FOREWORD

The author of this study examines the bases of American military participation in the array of Third World activities falling under the general rubric of peacekeeping and peace-enforcement. The relevance of this inquiry was underscored by President Clinton in his Inaugural Address, when he added situations where "the will and conscience of the international community are defied" to traditional vital interests and as times when American military force might be employed.

He begins by considering the major instances in the post-cold war world where so-called humanitarian interventions have occurred or may occur: the aftermath of the Persian Gulf War, Somalia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. The author then examines the effects of these actions on the principle of sovereignty. He next turns to the emerging roles of peacekeeping and peace-enforcement and the conceptual and practical differences between them, and concludes with some cautionary lessons for the Army.

The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to publish this report as a reference not only for specialists on peacekeeping and peace-enforcement, but also for those interested in the operational art as it applies to future peacekeeping and peace-enforcement operations.

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PEACEKEEPING, PEACEMAKING AND PEACE-ENFORCEMENT:
THE U.S. ROLE IN THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER

The search for the appropriate uses of military force in the post-cold war international system has commenced. During the cold war, the use of force by the major powers was tied clearly to their political and ideological competition; deterrence of major conflicts between them served the most fundamental national interest, survival. Vital interests revolved around preventing the other side from gaining undue influences in important places such as the Persian Gulf.

The post-cold war system is not so simple. The order and predictability of the cold war system have been replaced by the disorder, even chaos, of the new order, what one observer has called "the old world disorder in new configurations." East-West competition has evaporated and can no longer form the anchor that tethers policy and strategy together. As Leslie H. Gelb noted recently, the "old hawk-dove divide" no longer serves to inform where military action will and will not occur. No alternative structure has taken its place. We are left instead with vague entreaties that forces must serve the national interest, and apparently innocuous but potentially precedential and systemically upsetting notions of the "humanitarian use of force" and "humanitarian intervention," to mention two recent designations.

Lacking a framework of where and when to use force to provide guidance for "a more anarchical and competitive world order," both the United States and the world at large are forced to consider situations on a case-by-case basis where the criteria for evaluation are often vague. On a piecemeal basis, the United States has mounted a post-Gulf War operation in Iraq (Operation PROVIDE COMFORT/SOUTHERN WATCH) and in Somalia (RESTORE HOPE), leading General Powell to conclude: "Peacekeeping and humanitarian operations are a given." What--if anything--should be done about ethno-religious fighting in Bosnia or Nagorno-Karabakh? How much do we care about the Tamils in Sri Lanka? What patterns, if any, are emerging?

The problem with ad hocracy, the only available method when a framework is absent, is that the individual determinations may form an unintended pattern that comes to constitute a set of de facto principles of operation, a new set of rules of the game that would not have been adopted through a conscious deliberative process. The crises and responses of the early post-cold war period suggest strongly this possibility unless clarifying discussions and deliberations occur. PROVIDE COMFORT began this new ad hocracy; inaction (or for that matter, action) in Bosnia continues it; RESTORE HOPE compounds the confusion and widens the controversy.

The purpose of this report is to make a modest contribution to such a dialogue. It takes as its starting point the post-cold
war world's two most dramatic instances of armed conflict, the
Persian Gulf War and its aftermath and the struggle in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, in addition to the ongoing effort in Somalia. Each
is important because it was a major event that probably would not
have been allowed to occur during the cold war. More importantly,
the international action or inaction taken in each instance may
offer insights into the direction of the post-cold war system in
dealing with analogous situations.

The analysis then moves to the clear "new world order"
implications of the two cases: the operations in northern Iraq on
behalf of the Kurds min 1991 (Operation PROVIDE COMFORT) and in
southern Iraq in 1992 (Operation SOUTHERN WATCH), Operation
RESTORE HOPE in Somalia, and international activities on behalf
of the besieged Muslim population of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Both operations in Iraq represent direct assaults on the
Westphalian principle of state sovereignty, defined as the
"supreme power of the state, exercised within its boundaries,
free from external interference."7 Implicitly, each operation
promotes the contrary position that individuals and groups within
nation-states have international rights that in some cases (such
as atrocities against them) supersede the sovereign right to
govern and assert an international right to intervene in such
instances, an idea formally proclaimed by U.N. Secretary General
Boutros-Ghali under the principle of universal sovereignty:
"underlying the rights of the individual and the rights of
peoples is a dimension of universal sovereignty that resides in
all humanity and provides all peoples with legitimate involvement
in issues affecting the world as a whole."8 This is the
underlying concept for U.N. sanctions of efforts in Somalia, as
stated in Security Council Resolution 794. The resolution states,
in part, that "the magnitude of the human tragedy constitutes a
threat to international peace and security."9

In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the situation has not yet reached
that point; outside interference has not progressed beyond
actions common to the traditional order such as economic
sanctions, humanitarian relief (authorized on August 13, 1992 as
Security Council Resolution 771),10 and limited peacekeeping (the
United Nations Protection Force, UNPROFOR). None of these
challenges basic operating rules; if a more proactive step such
as peace-enforcement is contemplated or carried out, precedential
effects could occur.

The role of peacekeeping and peace-enforcement form the next
step in the analysis. In light of "the systematic transformation
of the United Nations into the chosen instrument for the
maintenance of peace"11 accompanying the end of its cold
war-induced paralysis, suddenly the world is rushing its troubles
to the world body. The Secretary General has issued his An Agenda
for Peace12 at the request of the Security Council. The document
suggests a greatly expanded U.N. role in peacekeeping,
peacemaking and peace-enforcement, an emphasis underscored by
former President Bush's September 13, 1992 speech to the United Nations. It also reflects fundamental underestimation of what is involved in such actions, as well as their effects on the world order. Parallel efforts are being undertaken by the U.S. Department of Defense to redefine and expand American participation in this area; assessing and dealing with these contingencies will undoubtedly extend to other executive agencies involved in national security, such as the Department of State. Depending on the worsening of the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina during winter 1992-93, dealing with this problem could also become an early priority of the Clinton administration. The outcome of the Somali effort will also have an effect.

The Secretary General, as well as some discussants in the United States, fail to distinguish adequately between peacekeeping and peace-enforcement. Peacekeeping, a role the U.N. has played over the years, is relatively straightforward and, despite its difficulties, comparatively easy. Peacekeeping involves monitoring and enforcing a cease-fire agreed to by two or more former combatants. It proceeds in an atmosphere where peace exists and where the former combatants minimally prefer peace to continued war.

Peace-enforcement, as it is used by the Joint Staff, entails the physical interposition of armed forces to separate ongoing combatants to create a cease-fire that does not exist. Boutros-Ghali, on the other hand, uses the term to refer to actions to keep a cease-fire from being violated or to reinstate a failed cease-fire. It is a subtle difference, but it does imply the existence of some will for peace. The American version more realistically portrays another, far more difficult matter. By definition, in a situation for which peace-enforcement is a potentially appropriate response, war and not peace describes the situation, and one or more of the combatants prefer it that way. This means that, unlike peacekeepers, peace enforcers are often not welcomed by one or either side(s). Rather, they are active fighters who must impose a cease-fire that is opposed by one or both combatants; in the process, the neutrality that distinguishes peacekeepers will most likely be lost. The Bosnian Serbs would not view U.N. peacemaking forces lifting the siege at Sarajevo and other Muslim-controlled cities as a welcome or neutral act. Only the Muslims, with whom a de facto alliance would be established, would welcome the intervention. As in Somalia, the troops arrive "uninvited" by any government. Their receptions will vary and likely will be unpredictable in advance.

