AC/RC INTEGRATION:
TODAY'S SUCCESS AND TRANSFORMATION'S CHALLENGE

Dallas D. Owens, Jr.

October 2001
The views expressed in this report are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. This report is cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited.

Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should be forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 122 Forbes Ave., Carlisle, PA 17013-5244. Copies of this report may be obtained from the Publications Office by calling commercial (717) 245-4133, FAX (717) 245-3820, or via the Internet at Rita.Rummel@carlisle.army.mil.


The Strategic Studies Institute publishes a monthly e-mail newsletter to update the national security community on the research of our analysts, recent and forthcoming publications, and upcoming conferences sponsored by the Institute. Each newsletter also provides a strategic commentary by one of our research analysts. If you are interested in receiving this newsletter, please let us know by e-mail at outreach@carlisle.army.mil or by calling (717) 245-3133.

ISBN 1-58487-071-0
FOREWORD

The U.S. Army has had a “Total Forces Policy” for over 30 years, with an increased focus for the past decade on what is now called Active Component/Reserve Component (AC/RC) integration. The modern version is distinguished by an increased frequency of inter-component training, the integration of reserve components into plans and operations for all contingencies, and RC participation in routine shaping operations. Recent successes in integration have come during a period of relative weapons platform and doctrinal stability, but the Army is now undergoing transformation, a period characterized by technological, organizational, and doctrinal turmoil, all of which threatens to undo AC/RC integration’s many accomplishments.

In the following monograph, Lieutenant Colonel Dallas Owens analyzes current integration programs and initiatives and evaluates them for their potential to resist transformation’s possible threat to AC/RC integration. His two-part analysis first addresses the continuity, logic, and effectiveness of the Army’s integration efforts and then turns to an examination of how historical experience with integration should direct future efforts.

In Part I, Lieutenant Colonel Owens examines historical and current concepts of integration. He shows how programs emerged from the concept, the barriers to integration that they attempt to address, and their success. In Part II, he looks into the future of AC/RC integration, starting with an overview of transformation, then discussing transformation’s impacts on the Reserve Components and their integration with the active force. Finally, he provides conclusions about the current and future state of AC/RC integration and offers recommendations to overcome transformation’s challenges to integration.
Maintaining an integrated force during transformational turbulence is imperative if the Army is to retain its ability to support the National Military Strategy. This monograph should significantly contribute to the Army's ability to meet the AC/RC integration challenges transformation will present in the years ahead.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, J R.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

DALLAS D. OWENS, JR., a lieutenant colonel in the U.S. Army, became the Reserve Adviser to the Strategic Studies Institute in July 2000. His recent assignments include Mobilization Branch Chief, DCSOPS Army Operations Center; and Transportation Action Officer, Mobility Division, Logistics Directorate (J 4), Joint Staff. Lieutenant Colonel Owens holds Sociology degrees from the University of North Carolina (B.A.), Utah State University (M.S.), and the University of Tennessee (Ph.D.), and has served on the faculty of Clemson University, North Carolina State University, University of Virginia, and University of Colorado. His military education includes Infantry OCS and Basic Course, Transportation Basic Course, Quartermaster Advanced Course, CAS3, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, and National Security Fellowship at Harvard University. Lieutenant Colonel Owens served as a Port Operator with a Transportation Terminal Unit during Operations DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM and as an infantryman in Vietnam.
SUMMARY

The 30-year-old “Total Forces Policy” was designed to meet Cold War requirements; 10 years ago a total force policy remained important, but proved inadequate to meet the need for increased use of the reserve components (RC) in response to challenges posed by a smaller military, more diverse missions, and more frequent deployments. Since the mid-1990s, AC/RC integration programs and initiatives have successfully addressed many of the barriers to timely and effective mobilization and employment of a trained and ready reserve component. The current Army transformation, changing missions, and fiscal constraints will further redefine the role of the RC and the level of integration necessary to perform that role.

The recommendations in this monograph suggest ways that the Army can ensure success in its future integration efforts, based on the transformation campaign plan; the evolution of the Army’s vision of AC/RC integration; past and current efforts to achieve integration; accomplishments and failures of integration programs; and future integration issues for the transforming Army. These recommendations for supporting AC/RC integration during the transformation process and after the objective force is fielded follow four lines: (1) support and expand the most effective current programs while creating new programs; (2) avoid choosing roles and missions that segregate the force; (3) change the mobilization process to fit the transformed force; and (4) conduct periodic analyses to determine how the force is changing and the effects of that change on AC/RC integration. The most important of the specific recommendations are to (1) support the AC/RC Association Program and related activities, especially the Training Support XXI Program; (2) transform RC units, when possible, at the same time as their affiliated AC units are transformed; (3) support that portion of the Multi-
component Units Program that research shows has an optimal chance of success and contributes to effective mission performance; (4) expand the Integrated Division Program; (5) in the context of mission specialization, avoid making any mission exclusively RC or AC when detrimental to the prestige or funding of a single component; (6) support Army Forces Command’s changes to maximize the flexibility of the mobilization process; and (7) monitor the transformation process constantly for its impact on AC/RC integration and adjust as necessary to continue supporting an integrated Army.
AC/RC INTEGRATION:
TODAY’S SUCCESS AND TRANSFORMATION’S CHALLENGE

INTRODUCTION: THIRTY YEARS OF EFFORT

The concept of “Total Forces Policy” is widely attributed to Defense Secretary Melvin Laird, who in 1970 directed that a Total Force be considered when planning, programming, manning, and equipping Defense Department forces. It was designed to meet Cold War requirements to fight a European war between huge mechanized militaries. Ten years ago a total force policy remained important, but proved inadequate to meet the need for increased use of the reserve components (RC) in response to challenges posed by a smaller military, more diverse missions, and more frequent deployments. Since the mid-1990s, active component/reserve component (AC/RC) integration programs and initiatives have successfully addressed many of the barriers to timely and effective access to a trained and ready reserve component. Army transformation, changing missions, and fiscal constraints will further redefine the role of the RC and the level of integration necessary to perform that role.

The current Army Chief of Staff, General Eric Shinseki, and his two predecessors, General Dennis Reimer and General Gordon Sullivan, employed their own special rubrics—The Army, Total Army, and One Army, respectively—to commit the Army to a modern and enhanced version of the concept. Secretary Laird’s intention was to create “a vehicle to promote a reduced response time for the reserves to back a small Active establishment in a national emergency.” General Shinseki retains Secretary Laird’s goal, but his vision of The Army is of greater scope. Charles Cragin, former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, characterized the increased scope as
“profound... changes are clear: the Reserve forces are not just sitting around waiting for the bell to go off and World War Three to begin.”

The past decade has seen a new focus on AC/RC integration, marked by increased frequency of intercomponent training, plans and operations incorporating multiple components for even minor contingencies, and routine use of two or more Army components for day-to-day worldwide shaping activities.

So how successful have 30 years of effort been? The integration of the Active and Reserve Components has obviously changed during that time, but has this been the product of the Army leadership's vision and their programs designed to fulfill that vision? Or is today's status merely the culmination of a series of disparate programs designed to address emerging Army force structure issues, changing missions, or increases in deployments of forces to meet national security requirements?

It is the purpose of this research to examine the evolution of the Army's vision of AC/RC integration, past and current efforts to achieve integration, accomplishments and failures of integration programs, and future integration issues for the transforming Army. The examination will lead to recommendations about how the Army should endeavor to ensure success in its future integration efforts.

The Core Questions.

Two central questions about integration must be answered. First, has there been continuity, rationality, and effectiveness in the Army's integration efforts? Second, how does our historical experience with integration direct our future efforts? The answer to the first question will tell us if the Army has had a consistent goal and if it has used the proper methods and programs to achieve it. The answer to the second question will address the appropriateness of goals and programs as the Army changes over the next 30 years. Staying the course assumes that today's vision of integration is that of the future force and that today's
methods, or similar ones, are effective now and will continue to be so in the future.

The first core question, addressed in Part I of this study, requires determining what the Army has meant by “integration,” its goals for integration, the Army and Department of Defense (DoD) efforts to reach those goals, and the effectiveness of those efforts. Accordingly, current Army programs and DoD initiatives will be evaluated for their success in moving the Army towards integration and for their potential to support that Army goal. The DoD integrative initiatives do not qualify as Army programs, but all affect Army integration and a few clearly target the Army more than other services. The initiatives are clearly important for understanding integration, and some have resulted in increased integration. The second core question, addressed in Part II, requires determining the “fit” of existing goals and methods into the context of the interim and fully transformed Army.

Current integration programs and initiatives assessed in Part I will be linked to predictions about the nature of the Army’s future force, potential structural and attitudinal barriers to integration, and the Army’s vision of integration. That linkage will lead to recommendations to eliminate, retain, expand, or otherwise adjust existing programs or initiatives.

Finally, conclusions will be provided about the current and future state of AC/RC integration. Recommendations will be offered in terms of integration programs, roles and missions for the RC, changes in the mobilization process, and the need for periodic analyses. The intent of these recommendations is to suggest what needs to be done to ensure a level of AC/RC integration that will be consistent with the Army’s vision of the future total force.
PART I: CURRENT ENDS AND WAYS OF INTEGRATION

FROM FIRST WAR TO COLD WAR

A number of excellent accounts describe the evolution of America's rather unique reserve forces system. Military historian Edward Coffman describes how "inheritance from England, geography, and democratic ideology" have given the United States two armies: a Regular Army of professional soldiers and a citizen army "of various components variously known as militia, National Guards, Organized Reserves, selectees." This "duality of the American military tradition," though it has served the country well and allayed the fear of large standing armies, also has spawned a combination of myths, mistrusts, and legal constraints that pose serious obstacles to efficient and effective integration of the various components.

Over 200 years of conflicts among Regular Army and various categories of citizen-soldiers resulted in negative attitudes and perceptions on both sides about the motives and qualities of the "other" Army components. Structural and legal barriers were also created by these historical antagonisms. Understanding the development of both types of barriers is important for their successful removal.

There were certainly many changes in Regular Army/citizen-soldier relationships between the American Revolution and Viet Nam, but, especially from the Mexican War forward, their roles remained much the same: the regulars bore the first onslaught of a conflict and provided the continuity of professionalism necessary to mold and mobilize citizen forces. Those massed citizen forces then fought and won the Nation's wars. Between wars, the Regular Army was reduced in size and most citizen-soldiers gave up any military status. The soldiers who were in the reserve components between wars became nearly irrelevant when they were rolled into a massive wartime Army, and sometimes considered themselves badly treated by regular
Army leaders conducting the war. None of this prevented RC soldiers from emphasizing their link to the glory of all citizen-soldiers and magnifying their component’s contribution to winning the war.

