

**STABILITY OPERATIONS
AND STATE-BUILDING:
CONTINUITIES AND CONTINGENCIES**

Colloquium Report

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FOREWORD

State-building is nothing new for the U.S. military. The current age of state-building may be traced back at least to U.S. involvement in the various Balkan conflicts. But with the advent of the Global War on Terror and the subsequent interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, the U.S. military, especially the Army and the Marines Corps, has been faced with an unprecedented challenge to reestablish entire countries and rebuild their institutions. It is no secret that our forces have suffered through a significant learning process to achieve the success and continued movement towards functioning states which currently marks our involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan. With the publication of Department of Defense (DOD) Directive 3000.05, *Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations*, in November 2005, the Defense establishment addressed this area of state-building and stability operations. The process of arriving at this point, however, indicates that no consistent view of the state-building mission area exists as yet. The Strategic Studies Institute's collaboration with Austin Peay State University allowed for academics, governmental and nongovernmental practitioners, and military personnel to step back and review the entire spectrum of state-building needs as theorized and practiced by modern societies.

Uniquely, this colloquium began with a review of principles from the Enlightenment period, philosophy, and religion to identify those enduring intellectual and cultural foundations which underpin the successful establishment of the modern Western world as we know it today. Then, by examining historical examples of successful state-building, the panelists engaged pos-


sible models, policies, and procedures which can contribute to the success of this mission area. Finally, selected military experts, with knowledge and experience in the two theaters, addressed the challenges our forces face in Iraq and Afghanistan. The colloquium was capped by a future-oriented presentation on global terrorism and the challenges to be expected in the future.

Next the attendees worked through an exhaustive list of possible principles to win the peace. Over 70 principles were nominated. Six principles which the group believed capable of guiding future state-building activities were identified. Interestingly, in the process of refining these principles, the group also identified 15 specific policies and procedures which will serve to assist in implementing the principles.

Two keynote speakers, Thomas P. M. Barnett and John Robb, acted as “bookends” for the colloquium. Barnett opened the event with a futures-oriented presentation spanning multiple levels of interpretation, such as economic, social, commerce, and military. Robb, as the concluding speaker, limited his presentation to the future of global terrorism. The elements of his presentation provided the attendees with alternative models of possible future terrorist activity and means for mitigating such activity. Both speakers provided attendees a substantive framework in which to place the results of the colloquium.

This volume contains the full range of intellectual theorizing, historical examinations, and practical engagement challenges which were so richly presented. In addition, the appendices contain not only the final principles, policies, and procedures determined by the plenary, but also the full list of nominated principles with which the attendees worked. The Strategic Studies

Institute and Austin Peay State University are pleased to offer this important compilation of knowledge on the most immediate challenge facing our forces in Iraq and Afghanistan today.

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr." in a cursive script.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

Director

Strategic Studies Institute

INTRODUCTION

During February 13-15, 2008, the Strategic Studies Institute and Austin Peay State University conducted an academic colloquium titled, "Stability Operations and State-Building: Continuities and Contingencies." The event took place on the campus of Austin Peay State University in Clarksville, TN. The purpose of this academic colloquium was to identify principles and supporting policies of state-building that will enhance America's ability "to win the peace" while stabilizing chaotic regions.

Basic to the concept of the colloquium was the idea that just as there are acknowledged principles of war that enhance the possibility of victory on the battlefield, there should be principles that, if applied during the state-building process, will enhance the chances of "winning the peace." The idea that principles should comprise the foundation of state-building and that supporting policies and procedures then flow from those principles was fundamental to the colloquium's process.

The participants included scholars from a wide range of academic disciplines, active duty military personnel, nongovernmental organization staff, and governmental administrators. The list of participants found at Appendix VI documents their interdisciplinary composition. The colloquium's sponsors endeavored to blend the expertise of civilian academics and military professionals.

Each speaker was asked to nominate several principles of peace that represent parallel ideas to the principles of war. (See Appendix II.) As expected, some duplication in naming the principles occurred. The speakers addressed their respective lists of principles

during their presentations. After all scheduled presentations, six independent breakout groups distilled the consolidated list of principles to a common core for each group (see Appendix III). Next, a plenary session considered the resulting six lists of principles for further consolidation into a core list of six principles (see Appendix IV). Those principles are: (1) rule of law, (2) security (military, economic, and civil), (3) legitimacy, (4) development (the encouragement thereof), (5) self-empowerment/self-sufficiency, and (6) communications (intergovernmental and international). The proposed principles that were discarded were often categorized as policies or procedures that could prove useful in the state-building process. These were then subjected to a redactive process to capture their meanings in encompassing terms (see Appendix V).

**STABILITY OPERATIONS AND
STATE-BUILDING:
CONTINUITIES AND CONTINGENCIES**

**How America Realigns Itself
to the Current Geostrategic Landscape**

**Dr. Thomas P. M. Barnett
Howard Baker Center, University of Tennessee**

Points of Emphasis:

- Leave the place more connected than you found it, across all networks possible.
- Promote industries that link the economy into existing and emergent production chains; any niche will do.
- Give the regime the technical and training wherewithal to secure its borders.
- Rehabilitate and/or build up air- and seaport security to meet American entry/fastpass standards, so that direct connections can be forged, giving transitioning states the software and hardware if necessary.
- Go slowly on elections and demands for democracy; most countries can only connect as single-party regimes because of the social and economic challenges involved with opening up to the global economy.
- Realize most societies have democracy within tribes and among tribal leaders, but that the decision point preference is consensus, not majority vote.

- Go with whatever traditional social hierarchal structure exists; build from that instead of transplanting.
- Do not push women's rights so much as women's education—especially for girls. (Remember how long it took for women to get the vote in the United States.)
- Do not feed people except for short durations and when extreme need arises; it is better to encourage agricultural development.
- Build police, not militaries.

PANEL 1

INTELLECTUAL AND CULTURAL FOUNDATIONS

Considering the history of the modern world, we decided that values from the Age of Enlightenment could and should provide us with a logical, intellectual foundation for the colloquium. Thus we began the proceedings with an examination of principles for state-building derived from that seminal age. Acknowledging that religion will continue to inspire people, we sought to examine, at least in broad principles, how and why religion must be factored into the state-building process. Since religions differ and peoples' perceptions of religion and the state differ, we sought to identify basic, universal concerns that must be considered. Additionally, the matter of ethics and state-building seemed especially important because, in a global society, state-building needs to be acceptable in the eyes of other actors on the world stage. Since it seems likely that future state-building will follow on the heels of military conquest, we decided to evaluate state-building according to the standards of a "just war." With Clausewitz in mind, we reasoned that if war is politics by other means, then the subsequent state-building process is a reassertion of politics.

The Enlightenment Quest for Peace

Dr. Richard P. Gildrie
Austin Peay State University

Early modern Europe was turbulent and violent. The 17th century in particular was dominated by revolutions, civil wars, and international conflicts, most horrendously the Thirty Years' War (1618-48) which

devastated central Europe and involved virtually all the European major powers of the era. Given these events, it is hardly surprising that the quest for peace within and among the emerging nation-states of the continent was a major theme of Enlightenment thought from the 1670s to the outbreak of the American Revolution.

One approach, centered in the Netherlands and the northern German states, was a renewal of the natural law tradition on a more secular basis so as to transcend the Catholic-Protestant divide. Such natural law theorists as Hugo Grotius and Samuel Pufendorf had a major impact on the development of international law and moral philosophy.¹ Another approach was historical analysis seeking to uncover the roots and consequences of political and social conflicts. Giambattista Vico and Algernon Sidney were among the most interesting of these writers.² Finally, there was moral philosophy itself, which, as cultivated by the Scottish Enlightenment in particular, gave rise to the social sciences.³ Of course, these approaches often intersected, sometimes in the works of the same writer. Voltaire, David Hume, and Adam Smith are famous examples of blending all three.

The goal of this panel is to distill from this extensive Enlightenment discourse some fundamental principles for establishing and maintaining peace among and within complex societies and states.

The first and most universally accepted principle, most famously asserted by John Locke, was that proper society and government exist to protect life, liberty, and property. Individuals or groups with no security in their persons, possessions, or basic liberties have no incentive to keep the peace or support government. Indeed, one could say that the preservation of life, liberty, and property was a basic Enlightenment

definition of peace.⁴ By including the notion of liberty along with security, Locke and other thinkers of the era were incorporating an element of dynamism and flexibility into their definition. A static order was neither possible nor desirable. That understanding was one result of the famed philosophical debate between the Ancients and the Moderns during the late 17th century. Thus, the state of peace would be a “dynamic stability,” to quote a recent social theorist, whose major feature is a capacity for self-correction and adaptation to emerging problems and opportunities.⁵ Stasis engenders frustration and conflict, and so does chaos. Hence, “dynamic stability” in any social or political arrangement would be another fundamental principle of peace. Thus, any definition of “security” that does not explicitly transcend mere suppression of violence seems doomed to fail, perhaps immediately.

The next requirement, in light of the above, is the rule of law. The obvious minimal aim is the security of persons in their daily liberties and property. Beyond physical security, the goal here is to establish “the empire of laws and not of men,” which allows predictability and a sense of fairness. No person, no matter how exalted, nor any group no matter how large or potent, can be allowed to treat others capriciously, regardless of motive or circumstance. This view was at the heart of the Enlightenment critique of Absolutism. A fundamental purpose of law in Enlightenment thought is to prevent individuals and groups from indulging their “passions and interests” at the expense of others. It follows that the spirit of peace must include a capacity for self-doubt, or at least compromise, as well as rules enjoining restraint. The frequent insistence on religious toleration during the Enlightenment was an important expression of this view. Thus the rule of law is an ethical and cultural concept as well as a judicial or

political one. Also, the operation of laws must be public, predictable, and universal because, as a contemporary scholar has noted, "A well-ordered . . . society cannot maintain itself without some level of social trust."⁶ Similarly, a current school of economists, pursuing what they call "constitutional political economy," link the problems of economic development and postwar reconstruction to this theme of predictability. Not surprisingly, one of their more famous works is titled *The Reason of Rules*.⁷

Cultivating mutual consent or "social contracts" along with the rule of law encourages social trust and thus the dynamic stability essential to peace. Indeed, mechanisms of consent are practical necessities as well as theoretical benefits. Coercion, whether open or subtle, can only make a temporary or illusory peace because it engenders resentment and resistance. Also, as the American Declaration of Independence suggests, consent is a stronger, more efficient basis of authority, an assertion that has had global resonance.⁸

A common understanding and a respect for maintaining institutions and arrangements are essential. As Hume wrote in 1741, "It is therefore on opinion only that government is founded; and this maxim extends to the most despotic and military governments, as well as the most free and most popular."⁹ Of course, authoritarian regimes, based on the operative will of relatively few people, are inherently more fragile and rigid than those based on the participatory consent of many. This point was the core of Algernon Sidney's influential history of tyranny, published in 1698.¹⁰

On one level, mutual consent may be merely utilitarian or prudential, as self-seeking individuals and groups may calculate the benefits of cooperation strictly to their own ends. Such arrangements are unstable

and conflict-ridden. As Hume would suggest, what is needed is a broadly held “opinion” or social vision undergirding both the rule of law and social contracts. Such a vision encourages the negotiating parties to transcend self-interest for a common good. Peace must be more than a temporary truce. An effective, persistent peace requires a collective moral and social imagination expressed through both a coherent ideology explaining and justifying shared ideals and a compelling narrative of struggles over time to realize them, an idea noted in the recent *Counterinsurgency Field Manual*.¹¹ Marc Tyrrell’s essay in this collection discusses this concept under the rubric of “narrative-mythic structures.” Enlightenment thinkers commonly described the product of this vision as a “common interest that . . . is the Result of Common Reason, or common Feelings of all.” The alternatives are “a Confederacy of Banditti, a Class of lawless Savages, or a Band of Slaves under the Whip of a Master.”¹²

In the pursuit of peace, a particularly valuable form of social imagination, according to Hume and others, is an explicit theory of justice, as it were, a preamble to making peace which gives a context and meaning to an agreement transcending the immediate interests or problems at stake. Most religions and cultures have such theories of justice. Of course, these vary in detail and forms of expression. Enlightenment thinkers believed that these differences should be explored, compared, and contrasted so that we might develop more nearly universal and compelling understandings of justice on which to base cross-cultural discussions, agreements, and codes. Montesquieu’s *The Spirit of the Laws* (1749) was an impressive and influential attempt, built on historical analysis and variations in the natural law tradition, which is still worth consideration.

The American Founding Fathers explicitly cited Montesquieu's approach during the Constitutional Convention. Initially, I would broaden the sources for our time by including such Islamic works as Ibn Khaldun's medieval classic, *The Mugaddimah*, to compare with Machiavelli on the social roots of justice.¹³ Careful comparative study of traditions of justice by scholars, policymakers, and pundits might encourage more thoughtful pursuits of peace within and among nations and societies.

Because social visions, to be relevant or inspiring, must arise out of the actual, lived experience of a people, they cannot usually be imposed from outside. Abstract, universal theories of justice, economic well-being, or political order may prove useful only if they can be adapted to what Enlightenment writers termed "the manners and customs" of a society. However, they may prove useful as criteria for evaluating local forms. Then, too, local societies often seek to emulate such standards, especially when other societies or groups seem to be applying them successfully. In early modern Europe, the nation-state spread largely through both competition and emulation.¹⁴ Thus, cultures are not impervious to outside influences, nor are most societies bereft of conflicting visions of justice.

The cultivation of peace then requires constant conversation and adjustment of ideals to realities and vice versa, continuously building active consent among those affected. This practical necessity is, after all, another element of dynamic stability. As Hume explained in 1754, "Sovereigns must take mankind as they find them, and not pretend to introduce any violent change in their principles and ways of thinking. A long course of time, with a variety of accidents and circumstances, are requisite to produce those great

revolutions, which so much diversify the face of human affairs." His view was echoed by the Marquis de Chastellux who argued in the 1780s that care should be taken in applying the lessons of the American Revolution to France:

legislators, like doctors, ought never to presume to believe that they can bestow, at will, a particular temperament on bodies politic, but should attempt to understand the temper they already have, while striving to combat the disadvantages and increase the advantages resulting from it.¹⁵

Other than government, which perforce involves coercion at some point, the arena in which these ideals arise and are debated was called "civil society" by Enlightenment theorists, which was the "product of agreement among naturally free men." In essence, it is the realm of voluntary associations: friendships, clubs, and other relationships free of the bonds of economic necessity or political and religious authority. A prime example in the 18th century was the Freemasons.¹⁶ A robust and complex civil society, in the view of most Enlightenment thinkers, provided the foundation for a "public sphere" in which public opinion can be formed and modified free of control by the rulers of church and state. In Hume's sense, "opinion" shaped in the public sphere is, on the whole, the most compelling and broadly shared source of social imagination or vision of justice out of which lasting agreements can grow. In short, it is the major source of legitimacy for both institutions and policies.¹⁷ Freely evolving "opinion" is thus a crucial element of the dynamic stability necessary to social or political order. The Enlightenment's famous hostility to censorship and consequent commitment to freedom of the press arose out of these considerations rather than simply as a belief in individual rights of free expression.

A fully developed civil society with a vibrant public sphere can emerge, as Enlightenment and recent theorists agree, only in relatively prosperous societies. This is a key theme of Adam Smith's *Wealth of Nations*, arguably the most famous work of the Scots Enlightenment. Smith suggested the link between peace and prosperity by the title's allusion to a biblical verse: "I will send peace flowing over her like a river, and the wealth of nations like a stream in flood" (Isaiah 66:12). The necessary affluence to support civil society can most effectively be gained by spreading the means of production as widely as possible among the populace while avoiding "the ruinous taxes of private luxury and extravagance" which, in his view, hinder the proper cultivation of civil society as well as economic development. He also denounced turning development projects over to monopolistic private companies, usually foreign, which are able to limit or control economic opportunities or resources at the expense of the populace constituting the local civil society. His observations have been confirmed by recent studies of the prospects for and fate of democracy in varying parts of the world since 1800.¹⁸ To be effective, economic development, as with the cultivation of civil society, should be a joint effort of the many who ideally share both the responsibility and the benefits and not simply an imposition by some authority. A current example is the micro-credit movement for which Muhammad Yunus won the 2006 Nobel Peace Prize.¹⁹

Neither civil society nor economic development can persist without the protection of political order. In our time, the preferred model for state-building is the sovereign nation. But, as Enlightenment thinkers well understood, it is not the only option. Historically, national states, city states, leagues of cities, ethnic or

tribal states, and even empires have been willing and able to protect the life, liberty, and property of their peoples.²⁰ The form depends on the aspirations and civil society of the populace and on the military and diplomatic context in which the state emerges. For instance, several of the new states in the Balkans and Eastern Europe resemble tribal states in size, forms of civil society, and aspiration more than they resemble the older national states such as Mexico or France.²¹ It is conceivable that some loose form of constitutional empire, embracing relatively autonomous cities and tribal areas, might better suit Arab traditions and civil society than the current collection of dubious national states mainly designed and imposed by European powers after World War I.²²

In our time, we commonly use the term “democracy” to denote the sort of regime described here. In contrast, most British Enlightenment writers used the term “republic” to suggest the optimum form of a state. They remain, in my view, correct to prefer the latter term. In the first place, “democracy” is a highly contested concept. As George Orwell remarked in 1945, “In the case of a word like *democracy*, not only is there no agreed definition, but the attempt to make one is resisted from all sides.” Also, as recent events in Palestine and Iraq indicate, democracy, defined simply as majority will as reflected by ballot to establish a constitution or elect leaders, does not guarantee stability, legitimacy, or even minimal protection for civil liberties or property. Enlightenment thinkers, such as James Madison, were right to warn of “majority tyranny” and Rousseau was mistaken in his faith in a nebulous “general will.”²³

For most Enlightenment writers, the term “republic” was preferable because, unlike the term “democracy,” it denoted a structure protecting rights and establishing

mechanisms of consent clearly connected to civil society. It included the idea of popular consent. Montesquieu's famous definition, echoed by Adam Ferguson, went, ". . . a republic is a state in which the people in a collective body, or part of the people, possess the sovereign power."²⁴ As implied, republics, all of which are based on popular consent, could have been either "democratic" or "aristocratic," depending on how the "sovereign power" was structured. This conceptual framework helps explain why, for instance, the first political party formed under the U.S. Constitution was called "the Democratic Republican Party." For them, the idea of democracy functioned best as an adjective, indicating an aspiration or a standard within a republic. However, for analytic clarity in our time, perhaps we should follow the recent advice of Princeton social theorist, Paul Starr, who uses the term "constitutional liberalism" to describe the optimum regime or political structure in relation to other social elements such as the economy and civil society and the term "democratic liberalism" to denote its egalitarian aspirations as a function of the dynamic stability necessary to adjust to shifting problems and opportunities.²⁵

But whatever terminology we choose, the Scots Enlightenment theorists remind us that, if we are contemplating the establishment of peace that is more than a truce or the creation of an effective state, then we must consider an entire social system, a "political economy" to use Enlightenment terminology, rather than just any one aspect of it. In human experience, there are no independent variables, no one fundamental "cause" or lever to make the world anew. In short, the Scots advise us to think synergistically and not mechanically.

A Possible List of the Principles.

1. Objective: security of life, liberty, and property.
2. Liberty as preservation of social flexibility (“Dynamic Stability”).
3. Rule of Law as a judicial and moral order.
4. Continuous Participatory Consent (“social contract” as “dynamic stability”).
5. Strong sense of justice (a compelling act of social imagination based on both ideology and narrative).
6. Complex civil society and robust public sphere as the social foundation.
7. Broadly shared prosperity and economic opportunity.
8. Liberal constitutionalism as the political framework for “democracy.”

ENDNOTES – Panel 1, Gildrie

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2. Leonard Krieger, *Time's Reasons: Philosophies of History Old and New*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989, esp. pp. 24-51; Alan Craig Houston, *Algernon Sidney and the Republican Heritage in England and America*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991.

3. Christopher J. Berry, *Social Theory of the Scottish Enlightenment*, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1997; Christopher Fox et al., eds., *Inventing Human Science: The 18th Century Domains*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995; Alexander Broadie, *The Scottish Enlightenment*, Edinburgh: University of Edinburgh, 2000, esp. pp. 43-139.

4. Locke was working within the natural law tradition, not only by simplification but also through addition of the stress on liberty. For example, Grotius states:

First, individual citizens should not only refrain from injuring other citizens, but should furthermore protect them, both as a whole and as individuals; secondly, citizens should not only refrain from seizing one another's possessions, whether these be held privately or in common, but should furthermore contribute individually both that which is necessary to other individuals and that which is necessary to the whole.

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5. Jane Jacobs, *The Nature of Economies*, New York: Free Press, 2000, pp. 84-117.

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14. John Millar, *An Historical View of the English Government*, (1787), Mark Salber Phillips and Dale R. Smith, eds., Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2006, pp. 56, 453; Lyn Spillman and Russell Faeges, "Nations," in Julie Adams *et al.*, eds., *Remaking Modernity: Politics, History, and Sociology*, Durham NC: Duke University Press, 2005, pp. 409-437; Richard Bonney, *The European Dynastic States*, Oxford UK: Oxford University Press, 1991.

15. David Hume, "Of Commerce," in his *Essays*, p. 260; James R. Gaines, *For Liberty and Glory: Washington, Lafayette, and Their Revolutions*, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2007, p. 165.

16. Reinhart Koselleck, *Critique and Crisis: Enlightenment and the Pathogenesis of Modern Society*, Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1988, pp. 62-97; Jasper Ridley, *The Freemasons: A*

History of the World's Most Powerful Secret Society, New York: Free Press, 2001, pp. 29-121.

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Ethical Principles for State-Building

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State-Building and the End of War.

State-building is the effort to construct or reconstruct a state when governing institutions have collapsed or been overthrown. It generally follows an armed conflict, whether a foreign invasion, civil war, or both. In the paradigm case, an occupying power seeks to steer the reconstruction of the state. Such armed intervention and imposition of a reconstruction plan requires ethical justification. The traditions of just war theory and moral and political philosophy provide the bases to offer suggestions in three areas: first, state-building's aims; second, the criteria for justly undertaking or continuing any state-building project; and third, principles for the manner of reconstruction.¹

Just war theorist Brian Orend suggests "the proper aim of a war is the vindication of those rights whose violation grounded the resort to war in the first place."² On this view, if a war is fought to defeat an aggressor, as in the case of the allied fight against Germany and Japan in World War II, the peace agreement and occupation concluding the conflict should disarm the aggressive state and prevent its resumption of aggression. On the other hand, if a war is undertaken as a humanitarian intervention, e.g., the allied intervention in Kosovo, the intervener should reconstruct the failed state to prevent its abuse of its own citizens.

Orend's model is ethically appealing because of its foundation in human rights and the accomplishment of a just cause. Psychologically, it appeals to the desire

to finish what one sets out to do. However, as a guide for peacekeeping and state-building, it is incomplete at best, and misleading at worst. The ethic of finishing what one starts presupposes first, that what one started was just;³ second, that finishing it does not do more harm than good; and third, that there are no overriding obligations.

Orend holds that ethical norms for occupation apply only to just interveners: "It is only when the victorious regime has fought a just and lawful war, as defined by international law and just war theory, that we can speak meaningfully of rights and duties, of both victor and vanquished, at the conclusion of the armed conflict."⁴ In my view, this is indefensible. It would be odd if the injustice of one's initial cause relieved one of obligations of ethical restraint in the pursuit of that cause. International law gives obligations to victors, which are meant to apply to all parties, just and unjust.

State reconstruction may sometimes be morally justified, if not morally required, after an unjust war. Although an aggressor does not originally aim to vindicate rights, it acquires an obligation to do so as far as possible. Almost all wars leave humanitarian crises in which there is a vacuum of authority and functional civil infrastructure. An occupier, by virtue of having caused this crisis and of being the greatest power on hand, acquires an obligation to restore peace and protect individual rights. This obligation has long been recognized in international law⁵ and observed, at least in part, even by many unjust invaders.⁶ In fact, an occupier probably acquires some rights as well as duties, as the population whose armed forces have surrendered has an obligation to cease fighting and support reconstruction of a state capable of preserving human rights.

The second reason that the initial cause is insufficient to guide state-building is that even a just war can become unjust when it violates rights or causes more harm than good. Just war theory holds that war must pass the tests of *last resort* and *proportionality* of harm to benefits. These may cease to be satisfied in the middle of a war if opportunities for peace emerge or if it becomes apparent that the intervention is exacerbating internal instability and suffering. For example, many argue that the Korean War was rightly concluded without an effort to reconstruct North Korea, because the main injustice of the occupation of South Korea had been rectified, and because a U.S.-led war to change the North Korean regime would have caused massive casualties and required a prolonged occupation. The 1990s U.S. intervention in Somalia was also terminated in part because of a decision that its continuation would have been disproportionate, with little chance of achieving worthwhile state-building.⁷

Values to Be Promoted in State-Building.

By virtue of setting up the institutions that will govern a people and territory, state-building acquires additional purposes. First, state-building must aim at **peace and security** by reaching agreements between and disarming warring parties. It has long been recognized that a war can only be just if it aims at peaceful resolution and has a reasonable chance of achieving this. Peace is desirable not only for its own sake but also for providing a secure context for achieving the other aims of state-building. Although the oft-repeated strategic imperative that security must be attained to defeat a resistance smacks of a truism, it is helpful to keep in mind the mutually-reinforcing relationship between gains in peace and broader social reconstruction. A

peace will have more legitimacy and be more easily sustained to the extent that it is achieved through nonviolent means, namely voluntary agreements such as treaties and negotiations. However, security and the pursuit of peace may require the forceful subduing and disarming of resistance fighters or other belligerents.

Second, state-building must be guided by the **protection of basic human rights** of all affected,⁸ not just those on whose behalf the intervention initially was undertaken. Human rights govern state-building in three ways. First, interveners must not directly violate rights. For example, occupying forces must take pains to avoid civilian casualties and respect the rights of prisoners. Second, occupying forces, in collaboration with local authorities, should seek to protect individuals from violations of rights by the new government or others. Finally, a new constitution should guarantee basic rights, with appropriate judicial mechanisms for their protection.

The exact content of “basic” rights is not uncontroversial, as there is disagreement about what is necessary for a dignified and decent human life. However, in the years since World War II a significant international consensus has solidified among scholars and practitioners about a core of rights. These include the right to life and to basic liberties, including freedom of movement, association, speech, and religious belief. It also includes equality under the law and freedom from arbitrary imprisonment and torture. It is beyond the scope of this paper to intervene in controversies about the proper understanding of rights such as free expression or gender equality.

In the context of state-building, one debate about rights warrants comment. Are democratic *voting* rights basic? The spread of democracy, and the holding of

elections in particular, is treated by the popular media as a yardstick for progress in reconstruction. However, I am inclined to say that suffrage is *not* a basic human right. Lives can be free and decent without the right to vote. Insistence upon Western style elections may actually cause destabilization which on balance undermines basic rights. This said, I would argue that substantial freedom of political expression, which allows the voices of the disadvantaged to be taken into account by decisionmakers, *is* a basic right.⁹

A third value important in state-building is national **self-determination**, a people's ability to determine their own form of life. Allowing people to govern their own territory without external interference enables the expression and development of autonomy and leads to laws compatible with local culture. Interference with self-determination not only militates against freedom but also undermines stability, insofar as constraints are imposed which did not emerge from and are not sustainable by indigenous forces. Rules implemented against public opinion and custom will lack legitimacy, as people neither feel an obligation to obey the law nor expect others to do so. If foreign occupation is ever to end, a government viable for long-term residents is required.

