy, a clear and coherent articulation of American interests helps others to understand U.S. aims while at the same time encourages commitment to these aims from American leaders.

Third, engagement is not always a non-zero sum game. Sometimes, U.S. foreign policy leaders must be prepared to accept short-term losses, (and these are usually economic losses) to win long-term gains regarding enlargement of the "core." A corollary to this principle is that engagement requires the use of both carrots and sticks. Progress regarding the development of market and democratic institutions is not cost free.

Fourth, American leaders must not only expend their energies trying to get "bad guys" to do good deeds, but they also must assist "good guys" to do good things even if such engagement might complicate
relations with sovereign heads of states. American detente with Soviet communist dictators in the 1970s and U.S. "constructive engagement" with South African racist dictators in the 1980s were premised on a belief that through engagement we could alter the behavior of these authoritarian leaders. In both of these countries, however, regime change only occurred when democratic challengers from below organized. An effective engagement strategy, therefore, entails a two-pronged strategy of encouraging old authoritarian leaders to modify their behavior while at the same time assisting new democratic leaders to come to power.

Taken together, these principles offer the United States a coherent strategy for dealing with the international system and the Russian revolution, in particular. The next section demonstrates how this set of principles regarding American grand strategy translates into concrete policies regarding U.S.-Russian relations.

American Policy toward Russia.

Because analysts and policymakers hold different interpretations of the nature of the international system; competing explanations about change, reform, or revolution in Russia; and alternative conceptions, whether implicit or explicit, of American grand strategy in international affairs, American policy towards Russia over the last several years has seemed erratic and ill-defined. Some have even argued that no policy exists at all. Single events in Russia have seemed to alter American strategy, indicating a lack of long-term vision or resolve. For instance, the American refrain of "more therapy, less shock," articulated in the wake of Vladimir Zhirinovsky's surprising electoral victory in 1993, helped to undercut domestically the political position of reformers within the Russian government. Similarly, the lack of a clear response to the Russian invasion of Chechnya served to undermine American credibility regarding human rights issues.
On other kinds of issues, commentators, pundits, and policymakers have advocated the same policy but for entirely different reasons. NATO expansion, for instance, is promoted by both those advocating neo-containment and enlargement. At the same time, other advocates of an engagement strategy have opposed NATO expansion. The debate over aid to other new states from the former Soviet Union also demonstrates how people with different strategic visions for American foreign policy can adopt the same position on a given policy. For instance, proponents of neo-containment have advocated greater American assistance to Ukraine and Uzbekistan as a way to balance Russia, while proponents of enlargement have encouraged the same aid programs as a method of bringing these new states into the "international society" of states. Sometimes, these odd alliances serve American interests; other times, especially when these temporary alliances break down, they impede the effective implementation of a coherent strategy.

To demonstrate what would follow from more comprehensive and clearly articulated concepts for U.S. engagement in the promotion of market and democratic institutions in Russia, the remainder of the paper discusses several specific policies. But first a note about the role of international institutions.

If guided by the grand strategy outlined in the previous section, American foreign policymakers must employ international institutions of every stripe to foster market institutions and democratic practices. International institutions that serve to isolate Russia should not be maintained, let alone strengthened.

The West's major international financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development already have been actively engaged in promoting market reforms in Russia. This kind of engagement did not come quickly enough,
and Russian reform suffered as a result. Now, however, the continued engagement of these institutions should be supported. Likewise, U.S. foreign policy leaders should promote Russian membership in other international financial groups such as the Paris Club, the World Trade Organization, and the G-7, or the "group of eight." 

U.S. policymakers must also expand international security institutions in a way that engages rather than isolates Russia. NATO is no exception. NATO expansion does not serve American long-term strategic interests. At this stage, however, a decision to renege on American commitments to expand NATO to East Central Europe also would be costly in terms of American reputation. Given this situation, Russian engagement with NATO through the NATO-Russia Charter and the Partnership for Peace program should be promoted at all costs. In parallel, greater Russian participation in other security institutions such as the OSCE must also be promoted. Beyond financial and security institutions, Russia must also be encouraged to join others kinds of international institutions, treaties, and conventions. Russian commitment to these international regimes will empower domestic advocates of these causes and at the same time expose Russia to international norms and standards.