A definitional note, expanded later in the report, needs to be inserted here. The term peace-enforcement, which is becoming the accepted definition for military efforts to impose peace, is a misnomer given normal English usage of terms (enforcing peace presumes peace exists). The U.N. has preempted the more descriptive term peacemaking to mean diplomatic means to end fighting (see later discussion), thereby creating the need for
an alternate term. Peace imposition or peace creation would be descriptively preferable to peace-enforcement in this regard. Boutros-Ghali, reflecting the difference in perspective noted above, suggests "cease-fire enforcement" as a synonym. This objection noted, peace-enforcement will be used here for the sake of continuity.

Moreover, peace-enforcement is likely to involve the violation of state sovereignty, particularly if the mission takes place on the soil of the combatant who opposes peace and thus does not invite the peace enforcers in. Had the Iraqis decided to continue attacking the Kurds of the north or the Shiite guerrillas of the south, peace-enforcement is exactly the role the United States would now have adopted. Militarily, that may be doable; unwrapping the political consequences may not be. Similarly, the interposition of peace enforcers into Bosnia and Herzegovina would have to be at the invitation of a rightful government to avoid violating someone's sovereignty. Who is that legal government? It depends on whose side you are on. In Somalia, the decision was simplified by the absence of a government.

All of this would have an academic air about it were it not for the fact that the world is very full of situations with the potential to resemble these two situations. The swath of land from the Balkans to the Caspian Sea where ethnicity and religion collided provides the most obvious examples where unleashed neonationalism threatens to rear its ugly head. The same is true of many areas of the Third World where multinationalism has been suppressed since independence and where democratization may result in more "ethnic cleansing" by the sword.

This may be the most difficult and fundamental set of problems the new order will confront. If we overturn the centrality of the rights of states at the expense of protecting the rights of oppressed, even savaged, ethnic and other groups, the system's menu will be very broad, the plate very full. In such a world, the peace enforcer will be in much demand, the instances of violence and atrocity many.

Even if we eschew the peace enforcer's role, we will not be able to ignore the problems. It is yet one other reality of the new world that global events, and especially atrocities, have become tremendously transparent and visible thanks to global television. Unable to ignore reality, we will be tempted to do something by the horror of what we see: starving babies in Somalia, detention camps in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This raises the possibility—which goes beyond the scope of this report—that global coverage of atrocious violence can create the public perception of a vital interest (one worth fighting over) on humanitarian grounds in situations where a more dispassionate, abstract analysis would not suggest that intensity of interest. Given the pressures that seem to emerge, one can call this temptation the "do something syndrome."
Faced with these realities, there is a compelling need to come to grips with and to try to start fashioning an orderly means of response to these kinds of situations. To deal with them responsibly requires defining the situations and the alternatives, tasks to which the remaining pages are devoted.

The Precedents: PROVIDE COMFORT/SOUTHERN WATCH, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Somalia.

Although the specific issues and dynamics underlying these instances of international reactions to communal violence are substantively distinct, they bear enough in common as challenges to the evolving order to be considered together. On one hand, all three involved large-scale violence and atrocity by one group within a country against other group(s), and violence that was made dramatically public by Cable News Network (the Kurdish refugee camps in Turkey) and the new Independent Television Network (the Bosnian detention camps), and the universal coverage of Somali suffering. Publicity has made it impossible for the world to ignore the bloodshed, a likely general reaction in the days before global television. On the other hand, the crises appeared at the extremities of the area stretching east from the Balkans across Asia minor into central Asia where Islam and Christendom (as well as sects of both) collided, leaving latent and simmering conflicts of similar natures and dimensions. What is principally different is in the international reaction to each: swift and effective succor for the Kurds, much handwringing and little curative for the Bosnians, and massive humanitarian aid for the Somalis.

Operation PROVIDE COMFORT seemed at first appearance to have been little more than a footnote to the general Persian Gulf War, a loose end in the implementation of the U.N. Security Council cease-fire conditions contained in Resolution 687.19 The cause of the problem, of course, lay in the conduct of the war itself. As a tactical move during the air campaign against Iraq, President Bush called on the Iraqi people on February 15, 1991 to rise and "force Saddam, the dictator, to step aside."20 The administration's motivations were probably mixed: the entreaty was presumably aimed at "moderate" Sunni Iraqis, since the administration opposed successful rebellions by either the Kurdish or Shiite populations on the grounds that the result could be three successor states to Iraq, none of which could serve as a postwar counterweight to Iran. Additionally, any rebellious activity in Baghdad could only undercut the effectiveness of Iraq's resistance to the anticipated ground war, thus protecting American lives.

The administration, of course, got the rebellion it did not want, as both the Kurds and Shiites, presumably emboldened by Bush's call, rose against the regime. When Saddam Hussein's army was freed of the allied onslaught, it turned its largely intact fury against the rebels. Iraqi helicopter gunships were unleashed
with particular effect against Kurdish villages in the Zagros mountains, leading to widespread panic and rumors of genocide. In this situation, large numbers of Kurds fled their homes. Some fled to Iran; the rest to the barren mountainsides of Turkey, where CNN found them. Because he watched CNN avidly, President Bush discovered them as well. When Secretary of State James Baker returned from a hastily arranged and conducted visit to the camps and reported that the scenes on television were only too real, some reaction had to occur.

The options were not great. The Kurds could not just be left where they were. Large numbers would die, and it would all be chronicled on global television. The connection between Bush's calls to overthrow Saddam and the situation was being realized, meaning we were partly (if not wholly) to blame. Moreover, the Turkish government, with a serious Kurdish minority problem of its own, did not want them to stay and add to that problem. As a NATO ally, the United States had to be sensitive to Turkish sentiments.

But what to do? The first problem was alleviating the disease and starvation that were killing mounting numbers of Kurds daily. The response was U.N. Security Council Resolution 688, which empowered the provision of "humanitarian assistance" to the Kurds by member nations and forbade Iraqi interference with relief efforts. The United States responded with military forces and supplies to implement that entreaty; Operation PROVIDE COMFORT was born. The problem then became what to do for the Kurds in the longer haul; they could not live on the mountainside forever, and the Turks did not want them to stay. At the same time, they feared the renewed wrath of Saddam Hussein if they returned unprotected too much to leave.

The answer was to move them back into Iraq under the protection of American (and other Gulf War allied) forces. The method was to create an exclusion zone from which Iraqi troops were barred and which would be guaranteed by allied military might. The zone and the forces were a necessary mechanism to convince wary Kurds to return home. The zone remains in effect over a year and a half later and forms the base for an increasingly autonomous Kurdistan that says it is not interested in full independence but increasingly acts as if it is. Moreover, the mood of independence has spread to the Kurds of Turkey, which was one of the things the exclusion zone was supposed to preclude.

The importance of the exclusion (or "security") zone, now also in effect in Southern Iraq to protect the Shiites and enforced by allied air rather than ground forces, is that its existence and continuation are in direct violation of Iraqi sovereignty. The United States has never indicated it considers the areas as anything other than sovereign Iraqi territory nor that its actions represent an advocacy of the rights of individuals and groups over the rights of states. The United
States just maintains that the government of Iraq cannot exercise its sovereign control of the population in the exclusion zones. The decision, at least based on the public record, appears to have been sheerly tactical (finding a way to get the Kurds to go home); its potential implications are far broader.

The situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina offers parallels. The problem began, of course, with the long-anticipated breakup of Yugoslavia in the summer of 1991. Titoist policies of population migration and intermixing created a federal structure where some of the "republics" (notably Bosnia and Herzegovina) were unnatural historical phenomena. Thus, as disintegration of the country proceeded, religious/ethnic conflict emerged. It was worst in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where three major "nationalities" collided: the largely Roman Catholic Croatians, the Greek Orthodox Serbians, and those who call their nationality Muslim (most of whom are ethnic Serbs but do not think of themselves that way).23

The result was panic that rapidly turned ugly and violent. Croatian enclaves in Bosnia and Herzegovina sought to throw out Serbs and Muslims, to set the scene to be attached to Croatia; the Serbs did the same in parts of Croatia and especially in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where they declared the existence of the "Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina." The Muslims, who make up 40 percent of the original Bosnian population, are fighting to maintain an independent Bosnia and Herzegovina. If they are successful and if parts of Bosnia are cannibalized into Serbia/Yugoslavia and Croatia, what is left would presumably become the first Muslim-dominated state in modern Europe (a prospect that some use as a rallying cry to avoid).

The ongoing sieges of Bosnian towns, the public symbol of which has become Sarajevo, must be seen in this light. The Bosnian Serbian policy of "ethnic cleansing"--which is specifically condemned in Resolution 77124--seeks to exclude non-Serbians (mostly Muslims but also Croats) from greater and greater parts of Bosnia, thereby strengthening their claims that the areas are Serbian and thus should be annexed to Serbia/Yugoslavia. Croats are doing much the same to Serbs and Muslims in parts of Bosnia they consider part of greater Croatia. The method for "persuading" the Muslims to leave are the sieges, ancient but repulsive methods to bring urban populations into submission.

Like all other sieges in history, they are not pretty; the Bosnian Serbian militias that surround the Muslim towns seek to terrorize the civilian population and, ultimately, to starve them out if necessary. Like all other sieges, they are cruel and nasty. Unlike other sieges, these are on television; thus it is impossible to ignore what is going on.

Just as the CNN pictures of the Turkish mountainsides forced Western governments to respond, so have ITN transmissions from
Bosnia. Operation PROVIDE COMFORT had as its first stage the airlifting of food, medicine and the like (humanitarian assistance) to the Kurds, followed by the military intervention that created and enforced the exclusion zone. The UNPROFOR mission to Sarajevo is the equivalent of the first stage of the PROVIDE COMFORT effort; to date, there has been no equivalent second stage aimed at lifting the sieges.

Anarchy underlays the Somali crisis. The factions that collectively were capable of overthrowing Siad Barre in early 1991 were individually too weak and fractured to form a government to replace that which they had overturned. Instead, the structure of government crumbled, and "armies" of young thugs (the so-called "technicals") nominally loyal to one warlord or another (the leading contenders being Generals Mohomad Farah Aidid and Ali Mahdi Mohamed) took to the streets, terrorizing the populace and stealing or ransoming most of the food supplies intended for starving victims of long-term drought and civil strife. As these interruptions created alarmingly steepening death rates, the United States, under U.N. auspices as described earlier, moved to break the cycle by imposing order to "create a secure environment,"25 in President Bush's own words.

A parallel seems to exist between the Somalian and PROVIDE COMFORT examples: both were apparently largely tactical decisions reached to solve a current, concrete problem with little apparent concern for the longer term strategic implications. As The New York Times opined on the day Resolution 794 was adopted: "Thus thousands of American troops are about to be committed to a distant land, for ill-defined purposes, without real consultation with Congress or President-elect Clinton, without serious debate or even a semblance of executive leadership."26 In the obvious immediacy of the situation, such concerns formed the minority. When RESTORE HOPE is over and can be placed in greater context, it may be a more important criticism.

Rights of States Versus Rights of Individuals and Groups.

If the two situations resemble one another in terms of brutality and offensiveness, the reactions by the international community to them varies dramatically: the second stage of active intervention occurred in Iraq and Somalia; it has not in former Yugoslavia.

The reason for the difference most commonly cited is the enormously complicated nature of the violence in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the consequent likely inability of outside intervention to solve the problem. Former Yugoslavia was, after all, one of the most artificial of nation-states, with multiple nationalities speaking three different languages, employing two different alphabets and confessing two sects of Christianity in addition to Islam. The feuds that underlay the conflict go back centuries, even millennia, and much of the animosity in the
current situation reflects the still felt wounds of World War II, where large numbers of Croatians supported Germany while Serbs formed the backbone of resistance to Nazi rule.

All of these things are true and relevant, and it is also true that outside military force cannot address or solve any of these problems, which are political and not military. The case for nonintervention is thus grounded in the intractibility of the situation. As Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell argued in a recent *Foreign Affairs* article, the reason for not involving American troops in Bosnia and Herzegovina is that "the use of force should be restricted to occasions where it can do some good and where the good will outweigh the loss of lives and other costs that will surely ensue." 27 Bosnia does not pass that test. The terms "Vietnam" and "quagmire" attach like glue to the discussions of potential decisive military actions in the United States. The inaction of both the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Community to a situation clearly more important to them than to the United States provides mute testimony to a similar conclusion. 28 The Clausewitzian entreaty that one must understand the nature of a war before becoming engaged appears particularly relevant.

These assessments are both empirically correct and entirely evasive of the real underlying importance of the violence in Bosnia and Herzegovina to the rules of conduct of the new international order. Alleviating the suffering by lifting the sieges is the overwhelming problem from the vantage point of the Bosnians. Whether this is practically attainable (can it be done within the limits of the amounts of force people would devote to it?), permanent or transitory (if wrested apart, would the enemies just resume once the intervenors left?) are relevant questions. Systemically, however, the real question is whether the international response will extend or repudiate the precedent set in Operations PROVIDE COMFORT, SOUTHERN WATCH and RESTORE HOPE about the meaning of sovereignty in the post-cold war world. Will Bosnia and Herzegovina reinforce the Westphalian order or continue its erosion?

This issue is clear if rarely addressed directly. The principle of state sovereignty extending from the notion that the sovereign monarch has no one as his or her superior has underlaid the international system for over 300 years. States possess sovereignty over their territory and those who reside in that territory, and no outside force has the right or jurisdiction to interfere in the enforcement of that sovereignty. In practice, of course, state sovereignty is never absolute. Small and weak states, for instance, are infringed upon by stronger neighbors, states voluntarily forfeit bits of their sovereignty to other entities to insure things like orderly delivery of mail across national borders. Economic interpenetration has greatly undercut the practical control of national governments over their economies.
The assaults on state sovereignty until recently have largely been practical, not principled or fundamental. The implicit challenge to state sovereignty in Iraq (it is implicit because no government is trumpeting it as a matter of principle) is a direct assault in principle to a state's sovereign right to govern its territory. Implicitly, it asserts the notion of the supremacy of the rights of individuals and groups within countries when they are abused by their governments. Boutros-Ghali embraces this principle and enshrines it, arguing that "the centuries-old doctrine of absolute and exclusive sovereignty no longer stands," being replaced by the idea of universal sovereignty. Even conservative columnist William Safire joins the parade for "the new sovereignty" (a term he borrows with acknowledgement from former Secretary of State George Shultz). He asks: "When do the world's responsible leaders have a right to intrude on what used to be an impenetrable sovereignty?"

The reason for this is abundantly clear. If states hew to the notion that there is an international right to intervene in other countries' affairs when there are perceived or real violations of the rights of groups and individuals, then state governments are also leaving themselves open to be intervened against—to have their own sovereign territory compromised. It is one thing for the United States to condemn Iraqi atrocities against the Kurds and Shiites of that country; it is quite another to extend that principle to, say, the right of South Korea to have intervened in the Los Angeles riots of 1992 to protect the rights of Korean-Americans who bore the brunt of much of the rage evident in that tragedy.