The logic of self-determination ultimately points beneath the state level, suggesting autonomy for distinct regions or ethnic groups within diverse states. Groups such as the Kosovar Albanians and Iraqi Kurds ought to be allowed to develop laws and institutions which reflect and protect their culture and language. This logic could imply a dangerous balkanization, in which today's states dissolve into small, weak national units prone to enact provincial restrictions on minority cultures and antagonize their neighbors. Security and

human rights protection support a presumption of maintaining current borders. Federal schemes should be used to allow relative regional autonomy, while the federal government ensures constitutional rights and maintains a monopoly on armed force.

A fourth goal of state-building is to promote the **rule of law**. Establishing a legal system in which rules are clearly articulated and consistently enforced is necessary for both justice and stability. It protects rights, keeps the peace, and contributes to an environment in which civil society can operate freely and effectively.

Reconciling Human Rights and Security Promotion with Self-Determination and the Rule of Law.

Any state-building project by an occupying force is problematic with regard to self-determination and the rule of law. To the extent that occupying forces engineer the reconstruction plan, it does not arise from the will of the population and may not be sustainable therein. Moreover, the creation of a new government and constitution will not themselves be governed by law. The inevitable arbitrariness of the process, combined with its external imposition, calls into question the legitimacy of any state-building project. State-building has ethical grounding insofar as it is a well-intentioned pursuit of human rights and international welfare. However, the issue remains whether and how the state builder can acquire the legitimate authority to implement this moral vision against the wishes of the people and the laws of the land.

There are two tempting responses to the legitimacy problem. The first is a **paternalistic liberalism** that asserts that if a constitutional system guaranteeing rights, the rule of law, and a free market is implemented,

it will inevitably secure widespread support, so that the problems of self-determination and legitimacy take care of themselves. This neo-liberal view is influential in international relations theory and has gained some currency in just war theory.¹⁰

In theory, protecting human rights is more important than respecting self-determination, since state sovereignty's value is conditional upon its promotion of individual freedom and well-being. But, in practice, the stability given by self-determination is necessary to preserve rights. As argued above, local support is necessary for any norms to function. Experience bears out the difficulty of imposing liberal, democratic norms from without. Local culture, historic antagonisms, impoverished economies, and fractured civil societies block the easy implementation of political structures that have been relatively successful in wealthy western societies.

Moreover, interventionists fail to take seriously the moral problem of using force to impose a risky reconstruction on a foreign people. The rebuilt state is like a person who, when sick, is kidnapped and forced to undertake an experimental surgery, that if all goes well would save his or her life. The experiment may or may not turn out to be in the best interest of the patient. Either way, the patient will have grounds to complain about the imposition. Because it arrogantly experiments on lives without consent, paternalistic liberalism has been properly labeled a form of imperialism.

Practical and principled reasons support a presumption against state-building interventions. Such considerations have led many to support the polar position: a strict **anti-interventionism** which rejects any uses of force other than for national defense. On this view, troubled states should be allowed to

evolve or fail on their own; no effort should be made to engineer solutions. Anti-interventionism gains additional support from realist, national-interest based arguments that intervention causes destabilization, fuels anti-Western sentiment, and spreads armed forces and financial resources too thin.

The difficulty with rejecting all state-building is that local processes, uninterfered with, can lead to prolonged anarchy, brutal civil war, tyranny, or genocide. The importance of avoiding such moral catastrophes justifies some state-building interventions. I think we have to agree with the moderate current in just war theory which argues that state-building interventions are justified when and only when they are intended to prevent massive violations of human rights and are reasonably expected to successfully prevent them.¹¹

If intervention is justified, the question becomes how to intervene. Our discussion favors a model that respects self-determination and the rule of law to the greatest degree possible, while preserving rights and peace. Insofar as feasible, occupiers should influence the reconstruction by advice rather than coercion. Nationals should be given the greatest role possible in creating the constitution, running the government, and policing the state. When intervention cannot be legitimated by the legal approval of a sovereign state, the onus is on would-be state builders to offer evidence that their state-building plan would be chosen by the local population to be helped, were they to articulate their views in a free and informed discussion.

Interventions gain legal legitimacy by observing as far as possible **international law** regarding the use of force and construction of states. Multilateral interventions approved by the United Nations are more likely to be and be seen as impartial and accepted as

legitimate than those undertaken unilaterally. Although international authorization does not automatically create *local* legitimacy, it gives an initial legal framework to an otherwise anarchical process. The support and participation of a regional authority in state-building also lends legitimacy and reconciles the new state with its neighbors. For example, state-building in Europe should be approved by the European Union; in Africa, the African Union; and so forth.

Other Ethical Dilemmas and Goals.

Other ethical issues in state-building warrant comment. A common dilemma is that of retributive **justice versus stability**. In most situations that call for intervention and state-building, war crimes and other human rights violations have been committed. Perpetrators ought to be punished, both for retribution and to remove them from positions of influence. Nonetheless, as other writers caution, it is prohibitively difficult and dangerously destabilizing to identify and prosecute all rights violators. Zeal for retribution prolongs armed resistance by those likely to face punishment, delaying the peace process. For such reasons, trials should be sought only for the most egregious rights violators, especially high ranking officials who gave criminal orders or instituted criminal policies. As Ken Rodman has argued, there may be reason to grant amnesty even to such individuals if necessary to conclude a peace deal and secure support for the new government and constitution. For example, in the 1990s, insistence on indicting Liberian dictator Charles Taylor for war crimes scuttled a negotiation and contributed to an additional 4 years of bloody civil war.¹²

To use an example from the Iraq War, insurgents should not be automatically treated as murderers. Our political leaders frequently make statements to the effect that no deals will be made with those who have killed American soldiers. This is a moral and practical mistake; a moral mistake because the killing of armed soldiers, although questionable if done by a guerrilla fighting without a uniform, is not the grave moral crime that the slaughter of noncombatants in a marketplace is. This is a practical mistake, because any deal that could get those who have been resisting peace to support the state-building process is helpful for all concerned. In Iraq, the collaboration of U.S. forces with militias of former insurgents has brought greater security. These militias' appropriate use of their current power is a matter of concern, but their past actions against American forces should not be. Finally, any prosecution of war criminals should be consistent and include possible instances of war crimes by intervening state-building forces. The U.S. refusal to ratify the International Criminal Court undermines the legitimacy of our prosecution of enemy war criminals. The U.S. Army has a record of prosecuting its own criminals, but such trials all too often seem to be conditional on publicity leaks and confined to the rounding up of low-ranked "bad apples," while ignoring command responsibility.¹³

Related to the issue of retribution is that of **restorative justice**. Those who have been harmed by the collapsed state or intervening forces should be compensated. The challenge is to achieve such compensation without doing further economic harm to the reconstructed state or its average citizen. Funds seized from former corrupt leaders, such as Saddam Hussein, can be redistributed to victims. Public apologies may also be a necessary

step in acknowledging victims when compensation is impossible. Against the objection that such symbolic statements are meaningless, I would point out that they are passionately argued for and resisted. Past wrongs should be acknowledged for the sake of truth and justice.

Apologies are one means of achieving a fundamentally important, but also elusive element of state-building: **reconciliation**. Reconciliation is a willingness to let go of past antagonisms and cooperate to build a new society. Such attitudinal change is uniquely difficult to engineer by force or other external manipulation. Reconciliation rests largely upon the informal interaction of local leaders and civil society. Yet, some creative policies may facilitate reconciliation. These include truth commissions as in South Africa; human rights education; and national celebration of peaceful, communal projects, such as cultural achievements and sporting events.

State-building must be designed to benefit the state's population. Beyond the principles already discussed, this includes sound, efficient government and the prevention of corruption. A corollary of this principle of **beneficence** is Gary Bass' assertion that "there cannot be any hint of **profiteering**."¹⁴ Reconstruction policies must not be designed to benefit the intervening state economically, militarily, or politically. In this light, the U.S. policy in occupied Iraq of disallowing contracts to states not involved in the intervention and granting uncontested contracts to U.S. corporations is illegitimate. By limiting competition, it contravenes sound governance, and by engineering advantages to the intervener, it detracts from the legitimacy of the occupation.¹⁵

Our discussion suggests the following preliminary ethical principles.

Regarding, when to state-build:

1. Attempt to state-build only when and so long as it is necessary to protect human rights, and it is likely to succeed. (**Necessity**)

Regarding how to state-build, interventions should observe the following:

2. Respect and protect basic rights, including life, liberty, property, and freedom from arbitrary arrest and torture. (**Human Rights**)

3. Seek peace and security by political means first, and military means if necessary. (**Peace and Security**)

4. Use minimal coercion and allow the greatest local self-determination consistent with the protection of human rights. Allow the self-determination of ethnically or politically defined regions to the greatest extent feasible. (**National Self-Determination**)

5. Establish the rule of law, with rights, for individuals and minority groups. (**Rule of Law**)

6. Seek international authorization to confer legitimacy. (**International Legality/Legitimacy**)

7. Design the reconstruction for the benefit of the state intervened in, and not for profiteering by the occupying power. (**Beneficence/Non-exploitation**)

8. Pursue retribution against only the most egregious rights violators consistent with preserving peace. (**Limited Retribution**)

9. Seek restorative justice, compensating victims, in a way that does not exact a high cost on innocent bystanders. (**Restorative Justice**)

10. Promote reconciliation by means such as local autonomy, truth and reconciliation committees, apologies and commemorations of past wrongs, education in human rights, and peaceful celebrations of national unity. (**Reconciliation**)

ENDNOTES – Panel 1, Rocheleau

1. The latter two questions parallel the basic division in just war theory between the norms of *jus ad bellum* (just recourse to war) and *jus in bello* (just conduct of the war). While I think the two questions are usefully distinguished for thematic purposes, I do not mean to assert that they are unrelated. That is, what one may justly do within state-building might depend upon the justice of the reasons for state-building, and the justice of the project might depend on the justice of the means to be employed.

2. Brian Orend, “Justice after War,” *Ethics and International Affairs*, Vol. 16, No. 1, 2002, p. 46.

3. As I explain in the next paragraph, this is somewhat overstated because an initially unjust intervention could become just because of changed circumstances, including the chaos caused by the intervention itself.

4. Orend, p. 44.

5. The sources of these laws include the Annexed Regulations to Hague Convention IV of 1907, the 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention, and customary international law.

6. Even aggressors like Nazi Germany sought to impose some sort of law and order on conquered territories. This might be explained by self-interest rather than a felt obligation to the local population, but there is a sense in which most such invaders want their authority to be recognized as legitimate and thus attempt to provide some security and services for the population.

7. This is an oversimplification, of course. It could be argued that there was little chance of success in Somalia either because the mission had become too broad (going from delivering food to full-blown state-building) or because the United States was committed to using too few resources, state-building “on the cheap.”

8. It might be thought that the protection of human rights follows from the norm of peace. However, human rights might be systematically violated in a time of peace, e.g., without continuing conflict. It would be more correct to say that the norm of peace follows from that of human rights preservation. One reason to obtain peace is to prevent the violations of rights that occur in armed conflict, whether conventional or guerrilla. However, preservation of peace also achieves other goods, such as allowing everyday life to resume and government, civil society, and economy to function effectively. So important is the securing of an end of war that it deserves mention as an independent criterion.

9. Here I follow John Rawls, who, in the *Law of Peoples* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999) argues that a decent people can be hierarchical and undemocratic but must have a “decent consultation hierarchy” wherein politically disadvantaged nonvoters are heard and represented by their government.

10. For liberal defenses of greater interventionism in just war theory, see Fernando Teson, “Eight Principles for Humanitarian Intervention,” *Journal of Military Ethics*, Vol. 5, No. 2, 2006, pp. 93-113; and Allen Buchanan, *Justice, Legitimacy and Self-Determination: Moral Foundations for International Law*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004.

11. This conclusion, most famously supported in Michael Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars*, New York: Basic Books, 1977, has been, in essence, reached repeatedly by writers too numerous to mention.

12. Kenneth A. Rodman, “The ‘Peace versus Justice’ Debate at the International Criminal Court,” presentation at the 23rd World Congress of Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy, August 6, 2007.

13. There may be a conflict between my willingness to forgive rights-violating nationals in the occupied state and my insistence on prosecuting American war criminals. I acknowledge the importance of finding those responsible in both cases. Abu Ghraib is more clearly a war crime than the blowing up of convoys by improvised explosives, because it targets helpless prisoners

rather than active combatants. Also, the occasional need to forgo prosecution of war criminals to secure cooperation required for peace should not apply to the U.S. Army, as I presuppose and hope that it would not insist on immunity before doing what is required for peace. On the other hand, while I recommend the voluntary submission of U.S. forces to international tribunals, it would not be productive for the international community to seek to capture and try American soldiers without U.S. consent.

14. Gary Bass, "Just Post Bellum," *Philosophy & Public Affairs*, Vol. 32, No. 4, 2004, p. 408.

15. One might wonder whether these obligations in the manner of state-building still apply to unjust interventions and occupations. That is, can one say "the U.S. occupation of Iraq is wrong" and "in its occupation of Iraq, the United States should give wider access to contracts in state-building"? The response is that obligations to obey ethical principles within an occupation exist regardless of the justice of the overall occupation. So one could say, "As long as we are going to occupy unjustly, we are obligated to make the occupation as ethical as possible, by practicing sound governance." Also note that while an unjust occupier is obligated to permit foreign participation, other states and businesses would be charged with deciding whether it is ethically valid to assist in an unjust occupation. The provision of some goods used in the state-building process might be defensible (e.g., food, hospitals) even if the overall occupation and state-building project is not.

State-Building and the Double-Edged Sword of Religion

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What we today know as philosophy—knowledge gained by logically reflecting on human experience—and science—knowledge gained by applying inductive logic to empirical observations—began over 2,000 years ago in Greece. Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle produced a method of inquiry that identified several necessary conditions for knowledge. Two are especially fundamental for this paper: (1) Reflecting on experience and communicating those reflections for debate; and, (2) the need for clarity of language—that is, as far as possible, eliminating ambiguity, vagueness, and mere subjective opinion from the search for truth and knowledge. Socrates taught many arrogant sophists and Greek politicians the folly of claiming to know what they did not know.

Concerning the subject of this paper, two terms must be put under the microscope of reflection: State-(Nation-) Building and Religion. Regarding state-building, two problems have eroded America's efforts in the Middle East. First, stereotypes and political myopia have created assumptions that states can be formed by external coercion. Dr. Richard Gildrie identified this problem when he said with regard to state-building:

It is conceivable that some loose form of constitutional empire, embracing relatively autonomous cities and tribal areas, might better suit Arab traditions and society than the current collection of dubious national states mainly designed and [artificially] imposed by European

powers after WWI [and WWII]—[The Sykes-Picot Treaty].¹

Gildrie's warning about state-nation stereotypes and external coercion are prophetically appropriate for any just and lasting peace in Iraq, as well as other parts of the world where state-building is needed. Consider the *fatwa* (religious decree) issued by Ayatollah Ali al-Husayn Sistani, who is the most influential voice in Iraq speaking for pragmatic peace and the best corrective to the militant, revolutionary Shi'ism advocated by Muqtada al-Sadr:

The Occupational Authority in no way has the authority to choose members of the drafting committee of a Basic Law. . . . no . . . authority exists for such a committee to represent the lofty interests of the Iraqi people or to translate into law the wishes and basic identity of the Iraqi people, the pillars of which are the glorious faith of Islam and society's values. The current [American] plan discussed is fundamentally unacceptable. Accordingly, popular elections are necessary so that each Iraqi . . . can choose his representative for a constituent assembly. . . . any Basic Law written by this assembly must be approved by a national referendum.²

Second, failure to identify religion in the state-building process has been a major flaw in Iraq, as it would be anywhere else for that matter. There is an excellent analysis of the necessity of including religion in the process of state-building by Chaplain (LTC) Timothy Bedsole, "Religion: The Missing Dimension in Mission Planning." He identifies several reasons for religion's ability to shape what happens on the battlefield as well as the processes of rebuilding society which inevitably follow armed conflict. Among the most important are:

1. Religion adds a higher intensity, severity, brutality, and lethality to conflict than other factors;
2. Religion offers a stronger identity to participants in conflict than other forms of identity such as nationality, ethnicity, politics, or language;
3. Religion can motivate the masses quickly and cheaply, and it often remains outside the view of nation-state forces;
4. Religion offers an ideology—or a platform for political ideology—that resonates stronger than other forms of propaganda;
5. Religious leaders are often the last leaders left when states fail, and they offer a voice to the disempowered or oppressed;
6. Religious leaders are often the first to seek peace and reconciliation after conflict.³

Chaplain Bedsole's comments make an excellent introduction to the title of this essay: "State-Building and the Double-Edged Sword of Religion."

The Double-Edged Sword of Religion.

The nature of and definition of religion has puzzled philosophers, scholars of religion, students of world religions, and most thinkers for centuries. Is religion an anthropomorphic creation of mankind? An ancient Greek, Xenophanes (6th century BCE), wrote: "Yes, and if oxen and horses or lions had hands . . . and could produce works of art as men do, horses would paint the forms of the gods like horses, and oxen like oxen, and make their bodies in the image of their several kinds."⁴ Or is religion the awakening in humans of a transcendent source of creation, love, and wonder? Is religion an illusion for the weak-minded

that cannot face the brutality of reality, a disguised political ideology, only another moral theory or a fairy tale for children? The debate continues. Further, since traditional Buddhism, Vedanta Hinduism, and Daoism affirm no supernatural beings, are they really religions or metaphysical philosophies? There are no easy answers to these questions.

Since the focus of this paper is state-building and the role of religion in state-building, especially its “Double-Edged Sword,” I limit my comments about religion to the better known Western monotheisms – Abraham’s Quarrelsome Children – Jews, Christians, and Muslims. The justification for such a limitation is that the major tasks of state-building that predominantly involve the United States are in the Middle East, a place sacred to all three religions. There are significant debates about the nature of the conflicts occurring there: Is it a Conflict of Cultures that is irreconcilable? Or is it a conflict between traditional religious-social customs, mores, and taboos, and the demons of modernity and secularism? Or is it really a religious Battle for God between Jews, Christians, and Muslims? Whatever the nature of the conflicts in the Middle East, religion is a critical factor.

Although the specific analyses, issues, and principles that emerge in the following comments are limited to Western monotheism, these same analyses, issues, and principles are by extension and modification applicable to other parts of the world where Buddhism, Hinduism, and Daoism are major influences, as well as where they interact with Western monotheism. For example, in Afghanistan, Islam is strongly influenced by both Hinduism and Buddhism. While it is important to identify positive principles necessary to just and peaceful state-building, the process must also describe

and critique the mistakes and misconceptions that erode and compromise just and peaceful state-building.

Since genuine dialogue requires sharing ideas, beliefs, and values, it is important to understand what Abraham's Children share in common, and how these shared beliefs can lead to either unity or conflict. First and foremost, all three religions take seriously the belief in Sacred History. As commonly understood, history examines events in terms of natural and human causality, but Sacred History introduces the Divine into historical events.

Sacred History is the belief that the One God began both time and history in the act of creation. Further, Jews, Christians, and Muslims believe that the world was created for peace and justice, and that in spite of the chaos humans have introduced into God's creation through war and injustice, God will redeem His creation. Thus, the Creator God of Sacred History is also a Provident God; He cares about his creation and takes an active role in moving it to a defining, fulfilling End, which will restore the original peace and justice of creation. Beliefs about this divine, predestined End of Sacred History, which is preceded by times of suffering and chaos, have been sources of great hope in times of tribulation and have elicited powerful emotions and sometimes violence.

A Provident God acts through natural events and the human community. Since both natural and human events take place in space and time, land takes on a significance that can hardly be overestimated. When land becomes Sacred Land, its significance goes beyond the temporal world and becomes part of the eternal, Divine plan, which unfortunately has been misused by religious extremists to provide justifications for Holy War. The Crusades are only one example of the

violence that centers on Sacred Land. The two primary ways that God acts through the human community is by calling individuals—the most important being prophets, but also Imams and Ayatollahs—and by Choosing Peoples to fulfill specific tasks.

Prophets are central to these monotheisms because they are the human vehicles through which Holy Books emerge and take form. Jews, Christians, and Muslims share a common Prophetic Tradition whose origins emerge in the 8th Century BCE. For example, of the 28 Prophets named in the *Qur'an*, 26 are in the *Bible*. The six most important are Adam—the First of God, Noah—the Preacher of God, Abraham—the Friend of God, Moses—the Speaker of God, Jesus—the Word of God, and Muhammad—the *Rasul* (Messenger) of God. For Muslims, Muhammad's selection by God also means his sinlessness and infallibility (*Ma'sum*)—a belief Christians reserve for only Jesus. In Sunni Islam, sinlessness and infallibility applies to all Messengers, those through whom God sent a Holy Book. For Shi'a this sinlessness and infallibility extends beyond Messengers and Prophets to the original Imams of Muhammad's lineage and their deputies, Grand Ayatollahs—a noun that means "Sign of God."

In order to begin understanding the Shi'a, one must recognize the sacredness—the sinlessness and infallibility—of their Imams, especially the third (Imam Hussein, Muhammad's oldest grandson by Fatima and Ali) and the last Imam (the *Mahdi*). The most revealing window into the spirit of Shi'ism is the celebration of *Ashoura*—the martyrdom of Imam Hussein at Karbala, Iraq. This is the paradigm event that defines the historical conflict between Sunni and Shi'a. The great Mosque at Karbala and the battlefield outside the city are still a defining moment for Shi'a—for *Ashoura*

is a celebration that evokes powerful emotions and passions, which can be a time of spiritual renewal or violence against oppression.⁵ The last in the line of the Twelve Imams from the lineage of Muhammad was Muhammad ibn Hasan, who became Imam when his father was murdered in 872 CE. From 872 to 939, ibn Hasan remained in hiding—the Minor Occultation (*Gayabat*)—in order to be safe from harm. In 939, the Twelfth Imam, Shi'a believe, entered the Major Occultation through the power of God—that is, he did not die, and he will remain safely hidden and protected by God until the predestined end of time, when he will return as the *Mahdi*—the Guided One. When he and the Christ defeat the powers of evil, the world will be returned to the original purposes of creation—peace and justice.

A Provident God acts by Choosing Peoples to do His will and by rewarding them with many blessings, but most especially Land. One has only to stand at the Wailing Wall or on the steps leading to the Dome of the Rock Mosque in Jerusalem—which are only a stone's throw away from one another—to become aware of the passions that center on the belief in being the Chosen People and the Divine gift of Sacred Land. Many Saudi Arabian Wahhabi Ulema believe that the whole of Saudi Arabia is *Haram*—sacred and forbidden to infidels (unbelievers). In this theology of Chosenness and Sacred Land, Osama bin Laden finds Divine justification for a Holy War against Americans and acts of terrorism against the Saudi Royal family for allowing infidels to pollute the sacredness of Saudi Arabia. Two years after his August 23, 1996, *fatwa* declaring Holy War, bin Laden specified that it was a duty “ . . . to kill the Americans and their allies—civilians and military . . . for every Muslim who can do it in any country in

which it is possible to do it.”⁶ His so-called *fatwa* was actualized in terrorist attacks on the Khobar Towers in 1996, the African Embassy bombings in 1998, the bombing of the USS *Cole* in 2000 and on September 11, 2001 (9/11).⁷ It is important to note that bin Laden does not possess the religious credentials to issue a *fatwa*, but this point is completely ignored by terrorists who look for any reason to engage in violence. Concerning the purpose of these attacks, Laurence Dobrot writes:

In a message attributed to al-Qai’da military commander Sayf Al Adl in May 2005, he claims the “ultimate objective [of the 9/11 attacks] was to prompt the United States to come out of its hole and provoke the United States into attacking areas of the Islamic world.” The concept was to provoke a disproportionate U.S. military response that would have the strategic effect of waking up the “slumbering nation of Islam,” rallying it to the cause of attacking the United States and the West. The objective of killing U.S. forces was to create unacceptable U.S. losses, in terms of both dollars and lives, in an attempt to break the will of the American people and force removal of U.S. forces and influence in the Middle East. This appears to be part of what is currently happening in Iraq.⁸

The same theology is used by Jewish settlers and extremists for acts of *Herem* (Holy War) against the Palestinians and any Israelis—for example, Yitzhak Rabin—who would trade land for peace. Those who do so are not only the enemies of the Chosen People but of God. A 1980 article in the official magazine of Bar-Ilan University, written by Rabbi Israel Hess, was titled, “Genocide: A Commandment of the Torah.” In it, he argued that the Palestinians were modern Amelikites—a people that God commanded Saul to commit genocide against because they were His

enemies as well as the enemies of the Chosen People. The same year, a Gush settler – the Gushites represent the most extreme of the settler movements in Israel – Haim Tzuria wrote: “In each generation we have those who rise up to wipe us out, therefore each generation has its own Amalek. The Amalekism of our generation expresses itself in the extremely deep hatred of the Arabs to our national renaissance in the land of our forefathers.”⁹

Before proposing general principles regarding the roles of religion in state-building, it is helpful to review the three basic relationships between state and religion. It is also important to look beyond cultural, political, and religious stereotypes that are counterproductive and destructive of peace and state-building. Further, it is essential to look beyond traditional Western views of nations as models for state-building in tribal societies, beyond American democracy as the paradigm for state-building, and beyond the American First Amendment as the only compromise possible between state and religion.

Concerning this last stereotype, it is instructive to note that the U.S. Supreme Court has been interpreting and reinterpreting the Constitutional meaning of the First Amendment for state–church relationships for over 200 years. Bedsole describes the “creative tension” between state and church as a

... dance between the two partners of state and religion. The dance is different for every state and religion. It [the dance] is an analogy that helps soldiers understand this tension and begin to move away from imposing a Western centric – American only – form of democracy on other nations.¹⁰

There are three basic ways that state and religion can be, and have been, historically related: (1) religion

controls the state—a theocracy; (2) the state controls religion; and (3) a separation between religious and state power. In the brief analyses and descriptions of the three patterns that follow, it is important to keep in mind the reciprocal interactions between institutions—the practical dimension of religion and state—and human meaning and understanding—the intellectual and spiritual dimensions of human nature. Each dimension influences the other. Institutions influence thinking, and human thinking can bring about changes in institutions.

