“SHAPING” THE WORLD THROUGH “ENGAGEMENT”:
ASSESSING THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE’S THEATER ENGAGEMENT PLANNING PROCESS

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April 2000
The Department of Defense (DoD) launched in 1997/98 an ambitious planning initiative that could have a major impact upon how resources are allocated among the military departments and the combatant commanders-in-chief (CINCs). The National Command Authorities have directed the geographic CINCs to implement the administration’s strategy of “shaping” within their areas of responsibility. In the past, no single, unifying planning mechanism existed within the Joint Strategic Planning System to address shaping. As a result, the DoD now seeks to ensure that all shaping activities conducted by the U.S. armed forces are executed to further U.S. policy and national security objectives.

The Theater Engagement Plan (TEP) system has been in existence for almost 4 years. From its early problematic initiation and the reluctance of many in the DoD and the armed forces to take it seriously, the TEP has become a major agenda item particularly for the geographic CINCs. Many in the combatant commands see the TEP as providing an important instrument that strengthens their respective positions in the never ending struggle to obtain the forces and capabilities needed to implement theater strategies. Therefore, the TEP must be consistent with military department Title 10 responsibilities to raise, train and equip the U.S. armed forces.

The authors of this study assess the TEP with the view of analyzing how to make the planning system better. The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this study for the consideration of the national defense community, particularly those who have an interest in the joint strategic planning of the Department of Defense.

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Every dollar we devote to preventing conflicts, promoting democracy, opening markets, and containing disease and hunger brings a sure return in security and long-term savings.¹

The Department of Defense (DoD) has launched a new and ambitious planning initiative that could have a major impact upon how resources are allocated among the armed services and the combatant commands. The administration has directed the geographic combatant commanders-in-chief (CINCs) to implement the administration’s strategy of “shape, respond and prepare now.”² Of course, DoD, the Military Departments, and constituent agencies have long been accustomed to “preparing” for potential conflicts so that the U.S. armed forces could “respond” when directed by the national command authorities (NCA). “Shaping,” however, has been a bit more problematic. A very strong argument could be made that the U.S. armed services have long been engaged in shaping activities in the international environment. From U.S. Marines all but occupying and governing Caribbean and Central American countries in the early part of this century, to U.S. servicemen and women engaged in peace-enforcement operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina today, many past and present U.S. operations can be categorized as shaping activities.³

What is perhaps new is how these activities are to be planned and managed within DoD.⁴ First, the fog of strategic ambiguity that followed the Cold War has dissipated sufficiently for the administration to contemplate taking advantage of what Secretary of Defense Cohen calls a period of “... strategic opportunity.”
The threat of global war has receded and the nation's core values of representative democracy and market economics are embraced in many parts of the world, creating new opportunities to promote peace, prosperity, and enhanced cooperation among nations.\textsuperscript{5}

In other words, "shaping" seeks to promote the spread of "Western" liberal norms (e.g., representative democracy, respect for basic human rights, adherence to the rule of law, etc.), with the primary objective of obviating the need to "respond" to future crises.\textsuperscript{6} There should be no question of the growing import of "shaping" from the perspective of DoD; of the two critical corporate goals of the department as required by the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, "shaping" constitutes the first.\textsuperscript{7}

The mission of shaping is to be conducted within the framework of the administration's strategy of "engagement," which states, "[W]e must be prepared and willing to use all appropriate instruments of national power to influence the actions of other states and non-state actors."\textsuperscript{8} The administration rejects isolationism, let alone adopting a reactive, passive approach toward its relationship with the world.\textsuperscript{9} On the contrary, the world will be engaged and the adoption of Western ideals and norms will be advocated to further U.S. national interests. Shaping the international environment has become, in essence, a primary national objective, as opposed to, perhaps, an important instrument of policy.

Second, with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff playing a more direct role in the "planning" of shaping,\textsuperscript{10} DoD envisages that "shaping" will achieve greater resource efficiencies and more direct strategic relevance. DoD also has the objective of ensuring that all shaping activities conducted by the U.S. armed forces are executed within the parameters of law\textsuperscript{11} and policy.\textsuperscript{12} In this particular aspect of implementing the president's strategy, DoD faces difficult challenges and opportunities. In the past, no single, unified planning mechanism within the Joint Strategic Planning
System (JSPS) addressed the issue of “shaping.” This situation stands in contrast to the elaborate, well-developed, and time-tested planning methodology the Joint Staff (acting on behalf of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS)), employs in directing the geographic combatant commanders-in-chief to develop deliberate war plans. In effect, the Joint Staff and combatant commanders are now asserting greater influence and control over the shaping activities that the armed forces have been carrying out for many years.

The method designed by the CJCS to bring discipline and central control to these diffuse activities is the recently introduced “Theater Engagement Planning” process. The five geographic combatant CINCs and the Joint Staff (acting as an Executive Agent for two Theater Engagement Plans [TEPs]) have been tasked by the CJCS to develop TEPs which express their “... intent, priorities, tasks and resources required to achieve objectives over the [Future Year Defense Program].”

Heretofore geographic combatant CINCs individually employed their assigned forces for shaping activities without discernible corporate consideration of relative costs and global priorities. Furthermore, these commanders have been primarily concerned with executing operations and conducting deliberate planning and the key resource allocation battles have traditionally been fought among the Services. The TEP process could provide the combatant CINCs a stronger opportunity to influence this politically sensitive debate. Moreover, given the criticality of shaping missions, combatant commanders may now have a new objective mechanism to compete for resources. The implications for the assignment of roles and definition of missions among the various components of the U.S. armed services are staggering.

The purpose of this essay is to assess the TEP system in order to identify problems and recommend reforms to improve the overall process. The authors argue that
although the TEP program is an important step in the right direction, it has a number of weaknesses that need to be eliminated if DoD is to gain better control over, and provide direction to, shaping activities. At the same time, a reformed "TEP" process could replace certain atavistic Cold War planning practices with those suited to the current international environment. In view of the potential for such far-reaching implications, it is in the best interests of the U.S. Government and DoD that the TEP process be refined as quickly as possible.

Background.

The National Military Strategy defines shaping in the following way:

U.S. Armed Forces help shape the international environment primarily through their inherent deterrent qualities and through peacetime military engagement. The shaping element of our strategy helps foster the institutions and international relationships that constitute a peaceful strategic environment by promoting stability; preventing and reducing conflict and threats; and deterring aggression and coercion.15

And indeed, particularly since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. armed forces have been involved in shaping the international security environment. Partnership for Peace (PfP) exercises and exchanges, International Military Education and Training, mobile education team seminars under the Expanded International Military Education and Training program, in addition to the "Enhanced Relations" programs and activities which have been undertaken by U.S. Army Pacific since the mid-1970s, are but a very few of the types of missions in which the armed services are now engaged.16 More to the point, "shaping" is not a partisan issue or ephemeral policy. The National Defense Panel, a bipartisan body hardly known for shying away from criticizing the administration's defense policy, strongly endorsed the concept of shaping.17 "Done well, [shaping] will enable the United States and its allies to influence and
shape future security environments to our mutual
benefit."