U.S.-Russian Bilateral Relations.

The strategy outlined above suggests that the promotion of market and democratic institutions must take priority over other issues in the U.S.-Russia bilateral agenda. Ultimately, American foreign policymakers will have an easier time in reaching agreement with their Russian counterparts on issues of arms control, regional conflicts, nuclear safety, or international terrorism if Russia has a democratic polity and a market economy. Market institutions help to enforce rationality in foreign policy behavior by creating domestic groups with tangible interests in
economic integration. Democratic institutions compel national leaders to justify their policy actions to a voting public. Public opinion polls demonstrate conclusively that the Russian population as a whole is much less interested in aggressive foreign policy behavior than Russian elites. The greater the voice of the public in foreign policy, therefore, the less threatening Russia will be.

However, recognizing that Russian market and democratic institutions serve American interests is much easier than developing policies that actually promote the consolidation of these institutions. At the bilateral level, the United States has very little leverage to promote or sustain these domestic Russian institutions. At the same time, the recent history of U.S.-Russian relations offers some general lessons about effective versus ineffective policy.

 Limiting Expectations. American leaders severely undercut their own credibility to promote domestic change in Russia by raising expectations about the West's ability to foster these changes. Once they defeated communism, Russians expected to enjoy overnight Western standards of living. Instead, most Russian have been frustrated with the minimal fruits of nascent capitalism and democracy. For most Russians, life was better and easier under Brezhnev. These disappointed expectations have been exacerbated by Western pledges of assistance. Great fanfare surrounded both the 47 nation conference on aid to the former Soviet republics hosted by the United States in January 1992, and the April pledge of $24 billion in assistance by the Bush administration. Only a fraction of these funds, however, were delivered, while few experienced any direct effect from the assistance that did arrive. Perhaps most tragically, the failure of the United States, and the West more generally, to deliver on these promises undermined the credibility of Russian reformers and raised suspicion about America's true intentions within Russia.
Given this earlier record, expectations about American assistance are low. The United States has a vested interest in maintaining these low expectations and then exceeding them by providing more effective assistance.

The Importance of Institutional Design. American resources devoted to assisting Russia's revolution always have been limited. Because Americans see no imminent danger such as communism or fascism threatening U.S. security interests directly, they are unwilling to transfer large resources abroad for ill-defined ends. Given these limited resources, the focus of U.S. assistance programs must be (and should have been) the creation and consolidation of liberal institutions in both political and economic realms.

For instance, regarding economic reform, U.S. assistance programs should facilitate the development of important market institutions such as laws governing property rights, disclosure, bankruptcy, pension funds, taxes, and the securities markets. Russia has made the transition to a market economy, but it is a market still closely tied to the state and dominated by a handful of large financial industrial groups (FIGs). In 2 short years from 1994 to 1996, these FIGs have captured a significant proportion of Russia's productive assets, accounting officially for 10 percent of Russia's GDP. Unofficially, experts have estimated that the eight largest FIGs control between 25-30 percent of Russia's GNP. Only through the development of a more competitive and open economic environment can Russia develop a liberal market economy.

On the political front, expertise targeted to promote the development of a party system, federalism, and civil society should be expanded. Market economies need market-friendly states to grow. Unfortunately, Russian reformers (as well as some of their Western advisors) believed that economic and political reform had to be sequenced, with economic reform coming first. U.S. assistance programs also adopted this
logic, meaning that the lion's share of American aid to Russia was channeled into economic reform while only a fraction went to promoting democratic institutions. Empirically, however, the record of reform in the post-communist world has demonstrated that the fastest democratizers are also the best performers regarding economic reform.

These attempts at sequencing in Russia has meant that the development of democratic institutions has lagged significantly behind the development of market institutions. Pluralist institutions of interest intermediation are weak, mass-based interest groups are marginal, and institutions that could help to redress this imbalance—such as a strong parliament, an effective party system, or an independent judiciary—do not exist. Elections may have become the only game in town—an important achievement considering the long authoritarian shadow of Russian history. In consolidated democracies, however, elections are only one of many channels of interest mediation between state and society. In other words, Russia has become an "electoral democracy" but not a "liberal democracy." U.S. assistance efforts should be focused on transforming this electoral democracy into a liberal democracy. In both economics and politics, if the "rules of the game" are right, then the right kinds of organizations and actors will follow.