It is because of the clear potential precedential nature of Operations PROVIDE COMFORT, SOUTHERN WATCH and RESTORE HOPE that no one in the American government is talking about the intervention in those terms. As Operation DESERT STORM was forming and the military action was being conducted, President Bush argued that this was the first defining act of the "new world order." When Operation PROVIDE COMFORT was extended to the exclusion zones within Iraq, the rhetoric of new orders disappeared; it was not a coincidence. A particularly cruel Bosnian winter may force President Clinton to add implicit or explicit imprimatur to this distinction. No principles have been enunciated to justify Somalia beyond humanitarian concerns.

One must be very clear about what is involved here. The action authorized by the United Nations first to remove Iraq from Kuwait (the series of Security Council resolutions culminating in 678) and to provide humanitarian assistance to the Kurds (Resolution 688) were Westphalian: DESERT STORM restored the state sovereignty of Kuwait and stopped at that, and the provision of humanitarian aid to the refugee Kurds posed no challenge to Iraqi sovereignty. Only when the operation extended to creating and maintaining the exclusion zones (an action not sanctioned by the United Nations) was the principle of
the primacy of individuals and groups implicitly entered into the equation.

The situation is parallel in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The United Nations has acted to condemn Serbian actions (originally through Resolution 770) through the imposition of economic sanctions and the suspension of Yugoslav membership in the world body, and it has sent peacekeepers into Bosnia to try to assure that the humanitarian assistance it has called for (Resolution 771) reaches those for whom it is intended. These actions are, once again, congruent with the Westphalian order. Resolutions 688 and 771 are parallel in this regard. They would extend the challenge to that order represented in Iraq if outside forces intervened and created something akin to an exclusion zone to protect the beleaguered segments of the Bosnian population. RESTORE HOPE, because it is authorized by the U.N., would appear to expand the principle underlying PROVIDE COMFORT/SOUTHERN WATCH from a unilateral (U.S.) to an international assertion.

To take decisive military action to end the violence in Bosnia and Herzegovina would create a powerful theoretical and practical statement about the rules of the new international order. Theoretically, it would reinforce the movement away from Westphalia to a much more circumscribed definition of state sovereignty. Given the villainy that exists in large portions of the world, that may be a desirable end. It is not, however, an end that should be countenanced without serious and complete acceptance of the consequences for all nation-states and the pursuit of their interests.

At a practical level, the assertion of a duty, right, or obligation to protect individuals and groups from the atrocious behavior of their own governments, particularly in times of internal war, redefines the purposes for which the international community will use force in the future. Specifically, the role of internationally derived force moves from the relatively passive role of peacekeeping to the very arduous task of peace-enforcement. The reaction to the violence in Bosnia and Herzegovina suggests an implicit reluctance to adopt such a role. The action in Somalia embraces that role. As The New York Times columnist Lawrence L. Friedman recently argued: "if halting starvation or upholding human rights are now legitimate criteria for American intervention abroad, as compelling as protecting traditional strategic interests, where does President-elect Clinton draw the new red line?" It is vitally important that such a determination, one way or the other, be made explicitly.

**Peacekeeping and Peace-Enforcement.**

In light of the apparently successful recent operations legitimized through the United Nations, major efforts have emerged to include multilateral efforts under the general rubric of peacekeeping as it has evolved under U.N. auspices. The
backdrop of this interest is the emergence of ethno-religious and nationalist conflicts in the former socialist world that roil the tranquillity of the post-cold war peace.

Secretary Boutros-Ghali distinguishes three kinds of actions that might be undertaken in the future. The first is preventive diplomacy, defined as "action to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur."  Preventive diplomacy, in other words, occurs before conflicting parties come to blows and seeks to avoid military conflict.

His second category is peacemaking, by which he means "action to bring hostile parties to agreement, essentially through peaceful means such as those foreseen in Chapter VI" of the U.N. Charter. These activities, which presumably occur while fighting is ongoing, include the ability to investigate and to make suggestions. Mediation, such as that conducted by former U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance in Yugoslavia, is an example of peacemaking so defined.

This definition is too restrictive. First, it only deals with the lowest end of possible actions that can be taken to deal with warring combatants and to create peace. Second, states of war, and especially internal wars fought over control of government, are often not amenable to negotiated settlement. Unless a situation is so deadlocked that both sides realize continuation is futile, peacemaking so defined is unlikely to succeed. Third, the prospect of failure is especially great in highly intractable, bloody and visible situations such as Bosnia and Herzegovina, where international public opinion (if such exists in a literal sense) demands alleviation of suffering. Moreover, the prospects for situations akin to Bosnia are great in the future, and this form of peacemaking, or what might alternatively be called diplomatic peacemaking, is unlikely to be sufficiently robust to treat situations effectively (make peace).

For the truly desperate, intractable conflicts attendant to the process of national self-determination currently occurring in the former socialist (second) world and potentially in the Third World as well, peace-enforcement as previously described (the employment of military forces to create a cease-fire between warring parties) is the more relevant concept and the one of interest to the American (and other) military establishments.

This form, which might be designated as military peacemaking, is synonymous with the American concept of peace-enforcement and is clearly more difficult, if more relevant. The problems with peace-enforcement are difficult for at least four obvious and preliminary reasons, each of which interact to make entrance into peace-enforcement an adventure to be undertaken only with extreme caution. At this point, these difficulties are introduced to illustrate the problems. The
differences between peacekeeping and peace-enforcement are expanded in the next section.

First, there is the nature of the situations for which military peacemaking may be deemed relevant. Normally, they will reflect deep-seated animosities with historical, ethnic, religious and other hatreds that layer upon one another as countries are torn apart and regenerated. The problems that underlay the violence that is to be suppressed are political and ultimately solvable only through political agreements that cannot be imposed by outsiders. Imposed cease-fires may be the precondition to negotiate political settlements; since the absence of ability or interest in negotiating is why fighting is occurring, it is hard to know where effectively to enter and break the vicious circle.

Second, the fact that peacemakers are needed suggests that one or more opponents to conflict do not desire peace more than the continuation of war. What this means is that the peacemakers are likely to be unwelcome by some or all of those on whom they seek to enforce peace. This certainly will make the peace enforcer's job more difficult. Both (or all) of the combatants may be attacking the peacemakers as well as one another; the analogy to a policeman intervening in a domestic dispute may be appropriate. It is not clear, for instance, that an international peacemaking force sent to create a cease-fire in Bosnia and Herzegovina would be greeted with anything but a hail of Serbian bullets.

Third, peacemaking may require troops with some specialized capabilities beyond those of peacekeepers, such as considerably more offensive capability and more political sophistication to recognize potential unintended effects of their actions. These forces will presumably have to fight their way into the combat zone and, in some cases, use force physically to separate the combatants. As such, they will be called upon to engage in offensive actions where mistaken action can worsen the situation. Moreover, they will likely inflict and suffer casualties, possibly making them less welcome and undercutting domestic support back home for their activities. The requirements of the Weinberger Doctrine— to the degree its precepts remain relevant— could well be challenged as operations unfold.

Quite obviously, these forces will have to be equipped and trained differently, and they will have to be considerably larger and more capable than conventional peacekeepers. To provide competent peace enforcers will require special skills for the troops (for instance, negotiating and foreign language competence), and provision of adequate firepower and defensive capability to protect themselves from hostile action by those they seek to help. Given these factors, they must also be prepared for a level of ingratitude from the target population of which the Vietnam experience is only a faint reflection.
Moreover, peace-enforcement will be much more costly than peacekeeping or diplomatic peacemaking. Certainly U.N. resources are inadequate for such actions, which may explain why the Secretary General adopts a much more modest and inexpensive conception of peacemaking. Diplomatic peacemaking, in other words, may be all the U.N. can undertake realistically. It will thus fall to the participating peace enforcer nations to pick up the tab: Out of whose budgets will the money come?