Attempts, begun by President Washington’s failed initiatives to create a Federal militia, to improve the regular-reserve relationship failed until the 1903 Dick Act began militia reformation. A succession of legislative enactments in 1908, 1916, 1933, and 1947 molded the reserve component structure into what we have today. That structure acquired a strategic importance during the Cold War as an affordable counter to an overwhelming Soviet threat. However, resources were not sufficient to keep the reserve forces ready to join the active component quickly or efficiently to conduct war.

Creating conditions and relationships among components that facilitate effective and efficient “joining” of components to perform military missions is now known as integration. Mobilization is the centerpiece of that joining, but neither begins nor ends the process of effective joining. Before and after joining together for operations or war, all the components comprise the “total force.” Secretary Laird and subsequent Secretaries of Defense prompted the four services to launch a variety of programs to integrate their two National Guard and five Federal Reserve components into a more effective total force.

THE NEW AGE OF INTEGRATION

As already shown, the issue of integration and all its vagaries is not new for the Army. The term “AC/RC integration” may be a recent coinage and integration’s scope is certainly broader now than even 10 years ago, but the generic concept’s meaning has not changed. The need for reserve forces, in all of their historical forms, to be joined to the regular force during times of war was clearly an issue dating back to the Revolutionary War. America’s military leaders tried, with mixed success, various methods to
increase the effectiveness of their militia soldiers or, failing in those efforts, to compensate for their readiness inadequacies. Realizing that fixing readiness during war is difficult, those leaders mounted efforts as early as 1792 to increase readiness prior to hostilities, either by increasing resources allocated to the existing reserve structure or by giving the regulars more control over that structure. For nearly 180 years, there were sporadic efforts either to mobilize the reserves more easily (increase access) as war approached or to increase advising and training coordination in peacetime, sometimes accompanied by more, but seldom sufficient, resources. Progress was slowly achieved, but often at a cost to active-reserve relations, especially among high-level leaders.

However, the depth and breadth of requirements to integrate gradually increased in response to increasing demand for large numbers of citizen-soldiers with greater technical skills. By the mid-1970s, Army National Guard (ARNG) and U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) soldiers were no longer just mirror images of their Regular Army counterparts, being held ready for expanding the active force during major war; rather, the RC formed some unique units and harbored very nearly all of certain capabilities. The depth of requirements increased as warfighting plans began to require RC units for all significant operations, some even prior to deployment of forces, and for augmentation during daily operations. The breadth of requirements increased as new roles emerged, such as engagement activities and some additional homeland security missions. The latter missions are always in concert with the AC, but are often “joining” without going through the formal mobilization process to change the component status of RC soldiers.

The “Ends” of Integration.

If the Army has been concerned with integration for 180 years, Army leaders should have been able to reach
consensus about what the concept means and what it is intended to accomplish, i.e., its ends. There is general agreement that integration means bringing together for a common purpose or making something into a harmonious whole by bringing all its parts together. These two meanings are compatible with a dictionary definition of “to form, coordinate, or blend into a functioning or unified whole... to unite... to incorporate into a larger unit.” For the Army, these “parts” are AC and RC individuals, units, leaders, structure, doctrine, and readiness, and AC and RC institutions that perform the process of mobilization and preparatory training. As will be discussed later, most of the Army integration programs are designed to affect relationships between “parts” or the process used to join them. Most of the DoD initiatives address similar concerns, but for all services and for legislative changes. Of note, for the sake of efficiency changes of relationships and processes should be conducted prior to attempting to join the parts. Put differently, integration programs would not be expected to address AC/RC relationships during an operation; rather, the programs would address conditions prior to the operation that are believed to affect the efficient joining of the components for effective operations. In current literature, efficient and effective joining is often described as “seamless” integration.

If Army leaders share a general definition of integration and agree that integration is desirable, then they may also agree on the vision or end-state of integration. “Full integration” is an often-used expression that implies a known end-state but actually does nothing to clarify how we will know when we reach the optimal level of integration. Though vague, the end-state is clear enough for most to agree that the Army is not there yet and that the Constitution and subsequent laws serve to place an upper, though slowly changeable, limit to “joining” the components.

The Army Chief of Staff, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Secretary of Defense all share a
vision of a force that can be efficiently mobilized and that can effectively combine the capabilities and special skills of all components. In principle, the ARNG and USAR leadership concurs with the vision. The devil continues to reside in the details. There is agreement that components must be “joined and blended” more efficiently and effectively, but less agreement about Where and When they should be joined and What they should be joined to do. These Three Ws require decisions on the mission, force structure, roles, utilization levels, employment timelines, and readiness levels. These are all complex and ever changing issues that are long familiar to Army leadership and traditionally generate healthy debate within and among components.

The importance of and potential disagreement about roles and missions is highlighted by former Defense Secretary William Cohen’s 1997 memorandum on “Integration of the Reserve and Active Components.” The memorandum espouses four principles for AC/RC integration: “(1) clearly understood responsibility for and ownership of the Total Force by the senior leaders . . ., (2) clear and mutual understanding of the mission of each unit . . ., (3) commitment to provide the resources needed to accomplish assigned missions, [and] (4) leadership by senior commanders . . . to ensure the readiness of the Total Force.” Unfortunately, the four principles say little about either the structure or process for joining units. These principles show the Secretary’s perception that the components’ leadership must have a mutual understanding of their roles and missions and be committed to implementing them when agreed upon by the components. Without such understanding and commitment, specific programs for integration are doomed to fail.

Despite some remaining differences, AC and RC leadership relations have greatly improved over the past 5 years, partly due to having instituted a number of “closing ranks” measures and partly as a product of the forced operational interdependence among components. Each of
the three components holds distinct institutional imperatives for the roles each feels it should play.\textsuperscript{17} The ARNG and the USAR can be counted on to oppose any degree of amalgamation that leads to loss of their identity and culture. Such a loss is only a small, but not inevitable, step beyond integration. The reserve components want to be respected by and relevant for the active component, but they do not want to be the active component. They will also resist any changes that appear to lead towards their destruction, and they know the history of proposals to turn the ARNG into a federal reserve or to merge the USAR with the National Guard. Short of these extremes, the short term should see continued general agreement about the vision of integration.

The “Ways” of Integration.

The components’ working consensus about the definition of integration and, at a general level, the vision or goal of an integrated Army do not necessarily mean that there is agreement about how the Army needs to be changed. The Army’s principles of integration, reflecting those of Secretary Cohen, are (1) understood responsibility for ownership by senior total force leaders, (2) clear and mutual understanding of the mission for each unit, (3) leadership to ensure readiness, and (4) commitment to provide resources.\textsuperscript{18} Of the four principles, there is less than total agreement about two: the components’ missions continue to shift, and skepticism remains about the commitment or ability to provide resources for integration. For the other two principles, there is currently a very high level of solidarity among Army leaders on the question of all components and their leadership being responsible for the force and its readiness.

Two recurring physical or structural barriers to integration, resources and readiness, are identified as important by the Reserve Forces Policy Board (RFPB), the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs. Two other frequently-invoked integration barriers involve responsibility and understanding; these two can be characterized as attitudinal. General Shelton identifies this latter category of barriers as how “components . . . regard each other.” Assistant Secretary Cragin refers to “cultural biases and stigmas.” These two proponents of integration seem to concur that there still exists “mistrust and suspicion [between components] embedded in our culture.” Though the barriers are conceptually separated into structural and attitudinal, most of the discussions about barriers recognize that the two are related. Trust is not likely to increase without increased commitment of resources, and those resources are unlikely to be committed without trust that they will be used appropriately. Having principles for achieving integration and knowing the barriers to integration should provide impetus for programs to succeed at integration.

Integration Programs.

For much longer than integration has been popular as a term, there have been attempts to prepare the AC and RC to operate together. Though unevenly employed, the AC has had the power to enforce Federal standards, provide instructors and inspectors, and control funds for the militia/National Guard since 1903 and for the Army Reserve since 1916. Even the “roundout” concept, adding units from one component to bring parent units from another component up to full strength, which achieved notoriety during DESERT STORM, dates back to 1908. Roundout and augmentation were two subsets of the Capstone Program, the predominant integration program from 1973 to the mid-1990s. Capstone represented a major turning point for the RC. “For the first time, RC units were integrated into war plans . . . and worked with their wartime AC headquarters . . . to integrate planning, training, and force modernization.” Current affiliation programs,
particularly the AC/RC Association Program and Army Teaming, are the legacy of Capstone.23

No two parties completely agree about what should be classified as Army AC/RC integration programs. For purposes of this monograph, there are now nine Army AC/RC integration programs, as categorized by the U.S. Government Accounting Office (GAO).24 The GAO list contains only the Army programs most often cited as integrative. It omits some smaller programs, and even one large program that is clearly important and integrative, the AC/RC Association Program. Though U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) Regulation 350-4, Training: Army Relationships, does not treat this as an umbrella program, it overlaps with and serves as the organizing link among three and perhaps five of the programs listed by GAO. Accordingly, the AC/RC Association Program will not be analyzed here but will be referred to frequently and should probably be evaluated in the same light as its linked programs. Table 1 summarizes the nine selected programs.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROGRAM</th>
<th>FEATURES</th>
<th>PURPOSE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Integrated Divisions*</td>
<td>2 AC division headquarters with training oversight responsibility for their enhanced separate brigades.</td>
<td>Provide guidance and oversight to improve their brigades' training and readiness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teaming*</td>
<td>Expanded in September 2000 to align all ARNG divisions with corps and team them with an AC division.</td>
<td>Establish or strengthen training and operational relationships of the teamed units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Force XXI Heavy Division Redesign</td>
<td>1 division experiment. Expansion planned to 2 more divisions and a corps.</td>
<td>Reduce the size of heavy divisions and fill some positions with RC individuals.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia Task Force</td>
<td>Alternate AC &amp; ARNG division headquarters with major troop units provided by component not providing the headquarters.</td>
<td>Provide systematic RC participation in the Bosnia stabilization force. Reduce demand on AC units.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Multi-component Units*

A single unit, with one MTOE, comprised of personnel from two or more components. Over 30 now organized with gradual expansion through 2007 to 113 units. Improve readiness and resource allocations, optimize component-unique capabilities, improve documentation, and enhance total integration.

### Integrated Light Infantry Battalions

27 ARNG Companies to "round-up" 3 AC & 1 ARNG Divisions. Expand the capabilities of selected divisions by adding a battalion.

### Training Support XXI*

Created training support divisions under operational control of the U.S. Army Reserve Command and the Continental U.S. Armies. Increase RC readiness levels by providing "synchronized, integrated, and effective training support" to RC units.