The political and moral dangers of the first two relationships are well-known and documented. When the state controls the religion, the first freedom lost is that of religious belief. One has only to look at the 1933 formation of the Evangelical Reich Church—the *Evangelisch Reich Kirche*—which united 29 regional Protestant churches. The Evangelical Reich Church selected Ludwig Mueller, a rabid, anti-Semitic Army Chaplain and close friend of Hitler, as the first Reich Bishop. Three months after taking control of the Church, Mueller merged the small Hitler Youth—less than 10,000—with the German Evangelical Youth—approximately 70,000, which converted the largest religious youth organization in Germany into Hitler Youth.¹¹ Later, in an interview, Mueller said that he prayed for weeks before God guided him in this decision. In an excellent paper titled “The Nexus of God and Citizen,” Benjamin Jensen and Lynn Kunkle describe the danger of the state controlling religion: “. . . absolute power is a tyranny in and of itself. Vesting absolute power in the state invariably leads to Nationalism.”¹² In its most extreme forms Nationalism deteriorates into Fascism, “. . . where the state becomes a religion and governs every aspect of private identity”¹³

The moral and political abuses of the second relationship are equally well-known. Ironically, when the religion controls state power, one of the first freedoms lost is also the freedom of belief. One has only to look at the Spanish Inquisition, the Khomeini effort to create a theocracy in Iran and the Wahhabi Sunni Muslim movement from its inception in the 18th century *Najif* to its current power in Saudi Arabia. This relationship creates the inverse of Nationalism: “. . . positioning absolute power in religion breeds Fundamentalism.”¹⁴ Nationalism and Fundamentalism both demand “. . . absolute allegiance, and it is within this demand that the horror of authoritarianism is born.”¹⁵

Because power often corrupts, the least abusive relationship requires some form of independence and division of power between state and religion. Related to the Middle East, it is necessary to set aside four misconceptions: (1) that efforts to implement Shariah into the state necessarily mean a Khomeini-type theocracy; barbaric, medieval punishments for violations of law; and abuse of women; (2) the reducing of all Shi'a views to Khomeini's revolution; (3) overestimating the power and influence of Khomeini throughout the Muslim world and underestimating his declining influence in Iran; and (4) simplistically assuming that the major key to establishing peace in the Middle East can be accomplished by resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Achieving peace in the Middle East is more complicated than just the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. While resolving this conflict is a necessary condition for long-term peace, it is not sufficient for establishing peace throughout the Middle East. Each of these is briefly addressed before concluding with a statement of healthy ways that religion can contribute to peaceful state-building.

First, the moment Americans and most Westerners hear the cry that Shariah must be integrated into the laws of the state, four stereotypes immediately form: another tyrannical Khomeini theocracy, religious persecution, barbaric punishments for crimes, and abuse of women. The demand for Shariah does not necessarily mean a theocracy. The history of Sunni Islam is filled with examples of political power residing in political leaders, political groups, or tribal chieftains alongside moral and religious authority residing with the *Ulema*. Thus, rather than immediately rejecting the call for Shariah as dangerous and counterproductive, it is wiser to explore ways that power can be shared and Shariah implemented through a division of power. Shariah as a Muslim way of life and a foundation for laws and social norms is flexible and adaptable to different cultures and different historical circumstances.

Historically and theologically, the Shi'a struggled for an ideal state in which their Holy Imams or their deputies, the Ayatollahs, combined both political and religious power. However, given centuries of persecution and the minority status of Shi'a in the Muslim world, they adapted to many different situations where political power was separated from religious power. Ayatollah al-Sistani represents a moderate, pietistic form of Shi'ism that can make accommodations with political power if the latter does not violate certain principles of Shi'a theology, especially freedom of worship.

The argument that democracy is incompatible with Islam is simply false. In their insightful paper, "The Nexus of God and Citizen," Jensen and Kunkle argue that establishing democracies in Islamic nations should begin by looking at Islamic history and rediscovering "... an Islamic metaphysical system that conceptualizes

individuals within their private lives as both citizens and believers. . . . The search for an Islamic democracy must begin by formulating a social contract system that transcends both Nationalism and Fundamentalism.”¹⁶ In other words, Jensen and Kunkle argue that efforts to find a social contract system for democracy in Muslim countries based on Western social contract systems—those developed by Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau—are bound to fail because they are inconsistent with Shariah, a way of life that does not separate citizen and believer but affirms both roles as inseparable for just and moral living in God’s world. This is what Ayatollah Sistani affirmed in his *fatwa* when he wrote that the “lofty interests” and “basic identity of the Iraqi people” are predicated on “the glorious faith of Islam and society’s values.”¹⁷ The major problem in implementing democracy in Muslim countries based on Western models is the privatization of belief. Correctly, Jensen and Kunkle warn that in:

. . . Islam, where interiorization or privatization of belief has never formed a core precept or practice, and where Islam is understood as *din*, a way of life [incorporated into Shariah]; there is less reason to believe a . . . secular citizenship model . . . would prove a desirable model for governance. Instead, the Islamic world is challenged to overcome the Western dichotomization of the individual [separation of citizen and believer] and develop a more holistic concept of a public individual as believer and citizen.¹⁸

While there are several social contract systems proposed by Islamic philosophers and theologians that can provide workable models for democracy in Muslim countries, Jensen and Kunkle find one of the best in the mystical thought of Al-Arabi (12th century CE). His social contract can be briefly described as

follows.¹⁹ It is through the individual's relationship with God that social consciousness emerges and matures. In other words, through his relationship with God, the individual learns that the "I" can only reach fulfillment in the greater "WE" of the community. For Jensen and Kunkle, this means that ". . . the individual in Al-Arabi's model is granted the inalienable freedom to exist as believer, but without imposing belief on others, a view fundamentally consistent with the Islamic injunction against compulsion in religion."²⁰ Through submission to God, both the individual and the community are bound together in a social contract whose fundamental objective is actualizing the purposes of creation—peace and justice. In Al-Arabi's model, ". . . there is no inherent antagonism between the individual and the community, believer, and citizen."²¹ This means that the people as a community, ". . . the source of interpretation and legitimacy, are empowered to create dynamic and responsible models of community."²² From this, it follows that the legitimacy of the form of government and of a society's religious and political leaders is judged by how well the form of government and its religious and political leaders contribute to "the self-actualizing potential of all individuals in a society."⁶³ In other words, ". . . developing an Islamic Democracy becomes a question of which institutions and laws best guarantee the rights of . . . [the] individual and . . . [his] identity as citizen and believer."²⁴ Al-Arabi's social contract, which is based on the *Qur'an* and its implementation in Shariah, clearly denies the stereotype that Islam and democracy are inconsistent; quite the opposite is the case.

The stereotype that Shariah means a return to medieval cruelty and barbarity is not historically or religiously true. Where such punishments are in

effect, it is because of Sunni purist movements such as the Wahhabi in Saudi Arabia and the Taliban in Afghanistan or the distorted Khomeini fanaticism as occurred in Iran.

Finally, that Shariah means the abuse of women and denial of their rights is also a stereotype. Following the *Qur'an*, Shariah provides rights for women that were centuries ahead of women's rights throughout the Christian world. Two of the most important ones are rights to divorce—Shariah provides women with more justifiable reasons for divorce than men—and legal rights of inheritance. Even today, in the United States, children, male or female, have no legal rights of inheritance. While it is true that there are inequalities in the applications of Shariah to women's rights throughout the Muslim world, where these rights are most abused is the result of cultural mores and customs or the result of extremist groups such as the Taliban or the Iranian Shi'a rather than Islam. While we should continue to encourage Arab nations to improve women's rights, we should do so with humility and national self-honesty. Even though America had a democratic Constitution and a Bill of Rights, it took over 150 years for women and African Americans to be included in the voting processes that are necessary to any real democracy. America and Europe also had the advantages of 400 years to adapt to modernity through the advantages of the Renaissance, Reformation, a developing secular philosophy, and modern science. Most Middle Eastern Arab nations have had little more than half a century to struggle with ancient customs and mores, the political and economic problems of Western occupations, poverty, limited educational opportunities, mass movements of urbanization, and negligible experiences with democracy that challenge

them in their struggles with modernity. For example, 30 years ago, the population of Riyadh, the capital of Saudi Arabia, was only 500,000. Today it is over five million. These radical changes in such a short period of time create daunting challenges for government leaders as well as ordinary citizens, and we should be fair and humble in our evaluations of their progress rather than negative and confrontational.

Second, Shi'ism is more diverse than the Khomeini aberration that occurred in Iran. For example, three different Shi'a perspectives are found in Iraq. The pietistic, moderate Shi'ism of Ayatollah Sistani and many other clerics who follow the views of the great Ayatollah Khoi represents a pragmatic Shi'ism that is capable of compromises with political power. On the opposite pole, more akin to Khomeini is the radical, militant, activist Shi'ism of Muqtada al-Sadr, which has strong holds in the slums of Basra and Baghdad as well as Kirkuk. However, it is worth noting that during the last 6 months, al-Sadr has cooled his revolutionary rhetoric and agreed to a limited cease fire on the part of his Mahdi Army. Hopefully, his actions represent a long-term, pragmatic moderation of his initial, radical views. Finally, there is an intermediate Shi'ism advocated by the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) by such individuals as the Hakim brothers, Baqer and Abdul Aziz. While this form of Shi'ism is more active than Sistaniis, it is nonetheless open to compromises on power.²⁵

Third, Americans and Westerners must resist the simplistic stereotype that all Shi'a are Khomeini revolutionaries. Initially, Khomeini was a hero to most Shi'a because he stood up to Saudi Arabia and its exportation of Wahhabi Sunni Islam into other parts of the Middle East. Where Wahhabis exercised power,

they persecuted Shi'a, Sufis (Muslim mystics), and any Sunni Muslims who did not practice their extremist-purist form of Islam. Initially, for many Shi'ites, Iran stood as an example of a Shi'a state ready to defend Shi'a from Sunni persecution. The United States fell into the trap of reducing all Shi'a to its Khomeini aberration, and, as a result, supported a brutal dictator, Saddam Hussein, as a countercheck against the revolution spreading beyond Iran. The Iraq-Iran War changed all of this, not only for the Middle East but for America. Khomeini's fanaticism and violent excesses tarnished his revolution. Khomeini's barbaric use of the Cult of Child Warriors in the war and his inhuman indifference to their deaths, which numbered in the tens of thousands, seriously eroded his credibility throughout the Middle East as well as Iran. Vail Nasr writes:

The Islamic revolution is today a spent force in Iran, and the Islamic republic is a tired dictatorship facing pressures to change. The victory of hard-line candidate Mahmoud Ahmadinejad . . . cannot conceal the reality that grass root concerns about democracy and economic reform are . . . key factors in Iranian politics. . . . The pull of modernity and reformism is strong but so also is that of tradition and conservatism. . . . Iran more than any other society in the Muslim world is a place where fundamentals are under scrutiny and open to questioning and new thinking.²⁶

Recent elections provide credible evidence for the accuracy of Nasr's analysis of the currents of change occurring in Iran. Keith Lee, Associated Press, writes:

Conservative opponents of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad made a strong showing in Iran's elections, according to partial results Saturday. . . .

Reformists, meanwhile, claimed to have made better than expected gains even though most of their candidates were thrown out of the race by Iran's clerical leadership.

If reformists succeed in expanding the largely muted block of around 40 lawmakers they had in the outgoing parliament, it would be a blow to . . . the power of clerics and . . . [represent an] opening up to the West.

Ahmadinejad's allies were on track to grab the largest share of the 290 member parliament. But they appeared likely to face a strong minority of conservative opponents, and . . . reformists.²⁷

In other terms, the moderates are beginning to win some of the political battles in Iran, and most importantly, some of them are conservatives that come from those who supported Ahmadinejad in the previous election. Hopefully, the Bush administration will recognize the historic importance of the emergence of the moderates – both old conservatives and reformists – and stifle the confrontational “Axis of Evil” rhetoric that has seriously compromised the small victories of moderates throughout the Middle East. Such rhetoric has, in the past, turned moderates into conservatives because they believed their nation was being threatened. (See Axiom #8 below.)

Finally, the traditional platitude that the “road to peace in the Middle East must travel through Jerusalem” – that is, must resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict – is not only simplistic but ignores a conflict that is 1,300 years older than the Israeli-Palestinian situation – the Sunni-Shi'a divide. Both conflicts are critical for peace and require addressing, but the latter may be more crucial because it is more pervasive

throughout Muslim history. Concerning the Israeli-Palestinian controversy, the issues mitigating against peace are historically and politically more complex than the general perception.

Unfortunately, far too many political and national misconceptions and myths of the Palestine War—which lasted less than 2 years from the United Nations partition of Palestine in November 1947 to the armistice between Israel and Syria in July 1949—continue to be instrumental in the current situation and taught in the school systems of the Middle East by both Arabs and Israelis. Based on documents released in the 1980s by the Israeli government concerning the Palestine war—the war of Independence (1948 War) as it is known by Israelis—a collection of Israeli, Arab, and Western historians have been engaged in demythologizing this war and its aftermath. A new collection of essays published in *The War for Palestine: Rewriting the History of 1948*, edited by Eugene Rogan and Avi Shlaim, tells a significantly different story of this war than the national myths portray. Concerning the significance of the Palestine War and its consequences, the editors write:

These 20 months transformed the political landscape of the Middle East forever. Indeed, 1948 may be taken as a defining moment for the region as a whole. Arab Palestine was destroyed and the new state of Israel established. Egypt, Syria, and Lebanon suffered outright defeat; Iraq held its lines; and Transjordan won at best a pyrrhic victory. Arab public opinion, unprepared for defeat, let alone a defeat of this magnitude, lost faith in politicians. Within 3 years of the end of the Palestine war, the prime ministers of Egypt and Lebanon and the King of Jordan had been assassinated, and the president of Syria and the king of Egypt overthrown by military coups. No event has marked Arab politics in the second

half of the 20th century more profoundly. The Arab-Israeli wars, the Cold War in the Middle East, the rise of the Palestinian armed struggle, and the politics of peace-making in all their complexity are a direct consequence of the Palestine war.²⁸

The general consensus of these historians is that the Palestinians were, for all practical and military purposes, abandoned by the other Arab powers as well as by some of their own religious and political leaders. While many national leaders and Muslim groups throughout the Middle East expressed a passionate concern for the Palestinians, it was more rhetoric than practice. The new documents these historians are examining provide compelling evidence that the major concern of the leaders of Syria, Jordan, Egypt, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan during the Palestine War was not the plight of the millions of Palestinians who became refugees but their own narrow political interests. They were much more interested in maintaining their national sovereignty, limiting the expansion of other Arab countries into disputed areas, and using the war to expand their land holdings, than they were in the displaced Palestinians. The present Middle East situation looks very much like the past, which unfortunately means that some Arab nations have more to gain from the conflict continuing than being resolved.

Any just and lasting peace in the Middle East must also find ways to bring Sunni and Shi'a together. The first task in this unifying effort is finding ways to reduce and limit the influence of Sunni purist movements such as the Wahhabis and the Taliban, Shi'a extremist movements such as the Khomeini Revolution and the militancy of clerics such as Muqtada al-Sadr. This needs to be done without compromising the efforts

of Muslim moderates to find pragmatic and peaceful solutions to the religious and political conflicts in the Middle East. The Bush administration's belligerent rhetoric of confrontation, threat, and the "Axis of Evil" has encouraged extremists and undercut the work of moderates.

In seeking peaceful, just state-building, religion is not only one factor, but one of the most important; however, it can be a double-edged sword. It is now time to identify principles for its healthy role in state-building.

Conclusions: Axioms for Religion's Role in State-Building.

Axiom #1: Do Not Stereotype. Stereotypes of both state-building and religion are counterproductive. All religious situations are unique to their historical circumstances and require flexibility and open-mindedness on the part of those involved in state-building to think outside the box of cultural stereotypes in seeking solutions to religious conflicts.

Axiom #2: Limit Personal Agendas. External groups whose thinking is culturally and religiously myopic and chauvinistic or have agendas for their own political-economic gain should be excluded. The Sykes-Picot treaty that divided the post-World War I and World War II Middle East into mandates for the economic and political benefit for the British and the French rather than the Arabs was an especially egregious example of the long-term dangers and conflicts that can be created by external myopic and chauvinistic political-economic agendas. Unfortunately, America's history with the repressive Shah of Iran, support for the brutal dictator Saddam Hussein, and misconceived invasion

and mismanaged occupation of Iraq represent for the majority of Muslims throughout the world another example of the desire of external Western powers to control the wealth of the region—especially oil—for their own economic–political benefit.

Axiom #3: State-building Cannot Be Externally Forced. Since bullets cannot defeat religious beliefs any more than they can change cultural, ethnic, and tribal loyalties, successful state-building cannot be coerced.

Axiom #4: Respect Religious Beliefs. Since religion is a fundamental source of personal and group identity that is often more influential than other forms of loyalty and identity, knowledge of and respect for the beliefs, values, symbols, and sacred observances of a people’s religion is a necessary condition for those involved in the process of peaceful and just state-building.

Axiom #5: Be Inclusive. If possible, where internal religious differences are a major source of conflict, all internal differing parties must be included in the process of state-building. Exclusion only fuels the fires of religious extremism and gives justification for violence.

Axiom #6: Co-Opt Violent Groups. “Isolate truly violent groups not by confrontation, which strengthens them [and gives their credibility among believers], but by co-opting them; address the grievances of violent groups through cooperation.”²⁹

Axiom #7: Protect Sacred Places. Identify, respect, and protect sacred places and relics.

Axiom #8: Support Moderates. Identify the leaders of all religious groups and work to incorporate all of them in the deliberations, encouraging internal differences to be worked out by relying on the more moderate ones to lead in seeking compromises rather than external pressure. If the moderates fail,

it is important not to overact and immediately reject dialogue with the other groups before sufficient efforts to work with them have been exhausted. While it is subject to debate, it is possible that had the United States not immediately rejected the Hamas victory in the last Palestinian elections as an evil and made efforts at diplomacy first, the current possibilities for peace might be different. Even if this would not have been the case, the American response has provided justification for charges of hypocrisy. See **Axiom #9**.

Axiom #9: Mediate Fairly. If external mediators are involved in the process, it is imperative that they not only be impartial, but are also *perceived* by all parties as impartial and fair. Unfortunately, the relationship between Israel and the United States and the invasion of Iraq on faulty intelligence and neo-con political agendas justify the pervasive Muslim perspective that the United States cannot be a fair and unbiased mediator. In order to possess legitimacy as an external mediator, the mediator must not be perceived as hypocritical. Consider for example, the following from an editorial in the *Arab News* about U.S. hypocrisy in promoting democracy in the Middle East:

Now at least Bush's perverse vision of the democratic process is patently clear. A democratic election must produce a government that is acceptable to the White House. Anything else will be rejected. The democratic voice of the people will be ignored unless it is singing the song that Washington wants to hear. This astounding hypocrisy undermines everything America says that it is trying to achieve in the region and everything that America once stood for.³⁰

The editorial occurred after the Bush administration rejected the Palestinian elections in which Hamas received the majority vote.

Axiom #10: Be Compassionate. Emphasize the central features of religion: practical compassion and respect for life. Practical compassion means working for peace and justice for all peoples. For example, given their differences, Jews, Christians, and Muslims all believe that God created the world for peace, and that God requires two things of human beings: righteousness—love of and faith in God and justice—and compassion for human suffering and respect for all human life. This is why Chaplain Bedsole argues in his article that this is not just one ingredient in successful state-building but a critical one for at least three reasons: (1) “religious leaders usually survive and fill in the vacuum when states fall and political leaders are removed”; (2) “religious leaders are usually the first to seek reconciliation after conflict”; and (3) “religious leaders and organizations are usually at the forefront of humanitarian efforts to feed and provide medical care for the survivors of conflict and violence.”³¹ Actualize the practical compassion that is at the heart of religion.

ENDNOTES – Panel 1, Randall

1. Richard Gildrie, “The Enlightenment Quest for Peace,” p.11, this volume

2. Vali Nasr, *The Shi’a Revival*, New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 2006, p. 174.

3. Timothy Bedsole, “Religion: The Missing Dimension in Mission Planning,” available at www.usafa.edu/isme07/Bedsole07.pdf, p. 9.

4. Xenophanes, “Fragment 21. B.15,” cited in W. T. Jones, *The Classical Mind*, New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1952, p. 19.

5. Bedsole provides the following war story about misunderstanding the nature of Sacred Places:

While in Iraq in 2003, one officer commented, "If we could just get the Saudis to send their army to Iraq, we could leave." He did not have an understanding of the religious/political history of the area. . . .

The forefathers of today's Saudi government . . . had torn down this shrine during the past, and there was no love lost between the two groups.

Bedsole's comments on this paper, p. 8

6. Laurence Andrew Dobrot, *The Global War on Terrorism: A Religious War?* Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, p. 11.

7. *Ibid.*

8. *Ibid.*

9. Karen Armstrong, *The Battle for God*, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2000, p. 346.

10. Bedsole, comments on paper, p. 10.

11. Peter Matheson, *The Third Reich and the Christian Churches: A Documentary Account of Christian Resistance and Compliance during the Nazi Era*, Grand Rapids, MI: Erdmann Publishers, p. 40.

12. Benjamin Jensen and Lynn Kunkle, "The Nexus of God and Citizen: The Individual as Citizen and Believer in Al-Arabi's Social Contract," a paper presented at the Center for the Study of Islam and Democracy, Fourth Annual Conference, Washington, DC, May 16, 2003, p. 3.

13. *Ibid.*, p. 16.

14. *Ibid.*

15. *Ibid.*

16. *Ibid.*, p. 3.

17. *Ibid.*, p. 2.

18. Jensen and Kunkle, p. 18.

19. It is important to note that the synopsis of Al-Arabi's philosophy that follows is just that—a synopsis; thus, it can hardly do justice to the depth and significance of his views.

20. Jensen and Kunkle, p. 8. See also *Qur'an* 2:256.

21. *Ibid.*, p. 28.

22. *Ibid.*, p. 30.

23. *Ibid.*

24. *Ibid.*, p. 34.

25. See Nasr, pp. 190-193.

26. *Ibid.*, pp. 212-213.

27. Lee Keith, "Critics Show Strength in Vote," Associated Press, *The Leaf-Chronicle*, March 16, 2008.

28. *The War for Palestine: Rewriting the History of 1948*, Eugene Rogan and Avi Shlaim, eds., with an afterward by Edward Said, Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2001.

29. Bedsole.

30. Dobrot, p. 8.

31. *Ibid.*, pp. 3-4.

PANEL 2

HISTORICAL EXAMPLES

Since Enlightenment values, religion, and ethics provide appropriate guidelines for state-building, it appeared logical and useful to examine instances of successful state-building to see if and how such guidelines were honored, whether intentionally or otherwise. Consequently, we decided to look at two historical examples, post-World War II Germany and Japan, not so much for specific details of practice as for the underlying principles that facilitated success.

State-Building in Post-World War II Germany

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History tells us that the 21st century will continue to witness powerful states attempting to guide new or unorganized states to make them “respectable” members of the world community. Such guidance will generally be based on principles of the Enlightenment using Locke’s famous dictum that government exists to protect life, liberty, and property. Thus, I have chosen to include an account of state-building in post-World War II Germany because it is a success story, and it largely seems to have been accomplished consistent with Enlightenment principles. The U.S. military played a crucial role in the reconstruction of post-World War II Germany, and the U.S. military will almost certainly play key roles in future instances of state-building.

I see seven Enlightenment principles that future state builders should be encouraged to acknowledge:¹

1. The rule of law is the goal, with emphasis on physical security of persons and property.

2. There is no such thing as a “blank slate” or “state of nature” in state-building.

3. The consent of the governed is essential in the long run.

4. The common interests of the governed must be supported.

5. The nation-state is the preferred option.

6. States should govern themselves in harmony with other states.

7. The formation of a state “should include a nuanced, layered, view of human nature.”

These principles are not pie in the sky. They are guidelines I suggest have been followed in the past and can bear fruit in the future.

In March 2006, I attended a conference entitled “Educating Military Leaders for the 21st Century,” where then Army Chief of Staff General Peter Schoomaker observed: “Tomorrow’s military officers will need to be more like Lewis and Clark than Patton.” Of course, tomorrow is already here. Officers still have to be the masters of military things, but they also have to be more culturally aware and linguistically able than officers in the past. We expect our officers to be politically astute and masters of the public relations world.² They are diplomats and state builders, more now than in the past when history occasionally cast the military in the role of state builder.

I realize that stark cultural differences exist across the network of societies around the globe. Much has changed since 1945, especially in the area of communications, but in spite of such differences, it seems to me there are some essential things to be learned from the post-World War II experience. The guiding powers will need to do these things if new

governments are going to be formed according to Enlightenment principles as suggested by Dr. Richard Gildrie, according to ethical principles as suggested by Dr. Jordy Rocheleau, and with respect for religious traditions as discussed by Dr. Albert Randall.

When the war was over in Germany in 1945, the victorious powers occupied the country in four zones and decided that they would pursue a policy based on what I call the four big “D”s: demilitarization, denazification, decentralization, and democratization.³ I will use these broad goals as a framework for examining the entire state-building process. The four big “D”s were complementary, as success in any one of them contributed to success in the others. As the situation unfolded, it became ever more obvious that the four occupying powers were going to administer their respective zones in different ways. The comments here pertain to developments in the West where Americans played the leading role throughout the occupation and for decades afterwards, even though America wanted to bring the soldiers home by the middle of 1946. Not only did America’s “exit strategy” not work, but there were many mistakes as well. America changed policies. The cost of the occupation was deemed outrageously expensive, and the victorious Allies could not agree on how to do things. But when we step back and look at the big picture, we can see that America did a lot that was right.

Demilitarization included, first of all, disarming and containing the defeated enemy military forces, but it also meant confiscating all weapons, explosives, and military paraphernalia in the hands of all Germans. Demilitarization prevented any new eruption of war and helped create a safe and stable domestic environment. Security was absolutely essential. The occupation

forces feared that the more weapons left inside the chaotic state, the more likely chaos would continue and even worsen. Curfews and travel restrictions further facilitated control by the occupation forces, thereby enhancing safety.⁴ One of the key reasons for curfews was the idea that occupation forces could not give up the night to potential plotters. Curfews were rigidly enforced in the beginning and only relaxed as time passed, and the military officials saw no dangers. While curfews were in force, any movement was cause for suspicion.

Denazification meant the removal of all things devoted to sustaining and celebrating Nazism. The victors abolished the Nazi party and prohibited the display of all of its symbols. The victors went to great lengths to identify and root out all party members and sympathizers. They sought to punish, in some fashion, all who had profited from the existence of the evil regime. Denazification meant tearing down the statues and monuments erected to glorify National Socialism. Denazification included renaming streets, squares, buildings, and all such public displays of loyalty and respect for the former system.⁵ This is not intended to say that the victors succeeded in removing all vestiges of Nazism, because some sympathies undoubtedly remained, but the clear message was that the Nazis had lost the war. Denazification was recognition that Germany was not starting with a blank slate. The society had a past, and the Germans had to be chastised for their past to the extent that that past could never be resurrected. I will also point out that denazification was never fully accomplished. It proved to be impossible. There were too many people involved, and some former Nazis had to be allowed to go back to work in postwar Germany because their

expertise as technicians or administrators was crucial to making things work.