The Harmful Effects of Corporate Welfare. In focusing specifically on institutional reform, other kinds of assistance should be avoided. Above all else, U.S. government assistance should not go directly to firms, be they American or Russian, unless this aid is tied specifically to a market return. In the early years of American aid to Russia, the U.S. Government wasted millions of dollars in the form of direct grants to U.S. firms tasked with providing technical assistance on restructuring to Russian enterprises. Because the market incentives were not in place to reward restructuring, little of this assistance translated into actual restructuring. Western companies
reaped huge profits from AID contracts but did little to foster the development of market institutions in Russia.

Today, a new type of corporate welfare has grown to occupy an increasingly large share of the U.S. assistance budget to Russia--subsidies, investment insurance, and direct loans to U.S. companies seeking to trade or invest in Russia. Under programs administered by the U.S. Trade and Development Agency (TDA), the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), and the Export-Import Bank, American companies have received giant subsidies from the U.S. taxpayers to do business in Russia. Not only do these programs support dubious projects such as expensive feasibility studies, but they also crowd out private sector investment and promote "big business" at the expense of "small business" development. Given Russia's highly centralized economy and the low level of market entry and small business emergence, these programs serve to reify the wrong kinds of economic actors. To the extent that money is allocated to foster individual economic entities, it should be channelled through commercial banks, enterprise funds, and non-profit organizations that aim to promote start-ups and small businesses.

*Individuals Matter.* For the last decade, American analysts and policymakers have debated the relative merits of backing individual Soviet and then Russian politicians. Many (including this author) argued that the Bush administration identified its policy too closely with Mikhail Gorbachev in the waning months of the Soviet Union. A similar criticism has been lodged against the Clinton administration's attachment to Boris Yeltsin. More recently, critics have questioned Vice President Al Gore's close personal relationship with Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin.

In bilateral relations, American government leaders must deal directly with their counterparts in the Russian government, no matter who they are or what their beliefs may be. Secretary Albright must develop a
relationship with Foreign Minister Primakov even though she may prefer to engage with Russian foreign policy experts that more closely share her vision of U.S.-Russian relations. Critics who chastise American government leaders for developing relationships with their equivalents in the Russian government often forget this fundamental principle of diplomacy.

At the same time, however, American officials must choose to engage more directly and closely those individuals committed to the long-term project of developing market and democratic institutions. After all, these individuals will be the actors most effective in promoting institutional change from within Russia. The strategy of engaging individuals with dubious reform credentials in order to convince them of the benefits of reform has been less successful. In particular, direct assistance programs to Russian government bureaucracies more often than not have produced corruption, not reform. A corollary to this policy is to engage and empower societal actors rather than state bureaucrats. State institutions will reform only when there are strong societal groups in place that can pressure them to do so.

Several examples illustrate the importance of developing relationships with individual reformers. Without question, the most important personal relationship for American foreign policy has been between President Clinton and President Yeltsin. Yeltsin has made a series of bad and sometimes disastrous decisions that have impeded economic and political reform in Russia. In particular, his decision to invade Chechnya made it difficult to justify continued engagement with him as an active partner in Russian reform. Over time, however, Clinton's personal relationship with the Russian reformer has helped to produce very tangible benefits, including Yeltsin's adherence to the electoral process during the 1996 presidential elections and, more recently, acquiescence to NATO expansion. A different Russian leader with more dubious reformist credentials and a more strained personal relationship with the American president may
have acted very differently regarding both of these issues.