### Active Component Associate Unit Mentor Relationships*

Matches AC & RC leaders at corps & division levels (senior) and junior leaders at below division (peer). To provide senior RC commanders with leadership and advice on training matters and junior commanders with peer mentors to share experience and information on training implementation.

### Active/Reserve Component Battalion Command Exchange Program

AC & RC will exchange battalion commanders and brigade & battalion executive & operations officers. Provide experience with and better understanding of other components by battalion commanders and key staff at battalion and brigade levels.

---

*Programs linked to the AC/RC Association Program in FORSCOM Regulation 350-4.

### Table 1. Army AC/RC Integration Programs

Though all of these programs are characterized as integrative, each addresses the issue differently. Four are exclusively division-brigade level programs and three others have impact at this level. Training (usually prior to mobilization) and readiness are themes in five programs. Leadership, guidance, and mentoring are themes in three programs. Only one is characterized as operational (Bosnia Task Force), but it actually has huge training impacts on units selected for participation in the program. All the others are designed in some way to prepare units better to operate with other components. Table 2 shows how
programs explicitly address structural and attitudinal barriers to integration. In practice, programs often address barriers that are beyond their mission.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROGRAM</th>
<th>STRUCTURAL BARRIERS</th>
<th>ATTITUDE BARRIERS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Integrated Divisions</td>
<td>Training resources, readiness</td>
<td>Senior leader mentoring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teaming</td>
<td>Training resources</td>
<td>Informal training relationships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Force XXI Heavy Division Redesign</td>
<td>Mutual training resources</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia Task Force</td>
<td>Resources (preparation phase)</td>
<td>Planned, cyclic, &amp; routine interaction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multi-component Units</td>
<td>Training resources, readiness</td>
<td>Routine interaction and interdependence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integrated Light Infantry</td>
<td></td>
<td>Affiliation &amp; routine interaction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training Support XXI</td>
<td>Training resources readiness</td>
<td>Increased interaction among training support staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active Component Associate Unit Mentor Relationships</td>
<td>Training resources, readiness</td>
<td>Increase formal and informal interaction and advice among component leaders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active/Reserve Component Battalion Command Exchange Program</td>
<td></td>
<td>Increased understanding among component leaders</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 2. Addressing Barriers.**

It is clear that most of the programs are designed to remove both attitudinal and cultural barriers, as would be expected since the two types are related. The DoD is also concerned with what, on the surface, appear to be structural barriers, but most of its efforts to remove them are outside the scope of Army integration programs and apply to multiple services. The DoD’s Reserve Component Employment 2005 (RCE-05) Study examines seven “Resource Challenges for the RC Employment” and makes recommendations to overcome them. These recommendations represent one list, but, of course, there are others.
There are other integration efforts that could be categorized as initiatives, but here, as a starting point, the list will be confined to recommendations identified in the RCE-05 report. The report’s recommendations are fairly comprehensive and, since its drafting nearly 2 years ago, some recommendations have resulted in significant changes. Three of its recommendations require changes in law, three others require DoD policy changes, and one requires both legislative and policy changes. Table 3 summarizes the report’s recommended initiatives, the key features of each, and their purpose.

Though not unanimous, leadership within each Army component generally supports some combination of current Army programs and DoD initiatives to further integration. Many believe that the programs do not go far enough or fast enough, but none of these efforts are seen as threatening to the core identity or survival of the components. Some of the efforts do require resource additions or shifts, and there will certainly be disagreement about resource allocation issues.

Even generally supported programs may not provide a unified, coherent, and focused effort to achieve the Army’s integration goals. The GAO states that the Army has “[no] overarching integration plan [which] currently involves a series of individual efforts that are being implemented on a piecemeal basis.” The GAO contends that this approach results in uncoordinated objectives and unintended effects but has “increased interaction between the active and reserve components.”26 The GAO fails to acknowledge that DoD and the Army approach integration at two overlapping levels. The DoD initiatives address removing legal constraints to mobilization, integrative measures at the joint level, and support to the services’ integration efforts. The Army is interested in implementing its internal components’ integration by establishing programs to remove structural and attitudinal barriers to integration. Table 4 illustrates how Army and DoD efforts overlap to address the dimensions of the joining process.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Initiative Focus</th>
<th>Features</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Increase Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) for RC.</td>
<td>Increase RC taking JPME-II by 10 percent and establish an RC course</td>
<td>To provide a common level of preparedness of AC and RC personnel for joint assignments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improve AC/RC interoperability</td>
<td>Special concern for communications, utility helicopters, tactical wheeled vehicles, night vision devices, and engineering and construction equipment</td>
<td>To increase RC unit effectiveness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use “smart cards” to minimize mobilization processing delays</td>
<td>Programs are operating and being tested at both OSD and Service levels</td>
<td>To decrease delays associated with personnel data and deployment qualifications records</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simplify RC peacetime employment procedures</td>
<td>ASD (RA) working group established</td>
<td>To make RC personnel more accessible in peacetime (non-PRC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase benefits equity between AC and RC</td>
<td>Concerns RC in IDT and AT status and on active duty for more than 30 days</td>
<td>To ensure equity in benefit packages between AC and RC personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lift restraints on operational duties for full-time support (FTS) reservists</td>
<td>Allows FTS to deploy with units and assume a full range of duties</td>
<td>To use RC units or individuals more effectively for operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Create more RC staff positions (FTS, IMA, and part-time) at major headquarters</td>
<td>Increase the number of NCOs, Officers, and Flag Officers, including both part-time and full-time personnel</td>
<td>Provide expertise to the HQ for using RC more effectively and to increase AC/RC leadership integration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Create round-up relationships for enhanced separate brigades (eSBs)</td>
<td>Would allow the eSBs to focus training and integrate into a combat division</td>
<td>To increase the role of RC in MTWs and increase combat power of selected divisions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase RC participation in logistics management</td>
<td>Shifting assets will save money but may increase risks elsewhere</td>
<td>To provide additional support to USTRANSCOM and MTMC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase RC participation in a JTF HQ for Homeland Defense (JTS-CS)</td>
<td>Provides reduced cost and increased effectiveness by balancing RC and AC personnel in the JTF</td>
<td>To provide expertise to the JTF for determining the most effective RC role in Homeland Defense</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 3. RCE-05 Recommendations for Initiatives to Increase AC/RC Integration.**

15
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROGRAM OR INITIATIVE</th>
<th>PRE-MOBILIZATION</th>
<th>MOBILIZATION</th>
<th>POST-MOBILIZATION TRAINING</th>
<th>OPERATIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Integrated Divisions - Phase 1</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integrated Division - Phase 2</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teaming</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No*</td>
<td>No*</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia Task Force</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multi-component Units</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training Support XXI</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AC Associate Unit Mentor</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AC/RC BN Command Exchange</td>
<td>Yes**</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smart Card (DoD)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lift FTS Constraints (DoD)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other DoD*** (Joint Focus)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Teaming is not designed to address mobilization and post-mobilization training, but the location of teamed AC units at mobilization stations, in some cases, can provide substantial assistance for RC units mobilizing there.
** The command experience gained by AC and RC personnel is intended to serve them in subsequent inter-component training and operations; hence, the program is intended to address, at least indirectly, the pre-mobilization and operations dimensions.
*** Includes all items listed in Table 3 except Smart Card and Lift FTS Constraints.

**Table 4. Joining Dimensions Integration Programs and DoD Initiatives.**
The Army's vision is consistent with that of DoD. Taken together, the programs and initiatives address all dimensions of the joining process. The pre-mobilization dimension, encompassing training and readiness issues, is the most often addressed, as would be expected given its potential to shorten the time needed for post-mobilization training and, hence, reduce the time needed before participating in operations. Though some programs have consequences for all dimensions, they invariably have more impact on some dimensions than others. For instance, the multi-component program is designed to improve the training and operational environments for its RC soldiers. However, the program has little impact on improving the mobilization process, a problem addressed directly by DoD's smart card initiative. Does this dimensional coverage mean that GAO is incorrect in its assertion that there is no overarching integration plan and that efforts are piecemeal? The Army certainly must depend on DoD and Congress to remove many of the remaining structural barriers to integration. Since the Army cannot address all the barriers, its programs can comprise only a partial plan, assaulting those barriers that it can overcome, while supporting DoD supplemental legislative and policy efforts. In the sense that the Army and DoD efforts are complementary and cover all the dimensions, they are “overarching” in their coverage. On the other hand, since the programs and initiatives evolved over time, they are certainly “piecemeal,” but perhaps contain sufficient pieces to make them nearly a whole.

WHAT HAVE WE WROUGHT

The preceding section discussed the vision and goals of integration, identified Army integration programs and DoD initiatives, and described what the programs and other efforts are attempting to accomplish. The next and more difficult task is to determine whether those programs and initiatives are successful at accomplishing their specific
goals and, of ultimate importance, whether they are moving the Army towards the desired integration end-state.

**Program Outcomes—Signs of Success.**

Several programs are showing signs of success, though formal program evaluations are beginning for only one program (the Integrated Divisions). Much has been written about the success of the Bosnia Task Force. DoD initiatives have also had some acknowledged successes. The following evaluations, to the extent that empirical indicators exist, will assess the success of specific programs and initiatives, and will also look at any successes achieved by their cumulative effects. The evaluations will often be tentative since many programs are at an early point in their life cycle. More often than not, data from programs are insufficient for firm conclusions. Though better data are desirable, those which are available can still provide some evidence to link program goals to their actual outcomes.

Evaluation is complicated further by the rhetoric of “full integration.” A program or initiative may be successful by simply increasing integration, even though it does not achieve the ill-defined ultimate goal. Even “full integration” proponents freely discuss limitations of roles, component weaknesses, and limits to RC employment. The standard for full integration is not to be found by comparing RC to AC capabilities; the standard should be to achieve the most efficient and effective process for joining the RC to the AC to perform Agreed-upon roles, at Acceptable standards, at Appropriate times and places. Determining the level of “consensus” for these Three As is beyond the scope of this work. Here, a program will be deemed successful if it significantly improves the efficiency or effectiveness of the joining process. The obvious question is: what constitutes significant improvement? As each program is reviewed, the question of significance will be addressed.

At the most general level, the GAO contends that the Army’s ongoing efforts are increasing integration, but goes
on to say that, because of an unclear definition of integration, “it cannot precisely measure and fully evaluate the effects.” Former Assistant Secretary Cragin declared the Integrated Divisions and the Bosnia Task Force programs to be “success stories”; he views them as indicators of success as well as creators of success. These success declarations are unsubstantiated by evidence or by formal evaluative research, but are offered as testimonies and starting points from two authoritative sources.