What has been missing in these engagement programs is
an effective and coherent national-level method of
orchestrating and effecting a priority of these activities
above the level of individual geographic combatant
commander’s regional focus. To be sure, there are
inter-agency processes in Washington for coordinating and
approving various shaping activities, funded by the
Services, and executed under the command authority of the
geographic combatant CINCs. Until the CJCS and
combatant CINCs implemented the TEP process, however,
there was no mechanism for an individual, let alone
collective, assessment of the efficacy of these activities. In
other words, there have been no centralized means of
examining whether, or to what extent, the various
CINC-conducted shaping activities supported the national
strategy of engagement. There have been no accepted
standard measures of effectiveness or merit. While there
are a number of avenues that combatant commanders have
to influence the program objective memoranda (POMs) of
the military departments, there are no specific means to
rationalize the provision of forces for CINCs’ engagement
programs to ensure the most effective and efficient
employment of defense resources by the combatant CINCs.

The release of the president’s 1997 National Security
Strategy marked a significant change from the 1995 edition
in that the 1995 strategy of “engagement” was given greater
fidelity and direction in 1997 through “shaping.” The 1997
document establishes the need to “shape, respond, prepare
now” which was strongly reflected in the administration’s
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). These forces brought
to the fore in DoD the need for a disciplined approach to
planning and executing shaping missions. A major obstacle
to overcome was the issue of whether, and how, the CJCS
should become involved in a process traditionally left
largely to the discretion of the combatant CINCs. Any
attempt to provide oversight over the shaping activities of
the CINCs clash with a widely held institutional view that the geographic combatant CINCs know best their respective areas of responsibility and should be left alone to carry out their missions. After all, as stipulated in Title 10, the geographic CINCs (vice the Joint Staff) carry out deliberate planning in their areas of responsibility (AORs) in accordance with direction from the Chairman contained in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP). \(^{20}\) The plans developed by the CINCs are individually reviewed and approved by the CJCS. \(^{21}\)

The reluctance by CINCs’ staffs to expand the planning system to provide the Chairman with a means to influence shaping missions was overcome by the Chairman and the Director of the Joint Staff whose personal involvement expedited the acceptance of the TEP concept. Subsequently, planners from the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff developed planning guidance to incorporate DoD shaping missions. This important reform initiative was formalized by the revision of the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) in September 1997. The new CJCS Instruction stated that the JSCP would task CINCs to develop, inter alia, “theater engagement plans (TEP) for peacetime engagement.” The NCA, via the Contingency Planning Guidance document, will direct the Chairman to specify which types of engagement and shaping activities will be carried out by the U.S. armed forces. \(^{22}\)

**The Theater Engagement Planning Process.**

Contingency Planning Guidance (CPG). The CPG is required by law to be promulgated annually and is a close-hold, highly classified document with limited circulation. \(^{23}\) The CPG contains contingency planning guidance from the NCA that is directly translated by the Chairman into the JSCP’s taskings to the CINCs. Following the QDR and as part of the Office of the Secretary of Defense’s keen interest in seeing a more disciplined method
of managing shaping missions, TEP guidance was established in the September 1997 CPG:

1. Directed the development of regional CINC TEPs . . . to include the full range of engagement activities . . .

2. Defined “Theater Engagement.”

3. Directed that TEPs be based on Prioritized Regional Objectives.

4. Established a submission, review and approval process.

The appended “Prioritized Regional Objectives” were to be pursued by the geographic combatant commanders and are articulated in the following priority:

Tier I: shaping activities to be carried out;

Tier II: shaping activities to be carried out to the extent possible; and,

Tier III: shaping activities to be carried out as resources permit.

A major weakness in the Prioritized Regional Objectives in the 1997 CPG is the absence of stated priorities across theaters or regions, or even within tiered objectives. One combatant command planner criticized the Prioritized Regional Objectives stating that they are far too detailed (i.e., they are, in effect, “tasks,” vice objectives). Moreover, priorities among the combatant commands have yet to be established. A slight, but significant, nuance in the transmission of this guidance is that Prioritized Regional Objectives are established in the CPG by regions, vice being aligned with the Unified Command Plan’s (UCP) division of geographic areas of responsibilities for the geographic combatant commanders to facilitate their contingency planning.

Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP). As part of the deliberate planning process the JSCP provides guidance and apportions resources to the regional combatant
commanders. With the guidance and requirements provided by the CPG, the Chairman subsequently tasks the combatant CINCs, through the JSCP, to prepare their respective operation plans, e.g., contingency plans, or in some cases, functional plans. The revisions initiated by the TEP process led to the current JSCP including a chapter (Enclosure E, Engagement Planning Guidance) which transmits the Prioritized Regional Objectives from the CPG. Initial guidance in the JSCP for TEP directed the CINCs to shape the security environment in peacetime with the following objectives:

1. Access, interoperability, regional stability,
2. Strengthen coalitions, and
3. Facilitate the ability to respond.

This revision, in effect, gives the JSCP a dual role: It is now an operational document, as well as a deliberate planning tool. The JSCP’s Prioritized Regional Objectives are given in the following order of import:

- Tier I: vital
- Tier II: important
- Tier III: lesser important

The JSCP further reflects three categories of TEP events as defined in the CJCS Manual on Theater Engagement Planning:

1. operations
2. exercises
3. other foreign military interaction (FMI), e.g., ship visits, military-to-military contacts, International Military Education and Training, etc.

With this guidance the CINCs are expected to produce two additional planning documents.
First, the CINCs and Executive Agents must develop a Theater Engagement Strategic Concept. This is defined as containing,

... a narrative statement of how engagement activities will be employed to support achieving the CINC’s or executive Agent’s objectives. [It] becomes the foundation of the TEP and includes the commander’s intent; prioritized objectives; and a general discussion of the engagement tasks and activities. Additionally, it identifies at the macro-level the forces and other resources required to accomplish the mission.

Theater Engagement Strategic Concepts look out 5 years and remain effective until updated or superceded by regional developments or prioritized regional objectives are changed in the CPG or the JSCP. The initial strategic concepts were due to the Joint Staff on April 1, 1998.