American commitment to individual Russian economic reformers also has produced high returns. Long-term cooperative relationships with such people as Anatolii Chubais, Boris Nemtsov, Yegor Gaidar, and Dmitrii Vasiliev have proven to be instrumental in fostering the development of market institutions even when these individuals have moved in and out of government. The political comebacks of Chubais and Gaidar should be a reminder to U.S. officials not to abandon reformers just because they are out of office. Prime Minister Chernomyrdin's poor record on deepening economic reform underscores the negative consequences of engaging too closely with individuals not committed to radical reform. 57

A similar philosophy must guide U.S. engagement with Russia's democratic reformers. Quickly after the euphoric days of communist collapse in 1991, U.S. Government officials and non-governmental organizations devoted less effort to assisting those seeking to foster democratic institutions. Instead, they devoted more time to whomever was in power. By the winter of 1996, many American analysts, politicians, and NGO leaders were advocating engagement with the communists and their allies, as communist leader Gennady Zyuganov appeared poised for electoral victory in Russia's presidential election. Today, General Aleksandr Lebed is the focus of attention for those concerned more with power than principle. 58 Without denying the benefits of deepening relations with all important political forces in Russia, American engagement policies should be directed first and foremost at those with proven democratic credentials. To survive, Russian democracy needs Russian democrats.

More generally, programs that expand contacts between Russians and Americans must be increased. As stated above, America's most effective tool in promoting markets and democracy is the example of the
United States itself. The more people exposed to this model, the better. This includes educational exchanges, military-to-military programs, sister city programs, business-to-business meetings, as well as government contacts. Likewise, mass civic education projects within Russia also should be expanded. While hundreds of business schools have sprouted throughout Russia, there are virtually no public policy schools and only a handful of organizations dedicated to the dissemination of materials on democracy.

Consistency. To maintain credibility before Russian elites and the Russian population more generally, U.S. policymakers must be consistent in their statements and actions regarding their commitment to fostering market and democratic institutions in Russia. Too often in the past, U.S. Government leaders have failed to criticize Russian actions and policies that inhibit the development of liberal market and democratic institutions. These silences, in turn, undermine our allies within Russia. For instance, by failing to speak out forcefully against Russia's invasion of Chechnya, American officials inadvertently undermined the credibility of Russian human rights activists who opposed the war. By failing to criticize Gazprom's resistance to paying taxes, U.S. officials tacitly have helped to sustain a dangerous and unfair policy. By sanctioning IMF transfers to Russia at the same time that major companies in Russia refuse to pay taxes, the U.S. taxpayer is effectively financing the Russian government's budget on behalf of multi-billion dollar Russian companies.

Despite these lapses, the United States still has a surprisingly high degree of moral authority within Russia. Without sounding preachy or imperialist, U.S. Government officials must seek to maintain a consistent commitment to a coherent American policy regarding the development of market and democratic institutions in Russia. At times, this consistency may even require that U.S. policymakers incur costs as well. Wavering produces doubt and thereby reduces our leverage over
the long haul.

Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States. The United States has a real interest in fostering the full independence of all the states that have emerged from the former Soviet Union. To the extent that resources are available, a similar strategy of engagement must be developed with each of these countries. Ultimately, however, the fate of democracy and capitalism in these countries depends on the future of democracy and capitalism in Russia. The converse is not true. The history of Eastern Europe in the inter-war period demonstrated that weak democracies in small countries cannot survive if they are threatened by authoritarian (be they communist or fascist) regimes in large countries on their borders.

Moreover, just as the United States should support and reward reformers in Russia, so, too, should American assistance and engagement in these other countries be directed at those with a demonstrated commitment to democracy and capitalism. Aid channeled to Ukraine, Uzbekistan, or Armenia in the name of "geo-strategic" objectives will ultimately be money wasted.  

Conclusion.

Over the long term, Russia's size, natural resources, educated population, and strategic location in Europe and Asia ensure that this country will emerge again as a power in the international system. Whether Russia makes this re-entry as a member of the international society of core Western states, or as a rogue state seeking to threaten this international society depends in large measure on the kinds of institutions that shape economic and political activity within Russia in the years to come. Several years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, there is still a chance that Russia will develop a market economy and a democratic polity, and that Russia therefore will join rather than threaten the community of democratic and capitalist states. That this window of opportunity is
still open is surprising considering all that Russia has endured, including a sustained economic free fall, a threat of fascism, two civil wars (in October 1993 and in Chechnya), and the expansion of an alliance system aimed ultimately at keeping Russia out of the West. It is in the vital national interests of the United States to ensure that this window of opportunity remains open. The costs of it closing are too high.