Decentralization is the term frequently used to describe the denial of a strong centralized government and economic structure that could fall under the sway of another demagogue. It mandated rebuilding political and economic institutions from the ground up, so that local and regional interests were served, and their beneficial practices preserved and used to guide the reconstruction process as institutions grew larger with increased spans of influence.⁶ By upholding grass-roots interests, Germany was being prepared for a time when the government would govern on behalf of all the people and the people would consent to that government. It is highly likely that our future state-building efforts will be in the wake of a deposed despotic regime characterized by a centralized government and economy that had served the despot. Decentralization goes hand-in-hand with democratization. Furthermore, economic development in Germany demonstrated that cooperation with the occupying forces was in the best interest of the Germans. Even before the Marshall Plan, the U.S. military primed the German economy. Indeed, the U.S. military quickly became one of the principal employers in all of Germany.⁷ But steadily, the reviving German economy spawned new jobs and the military's role as employer diminished. Where German interests were served, homegrown prosperity spread.

Democratization was the biggest and most important task faced—and accomplished—by the Western Allies in postwar Germany. One can say it was actually resurrected, particularly because of Germany's Weimar experience. As a prelude to my comments on democracy, let me point out that the emphasis on

democracy was not without internal contradictions. Germans were told that they had to accept it, i.e., democracy, along with a number of other restrictions on German freedom.

It is true that Hitler never received a majority vote in a free election, but it is also true that he achieved power through constitutional means in a democratic state. He turned democracy against itself and then co-opted the state. Democracy is rarely as pure as it sounds. During the Third Reich, almost every public institution and instrument of policy had been altered to serve Nazi purposes (*Gleichschaltung*), so all such institutions and instruments were closed down when the war ended. Newspapers, schools at every level, banks, courts, publishing houses, theatres, museums, radio stations, and government offices were closed. Political parties ceased to exist. Even the German Red Cross had been corrupted and was closed down. This was "Zero Hour" (*Stunde Null*).⁸

Public life was restarted with extreme caution and under close supervision by the respective military governments. Crucial to this whole process was the control of information. Information is an aspect of national power. Governments can restrict information that undermines goals. Governments can also distribute information deemed helpful to those same goals. I am not talking about propaganda but the control of negative and positive reporting. Simply because a situation exists does not mean that it has to be made public. In postwar Germany, the German media, once resumed, were not allowed to criticize any of the victorious Allies until the Korean War erupted in 1950. By then, the military governments had been replaced by High Commissioners, and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and the German Democratic Republic had been

formally established. Until the military government relaxed the press controls, all reports coming out of Germany, whether print or radio, had to meet the approval of the respective military government's press officials.⁹

German newspapers printed features and stories from approved, external wire services, e.g., the Associated Press.¹⁰ No free press existed in the immediate postwar period because all the Allies believed a free press that permitted negative reporting on the occupation forces or governments, even if accurate, would be unsettling and undermine the state-building process. Schoolbooks supporting Nazi ideology were confiscated and replaced by textbooks written under Allied supervision. Germans were required to attend lectures, watch films, and undergo a host of reorientation programs. And America Houses opened their doors throughout West Germany. The Allies believed Germans needed to be reeducated so they would consent to the new style of government. In other words, the people needed to understand that the new form of government was in their common, long-term interest. But the big difference between 1945 and the 21st century is that information is much more difficult to manage. This may be the most important challenge facing forces trying to stabilize a chaotic state. Indeed, I will suggest that an entire conference could be organized around how to manage information in the state-building process. We are committed to a free press, and the free press and the communications revolution have combined to make it nearly impossible to control the flow of information.

When the FRG was established in 1949, the Basic Law (*Grundgesetz*) was written under the scrutiny of the military governors, most notably the American

General Lucius D. Clay. The document was called the Basic Law and not a constitution because that title was reserved until the document could be voted on by all Germans, both West and East. They intended to create a nation-state—not just a state. They meant to bind together Germans inside a common border, with a common cultural heritage, common language, and common history (even considering the short time that a state called “Germany” had existed). When political parties came back to life, allowances were made so that they could be informed by religious values, but equal opportunity was extended to political parties to exclude religion from their platforms.

It is interesting to note that the title “Federal Republic of Germany” contains the word “republic” — not democracy. “Republic” is more appropriate because “republic” is more indicative of a representative form of government intended to address the needs of minorities as well as the majority. The FRG was founded on principles that address “the social and cultural complexities, the civil societies, and moral aspirations of the people.”¹¹ It excluded the Nazi past to the degree reasonably possible but embraced Germany’s rich heritage at the same time. All of these things were accomplished in Germany under the auspices of military governments that had been put in place as a consequence of victory on the battlefield and supported by the continued, if ever dwindling, presence of military forces.

Military commanders and scholars have long recognized that there are principles of war that, if followed, will contribute to success on the battlefield. So I offer the idea that, just as there are principles of war, there are principles of state-building, or principles

of peace, that can help to “win the peace.” I believe that the following are among those principles:

1. **Security.** This includes disarming potential insurgents, maintaining a military presence, and controlling the movement of the population.

2. **Rule of Law.**

3. **Respect for Culture.** This applies to religion and traditions not harmful to the goals of state-building.

4. **Common Interest.** The people need to see a better future for all.

5. **Grassroots Strengths.** This means capitalize on local building blocks.

6. **Decentralize or Divide.** Build political structures regionally and then combine when consent exists.

7. **Public Support.** This is essential at every level.

8. **Realism.** Be willing to adjust goals when necessary.

9. **Patience.** State-building is a long, complicated process.

ENDNOTES – Panel 2, Browder

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6. Browder, *Post-World War II Germany*, pp. 23-36; Lothar Kettenacker, *Germany Since 1945*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1997, pp. 110.

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8. Browder, "First Encounters," pp. 10-11; Browder, *Post-World War II Germany*, pp. 165-168.

9. *Ibid.*, pp. 97-111.

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11. Gildrie.

Planning for Reconstruction and Transformation of Japan after World War II

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Plans are worthless, but planning is everthing.

General Dwight D. Eisenhower

Summary.

The original study from which this presentation was excerpted used primary sources at the National Archives and Library of Congress to try to understand the process by which the Franklin Roosevelt administration prepared for the postwar occupation of Japan. Among other uses, this study is included as a case history for the Project on National Security Reform, a National Defense University (NDU)-funded effort to revisit the National Security Act of 1947.

Although the actual occupation occurred in a country that was completely defeated and compliant to U.S. authority, it is important to remember that the entire primary plan, plus contingency plans, were prepared under the expectation of a bloody invasion and occupation that would cost 500,000 U.S. casualties and 4-6 million Japanese deaths.

The expectation of a hostile occupation prevailed within the U.S. Government from the start of the process on December 28, 1941, until late July 1945. As a result, the planning experience and the plan itself were part

of a process which is highly relevant to current and future U.S. actions which may result in the presence of U.S. forces in a country.

The research points to a number of lessons that must be considered for the planning and implementation of future stability operations. This interagency process was institutionalized in an interagency organization called the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC, pronounced "swink"). Prior to its organization in December 1944, cooperation had proved difficult to maintain, despite the strong intentions of the Secretaries of the Departments of State, War, and Navy.

As a part of organizing SWNCC, Secretary of State Edward Stettinius, Jr., asked Roosevelt, on behalf of his fellow secretaries, for permission to have complete interchange of all secret diplomacy and all military matters. Roosevelt agreed. The result was that there was information transparency which served the process well.

Within SWNCC, policy formulation was delegated downward, with the main responsibility centered at the assistant secretary level. These key assistant secretaries further delegated their authority downward and outward (horizontally), incorporating all available experts within and outside government. As a result, the effort became a true "whole-of-government" (WOG) effort, rather than a simpler division of authority in an all-of-government effort, such as we currently have.

The result was that there was a premium on policy consensus which allowed organizations and individuals to cooperate as equals and have common "ownership" of policies. This was helped by the fact that assignment to SWNCC was viewed as a high status post within the various departments.

Once a consensus had been formed on policies, a joint review was conducted at the political level—mainly a cabinet committee—which allowed the integration of policies. Policy disputes which could not be resolved at the staff level were referred to the President, but this was a very rare event, requiring only six referrals out of 750 SWNCC decisions.

SWNCC provided a detailed contingency planning process which provided a flexible script to General Douglas MacArthur and his staff, which was a completely integrated civil-military group. Although the military led the implementation of this plan once Japan was occupied, MacArthur was fully supported by civilian experts at all operational levels and guided by SWNCC's joint policy, conveyed through the Joint Chiefs of Staff to MacArthur.

It is no accident that the only individuals considered for the post of the U.S. Viceroy in Japan were two military men: General MacArthur and Admiral Chester Nimitz. History—U.S. and others'—suggests that this is the only practical approach to effectively managing any postwar environment or major U.S. military commitment to maintaining security.

The first three U.S. governors-general of the Philippines were military men, as were both U.S. governors-general in Cuba. The British Governor-general in Malaya who managed the defeat of the communist insurgency there in the 1950s was a general, while his key manager—the famous Sir Robert Thompson—was a colonel.

However, in Vietnam, the tension between the civil and military branches was only moderated by a cooperative effort called Civilian Operations and Rural Development Support (CORDS), but its impact came too late to affect the course of the war. A major

problem for the U.S. effort in Vietnam—a problem that resonates today in both Iraq and to a lesser extent in Afghanistan—was that the State of Vietnam was nominally sovereign, rather than simply self-governed. This was not necessary—at least after 1956—but we continued the French fiction of sovereignty and so forced the State Department to take the lead in managing the U.S. mission. In any future mission, the military must be in charge of the occupation initially, and be judicious in managing the process by which sovereignty and democracy are implemented.

Synopsis.

This presentation is the result of primary research into the planning for the U.S. occupation of Japan, seeking lessons for stability operations today. It seeks historic precedents to illuminate issues such as the content of postwar actions, and the decision concerning the establishment of civilian or military leadership in the initial postwar period.

Introduction.

Every time I heard or read about the “greatest generation” and our success in Japan, I wondered “Why we did do it? How did we do it?” Having seen Vietnam and now Iraq and Afghanistan, I wondered if there were lessons for today from our successful experience in Japan.

In 2006, I was given a grant to try to find answers. The two key lessons I took from this work relate first to organization, and then to policy. In this session, I will focus on how the U.S. Government organization evolved in the course of planning the occupation of

Japan. Then in the next session, I will discuss specific policies which we executed in Japan and contrast that with what we did elsewhere.

But first, let me note that a lot of analysts say Japan is not relevant to our current conditions because the Japanese surrendered. But in thinking about the relevance of Japan, consider that news of the atom bomb had only begun to circulate among senior U.S. officials in late July just *weeks* before the first U.S. occupation troops landed in Tokyo. Up until then, we had spent almost 4 years planning a bloody invasion and hostile occupation. I don't do alternative histories, but I think it is highly likely that the enlightened U.S. occupation policy may have stopped the rise of a nationalist revolt and almost certainly stopped the rise of the Communist party within the political system, and perhaps a Communist-led rebellion.

U.S. planning for the occupation of Japan became a singularly successful integration of the government's military and civilian staff which created a practical strategy for the reform and reconstruction of Japan despite the fact that the debate over policies was heated, and there were substantial differences between civilian and military officers who engaged in the process.

Planning for War.

Planning for war and planning for the occupation are tightly bound together, so my focus on this process starts with the war planning. At the outset of World War II, there was considerable debate about the creation of a "war cabinet" modeled after the British system which included opposition leaders and outside experts. Roosevelt did form a more narrowly constituted War "Council," but due to the surprising success of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) in 1942, Roosevelt came to feel that this War Council was unnecessary and the war planning could be managed in the White House, working through Admiral William Leahy who was then Chief of Staff to the President but effectively was Chairman of the JCS.

But as far back as 1940, Secretary of War Henry Stimson—a war cabinet supporter—had been concerned with the President’s centralization of decision-making. So he organized an informal group composed of himself, Secretary of State Hull, and Secretary of the Navy Knox.¹ These three men—known as the “Committee of Three” (C3)—met in informal, *weekly* meetings to try to iron out interagency problems for the conduct of the war. But the C3 had no executive authority and was essentially advisory. By mid-1942, however, they stopped meeting and abandoned the field to the President and his small White House staff which functioned as the center of warplanning activity. The White House quickly became a bottleneck for information flow in both directions, particularly planning for the invasion and occupation of North Africa and the planning for the invasion of Sicily.

With this structure, it was impossible to prepare detailed policies of either war or peace, so many key issues lacked authoritative statements of policy forcing field personnel to improvise responses often without the benefit of expert help.

Planning for the Occupation.

During this period, Secretary of State Hull had been given primary responsibility for all planning for the *postwar* era. On December 28, 1941, the Department of State organized the Advisory Committee on Post-War Foreign Policy. This was just 3 weeks after Pearl Harbor. This committee, composed of bureaucrats, scholars, and academics and managed by Hull's Under Secretary, Sumner Welles, held its first meeting in February 1942. Ultimately, it reported to C3 which was chaired by Welles' boss, Cordell Hull.

By the summer of 1942, State's Advisory Committee had six subcommittees which were staffed by

thirty graduate students who had just received their Ph.D. degrees or were just about to—historians, political scientists, economists, librarians, cartographers, and so on—and who were recruited specifically for this job. The research staff, known officially as the Division of Special Research, consisted of 55 people at the end of 1942, and 96 by mid-1943.²

However, despite the interdisciplinary nature of the staff and the broad reach of the subjects being considered, the planning committee lacked senior-level agreement and clear lines of authority. This resulted in pieces of the plan being developed in different offices throughout the government, with the strategy originating with the President and his staff. As a result, policy tended to flow from the center outward, with the staff work channeled back to the President.

This architecture did not permit the creation of practical and actionable policies which were endorsed by the entire government. And this lack of integration inevitably stimulated parochial interests of turf, budget, and careers.

Reviving the Committee of Three.

By mid-1944, Under Secretary of State Stettinius (who replaced Welles) and the newly appointed Secretary of the Navy, James Forrestal (who replaced Knox), took the initiative to revive the weekly C3 meetings. The cooperative relationship between these top officials created much greater integration of postwar policymaking at the staff level within the individual departments, but staff integration was still lacking.

Creating SWNCC.

In late November, Stettinius learned that he would succeed an ailing Cordell Hull as Secretary of State. His first priority was to address the inadequacy of postwar planning, and the C3 agreed to create a *formal*, interagency organization dedicated to planning postwar operations. This organization had an institutional life, with a formal secretariat that was headed by a Roosevelt favorite, Assistant Secretary of War John McCloy. SWNCC was formally constituted on December 9, 1944, just 8 days after it was proposed, and held its first full meeting on December 19th.

Although Stettinius was the nominal chairman, it was the C3's clear intention that SWNCC would be structured and run in such a way that the members of the group worked as equals in creating policy and required a consensus to make decisions. The C3 members all recognized that the military officers were full partners in the planning. Their emphasis was on finding cooperative solutions, and SWNCC became a true interagency effort. One analyst notes:

A review of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) reveals components necessary to achieve true coordination within the [interagency]. The Committee achieved senior leader involvement, sustained interaction, and thorough integration of respective departmental guidance within the policy development process. The efforts of the SWNCC experience provide important lessons for the future.³

Stettinius was concerned that even this level of integration would prove inadequate. He writes in his diary:

I stated that there had been a bit of confusion on how Navy and War had been informed on political matters and the State Department on military matters; that Stimson, Forrestal, and I had a suggestion and we wished to make a joint recommendation to the President. I spoke for all three of us and said that we wanted the authority from him to have complete interchange on all subjects at all times and I was authorized to tell them fully about all secret diplomatic matters and they were instructed to inform me fully on military matters. As we came to the end of the war it was impossible to improvise these military and political matters and we had to have the information. He [Roosevelt] said you are now authorized to do this.⁴

Although Stettinius continued to chair the weekly C3 meetings, the planning process itself was shifted down to the assistant secretary level and from that point down to relevant experts.

It is extraordinary to realize that nearly all the SWNCC decisions, made at the subcabinet level, became official U.S. policy for the occupation, guiding MacArthur and his staff. SWNCC provided a flexible script of action for the occupation so that the most important points – the preservation of the institution of

Emperor, keeping the government apparatus in place, defining the rights of all citizens, and the reformation of land tenure—were able to be implemented within a few months of MacArthur’s arrival, and form the economic and social foundations that persist until today.

The planners knew that our ability to capitalize on the *initial* window for reform is critical in any postwar or post-collapse situation. A prescient Department of War memo states:

The American public will unquestionably become restive under a prolonged occupation of Japan by American forces. It will not wish to assume the burdens of governing Japan over an extended period. Demands for withdrawal are likely to begin within 6 months after the surrender of Japan and thereafter to build up increasing political pressure to that end.⁵

They understood that the advantage possessed by winners who intend to make radical changes is quickly dissipated. Quick action is the only way that the advantage can be gained and maintained, and that can only come to pass with the kind of interagency planning described above. The quality of the interagency process during this period is demonstrated by the fact that of *the 750 issues considered by the SWNCC . . . only 6 cases were forwarded to the President for final resolution.*⁶ This reflects an extraordinary consensus which could only result from a truly WOG process.

Military Leadership of the Postwar Environment.

People today still debate whether Japan’s success was an example of the “great-man theory” of history or a solid planning and management system we put

in place. I would answer that it was the convergence of these two components which produced success in Japan.

U.S. planners recognized that an occupying force faces a narrow window in which it can shape the human environment. The American military is not designed to manage this window without clear political guidance because conventional military training does not prepare its personnel to take appropriate action. However, the other departments do not have the ability to manage the security or conduct autonomous operations within a postwar environment, so it was only through close cooperation, *not a division of labor*, that success was achieved. Secretary Stimson notes that,

WWII demonstrated with unprecedented clarity the close interconnection between military and civilian affairs; nowhere was this connection more evident than in military government. Yet no task undertaken by the Army produced more misunderstanding at high levels of Government. Orderly civil administration must be maintained in support of military operations in liberated and occupied territories.⁷

Stimson also notes that “*before Pearl Harbor the War Department began planning in anticipation of this sort [postwar civil affairs] of work.*”⁸ That was when the Army established the School of Military Government at the University of Virginia in Charlottesville to train “military government officers.” But he goes on to say that, “New dealers around the throne” opposed this school because they “were anticipating such activities as an opportunity for themselves.”

However, Hull agreed with Stimson and the Army staff that “administration in foreign lands must initially be an Army responsibility, while Stimson, in turn, fully

accepted the State Department's responsibility for the formulation of political policy."⁹

Hull's successor, Stettinius, also believed that the military had *primary* responsibility for the initial management of the postwar environment. Their position, also accepted by Roosevelt, was that the U.S. viceroy should be a military leader of great stature. In our research, we were unable to find any serious attempt—or even discussion—of an alternative to having the military manage postwar Japan, and only MacArthur and Nimitz were considered for the job.

It is interesting to note that the United States has completed only three long-term, postwar occupations: Japan, the Philippines, and Cuba. In the Philippines, the first three U.S. Governors General were military men: Major Generals Wesley Merritt, Elwell Otis, and Arthur MacArthur, the father of Douglas MacArthur. And even though Cuba was granted nominal independence after 3 years, both of our Governors General—Generals John Brooke and Leonard Wood—were active duty military men.

It is important to note that the successful and often studied counterinsurgency in Malaya was managed by *Colonel* Sir Robert Thompson, who worked for *General* Sir Gerald Templer. I think the lesson here is clear.

So, in closing, I offer what I think are the key factors that ultimately contributed to the effectiveness of this particular whole-of-government interagency planning approach during this period.

- Policy formulation was delegated downward, centered at the assistant secretary level.
- These key assistant secretaries delegated their authority further downward and outward (horizontally), incorporating all available experts within and outside government.

- This interagency process was institutionalized.
- There was information transparency and a premium on policy consensus which allowed organizations and individuals to cooperate as equals.
- There was information transparency between departments.
- A policy consensus was required which allowed all departments and individuals to cooperate as equals.
- Joint review and integration of policies was conducted at the political level – mainly a cabinet committee.
- Policies which could not be resolved at the staff level were referred to the President, a very rare event.
- Detailed contingency planning provided a flexible script to field staff.
- The military lead the implementation supported by civilian experts at all operational levels and guided by joint policy, conveyed through the JCS.
- Assignment to this policy institution was viewed as a high status post.

ENDNOTES – Panel 2, Schaefer and Schaefer

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6. Kolterman, p. 2.

7. Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, *On Active Service in Peace and War*, New York: Harper & Brothers, 1947, p. 553.

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9. *Ibid.* p. 554.

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Though countless primary documents were reviewed at the National Archives and Records Administration, the University of Maryland in College Park, and the Library of Congress in Washington, DC, we have chosen to cite specifically only those sources most central to this work while still providing the information necessary to access the collections that contain them. In this way, we hope to alert future researchers to crucial documents without rehashing the work of the dedicated archivists who have already produced detailed annotated bibliographies for much of the World War II source material.

Collections.

The Occupation of Japan. Congressional Information Service, Bethesda, MD and Maruzen Pub. Co, Tokyo, Japan 1987-1995. “U.S. Planning Documents 1942-1945” L.O.C. Microform Call Number 89/9022. Guide by Iokibe, Makato DS889.16 .I56 1987 and “Economic Reform 1945-1952,” editorial adviser Ryoichi Miwa. Library of Congress Microform Call Number 96/156. Guide Z7165.J3 O29 1994.

This collection contains hundreds of microfiche copies of recently declassified and previously unpublished documents, and is indispensable for any detailed study of the occupation. Without its coverage of the land reform in particular, its design, implementation and impact, our research would have been impossible.

World War II Text Records. National Archives and Records Administration College Park, Record Groups 353, 331, 165, and 127.

The loose and disorganized records of the SCAP, SWNCC, Department of War, and Department of State present a serious challenge to investigators, but they provide a unique and unfiltered glimpse into the internal debate and policy process. They are vital to understanding the chain of command and the sometimes messy and organic interagency process that developed during these years.

Birth of the Constitution of Japan. Japanese National Diet Library, Online Archive of English Language Materials. Accessed at www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/index.html.

This archive contains scanned U.S. documents (often multiple drafts) and original commentary. Materials primarily from the SWNCC, JCS, and SCAP illuminate the democratic capitalist reform of Japan after World War II.

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PANEL 3

POSSIBLE MODELS

There are an untold number of possibilities we might face in future state-building situations, so it is impossible to be prescriptive and describe how the U.S. Government should address state-building. Nevertheless, we deemed it useful to provide some examples that could be adapted for a wide variety of situations, or at least serve as a starting point. Governmental agencies, sociological concepts, and economic institutions seemed appropriate topics of discussion.

Postwar Nation-Building

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Synopsis.

The rule-of-law must include both criminal and civil codes, and the military has no choice but to manage the process of establishing them. Successes and failures are examined to draw a set of conclusions about nation-building and state-building, and an understanding of the differences between them.

Nation-Building and a Civil Code.

This presentation focuses on a particular aspect of our occupation in Japan—the establishment of a civil law code—in order to make a larger case about nation-building and then parallels between Iraq and Afghanistan. To use this critical tool effectively, we need to understand what is it about the law that helps

a country transform itself into a modern state, because too often when we talk about rule of law, we think about locking up criminals, and that is only a *small* part of it. Criminal law is about what you cannot do, but civil law is really about what citizens and governments *can* do.

To frame an answer which establishes continuity with the rise of modern states, we need to look further back in history. Let me offer the proposition that the modern era began in 1538, which was the year that Henry VIII sold a half million acres of Church land for a clear title.¹ This was a revolution not because he sold it — after all, it was his land, not the church's which, like the great feudal lords, held their property as a grant or a user right from the king — but because this is the first time that a king had acknowledged that someone other than him had sovereignty over land.

John Locke writes 150 years later, “The great and *chief end*, therefore, of men's uniting into commonwealths and putting themselves under government, is the *preservation of their property*.”² In fact, Locke goes on to say that when “legislators endeavor to take away . . . the property of the people . . . they put themselves into a state of war with the people, who are thereby absolved from any further obedience.”³

Now remember, Locke is the hero of our founding fathers who clearly asserted the primacy of private property in the Declaration of Independence,⁴ the Constitution,⁵ and the first paragraph of the first document issued by the First Continental Congress in 1774. Alexander Hamilton said, “One great objective of government is personal protection and the security of property.”⁶ Now, in our postwar efforts, the military does a great job with the security part, but no one does much of a job with the second part, and I am

going to argue that this is a large part of the problem of underdevelopment everywhere and instability in postwar environments.

In pre-modern societies operating under a system of arbitrary, customary, or informal rule-sets, the leaders—tribal, political, and religious—are the ultimate arbiters of the rules, and so ultimately control the wealth, or savings of the poor. If you are a member of the Hutu tribe and the president is a Tutsi, the only way he can earn the trust of Hutus is by being the chief magistrate of a system of laws. So long as he is the guy at the top of a competing tribal ladder, he will never command your allegiance. Now substitute Sunni and Shi'a, mullah and sheik, for similar tribal terms and then explain how Iraq becomes modern.

Good property law is a fundamental precondition for the legitimacy of any government, for the validity of any contract, for the security of any home, and even for the ability for a democracy to function properly. The superstructure of a modern state is built on a code of civil laws which, in turn, is built on property law systems.

Is that relevant to our work in Iraq and Afghanistan? Well, while Bremer's team was writing traffic laws in Baghdad, a Palestinian named Khaled Suffuri was writing, "A lasting Iraqi peace will require not only giving political power to the Iraqi people, but also economic power. Property rights are the foundation . . . yet the State Department has not listed those rights as one of the U.S. postwar goals." And he is exactly right. And in Afghanistan, 2.4 million of Kabul's 3 million residents live knowing their homes could be bulldozed at any time. And *half* of them are already under eviction orders.⁷

As Hamilton said, all societies require rules that govern personal behavior and general security, but also govern property. In the absence of formal laws, people will create informal or local rule-sets to ensure some degree of stability. However, the rule-sets in one neighborhood do not necessarily comport with those in another, creating a balkanization of rules making modern commerce and trade nearly impossible.

Only a national government can make and enforce a national rule-set that protects buying, selling, renting, and collateralizing property. But no poor countries have such national civil codes that incorporate a modern property law *system*. None.

In the previous session on Japan, I discussed how we *organized* a successful nation-building effort. But what is interesting is that we failed in *all* our subsequent attempts at nation-building, most particularly Vietnam. Stable states *may* eventually rise in Iraq and Afghanistan, but it will hardly be due to the brilliance of our postwar stability operations. And even if they survive, they will almost certainly not be modern political economies.

Japanese Property Rights.

The most important economic decision made by General James MacArthur was land reform, and today the Japanese economy is based on a modern property law system. At the end of World War II, *half* the farmers in Japan were tenants, sharecroppers without formal property rights operating in a ruthlessly oppressive system of rents and taxes, despite the fact that most families had farmed the same land for centuries. Not only did they did not own the land, they did not even have a legal right to their tenancy. Custom was their

only protection, but custom did not have the force of law.