There are indications that the Integrated Divisions Program is successful at removing some physical and attitude barriers. Interviews with current and recent ARNG brigade commanders assigned to the 7th Infantry Division indicate improvements in training coordination, post-mobilization processing and training, and mentoring relationships. The GAO states that the brigades report improved preparation for deployment, especially in training battalion and brigade staffs, improved identification of equipment modernization and compatibility issues, and accelerated fielding of equipment. Since the program is only in its early stage, it is not yet mature enough to claim significant successes. It has, however, demonstrated its potential to improve the integration process for the six ARNG brigades that are included in the program.

The Bosnia Task Force Program recently completed its first rotation with a National Guard Division Headquarters in command of RC, AC, and other nations’ troops. Though generally touted as a success, the required pre-mobilization training caused the average per-person active duty days to exceed the Presidential Reserve Call-up (PRC) authority by over 30 days. If this trend continues for subsequent rotations, the expense to the National Guard and hardships for individual soldiers and their employers could become a major issue. There are initiatives being proposed to decrease the number of days in theater so as to reduce the total number of active duty days required by each soldier. This program does not, by itself, significantly improve the integration process. It does, however, provide a
frequent, though far from routine context for other programs, e.g., Division Teaming, to address the process of preparing high echelon RC units for leadership roles in contingency operations. Its impact on the goal of integration may be significant, based primarily on the attention to RC missions that it generates and its positive effects on the attitudes of both AC and RC soldiers.

The value of the Division Teaming Program was tested when the 1st Cavalry Division helped prepare the 49th Armored Division Headquarters for its Bosnia command. These two divisions were part of the pilot program for division teaming begun in 1998, and the deployment’s success is attributable in some measure to efforts of the 1st Cavalry Division. Divisions scheduled for subsequent rotations are also teamed with active duty divisions, though many do not enjoy the close physical proximity of the 1st Cavalry and 49th Armored Divisions. If other teaming relationships become equally successful, this expanding program will significantly improve the integration process for a large portion of the Army’s warfighting units.

The Training Support XXI (TS XXI) Program was mandated by the FY93 National Defense Authorization Act (Title XI) and requires that a specific number of AC personnel be dedicated to improving RC readiness levels. As an 8-year-old concept and 4-year-old program, this is the senior integration program whose very survival attests to its success. The program is currently manned at nearly 100 percent of officer and NCO requirements. The apparent success at filling requirements does not diminish contentions that the number of personnel devoted to the program is too few or too many nor negate the squabble over their distribution. The program in its current form is experiencing two threats: funding reduction and personnel issues. Reduced funding threatens some forms of training support, especially to lower priority units. Field Grade promotion rates for AC officers participating in the program are well below those of the Army-wide rates. This fact, plus
the reasons behind it, might ultimately damage the program. The Multi-component Units Program continues to expand. During FY01, 20 additional multi-component units are scheduled for activation, with 62 more during FY02-FY07, for an eventual total of 113. Three working issues remain for the program, but 15 other issues are being monitored. The three issues being worked on are multi-component policy, personnel asset visibility, and multi-component funding. The program is small now, but has the potential, as it grows, to increase integration significantly. As indicated by the number of issues being addressed by the Department of the Army, this program is not easily managed. Nor is it yet clear what increased benefits (other than symbolic integration) lower echelon multi-component units have for the Army or if the real benefits are worth their additional management costs.

The Active/Reserve Component Battalion Command Exchange Program has seen assignment of ten lieutenant colonels and two colonels to commands in components other than their own. Eight of the officers are Regular Army (RA) commanding RC units, while two USAR and two ARNG officers command AC units. Three RA officers have completed their assignments with ARNG units. As part of this program, 16 RA officers are also assigned to senior staff positions in ARNG divisions and brigades. This program has not yet produced sufficient results to be declared an unqualified success, but is showing some positive impacts. It is becoming institutionalized and evaluated for expansion to brigade command, but is likely to remain a small program for at least the next few years. It contributes to integration by increasing knowledge for the selected commander and affecting attitudes of those in the commands, but has less impact than some of the larger programs. No evaluation has yet been conducted to determine whether these commanders’ careers are enhanced, damaged, or unchanged by their participation in the program. The program’s claim to success would certainly be more credible.
if participants' careers are enhanced, thereby allowing them to contribute more to the Army as a result of their experience.

The Active Component Associate Unit Mentor Relationships Program contains elements of training support and evaluation, interrelated with the TS XXI program, plus the traditional concept of mentoring at the senior and peer levels. The traditional mentoring portion of the program is, like mentoring within a component, difficult to evaluate. Its success is clearly tied to the strength of unit affiliations directed by the AC/RC Association Program and the Division Teaming Program. There are no quantifiable indicators of the program's success, but it certainly has potential as affiliations increase in breadth and depth. There are, unfortunately, many units, mostly low priority, omitted from directed associations. These units, already receiving fewer training resources and assistance, may be the ones in most need of mentoring.

Program Outcomes—No Indication of Success.

None of the programs can yet be characterized as failing. Several, however, have yet to display indicators of success.

Half of the Integrated Light Infantry Battalions Program, that is, the round-out portion, was eliminated without being tested when the Department of the Army more closely evaluated the program. The round-up portion, now renamed the Light Anti-Tank Initiative, was implemented, also without testing, for one National Guard and three Active divisions. The Army National Guard in FY05 plans to resource the 27 required round-up companies from existing force structure. This program is obviously too new to evaluate.

The 4th Infantry Division was the test bed for Force XXI Heavy Division Redesign. One feature of the redesign was to integrate RC personnel into the division's structure. Initially, 408 RC soldiers would be in units spread
throughout the division, but this number has been significantly reduced by Department of the Army based on FORSCOM requests. Most remaining RC soldiers will be part of an ARNG multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) battery with dual missions.\textsuperscript{41} The program that began as an ambitious integration program is now an insignificant contribution to the integration effort.

\textbf{RCE-05 Recommendations: Subsequent Actions.}

Since the RCE-05 recommendations were announced, there have been a number of changes affecting AC/RC integration. Some of the changes resulted directly from the recommendations, but most resulted from work begun earlier; those earlier efforts were better focused or publicized by the study. With some exceptions, the recommendations have been supported in subsequent policy or legislative actions.

The RCE-05 study recommended that constraints on operational duties for FTS reservists be lifted. That goal can be met by allowing Active Guard/Reserve (AGR) soldiers to be used in operations, rather than only for “organizing, administering, recruiting, instructing, or training the reserve components.” The FY00 National Defense Authorization Act authorized the desired expansion.\textsuperscript{42} However, the expansion pertains only to Title 10 AGRs, those managed by Office, Chief Army Reserve (OCAR), and the National Guard Bureau (NGB), and not to that portion of National Guard AGRs governed by Title 32, those managed by the states. The National Guard Bureau has submitted a request to further amend 10 USC 12310(b) to extend the modification to include Title 32 AGRs.\textsuperscript{43}

The Joint Task Force—Civil Support (JTF-CS) was established in 1999, under the United States Joint Forces Command (USJ FCOM), to “integrate the Defense Department’s support to the lead federal agency for consequence management during a Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) incident.”\textsuperscript{44} Over one-third of the
full-time military personnel, including the JTF Commander, are reserve component\textsuperscript{45} and the full-time personnel are augmented by part-time RC personnel.

Though not creating a round-up relationship for enhanced separate brigades (eSBs) with divisions, all of the eSBs are now affiliated with corps as part of the teaming and “corps packaging” announced in September 2000. This is a step closer to clarifying the relationship of eSBs to their wartime higher headquarters. The Army Senior Steering Group for RCE-05 oversight directed the round-up concept be included in the Army transformation campaign plan to further clarify the eSBs’ affiliations.\textsuperscript{46}

There has been some success at creating more RC staff positions at major headquarters. Over the past 3 years, RC general officers have been assigned to CINCs as part of an initiative sponsored by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, commonly referred to as the Chairman’s Seven Program. Additionally, in 1998, two general officers were assigned as assistants to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for National Guard and Reserve Matters.\textsuperscript{47} Nearly all major Army or Joint headquarters now have mid-level RC staff officers, a few of whom are associated with these general officer assignments. The recommendations did not make it clear what constitutes an adequate number of positions, but the personnel and funding ceiling, especially for AGR and Individual Mobilization Augmentee (IMA) personnel, makes expansion beyond current levels doubtful.

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs (ASD[RA]) working group that studied how to simplify RC peacetime employment procedures determined that there is no foundation for the perception that the RC is unreasonably difficult to employ in peacetime. Though there may be funding challenges, there is no problem with access, structure, or process. Accordingly, no proposals for legislative or policy changes resulted. This issue was a spin-off from a long history of attempts to increase access to reservists for operations short of war. The desired increase
has been in terms of process efficiency, numbers of soldiers, length of mobilization period, and category of reservist. Generally, all but the first of these increases involve legislative changes; the first is more a product of DoD and service policies. All but the last, expanding the category of reservist, have been successful. The number of reservists who can be mobilized under Presidential Selected Reserve Call-up (PSRC) increased from the original 50,000 in 1976 to its current 200,000 in 1986. The length of time they can be mobilized increased from 90 days to 270 days during the same 10 years. Efficiency in the process has been achieved through the efforts of the Joint Staff, the services, and DoD.

Compromise legislation to include some PSRC access to the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) has been a failure. A category of IRR was established that allows IRR soldiers to volunteer for placement in a management group that can be involuntarily mobilized upon declaration of Presidential Reserve Call-up. After nearly 2 years, an insufficient number of soldiers had volunteered to make the program viable for its intended purpose. However, the USAR continues to search for ways to productively use individuals from this IRR category.

The FY98 National Defense Authorization Act established benefits equity between AC and RC. The major changes, represented in Public Law 105-85, Section 513, address issues surrounding housing allowances, CONUS COLA, accrued leave during short tours of active duty, medical care for family members, disability severance pay, and other health care and medical entitlements.

Improving AC/RC interoperability is a question of money and time more than change in policy or legislation. The Army leadership is committed to upgrading equipment and recently modernized some aviation and combat service support (CSS) equipment for the Reserves. As the Army modernizes and transforms, the cost of equipping the Total Army will increase. There is little reason to expect interoperability for all types of equipment to be achieved,
but it remains a goal for high priority and early deploying RC units.

