Key Points and Recommendations:

- War has changed. New organizing principles require a new paradigm that facilitates change from a singular military approach to a multidimensional, multi-organizational, and multilateral/multinational whole-of-government and whole-of-alliance/coalition approach to deal more effectively with the contemporary global security reality.

- Based on its 3-D (Defense, Development, and Diplomacy) approach, Canada has made great strides in developing a new external conflict and internal catastrophe/disaster paradigm in which traditional military and police organizations continue to play major roles, but are closely coordinated with all the other instruments of power under the control of the civil authority.

- The 3-D concept is rapidly growing into a broader and more effective strategic whole-of-government and grand-strategy whole-of-alliance paradigm.

- Participants recommended that these models be utilized as the essential organizing principles to make carefully-staffed supplementary recommendations to the appropriate authority to establish a comprehensive North American process for active intergovernmental and multilateral policy coordination and cooperation.

- In these terms, they further recommended that governments and their security-related institutions continue to develop appropriate organizational mechanisms that will achieve an effective unity of effort. The intent is to ensure that the application of the various civil-military instruments of power directly contributes to a viable and mutually agreed political end-state. Generating a more complete unity of effort will require conceptual and organizational contributions at the international, as well as the national level.
The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College (USAWC); Queen’s University in Kingston, Ontario, Canada; and the Canadian Land Forces Doctrine and Training System cosponsored a colloquium at Kingston, Ontario, Canada, on June 21-23, 2006, entitled, “Defense, Development, and Diplomacy (3D): Canadian and U.S. Military Perspectives.” This colloquium brought together over 130 Canadian, U.S., and other international government and academic experts; think tank members; and university faculty members. Lieutenant General Andrew Leslie, Chief of the Canadian Land Staff; Lieutenant General Michael Gauthier, Commander of the Canadian Expeditionary Force Command; and (by video-teleconferencing) Brigadier General David Fraser, Commander of the Canadian Brigade operating under NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) auspices in Kandahar, Afghanistan, led the Canadian military representation. Major General Charles Jacoby, Commander, U.S. Army, Alaska, and former Deputy Commander, U.S. Forces in Afghanistan, 2004-05; and Brigadier General Frederick Rudesheim, Deputy Director for Political-Military Affairs, Western Hemisphere at the Joint Staff, J5, led the U.S. military representation. All the participants, through a robust program of panels and question and answer discussions, examined the considerable experience of the United States and Canada in the use of military, diplomatic, and economic instruments to deal with the full spectrum of nontraditional and traditional security threats in the contemporary global security environment. This colloquium was considered to be a very timely and important effort, given the likelihood that individual national powers—such as the United States and Canada—and international organizations—such as the United Nations, NATO, and the OAS (Organization of American States)—increasingly will be expected to provide the leverage to ensure peace, security, and stability in an increasing number of post-conflict and stabilization situations over the next several years.

The Contemporary Threat Environment—At Home and Abroad.

The major trend that permeated the colloquium dialogue involved a generalized move toward the consideration of the role of the military, diplomatic, and economic instruments of national power in cooperatively helping to provide a secure environment, making and keeping the peace, restoring or developing economic and social structures, and helping to build free and stable political institutions in the parts of the world in which stabilization and post-conflict operations have been ongoing. Additionally, participants recognized and articulated the need for coordination and cooperation in North American homeland defense efforts. The September 11, 2001 (9/11), attacks and the political, economic, and security repercussions of that event provided a disquieting reason for creating a policy and structure for national security planning and administration in both the United States and Canada. The new policies that stemmed from those attacks in New York City and Washington, DC, addressed directly the need to protect the homeland, while at the same time constructing an effective mechanism to combat threats to national security interests abroad.

Clearly, the United States, Canada, Europe, and those other parts of the global community most integrated into the interdependent world economy are embroiled in a security arena in which time-honored concepts of national security and the classical military means to attain it, while still necessary, are no longer sufficient. In addition to traditional regional security issues, an array of nontraditional threats challenges the global community. These include state and nonstate, military and nonmilitary, lethal and nonlethal, direct and indirect, and a mixture of some or all of the above kinds of threats. Whatever this type of “war” or “conflict” is called—Fourth Generation War, Irregular War, Insurgency War, Asymmetric War, or Post-Modern War, contemporary conflict is the product of weak or collapsing nation-states and the emergence of new organizing principles.