Fourth, peace-enforcement will not solve the underlying problems in most areas of potential application. It may have been possible in 1992 to impose a peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina through the insertion of adequate force, but a cease-fire so imposed would not address the underlying animosities. Since the peace enforcers will eventually leave, the problems may simply revert after their departure. Peace enforcers, in other words, had better be prepared for disappointments after their part of the operation is concluded. They may be able to create conditions favorable for follow-on peacekeepers in some instances; in other situations, they may not.40 Put another way, a short-term objective--convoying food in Somalia--may be easily achievable. The long-term objective--a stable authority in that country--may not be.

Boutros-Ghali adds peacekeeping, which he defines as "the deployment of a United Nations presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all the parties concerned, involving United Nations military and/or police personnel and frequently civilians as well. Peace-keeping is a technique that expands the possibility for both the prevention of conflict and the making of peace."41

This definition expands the concept in a dangerous way. Traditional peacekeeping was feasible because two conditions adhered before peacekeepers were inserted: fighting had ceased, and both or all parties preferred the presence of the peacekeepers to their absence (the peacekeepers are invited guests). Under those circumstances, the prototypical peacekeeper arose: the lightly armed, defensively oriented observer force that physically separated former combatants and observed their adherence to the cease-fire while negotiations for peace occurred.42

The danger is in thinking peacekeeping forces can be inserted into peace-enforcement situations; that somehow the situations represent a lineal extension of one another. Peace-enforcement requires, as argued, very different forces qualitatively and quantitatively than does peacekeeping. The result of confusing roles and forces has been most evident in the placing of the UNPROFOR peacekeepers in a war zone in Sarajevo, where the peacekeepers were placed in a peace-enforcement situation and have proven--unsurprisingly--not to be up to a task for which they are unprepared.
An Agenda for Peace adds the need to engage in peace building, defined as "action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict." While this is certainly a noncontroversial idea, in the context of Bosnia and Herzegovina-like situations, finding such structures is likely to be very difficult and, given that situations arise in places suffering from some level of economic misery, expensive as well.

It is possible to rearrange these concepts and to array them as tools applicable to various stages of conflict, as is done in Table 1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conflict Stages</th>
<th>Tools</th>
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<tr>
<td>Pre-War</td>
<td>Preventive Diplomacy</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wartime</td>
<td>Diplomatic Peacemaking</td>
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<td>Peace-Enforcement/Military Peacemaking</td>
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<tr>
<td>Post-War</td>
<td>Peacekeeping</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Peace Building</td>
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Table 1. Stages of Conflict and Tools Available.

What is important about this array is understanding which tool is appropriate at what stage of conflict. The critical threshold is between peace-enforcement and peacekeeping. It is crucial to the evolution of multilateral efforts that the proper distinctions and their implications for forces, situations, and the like be understood.

Two critical variables are involved in these distinctions. The first is the existence of peace (the lack of military hostilities) and acceptance of these conditions by the antagonists as desirable. When those conditions hold, then peacekeeping and peace building may be possible at reasonable cost. When peace is present but the desire for peace is questionable, then preventive diplomacy or U.N.-defined peace-enforcement are the applicable tools. When peace does not exist, then the more arduous form of peace-enforcement is relevant.

The second variable is the nature of the tool, military or political, that can be effective. In simple Clausewitzian terms, of course, all military or potentially military situations are political in nature and the Liddell-Hart "better state of the peace" is only achievable through political processes. In this circumstance, military force is relevant as a condition to
facilitate political processes, not as a substitute for them. Military force can act as a precondition for enduring peace (short-term objective); it cannot create such a peace (long-term objective).

Of the sequential activities, the polar ends are the most overtly political: preventive diplomacy, diplomatic peacemaking, and peace building. To repeat, both of these presuppose that either war has not broken out or that it has been terminated. To be effective, negotiated peace must be seen as preferable to war. Peace-enforcement, on the other hand, occurs when combat is ongoing and either or both sides prefers its continuation. The insertion of forces to stop combat may be effective in making the continuation of violence impossible; it cannot, in and of itself, create the conditions for lasting peace, which involve the political embrace of peace as more attractive than war. The insertion of outside force may break the cycle of violence and convince the combatants that resistance to the peace enforcers is more painful than compliance to an imposed peace. Since these conflicts are normal very deeply rooted and desperate, the shock effect of outside force may prove to be no more than a respite between rounds of fighting.

**Peacekeeping versus Peace-Enforcement: Fundamental Distinctions.**

The great danger in this entire area is to think of the five categories of actions detailed in the preceding section as representing something like a continuum, where movement from one form of activity to another represents a quantitative rather than qualitative progression. Moving from peacekeeping to peace building may represent such a progression; the interval between peacekeeping and peace-enforcement, on the other hand, makes a fundamental, qualitative distinction.

The qualitative differences can be placed into four admittedly overlapping categories, each with distinctive subpoints. The first is environmental and refers to characteristics "on the ground" when actions are being contemplated. The second is contextual, referring to the situation that would confront peacekeepers or peace enforcers were they to be inserted. The third category, based on the first and second, is the mission challenges that face forces inserted. The final category is the compatibility of a mission with current policy and strategy. As we shall see, the differences on each dimension are stark.

**Environment.** The environment refers to the conditions that exist at the time that a peacekeeping or peace-enforcement action is contemplated. Two factors, each shockingly obvious but fundamental in their import, stand out by means of contrast when thinking about peacekeeping or peace enforcing operations.

First and most obvious is the existence of peace or war. In
a peacekeeping situation, peace (or at least the absence of war) has been reestablished--a cease-fire is in place. This means that the task before the peacekeepers is to maintain that peace. By contrast, a peace enforcer contemplates a state of actual ongoing combat; his task is to cause that combat to cease. The contrast is fundamental.

Second, and flowing from the first, in a situation requiring peace-enforcement, some--or possibly both or all--of the combatants prefer the continuation of hostilities to their cessation. Were this not the case, it would be true virtually by definition that a cease-fire would exist that only required monitoring--a peacekeeping environment. By contrast, peacekeepers only enter a situation when all parties have agreed to a cease-fire and where, implicitly or explicitly, they have agreed that the absence of hostilities is preferable to the continuation of combat.

Both of these environmental influences point to a basic difference in the situation into which peacekeepers and peace enforcers may be introduced. If peace enforcers are required, a state of war exists and some or all prefer that situation to its alternative, a cease-fire. In this situation, outside intervention may well be ineffective. While obvious, this contrast creates very different sets of problems for the potential peacekeeper or peace enforcer.

Context. The context in which outside force is inserted refers to the attitudes and conditions of the host groups or countries where force may be inserted. At least three related conditions stand out.

The first is whether the outside forces are invited or not. In the case of peacekeepers, who operate on "the concept of peaceful interposition of U.N. forces between the contenders," they clearly are. If a cease-fire is in place and its continuation is preferred to the reversion to war (an accepted precondition for accepting a peacekeeping role), then it follows that the peacekeeper becomes involved only if the invitation is universal. By contrast, at least one of the parties in an active combat situation for which peace-enforcement may be contemplated does not want an outsider to come in and cause the fighting from which it is presumably benefitting to end. More often than not, it will be those who are losing--the Muslims in Bosnia, for instance--who want peace to be created, not those who are winning.

This leads directly to the second contextual point: peacekeepers are welcome in the country (or between the countries) in which they interposed; peace enforcers almost certainly will not be welcomed by all, and in some cases their mission may be opposed by all. Once again, this is true virtually by definition for peacekeepers; a welcome reception is part and parcel of the invitation they require before agreeing to be
introduced. The peace enforcer, by contrast, is being asked to break up a fight that someone is enjoying. Like the policeman or MP asked to break up a barroom brawl, his mission may be for the greater good, but it is not likely to be appreciated by the brawlers.