Attempts to increase Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) for the RC have thus far met with limited success. There is reported progress at the Armed Forces Staff College (AFSC) towards implementing an effective JPME course that will meet Congressional and CJCS requirements and can be completed by RC officers during drill weekends and one 2-week active duty training period.\textsuperscript{49} The JCS Chairman's Assistants for National Guard and Reserve Matters anticipate final approval of a new DoD RC Joint Officer Management Instruction that will begin "viable Joint tracking and career monitoring for RC officers."\textsuperscript{50}

The recommendations for increased RC participation in logistics management were for joint organizations rather than Army units. Though joint, MTMC is dominated by Army personnel and leadership and has significant impact on its many subordinate, mostly RC, Army units. Over 95 percent of the total Army uniformed personnel assigned to MTMC are currently RC. MTMC has proposed that additional USAR AGR personnel be assigned to MTMC leadership positions, thereby increasing RC participation in logistics management while freeing AC officers for other duties. In another arena, an RC unit was recently activated to manage some aspects of Logistics Civilian Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) operations. Within weeks of activation, unit personnel were deployed to assist with contracting for the East Timor operation.\textsuperscript{51}

In November 1999, the Deputy Secretary of Defense issued a memorandum establishing responsibilities and timelines for implementing a "department-wide common access card (CAC)."\textsuperscript{52} This initiative clearly exceeds the RCE-05 recommendation for use of smart cards to minimize processing delays. Designed to contain a records information chip, the DoD card will serve as the public key infrastructure (PKI) platform that was directed under
previous DoD guidance. Though currently behind on the implementation schedule, the structure and process are in place to complete this ambitious project.

WHERE WE STAND: AN OVERALL ASSESSMENT

The preceding section demonstrates the complexity of integration; there are multiple levels of the concept and many facets within each level. There has certainly been highly intense integration activity over the past 3 to 5 years. Unfortunately, intense effort is not proof of effective effort. With few formal evaluation indicators, how do we assess our overall efforts to integrate? Both span and depth of integration programs and DoD initiatives must be examined. The span of potential effects is indicated by how much of the Army is targeted by an integration program or effort. Estimating the extent or intensity to which the target group is affected indicates the depth of effects.

Span and Depth of Integration.

Most of the Army programs and DoD initiatives show evidence that they are achieving some of their specific goals. If a program’s integrative achievements affect significant portions of the Army, they have a high probability of success for affecting integration for the entire Army. That probability is further enhanced if the magnitudes of integration effects on the target group are intense or significant. Table 5 summarizes the total Army “effects” of the programs.

Several obvious conclusions emerge from the display of who is targeted and how much that target receives impacts from programs. First, the entire combat force is targeted, much of it repeatedly, but more often than not the impacts are not significant. It is clear that our integration programs are most concerned with the combat arms since four programs target them almost exclusively. Two other programs
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROGRAM (BRANCHES)</th>
<th>PORTIONS (SPAN) OF ARMY TARGETED*</th>
<th>SIGNIFICANCE (DEPTH) OF IMPACT**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Integrated Division (combat)</td>
<td>2 AC Div HQ &amp; 6 ARNG eSBs (small percent of combat forces)</td>
<td>Medium but potential for High if divisions become deployable (phase 2 of the program)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teaming (combat)</td>
<td>All AC &amp; ARNG Divs &amp; Corps (large percent of combat forces)</td>
<td>Low but potential for medium as the program matures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Force XXI Heavy DIV Redesign (combat)</td>
<td>Current: 1 AC Div (-); Future (to 2004): 2 more AC Div and Corps planned (small percent of combat forces)</td>
<td>Low; significant division structure changes but no integration changes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia Task Force (combat emphasis)</td>
<td>Selected units &amp; Hqs from all components, Bde equivalent and Div Hq per rotation (small percent of total force)</td>
<td>High; significant training and operational integration required</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multi-component units (all branches)</td>
<td>Current: 30 units, all components; Future (to 2007): 113 units, all components (small percent of total force)</td>
<td>High; designated unit must adjust funding, equipment, property book, training, and mobilization/deployment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integrated Light Infantry Battalions (combat)</td>
<td>Current: none; Future (to 2005): 27 ARNG Cos, 3 AC Divs, 1 ARNG Div (small percent of combat force)</td>
<td>Currently none but potential for low to medium when the program becomes implemented</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training Support XXI (all branches)</td>
<td>The integrated support divisions and the supported RC units, priority given to early deploying units and those preparing for significant training or operations (medium percent of total force)</td>
<td>Medium for those high priority units and those facing a significant training or operational event. Low for many others with lower priority for support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AC Associate Unit Mentor Relationships (all branches)</td>
<td>Unknown extent or quality since there has been no analysis of implementation or consequences</td>
<td>Unknown, but potential is medium if the relationship is more than nominal since the program could affect many aspects of training and operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AC/RC Battalion Command Exchange Program (combat emphasis)</td>
<td>About 10 selected Battalion, Group, &amp; Squadron commands from all 3 components and less than 20 staff positions (small percent of total force)</td>
<td>High for the individuals in leadership positions and moderate for the selected units</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Units specified and portion of Army/force directly targeted, rated small (0 percent-25 percent), medium (26 percent-75 percent), or large (76 percent-100 percent).

**Significance of integration impacts on the targeted portion of the Army, rated as low, medium, or high. Rating based on judgment of integrative change attributable to the program experienced by the target population, units or individuals.

Table 5. AC/RC Integration Program Effects.

Predominantly target combat arms, while the other three include them with all other branches. The complexity of integrating higher echelon combat arms units has made designing effective integration programs very difficult. Most of the large or potentially large programs, such as teaming and integrated light infantry battalions, are only recycled, possibly improved, older affiliation programs. The new affiliation programs have the potential, if pursued vigorously, to repair relationships lost when Capstone was abandoned and the Wartrace program was allowed to atrophy. At best, we are probably a few years away from recovering the 1990 level of affiliation. Real innovations, such as the integrated division, AC/RC battalion command exchange, and multi-component units, are approached very cautiously and are applied to only a small portion of the combat force.

Judging by placement and timing in war plans, combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) units are more integrated into the total Army than combat units. Accordingly, their part of the Bosnia task force program is taken for granted, and programs for CS and CSS, such as the multi-component units and training support XXI, are small or medium programs with more significant impacts. These programs are allowed to produce more significant impacts because risks to warfighting capabilities are perceived to be less when affecting RC CS and CSS units. Reserve component CS and CSS units have established a reputation for success over the last 10 years while RC
combat arms, especially at higher echelons, are still trying to establish their credibility.

The implementation of RCE-05 recommendations for integration initiatives has, collectively, targeted the entire Army (along with other services), and some have significant impacts on the force. Specifically, improvements in AC/RC interoperability, benefits equity, and the use of smart cards target a high percentage of the force, and the latter has the potential for having significant impacts on the mobilization dimension of force integration. Most other changes target smaller portions of the Army and have smaller incremental impacts on integration. Only creating round-up relationships of eSBs is exclusively concerned with combat arms; the others are for all branches except for the attempt to increase RC participation in logistics management.

**Success of Integration Programs—Quantification.**

The preceding section establishes the criteria, program span and depth, necessary for evaluating, with some confidence, the success of current integration programs. Clearly, two programs currently have no real consequences for integration: Force XXI Heavy Division Redesign and Integrated Light Infantry Battalions. The former has little potential for becoming an integrative program, but the latter will probably be moderately effective if it is fielded.

Some quantification is necessary to differentiate relative utility among the remaining programs. If we heavily weight “span,” thereby emphasizing integration of the entire Army, the most significant (having impact on more of the entire Army) programs are Teaming, Training Support XXI, and AC Associate Unit Mentor Relationships. Less significant, primarily because they affect less of the Army, are Bosnia Task Force and Multi-component Units, AC/RC Battalion Command Exchange Program, and Integrated Division.
If we heavily weight depth, the degree that the barriers of attitude and structure are affected by the program, we get very different results because our method then measures program success rather than program significance. The most successful programs would be the Bosnia Task Force, Multi-component units, and AC/RC Battalion Command Exchange Program. None of these three are suitable candidates for a prototype program that would be both significant and successful. It is probably not in the Army's best interest to have most of its units become multi-component or to exchange their battalion commanders across components. It may be practical, if the operation continues long enough, to rotate every ARNG Division headquarters through Bosnia, but that procedure would still not affect a high percentage of the Army.

The preceding analysis leads to a dilemma. The integration program that can be a centerpiece for a combined effort may be neither the most successful nor the most significant, but rather one that is fairly successful for a large part of the Army, such as Training Support XXI. It may be the only program that can be increased in depth and span at a reasonable cost and without increasing risk to the Army's ability to perform its mission. The other candidates for increasing depth would be the Integrated Division (already planned in Phase 2 of the program) and Teaming. Minor increases in span could be practical, though politically difficult, in the Integrated Division, the AC/RC Battalion Command Exchange programs, and the Multi-component Units (planned over the next few years).

**Summing Up the Efforts.**

Where do we stand with AC/RC integration? Making sweeping summary statements about integration is hazardous because of the phenomenon's complexity. Some parts of the Army are more integrated than they have ever before been during peace, but there are qualifications that indicate where more needs to be done.
Rhetorically at least, the Army leadership, from all components, is more united than ever in its support for the vision of integration and its agreement on the roles and missions of the components. **Qualification:** The Army is beginning a transformation that will take much of its leadership’s time, energy, and resources. If leadership becomes distracted from integration and Army program and DoD initiative benefits are slower or less than expected, the unity may dissolve. Roles and missions will continue to change, further challenging hard-earned unity.

- Taken as a whole, AC/RC equipment compatibility, one aspect of integration, is as high as it has been in recent times of peace. **Qualification:** The shrinking Army and a period of slowed acquisition of major platforms have allowed cascading of equipment and time to improve AC/RC equipment compatibility. There remain some serious incompatibilities but the coming period of more rapid transition, with little additional funding, threatens to widen the compatibility gap again.

- The mobilization portion of the joining process has been refined, and units from different components train and operate together more than ever before in peace. **Qualification:** There remain inefficiencies in the process, but implementation of the DoD Smart Card program will improve it further. Incompatible personnel systems among the components continue to create difficulty, but recent initiatives by the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel are attempting to remove the incompatibility.

- Integration into war plans and contingency operations is now very effective for CS and CSS units. These units generally know and accept their missions, benefit from frequent operations with the AC, and have established some credibility with the AC. **Qualification:** Army transformation and dual missioning for homeland security are introducing new elements of uncertainty for these units, at a time when some of them are experiencing high rates of
employment in contingency operations or high tempo training events.

- Modest improvements have been accomplished for integrating the combat arms. Affiliation and some integrated unit programs have the potential for further improving integration. **Qualification:** If the affiliation program is not pursued vigorously and divisions are not included in war plans, combat arms integration will continue to languish.

PART II: INTEGRATING THE FUTURE FORCE

INTEGRATE WHAT—THE FUTURE FORCE

Before addressing the adequacy of current programs for integration of the future force, it is important to have some idea about the nature of that force. It is not the goal here to summarize all that is known about the transformed force or the transformation strategy. The task rather is to examine the nature of the transformed force, extract the elements of the transformation that are most important for AC/RC integration, identify key integration issues, and recommend measures to ensure continued momentum for integration.