The primary organizing principle is asymmetry—or the use of disparity between the contending parties to gain advantage. Wise competitors will seek to shift the playing field away from conventional military confrontations, and tend to employ terrorist tactics and strategies and other unconventional forms of assault on “enemy” nations and “undesirable” global institutions. Another defining characteristic of contemporary war stems from “ungoverned” or “lawless” territories. In this context, a government’s failure to extend an effective sovereign presence throughout its national territory leaves a vacuum in which gangs, drug cartels, leftist and religious insurgents, the political and narco-
Right, warlords, and governments may all compete for power—and contribute substantially to the processes of state failure. In many cases, this unconventional type of conflict requires the imposition of law and order by the international community to generate regional stability, development, peace, and effective sovereignty. In this new global security environment, war can be everywhere and can involve everybody and everything. All this represents a sea-change in warfare, and requires nothing less than a paradigm change in how conflict is conceived and managed.

The Canadian Response to the Reality of the “New” Global Security Arena.

Another dominant theme within the colloquium dialogue stressed the evolution of a new conflict paradigm in which traditional state security institutions continue to play major roles, but are closely coordinated with all the other instruments of power under the control of the Canadian civil authority. Since 9/11, it has been recognized that fighting global terrorism, stabilizing failing or failed states, or confronting a national man-made or natural disaster together, but separately, is neither efficient nor effective. Dealing with these kinds of national and global threats involves the entire population of affected countries, as well as large numbers of civilian and military national and international governmental and nongovernmental organizations and agencies—and subnational, indigenous actors. As a result, a viable unity of effort is required to coordinate the many multidimensional, multi-organizational, and multilateral/multinational activities necessary to play in a given security arena. Thus, all means that can be brought to bear on a given threat situation must be utilized to achieve strategic clarity and the grand strategy objectives of the government.

In these terms, superior firepower is no panacea, and technology may not give one a knowledge or information advantage. Likewise, traditional military and police power—although helpful—is not well-suited for generating economic-political development or confronting some sort of internal catastrophe. Thus, Canada has begun to implement an integrating strategy that draws on its diplomatic, development, and defense resources to deal with direct threats to that country or indirect threats to its interests abroad. This 3D approach internationally, and the whole-of-government approach at home, demand a fully integrated and unified effort on the part of all the instruments of contemporary national power. Additionally, the 3D approach requires a unity of effort with allies—a whole-of-alliance approach.

The Challenges and Tasks Ahead.

The logic and general flow of the colloquium discussion argues that the conscious choices that civil-military leadership in the international community and individual nation-states make about how to deal with the contemporary, nontraditional security environment will define the processes of national, regional, and global security, stability, and well-being far into the future. The continuing challenge for Canada, the United States, and the other parts of the hemispheric and global communities, then, is to exploit the fact that contemporary security—at whatever level—is, at base, a holistic political-diplomatic, socio-economic, psychological-moral, and military-police effort. The corollary is to move from a singular military approach to a multidimensional whole-of-government and whole of alliance/coalition paradigm. The Canadian whole-of-government approach and the NATO whole-of-alliance model to homeland defense and global security requirements do that, and could be very useful as primary organizational principles to establish a comprehensive North American process for active intergovernment and multilateral policy cooperation. That, in turn, requires a conceptual framework and an organizational structure to promulgate unified civil-military planning and implementation of the multidimensional, multi-organizational, and multilateral/multinational security concept.

The associated task, as a consequence, is multilevel. It is at once conceptual and organizational. Ways and means to begin the implementation of this set of tasks would include but not be limited to the following actions:

• Hemispheric leaders must emphasize the interconnectivity among national and global political, economic, and security challenges—and the need for greater multinational cooperation.

• Civilian and military leaders at all levels must learn the fundamental nature of subversion and insurgency with particular reference to the
way in which military and nonmilitary, lethal and nonlethal, and direct and indirect force can be employed to achieve political ends. Leaders must also understand the way in which political-psychological considerations affect the use of force.

- As a corollary, the debate on aggregate power has begun to address how military power can be brought to bear on “nonmilitary” issues. That debate must now turn the problem around and address how “nonmilitary” economic or other types of power may be used in a military or law enforcement context.

- Operations will achieve strategic clarity and maximum effectiveness as a result of integrating both horizontal and vertical planning and implementations processes from the outset. That is, the organizational integration of horizontal (i.e., multinational/multilateral) political-military planning and operations with vertical national (e.g., U.S. interagency) political-military planning operations must be implemented to achieve synergy toward the achievement of an agreed political vision.

- Two fundamental organizational mechanisms are necessary—a national executive-level management structure and an international executive-level coordinating body—to help eliminate “ad-hoc-ery” and to help ensure vertical and horizontal unity of effort.

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