In the summer of 1943, the State Department studied the whole Japanese economy and in the section on agrarian reform said that, "The need for thoroughgoing agrarian reform . . . will be one of the first tasks facing the nation with the return of peace."⁸ We had three strategic objectives for a land reform program:

- Reduce the power of the feudal lords.⁹
- Reduce or eliminate the appeal of Communism.
- Close the wealth gap.¹⁰

We did this by the rule of law and by clearly understanding the dynamics of land rights. As a result, "By August 1950, some 4,780,000 tenants had purchased close to 5 million acres of rice land and upland . . . [which had] . . . earlier been acquired from roughly 2,341,000 landlords."¹¹ And the tenants themselves were directly involved in the land reform program, which was completely decentralized and based on *elected* Agricultural Land Commissions representing the interests of 11,000 peasant associations.

Although we succeeded in all three of our objectives in Japan (and Korea and Taiwan), we have continuously failed to understand the role of civil law from our own experience. Let me run through a few examples.

Afghanistan.

Within weeks of the Taliban defeat in late 2001, the United Nations (UN) conference in Bonn, Germany, established an *appointed* Interim Authority which was immediately vested with Afghanistan's sovereignty. So almost as soon as it started, the

occupation of Afghanistan diverged sharply from the Japan experience. This group of 30 exiles and opposition leaders was charged with managing a process by which an emergency committee created a constitutional committee and appointed an authority that was to rule for 2 years. The 1,500 members of a *Loya Jirga* were selected by Afghan elders through a formula determined by the Bonn Agreement.

The *Loya Jirga* then had 18 months to create a constitution, and in the interim, the UN mandate said that, essentially, the Constitution of 1964 was still in effect. Compared to Japan, this was a weak approach to maintaining political continuity since the 1964 document was just a place-holder and so had ceased to be a constitution in any meaningful sense. Compared with the sense of sovereignty so carefully preserved in Japan after World War II, the treatment of Afghanistan's independence was rough.

The irony is that the 1964 Afghan constitution was, by almost any standard, liberal and modern. It spoke about "Life, liberty, and property protected by a government reflecting the will of an electorate that was not restricted by gender or ethnicity." It spoke of liberty as a natural right, rejected unlawful search and seizure, and provided for an orderly, law-based approach to eminent domain. It had created a constitutional monarchy under the king during a period called the "New Democracy" in which women were allowed to vote. They even had four seats reserved for them in the parliament's lower house and they served in the cabinet.

Had we reaffirmed the 1964 constitution—as MacArthur did with the Meiji Constitution—elections could have been held, and a legitimate government put in place within months (Japan took 7 months to

have elections). The 1964 constitution has provisions for amendment that would not have restricted the creation of a presidential system were that the will of the people.

However, instead of the people of Afghanistan deciding, a tiny group of elites at the UN Bonn Conference defined the process of reform, the character of the new government, and indeed selected the people who would control it. The people of Afghanistan did not have any real input into the selections of leaders or laws until the elections of 2004, and then they simply voted to ratify the constitution. Rule of law? It seems to me that in the name of continuity, expediency, and democracy, the Afghans lost all three.

The profound changes in land tenure and property rights in Japan were central to the ultimate creation of a modern, democratic capitalist polity there. Afghanistan, like Japan, never has had a formal property system. So to go back to my opening, if you cannot rely on a civil code backed by the power of the state, you have no real choice but to accept the authority of warlords who can use force to protect your property, but can also use force to take it away.

The Shining Path in Peru.

In the early 1990s, the Peruvian government destroyed the Maoist Shining Path insurgency in a matter of months by providing property rights to farmers involved in coca production. Like the poppy growers in Afghanistan, the poor farmers often grew coca because they had no viable alternative. They lived in constant fear of being driven off their squatter-farms by the government, so they cooperated with the rebels by growing the fast-maturing, low overhead coca bush

in exchange for protection. Because they could not get credit for farm improvements, seed, or fertilizer, nor access the international market through legal means, they were at the mercy of the insurgents.¹²

The Peruvian government asked them what they wanted. And just like the denizens of *Deadwood* in the HBO series, the answer was “property rights.” So the government gave it to them, and the farmers immediately turned on the Shining Path. Within months, the “army” had melted away, the safe havens disappeared, and the Shining Path leaders had to go to the cities to be safe. And here it became a police matter. They were rounded up and put in jail. Elapsed time? Six months.

Vietnam.

The Viet Minh were actually defending private property against the encroachment of Vichy French landlords. In fact, the Viet Minh did not even communalize land, but rather were protecting and even *creating* private property, a policy later adopted very effectively by the Viet Cong in their war against the United States.¹³

We promised to bring to the people of Vietnam democracy and capitalism, but by then allowing Saigon to appoint the village headmen, we deprived villagers of a system of democratic self-rule that went back to their pre-history. And by bringing back the landlords, we deprived them of property rights that the Viet Minh had given them. The “blessings” of democracy and capitalism at work.

The Emperor.

Before any U.S. soldiers landed in Japan and well before MacArthur was appointed Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers, we had fully researched, debated, and decided on nearly all critical decisions which informed our occupation of Japan.

For instance, the occupation authority retained Hirohito as a figurehead which proved to be crucial to social and political support. But this was only part of an attempt by Washington to identify and co-opt traditional sources of authority in order to facilitate the Japanese reform agenda. Keep in mind that this was a policy recommended in 1943 by an academic working for the State Department, and was reaffirmed at every step as it made its way up to Roosevelt and again to Truman.

The Politicians.

While Japan did not have a sovereign government for over 6 years, Japan never lost *self*-government at any time during the U.S. occupation. In fact, the final wartime government of Prince Naruhiko—this is the government which signed the surrender on September 2, 1945—was *not* disbanded but allowed to remain in power and operate under the prevailing Meiji Constitution.

Although Prince Naruhiko's government fell within a month, it was not dismissed by MacArthur. Rather, Naruhiko resigned in October to protest a directive entitled "Removal of Restrictions on Political, Civil, and Religious Liberties,"¹⁴ all of which were promised in the Potsdam Declaration and taken entirely from a State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC)

directive approved by President Truman and published in Japan 4 days after the surrender.

And the resignations were not the end of the political system.¹⁵ The Naruhiko government was replaced by the government of Prime Minister Shidehara according to the Meiji constitution, and then he was replaced by the first election 6 months later.

The Bureaucracy.

Because bureaucracies are critical to the functioning of any government, SWNCC instructed MacArthur that,

The function of military government in these fields will be supervisory rather than administrative, relying to the fullest extent practicable on Japanese civil servants and other acceptable personnel. These functions shall be exercised in such a way as to facilitate the withdrawal of the occupation forces from Japan at the earliest possible date.¹⁶

No de-Bathification.

The Economy.

It was never in question that we would not dismantle Japanese industry, but rather encourage Japan to rebuild and enter the global market. This is the reason that some of you no doubt drive a car built by the same company which built the planes that attacked Pearl Harbor.

Economic Elites.

A key American policy, set well before occupation, was aimed at economic democratization by the

dissolution of the largest conglomerates. They controlled thousands of subsidiary corporations in all areas of commerce which clearly inhibited democratization. The planners believed that removing the *Zaibatsu* was “scarcely less important to the national future and economic welfare than agrarian reform.”¹⁷ But we *never* planned to shut down the component corporations, but rather aimed to dissolve the networks of control.

Yet despite our persuasive rationale for dismantling the *Zaibatsu*, there was a substantial reversal during the occupation as Washington realized that reversing industrial policy in Japan (and in Germany) reflected the need to use economic growth to counter the spread of Communism in both Asia and Europe. In fact, the main theoretician of the Cold War—George F. Kennan—was deeply involved with the reversal of our industrial policies in both Japan and Germany, which he considered his most important contributions to history.

So the U.S. occupation did not aim to remove the Emperor, the politicians, the bureaucracy, the *Daimyo* warlords, or the *Zaibatsu* industrialists, but rather to use these people to change Japanese institutions in a way that reduced the incentive to make war and placed the country’s leadership under more democratic control.

The Lessons Not Learned.

The Inspector General’s report on Iraq makes nine recommendations, four of which reflect the lessons of Japan. The report noted that its recommendations were in response to the fact that postwar management was an:

. . . unavoidably *ad hoc* response that . . . was less than optimal. Developing *ad hoc* organizations in theater . . . consumed significant resources and time [because they] did not have appropriate staff, procedures, systems, or institutional strength to direct effectively the complex interagency rebuilding effort.¹⁸

The four relevant recommendations are:

1. create new legislation mandating better inter-agency cooperation,
2. clarify lines of authority,
3. fully fund the effort,
4. integrate local people and practices at every level.

The report then notes that “The U.S. Government should clarify the authorities of multiple agencies involved in post-conflict operations to avoid ambiguity over who is in charge.”¹⁹ Unfortunately, this will accomplish the opposite of the desired integration. By defining areas of authority more clearly, you are defining boundaries and thus turf, and this puts us right back to a failed organizational structure we used during World War II in the initial phase of the planning.

The way to eliminate ambiguity is not to more tightly define areas of responsibility, but rather, to make certain elements of war planning and the entire process of postwar reconstruction a *joint* responsibility by institutionalizing the effort in the manner of SWNCC. This effort is to operate under one “roof” or in the virtual office, under one flag. Shared responsibility for the output creates a shared buy-in to the policy.

Just think about the “hand-off” problem we debated for hours at the National Defense University Short Course: When do you shift responsibility? Well,

this is a moot question within a joint structure since the question of “hand-off” is really then just a question of staffing, not of shifting responsibility.

Conclusion.

The joint strategy talks about “the toolbox.” But what are the tools we put in it? No countries have graduated from the foreign aid “dole” to self-sufficiency. The modern tools of nation- and state-building simply do not work, but still Defense, State, the Agency for International Development, Treasury, and others continue to spend billions on it every year.

Our inability to find good tools perversely comes out of the success of the Marshall Plan which provided *reconstruction* funds to the existing, modern political economies of Europe. France and Germany already had a very strong sense of their nationhood. It was their already modern economies which were destroyed. The Plan aimed to help rebuild economies to block Communist expansion more than toward any humanitarian impulse.

But poor countries do not need to be rebuilt. Afghanistan and Iraq do not really have major *rebuilding* needs. Nevertheless, we focus on the state—the apparatus of the nation—and not on the nation itself.

Why did we do what we did? I do not know. After all, we have been essentially at war with Iraq since 1991, so this failure to plan for the occupation of Iraq is stunning. The history of Japan’s occupation suggests how we might have done it right.

I am sorry to say that in many ways Afghanistan and Iraq have more in common with our approach to the occupation of the Philippines than to that of Japan,

which is not a good model for the modern era. The Philippines required 15 years to pacify, we had no plan, our focus was on countering insurgents rather than true counterinsurgency, and we maintained an arrogant father-knows-best approach to nation-building, all of which has disturbing parallels with modern Iraq.²⁰ And the results of which are still being felt in a war still being fought in the Philippines.

So, in conclusion, let me offer my candidate list of principles to win the peace:

- **Joint Responsibility:** True interagency *responsibility*, not simply allocation of authority, is the key to creating a widely-supported and an executable plan.
- **Full Integration:** Joint-responsibility can only result from fully integrated analysis, planning, and policymaking.
- **Permanent Structure:** The process of postwar planning for nation-building is far too complex to be built each time the United States faces such a task. We need to create a permanent structure.
- **Utilize Those with Experience in the Country to be Occupied:** Knowing how specific acts will be judged by the occupied society and how to gain that society's cooperation is essential and cannot be provided by generalists or by opposition leaders. Unfortunately, that sort of expertise tends to be deep within bureaucracies, if it exists at all.
- **Military Leadership:** Because the first objective should be physical security, the U.S. viceroy should be a military leader, at least during the initial postwar period.

- **Help rebuild the Nation before the State:** The primary objective of *nation-building* should not be to construct or reconstruct the physical infrastructure, but rather to guide the rise of a modern political economy capable of self-government which can protect security, property, and freedom through law.
- **Stability through Prosperity:** The center-of-gravity (social, political, and economic) of *all* functional democracies is a large, independent middle class. This is what will ultimately destroy the Chinese empire. Occupation plans must aim to *cultivate* the formation of a middle class by defining a path for a wide cross-section of the population to improve themselves economically.

ENDNOTES – Panel 3, Schaefer

1. Andro Linklater, *Measuring America*, New York: Walker Publishing Company, 2002, p. 11.

2. John Locke, *Two Treatises of Government, Book Two, On Civil Government*, Chapter 9, “Of the Ends of Political Society and Government,” London, 1682, p. 295, para. 124.

3. *Ibid.*, Ch. 19, p. 377, para. 222.

4. Jefferson changed the formulation to “life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness” to avoid discussion of slavery but Locke was one of Jefferson’s greatest heroes, so there is little doubt he was echoing Locke’s political formula.

5. U.S. Constitution.

6. Records of the Federal Convention of 1787.

7. *Kabul Urban Policy Notes Series n.4*, 2005, South Asia Energy and Infrastructure Unit, World Bank, accessed at siteresources.worldbank.org/SOUTHASIAEXTResources/223546-1150905429722/PolicyNote4.pdf.

8. Robert A. Fearey, "Japanese Post-War Economic Considerations, July 21, 1943," *The Occupation of Japan*, Congressional Information Service, Bethesda, MD, and Maruzen Pub. Co, Tokyo, Japan 1987-95, "U.S. Planning Documents 1942-45" L.O.C. Microform Call Number 89/9022, p. 15.

9. The role of the Daimyo in fomenting war was well understood in Washington, and the general demand in the Potsdam Declaration that there "is convincing proof that Japan's warmaking power is destroyed" was to a large extent aimed at the warlords as a class.

10. SWNCC 150/4/A states, "Policies shall be favored which permit a wide distribution of income and of the ownership of the means of production and trade."

11. Steven Schwartzberb, "The 'Soft Peace Boys': Presurrender Planning and Japanese Land Reform," *Journal of American East-West Relations*, Vol. 2, No. 2, Summer 1993, p. 209.

12. Hernando De Soto, *The Other Path*, New York: Basic Books, 2002, reissue, pp. xi-xxxix.

13. Jeffrey Race, *The War Comes to Long An*, Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1972, pp. 123-127.

14. Removal of Restrictions on Political, Civil and Religious Liberties (SCAPIN 93), October 4, 1945, accessed at ndl.go.jp/modern/e/img_1/M003/M003-0011.html.

15. United States Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan, (SWNCC 150), accessed at 210.128.252.171/constitution/e/shiryo/01/022/022tx.html.

16. United States Initial Post-Defeat Policy Relating to Japan (SWNCC 150/4), accessed at 210.128.252.171/constitution/e/shiryo/01/022_2/022_2tx.html.

17. Fearey, p. 18.

18. Special Inspector General Iraq Reconstruction, *Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in Program and Project Management*, available from www.sigir.mil/reports/pdf/Lessons_Learned_March21.pdf, p. 16.

19. *Ibid.*

20. For a discussion of these parallels and our 15-year war there, see Peter F. Schaefer, "Repeating History," *The Washington Examiner*, January 20, 2006, p. 17.

**What To Know Before You Go:
10 Questions To Ask Before, and During,
a Mission¹**

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Abstract.

In this section, I argue that warfare and peace building are forms of communicative action in Habermas' sense of the term. Drawing on Canadian Communications Theory, Symbolic Anthropology, and the work of Bronislaw Malinowski, this section examines three main areas of military operations in terms of communicative action—communication about global policy, communication in the operational environment, and communication in terms of narrative-mythic structures—and uses them to pose specific operational questions.

I. INTRODUCTION

For to win one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the acme of skill. To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill. Thus, what is of supreme importance in war is to attack the enemy's strategy.

Sun Tzu, *The Art of War* III, pp. 3-4²

The origin behind this paper was a request for a list of nine or ten principles for building the peace. Instead, I offered questions in place of principles since principles, especially in the current business-dictated genre of "10 Principles for X," are nothing more than

a checklist for how to do something wrong with assurance. Questions, on the other hand, are much nastier – they require thought and analysis rather than a mindless series of check marks.

Any number of authors have offered such principles, based on the basic needs for stabilization and reconstruction. What additional insight would come from a repetition of these lists? Do we really need another person saying, “establish local security” and “rebuild the economic infrastructure”? The only possible answer is “no.” Moreover, most of said principles are in reality goals rather than guidelines. “Thou shalt establish local security” suggests that local security is critical but does not say why that is so nor explain how to achieve said security. What, then, could a symbolic anthropologist write about building the peace that had not already been written?

The answer to that question was, as it turned out, simple: it was another question. Consider again, security. Countless pundits in the past 5 years have remarked, “Iraqis are like us; they want security for their families and their future.” That may be true but how one defines security in Baghdad is dramatically different than in Ottawa. If I am to tackle the demands of building the peace, should I not define or describe what “peace” entails?

I asked myself, “What is the essence of war and peace”? Those two terms, which we hold to be polar opposites (or what Levi-Strauss called a “binary opposition”³), contained the answer: building the peace is, at its heart, about creating a shared reality and shared narrative (story or myth) about what *could* be in the absence of war.

Is it possible to win all the battles and still lose a war? Obviously, it is, so the creation of a peace cannot

be solely on the battlefield;⁴ it must be lodged in something more insubstantial – the hearts and minds of the participants. If this is the case, then, both war and peace are agreed upon stories that we reaffirm through our actions. In effect, both war and peace are constantly created and recreated by all stakeholders in a given location. Both warfare and, to coin a term, “peacefare” are what Habermas called “communicative action.”⁵

This idea, that war and peace are communicative action, is the basis that underlies this paper. Each section of the paper starts with a core set of observations, then follows with a theoretical discussion of a particular area of communications and then moves to particular questions related to that area. These questions are “mission-focused” in the sense that they are questions that should be answered before (or during) deployment. In some cases, they are more prescriptive than in other sections. In all cases, they purposefully disregard the conventional understandings of the role and limits of the U.S. military regarding politics. I have done this for one simple reason: all military deployments are inherently political as is all action in the field.⁶

I have written this paper on the assumption that these questions will be asked by the military. The questions, and observations, are equally valid if nonmilitary agencies, such as the U.S. Department of State’s Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), were to answer them.

Warfare as “Communicative Action.”

War is an extension of politics [policy] by other means.

Clausewitz, *Vom Krieg*

Youth instinctively understands the present environment—the electric drama. It lives mythically and in depth. . . . Wars, revolutions, civil uprisings are interfaces within the new environments created by electric informational media.

Marshall McLuhan and Quentin Fiore,
The Medium is the Massage, 1967, pp. 8-9

Conflicts that are described independently of communications theory or systems theory are empirical phenomena without relation to truth.


Jürgen Habermas,
Legitimation Crisis, 1975, p. 28

Warfare is about one group changing another group's perceptions of reality to align with the wishes, desires, preconceptions, and perceptions of the first group. It is, in effect, a "communicative act" where the *content* of the message is sent using a kinetic medium. Graphically, this would look like:

Policy → Medium → Audience
(content) (message) (opponent)

Warfare, obviously, is not a monologue. At a minimum, it is a dialogue, but most often there are multiple groups sending conflicting messages—a "multilogue." Von Moltke's dictum that "no battle plan survives contact with the enemy" holds equally for the communicative aspect of warfare; no policy ever survives contact with the reality of operations. In part, this derives from the simple nature of warfare as a multilogue, with differing messages competing for dominance. In this competition, the fog of battle (i.e., the messy reality of any operation or "friction" for Clausewitz) extends

itself to become noise in the communications signal. Graphically, this would look like:



Warfare is also a “game,” in the sense of a purposive activity carried out between actors according to a set of generally agreed upon rules – at least that has been the assumption following the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. The Napoleonic Wars, World Wars I and II, and the post-colonial “Wars of Liberation” were conditioned by and reinforced other social and communicative changes affecting the societies involved in these conflicts and, in turn, changed the unofficial rules of warfare.

I would like to highlight two particular changes. First, over the 350+ year period, there has been a consistent movement towards tying individuals into a state system whether they wish it or not. In the industrializing world, these ties tended to follow similar forms: an increasing bureaucratization of all organizations,⁷ increasing social interdependence,⁸ increasingly complex technology, increasing educational requirements, increasing global interdependence and, finally, the deployment of mass communications technologies.⁹

The second change I would like to highlight centers on the formal (i.e., structural) nature of communications technologies that developed over this period, and the period of convergence in which we now find ourselves operating. In general, there were two competing formal structures for communications technology: an overall broadcast structure (e.g., television, radio, movies,

newspapers, etc.) and an overall interactive structure (telephone, telegraph, etc.). Structurally, they look like this:

Broadcast technologies:

Message originator → medium → audience

Interactive technologies:

Message originator 1 → medium ← Message originator 2

←┘└→

(Communicative fora)

In all instances, the medium is skewed towards the transmission of one or more sensory inputs (e.g., sight, direct and indirect sound, etc.) and with a bias (in the sense of variable contraction) in both time and space.¹⁰ These sensory inputs, and the temporal and spatial biases, determine how “real” a message is conveyed to the audience based, in part, on how closely the media mimic face-to-face, lived experience.¹¹ The more immediate a medium is, then the more immediately important it is and the less time spent on rationally examining it for content meaning will be.¹²

This final point is crucial. When someone is trained in a physical action, whether it be learning how to tie their shoe laces or hand-to-hand combat, the goal is to create a “default value” for a pattern of action in a given situation. In effect, physical training for any action is conditioned in a form of stimulus response where sensory stimuli A, B, and C activate a neural network in the brain saying “perform action X, Y, or Z” (in decreasing probability). The same is true of cultural systems of meaning: sensory stimulus A leads to interpretation (of the stimulus as “meaning”) X, Y, or Z (in decreasing order of probability).

The medium and the message come together in communicative fora,¹³ or what Hilgartner and Bosk¹⁴

refer to as definitional arenas. Within these fora, and they can be anything from a coffee house to a battlefield to a discussion board, different messages interact to produce and/or maintain the shared understanding of reality that is encapsulated in the term “culture.”

U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*,¹⁵ contains two definitions of culture (para. 3-37 and 3-38).¹⁶ The first (3-37) and most commonly understood meaning is what anthropologists refer to as a “Culture of. . . .”¹⁷ It is a static snapshot in time and space of a group of people. The second meaning (3-38), referring to culture as “an ‘operational code’ that is valid for an entire group of people,” is closer to how symbolic anthropologists view culture, and how culture is used in this section of the paper. In this meaning, culture is how one encodes and decodes communications, actions, and observations/understandings of reality.

Organization of the Paper.

In the next three sections, I will be examining three different levels of communications, or environments: the political environment (general policy communications), the operational environment (basic needs and infrastructure), and the cognized environment (symbolic reality and meaning construction). The distinction between the operational and cognized environments comes from the work of Roy Rappaport.¹⁸ Generally speaking, the distinction between the two is that the operational environment refers to the reality in which a group lives, while the cognized environment refers to how that group symbolizes that “reality.”¹⁹

Each section is centered around a set of observations about the specific environment, a pillar²⁰ which guides

the general discussion and model of that environment and is the basis for specific questions.

II. THE “POLITICAL” ENVIRONMENT: GENERAL POLICY COMMUNICATIONS

Humans are a social species with a finely tuned neurobiology that allows us to detect people who cheat on a social (or cultural) contract, regardless of the specific content of that contract.²¹ This implies that social action must be based in some form of an agreement, whether part of a contract²² or by reaction to a breach of that contract. In effect, all actions, including inaction, must be justified and that justification must be communicated.

Discussion.

At the general level of policy communications, decoding is simple when the message itself is simple and, to some degree, universal. For example, every human culture has a narrative of conquest; whether the role played is conqueror or conquered is immaterial—they are both known “roles,” even though the specifics vary significantly. In many early historical cases (i.e., pre-1500), the messages encoded in conventional warfare coming from policy decisions were fairly simple and easy to decode—“give us X,” “Allow Y,” “Stop doing Z.”

Again, at the general level of policy communications, simplicity in decoding has also come about as a result of the technological dominance of a small group of inter-related cultures (the “West”) that has dominated the globe for the past 200 years. In effect, this small group of cultures globalized certain rules and conventions of

warfare and required other cultures to follow at least part of them, although there have been significant changes in their form over the past 60 years.²³ Since the end of the Napoleonic Wars, these conventions have increasingly assumed the form of multistate agreements where nonsignatories may be held to the agreements,²⁴ and the moral rhetoric has assumed an increasingly sophisticated form of Just War Theory.²⁵ Since the end of World War II, the United Nations has acted as the *de jure*, if not always *de facto*, arbiter of the moral status of conflict operations, including wars.²⁶

General policy communications, when used as a tool to shift perceptions at the global level (i.e., strategic communications), are frequently difficult to decode.²⁷ This difficulty arises from a number of reasons, of which I will only consider two: targeting an audience, and a basic shift in the nature of communications media from a broadcast to an interactive form.

The problems in targeting the audience stem from three considerations. First, who is the audience? Second, how do they as individuals communicate (i.e., which media do they use)? Third, where are they located (both geographically and in terms of communications)? Back in the “good old days” of the Cold War, you could identify your audience as people who lived in a specific geographic region (say East Germany) and target radio broadcasts at them. Those days made for a nice (and extremely simplistic) model.

Who is the audience today? The chances that a relevant audience for any current or possible conflict situation lives solely in a single geographical region are small. At a minimum, the audience will include people who live in diaspora communities in other nations, as well as the home audience and the populations (and/or politicians) in other states.


Communications technologies, and especially Computer Mediated Communications (CMC) media, have become more interactive, more temporally immediate, and more spatially irrelevant. Indeed, the very basic unit of cultures, community(ies), has, for many, been virtualized, and physical location is becoming increasingly irrelevant as long as basic needs are met.²⁸

What does this mean in terms of the coding/decoding of general policy communications? Well, for one it means that communications stemming from a broadcast model can be rapidly refuted. For another, it means that potential enemy combatants may appear anywhere since recruitment is no longer limited by geography.²⁹ Finally, it means that resources necessary to become involved in a conflict, including targeted propaganda messages, are available globally.³⁰

The entire area of general policy communications, especially in its strategic communications form, has become problematic due to shifts in communications technologies and global migration.³¹ One of the most important aspects of this is the ability to rapidly refute part of the message by presenting a real world counterfactual (e.g., videos on YouTube). This refutation, regardless of whether or not it is true or false, is designed to change the probability of an audience, A, selecting a given interpretation, X, of particular message, Y, by associating that message with real world events that contradict it. If successful, the refutation changes the audience's emotional reactions to the message.³²

Truth Claims.

All general policy communications rely on both implicit and explicit truth claims. Following Joel Best's analysis of the operation of rhetoric in claims-making,³³ we can say that truth claims are based on the following structure:



Source:Best (1997:102)

The grounds, or data, of an argument fall into three main types: definitions, examples, and estimates. Definitions, the range and type of data to be included, serve to control certain areas of communicative space; they parse out **what** is to be perceived as a component of the problem and serve to produce the boundary conditions. Examples and, in particular exemplary stories, serve to modify people's emotional reactions to a given truth claim by associating a particular claim with reactions to the story.³⁴ Grounds also include estimates of the incidence, growth, and the range of the problem. These estimates aim at producing a rationally based reaction in the audience which has, however, been preconditioned by the creation of emotional reactions from the exemplary tales. The numbers included in the estimates are for all examples of the problem, as defined by the claims-maker, while the exemplary stories are usually only the most extreme cases.