The third condition deals with the receptiveness of the parties to peaceful political settlement of their differences. In the case where a peacekeeping operation is envisaged, such a sentiment is normally present, or at least a continuation of the cease-fire is viewed as desirable. The peacekeepers have as a primary mission, after all, the facilitation of a peace process by keeping the former combatants apart.

The situation is altogether different for potential peace enforcers. As noted, the continuing existence of warfare that needs ending is clear evidence that at least one side prefers to continue pursuing military rather than diplomatic solutions to the differences which led to war in the first place; the struggle is political at heart, if conducted militarily. As long as that is the case, the outside peace enforcer is rather more likely to be an irritant rather than a lubricant for the peace process.

The contextual elements define the receptivity of the contestants to outside intervention by peacekeepers or peace enforcers. For the peacekeeper, the environment is comparatively benign; the peacekeeper is the invited guest of the participants and is a positive part of the process of reconciliation. The environment facing the peace enforcer, on the other hand, is likely to be intensely hostile. By interposing themselves between combatants who have not eschewed continuing violence, peace enforcers will be an unwelcome addition by some or all combatants. Any peace enforcer who expects the gratitude of those he forces apart is likely in for a rude awakening.

Mission Challenges. The quality of the environment into which the peacekeeper or peace enforcer is thrust will affect how the mission will be conducted. The peacekeeper exists in the comparatively benign atmosphere of welcomed peace; the peace enforcer is an unwanted addition to a state of war. Those conditions make a difference in how each can operate.

The first difference, suggested earlier, is in the neutral or partisan role each adopts. Strict neutrality is one of the hallmarks of the peacekeeper, and peacekeeping missions have always brought in nonpartisan forces to carry on in a manner fair to both sides. To act in any other manner would prejudice their mission and run the risk of being disinvited by the side perceiving unfairness.

In all likelihood, peace-enforcement missions would initially think of themselves as neutral as well. Such a presumption could arise from the likely humanitarian underpinning of such a mission ("our purpose is to alleviate human suffering")
or from the mistaken impression that peace-enforcement represents a simple step on the continuum of international responses. This kind of sentiment was expressed explicitly in a recent New York Times editorial, which heralded the humanitarian aspect of an effort but failed to appreciate the loss of neutrality the effort would imply. It is the "do something syndrome" impulse in action.

However noble peace enforcers may perceive themselves to be, they will almost certainly not be so perceived by those they have come to "save." The purpose of peace enforcers is to alter the existing situation by ending combat and establishing peace. Since peace is not universally desired (if it were, there would be no need for the peace enforcers), this means altering the status quo in a manner that has a negative effect on the interests of one or more parties to the dispute. Those adversely affected can hardly view the peace enforcer's actions as neutral in content. The Americans in Somalia soon learned, for instance, that the "technicals" came to view them as enemies.

A second difference has to do with the difficulty of accomplishing the mission. Assuming that a peacekeeping force is inserted into a true peacekeeping situation, its mission is rather simple and straightforward; it is there for a well-defined and generally supported mission. It is only when peacekeepers are mistakenly put into a peace enforcing situation, as was done to UNPROFOR, that the peacekeeper's task becomes untenable.

Peace-enforcement is likely to be much more difficult. The underlying internal situations into which peace enforcers might be thrust (e.g. Bosnia) are likely to be analogous to insurgency-counterinsurgency scenarios, and the success of outsiders in those "domestic" disputes is unimpressive at best. Such situations are intensely political, and military force is rarely capable of political conversion, especially when those wielding that force are outsiders. It is arguable that many of the missions for which the peace-enforcement mechanism appears to provide an option fall into the "too hard box," a judgment certainly influencing outside assessments of Bosnia.

A third difference has to do with uniqueness and controversy about the mission. Peacekeeping, of course, is a traditional and accepted practice; the role of the "blue berets" has been well established over time. The fact that there are currently about a dozen of them in place is evidence of their legitimacy.

Such is hardly the case with peace-enforcement. Part of the difference arises from the fact the even the idea of peace-enforcement is brand new, a product of the post-cold war world. Peace-enforcement was unthinkable in the cold war because most wars pitted American- and Soviet-supported antagonists, thereby stripping any shard of neutrality. We lack direct experience with these kinds of actions. Moreover, to the extent that such actions are taken to pry apart warring factions within
nations, they run afoul the valid charges of interference in the sovereign affairs of nations. In the United Nations' experience, the ONUC operation in the Belgian Congo/Zaire, where U.N. peacekeepers became embroiled in thwarting the attempted secession of Katanga Province, may provide the closest available parallel. If so, it is an example that counsels caution. \(^50\) Boutros-Ghali himself suggests a parallel between Somalia and ONUC. \(^51\)

The fourth difference deals with the obviously different forces one needs to conduct one or the other kind of operation. For peacekeepers, the model is clear and well defined. The forces can be relatively small, lightly armed, defensive in orientation, essentially passively equipped and supported. Because of these characteristics, they are also relatively inexpensive, which is one reason they are attractive to the perpetually underfinanced United Nations.

Peace enforcers will have to be quite different. They will have to be combat troops, since they will be thrust into conditions of war. They will require offensive orientation and equipment to protect themselves in combat and to conduct offensive missions. They will likely have to be bigger in size and will require more logistical support than peacekeepers. As a result, such operations will also be much more expensive, a practical reason they are unlikely to be U.N. operations.

These challenges help define the attractiveness of the two contrasting missions. If ease and likelihood of success are major criteria by which attraction is measured, it is clear that peacekeeping is more attractive than peace-enforcement. A final way to look at the contrast, however, requires looking through the lens of each activity in its relationship to existing policy and strategy.

Policy and Strategy Compatibility. For Americans, both peacekeeping and peace-enforcement represent relatively novel missions. American forces have, of course, some modest experience as peacekeepers (the Sinai mission), and should the Iraqi government seek to reinstitute its violence toward the Kurds in the "security zone" or the Shiites south of the 32nd Parallel, we could quickly gain peace-enforcement experience as well.

These proposed missions bump differentially against established policy and strategy. One way to look at the missions is through the lenses of the Weinberger Doctrine and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin S. Powell's criteria for using force. As example, General Powell recently raised the following questions when contemplating force: "Is the political objective we seek to achieve important, clearly defined and understood? Have all other nonviolent policy means failed? Will military force achieve the objective? At what cost? Have the gains and risks been analyzed? How might the situation that we seek to alter, once it is altered by force, develop further, and what
might be the consequences?" All are good questions to ask about potential peace-enforcement missions. One might add a question about short-term versus long-term objectives achievement.

The Weinberger Doctrine suggests the need for vital interests to be present before any action is contemplated (see below), and that victory and popular support be reasonably assured. Peacekeepers, by and large, are successful, and if winning is not defined in militarily activist terms, unlikely will violate public support. Peace-enforcement, on the other hand, is likely to be unpopular if actions cannot be concluded rapidly (and if the analogy to counterinsurgency holds, they likely cannot) and sacrifices mount. The Powell entreaty that maximum force be applied toward rapid conclusion of hostilities is unlikely to be met in either mission. If the bottom line is long-term success, both missions are questionable.