There are limitations to how well the Army of the future can be characterized. The further we look into the future, the less reliable are our predictions. Detailed information, such as platform descriptions, is less available than general requirements, such as desired capabilities. A comprehensive set of technological recommendations and research and development plans is not expected until the year 2003, but the Transformation Campaign Plan delineates the desired characteristics of the force that will drive those recommendations and plans.\(^{53}\)

**Transformation to the Future Force.**

The goal of transformation is, in the long term, to produce a force that is more responsive, deployable, agile,
versatile, lethal, survivable, and sustainable. The transformation campaign plan describes how the Army will reach this goal over the next 30 years, while maintaining essential warfighting readiness to execute the National Military Strategy. To avoid loss of readiness, the plan calls for three sequential but overlapping forces: legacy, interim, and objective. Such a plan is congruent with recommendations from RAND's National Defense Research Institute. These recommendations call for a two-track approach: one to satisfy the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) demands to exploit within-reach technology to address understood near- and mid-term problems, and one to satisfy RMA demands to address uncertain problems by developing a longer-term “robustly diverse” set of capabilities. The following will examine each force, its purpose, its characteristics, and the RC role in it.

The Legacy Force.

The legacy force is what we have now and is the means to guarantee near-term warfighting readiness. The plan is to enhance that force's capabilities by recapitalizing and modernizing selected equipment, procuring some new equipment, and ensuring a high state of readiness. The combat arms portion of the legacy force will be reduced from the current 68 combat brigades to about 55 over the next 5 to 7 years as six to eight brigades (most AC, one or two ARNG) are changed into interim brigade combat teams (IBCT) and six ARNG brigades are transformed into CSS. From FY2010 to FY2031, the legacy force will gradually transition into the objective force. The ARNG brigades will begin conversion in FY2012 and the last will complete conversion in FY2031, 6 years after the last AC brigade's completion. CSS units will transform over the near term to support both the legacy combat force and the smaller interim combat force. From FY2008 to FY2031, some balance of all three forces will require support. The period of greatest CSS system stress is likely to be from FY2012 to FY2024, when three brigades per year are starting transformation and where at one point
half of the non-IBCT Army is objective (mostly AC) and half legacy (mostly RC). This period is also when AC/RC equipment incompatibility is at its height because it is when the RC is most different in structure from the AC; before this period, most units of both components are legacy; afterward, most units are objective.

The Interim Force.

The interim force will consist of six to eight IBCTs. Six have been funded, five AC and one RC. These IBCTs, rapidly deployable combat brigade task forces, are designed to provide increased combat capability in the near term. They are more responsive, deployable, sustainable, and agile than heavy forces and more lethal and survivable than light forces. These improvements make the IBCTs more versatile than either force. The first IBCT should be operational by FY2003 and the last by FY2007. The interim force has minor consequences for RC structure, interoperability, and its integration with the AC, other than for the one ARNG brigade that is funded for transition (and possibly a second, if selected and funded). The logistics community will require minor adjustments to support the IBCTs properly, and the entire Army will need to understand their capabilities and how they operate.

The Objective Force.

What is known about the objective force is what the Army wants it to do and when it is scheduled to be transformed. It must have significant improvements in all seven of the desired characteristics: responsiveness, deployability, agility, versatility, lethality, survivability, and sustainability. These improvements will make some unit distinctions unnecessary, such as light and heavy. It is unclear how far unit homogeneity will go; there may be no need, other than tradition, for unit distinctions such as airborne, airmobile, armor, infantry, mechanized, and armored cavalry. Since no unit has sufficient time to train
on all missions, there will certainly continue to be unit mission emphasis, such as urban warfare, that will create different mission essential task lists (METL). Regardless of future unit distinctions, all will be transformed to become more capable.

Most platforms are as yet undeveloped: some are not yet designed; others have major technological barriers to overcome. Technological recommendations and research and development plans are scheduled for announcement in 2003, prototype demonstrations in 2004 and 2005, and operational status for the first transformed brigade by 2010. The planned conversion rate would be about three brigades per year from 2011 to 2031; starting in 2012, one of the three converted brigades would be RC. Assuming that there is no reduction in structure and that funding supports the current transformation program, Table 6 represents the rate of transformation for the AC and RC combat brigades.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FY</th>
<th>Active Component</th>
<th>Reserve Component</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LEGACY</td>
<td>IBCT or OBJECTIVE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2025</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2029</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Assumes that 2 RC IBCT Brigades are funded.

**Table 6. Transition Time-Line Percent.**

Table 6 clearly shows that for a relatively long period, as many as 8 years, the AC is predominantly a transformed combat force, while the RC's combat force remains largely legacy. Noncombat forces, a high percentage being RC, will also be transforming, but less is known about the relative component rates of transformation. Division and below CS and CSS forces are likely to follow the same trend as their respective component combat forces because of their critical direct support role. The transformation rate of above-
division CS and CSS forces is more difficult to predict. Most of these forces are RC, many deploy early under current war plans, and nearly all are clearly designed to support a mix of AC and RC forces.

THE FUTURE TOTAL FORCE VISION

The Macro Vision.

In general, there is no indication that the current vision of a total force, integrated to the extent possible, will change with the transformation. Certainly, the structural and attitudinal aspects of responsibility, understanding, readiness, and resources will continue to be central themes in the macro vision of integration. On the other hand, as the Army transitions to a new way of fighting, how the components are combined can be expected to change. To the extent that we will no longer mass forces but rather focus capabilities, a new vision of integration may eventually be needed. Referring to the definition of integration, the parts being combined may change to the point that the process for preparing to combine them (training) and for combining them (mobilization) may also require changing.

In the more immediate future, is there anything inherent in the transformation that will weaken or strengthen structural or attitudinal barriers to integration as currently envisioned? If these barriers become greater for any reason, the clearest of visions may dim.

Future Structural Barriers.

There are a number of potential structural barriers that could reduce AC/RC integration; some are the reinstatement of old barriers and some are unique to the characteristics of the newly transformed Army. First, the barrier that is as old as the Army, the one that over half of the existing programs are designed to help overcome, is that of resources for equipment and training. Transformation will require extraordinary levels of resources to acquire,
maintain, and train (individually and collectively) on new systems. The uneven transformation rate between the components is very likely to lead to a corresponding reduction in commitment of resources to RC combat forces. Low priority National Guard Divisional combat brigades, already low on the funding agenda, are likely to become “have-nots” for a very long time. Lower priority CS and CSS units are likely to suffer the same fate, as they do now. Transformation will not create new funding problems for low priority units, but may exacerbate the current gap and diminish any optimism that has developed over recent years.

Readiness, because of reduced resources, may be difficult to maintain for all legacy units, but will be especially difficult for lower priority units. In the early years of transformation, prior to the transformed force reaching the numbers necessary to fight a sizable war, there will be convincing arguments for keeping the legacy force at a high state of readiness; it will be the only choice to fight a strong enemy. But what about in the year 2015 when there are over five division-equivalents of objective forces (75 percent AC) and over three division-equivalents of interim forces (75 percent AC)? In the spirited competition for funds, is the winner likely to be training for existing objective and interim forces; equipping and training for a few more AC objective brigades; or training, maintaining, and “recapitalizing” over 20 brigades of mid- to low-priority legacy forces (nearly 100 percent RC)? These are difficult choices, but failure to support adequately that remaining untransformed 75 percent of the RC will certainly create the impression that they are not an important part of the “Total Army.” Under circumstances that are short of war or without some relatively prestigious mission, those RC units will probably be less than enthusiastic about training while waiting their turn to transform.

The call for RC mission specialization is not a new phenomenon, but seems to be more frequent and better intended in recent years. These recommendations are not
always directly tied to transformation, but may be seen as a means to gain more productive use of slower-mobilizing RC units in an Army that is emphasizing rapid deployment and rapid victory. If the transformation and war plans develop as planned, a unit taking 90 to 120 days to mobilize will miss the war. Some contend that the RC “as a whole will almost assuredly not be fully transformed technologically” because of costs and operational concerns, and recommend that the RC be the lead for expeditionary missions, all but replacing “AC forces in the key role of ‘shaping’ the international security environment.” Another contends that “National Guard brigades must be reorganized and retrained for the specific demands of the urban environment.” It is not clear why any component must retain a special structure or be “reorganized” for this mission if the transformed force, including the interim force, is as versatile as it is intended to be.

RCE-05 and other sources propose an enhanced role for homeland defense/security be given to the RC. Hart-Rudman goes further, recommending that “the National Guard be given homeland security as a primary mission [and] be reorganized, trained, and equipped to undertake that mission.” They further recommend that “the National Guard should redistribute resources currently allocated predominantly to preparing for conventional wars overseas.” Again, it is not clear why the National Guard needs to reorganize to perform a “primary mission” that has been their major mission for many years. The assumption can only be that a warfighting structure is not appropriate for homeland security and that the National Guard is no longer needed for the warfighting mission. The National Guard is not likely to support either assumption but is likely to support minor structural adjustments to place further emphasis on recognized new demands for their traditional homeland security mission.

A former member of the AC/RC Integration Council of Colonels takes a different tack; he would not change the missions, but would adjust roles within existing missions to
account for slower deployment by RC forces. Such an adjustment would have negative consequences for allocating resources to the RC unless the Army is willing to change its "first to fight" prioritization system. Moreover, war plans already account for variation within the RC in their deployment speeds. For instance, the MTMC deployment and port operations units, nearly all RC, are occasionally activated and/or deployed prior to most AC units. Likewise, the rates of deployment for combat units vary greatly in war plans, but higher echelon RC combat units are usually slower to deploy than their AC counterparts.

Is being specialized, deliberately developing different capabilities and missions, necessarily a structural barrier? If one takes literally Assistant Secretary Cragin's 1998 definition of a "fully integrated Total Force[as] the ability to use National Guard, Reserve, and Active duty personnel interchangeably," the answer would have to be yes. If one believes the essence of integration is in the effective combining of components, then the respective roles are less important than the understanding, appreciating, and combining of the roles for a united effort. Specialization in that case would not necessarily be a barrier. However, if some specialized roles are considered less important, components with those roles could become "separate but not equal." At the very least, broad specialization for one component should be approached with caution. On the other hand, demands for being interchangeable seem unnecessary and unrealistic. Resistance to such specialization may be based on a long-standing fear that if the RC is assigned special roles, those roles will be what the AC does not want or value. The degree to which the ARNG and USAR are embracing new or expanded roles, such as homeland security, indicates to some degree that such a fear is abating, that the roles have high value, and that RC leaders believe that seeking roles aligned with their "unique" core competencies are in their interest. The AC, in turn, seems to support the RC's role expansion by providing resources,
prestige, and some force structure for predominantly RC missions.