Warrants draw on preexisting cultural structures and semantic reactions which define what is right and proper and what is wrong and improper. Often these warrants have no basis in fact but, rather, draw

their strength from perceptions of what ought and ought not to be. For example, in Just War theory, self-defense against acts of aggression is usually considered to be the basis for a just-cause declaration of war. This warrant, however, does not define what constitutes aggression.

This brings us to the first three questions that must be asked, and answered, before any deployment. It is important to note that while all of the questions operate at the level of political policy decisions, the answers to these questions have a profound effect on both mission planning and operations. In terms of the early draft of the S/CRS guide for planning stabilization and reconstruction operations, these questions should be answered initially at the level of policy formulation.³⁵ It is also, however, crucial to note that missions **will** change as time, politics, and events dictate, so these answers must be tracked and updated on a regular basis.

In answering these questions, it is important to establish what truth claims are built into the policy assumptions/statements that precede the mission and to establish the grounds and warrants of these truth claims. Part of the reason for doing so is to anticipate future attempts to insert counterfactual “noise” into the communications system.

Question 1: What is the Mission?³⁶

Whatever can go wrong will go wrong, and at the worst possible time, in the worst possible way.

Murphy’s Law

The first, and most basic, question that must be asked is, “What is the mission?” How a mission is defined, i.e., the grounds and warrants underlying

the truth claims that establish the mission, has crucial implications for everything that comes later. The importance of these grounds and warrants is not limited to the establishment of task definitions for the mission (i.e., the S/CRS guide levels of strategy development and implementation planning) but rather extends to the rhetoric that underlies the emotional support for a mission.

Increasingly, the center of gravity of any operation is the “hearts and minds” of four specific audiences: the specific target audience,³⁷ the host nation, the homeland populace, and the global population. Inevitably, some of the grounds and warrants for a mission will prove to be either false or inapplicable and, if they have been held to be absolutely true, their falsification (or irrelevance) will seriously damage the audiences’ perceptions of the mission.

Question 2: What is the Ongoing Moral Justification of the Mission?³⁸

The universal aptitude for ineptitude makes any human accomplishment an incredible miracle.

Stapp’s Ironic Paradox

Even if every ground and warrant for the truth claims underlying a mission actually prove to be true and the claimed *jus ad bellum* is established beyond all doubt, events will, in all probability, conspire to create new problems. While the initial moral justification for the mission is established before it is launched, there is also an ongoing moral justification, composed in part of the *jus in bello*, in part by changes in the value of truth claims of the original mission and, in part, by ongoing changes in the nature of the mission itself.

Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) is proving to be a soon-to-be classic example of shifts in moral justifications, since many of the truth claims advanced as a *jus ad bellum* have proven either false (e.g., current [2003] WMD programs) or inapplicable (e.g., the spontaneous creation of a liberal democracy). OIF has also highlighted the importance of monitoring and presenting the ongoing moral justifications of a mission and, perhaps more importantly, developing communications channels above and beyond broadcast media for presenting the ongoing justifications. This is not an argument for propaganda in the crude sense of the term. Rather, it is an argument for the presentation of the most realistic (at the time) assessment possible of the current situation, along with the consequences of possible actions.

The purpose of such monitoring, presenting, and communicating is twofold. First, it is an ethical necessity in the sense that failure to do so will degrade the military organization to the point where it may become ineffective.³⁹ Second, each mission is a narrative (see Section IV) – an ongoing story that is being told to many audiences and used by them to make sense of reality. The absence of effective monitoring, presentation, and communication will allow the narratives of other groups, including any opponents, to gain dominance and may lead to the collapse of mission critical public opinion at home and abroad.

Question 3: What is the Source of Legitimacy for the Mission?

The concept of legitimacy is both complex and slippery.⁴⁰ For the purposes of this paper, I will define legitimacy as the warrant held by a person

that establishes their authority within the limits of an associated system. One might think of legitimacy as the Rule of Engagement (ROE) for actions taken within a socio-cultural system. Moving from individuals to institutions (and organizations), Malinowski called this a charter.⁴¹

There is, however, a significant problem—legitimacy derives from actions within a socio-cultural system, but most missions, including war, operate between socio-cultural systems. The solution to this problem has been the development of global systems that transcend individual nation-states and provide the system to issue mission warrants that provide subsequent legitimacy. The latest incarnation of such a global system is the United Nations which, in addition to providing warrants for wars, also has defined the grounds leading to warrants for various types of humanitarian and ecological missions. There are other, less global, systems in place such as various bilateral and multinational treaties that may serve to define the grounds for a mission warrant.⁴²

While the procurement of such a warrant is not the province of the military, at least in nations where the military is subordinate to the civilian leadership, knowing exactly where the warrant comes from is crucial for a number of reasons, especially in stabilization operations. First, it will condition the mission ROE by placing limits on what actions can be taken, and these limits may not allow for the most efficient resolution of the root problems of instability. Second, especially in extended missions, it is likely that the warrant will have to be significantly amended in order to meet emerging requirements.

A Note on Politics.

These three questions are inherently political, a categorization which is often considered to be off-limits to members of the armed forces of most Western nations. But if Clausewitz is correct in stating that war is an extension of politics, then all war and operations other than war will inevitably take place within a political environment--a conclusion that should be obvious to everyone after the past 7 years.

Being nonpolitical does not mean being apolitical. All human beings will talk; they will tell each other stories, try to make sense of their lives and lived reality and communicate these understandings to other people. These stories and understandings will feed into the broader discussions surrounding any mission where they will be taken up by people who are political and used to meet their own agendas. The best defense against this politicization is open, accurate, and above all, fast information communicated globally, produced by any soldier in the field.⁴³ Even with a due consideration of Operational Security (OPSEC), such open communication is quite possible. As Lieutenant General Caldwell recently noted,

What if we had documented video footage of the same operations which refuted what our enemies say? By the way, that is not enough, we have to get our images out FIRST! The first images broadcast become reality to viewers. If we wait until we see the enemy's images, we are being reactive and we have already squandered the opportunity.⁴⁴

Conclusions on the General Level of Policy Communications.

All actions taken while engaged on a mission have an inherent political influence. Given current computer-mediated communications technologies, this political influence will operate at a global level and feed back into support for or opposition to the successful completion of the mission. Any attempt at concealing actions, beyond the limited requirements of immediate operational security will, therefore, endanger the mission by potentially undermining the validity of the truth claims, both original and current, that legitimized the mission.

III. THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT: BASICS NEEDS AND INFRASTRUCTURE

In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, anthropologists thought that cultures might exist in isolation and have a pure form.⁴⁵ Pristine cultures, as they were sometimes called, may have existed at some time in the past, but they do not exist in the present. Every culture is in contact with other cultures and, often, states are composed of multiple cultures which frequently cross nation-state boundaries. Given this situation, it is imperative that a distinction be made between "culture" and "society" and between the "cultural" and the "social."

In the context of this paper, the terms society and social refer to structures, actions, institutions, etc., within a single nation-state, while the terms culture and cultural refer to structures, etc., within a self-defined people. Keeping this distinction in mind is

crucial since **social** institutions, which are the primary focus of many stability operations, are the result of complex and ongoing negotiations between different cultural groups, many of whom are not members of that society.

Discussion.

I noted earlier that the term “operational environment” as used in this paper refers to the objective reality in which a group lives. This reality shapes a group in many ways, but the most important appears to be how they originally⁴⁶ made their livelihood coupled with their current technology.⁴⁷ Over this period of time, cultures adapt dynamically to the environment and, in turn, condition the symbolic, material, and psychological development of the group.

Cultural groups do not live in isolation from other groups. Often there will be a flow back and forth between groups of concepts, technology, rituals, etc.⁴⁸ When something comes into a culture, it is usually not adopted “as is” but, rather, the use of that item (or concept, etc.) is shaped and fitted into preexisting expectations and forms.⁴⁹ Furthermore, and especially in the case of technology, the adoption will frequently skip developmental generations. Consider, by way of example, the spread of cell phones vs. the adoption of land lines in much of Africa and Asia.

Many states that are unstable are so as a result of the adoption (either by force or by choice) of concepts and technologies⁵⁰ that do not mesh with their culture. The other primary reasons for unstable states are destabilization by other states and/or nonstate actors and internal conflict. For example, Rwanda did not have separate tribal groups as ethnic identities until after

colonization. The construction of the Tutsi and Hutu as separate “races” was an artifact of the Germans and, later, Belgians, who destroyed the local power sharing arrangements and social mobility between the groups leading, eventually, to the 1994 genocide.⁵¹

At their core, stabilization and reconstruction are euphemisms for different forms of cultural and social engineering, most often social engineering with little consideration given to cultural engineering. The term social engineering refers to purposefully changing social institutions such as governance practices, the official economy, legal codes, etc., while the term cultural engineering refers to both changes in the expression of existing cultural patterns and in the culture itself (i.e., the creation of new cultural patterns). Much of the post-colonial experience in Africa has shown that conducting social engineering without cultural engineering is both dangerous (it tends to destabilize the state) and, at the same time, not very efficient (it often fails to achieve its goals). In part, this problem arises because the desired end states of most social engineering are not really part of the cultural matrix: they are imposed by other cultures without meshing them into the local culture.⁵²

Successful social engineering requires one of four situations:

- gradual social engineering is required in order to effect cultural engineering;
- the desired end form of the social engineering already fits into the cultural matrix, but is not the current form;
- a consistent, charismatic vision and constant communications that fits, at least partially, into the cultural matrix;

- the systematic destruction of the culture and its replacement.⁵³

Since the fourth situation really is not an option at the present time,⁵⁴ this argues for using one of the other three options.

The third option, a charismatic visionary, has not proven, on the average, to be a congenial option to most Western interests over the past 100 years—Ayatollah Khomeini, Adolph Hitler, Mullah Omar, and Ho Chi Minh come to mind. In general, charismatic visionaries have a tendency to lead what A. F. C. Wallace called revitalization movements—movements that attempt to “reconstruct Golden Ages” that are either highly romanticized or never existed.⁵⁵ Even when a potential charismatic visionary presents him/herself to Western nations, extreme care must be taken in deciding to support them, since their vision may not be shared with other members of their culture.⁵⁶ This is not to say that charismatic visionaries should be automatically rejected as a source of cultural and social change—they can be an extremely potent focus for transformation. The difficulty lies in assessing the long-term consequences of supporting such a visionary.

Both the first and second options require a solid understanding of the cultural matrix in order to use them. The first option is gradual; usually it takes more than 10-20 years before its effects come fully into the cultural matrix. The second is, usually, much faster, but the model already exists in the cultural matrix. The primary difference between the two options, apart from timing, lies in the locus of change: social institutions vs. cultural institutions (patterns). The civil restructuring in Iraq is an example of the first option—changes in social institutions which will (hopefully) lead to changes in

cultural institutions.⁵⁷ On the other hand, the Al Anbar Awakening is an example of the second option where changes in cultural institutions will (hopefully) lead to changes in social institutions.⁵⁸ A good example of the combined effects of social and cultural engineering is the Occupation of Japan at the end of World War II.⁵⁹

Another way to think about the differences is that the first option is top-down design and engineering, while the second option is bottom-up design and engineering.⁶⁰ While **social** engineering is currently fairly well-understood,⁶¹ **cultural** engineering appears to be less well-understood, as does the interface between the two of them. In some of the anthropology literature of the first half of the 20th century, the difference between the two was cast in terms of direct vs. indirect rule of colonies. This was expressed very nicely by Malinowski:

The real difference between “direct rule” and “indirect or dependant rule” consists in the fact that direct rule assumes you can create at one go an entirely new order, that you can transform Africans into semi-civilized pseudo-European citizens within a few years. Indirect rule, on the other hand, recognizes that no such magical rapid transformation can take place, that in reality all social development is very slow, and that it is infinitely preferable to achieve it by a slow and gradual change coming from within.⁶²

In order to effectively engage in social engineering, there must be at least some common cultural ground between the cultural groups involved. By understanding the cultural institutions within a society, this common ground can either be discovered or, as a minimum, certain forms of social institutions may be removed from the discussion. In the following section, I present a model developed by Bronislaw Malinowski

that shows how cultural institutions are formed, and gives a basic template for analyzing them.⁶³ The reason for presenting this model is to establish common ground for later discussions that go beyond Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs and that capture the fluidity of cultural adaptation.

Malinowski's Scientific Theory of Culture.

Whether we consider a very simple or primitive culture or an extremely complex and developed one, we are confronted by a vast apparatus, partly material, partly human and partly spiritual, by which man is able to cope with the concrete, specific problems that face him. These problems arise out of the fact that man has a body subject to various organic needs, and that he lives in an environment which is his best friend, in that it provides the raw materials of man's handiwork, and also his dangerous enemy, in that it harbors many hostile forces.

Malinowski, *A Scientific Theory of Culture* ⁶⁴

Malinowski started his major theoretical work with one basic assumption, upon which he built his entire model:

. . . that the theory of culture must take its stand on biological fact. . . . They [humans] are subject to elemental conditions which have to be fulfilled so that individuals may survive, the race continue and organisms one and all be maintained in working order.⁶⁵

This short quote foreshadows the three major areas of his inquiry: individual survival, racial continuance,⁶⁶ and organism maintenance.

Malinowski argued that there were three main types of needs, each of which derived from a different source. He starts with basic physiological instincts, and argues that these produce a universal list of processes, or vital sequences, which all cultures must address. These vital sequences, when considered at the general level of both a group and an individual, give rise to specific basic needs which must be met by all cultures.⁶⁷

Each basic need is met by a cultural response (see Table 1). These cultural responses are organized patterns of behavior which have evolved in response to that basic need and within a particular environment.⁶⁸ Many of these cultural responses are systematized, named, and given a social existence – they are a culture's institutions. It is important to note that, in Malinowski's conceptualization of institution, he is making an un-named distinction between institutions that exist in the cultures' symbology and institutions that exist in the cultures' society. This distinction is important, and parallels that of the genotype-phenotype distinction in biology or "potential" in physics.⁶⁹

Within these institutions, Malinowski noted two types of regularities: (1) a regularity of components or elements,⁷⁰ and (2) a regularity in functional type across cultures. These institutions, in turn, produce a secondary environment and have their own derived needs or imperatives relating to their survival.⁷¹ While this model is useful, it also can be matched in many nonhuman species.

For Malinowski, what sets human cultures apart from nonhuman is the process of symbolization involved in the creation of integrative imperatives – a third environment which is primarily symbolic. As Malinowski notes,⁷² ". . . symbolism, in its essential nature, is the modification of the original organism

which allows the transformation of a physiological drive into a cultural value.” This symbolization must allow for the transmission of cultural knowledge (the full knowledge of tribal tradition), coupled with the ability to link emotional states to this knowledge (i.e., the production of values).

Basic Needs	Cultural Responses	
	<i>Original form</i>	Modern
Metabolism	Commissariat	The entire food production and delivery system, including ways of food preparation
Reproduction	Kinship	Kinship and para-kinship systems ⁷³
Bodily Comforts	Shelter	Physical protection from the environment (e.g., housing, clothing, heating/cooling, etc.)
Safety	Protection	Physical security (i.e. “security” in the modern sense)
Movement	Activities	Patterned physical movement (including “play,” dance, etc.) that helps to physically condition individuals to their environment
Growth	Training	Similar to movement, but including mental activities as well — designed to teach and train children and apprentices. Often includes “rituals”
Health	Hygiene	“Health care” in the broadest sense of the term: allopathic, homeopathic, preventative, psychological and frequently, “magical” and/or “religious”


Source: Malinowski, 1994, p. 91, modified.

Table 1. Basic Needs and Cultural Responses.

Malinowski argued that all cultural organizations (institutions) appear as specific ways to meet particular needs and/or desires which, in turn, produce a series of secondary or derived needs that stem from the

operation and maintenance of various institutions.⁷⁴ On top of these, there are also a series of what he termed integrative imperatives: symbol systems designed to maintain group cohesion (Economics, Social Control, Education, Political Organization).⁷⁵

For Malinowski, the institution was the primary interface between individuals and their environments. Institutions embody the composite answers (material, perceptual, and organizational) of a culture to particular needs, problems and desires. Malinowski used a single template to analyze institutions (see Figure 1). Each box represents an analytic area requiring specific, observational data which was to be obtained by direct observation, interviews and lived experience (i.e., fieldwork).



Source: B. Malinowski
A Scientific Theory of Culture

Figure 1. Malinowski's Institutional Template.

Malinowski argued that there were six minimal requirements for an institution: charters, personnel, norms, material apparatus, activities and function(s) (see Figure 1.). Charters provide the socio-cultural and moral legitimacy for an institution (i.e., the social and cultural warrants). The personnel and norms of a chartered institution define what is now referred to as the organizational culture of the institution.⁷⁶ The material apparatus (artifacts) and the activities (observed actions), the informal culture of organizations, contain the lived and living reality of their operation.⁷⁷ Finally, we have the function of the chartered institution which is, to use Malinowski's words, ". . . the integral result of organized activities."⁷⁸

In the 21st century, we rarely speak in the terms used between World Wars I and II (e.g., of direct and indirect rule). Rather, we tend to speak of failing or failed states, and use a political rhetoric, at the general policy level, that is more often couched in terms of human rights, self-determination, and humanitarian concerns.⁷⁹ National interest concerns, such as access to and control over natural resources, basing rights, trade access, etc., are often used in the current rhetoric with highly negative connotations, and even self-defense arguments are questioned.⁸⁰

This rhetorical shift has had a major impact on mission warrants (see Section II) which are no longer in terms of direct or indirect rule but, frequently, in terms of temporary "co-rule" or "crisis intervention"; the analogy is no longer to "parents" but to "midwives" and "social workers."⁸¹ This shift, in turn, has produced significant limitations in both time and potential actions on what social and cultural engineering can take place.

Question 4: What Social Institutions Have Failed and Why?

This is, often, the hardest question to answer—especially the **why**. In some cases, failure is clear,⁸² but in most cases a social institution has not failed for the core group in that society but, rather, has been judged by others as unacceptable and, hence, a failure to be changed.⁸³ This is probably clearest in cases of forced regime change, but it is also clear in the case of so-called ungoverned spaces where the integrative imperative of political organization is vested in some form other than that of a nation-state (e.g., the kinship system).

If questions 1 and 3 have already been answered, then you have a start at answering this question—at least being able to define the criteria for failure. In most cases, the answer will involve an interlocking system of all social institutions, some of which failed directly, while others were caught up in a general systems failure through a series of dynamic feedback loops. Given sufficient time, the social institutions that did not fail directly will wither away and be replaced by cultural institutions. Examples of this include the reversion of most integrative imperatives from the state to kinship systems (such as tribes) in Somalia and Afghanistan.

The why of failure is more complex and often not vested solely in the society under consideration, especially when failure criteria are set by external groups. One way of analyzing the why of the failure of social institutions is contained in Malinowski's *Dynamics of Culture Change*.⁸⁴

Question 5: What Social Institutions Does Mission Success Require and Desire?

This is a question of function vs. form. For example, is it enough to say that a failed state must have a government that can guarantee the physical security of its population, or is there a requirement that this government take a particular form (e.g., a liberal democracy)? The Post-Conflict Reconstruction Essentials Task List⁸⁵ assumes the adoption of particular forms of social institutions, many of which failed in the first place often because they had insufficient support from cultural institutions.

The particular form a (re-)constructed social institution takes should be analyzed based on required (function) and desired (form). Attempting to impose forms from the Western world directly (and immediately) has often proved problematic. For example, the Salvation Councils coming out of the Al Anbar Awakening are proving to be quite capable of providing local security for the population, stopping sectarian violence, and allowing for economic and social improvements.

In his analysis of the tribal uprisings in Iraq, Kilcullen noted that,

we have spent the last four years carefully building up and supporting an Iraqi political system based on non-tribal institutions. Indeed, the Coalition Provisional Authority deliberately side-lined the tribes in 2003 in order to focus on building a “modern” democratic state in Iraq, which we equated with a non-tribal state. There were good reasons for this at the time, but we are now seeing the most significant political and security progress in years, via a structure outside the one we have been working so hard to create.⁸⁶

Does the effectiveness of the tribes at providing security (and other benefits) invalidate the goal of creating a liberal democracy in Iraq? Not necessarily. What it has done, however, is show that local cultural institutions: (a) can have tremendous power, and (b) will require that (re-)constructed social institutions take them into account (in this instance, the kinship system). It also highlights the differences between a required end-state (security so that other development can happen) and a desired end-state (a “modern” liberal democracy *sans* tribal input).

Question 6: What Cultural Institutions Support Required Social Institutions?

In the Iraqi polity, tribes’ rights may end up playing a similar role to states’ rights in some other democracies.

Kilcullen, *Anatomy of a Tribal Revolt* ⁸⁷

Most cultures have institutions that can support at least one form of a required social institution, although that form may appear odd to Western eyes. For example, North American style, free market enterprise makes certain assumptions that are incompatible with many cultures including the assumption of a modern banking system, extreme individualism, the acceptance of contract law, and an impartial judicial system. The failure of most economic development schemes that have relied on these assumptions can be put into perspective by looking at the extraordinary success of the micro-finance movement which relies on social networks and not on legal networks: cultural institutions (kinship and para-kinship networks) have been made to support a social institution (the economic system).⁸⁸

The examples listed above illustrate a core truth in anthropology: while the form of social and cultural institutions may vary considerably, there is a surprising universality in what basic needs they meet (a core argument in Malinowski's model). If social stability is a *required* social condition, then the manner in which social stability is achieved depends on the varying cultural institutions that support both stability and instability. An excellent example of this type of analysis that looks at very specific cultural institutions that may support social stability was published by McCallister in his examination of operations in Afghanistan's tribal areas.⁸⁹

On Social and Cultural Engineering.

Any stabilization and/or reconstruction program will involve a fair amount of social engineering and, at the micro-level, cultural engineering.⁹⁰ I would like to conclude this section by reexamining Malinowski's list of basic needs (cf. Table 1) and making some observations about each of them.

- **Metabolism:** The entire food production and delivery system, including ways of food preparation. This is one of the hardest areas to change and, in addition to its economic and physical infrastructure, is usually tied in very closely with gender roles and social networking. Most tribal cultures have elaborate codes of hospitality tied in with food and/or drink which, frequently, involve obligations well beyond what North Americans consider the duties of a good host.⁹¹ Familiarization both with codes of hospitality and local foods should happen, if possible, before deployment to avoid possible insult.⁹²

- **Reproduction:** Kinship and para-kinship systems. Kinship (and para-kinship) systems are the earliest form of *social* organization and, for many cultures, they are the default mode of organization in times of social stress. While there are only six general forms of kinship systems as systems, how these play out in any given culture can vary significantly in terms of obligations, honor codes, gender roles, duties, and rights, etc.⁹³
- **Bodily Comforts:** Physical protection from the environment (e.g., housing, clothing, heating/cooling, etc.). In general, environmental protection is adaptive to the physical environment, dependant on the locally available and affordable technology, and used as a status marker.⁹⁴
- **Safety:** Physical security (i.e., “security” in the modern sense). While of paramount importance, Kilcullen’s *28 Articles*⁹⁵ has covered the vast majority of the concerns at a cultural level. The only addition I would suggest is to examine whether or not there are specific rituals for ending conflict, which most tribal societies have.⁹⁶
- **Movement:** Patterned physical movement (including play, dance, etc.) that helps to physically condition individuals to their environment; and
- **Growth:** Similar to movement, but including mental activities as well – designed to teach and train children and apprentices. Often includes rituals.

Both movement and growth will blend together since “play” by adults tends to be based on childhood training. As a note, the majority of cultures tend not to have a sharp distinction between work and play – they are blended together.⁹⁷ Kilcullen’s article 19, “Engage the women, beware the children,” is crucial not only for its pragmatic advice, but for how it highlights the role of children in many tribal societies.⁹⁸ In particular, what might appear innocuous, say giving soccer balls to children, may well be viewed as an attack on the social order of the family (They are trying to seduce your children!).

- **Health:** “Health care” in the broadest sense of the term: allopathic, homeopathic, preventative, psychological and, frequently, magical and/or religious. Many cultures have what might be called a “spiritual” causation system for health problems; i.e., the source of a “disease” comes via some religious or magical agency (e.g., witchcraft, Djinn, Demons, etc.). It is important to remember that these agents are, for the local population, absolutely real and ignoring them or, worse, saying that they do not exist, is a guaranteed way to have the local population view you as a fool and, if you are foolish in one thing, you are probably foolish in another.⁹⁹

A Concluding Comment on the Operational Environment.

While the operational environment of a culture is objective, it is also (collectively) subjectively created. The operational environment defines reality

for the members of that culture in broad terms, and cultural institutions are the collective response to that perceived reality. What we call social institutions are the result of negotiations between cultural groups on how to construct formal institutions, and they are always influenced by and, in turn, influence, cultural institutions.

When thinking of the operational environment, there are two key points to keep in mind. First, no two individuals perceive exactly the same reality even within the same culture. One of the key roles of the basic need Malinowski termed “Growth” refers, in part, to the cultural creation of shared experiences that allows people to have common ground for communication.¹⁰⁰ This establishment of a common ground of experience serves as both a referential base for communications between members of the culture and as a basis for identity construction by individuals within that culture. Most importantly, the experience is interpreted by someone in the culture for the individual going through it.¹⁰¹ This final point is crucial, since two people from different cultures may share an experience but have it interpreted for them quite differently creating, in effect, two different operational environments.¹⁰²

The second key point about the operational environment stems from the first in that it deals with how a reality is communicated and interpreted, i.e., through language, narratives, and social dramas, which is the subject of the next section.

IV. THE COGNIZED ENVIRONMENT: LANGUAGE, NARRATIVE, AND SOCIAL DRAMA

One of the biggest differences between the counterinsurgencies our fathers fought and those we face today is the omnipresence of globalized media. . . . Beware the “scripted enemy,” who plays to a global audience and seeks to defeat you in the court of global public opinion.

David Kilcullen, *28 Articles* ¹⁰³

Language, narratives, and social dramas compose the core of the cognized environment, but stem directly from the operational environment. At this level (i.e., real world, day-to-day operations) reality is constantly being interpreted and negotiated between all of the stakeholders.¹⁰⁴ Coding and decoding are embedded in two key areas—language (including body language) and narratives—while negotiation is embedded in social dramas and rituals.¹⁰⁵ Together, language, narratives, social dramas, and social rituals establish the context within a culture and a society that enables and conditions communications. Frequently, this plays out in scripted actions which allude to, rather than state how, an actor or event should be perceived and interpreted. Learning the scripts in a given culture allows you to negotiate effectively within that culture.

Language and Narratives.

Language, including body and sign language, is probably the best known form of a coding-decoding problem identified in current operations. Obviously, the best way to overcome this problem is language

training, including training in body language.¹⁰⁶ This is well-understood, and excellent progress in general pre-deployment language training has been made. But language, as with experience, is contextualized and interpreted. Even when many of the words are understood by both speaker and listener, the emotional connotations of those words may be different for each person. Consider, for example, a uniformed police officer asking questions of a torture victim, even if that person was tortured in another country. The questions may be innocuous, but the medium (a uniformed police officer) evokes a violent reaction.