In addition to this, it is not at all clear that in most of the situations where peacekeeping or peace-enforcement will be appropriate that sufficiently vital American interests will be involved to justify the application of force. In fact, it has been argued that this situation will hardly ever involve American vital interests. The passive, noncombative nature of peacekeeping makes the absence of vital interests somewhat less important, because, in a real sense, forces are not being sent to war but to maintain peace. The absence of vital interests does make a difference in peace-enforcement, because forces will be sent into war to create peace. In that circumstance, the outcome of the situation will have be justified in terms of vital interests (the first criterion of the Weinberger Doctrine).

A third policy concern is what international principles will be served by the two kinds of operations and whether the actions are congruent with the principles the United States espouses. As argued, American action in establishing the security zone in Iraq is compatible with the promotion of the rights of individuals and groups, even if this was not the underlying intention. Other peace-enforcement actions, especially in the remnants of the former Soviet Union and in the Third World, are likely to be analogous. If this is the intent, then we should clearly delineate that in policy, because it would represent a fundamental shift. Peacekeeping, on the other hand, is a traditional, Westphalian activity congruent with the supremacy of the rights of states.

The fourth policy implication has to do with the continuing salience of the United Nations as a primary conflict resolver in American policy. With the veto gridlock broken in the U.N. in 1990 (the last time the veto was used in the Security Council), the U.N. has become the legitimizing agent for international change. Peacekeeping reinforces that legitimation; peace-enforcement undercuts it.
There is both a principled and a practical reason why the U.N. cannot be used as the instrument for peace-enforcement except where peace is forced upon two sovereign nation-states at war (which will be the exception). The matter of principle is the U.N. Charter's adherence to the "sovereign equality" of its members found in Article 2, Section 1.55 To authorize the use of a peace-enforcement mission in, for instance, Bosnia, would force the U.N. to amend or ignore its Charter. To suggest that it do so would compromise and abuse the organization.

The second and practical reason is that any such action would almost certainly be vetoed in the Security Council by those states fearing a precedent that could justify peace-enforcement missions in their own countries sometime in the future. The former Soviet Union, represented by Russia, certainly is a candidate for future peace-enforcement, as is the People's Republic of China. Recognizing these difficulties is why PROVIDE COMFORT was not legitimized by the U.N. and why the use of military force in Bosnia (beyond peacekeepers) cannot be. Having said that, the U.N. action in Somalia suggests that attitudes may be changing to embrace "humanitarian intervention."56

This does not mean that potential peace-enforcement actions cannot or will not be multilateral in nature. They may well be. What it does mean is that the broad international sanction that U.N. blessing provides will be absent from such actions. As we learned in Somalia as well, U.S.-sponsored peace-enforcement may be preferred by the parties involved to U.N. operations, oddly enough on the grounds of neutrality and fairness.

This suggests a fifth policy and strategy implication, and that is that this is such a new and unique use of military power that there is little to shape or guide either policy or strategy or to suggest when we should and should not avoid peace-enforcement "opportunities." If, as suggested, there may be a parallel with the U.N. Congo operation, then caution is advised; most observers feel this was the most controversial peacekeeping operation by the world body, and one whose actions bordered on peace-enforcement. It is a case worth serious reconsideration.

What this discussion suggests is that peacekeeping, while on the margins of existing policy and strategy, violates little existing orthodoxy. Peace-enforcement, on the other hand, opens up several policy areas and may require significant political and strategic, as well as operational, changes in the way the United States does business.

Implications for the Army.

The movement toward a policy commitment embracing peacekeeping and peace-enforcement remains in its infancy. It is not at all clear that either civilian or military leaders have
fully explored the kinds of situations in which such a capability would be used, the implications of varyingly aggressive peacekeeping/peace-enforcement for the operation of the international system, and even the global desirability of attempting to pry apart warring factions within states or warring states. With the policy end of the equation incomplete, so too necessarily must the strategy and force implications remain tentative and shadowy.

This suggests that this area remains a part—indeed possibly even the signature—of the great uncertainty that marks circumstances in the post-cold war environment. What we prepare for depends vitally on what we want to prepare for, and that requires an assessment of the world that we have not yet completed.

With a new administration and a new party occupying the White House, the policy answers that must drive strategy and forces will not likely be resolved rapidly, and for that we can probably be thankful. The new policy team that is being assembled will have to confront the problem of peacekeeping and peace-enforcement, but unless the evolving situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina dictates an action during the winter, one can hope that there will be adequate time to deliberate and form a coherent, intelligent policy.

Because the policy questions are not totally resolved, it is difficult to outline in any detail what a commitment one way or the other to peacekeeping and peace-enforcement means for the Army. If one assumes, however, that there will almost surely be some commitment to the concept, then one can lay out at least some tentative categories of implications. For present purposes, four implications, sharing the common theme of the disjunction of peacekeeping and peace-enforcement and traditional Army practice, will be discussed.

The first implication is a rejoinder: Do not think of peacekeeping and peace-enforcement either as an extension of what the Army does or as parallel and compatible missions. The Army has limited experience in peacekeeping, and could probably adapt itself fairly easily to some expansion of that mission through an increased emphasis and some modifications to procedures for training military police (MPs). An expansion of the peacekeeping role would require more emphasis in this area.57 The same is hardly true for peace-enforcement.

As the preceding discussion has attempted to demonstrate, peace-enforcement is likely to be very difficult and probably an extremely frustrating activity. This is so because of the political intractibility of the kinds of situations where peace-enforcement will be an option. The military task of disengagement will not be the hard part; adequately deadly and well-aimed firepower could probably dislodge the various Serbian militia units from the positions they use to strangle Bosnian
cities with reasonable ease. The problem is that the military separation is only the first, tentative step toward the kind of reconciliation that would allow peacekeeping to be the follow-on to peace-enforcement. That requires political processes and will for which military force is not clearly relevant. The Army's preparation for the broader task is at least suspect.

Likewise, the two forms of activity are not part of any continuum: Peace-enforcement is not simply peacekeeping that is a little harder. There is a fundamental political and military difference between the two. To engage in peace-enforcement in essence requires deciding to go to war; peacekeeping does not. Peace-enforcement requires physically going to war in a complex, politically difficult environment; peacekeeping does not. Peace-enforcement, in other words, is not business as usual extended.

This leads to a second observation: A sizable commitment to peace-enforcement requires abandonment of some post-Vietnam dogma. Many of the situations for which peace enforcers will be needed will be internal wars between factions within states whose animosity is defined along historical, ethnic, linguistic, religious grounds or some combination of those causes. The schisms are likely to be deeply felt and strongly held. Using outside force to "attack" those symptoms runs the very real possibility of involvement in quagmires that policy has attempted to avoid since Vietnam.

Two tenets are almost certain to be victimized in the process. The first is the Weinberger Doctrine; all but the last principle of six will probably be violated in a peace-enforcement exercise: American vital interests will not be at stake; winning will have an elusive meaning; political and military objectives will be vague and subject to change; forces will be inappropriate to the task; and public support will be quickly eroded. The only principle upheld is likely that peace-enforcement will be the option of last resort.

General Powell's principle of the massive and rapid application of overwhelming force is also not relevant in a peace-enforcement situation. When the situation is internal and any action will have clear political implications for all parties, considerable discretion and restraint will be necessary in the application of force to avoid unintended and unfortunate results. It would, for instance, be very difficult to apply the principle of maximum force in Bosnia in a way that would not harm all sides, including innocent bystanders, along the way.

This leads to a third implication: Significant involvement in peace-enforcement and peacekeeping operations will require the Army to modify the way it does business. Once again, the extent of the impact of this observation is much more pointed for peace-enforcement than it is for peacekeepers. Peace-enforcement will require some fairly basic changes in the way the Army
prepares for war.

Because peace-enforcement operations will occur in more complex politico-military phenomena than normal operations, those who carry them out will have to be correspondingly more sophisticated than regular operators. Two aspects of this sophistication stand out; there are probably others that experience will ultimately reveal.