Second, CINCs and Executive Agents develop Engagement Activity Annexes to their Theater Engagement Strategic Concepts. These annexes, all of which support the CINC’s strategic concept, address the specific military activities (operations, exercises, and foreign military interaction) that will take place each year of the 5 years covered by the TEP. The J SCP does not assign forces specifically for shaping. Rather, as a starting point, combatant CINCs plan their shaping activities using forces assigned to the combatant command (from the “Forces For” document), forces that rotationally deploy to the theater, and those forces temporarily deployed for engagement activities. Any significant resource shortfalls are identified and theoretically adjudicated in the TEP review process. The CINCs submitted the initial Engagement Activity Annexes (designated as a “trial run” by the Joint Staff) to the Joint Staff on August 1, 1998.

National Level Review of TEPs. After CINCs have approved their TEPs, they are forwarded to the Joint Staff for “review” and integration. The Chairman is responsible for ensuring that TEPs conform to the CPG’s policy guidance. In this review capacity he is responsible for
informing the NCA of strengths and deficiencies in these plans and judging the impact such inadequacies could have on achieving national strategic objectives and policies. The Joint Staff Operational Plans and Interoperability Directorate (J-7), specifically the Conventional War Plans Division, is charged with overseeing the TEP review process. The process affords review by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, the Services, and Defense Agencies, as well. The criteria for review assesses whether strategic concepts and supporting annexes support the JSCP regional objective priorities, as well as additional guidance derived from other national-level documents. Specifically, the review process uses three criteria:

1. adequacy (does the plan satisfy JSCP tasks and other guidance?),
2. feasibility (is resource availability adequate to requirements?), and
3. acceptability (is the plan worth the cost?).

If the review finds any deficiencies, the responsible command will be required to address these issues and perhaps make changes. Once the TEPs have been reviewed, they are integrated into a “global family of plans” and submitted as a whole to the Chairman for his approval, and thereafter, for further review by the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.

Assessing the TEP Process.

As a general observation one must not be too critical of DoD’s effort to introduce a disciplined planning system to shaping activities conducted by the U.S. armed forces. The TEP initiative attempts to exert control over diffuse and long-standing defense activities and programs. Significantly, these activities and programs were established by various pieces of key legislation and administered widely throughout the U.S. defense community. Given the importance the administration has
placed on shaping the international environment through engagement, the rapid introduction of the TEP process should be seen as a significant advancement in planning. In light of instituting a new process within DoD, the initial planning guidance was envisaged as a first effort in an evolutionary process. In view of the novel nature of this planning process, however, a number of procedural and conceptual problems have surfaced.

There are two levels of analysis when assessing the TEP. First, does the current system, as designed, work? Second, does the current TEP system feature the necessary linkages to the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS) and the Joint Strategic Planning System? The authors argue that not only does the current TEP system possess what can fairly be described as shortcomings, but the system, as it now exists, is unlikely to introduce the necessary discipline effectively and efficiently to execute the shaping element of the president’s strategy. More specifically, an examination of the TEP system indicates that many of its key features are not yet in harmony with the JSPS and PPBS and, therefore, sub-optimally respond to the direction provided by the NCA. This section identifies where specific shortcomings in the existing TEP process exists and recommends reforms to the TEP and JSPS processes. If implemented, these improvements should enable the process to support better a strategy for shaping the international security environment, while ensuring U.S. forces remain capable of responding to challenges to U.S. national interests.

1. Measuring merit/effectiveness. An essential aspect of strategic planning is the requirement for senior leaders to establish priorities and develop a mechanism to monitor compliance with their guidance. The current TEP process fails to define or to examine what constitutes effective shaping activities. While the system is well structured to inform the Joint Staff what the geographic combatant CINCs and their Executive Agents are doing, it is currently incapable of demonstrating how effectively they are
carrying out these activities. The TEP process, as currently
designed, does not set forth an appropriate “measure of
merit/effectiveness.” This major oversight inhibits the
Chairman’s ability to assess which “activities” conducted by
a geographic CINC are more or less effective than others.
For example, a combatant CINC can claim that “presence”
is a shaping activity, but he is not asked in the process to
demonstrate how this is an effective tool of “engagement.”

The lack of a standardized, across-combatant command
system to measure the merit/effectiveness of shaping
activities conducted within combatant commands negates
any attempt to assess all of the TEPs, individually and
collectively. If priorities within regions were established, an
absence of measures of merit/effectiveness precludes
efficient application of scarce resources to accomplish
regional objectives. Even if inter-regional priorities were
established at the national level, it follows that the lack of
measures of merit/effectiveness prevents efficient
allocation of resources among regions or commands.

2. Title 10, United States Code Ambiguities. Closely
linked to the lack of measures of effectiveness is the
politically sensitive issue of Title 10 authority of the
Services that relates to the actual costs associated with the
shaping activities conducted by the CINCs. While Title 10,
U.S. Code designates that combatant CINCs possess
“combatant command” over their assigned forces, CINCs
possess little budgetary control over forces provided by the
Services. Financial control remains predominantly within
the grasp of the Military Departments. Such control is
established by Title 10 Service functions that include the
responsibilities to “raise, train, and equip” the force. The
Services continue to guard their Title 10 authorities against
encroachment by the combatant commanders.

As a result of this legal and bureaucratic history,
combatant command headquarters are not in a good
position to ascertain the effectiveness and efficiency of
shaping activities. Even the Services are not well-prepared
to provide this type of detailed information because shaping activities are not segregated in Service Program Objective Memoranda (POMs). In short, TEP planning and execution conducted by the combatant CINCs, and the activities of the Services in providing TEP forces, are not harmonized to ensure effective and efficient shaping activities. Therefore, TEP activities cannot be assessed, even on a discrete command or Service basis. While addressing this problem could result in visceral reactions by the Services to such scrutiny and resistance by the combatant CINCs to such oversight, an essential aspect behind the development of TEP, i.e., the ability to judge overall effectiveness of engagement activities, will be unattainable otherwise.

3. Future Years Defense Program. An early problematic issue concerning TEP was its incompatibility with the important Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS), the process by which DoD translates military capability requirements into defense programs and budget items. As initially structured, the submission of the Engagement Activity Annexes was not aligned with the POM development process. The TEP process was initially planned to cover the immediately succeeding 5 years, while the Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP) covers the period 2-8 years from the present. This programmatic mismatch further isolated engagement activities from being considered in the Services' development of force requirements. The top-down guidance provided in the engagement planning process is in the form of the CPG's Prioritized Regional Objectives, whereas the budgetary authority to develop forces resides in the Services who build their programs in a bottom-up fashion. Not surprisingly, after the first "trial run" of the TEP, five of the six CINCs' TEPs had unfunded activities. Also, the dates of the CINCs' TEP submissions were not aligned with submission of their Integrated Priority Lists (IPLs), further inhibiting TEP from influencing the PPBS process.