Everyday language is much more than words and grammar—it draws on associations with culturally shared stories or narratives.¹⁰⁷ Let us consider the narrative example contained in FM 3-24:

At the Boston Tea Party in 1773, Samuel Adams and the Sons of Liberty dumped five tons of tea into the Boston Harbor to protest what they considered unfair British taxation. This narrative explains in part why the Revolutionary War began.

For Americans, this is a core narrative, and a reference to the Boston Tea Party evokes a particular, positive emotional reaction. As FM 3-24 notes, this narrative “tells Americans something about themselves each time they hear the story: that fairness, independence, and justice are worth fighting for.”¹⁰⁸

But what does that same reference evoke in Canadians descended from United Empire Loyalists and raised on narratives that construct the American War of Independence as a brutal insurgency led by anarchists? Obviously, the Boston Tea Party must have a negative emotional connotation since it points towards an act of extreme civil violence against lawful

authority.¹⁰⁹ The same narrative is contextualized and interpreted depending on the cultural context of the listener. Obviously, decoding a message is simplest when the sender and receiver share the same codes of language and narrative.

One of the best ways to overcome the problem of incompatible interpretation of narratives is to create new narratives based on shared events—in effect, to act as interpreter for all groups. Often, and especially when you are dealing with cultures that are significantly different, these shared narratives should be extremely simple, concentrate on shared basic needs, center on highly stylized characters, and use extremely evocative language. One of the best examples of this type of a narrative is the *How to Win the War in Al Anbar* PowerPoint presentation by Captain Travis Patriquin.¹¹⁰

Even when new narratives are not intentionally constructed, they will still be created in the stories that people tell each other. And, given the now global spread of computer-mediated communication (CMC) networks, these stories will become public creating the real world, lived experience (even if it is only lived virtually) basis to interpret these stories. An example of an exceptionally poor narrative of this type entitled *Cavalry Scout Putting Pork on Bullets* was posted on *LiveLeak.com* on February 8, 2007, by “trooperway.”¹¹¹

Let us to return to FM 3-24, para. 3-50 and its definition of a narrative:

A cultural narrative is a story recounted in the form of a causally linked set of events that explains an event in a group’s history and expresses the values, character, or self-identity of the group.

There are two major problems with this definition. First, it situates narratives in the historical past of a group. While it is certainly true that many narratives concern events in the historical (or mythological) past, it is equally true that narratives are constantly being constructed and reconstructed to explain the present. While this use of narratives to understand currently occurring lived experience is obvious in oral cultures, it is also apparent in other cultures.¹¹²

The second problem with this definition is that it makes no mention whatsoever of characters or roles—the “Joe” and “Mohammed” of Captain Patriquin’s narrative—or what Carl Jung called archetypes.¹¹³ Individuals are much more likely to remember a personification rather than an explanation, and they model their behavior not on an abstract, “causally linked set of events” but, rather, on the actions of mythologized individuals.¹¹⁴ For example, when Moqtada al Sadr fled to Iran shortly before the start of the surge in Baghdad, he was attempting to replicate the actions of the 12th Imam (i.e., going into hiding to return as the Mahdi).¹¹⁵

Social Dramas.

All the world’s a stage,
And all the men and women merely players:
They have their exits and their entrances;
And one man in his time plays many parts,

William Shakespeare, *As You Like It*

Cultural narratives are often performed in public, both consciously and subconsciously, and anthropologists call these collectively social dramas or social theater.¹¹⁶ In many ways, social dramas, especially

in their mystery play form, are the most effective communicative form since they reconstruct a cultural narrative, with the audience acting as characters in the play, engage all the senses, and place the participant in continuity with the event portrayed in the narrative. For example, consider Nibras Kazimi's description of the effects of hearing the Asura narrative.

This was powerful stuff, and this piece of propaganda left its intended mark on me. For, on that day, a link in a chain, which had been unbroken for almost 14 centuries, was added: according to our family lore, we are descended from a man who commanded the armies of Ali—Hussain's father. I was now heir to a tradition; carried on from the earliest Shi'as through the loins of my ancestors to our modern day.¹¹⁷

Lest the reader think that social dramas only take place among other cultures, the following events are all social dramas: political rallies; town hall meetings; trooping the colors; KKK cross burnings; balloting in elections; basic training; parades; union rallies, white collar job firings, etc.¹¹⁸

It is important to understand the nature of social dramas for two reasons. First, they can have a significant effect on internal political dynamics and also how American troops are perceived. Consider the March 2004 Asura festival in Kadhimiya. As Kazimi describes it:

But during those days in Kadhimiya, it was as if an innate instinct—a behavioral gene—had been suddenly animated. Everything seems to flow with a perfect rhythm, and in perfect pitch. . . .

Twenty minutes later [after the end of the festival], a suicide bomber blew himself up inside the shrine's courtyard, within meters of where I had been observing that morning's procession. Another detonated himself at the Bab al-Murad entrance, shattering the centuries-old gold encrusted timbers of the gateway, and taking many more lives. And yet a third suicide bomber killed many others at nearby market.

I saw the news as I walking into my home. It took a few minutes to sink in, but I instinctively began gathering ammunition. I was convinced that a civil war would start that evening. At least, it should have: this was an unprecedented provocation in the annals of Sunni-Shi'a relations in Iraq. . . .

I was wrong: a civil war did not break out that day. The Shi'a leadership under Sistani chose to hold the Americans responsible for not providing enough security. After that, an angry mob had turned against American soldiers trying to provide medical assistance to the wounded, and began pelting them with stones and shoes, just like Shimr [one of the characters].¹¹⁹

The suicide bombings had been a specific attempt to trigger a Sunni-Shi'a civil war, an attempt that was derailed by Sistani by blaming the only participants in the social drama who were not included in the narrative: the Americans. This action on Sistani's part avoided an open civil war but, at the same time, significantly degraded the general perception that American troops could provide security.

Not all social dramas are replications of historical events; they can also be consciously constructed narratives such as the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission or the *gacaca* system of reconciliation in Rwanda.¹²⁰ The *gacaca* system is especially interesting, since it appears to be based

on the Xhosa concept of *ubuntu* consciously applied to the Rwandan situation by Bishop Tutu of South Africa—a cultural concept that may never have existed in Rwanda. Enacted into state law in 2002, the *gacaca* system appears to have been successful in some reconciliation in Rwanda.¹²¹

The second reason for understanding the nature of social dramas stems from the first: social dramas will be manipulated by people to achieve certain political ends, as both of the examples above show. It is imperative that this manipulation be focused towards mission goals and when (not “if”) they are manipulated against mission goals, that another social drama be used to contain the damage.

Question 7: What Are the Basic Narratives of the Culture?

Learning the basics of a language, the words and grammatical constructions, is the start of learning about how to communicate in the culture. The next step is to contextualize the language (i.e., to learn how it is interpreted), which can be done by learning the basic narratives of the culture.¹²² Ideally, for any deployment, there will be a reachback team similar to that currently supporting the Human Terrain System, which will collate cultural narratives and make them available to troops pre-deployment.¹²³

Question 8: What Are the Basics of the Culture?

In the same way as a language is composed of words and grammar, culture, in the sense of lived, day-to-day reality, is composed of social actions and events.¹²⁴ Social events circumscribe what actions may

take place and deviations from those actions may result in negative emotion reactions: the event interprets the action. For example, talking loudly and singing is generally acceptable in pubs and bars in North America, but unacceptable in restaurants; the event or “scene” controls the interpretation of the individuals’ actions and, hence, what “stories” are told about the individual and others who they are identified with.¹²⁵

While it is not necessary (or frequently possible) for deployed personnel to be members of the culture, it is necessary that they not consistently act in a manner that will cause members of the local culture to consider them fools or barbarians. In discussing the concept of “Hearts and Minds,” Kilcullen notes that:

“Hearts” means persuading people their best interests are served by your success; “Minds” means convincing them that you can protect them, and that resisting you is pointless. Note that neither concept has to do with whether people like you. Calculated self-interest, not emotion, is what counts.¹²⁶

He is quite correct that emotion doesn’t count, at least in the sense of whether or not you are liked by a host population. However, if you are hated or ridiculed, this will have an impact and, in this sense, emotion does count. Learning how not to give inadvertent offense by not transgressing event-permissible actions unless otherwise necessary is crucial to allowing the host population to remain capable of calculating their self-interest rather than reacting emotionally to your presence. Ideally, core scripts would be produced by the Human Terrain System and available in pre-deployment, cross-cultural training.

Question 9: What Are the Core Narratives of the Culture That Relate to the Mission?

In this battlefield popular perceptions and rumor are more influential than the facts and more powerful than a hundred tanks.

Kilcullen, *28 Articles* ¹²⁷

Narratives are often encapsulated in single words. Are the American troops in Iraq Liberators or Crusaders? Is al-Qaeda composed of Jihadi or Irhabi? It is not enough to use the correct terms in policy communications; they must be used in day-to-day interactions.¹²⁸ This is strategic communications at the level of the strategic corporal; it is emotional Judo whereby a cultural narrative is used to enhance mission-positive, emotional (or at least neutral) states among the host nation population and diasporic community. In a similar manner, adopting the narrative of your opponent is as ridiculous as Benjamin Franklin describing the Continental Army as a band of rebel anarchists rather than patriots.

What are core narratives? In general, there are two types of core narratives: historical and symbolic. In the United States, the War of Independence is an historical core narrative as is the Civil War, the Civil Rights Movement, the Moon Race, the Vietnam War, etc. They are the defining stories of a culture that answer the question, "Where are we now and how did we get here?" Again, using the United States as an example, the core symbolic narratives are the Bible and the Declaration of Independence.¹²⁹ Understanding the core narratives of a culture before deployment, including the specific characters and terms (e.g., patriot vs. rebel; Jihadi vs. Irhabi), is crucial to controlling which narrative

will be adopted by the neutral majority in the host country.

Identifying core narratives can be done in a number of ways. For example, Ruth Benedict¹³⁰ identified a number of core narratives in the case of Japan, and a similar methodology was used by Lieutenant General James Mattis in preparing for OIF.¹³¹ One of the simplest ways to identify core narratives is to read blog postings (if available) and childrens' books in translation. In an ideal world, a listing of core narratives would be made available by the Human Terrain System before deployment.

Of Narratives and Peacebuilding.

All cultures that have a concept of war have a concept of peace and some way of moving between the two in a form that is considered to be just. There is little sense in building a peace that is viewed as unjust by a significant minority, since this will plant the seeds of a future war. Finding a story that matches what all stakeholders can view as just is crucial to building a lasting peace.¹³²

V. CONCLUSIONS

Virtue is knowledge, and the man who knows the right will act rightly.

Socrates

qui desiderat pacem, praeparet bellum

Flavius Vegetius

Epitoma Rei Militaris iii. (Intro.)

The purpose of this paper was to present a series of questions, not principles, that could lead to building a peace. I have deliberately excluded discussions of such basics as physical infrastructure reconstruction, since that has been discussed elsewhere, and concentrated instead on war and peace as communicative action. This discussion has led us through global policy communications (Section II), social and cultural engineering (Section III), and cultural narratives (Section IV).

I have not offered any specific guides to building the peace in this paper. PowerPoint presentations and the “10 Principles of X” have their place, but that place is not in the lived reality of reconstructing a war-torn society. Instead, I have followed Socrates and offered questions in place of principles.

We must always remember that peace is only one side of the coin, with war being the other. This is a dichotomy which some have argued is built into the human cultural-genetic code.¹³³ While there is no doubt that the potential for violence is inherent in our genetic makeup, there is significant doubt as to whether or not this must appear as warfare. More importantly, over the 5+ million years that we have been evolving as a species, we have developed extensive cultural technologies to overcome and channel our genetic propensities. Our cultures now mitigate, channel and, in some ways, define our biologies.¹³⁴ Our next challenge, as a species, is to learn how to negotiate between and transcend our cultures. Until we are all able to do that, however, we must still prepare for peace by preparing for war, which brings us to the final question of the paper – “Why are we fighting?”

ENDNOTES - Panel 3, Tyrrell

1. The author would like to thank a number of people for reading over and commenting on earlier drafts of this paper. Many of the ideas presented here have been discussed with my colleagues in the Carleton University Counter-Terrorism Discussion Group; Owen Hewitt, Jan Fedorowicz, and Yannick Veilleux-LePage. I would also like to thank my other colleagues at Carleton for their input, especially Gregory Chin, Keith Gomez, and Bill Skidmore. There are many great people at the Small Wars Council who have helped hone these ideas so that they can be put into practice, and I would especially like to thank Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) Thomas P. Odom; Bill Van Horn; CW5 Bill Moore, U.S. Army; Major Robert L. Thornton, U.S. Army; Major Stanley J. Wiechnik, USAR; and Matt Armstrong for their comments on the paper. Special thanks go to Eric Bergthold of RTI International, Major Enrique M. Silveira Ejército de Tierra, and David Thexton and Lydia Zorn of Insignia Research. Needless to say, any mistakes or opacity are mine alone. Finally, I would like to thank Marc-Antoine Charpetier, Heinrich Schütz, and J. S. Bach for providing the ambience in which to write the paper.

2. Sun Tsu, *The Art of War*, Samuel B. Griffith, trans., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963.

3. Claude Levi-Strauss, *Structural Anthropology*, New York: Basic Books, 1963.

4. Obviously, this excludes the *Cartago delenda est* option of total annihilation of the opponent.

5. Jürgen Habermas, *The Theory of Communicative Action*, Vol. 1, Boston: Beacon Press, 1984.

6. A point made by Matt Armstrong (personal communication, January 29, 2008) who notes that “the military, especially today, is the chief public diplomat of the United States. It is the American warfighter that represents the U.S. in formal and informal media alike. It is the military, by both direct and indirect direction of the President, that has become the face of American foreign policy.”

7. See Max Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, T. Parsons, ed., A. M. Henderson and T. Parsons, trans., New York: The Free Press, 1947.

8. What Durkheim referred to as "Organic Solidarity." See Emile Durkheim, *The Division of Labor in Society*, W. D. Halls, trans., New York: The Free Press, 1984.

9. For a full discussion of these trends, see Marc W. D. Tyrrell, *At the Cusp of the Information Age: Outplacement as a Rite of Passage in Late 20th Century Canada*, Ph.D. Dissertation, Department of Sociology and Anthropology, Ottawa: Carleton University, 2000, Chapter 6.

10. On the biases of communicative media in general, see Paul Levinson, *The Soft Edge*, London: Routledge, 1997. For the biases in time and space, see Harold Innis, *The Bias of Communication*, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1951. On the sensory biases, see Derrick DeKerckhove, *The Skin of Culture*, Toronto: Patrick Crean, 1995; and Walter J. Ong, *Orality and Literacy*, London: Methuen & Co, 1982.

11. Consider, for example, the differences between reading about a battle, viewing a reconstruction of it on television, and being in the battle itself.

12. This argument derives from both evolutionary psychology (see Leda Cosmides and John Tooby, "Evolutionary Psychology: A Primer," January 1997 available at www.psych.ucsb.edu/research/cep/primer.html; and Jerome H. Barkow, L. Cosmides and J. Tooby, eds., *The Adapted Mind: Evolutionary psychology and the generation of culture*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1992) and cognitive science (for an overview, see Daniel J. Leviton, *This is Your Brain on Music*, Toronto: Plume, 2006, chapters 3-5).

13. Forums in which and through which communications take place. See Marc W. D. Tyrrell, "Hunting and Gathering in the Early Silicon Age: Cyberspace, Jobs and the Reformulation of Organization Culture," in *The Handbook of Organizational Culture and Climate*, N. Ashkanasy, E. Wilderom, and M. Peterson, eds., Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2000.

14. Stephen Hilgartner and Charles L. Bosk, "The Rise and Fall of Social Problems: A Public Arenas Model," in *The American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 94, 1988, pp. 1, 53-78.

15. Herein after referred to as FM 3-24.

16. It is important to note that FM 3-24 does not consider the non-host nation audience(s).

17. On this distinction, see Ann T. Jordan, "Organizational Culture: The Anthropological Approach," in Ann T. Jordan, ed., *Practicing Anthropology in Corporate America: Consulting on Organizational Culture*, NAPA Bulletin #14, American Anthropological Association, 1994, pp. 3-16; and Tyrrell, "Hunting and Gathering in the Early Silicon Age."

18. See Roy A. Rappaport, *Pigs for the Ancestors*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968; idem *Ecology, Meaning, and Ritual*, Richmond, CA: North Atlantic Books, 1979.

19. The use of the word "reality" may be somewhat misleading for readers; I have placed it in quotations to highlight the fact that it does *not* refer to an "objective" reality but, rather, "objective reality" as groups examining it perceive it. For example, if a group believes in the existence of nonphysical beings (e.g., Djinn) as being a part of their environment, then they are a part of that environment *for that group*.

20. Thanks to Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) Thomas Odom for suggesting this analogy.

21. See Leda Cosmides and John Tooby, "Cognitive Adaptations for Social Change," in Barkow *et al.*, *The Adapted Mind*.

22. The use of the term "contract" does not mean that the Social Contract Theory of Hobbes is hardwired into our brains.

23. On the establishment of this system, see David Held, "Law of States, Law of Peoples: Three Models of Sovereignty," *Legal Theory*, 8, 2002, pp. 1-44; Christopher Chase-Dunn and Thomas D. Hall, "The Historical Evolution of World-Systems," *Sociological Inquiry*, 64(3), 1994; and Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Modern World-System*, Vol. 1, New York: Academic Books, 1974.

24. For example, Chapter 1, Article 2, point 6, of the United Nations Charter specifically states that “The Organization shall ensure that states which are not Members of the United Nations act in accordance with these Principles so far as may be necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security.”

25. For example, see Jean B. Elshtein, *Just War Theory*, New York: New York University Press, 1991. On The development of international conventions, see Geoffrey Robertson, *Crimes Against Humanity: The Struggle for Global Justice*, 3rd edition, New York: The New Press, 2007.

26. Matt Armstrong (personal communication, January 29, 2008) notes that “The romantic legal frameworks of just war [have] eroded as differences between civilian and combatant, private and public, national and international, and even war and peace have become even fuzzier in the new century. The proliferation of cheap and easy weapons has increased the ability of people to access and employ kinetic options to solve conflicts, commandeer resources, or other disruptions for personal, ideological (including national and religious), or criminal purposes.”

27. See Matt Armstrong, “What the Sec Def Didn’t Call For, But Should Have,” *Small Wars Journal* (SWJ) blog posted on November 30, 2007, available at smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2007/11/what-the-secdef-didnt-call-for/.

28. On communities as a basic cultural unit, see Rappaport, *Pigs for the Ancestors*. On the creation of virtual communities, see Tyrrell, “Hunting and Gathering in the Early Silicon Age”; and Marc A. Smith and Peter Kollock, eds., *Communities in Cyberspace*, London: Routledge, 1999.

29. Consider, for example, the perpetrators of the 7/7 London bombings (see en.wikipedia.org/wiki/7_July_2005_London_bombings for a good overview).

30. For example, terrorist TTPs, manuals, etc. For a detailed examination of the types of resources passed through some websites, see the Islamist Websites Monitor Project by MEMRI at www.memri.org/iwmp.html.

31. For a good discussion of the concept of strategic communication beyond text and speeches, see Matt Armstrong, "In-sourcing the Tools of National Power for Success and Security," SWJ blog posting dated January 3, 2008, available at smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2008/01/insourcing-the-tools-of-nation/.

32. What Alfred Korzybski called a "semantic reaction." (Alfred Korzybski, *Science and Sanity*, 5th edition, Fort Worth TX: Institute of General Semantics, 1958.) For example, consider the simple message "Mission Accomplished" made famous during President Bush's May 1, 2003, speech on the USS *Abraham Lincoln*, and how its meaning has changed over time.

33. Joel Best, "Rhetoric in Claims-Making: Constructing the Missing Children Problem," *Social Problems*, 34(2), 1987, pp. 101-121.

34. Exemplary stories may take many forms, the most common of which are Atrocity Tales and Wonder Tales. On Atrocity Tales, see Best "Rhetoric in Claims-Making"; and John M. Johnson, "Horror Stories and the Construction of Child Abuse," *Images of Issues*, Joel Best, ed., New York: Aldine de Gruyter, 1989. On Wonder Tales, see Vladimir Propp, *Theory and History of Folklore*, Ariadna Y. Martin and Richard P. Martin, trans., Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984; and Tyrrell, *At the Cusp of the Information Age*, sections 5.1.1, 7.1, and 7.3.

35. See U.S. Government Accountability Office, *Stabilization and Reconstruction*, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2007, p. 12, available via www.gao.gov/docsearch/abstract.php?rptno=GAO-08-39, accessed January 17, 2008. Hereinafter referred to as GAO-08-39.

36. One commentator suggested I reword this question to read "What is my government's desired outcome even if everything goes to hell?"; an apt, albeit far from academic, wording.

37. The "specific target audience" is defined as the specific group whose perceptions must be changed in order to achieve policy objectives. It may be politicians, opposing military personnel, members of a terrorist organization, or other nonstate actors.

38. One commentator (Major Wiechnik, Stanley J., personal communication, January 27, 2008) suggested a subtitle of "Or how do I keep the rest of the world from ganging up on me" which is quite apt. One thing he notes that is frequently forgotten is that a large part of the function of moral justification and legitimacy is to neutralize opposition to that action; it does not imply that other nations or people *agree* with the action, only that they do not forcefully *disagree* with you.

39. An example of this consequence comes towards the end of World War I where the constant lack of monitoring, presenting, and communicating moral justification led to a series of soldiers' revolts that, ultimately, led to the defeat of Imperial Germany. The causal relationship is directly affected via changes in the organizational culture that place the soldiers in a double-bind situation. Early warning signs of such a problem may include increasing difficulty with retention and one part of the organization lying to the rest of the organization. This situation is analyzed by Nuala Beck in a civilian organizational setting; see Nuala Beck, *Shifting Gears: Thriving in the New Economy*, Toronto: Harper Collins, 1992.

40. For an excellent analysis, albeit highly theoretical, see Jürgen Habermas, *Legitimation Crisis*, T. McCarthy, trans., Boston: Beacon Press, 1975.

41. See Bronislaw Malinowski, *A Scientific Theory of Culture*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1960[1944], esp. chapter 11.

42. See Robertson.

43. For example, the restrictions imposed by AR 530-1, especially in 2-3 (15), are an example of how not to handle the issue; the sheer fact that AR 530-1, a FOUO document, showed up online within 2 weeks should illustrate the idiocy of the policy. The original story is by Noah Shackman (2007) "Army Squeezes Soldier Blogs: Maybe to Death" at *Wired*, May 2007, available at www.wired.com/politics/onlinerights/news/2007/05/army_bloggers. A more recent training oriented examination was just produced by Lieutenant General William B. Caldwell, "Changing the Organizational Culture (Updated)," SWJ Blog entry, February

1, 2008, available at smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2008/02/changing-the-organizational-cu-1/. On milblogging and its benefits, see Major Elizabeth L. Robbins, "Muddy Boots IO: The Rise of Soldier Blogs," *Military Review*, September-October, 2007, pp. 109-118, available at usacac.leavenworth.army.mil/CAC/milreview/English/SepOct07/robbinsengseptoct07.pdf, accessed January 18, 2008; and Cori E. Dauber, "Life in Wartime: Realtime War, Realtime Critique; Fighting in the New Media Environment," in *Military Culture*, Vol. 4, *Military Life: The Psychology of Serving in Peace and Combat*, Thomas Britt, Carl Castro, and Amy Adler, eds., Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2006, pp. 180-210.

44. See Caldwell.

45. See Adam Kuper, *The Invention of Primitive Society*, London: Routledge, 1988.

46. The term "originally" refers to the founding myth(s) of the culture.

47. See C. Daryll Forde, *Habitat, Economy and Society*, 7th Ed., New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1949; Gerhard Lenski and Jean Lenski, *Human Societies: An Introduction to Macrosociology*, New York: McGraw Hill, 1987; Karl Polanyi, *The Great Transformation*, New York: Rinehart and Co., 1944; *Idem.*, *The Livelihood of Man*, Harry W. Pearson, ed., New York: Academic Press, 1977; Karl Polanyi, C. M. Arensberg, and H. W. Pearson, eds., *Trade and Market in the Early Empires*. Glencoe IL: Free Press, 1957; Marshall Sahlins, *Stone Age Economics*, Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1972; Leslie A. White, *The Evolution of Culture: The Development of Civilization to the Fall of Rome*, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1959.

48. Anthropologists call this process "diffusion."

49. This often happens in the case of technology. The new technology, in turn, then turns around and influences the culture until a new stability is achieved (if it is).

50 . "Technology" is used in the loose sense to include "technique" (cf Jacques Ellul, *Propaganda: The Formation of Men's Attitudes*, New York: Vintage Books, 1973).

51. See Jean-Pierre Chrétien, *The Great Lakes of Africa: Two Thousand Years of History*, Scott Straus, Trans., New York: Zone Books, 2003.

52. By way of analogy, imagine how well most Americans would react to a ruling by the World Bank that the Federal Government must nationalize all businesses employing more than five people. Holding that example in mind, examine *Post-Conflict Reconstruction Essential Tasks*, Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, U.S. Dept. of State (hereinafter OCSR 2005) and ask yourself how many of those tasks are based on *American* culture.

53. Examples: (1) the creation of the U.S. Federal Reserve System after the engineered banking crisis of 1913 (central control over the money supply); (2) the creation of socialized medicine in Canada; (3) Maoist reforms in China (they mimic the ideals of the 1516 peasant rebellion) or the Taliban in Afghanistan; and (4) most First Nations (“aboriginals”) in Canada and the USA.

54. At least for most Western nations; it is still being used by the PRC in Tibet.

55. Anthony F. C. Wallace, “Revitalization Movements,” *American Anthropologist*, Vol. 58, 1956, pp. 264-281. Ho Chi Minh is an interesting exception to this (in part), since he modeled his “revitalization” of Vietnam on the U.S. Declaration of Independence, although this may well have been in an attempt to “neutralize” U.S. opposition to the Viet Cong.

56. Ahmed Chalabi and his *soi disant* Iraqi National Congress come to mind as an excellent example of a self-proclaimed “charismatic visionary.”

57. The Marshall Plan, on the other hand, is an example of successful social engineering.

58. One of the specific cultural changes was the inclusion of the U.S. military as a “tribe.”

59. See Ruth Benedict, *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword*, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1946.

60. Another analogy, although it is less exact, is that “conventional” warfare is social engineering while counterinsurgency warfare is cultural engineering.

61. As an example, see OCRS 2005.

62. Bronislaw Malinowski, “Practical Anthropology,” *Africa: Journal of the International African Institute*, Vol. 2, No. 1, January, 1929, pp. 22-38.

63. While Malinowski’s model is considered by many anthropologists today to be *passé*, it has gained some interest among organizational culture scholars and remains one of the better models available. For example, see Neal M. Ashkenasy *et al.* His formal model does contain many flaws, but the basic components of it appear to be quite valid with some reworking (see Tyrrell, *At The Cusp of the Information Age*, chaps 2-5).