A first aspect of sophistication is that the peace enforcer must understand that even the most tactical actions he takes (or orders) may have enormous strategic and political implications. Who is separated, how they are separated, and where separation occurs in, say, a neighborhood, a town, or even a street can affect local balances of power, and can implicitly align the peace enforcer with one side or another to the dispute. The average soldier clearing a town or lifting a siege does not have to be concerned with such matters; the peace enforcer who does not can change things without realizing what he is doing. In peace-enforcement, everything is strategic.

This kind of distinction would not be important if the peace enforcer's actions were openly partisan: helping one side or another. That, however, is unlikely to be the case. Instances consonant with the United Nations'/Joint Staff's definition of peace-assisting activities form the conceptual, if not physical, continuum of restoring or reinforcing peace. To do so will require a strict neutrality toward the combatants if the purpose is to reconcile the combatants into a willing peace rather than imposing a peace (which will be the case). As argued, doing this will be exceptionally difficult under the best of circumstances, since almost any action will benefit one side at the expense of the other. To march unprepared into a strategic maelstrom could do enormous harm.

A second aspect of this sophistication is linguistic and geopolitical. Because peace enforcers' actions at the small unit level can have important strategic effects on situations, it will be extremely important that, even at the small unit (platoon, company?) level, someone be capable of communicating with the inhabitants where operations are occurring. In a place like Bosnia, where three separate languages are spoken, that is no small task.

Geopolitically, many, if not most, peace enforcing opportunities will occur in remote areas that have not been geopolitically scrutinized in detail by the Army, or others in government. How many Foreign Area Officers (FAOs), for instance, does the Army possess with detailed expertise in the Caucasus region, where instability is rife? Without detailed advice from somewhere, will the Army make mistakes that geopolitical expertise could have avoided? Would, for instance, the apparently tactical decision to set up the security zones in Iraq have been undertaken if the broader systemic consequences had been
This leads to a third way in which the Army will have to do business differently within peace enforcing operations. Because of their heavily political content, these situations will require more than just "jointness" within the armed services; they will also require considerable interagency cooperation within the Executive branch of government. Certainly overt cooperation between the armed services and the State Department will be required; how far the interagency net will have to extend will vary with the individual situation. Where such operations will find an eventual institutional "home" is also an interesting concern. It is not clear that that base will be within the Department of Defense.

This leads to a summary warning about entrance into this whole business of peacekeeping, peace-enforcement and the like: It is a very new enterprise to be examined and embraced only with all due caution. Conceptually and practically, it is a potential minefield into which one should enter tiptoeing lightly.

The caution is, of course, tempered by what kind of activity one embraces in the conceptual continuum of activities. Peacekeeping, where the conditions for success inhere, does not represent a novel or conceptually radical form of activity, nor does peacemaking defined as diplomatic activity. It is peace-enforcement that represents the radical change.

We do lack critical direct experience with peace-enforcement actions, and are uncertain what precedents may apply to guide deliberations and actions. If there is any parallel suggested at least by Bosnia, it is that the situations will be akin to insurgency/counterinsurgency situations: warring internal fracases where control of government or dismemberment of states are the underlying conditions. Outside intervention into such situations has a sufficiently questionable track record that, if the analogy holds, suggests considerable caution.

A Glimpse into the Future.

This discussion is more than an academic exercise. Whether the intrusiveness and potential precedent set by Operation PROVIDE COMFORT/SOUTHERN WATCH and RESTORE HOPE or the feeble hesitance surrounding the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina are the harbingers of the future matters considerably for the international system in the post-cold war world. Essentially, the difference is whether the new international system is fundamentally different or not, and what will be the primary role of military force in that order. Each is a matter of considerable moment and not something into which we should enter without pause. The ad hoc consideration of individual cases may find us, in Kafkaesque terms, not merely peering into the abyss, but finding ourselves in its midst.
The decision to use PROVIDE COMFORT/SOUTHERN WATCH or RESTORE HOPE as precedents represents a direct, frontal assault on the principle of state sovereignty unlike any of the informal compromises that things like economic interdependence represents. If the idea becomes widespread that there is a right and/or obligation to intervene in internal affairs of nation-states to relieve the suffering of individuals or groups, it is hard to imagine non-cynical criteria for deciding where to intervene and not to intervene. A powerful nation such as the United States may not feel assaulted by the precedent (we can physically prevent people from intervening in our affairs), but it is not clear how others may deal with these situations. How, for instance, is Russia to react when the analog to PROVIDE COMFORT is proposed for parts of the Caucasus? In circumstances where we decide to act, it will be in the role of peace enforcer, and we will be promoting, at least implicitly, the rights of individuals and groups over the sovereign rights of states.

We already know the answer to the question. The reason that there was no direct U.N. sanction for the actions taken to create the exclusion zones in Kurdistan and south of the 32nd parallel in Iraq is because there is no international consensus favoring such action as an international principle. In fact, to have proposed such action would have revived the veto in the Security Council. The reason is simple enough: both Russia (as heir to the former Soviet seat) and China have situations within their former or present borders that would meet the criteria for parallel activity. In Somalia, the dimensions of human tragedy may simply have overwhelmed geostrategic considerations or created a new geostrategic reality of its own.

The second reason all this is important is that the international plate of situations for which peace-enforcement might be undertaken is very full indeed. Multinationalism and potential irredentism are powerful forces throughout the crumbling socialist and Third Worlds. As freedom and independence of expression comingle with an increasingly transparent world, the potential and temptation to become involved around the globe will multiply.

The international system, and especially the American people, are neither prepared for nor willing to support widespread application of the PROVIDE COMFORT precedent, nor have American officials shown overt enthusiasm for overthrowing the Westphalian system and diluting American sovereignty in the process. Such situations will occur mainly where American interests are not directly involved and where public support will be nonexistent, particularly when the body bags begin to come home. These situations will be, to reiterate, complex, intractable, and poorly understood by the American public and by our responsible officials. If this sounds a bit like our approach into Vietnam, the analogy is purposeful.
Vietnam spawned the Weinberger "doctrine" as a set of criteria that should guide American response to crises and the engagement of military force. The criteria were very conservative and cautionary, which was and is appropriate. At the very base of the criteria was the caution that American force requires the Clausewitzian trinity of unity among the people, the government, and the military. The inaction in Bosnia and Herzegovina—especially because of the unlikelihood of decisive success of any feasible military action—suggests a proper assessment of holding that trinity intact. It should be applied across the board.

Is the new order different or not? It is clear that in many ways it is not, but the potential impact of extending the Operation PROVIDE COMFORT/SOUTHERN WATCH or RESTORE HOPE precedents to the future could alter fundamentally that assessment. There is, to repeat, no shortage of Bosnia-like potential situations on the horizon. The conscious choices that Americans and the international community generally make about how these situations are handled will define the new order. There will, thanks to the publicity created by global television, be great temptations to try to alleviate, by the application of military force, numerous situations, most of which cannot be solved by the application of the sword.

Notes:


29. For a discussion, see Talbott, "Post-Victory Blues," p. 56.


34. Sifry and Cerf, eds., The Gulf War, pp. 155-156.


38. Ibid., pp. 11, 20-27.


40. See Snow, Distant Thunder, pp. 130-135, for a discussion of the differences.


43. Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace, pp. 11, 32-34.


54. Ibid., p. 13.


58. This warning is sounded in Greentree, *The United States and the Politics of Conflict in the Third World*, p. 23.

59. Ibid., pp. 5, 40.

60. Sayigh, *Confronting the 1990s*, p. 10.