In a move to improve this situation, the Director of the Joint Staff effected several important reforms in February
First, TEP Strategic Concepts will be submitted every other year (vice yearly as initially envisaged), except in certain circumstances. Second, Engagement Activity Annexes will be submitted annually on October 1, in harmony with the Integrated Priority List submissions by the combatant CINCs. IPLs are employed by the combatant commanders as a way to submit their force program priorities through the CJ CS to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Program Analysis and Evaluation. Third and finally, the reform extended the planning horizon from 5 to 7 years, aligning the last 6 years of this planning period with the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG), as well as with the Future Years Defense Program. Significantly, combatant commanders will be able to identify force requirements for shaping early enough to include them in their IPLs.

4. “Review” vice “Assessment” of TEPs. One will recall that the current TEP system specifies that the CINCs’ plans are reviewed and presented for approval to the CJ CS as a part of a “globally-integrated family of engagement plans.” Thus, the Joint Staff chose not to “review” TEPs against each other. In effect, the lack of measures of merit/effectiveness limits the review of the Joint Staff simply to examining whether a particular commander’s Theater Engagement Strategic Concept is supported by the accompanying Engagement Activity Annexes. There is, as yet, no step that assesses whether a specific TEP supports national objectives. Where there are shortfalls, the lack of comparable data at the strategic level inhibits the Chairman from being able to make informed resource decisions. Indeed, one can see where “have” CINCs (e.g., EUCOM) will wish to protect their peacetime allocated forces by demonstrating their heavy involvement in shaping, while “have not” CINCs (e.g., U.S. Southern Command) may attempt to master the TEP process to establish that their shaping requirements necessitate a higher peacetime allocation of forces. Again, strategy, disciplined planning, and priorities are likely to be left out of the decisionmaking equation.
At the heart of this particular weakness in the TEP process is the decision to incorporate TEP directly into the Chairman’s deliberate planning system. The review criteria, one recalls, is essentially the same as that employed when reviewing deliberate plans developed by the combatant commanders: (1) feasibility, (2) adequacy, and (3) acceptability. Two fundamental problems result from the decision to incorporate TEP into the deliberate planning system. One relates specifically to TEP and the other, much broader than TEP, concerns the incomplete adherence by the CJCS to statutory strategic planning requirements.

As to the first point, the decision to incorporate TEP into the deliberate planning system reflects the Joint Staff’s initial decision to view TEP similarly to conventional war planning. The problem is that these plans, let alone activities executed by the plans, are not at all similar to typical war plans. Some examples of these differences are:

1. Unlike deliberate plans, TEPs are plans that are presently and continually executed. A TEP more accurately resembles the kinds of products that emerge from crisis action planning where one sees the results of planning and its relationship to outcomes.

2. Deliberate planning products address a specific situation or contingency and describe a projected end-state, while engagement is open-ended. A shaping end-state is more like a vision than an objective. Moreover, TEP successes and failures cannot be ascertained quickly (i.e., building “institutions” takes time).

3. Combatant CINCs do not completely control many of the constituent elements in a TEP.

4. Risk assessment in the area of shaping is different from risk assumptions and assessments applied in the development of operation plans.

5. Deliberate planning is not focused on operation tempo or force readiness. Units are apportioned for planning purposes assuming that they will be ready at plan
execution. Conversely, “shaping” activities are executed and, therefore, depend more directly upon the readiness of the forces assigned to these missions.

6. The assessment process in deliberate planning focuses on the application of military judgment within the parameters of the defined situation that provides the basis for the plan. TEP, on the other hand, involves the expenditure of resources at some level of effort. Therefore TEP must be assessed in view of the national and theater strategy, NCA priorities and regional objectives.

Two points emerge from this review of TEP and the Deliberate Planning System. First, while TEPs are generally developed in conformity with the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) format, they are markedly different from deliberate plans. Second, given this finding, other than accomplishing a perfunctory oversight, it makes little sense for the Joint Staff merely to “review,” vice assess them. Clearly, a full assessment is required if DoD is to be able to make accurate and rational resource decisions regarding shaping requirements.

5. Areas of Responsibility and the UCP. Current planning guidance documents categorize Prioritized Regional Objectives within regions; regions which do not match with the assigned areas of responsibility of the geographic combatant CINCs. The Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Department of State are organized along regional lines which simply do not match up with UCP defined areas of command responsibility. It is unreasonable to assume, let alone argue, that CINC AORs, which are subject to change, should be aligned with regional bureaux in the Departments of State and Defense.

Another vexatious issue relates to shortcomings in the UCP itself. Three countries key to U.S. national security; Russia, Canada, and Mexico do not fall under the responsibility of any geographic combatant commander. Thus, the TEP for Russia is developed by the J-5 Division of the Joint Staff, but executed by various combatant
commanders and their component commands. Mexico, for TEP purposes, is assigned to U.S. Southern Command, whereas the Canadian TEP is the responsibility of Joint Forces Command, previously known as USACOM. Notwithstanding the Mexican and Canadian cases, the lack of command nullius for Russia leads to, due to TEP overlapping, five combatant CINCs listing shaping activities with Russia in their respective TEPs. Not assigning these three countries to combatant CINCs results in inefficiencies and muddled guidance. Moreover, it makes little sense to have the Joint Staff engaging in this type of deliberate planning since the staff is removed from its execution.

**TEP: Unfinished Business.**

Notwithstanding the important reform of better aligning the TEP and PPBS processes, additional reforms should be considered for implementation. These reforms, that the authors envisage, would greatly improve the current process and fall under four broad categories:

1. the requirement of the Chairman to reform the Joint Strategic Planning System the better to effect strategic plans to establish global and regional priorities for shaping,

2. the need to revise the UCP,

3. the need to develop measures of merit, and

4. the merit of fusing the TEP and the Deliberate Planning processes.

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Two of the current authors have argued elsewhere that one of the weaknesses of the JSPS since the end of the Cold War has been the reluctance of successive Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to exercise their Title 10 responsibilities and effect strategic plans. This would require the Chairman to take NCA guidance (the National Security Strategy and Contingency Planning Guidance) and establish global
objectives and priorities to help guide the development of regional priorities, as well as the development and operational orientation of the U.S. armed forces. Apropos the issue of TEP, the Chairman, by establishing key strategic priorities, could make significant improvements to this endeavor in two important areas.

First, strategic priorities would enhance the Chairman’s Program Recommendation (CPR) for influencing the development of Service POMs to ensure that they address the force structure requirements entailed by “shaping.” The CPR provides the personal views of the CJCS to the Secretary of Defense concerning key defense planning issues. These issues are gleaned from a variety of sources including the work of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC), and the Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessment (JWCA) teams, CINC input, and JCS deliberations. Similarly the CJCS provides his personal evaluation of the adequacy of support afforded the CINCs by the Service and Defense Agency POMs in the Chairman’s Program Assessment (CPA), the content of which is again informed by a variety of sources.