**Future Attitudinal Barriers.**

To a large extent, attitudinal barriers could be expected to increase if structural barriers increase. The current levels of trust and good will among the components were gained slowly and with difficulty, through building personal relationships and, to a larger extent, real changes that symbolize promises kept. In the transforming Army, RC leaders will certainly perceive the reinstatement of structural barriers as the breaking of those promises. How fragile is the current trust among component leaders? Many RC leaders indicate that no great depth of lasting trust has yet developed; they continually seek confirmation that their trust is well placed, sounding the call to “work together unencumbered by the old notional barriers of the past.” Former Secretary William Cohen emphasized that “readiness and trust” were desirable future conditions, necessary for integration, something yet to attain. He was admitting that we are not yet at the desirable levels of either. In the 4 years since, there have undoubtedly been some gains in both, but there is a distance yet to go.

The underlying assumption for integration programs’ efforts to change attitudes is that increased interaction, especially that relating to mutual missions, among members from the AC and RC will increase familiarity, reliance, appreciation, and trust, all of which are indicators of favorable attitudes. The logic of such assumptions depends on those interactions being positive, thereby providing impetus for changing attitudes for the better rather than reinforcing old negative ones and breeding contempt. Such a process is at best slow and is not particularly reliable; but, without increased interaction, there would be little chance of attitudinal change.

Does what we know about the transforming or transformed Army have implications for attitudinal
barriers? We know that while transforming there will be competition for scarce resources and probably increased friction among leaders. There is danger that friction may concentrate at traditional fault lines, such as between components. During rapid change and stress, the focus tends to be inward, possibly challenging external efforts to keep cross-component unit affiliations healthy. It is difficult to imagine that AC units in the midst of fielding and training on new equipment will make unit affiliation obligations a high priority. Training organizations will be converting equipment and expertise to new tactics and systems, probably at the expense of helping late transformers, which will often be lower priority RC units that are at the bottom of the training chain.

OLD PROGRAMS—NEW ARMY

Of the programs and initiatives assessed in Part I, not all are likely to be useful during transformation for increasing integration or even maintaining those levels achieved in recent years. The programs need to be identified that can best avoid the potential transformation-related problems with structural and attitudinal barriers. Analyzing program success in an uncertain future is certainly more difficult than was the attempt in Part I to determine current utility. But the foregoing discussion has provided a focus for evaluating future programs. In general, a program is likely to remain useful if it is currently successful for a large portion of the Army and we accept the assumption that the Army’s operating environment will not significantly change. The current programs that were deemed effective in Part I are likely to continue to be successful unless the barrier being addressed by that program becomes unimportant in the transformed Army. Some programs, based on anticipated conditions, may become even more useful, while others have less value.
Usefulness of Legacy Integration Programs.

The programs that are most successful now are those that promote vigorous, focused, and productive affiliation between AC and RC units. These programs include Teaming and AC Associate Unit Mentor Relationships. Both, in addition to Training Support XXI, are linked to the AC/RC Association Program as described in FORSCOM Regulation 350-4. These programs, as a package, address a large number of significant structural and attitudinal barriers and significantly affect a large portion of the total Army. They are programs familiar to the Army leadership since they represent an improved version of the successful Capstone program. The barriers they address are the very ones most likely to create integration digression during transformation, especially in the middle and late years of the process. These barriers could include loss of affiliation focus, decreased training funds and opportunities for later transforming units, isolation of specialized units, decreased interpersonal bonds across components, decreased commonality of experience and prestige between high priority transformed units and their low priority legacy unit peers, decreased appreciation of legacy roles, decreased readiness in increasingly less relevant low priority units, and concentration of have-nots in one component more than another.

To a degree, multi-component units and integrated division programs are a specialized subset of the AC/RC association program. Both programs serve smaller target populations, but address many of the same barriers as the other affiliation programs. The multi-component program places personnel from different components in the same unit, making individuals, rather than units, affiliated. But a common unit identification code is not sufficient to remove many of the same differences that units experience. The AC and RC personnel continue to have different amounts of training, different personnel management systems and requirements, and a different process and time line for
deployment (with the legal stipulation for mobilization for RC unit members).

The integrated division program, now only a training association, would be even more effective if allowed to mature to its second phase and become a deployable division. As a deployable division, the program would become the only higher echelon program for combat units to integrate across all joining dimensions. The program would continue to have peacetime challenges since they would still share “chain-of-command” with the states (for their ARNG brigades) and possibly with the USAR (for some additional divisional support troops).

Both programs, but especially the multi-component program, are relatively “high maintenance.” They require more unique memoranda of agreement and special legislation, for their size, than the other programs, and they are novel enough to be considered experimental. The cost-benefit ratio of these programs, in terms of management, political capital, and inter-component stress, will at least restrict their growth and perhaps cause their eventual demise.

The AC/RC Battalion Command Exchange Program can continue its modest contribution to integration, though with increased difficulty during the period when the RC is predominantly a legacy force, and the AC is nearly transformed. The Integrated Light Infantry Battalions might also rise to that level, just in time to become obsolete. Force XXI Heavy Division Redesign is likely to expand enough to make some of the legacy force more effective, but is not likely to increase its value to integration beyond its current negligible effects.

Operational programs, such as the Bosnia Task Force and additional similar programs, are likely to be with us for a long while. For the near future, they will probably continue their contribution to removing attitudinal barriers and serve as an opportunity to exercise the effectiveness of the AC/RC Association Programs. In the long term, their
usefulness for improving the image of the RC and the self-concept of some of its members will diminish, unless such missions become high prestige missions for the legacy force. Long term commitment to such programs, with gradual removal of AC participation, may move the RC to one form of specialization and all the potential pitfalls of such separateness. At its worst, such programs could become an excuse not to transform or to transform portions of the RC differently.

**New Programs.**

Most of the preceding discussion has emphasized the potential negative effects of transformation, looking at legacy programs and traditional ways to integrate, with integration defined as bringing different Army components’ units, individuals, and equipment together for operations. Such views are useful since we will be operating with legacy programs, forces, and definitions for many more years. But transformation may eventually lead to new ways of thinking about integration; instead of combining units, where people have to be brought together, we may reach a point where we combine capabilities, but not necessarily people. An example of how we do some of this already is found in the CSS community. The day-to-day ordering of supplies is done at several locations in the United States. In time of deployment, the activity location does not move but a small flyaway team goes forward to transmit orders electronically back to the activity. The RC role in the activity varies by location. In some, the RC provides the daily activity personnel and the flyaway team. In others, the RC moves to the activity to replace the AC who comprises the flyaway team. In others, the RC is purposely redundant, offering backup or expansion capabilities. As new technology provides ever greater “reach” to more aspects of making war, physical location of the soldier becomes less relevant than how far and how effectively he/she can reach. As personnel systems become more compatible across components, the need to move some soldiers to mobilization
stations for post-mobilization “soldier readiness processing” should disappear.

It is not yet clear whether changes will eventually require a “transformation of integration.” We cannot yet know what these new ways of doing business will mean for integration, but they portend change in both Army capabilities (for all components) and how we combine those capabilities to maximize effectiveness. What we know is that we need to be prepared to change and that the programs that are useful now may have to be adapted for relevance in 20 years. We are slowly and painfully adjusting traditional methods of mobilization (one aspect of integration), though far slower than technological advances would allow. We have only slowly begun allowing home station mobilization, even though in 1989 a transportation unit was successfully mobilized for Operation DESERT STORM at its annual training site, without returning to home station or going through its mobilization station. 67 In the intervening 12 years, vast improvements in personnel system compatibility and technology have yielded only modest increases in mobilization flexibility. We will need to adjust more rapidly to the coming changes.

CONCLUSIONS

Even the most cynical analyst is likely to admit that there have been huge improvements in AC/RC integration over the past 30 years and significant reemphasis over the past 10 years. Over the past 2 to 3 years, there has been a decrease in the number of new programs and DoD initiatives, possibly because our very success has decreased the amount left to fix, or because we have already fixed the easy part, or because of some combination of the two. To complicate the overall evaluation, the last 10 years have been a fairly stable time for the Army in terms of fielding major weapons systems and doctrine. This stability, combined with increased information processing capabilities, has generated a nearly ideal medium for
integration. Finally, for the last 3 to 4 years, senior leaders of the three Army components have increased cooperation, allowing many of the new programs an optimal chance to succeed.

Transformation, an unstable medium, has the potential to decrease integration, at least temporarily, because of uneven transformation and strains on affiliation. Combined with external dynamics, like moving towards specialization, the setbacks for integration could be substantial.

Existing programs for integration vary widely in their demonstrated success at integrating our Army. Taken as a whole, they address most of the structural and attitudinal barriers to integration, at least for that portion of the Army they target, and cover all the joining dimensions. But no single program of large span or high impact covers all the dimensions, nor do they combine to address all barriers for all of the Army. The most effective programs, like their predecessors, are loosely grouped as AC/RC Association Programs. These are successful because they are related and collectively reach a large portion of the Army, they address both structural and attitudinal barriers for all dimensions of joining, and they work at the interpersonal and organizational levels where there is potential for operational outcomes for all parties in the association. They still fall short of the ideal of being a single program that effectively addresses both types of barriers for all of the Army, across all dimensions.

Accordingly, the existing programs that are best suited to sustain integration during transformation are probably those that continue to enhance effective and relevant associations. Supporting and, if possible, expanding the most effective programs represent our best chance to get through the transformation with an integrated Army. But more is needed. Gaps left in even the best of present programs need to be filled, and existing programs need support from aforementioned DoD initiatives, especially
those that create greater flexibility and efficiency in mobilization, the process that is seldom addressed by Army programs.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendations for supporting AC/RC integration during the transformation process and the subsequent objective force follow four lines: (1) support and expand the most effective current programs while creating new programs, (2) avoid choosing roles and missions that segregate the force; (3) change the mobilization process to fit the transformed force; and (4) conduct periodic analyses to determine how the force is changing and the effects of that change on AC/RC integration.

Programs.

AC/RC Integration Programs should be improved in two ways: (1) support the ones that are currently effective by addressing their problems and by selectively expanding them to include more of the Army, and (2) create new programs that provide greater barrier and joining dimension coverage, consolidate the best characteristics of existing programs, and address new issues that emerge as the Army transforms.