ENDNOTES


2. Try to get an official at the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to explain to you what is the American policy towards Russia. In my experience, each Russian diplomat gives you a different answer.


5. Kissinger has called these kind of international systems instances of a "revolutionary" order in distinction from a "legitimate" order. Hedley

7. Realists posit that war is the only event that can change the balance of power in the international system in an abrupt way. See, for instance, Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981 p. 203. This change in the international system that has occurred since 1991 poses a serious challenge to classical realist approaches to the study of international politics.


10. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future."


12. Realists had interpreted peripheral wars throughout the Cold War as a consequence of bipolar balancing.

13. In the years of the 20th century, this condition has often been referred to as the "democratic peace." The argument here is different in two respects. First, it is not just democracy that matters but market economies as well. Second, the condition of homogeneity may be as important as the actual attributes of the domestic political systems. For instance, a states system dominated by monarchs may be as effective at keeping the peace as a system of states comprised of democracies. While we are still too early into the era of the "democratic peace" to judge it against other international systems, the relative peace of the 19th century has provided a high standard for


18. Sigmund Neumann, "The International Civil War", World Politics, Vol. 1, No. 1, April 1949, pp. 333-334. For further discussion on the different definitions of revolutions, see Peter Calvert, Revolution and Counter-Revolution Minneapolis:
19. Coup d'etats, rebellions, and even changes in regime which do not precipitate a synchronous transformation of the socio-economic system are not considered revolutions here. These phenomena are related to revolutions in that they are abrupt, and often lead to the reorganization of the polity. It is the assumption of this essay, however, that the absence of the reorganization of the socioeconomic system—and, first and foremost, the reallocation and reordering of property rights—leads to different paths and outcomes than those regime changes which involve both the reordering of the political and economic system. Similarly, evolutionary changes in the structure and distribution of property rights are also not considered revolutions. Aspects of modernization, i.e., industrialization, can serve as the long-term causes of revolutions, but constitute an analytically distinct class of events than rapid and simultaneous changes in both polity and economy. For such an interpretation, see Francis Fukuyama, "The Modernizing Imperative: The USSR as an Ordinary Country," The National Interest, Spring 1993, pp. 10-18.


21. For an assessment of democracy's prospects in Russia, see Michael McFaul, "Russia's Rough Ride," in Larry Diamond and Marc Plattner, eds., Consolidating


23. The putchists from 1991 were arrested but then later released, the Communist Party has been put on trial, and Mikhail Gorbachev has been harassed, but the vast majority of those associated with the ancien régime, including the most of the leadership, are still active in politics and the economy. Many still have senior government positions, while another set of former Soviet officials now operate newly formed investment funds, banks, and holding companies.


27. Here, it seems that the power of the idea of international law sovereignty also may have been at play as there was no conceptual space from something between a federal state and a set of independent states that choose to enter into a treaty with each other. Obviously, the EU is an example of an organization "in between," but the development of this new quasi-
sovereign entity has evolved over decades. In a crisis moment such as the collapse of the USSR, leaders--both in these newly independent states and in countries that had to make decisions about recognition--must have felt more comfortable with the script of state sovereignty rather than confront the difficulties of dealing with a new animal like the CIS.

28. During the 1996 presidential campaign, Yeltsin gave the following explanation for his fateful 1991 decision:

The Belovezhkaya accords were necessary mainly to turn the former republics of the collapsing union back to the center, toward the idea of a new union, to stimulate the negotiation process, and most importantly, to avoid the bloody "Yugoslav scenario" of uncontrollable collapse not only of the Soviet Union, but also of Russia itself••since already in 1991 the USSR law of 26 April 1990 was already showing results in terms of the events in Tatarstan and Chechnya. Therefore, it is strange to hear today that our actions were directed at the consensual collapse of the union and its immediate destruction. I know that it will not be easy to overcome this myth, but I emphasize once again: the CIS was the only possible way of preserving a united geopolitical space at that time.

Quoted in OMRI Russian Presidential Election Survey, No. 5, May 29, 1996.