Second, exercising his authority to effect strategic plans, the Chairman should also take the Prioritized Planning Objectives contained in the Contingency Planning Guidance (CPG) document and derive from them priorities and guidance for the combatant CINCs. Just as the Chairman must take the CPG and establish priorities and guidance in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) for the CINCs to develop operation, contingency and functional plans, he should do the same as regards guidance for the development of Theater Engagement Plans. This reform would provide improved guidance to the CINCs. It also would force the Joint Staff to think of force assignments for TEP missions as being more than simply the process used to assign forces to combatant CINCs, those rotationally deployed forces to the theater, and temporarily deployed forces for engagement activities.
2. Revising the Unified Command Plan. The revision by the Chairman of the J SCP as outlined above would solve the current problem where the CPG's Prioritized Regional Objectives are listed by region, vice AOR as established by the Unified Command Plan. Yet, other nettlesome issues remain to be addressed regarding the UCP. Most important is the need for Russia to be addressed in the UCP. To be sure, how the U.S. armed forces will deal with Russia as determined in the UCP has repercussions far beyond those related to TEP. That said, one would think that, at a minimum, a coherent and effective Russian TEP, which implies clear lines of responsibility and allocation of resources, should be a high priority for the NCA and DoD.

The issue of Mexico and Canada need to be addressed separately, though they share one key commonality. Defense cooperation with both Mexico and Canada has long been addressed through special bilateral bodies falling under the Joint Staff. As such, both countries are able to deal directly with the Joint Staff and by-pass a combatant CINC: a coveted status. The TEPs for both countries are developed by the J-5 Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate of the Joint Staff.

Canada presents a relatively easy case to address. The Joint Staff through the Canada-U.S. Cooperation Committee coordinates defense cooperation with Canada and political guidance is derived from the Permanent Joint Board on Defense. Whereas cooperation with Mexico is strictly limited, that with Canada is all-inclusive. Given the breadth and depth of cooperation that exists between our two departments of defense and armed forces, it is rather ridiculous even to consider thinking there is a need for a "TEP" for Canada, let alone assigning it to U.S. Joint Forces Command for engagement purposes. Indeed, the mere existence of such a plan could be politically explosive in Ottawa: why does the U.S. DoD think it needs to "shape" a developed democracy which is also a global ally? One would think that Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia, and select NATO allies should not be addressed by a combatant
CINC within the context of TEP. Such efforts are a waste of time and effort, let alone politically injudicious. Instead, combatant CINCs should coordinate their TEP campaign plans with key allies to ensure that we are not duplicating their own shaping efforts. Defense activities carried out by combatant CINCs with allied armed forces should fall under the “respond” strategic concept (as they are considered by Chairman’s exercise program) in the National Security Strategy where they would more appropriately be planned and executed.

Bilateral defense cooperation with Mexico is addressed in the Joint Mexico-U.S. Defense Commission. The implementation of the TEP for Mexico was muddled in that both U.S. Southern Command and U.S. Joint Forces Command (formerly U.S. Atlantic Command) had responsibilities for that country’s TEP implementation. However, since March 1999, as mentioned above, U.S. Southern Command has the lead for TEP planning and implementation. While perhaps outside of the purview of this particular essay, it seems to make little sense to keep Mexico in a state of command nullius for deliberate planning purposes given that U.S. Southern Command now has the lead to develop the Mexico TEP.

Finally, the Continental United States (CONUS) does not formally fall under a combatant commander. The closest commander that fills that requirement is CINC U.S. Joint Forces Command. This is an important consideration given that many “shaping” activities physically take place in CONUS under the sponsorship of another combatant CINC, or use assets assigned to the Service components of CINC Joint Forces Command (e.g., Partnership for Peace exercises that take place in CONUS). Given that Joint Forces Command’s AOR currently consists of the Azores Islands, Greenland, and Iceland (and Canada for TEP), consideration should be given to directing that the command concentrate its focus on developing supporting TEPs for the other CINCs, as opposed to spending its resources on such a limited TEP program of its own. With 80
percent of the U.S. general purpose forces stationed in CONUS and most of them falling under U.S. Joint Forces Command, ensuring that the other geographic combatant commanders’ TEPs have adequate forces and resources based in CONUS should be that CINC’s priority.  

3. Assessing TEPs. DoD has determined that the Joint Staff will “review” TEPs, as opposed to “assess” them. At present, the TEP review process is incapable of ascertaining which specific shaping activities undertaken by a combatant CINC should be denied to provide resources to another CINC with greater priority or who can make better use of the resources. Hence, there is a need to develop a standard by which shaping activities are judged to be of value in meeting national objectives. This is not, however, to argue for the introduction of a cumbersome quantitatively-based assessment process that would provide a limited and rigid means of assessment. To be useful, the assessment process must be capable of addressing accurately the intangible, and admittedly subjective, aspects of shaping activities. For this reason, the authors argue that such a system needs to be based upon the principle of “merit,” vice “effectiveness” to inhibit the introduction of quantitative-based methodology.

The genesis of this problem can be traced to the failure of DoD planning to establish priorities among regions. As in the case of the problem of the mismatch of the CPG’s Prioritized Regional Objectives to the geographic combatant commander’s AORs, however, this does not absolve the Chairman from his Title 10 responsibilities to effect strategic plans. This responsibility includes deriving from NCA guidance the establishment of global or inter-regional priorities to direct the operation of the U.S. armed forces. In consequence, the creation of a system of measures of merit, broadly applicable across all combatant commands, along with the revision of translating Prioritized Regional Objectives into prioritized guidance in the JSCP to the combatant CINCs, would greatly improve the ability of DoD to ascertain whether planned shaping
activities are supporting the pursuit of national objectives and where resources need to be redirected.\textsuperscript{69}

4. Deliberate Planning and TEP. TEPs are currently treated similarly to deliberate plans developed by a combatant CINC. For the numerous reasons cited above, the current authors argue that TEP are simply not deliberate plans, and importantly, should not merely be “reviewed,” but also “assessed” by the Joint Staff. Indeed, U.S. Code requires that the CJCS should:

Advis[e] the Secretary [of Defense] on critical deficiencies and strengths in force capabilities (including manpower, logistic, and mobility support) identified during the preparation and review of contingency plans and assessing the effect of such deficiencies and strengths on meeting national security objectives and policy and on strategic plans (emphasis added).\textsuperscript{70}

In other words, the law is quite clear that there is the expectation that the CJCS should “assess” all of the deliberate plans produced by the CINCs, i.e., produce an analysis of all of the plans collectively to ensure that they meet the stated intentions and spirit of the administration’s policy. This requirement should extend to TEPs, also. A “review” alone of individual TEPs does not provide this additional level of analysis, nor does it meet the requirements of Title 10, U.S. Code.