With regard to (1), support the most effective current programs, those under the umbrella of the AC/RC Association Program. Support them by correcting problems with the Training Support XXI Program through fully funding and providing quality personnel to meet training requirements. The issue of lower promotion rates should be examined to determine its cause and then addressed to resolve the issue. The additional step of expanding the program to meet needs of lower priority RC units would go far towards convincing the entire RC that they are a valued and integrated part of the Army.
The Active Component Associate Unit Mentor Relationship Program, another part of the AC/RC Association Program, needs to be evaluated for its effectiveness, and subsequent actions should be taken as needed to sustain or enhance the program. The nature of mentoring and the Army’s attempt to institutionalize it makes evaluating the program’s effectiveness very difficult, even within a component. Evaluation may show that mentoring needs to be decoupled from the evaluation scheme, the chain of command, or the training oversight function. Certainly mentoring has value, but the reciprocal nature of the mentoring relationship demands a context that cannot be forced, but may be fostered rather by encouraging development of trust between any more experienced leader and one in need of his or her advice.

When possible, RC units should be selected for transformation when their affiliated AC units are selected. Going through the traumatic transformation experience together is likely to enhance affiliation; transforming on very different schedules, thereby emphasizing differences, is likely to decrease the effectiveness of affiliation. The different rate of transformation among components will make concurrent cross-component change difficult, but should be factored, to the extent possible, into the scheduling of units.

The Multi-component Units Program is a kind of affiliation program, only at the individual level, thus far involving units from a variety of echelons, branches, and component headquarters. This experimental approach is admirable, but now research is needed to determine if there is greater effectiveness, in terms of integration, efficiency, readiness, etc., from particular combinations of echelons, branches, and component headquarters than from others. Further research should determine if this program produces better results, using the same norms, than more traditional and less invasive affiliation programs. The Multi-component Units Program can warrant support only if the answer to the latter question is yes and results from
the former lead to selection of units with an optimal chance of success. Anecdotal evidence seems to support high-echelon multi-component staff organizations but show less benefit or even major difficulty for lower echelon early deploying units. There is little evidence, for instance, that two multi-component maintenance companies offer deployment or risk avoidance advantages over one AC and one RC maintenance company, assuming that both combinations are adequately resourced to sustain acceptable readiness levels.

With regard to (2), new programs may also be needed. A round-up program has already been proposed and the Army is committed to its eventual implementation for the ARNG’s enhanced brigades. As the nature of the transformed Army becomes clearer, the round-up concept’s usefulness needs to be further evaluated.

Moving the Integrated Division Program to phase II is a change whose magnitude results in an essentially new program. To become a deployable division, additional combat, CS, and CSS structure would be required. By using the 7th Infantry Division as the model, the division commander is also the post commander for the division’s RC units’ mobilization station and is responsible for validating their post-mobilization training. This “new” program would be remarkable in its total dimensional coverage of the joining process, with close training oversight of RC units in RC status, responsibility for mobilizing the units and post-mobilization training, evaluation of their readiness for deployment, and command and control during operations.

Transformation and interdependent maneuver may, in the long term, allow any division to be integrated because of the diminishing importance of spatial proximity to and temporal congruity of their subordinate units. The ability to command and control a larger number of such disparate units assumes giant leaps in information technology and management. Though alien to how we now join units together, ultimate integration would be achieved by a
continuous association, from training through operating, at relatively lower levels of command (divisional). As now organized, the divisional headquarters and staff would be predominantly AC. In a future where the headquarters may only partially deploy, augmented RC divisions may also have the ability to perform the role.

A Cross-component Migration Program has also been proposed to allow relatively easy movement of personnel from one component to another, without damaging careers. There are clear integrative advantages of such a program, but there are significant personnel management obstacles to overcome before it would be practical. The Active Guard/Reserve (AGR) program, on the surface, might appear to be a prototype for cross-component migration. But the AGR program, especially that portion governed by Title 10, U.S. Code, falls short as a model since its personnel cannot easily move from full-time to part-time status, especially since the AGR Program has become recognized as a career program. In fact, integration of AGRs into USAR and ARNG units is an intra-component issue, in addition to the issue of integrating them into predominantly AC organizations. The ARNG, with both Title 10 and Title 32 AGR programs, has an additional set of unique issues.

Roles and Missions.

The drive towards specialization is likely to continue, supporting such missions as homeland security, peacekeeping contingencies, urban warfare, and others. Some of the missions are likely to be seen as “a natural” for the RC. If integration remains a goal, making any mission exclusively RC should be avoided. Requiring specialization to cross component boundaries will help, but not guarantee, the prestige of the mission and avoid the return to “separate but not equal” components.

Cross-component specialization does not prohibit making one component the lead for certain types of missions. In fact, integration is likely to be enhanced by
making the RC lead for high prestige missions if those missions are achievable within the constraints imposed on the RC's core competencies, accessibility, training, and funding.

**Mobilization Process.**

We do not yet know what changes will be needed in the mobilization process because of transforming the Army, but we do know that changes are inevitable. FORSCOM will likely remain responsible for mobilizing Army forces, though some developments, such as the DoD common access card, will change some traditional mobilization requirements. FORSCOM should be supported in its analysis of what mobilization process changes will be required to support the transformed force structure and doctrine. FORSCOM’s options to introduce greater flexibility into the process should be enhanced by fielding of the DoD common access card and by HQDA’s personnel system compatibility initiatives.

**Periodic Analyses.**

The truth is that we cannot yet know what the transforming force will look like at any point in the future. It is imperative that changes in the force and its consequences for integration be constantly monitored. Timely monitoring, along with program analysis, will allow necessary adjustments in existing integration programs and provide impetus for developing new programs or DoD initiatives. It will allow the Army leadership to identify and repair minor breaks in cross-component solidarity before they become serious rifts. Preventing rifts that cause our Army to veer from a united transformational path should continue to be one of our most important goals.
ENDNOTES


4. The uniqueness of the U.S. Army reserve system is discussed in Charles C. Moskos, The Sociology of Army Reserves: A Comparative Assessment, Defense Technical Information Center, July, 1990. That uniqueness includes (1) greater required training time, (2) reliance on its own full-time support, (3) a developed career path with corresponding professional military education, and (4) greater limitations on vacation time because U.S. reservists are more likely to use it for training. The U.S. Army Reserve may become less unique as some European, Australian, and other militaries change their reserve systems. As an example, see “An Army With Too Little In Reserve,” Sydney Morning Herald, May 14, 2001, http://ebird.dtic.mil/May2001/s20010506anarmy.htm.


8. Examples of these barriers include the five stages of mobilization specified in Title 10, U.S. Code and the dual (State and Federal) missions of the Army National Guard. In subsequent sections of this monograph, current barriers and those programs designed to overcome them will be described.
9. Heller, p. 12-13. Heller provides an excellent summary of the legislative reforms from 1903 to 1947 and attempted reforms before that period. Since 1947 there have been many changes in law to further mold the RC, but change has been more gradual, causing few writers to refer to those changes as reform.


14. There remain disagreements about the issue of proper balance, between keeping component distinctions that were intentionally and legally created and the desire to selectively remove those distinctions, when legally allowed, during times of crisis or conflict. Congress has been reluctant to remove distinctions during times of peace, but over time has expanded the definition of crisis and conflict. On-line access to important legislation can be found at http://www4.law.cornell.edu/uscode/10/index.text.html and http://www4.law.cornell.edu/uscode/32/index.text.html.


16. Shaver, pp. 11-12. Shaver recommends an outline for success that includes needed actions, gestures, and concepts to implement. The two most important programmatic concepts—“eliminate roundout as we know it today” and “make a new, flexible CAPSTONE an AC top priority”—have been largely implemented.


24. Force Structure: Army is Integrating, pp. 6-7, lists the four Army “integration initiatives” that they intend to examine in their report. In Appendix I of the report, they briefly describe five additional Army initiatives, but do not analyze their impacts on the Army.


26. Force Structure: Army is Integrating, pp. 31-32.

27. The RCE-05 report offered recommendations for changes affecting employment of reserve components for all services. Only some of the recommendations were intended to increase integration. This table extracts those recommendations that potentially affect Army AC/RC integration by making the mobilization process more effective or changing structures to make using the RC easier or more effective. Recommendations directly related to the integrated division, teaming, and multi-component unit programs are omitted since these programs are discussed elsewhere. Recommendations for changes in missions, dual missioning, and creation of new units were also omitted unless the recommendations contributed to greater integration. Recommendations to examine, rather than implement, are also omitted.


30. Interviews were conducted by this author with current and former commanders from two brigades in the 7th Infantry Division and staff members of Headquarters, 7th Infantry Division, September-November 2000.

31. Force Structure Army is Integrating, p. 29.

32. John M. Keane, General and Vice Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, Comments on AC/RC Integration to the Army Reserve Forces Policy Committee (ARFPC), ARFPC Quarterly Meeting Summary, September 18, 2000.

33. Army Reserve Forces Policy Committee, Quarterly Meeting Summary, September 17-19, 2000, p. 4. Discussions about the appropriate number of in-theater days predate the issue created by the Bosnia Task Force Program. The common theme in all these discussions is to balance the impacts on soldiers and their families with those of mission accomplishment. The major issue about reducing the number of in-theater days for the National Guard Division Headquarters is whether doing so would have adverse impact on performing its mission.


36. The issue of lower promotion rates was raised by FORSCOM and confirmed by OCAR and 78th Division personnel. In FY00, the AC promotion rate to major was 15 percent lower for TS XXI captains and over 30 percent lower for promotion to lieutenant colonel for TS XXI majors.


38. Department of the Army, Memorandum for Reserve Component Coordination Council (RCCC), Subject: AC/RC Integration Item 96-11,
Active and Reserve Component Battalion Commander Exchange Program, October 13, 2000.


40. Department of the Army, Memorandum for Reserve Component Coordination Council (RCCC), Subject: AC/RC Integration Item 98-103, Light Anti-Tank Initiative, October 1, 2000.

41. Department of the Army, Memorandum for Reserve Component Coordination Council (RCCC), Subject: AC/RC Integration Item 98-104, Redesign of the Army’s Heavy Division, October 4, 2000.


43. Headquarters, Department of the Army, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations (DAMO-FD), briefing titled “Multiple-Component Action Officer Working Group September 22, 2000.”


46. Department of the Army, Memorandum for Reserve Component Coordination Council, Subject: AC/RC Integration Item 00-120, RCE05, October 2, 2000, p. 4.


48. PSRC became PRC once IRR soldiers, who are not in the Selected Reserve, became accessible under the authority of Title 10, Chapter 1209, Section 12304.


50. Assistants to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, for National Guard and Reserve Matters, “Top 14” RC Initiatives/Issues, October 2000 (updated May 2001), p. 3.


65. Ibid, p. 5.

67. The 1185th TTU was mobilized while conducting annual training at Savannah, GA. The home station was Lancaster, PA, and their mobilization station was Fort Eustis, VA. At mobilization the unit moved to Sunny Point, NC, and a contact team was sent from Fort Bragg, NC, to complete formal mobilization requirements while the unit continued conducting its mission.