30. VTsIOM, Pyat' Let Reform, Moskva, 1996 p. 17.

31. Ibid.

32. For an analysis of this election and this electorate, see Michael McFaul, Russia's 1996 Presidential Election: The End of Bipolar Politics, Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1997.


35. It follows that a change in either one of these conditions would necessitate a change in American strategy as well.

36. Note that the strategy outlined here approximates in spirit the Clinton administration's doctrine of enlargement, but also as discussed below in detail differs in several important ways at the policy level.

37. One of the greatest myths that pollutes debates on these issues is the idea that market reform must precede democratic reform for either to succeed. The counter argument is spelled out below.

38. Stephen Sestanovich, "Why the United States Has No Russia Policy," in Robert Lieber, ed., Eagle Adrift: American Foreign Policy at the End of the


40. For the most articulate version of this approach, see Michael Mandelbaum, The Dawn of Peace in Europe, New York: Twentieth Century Fund Books, 1996.

41. The G-7's decision to invite Yeltsin to attend the opening of their next summit in Denver, Colorado instead of coming at the end as he did before was a wise symbolic gesture. This phrase, "group of eight" has been coined instead of G-8 so as to maintain the organizational integrity of the G-7 without alienating the Russians.


43. VTsIOM, Pyat' Let Reform, Moskva, 1996, p. 23.

44. Imagine, for instance, if Russia shared a border with a superpower that aimed to undermine the domestic institutions of the Western core states. Support for a "second" Marshall Plan for Russia would be easy to muster.

45. For more details on the negative effects of these financial industrial groups on both economic and political reform in Russia, see Michael McFaul, "The 'Privatized' State as an Impediment to Democracy in Russia," ms, Stanford, March 1997.


52. McFaul, "Russia's Rough Ride."


56. At the time of invasion, I believed that the United States should have taken more punitive measures against the Russian government. See Michael McFaul, "Russian Politics After Chechnya," Foreign Policy, No. 99, Summer 1995, pp. 149-165; McFaul, "Russia aid: Not all or nothing," The Washington Times, February 16, 1995; and McFaul, "West Must Think Hard about aid to Russia," The Moscow Times, January 28, 1995.

57. Anders Aslund, "Governing by Default," The Moscow Times, November 10, 1996. In March 1997, Boris Yeltsin also began to recognize that Chernomyrdin was more of a hindrance than a help in deepening economic reforms in Russia. While Yeltsin allowed Chernomyrdin to retain his position as prime minister in order to avoid a clash with the Duma, he gave Deputy Prime Ministers Anatolii Chubais and Boris Nemtsov effective control over economic policymaking.

58. For a quick summary of Lebed's dubious democratic credentials, see Michael McFaul, "Lebed: the Next Hope?" The Moscow Times, February 27, 1997. For a comprehensive analysis, see Benjamin Lambeth, The Warrior Who Would Rule Russia, Santa Monica: RAND, 1996.

59. When I was a student in Moscow in the 1980s, there was a joke among the African students studying at my institute. Africans who studied in England returned to Africa as Marxists. Africans who studied in the Soviet Union returned as militant capitalists. Africans who studied in the United States did not return.

60. It must be remembered that most people in
Russia have incentives to learn how markets work, but see few obvious incentives in learning how democracy works. Moreover, the concept of democracy in Russia has been discredited by all the nasty policies undertaken in its name. For most people in Russia today, the word, "democrat," is a pejorative label.

61. The willingness to suffer losses, be they economic or diplomatic, has been missing from the Clinton administration's strategy of enlargement, both with respect to Russia and elsewhere. Notice the absence of any discussion of costs in an otherwise cogent account of American interests in democracy abroad in Talbott, "Democracy and the National Interest."

62. This logic here harkens back to the Cold War days when the U.S. Government would throw money at any leader--democrats and dictators alike--as long as they were anti-communist. This kind of aid fostered corruption and crime in countries like Zaire, El Salvador, or Egypt but little democracy or capitalism.

63. The parallels to 1917 are striking. At that time, many analysts predicted that Russia's internal strife would relegate Russia to a peripheral role in international affairs for decades. Yet, the Soviet Union emerged as a more powerful state than the Russian empire.