Additionally, the early determination to include TEP in the Deliberate Planning system raises an unintended, yet important question. What should be the relationship between a combatant commander’s TEP and his deliberate planning requirements? In other words, should combatant CINCs continue to develop separate plans for “shaping” and “responding” using two discrete systems, where they may not be mutually supportive, let alone closely coordinated?

It would appear that the developers of the TEP system placed it in the deliberate planning process without fully considering these important questions. Either intended or
not, an intellectual border either exists, or could be allowed to develop, between shaping and responding that is both artificial and not particularly useful in implementing the National Security Strategy. To be sure, the deliberate planning system served the country well during the Cold War when threats were clearly discernable, predictable, and quantifiable. Shaping was undertaken during this period, however, only as a secondary mission for the U.S. armed forces to that of preparing for global conflict. To be rather blunt, given the current international environment, one needs to consider what is the utility of addressing shaping and responding through the Deliberate Planning process separately.

Given the priorities of the administration and DoD, a more inclusive and holistic approach to operation planning and shaping should be considered. This initiative should begin with the fact the U.S. armed forces spend more time, resources and effort engaged in “shaping” than they do “responding.” This is not to argue that preparation for conflict should be eschewed. Rather, one must recognize that the current Joint Strategic Planning System produces separate, and not necessarily coordinated, plans for “shaping” and “responding.” The authors argue that combatant command and Joint Staff planners should approach shaping and responding in the same planning continuum, vice continuing the current system where response planning remains reactive and detached from shaping.

More specifically, JSCP-directed deliberate planning guidance should outline the outcomes NCA expects from each planning scenario and how U.S. forces engaged in shaping can effect positive changes short of war. The guidance to develop TEPs should address the possibility that shaping activities might not have the desired effect on specific countries. In short, operation and contingency plans and TEP could be conducted simultaneously and concomitantly. Under such a revised planning system, the plans to shape and those to respond would be directly
connected to allocated forces in a more systematic fashion. One could envisage (see Figure 1) that a reformed TEP/deliberate planning system would resemble very broadly the CJCS’s standing rules of engagement where planning would transition as threat increased:

1. Peacetime activity (Shape/TEP),
2. Transition from peacetime to crisis (TEP/Deliberate Planning), and
3. Transition from crisis to war (Respond/execution of Operation Plans).

![Figure 1: Integrated Shaping/Execution Planning Process.](image)

The implications of such reforms to the Joint Strategic Planning and the Joint Operation Planning and Execution systems would extend far beyond the current systems used by the combatant CINCs. However, the benefits from such a change appear to far outweigh any disadvantages. By addressing both missions in the same planning...
methodology, the short, mid- and long-term requirements for shaping and responding would facilitate coordination between supporting and supported combatant commanders. This, in turn, would be reflected in the combatant commanders’ IPL submissions. This improvement would enable the Services in their POM development to program the forces that the combatant CINCs will require for TEP purposes in the future. A further necessary step would be to introduce a cycle of TEP risk assessments, perhaps as part of the CJCS’s assessment of TEPs. The purpose of this risk assessment would be to allow the Chairman to reallocate resources globally to respond to changes in the international security environment, the better to exploit shaping opportunities. Thus, the allocation of forces for shaping activities would not necessarily have to be limited to the JSCP planning period of 2 years, but could be made more responsive to the development of international “opportunities.”

Treating shaping and responding in more equal balance has great implications for force assignments to the combatant CINCs for both contingency and shaping planning requirements. Allocation of forces for shaping would be directly linked to the Chairman’s establishment of global and regional priorities in the revised JSCP taskings to the combatant CINCs. No longer would these commanders be constrained to develop shaping plans with only those forces assigned to the command. Rather, the JSCP would allocate forces to combatant commanders for shaping and responding, thus ensuring that CINCs have sufficient forces to carry out their full spectrum of requirements.

**Conclusion.**

The Theater Engagement Planning process represents a major attempt at reforming a key aspect of the JSPS, with the aim of aligning better the activities of the Services and combatant CINCs to national level strategic guidance. A
A successful shaping strategy and TEP process have the potential of obviating possible future threats to U.S. and Western security interests, as well as facilitating the ability of the U.S. armed forces to respond to crises should shaping fail. DoD is attempting to move away from solely reactive planning for potential conflict to where it can capture what the U.S. armed services are already doing in the area of shaping and then ascertain where there are successes and deficiencies. Given the difficulty of effecting any type of reform in an organization the size of DoD, it should not be surprising that change is often accomplished incrementally.

At present, significant progress has been made in better aligning the joint planning process to support the engagement strategy of shaping. Many key reforms need to be taken, however, before shaping earns its rightful place in the planning and budgeting processes in DoD. Measures of merit must be developed, as well as a clarification of Title 10 prerogatives to force the Services to support combatant commanders with the necessary data to make measures of merit useful for decision making at the NCA level. The alignment of the TEP planning process with PPBS signifies an important advance. However, the Chairman must continue this reform to its logical conclusion by ensuring that his Chairman’s Program Recommendation (CPR) and Chairman’s Program Assessment (CPA) are principally and independently influenced by IPLs submitted by the combatant CINCs. Moreover, the CJCS needs to implement a more systematic assessment of TEPs to ensure that they are collectively meeting the objectives of, and are in conformance with, the guidance given by the NCA. The Unified Command Plan (UCP) needs to be revised to deal more effectively with Canada and Russia. And finally, TEP and the deliberate planning systems need to be merged, the better to enable combatant CINCs to shape their areas of responsibility, as well as to be better prepared to transition to crises and war when required. Albeit perhaps dismissed by some as a minor issue in defense planning, the continued reform of the TEP process has the potential to continue the
reform of DoD the better to enable the United States to secure the hard won peace that was produced following the end of the Cold War.

**Recommendations.**

1. A system of measures of merit needs to be developed to enable the effective “assessment” of TEPs. The CJCS should develop categories and combatant CINC’s should be directed to demonstrate how they meet their own measures of merit. This reform will eliminate the current practice of the Joint Staff merely “reviewing” TEPs, but include an assessment of them collectively.

2. Title 10 needs to be reexamined to ensure that Service components **must** provide the necessary information to combatant CINC’s to enable them to undertake an assessment of measures of merit. Specifically, component commands must be prepared to supply budgetary information for any component temporarily or permanently assigned to a combatant CINC.

3. Global and regional priorities, guidance, and resource allocations for shaping should be communicated by the Chairman in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan.

4. The Unified Command Plan (UCP) should be revised in the following manner:

   a. Global allies (e.g., Canada) and select NATO allies do not require TEPs. Combatant CINC’s should be directed to coordinate their TEP campaign plans with select allies.

   b. For TEP planning and execution purposes, Russia should be assigned to U.S. European Command.

   c. U.S. Joint Forces Command should not develop TEPs for Iceland, Greenland, and the Azores. Rather, it should focus its attention to becoming the force provider for the TEPs planned and executed by the other combatant commanders.
5. The CINCs’ IPLs should address shaping and form the basis for the Chairman’s Program Recommendation (CPR) and the Chairman’s Program Assessment (CPA).

6. The Joint Staff needs to consider combining TEP with response planning methodologies. A new planning methodology should be developed that combines TEP and deliberate planning in a coherent and integrated fashion.

ENDNOTES


3. There is some conceptual blurring between what constitutes shaping and responding. For example, U.S. participation in the Stabilization Force in Bosnia is commanded by U.S. European Command (USEUCOM). Officials at HQ USEUCOM claim that U.S. participation in this force is not a “shaping” activity, but rather an “operation.” It is instructive to note that in the command’s “strategy,” “support NATO operations” in Bosnia falls under “shaping.” See “Strategy of Readiness and Engagement,” Stuttgart, U.S. EUCOM, April 1998, p. 26.

4. Since the first National Security Strategy (NSS) was published in 1987, “shaping” the international security environment, in varying definitions, has been identified as an important national objective, but specific guidance for defense planning purposes has been slow to evolve. Note how guidance from the president has become more specific in terms of providing guidance to the Department of Defense. Examine, for example, the evolution of the verbiage in the NSS: 1987 (p. 5, point 5), and 1988 (pp. 4-5, point 5) discusses the importance of “relationships”; 1990 (p. 18) “project American values”; 1991 (p. 1) “an accurate sense of the opportunities that history has put before us” and (p. 4) “promote the growth of free, democratic political institutions”; 1993 (p. 3) “a strategy of engagement and leadership”; 1994 (pp. 18-20) “promoting democracy”; 1995 (p. ii) “leverage to reshape existing security and economic structures and create new ones”; 1996 (p. ii), “America remains engaged in the world and by enlarging the community of secure, free market and democratic nations”; 1997 (p. 5) “Our tools of
foreign policy must be able to shape the international environment . . .”;
and 1998 (p. 6) “Our strategy of enhancing U.S. security recognizes that
we face diverse threats requiring integrated approaches to defend the
nation, shape the international environment, respond to crises and
prepare for an uncertain future.” Note that the National Military
Strategy (NMS) has been equally ambiguous over time in terms of
providing direction for shaping activities. The 1992 NMS states (p. 5),
“Strengthen and enlarge the commonwealth of free nations that share a
commitment to democracy and individual rights.” The next version of
the document (1995) provided a much more descriptive explanation of
how DoD was implementing the strategy of engagement (see pp. ii-iii;
8-9). The 1997 NMS provides the best explanation of shaping and
description of DoD’s extensive efforts (pp. 1-2; 6-7; 12-14). The point of
this discussion is to demonstrate that national guidance regarding
“shaping” has been ambiguous until rather recently and that once it has
been made more clear, DoD has responded.

5. William S. Cohen, Annual Report to the President and the Congress

6. For an informative journalistic review of U.S. shaping activities,
see the numerous articles by Dana Priest in The Washington Post,
December 5, 14, and 31, 1998.


9. “The alternative to engagement is not withdrawal from the world;
it is passive submission to powerful forces of change—all the more ironic
at a time when our capacity to shape them is as great as it has ever been.” Ibid., p. 2.

10. Through revisions in the Contingency Planning Guidance
(CPG), September 1997. This issue is discussed below in greater detail
and length.

11. Law regarding security assistance is addressed in a statutory
sense throughout the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended and
the Arms Export Control Act, as amended. For an in depth analysis of
the legal and programmatic details and nuances of security assistance,
see The Management of Security Assistance 18th Edition,
Wright-Patterson AFB, OH: Defense Institute of Security Assistance
Management, 1998, particularly pp. 49-59. The specific responsibilities
of the combatant commanders established in law and policy are found in
the UNAAF. “The combatant commanders are responsible for the
development and production of joint operation plans. During peacetime, they act to deter war and prepare for war and military operations other than war.” Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), Joint Pub 0-2, February 24, 1995, p. IV-6.

12. “Policy” governing aspects of security assistance is established in PDD-34, “Conventional Arms Transfer Policy,” February 17, 1995. See http://fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd34.htm. There were press reports published in 1998 that implied foreign training activities conducted by U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) were conducted outside of U.S. law and policy. Given that such military activities can only be planned and executed with both the knowledge and support of the country teams in U.S. Embassies, it stretches the credibility of the press to suggest that these activities were done by SOCOM “free of oversight.” See the series of articles by Dana Priest in The Washington Post, July 12, 14, 15, 1998.

13. For a description of the deliberate planning system, see Joint Operation Planning and Execution System, Volume I: Planning Policy and Procedures, Joint Pub 5-03.1, August 4, 1993. Specifically see Chapter II (Joint Planning Process); Chapter III (Deliberate Planning Process); Chapter V (Crisis Action Planning); and, Annex A (Crisis Action Planning Checklist).


... a proactive policy to foster regional stability, far from being a lesser mission, should be viewed as an essential component of U.S. national security. The evolution of a more secure and predictable environment will allow the United States to promote its interests globally without employing military forces as often as we do today, and should be central to our security strategy.


18. Ibid., p. 31.


... the Department of Defense has an essential role to play in shaping the international security environment in ways that promote and protect U.S. national interests. . . . To do so, the Department employs a wide variety of means including: forces permanently stationed abroad; forces rotationally deployed overseas; forces deployed temporarily for exercises; combined training, or military-to-military interactions; and programs such as defense cooperation, security assistance, International Military Education and Training (IMET) programs, and international arms cooperation.


20. Title 10 U.S. Code, Chapter 5, section 155 (e); and, Chapter 6, section 164(a)(2)(c).


23. See Title 10, United States Code, Armed Forces, section 113(g)(2).


27. The Unified Command Plan (UCP) assigns general responsibilities and delineates geographic areas of responsibility for the unified combatant commands. Note that the document is classified; however, sanitized versions are available. The most recent UCP is: Unified Command Plan, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, September 29, 1999. For an excellent history of the UCP, see Ronald H. Cole, et al., The History of the Unified Command Plan, 1946-1993, Washington, DC: Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint History Office, February 1995.


29. Ibid., p. 185.

Plans involving the conduct of military operations in a peacetime or permissive environment developed by combatant commanders to address requirements such as disaster relief, nation assistance, logistics, communications, surveillance, protection of US citizens, nuclear weapons recovery and evacuation, and continuity of operations, or similar discrete tasks. They may be developed in response to the requirements of the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, at the initiative of the CINC, or as tasked by the supported combatant commander, Joint Staff, Service, or Defense agency.


32. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual, “Theater Engagement Planning,” CJCSM 3113.01, February 1, 1998, p. GL-4. Note that this manual has been substantially revised and has been
released for comment. See CJ CSM 3113.01, Final Coordinating Draft, August 1999.

33. “Theater Engagement Planning.” CJ CSM 3113.01, February 1, 1998, p. A-10. Note that a draft revised version of this manual deletes this category and defines TEP activities as including: operational activities, combined exercises, security assistance, combined training, combined education, military contacts, humanitarian assistance, and any other activity the CINC designates. Cf., CJ CSM 3113.01, Final Coordinating Draft, A-2.

34. “A term used in Department of Defense and Service regulations to indicate a delegation of authority by a superior to a subordinate to act on behalf of the superior.” Joint Pub 102, p. 163.


36. For guidance as to the exact format and details which are to be contained in the TEP Strategic Guidance, see ibid, pp. C-1 through C-8.


39. For a description of the deliberate planning and review process, in general, see Joint Operation Planning and Execution System, Volume I, Joint Pub 5-03.1, August 4, 1993.


41. For the complete responsibilities of the CWPD of the J-7 as regards TEP, see Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction, “Responsibilities for the Management and Review of Theater Engagement Plans,” CJ CSI 3113.01, April 1, 1998, pp. B-1 through B-2.

42. Note that the criteria for the review of TEPs is similar to that of deliberate plans, except for the absence of “conformity to joint doctrine.”

43. For background on the entire TEP review process, see ibid., p. B-1 through B-7.

44. See Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction, “Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, CINC[s] of the Combatant Commands and Joint Staff Participation in the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System,” CJ CSI 8501.01, April 1, 1999. For an explanation of PPBS see, The Joint Staff Officers Guide 1997,
45. “A list of a combatant commander’s highest priority requirements, prioritized across Service and functional lines, defining shortfalls in key programs that, in the judgment of the combatant commander, adversely affect the capability of the combatant commander’s forces to accomplish their assigned mission. The integrated priority list provides the combatant commander’s recommendations for programming funds in the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System process.” Joint Pub 1-02, June 10, 1998, p. 223.

46. These reforms are reflected in CJ CSM 3113.01, “Final Coordinating Draft,” pp. A-4 thru A-6.

47. These exceptions are:

(1) the CINC or Executive Agent chooses to develop a Strategic Concept more frequently, (2) National Security or National Military Strategy changes require modification of existing Strategic Concepts, (3) CPG/JSCP Prioritized Regional Objective changes require changes to existing Strategic Concepts, (4) significant changes to regional security environment make revision of existing Strategic Concepts compelling, (5) significant changes in engagement resource availability which require updates to existing strategic concepts, (6) other exceptional circumstances (i.e., NCA direction).

Joint Staff Message, 052229Z FEB 99, Subject: Theater Engagement Plan (TEP) Process Adjustments, UNCLASSIFIED.

48. It should be stressed that IPLs are keyed to the Future Years Defense Program under consideration. The ASD (PA&E) requests the IPLs by a memorandum to the combatant commanders. For example, see the June 24, 1991, memorandum, Subject: Submission of FY 1994-99 Integrated Priority Lists.


50. Joint Staff Message, 052229Z FEB 99, UNCLASSIFIED.

51. Cohen, Annual Report to the President and the Congress p. 17.
52. The J-7, Conventional War Plans Branch, uses one additional criterion when reviewing operation plans, i.e., conformance to joint doctrine. See Joint Operation Planning and Execution System, Volume I, Joint Pub 5-03.1, p. IV-4.

53. Not only do combatant commanders have limited control or influence over certain key shaping instruments, e.g., the extensive and growing National Guard State Partnership programs, but many of their timelines impede effective planning. For example, security assistance is based on an annual budget cycle and is tightly controlled by Congress, component exercises are planned 2 years out, while the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s Exercise Program is based on a 5-year planning cycle. Indeed, component commands routinely conduct exercises and other shaping exercises activities that are not coordinated/controlled by combatant commanders.

54. In deliberate planning, risk assessment is considered during each phase of the campaign. Risk management in a TEP is less disciplined in its application and requires further sophistication and universal implementation.

55. Note that a full discussion of the differences between “review” and “assess” is provided later.

56. Joint Chiefs of Staff, J-5, “Unified Command Plan” (U), September 29, 1999, p. 6 (para 15).


58. Joint Staff Message, 241149Z MAY 99, Subject: Reassessment of Executive Agents for Canada and Mexico (U). This reform will be represented in the final revised CJSCM 3113.01.

59. Lovelace and Young, U.S. Department of Defense Strategic Planning.

60. See Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction, “Charter of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council,” CJCSI 5123.01, May 2, 1997.

61. See Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction, “The Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessment Process,” CJCSI 3137.01A, January 22, 1999. Despite the growing importance of JWCAs since their introduction in 1994 in defining joint requirements, there is little analysis of their role in the literature. A major exception to this

62. See CJCSI 3141.01, B-2 (paras d and e).


64. For example, see the recent Australian foreign policy white paper which addresses shaping. In the National Interest, Australia's Foreign and Trade Policy White Paper, Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, August 1997, particularly the overview and Chapter 3.


66. Ibid.

67. This prescription for the redesignation of Joint Forces Command's AOR is established in the 1999 UCP. That said, future reforms are required. The command should lose the last of its AOR to a "CINC Americas" which would subsume, inter alia, the current Southern Command. Should this come to pass, then all planning responsibility for Mexico under the UCP should be transferred to CINC Americas. See Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr. and Thomas-Durell Young, Defining U.S. Atlantic Command's Role in the Power Projection Strategy, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1998, particularly pp. 37-39; 41-42; 44-46.

68. Title 10, United States Code Armed Forces, section 153(a)(4)(B), (C), and (E). For an in-depth assessment of the question of the Chairman's responsibilities to establish priorities and effect "strategic plans," see Lovelace and Young, U.S. Department of Defense Strategic Planning.

69. An example of this type of measuring merit is the system of "measures of effectiveness" employed by U.S. Army Pacific (which given its methodology of assessment might be better described as measures of merit). The methodology is based on the responsible desk officer recommending an assessment based upon: (1) the commanding general's guidance, his judgments and experience, (2) Country Team judgments and experience, (3) higher guidance and assessments from
trips, opinions and experience, (4) foreign area officer trip reports, (5) information from the intelligence community, (6) occasional interaction with national armies, (7) after action reviews, and (8) desk officer judgment, training and experience. To be sure, this type of assessment would be appropriate for use within a combatant command, vice as providing an over-arching, strategic methodology template. That said, the criteria used for assessments in the U.S. Army Pacific Command warrants close examination. U.S. Army Pacific Command, “FY01-03 (Strawman) Expanded Relations Program Briefing,” June 5, 1998.

70. Title 10, United States Code Armed Forces, Sec. 153 (a)(3)(C).