64. Malinowski, *Towards a Scientific Theory of Culture*, p. 36.

65. *Ibid.*

66. The term “race” is used here as “total membership of a social group” rather than in either the biological sense (“species”), or in the ideological sense of differentiation by distinguishing characteristic (e.g., skin color).

67. It is important not confuse the concept of “needs” with that of “causes.” Such a confusion happened in anthropology in the 1950s, where certain needs were given the status of prime causes or ultimate goals. This created a situation where the entire concept had to be disposed of due to an obvious lack of relationship to observed reality (cf. Dorothy Lee, *Freedom and Culture*, New York: Prentice Hall, 1957, pp. 70-77). “Needs” should not be viewed as either prime causes or as ultimate goals. Rather, they should be conceived of as an environmental context which creates certain perceived minimal conditions.

68. As such, cultural responses are phenotypic expressions rather than genotypic determinations.

69. See Mark F. Peterson, "Embedded Organizational Events: The Units of Process in Organization Science," *Organization Science*, Vol. 9, No. 1, January-February 1998, pp. 16-33, for a discussion of the implications of this.

70. Which he describes in his Theory of Organized Behaviour (cf. Malinowski, *Towards a Scientific Theory of Culture*, chapter 5).

71. *Ibid.*, pp. 120-131.

72. *Ibid.*, p. 132.

73. A "para-kinship system" is any system that consciously mimics "family" (kinship) obligations including, but not limited to, secret societies, fraternities and sororities, and many religious organizations (e.g., monasteries, convents, some religious orders from Christianity, Islam, Buddhism, Hinduism, etc.).

74. Malinowski, *Towards a Scientific Theory of Culture*, chapter XI.

75. *Ibid.*, chapter XII. See also, Raymond Firth, ed., *Man and Culture*, New York: Routledge and Keegan Paul, 1957. "Integrative Imperatives" should be viewed as the symbolic "genotype" rather than the organizational "phenotype" of a social institution.

76. In actuality, this corresponds more closely with the idealized organizational culture, at least as far as the norms component is concerned.

77. For an interesting and quite humorous discussion of the distinctions between the "formal" and "informal" cultures of an organization, see Peter C. Reynolds, "Corporate Culture on the Rocks" in Tomoko Hamada and Willis E. Sibley, eds., *Anthropological Perspectives on Organizational Culture*, New York: University Press of America, 1994, pp. 301-310. The concept of formal and informal, or "espoused" and "observed" cultures (cf Chris Argyris and Donald A. Schön, *Organizational Learning*, Reading, MS: Wesley, 1978), is a useful since it allows us to describe a third "culture" which derives from the perceived differences between ideals and the actuality.

78. Malinowski, *Towards a Scientific Theory of Culture* p. 53.

79. It can be argued that the application of the concept of a nation-state to many areas of the world after World War II (i.e., decolonization) has been an act of social engineering with little concern for cultural engineering with somewhat disastrous effects that were foreseen by Malinowski (cf Bronislaw Malinowski, *The Dynamics of Culture Change*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961[1945]).

80. For an example of this, see globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=7693.

81. David J. Kilcullen, *28 Articles: Fundamentals of Company-level Counterinsurgency*, edition 1, March 2006, available at www.d-n-i.net/fcs/pdf/kilcullen_28_articles.pdf, accessed January 17, 2008.

82. This is most obvious in the case of natural disasters where emergency response institutions cannot deal with the scale of the disaster.

83. The Taliban as a government is an example of this. Other examples include economic practices that have been judged by the World Bank or IMF as "unacceptable."

84. Malinowski, *The Dynamics of Culture Change*.

85. OCRS, 2005.

86. David J. Kilcullen, "Anatomy of a Tribal Revolt," *Small Wars Journal* blog entry dated August 29, 2007, available at smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2007/08/anatomy-of-a-tribal-revolt/.

87. Kilcullen, "Anatomy of a Tribal Revolt."

88. For more on the micro-finance movement, see www.kiva.org/app.php. For a collection of articles relating to the micro-finance movement, see www.unCDF.org/mfdl/readings/.

89. William S. McCallister, "Strategic Design Considerations for Operations in Pakistan's Tribal Areas: Dust-up along the

North-West Frontier," *Small Wars Journal* Blog entry dated January 30, 2008, available at smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2008/01/operations-in-pakistans-tribal/.

90. Macro-level cultural engineering is best left as a long-term by-product of the social engineering.

91. Cf Marcel Mauss, *The Gift*, W. D. Halls, trans., New York: W. W. Norton, 1990[1950].

92. The reason for being familiar with the local food before deployment is because what some cultures consider food, others do not. Consider the case of dog as a food meat in Korea. See also Sahlins.

93. An excellent resource on kinship systems is Brian Schwimmer's *Kinship and Social Organization* tutorial available at www.umanitoba.ca/faculties/arts/anthropology/kintitle.html.

94. Clothing, especially, can be used as a status marker for shifting social roles.

95. Kilcullen, *28 Articles*.

96. See Mark Davidheiser, "Rituals and Conflict Transformation: An Anthropological Analysis of the Ceremonial Dimensions of Dispute Processing," 2006 ms essay, available at www.beyondintractability.org/essay/rituals_and_ceremonials?nid=6776.

97. The distinction in Northern European and North American cultures is as a result of the Protestant reformation combined with the Industrial Revolution. In many cultures, "play" can be a "serious" as "work" and "work" as "nonserious" as "play" — they both serve as key sources of identity. As Northern European and North American cultures become more post-structuralist, the distinction is gradually reverting with "play" becoming equal to "work" in terms of identity formation. See Clifford Geertz, *The Interpretation of Cultures*, New York: Basic Books, 1973; Victor W. Turner, and Edward M. Bruner, eds., *The Anthropology of Experience*, Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1986; Max Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, T. Parsons, trans., New York: The Free Press, 1958.

98. Kilcullen, 28 Articles.

99. See, for example, Martin Frost, "In Search of Jinn," *The Economist*, December 19, 2006, available at www.economist.com/world/displaystory.cfm?story_id=8401289, full version available for free at www.martinfrost.ws/htmlfiles/dec2006/search_jinn.html.

100. This is the "ritual" component mentioned in the area, but it also works for physical actions as well. Think of the use of sports analogies in North America as an example. On this use of ritual, see Ronald Grimes, *Marrying and Burying*, Boulder CO: Westview Press, 1995; Charles D. Laughlin, "Ritual and the Symbolic Function: A Summary of Biogenetic Structural Theory," *Journal of Ritual Studies*, Vol. 4, No. 1, 1989, pp. 15-39; *Idem.*, "The Cycle of Meaning: Some Methodological Implications of Biogenetic Structural Theory," in Stephen Glazier, ed., *Anthropology of Religion: Handbook of Theory and Method*, Westport CT: Greenwood Press, 1994; Charles D. Laughlin, J. McManus, and Eugene G. d'Aquili, *Brain, Symbol and Experience: Toward a Neurophenomenology of Consciousness*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1990; Victor Turner, *The Ritual Process*, New York: Aldine de Gruyter, 1969; *Idem.*, *Process, Performance and Pilgrimage*, New Delhi: Concept Publishing Company, 1979; *Idem.* *From Ritual to Theatre*, New York: PAJ Press, 1982.

101. This is sometimes referred to as "framing" an experience (see Erving Goffman, *Frame Analysis*, New York: Harper Colophon, 1974). On the process of interpretation, see Laughlin, "The Cycle of Meaning."

102. One of the best examples of this happened early in OIF when Coalition troops came under fire fairly often, but the fire was very poorly aimed. The troops interpreted this as "enemy" activity. Many of the people who shoot at the troops, however, had been men who had been embarrassed by Coalition troops in front of their families during cordon and search operations and had lost their honor. The only way to regain their honor was to attack those who stole it, even if they actually supported OIF.

103. Kilcullen, 28 Articles.

104. The term “negotiated” is used broadly, and in the theoretical sense, to include any and all actions taken by people that lead to the construction and/or maintenance of an understanding of social reality including kinetic operations and inaction.

105. See, for example, Erving Goffman, *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life*, New York: Anchor Books, 1959; *Idem.*, *Behavior in Public Places*, New York: The Free Press, 1963; Goffman, *Frame Analysis*.

106. See FM 3-24, section 3-53. On some of the problems with (mis)using body language, see Edward T. Hall, *The Silent Language*, Greenwich, CN: Fawcett Publications, 1959; and Chris Hedges and Laila Al-Arian, “The Other War: Iraq Vets Bear Witness” *The Nation*, July 30, 2007 (posted July 9, 2007), available at www.thenation.com/doc/20070730/hedges/10.

107. See FM 3-24, section 3-50. On analyzing these narratives, see Best, Propp, and Tyrrell, *At the Cusp of the Information Age*, chapter 7; 7.0-7.6.2. On a more general level, see Edward Sapir, *Culture, Language and Personality*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1961.

108. FM 3-24, section 3-53.

109. This particular example was chosen for a number of reasons but primarily because the cultures of Canada and the United States are often assumed to be almost exactly the same.

110. Available at www.blackfive.net/main/files/how_to_win_in_anbar.pdf (accessed, January 15, 2008).

111. Available at www.liveleak.com/view?i=6d3b99daae (accessed, January 15, 2008). There is a discussion of this video and its faults available at the Small Wars Council (council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=2233).

112. See, for example, Northrup Fry, *The Great Code: The Bible and Literature*, New York: Harcourt, Brace Jovanovich, 1982.

113. See Carl Jung, *The Archetypes and the Collective Unconscious*, Collected Works, 9i, Bollingen Series, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959.

114. Cf Gregory Bateson and Mary Catherine Bateson, *Angels Fear*, Toronto: Bantam Books, 1987; and Propp.

115. For a Western version of the same process, consider the part of the Arthurian legend that holds that he will return in Britain's day of need.

116. There is a continuum of social drama ranging from the unconscious replication of a narrative to the conscious, public "recreation" of a narrative. This final version is often termed a "mystery play." See Victor Turner, *Schism and Continuity in an African Community*, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1957; *Idem.*, *The Ritual Process*; *Idem.*, *Dramas, Fields, and Metaphors*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1974; *Idem.*, *Process, Performance and Pilgrimage*; *Idem.*, *From Ritual to Theatre*; *Idem.*, *The Anthropology of Performance*. New York: PAJ Press, 1987; and Turner and Bruner.

117. Kazimi, Nibras "Today is Asura...," blog posted on January 28, 2007, at Talisman Gate (talismangate.blogspot.com/2007_01_01_archive.html).

118. See Tyrrell, *At the Cusp of the Information Age*, chap 1, for examples. See also Goffman, *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life and Behavior in Public Place*.

119. Kazimi.

120. For a general analysis, see John Borneman, "Reconciliation after Ethnic Cleansing: Listening, Retribution, Affiliation," *Public Culture*, Vol. 14, No. 2, 2002, pp. 281-304; and Richard A. Wilson, "Anthropological Studies of National Reconciliation Processes," *Anthropological Theory*, Vol. 3, No. 3, 2003, pp. 367-387. For a specific military role in this process, see Michael W. Mosser, "The 'Armed Reconciler': The Military Role in the Amnesty, Reconciliation, and Reintegration Process," *Military Review*, November-December 2007.

121. Bernadette Johnson, "Gacaca," unpublished ms., 2005. See also *Genocide and Justice*, www.gov.rw/government/genocide.html, accessed January 16, 2008.

122. An excellent example of this is Benedict's work on Japan.

123. This is one of the goals of the HTS. Similar products were developed for U.S. forces in both World War II and during Vietnam.

124. Cf Goffman, *Behavior in Public Places*.

125. This process is actually the basis of social labeling and the construction of cultural stereotypes. See G. H. Mead, *Mind, Self, and Society*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1934.

126. Kilcullen, *28 Articles*, p. 5.

127. *Ibid.*, p. 1.

128. For an examination of current problems with this issue, see Jim Guirard, "General James Mattis – Attacking the al Qaeda 'Narrative'," *Small Wars Journal* blog entry dated August 7, 2007, available at smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2007/08/general-james-mattis-attacking/.

129. Cf Fry.

130. Benedict.

131. Lieutenant General James N. Mattis, "LtGen James Mattis' Reading List," SWJ blog posted June 5, 2007, available at smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2007/06/ltgen-james-mattis-reading-lis-1/.

132. Consider, by way of a negative example, the peace achieved at the end of World War I.

133. E.g., Richard B. Lee and Irvn DeVore, eds., *Man the Hunter: Symposium on Man the Hunter*, University of Chicago, Chicago: Aldine Publishing, 1966. For a contrary view, see Donna Hart and Robert W. Sussman, *Man the Hunted*, New York: Basic Books, 2005.

134. E.g., Richard Dawkins, *The Selfish Gene*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989.

Learning from the Past and Leaning Forward: Principles for Action in Undertaking Complex Activities

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Principles have their greatest utility in guiding the formulation of doctrine. Indeed, a measure of the adequacy of good principles is if they lead to the development of sound doctrine. There is certainly a need for sound doctrine that addresses how to achieve success in post-conflict settings; efforts to regain security, prosperity, and freedom in ungoverned areas; or assist territories in recovering after catastrophic disasters whether they result from natural disasters or malicious human activity. That foundational doctrine has been grouped into three principles:

- Process – preparing government to undertake complex operations;
- Purpose – organizing for complex activities; and,
- Peace – guidelines for the transition to establishing safe, free, and prosperous societies.

For me, these principles derive from a very rich body of data, an appreciation for America’s historical successes and failures in undertaking complex contingency activities.

Principles of Process.

Regardless of the mission, when the federal government as a whole has to work towards a common purpose, when it needs to team with friends and allies

or state and local governments and nongovernmental organizations, it needs a doctrine to start with. The larger the scale of the operation and the more decentralization required, the more dire a need for doctrine. The kinds of operations we are talking about certainly fit into this category. So any list of principles ought to start with principles that guide efforts to engage in concerted action.

History really informs meeting this challenge. In *Waltzing into the Cold War*, I wrote about the history of Austria after World War II, where the United States participated in an occupation much like it did in Germany. U.S. forces were supposed to be there for 2 years. They stayed for 10 years.¹ To put this effort in context, I looked at every U.S. occupation going back to the American Revolution, when we tried to get Canada straight, and one of the things I discovered is that we did them all exactly the same. Every one of them was an *ad hoc* affair, and when we were done, we immediately purged any lessons that we might have learned. And then after the next war, when transitioning from warfighters to peacekeepers, we would reflexively start over all over again as though we had never done it before.

I call this the rhythm of habits. Every time we do this, we basically start from scratch. We always do it the same way, and there are some things that we institutionally always do. For example, we always do a very poor job at interagency operations—getting all the federal agencies to work together. And we always use our military in much the same way. We also do a very poor job of doing post-conflict planning before and during the conflict. And we take warfighting military structures, which are not really well-suited to post-conflict operations, and we try desperately to

adapt them. Eventually we figure out that our forces that fought so well in battle are not well-equipped, trained, and organized to win the peace—that using the military that won the war to win the fight for peace creates as many problems as it solves.

Needless to say, though, we always, or at least usually, *ad hoc* our way to victory. As Winston Churchill said, “Americans can always be counted on to do the right thing . . . after they have exhausted all other possibilities.”

Perhaps the best example of America’s long tradition of not preparing well for complex contingency operations is the role played by the U.S. military. The Army’s experience and knowledge about peace operations have never been incorporated into mainstream military thinking in any major, systematic way. For example, the official report on the U.S. participation in the occupation of the Rhineland after World War I noted that “despite the precedents of military governments in Mexico, California, the Southern States, Cuba, Puerto Rico, Panama, China, the Philippines, and elsewhere, the lesson seemingly has not been learned.”²

After World War I, the tradition of forgetting continued. The Army’s *Field Service Regulations* of 1923 (doctrinal guidance crafted to capture the lessons of World War I) made no mention of the occupation of the Rhineland, nor that there might be a need to conduct similar operations in the future. The manual simply affirmed that “the ultimate objective of all military operations is the destruction of the enemy’s armed forces in battle.”³ Field Manual (FM) 100-5, the Army’s capstone field manual for the conduct of operations during World War II, did not mention the conduct of occupation duties.

As the United States prepared to enter World War II, the military discovered it had virtually no capacity to manage the areas it would likely have to occupy. In fact, one of the planners' first acts was to root out the report on lessons learned from the Rhineland occupation. The Army did not even have an FM on occupation management before 1940. A senior general was not appointed to plan overseas occupation operations until 1942—the same year the Army created staff officer positions for division (and higher) units to advise commanders about civil affairs and established its first military government school. Even then, the military undertook its occupation duties only reluctantly. When President Franklin Roosevelt wanted to free up more shipping to ferry civil affairs personnel to Europe for occupation duties, the Pentagon complained about diverting resources from its warfighting tasks. The best way to prepare for the postwar period, the Joint Chiefs argued, “is to end the war quickly.”⁴ U.S. military forces remained reluctant occupiers throughout the postwar period.

After World War II, the Pentagon largely forgot about the problem and continued to reinvent solutions each time it faced a new peace operation. Fighting the battles of the Cold War remained the military's overwhelming preoccupation.

Arguably, America's military after the Cold War has a better appreciation for its post-conflict responsibilities. It could not forget these missions entirely because they had become a fact of life in the post-Cold World disorder. On average, the U.S. military has conducted an operation related to peacekeeping, peacemaking, or post-conflict occupation every 2 years since the end of the Cold War. With the Soviet menace gone, there was greater pressure to employ U.S. forces

for a range of operations, which the Pentagon termed “military operations other than war” (MOOTW).

Yet it is not clear that the military internalized the requirements for post-conflict operations. In 1995, the Pentagon produced its first joint doctrine for MOOTW. The U.S. Army established a Peacekeeping Institute at its Army War College in Carlisle, Pennsylvania. These initiatives left much to be desired. They paid scant specific attention to post-conflict operations – arguably the most difficult and strategically important of all the peace activities that military forces might be called on to undertake.

Even the term “operations other than war” was problematic, implying a range of military tasks less strategically important than warfighting and grouping post-conflict operations (essentially an extension of the warfighting mission) in with a plethora of tasks that included everything from peacekeeping to helping out after hurricanes.

There was also little special recognition that the military’s two most recent major postwar operations in Panama (after Operation JUST CAUSE) and Kuwait (after the first Iraq War) were both deeply flawed.⁵ For example, Lieutenant General John Yeosock, who was given initial responsibility for overseeing operations in Kuwait in 1991, recalled that he received virtually no assets or planning assistance for the task. Yeosock recalled he had been handed a “dripping bag of manure” that no one else wanted. Operations in Iraq today appear different only in scale and duration.⁶ Initial assessments of U.S. military operations in Iraq suggest that the military failed to follow its own doctrine or learn from past experiences.

We can do better. In another book, *Mismanaging Mayhem*, I edited a dozen historical case studies looking

at interagency operations going back to World War I, covering everything from the pandemic of 1918 to civil-military operations in Vietnam to the response to Hurricane Katrina.⁷ Some consistent themes emerged again and again.

1. Washington habitually fails to invest in its human capital. When a crisis or contingency occurs, Washington plays Russian roulette. By happenstance, the people in charge may or may not have the skills to do the job.

2. Washington lacks good doctrine, the “lifeline of a guiding idea” to inform interagency operations.

3. Process cannot replace people. At the highest levels of government, no organizational design, institutional procedures, or legislative remedy proved adequate to overcome poor leadership and combative personalities. Presidential leadership is particularly crucial to the conduct of interagency operations.

Guidelines that address these key shortfalls, the problems that can and should be fixed before the crisis or contingency, should be part of the principles. These should include:

Principle #1. Develop Human Capital. Organizing these efforts requires a core of professionals skilled in interagency operations. The professionals that lead the effort must have three essential skills:

- Familiarity with a number of diverse related disciplines (such as health care, law enforcement, immigration, and trade) and practice in interagency operations, working with different government agencies, the private sector, and international partners;
- Competence in crisis action and long-term strategic planning; and,

- A sound understanding of the free-market economy, constitutional rights, and international relations.

Establishing this corps requires a professional development program with the following attributes.

- *Education.* A program of education, assignment, and accreditation that cuts across all levels of government and the private sector with national responsibilities has to start with professional schools specifically designed to teach interagency skills.
- *Assignment.* Qualification will also require interagency assignments in which individuals can practice and hone their skills. These assignments should be at the “operational” level where leaders learn how to make things happen, not just set policies. Identifying the right organizations and assignments and ensuring that they are filled by promising leaders should be a priority.
- *Accreditation.* Accreditation and congressional involvement are crucial to ensuring that programs are successful and sustainable. Before leaders are selected for critical (nonpolitically appointed) positions in national and homeland security, they should be accredited by a board of professionals in accordance with broad guidelines established by Congress.

Principle #2. Create Common Space. It is senseless to talk about “unity of command” among governmental and nongovernmental organizations. It is even unreasonable to talk about “unity of effort.” It is, however, a reasonable expectation to create a “common space” where legitimate organizations can have an

opportunity to engage in those activities they believe will be helpful in creating a safe, free, and prosperous society. There is no “one size fits all prescription” for how to achieve these conditions. Indeed, there are many situations where security is minimal, infrastructure inadequate, and civil society crippled – where creating the common space will be extremely difficult. However, given the existing situation, U.S. efforts should strive to set the conditions for the common space. Teaching leaders and planners how to create the common space must be a priority.

Principle #3: Fight the Fog of Peace. It is often forgotten that there is a “fog of peace” that is equally as infamous as Clausewitz’s “fog of war” – which rejects the notion that outcomes can be precisely predicted or that there is a prescribed rulebook for success that any military can follow.⁸ Large scale operations will inevitably include ambiguous and confusing situations with unclear, contradictory, or incomplete information. Operations should be designed to anticipate and account for the most common elements of the “fog of peace.” These elements include:

- *Convergence.* The most common problem in crisis intervention is too much – not too little – aid. Well-meaning actors choke the scene with people, equipment, and supplies that create security and safety risks, logistical nightmares, and confusion that hinders the delivery of help.
- *Lack of interagency planning.* Plans fail not because responders have not planned how to respond, but because they have failed to coordinate and exercise their plans with one another. This problem persists both within jurisdictions and across levels of government and the private sector.

- *Lack of information and sharing of information.* Knowing the location and nature of problems, victims, and available assets, as well as conditions in the area, can be extremely difficult. The press for time, chaos, stress, and the inability to deliver vast amounts of data in a usable form can all make the issue of dealing with a problem worse.

Any doctrine which does not incorporate this principle will produce plans that consistently fail to meet the conditions on the ground.

Principles of Purpose.

Any doctrine must drive leaders toward establishing and sticking to a unifying purpose for activities. Nation-building, for example, is a terrible goal. History teaches that nations do not build nations. Nations build or rebuild themselves. Europe certainly rebuilt itself after World War II. The Marshall Plan did not come along until 1948, after legitimate governments had been established in the postwar countries of Western Europe, after basic security had been restored. The Europeans themselves directed how funds available under the Marshall Plan would be spent. We get all the credit. They did all the heavy lifting.

Indeed, nation-building is such a complex phenomenon that even practitioners are unsure how they achieved success. U.S. goals should always be more modest and circumspect. The United States can learn from the past that it has consistently ignored. Lessons from the postwar occupations of Japan, Germany, and Austria suggest why the United States succeeded despite troubled occupations. In each case, after a

period of over 3 years, the United States got the fundamentals right.

World War II planners called this the “disease and unrest” formula. They concluded that an occupation force must perform three tasks before reconstruction or nation-building could begin:

- *Avert a humanitarian crisis.* The occupying forces must ensure that the population does not die *en masse* from disease, starvation, or exposure.
- *Establish, reestablish, or support legitimate government.* The occupiers need to create a political leadership that people widely perceive as credible to lead the long-term reconstruction effort.
- *Provide domestic security forces to support the government.* It is not essential that the nation is free of violence, but the occupiers need to ensure that the new leadership has adequate forces at its disposal to begin to establish a functioning civil society.

Once these tasks have been completed, post-conflict operations are essentially finished. The struggle for safety, growth, security, and liberty is not over, but the nation’s fate is largely in the hands of its new leadership. In virtually every case of successful reconstruction following an occupation, nations built or rebuilt themselves. Principles of purpose should focus on implementing the “disease and unrest formula.” These principles should hold for any kind of contingency operation.⁹ They should include:

Principle #4: Determine clear, concise national objectives. Before deciding to engage in operations, the President must articulate specific, clear, credible national interests and objectives. During the operation, the authority in charge of U.S. operations should continue to measure

its actions against those objectives. This is essential both for the efficient allocation of resources and to sustain public support. Throughout operations objectives may change. Measuring success will change as well.

Principle #5: Establish Interagency Coordination. Operations require more than DoD participation. They will require that multiple U.S. agencies coordinate their activities, especially in the post-conflict phase of the regime change. Issues will include restoring basic public services such as water, power, waste management, and public safety. Transportation and power generation infrastructure damaged by military operations will need to be rebuilt. Refugees will need to be returned to their homes, prisoners of war repatriated, and members of the old regime tried for their crimes when necessary. For the new regime to become self-sufficient, the economy must be restarted and the country put back to work. All of these tasks will require some degree of coalition participation and interagency coordination.

Principle #6: Ensure Unity of Effort. By their nature, operations are a multiagency operation and usually involve a coalition of other countries as well. Despite the multiplicity of actors, a single agency or headquarters must command the operations. Splitting authority for operations in Iraq, for example, between military commanders and a civilian administrator was a mistake and complicated the problems of implementing the disease and unrest formula. In contrast, the post-World War II operations remained under a single command authority, and this decision contributed to their success. Unity of command allowed the occupying forces to learn more quickly from their mistakes and to adapt better to unforeseen circumstances. In future U.S. operations, the military should remain in charge until

the disease and unrest formula has been accomplished. The decision to make the transfer to civilian authority should be made by the President.

Principles of Peace.

The disease and unrest formula is prerequisite for any operation. Moving beyond the simple but difficult tasks the formula requires is essentially the responsibility of the indigenous population. Here U.S. operations must shift from a lead to a supporting role. While the United States might provide a range of support activities from aid to security assistance, the fundamental purpose of these efforts must be ideological. The ultimate route to a safe, free, and prosperous nation is building a strong civil society—and that is essentially an ideological struggle—institutions come from ideas. There are three principles that can be applied to winning the war of ideas.

Principle #7: Understand the Country. An ideological struggle requires knowing the political, social, cultural, economic, demographic, environmental, and geo-spatial factors that impact the operation. An ideological struggle requires knowing how ideas are sent, received, and understood.

Principle #8: Delegitimize Bad Ideas. An ideology offers solutions to political, cultural, security, or economic ills. When that ideology is destructive to the civil society, it has to be effectively combatted.

Principle #9: Create Credible Alternatives and the Will to Prevail. Winning requires offering ideas that provide the tools for building the institutions that will result in a strong civil society and demonstrating the perseverance to establish these institutions.

These principles should serve as the foundation for all U.S. assistance in rebuilding activities. Together they argue for a simple goal—advance the cause of freedom. Here concerted action means a lot more than just holding elections, though free and fair elections of course are an important step in building civil society. These principles must be infused in all U.S. operations, advancing legal and economic institutions, liberties regarding free speech and the practice of religion, justice and reconciliation—all these activities are part of cutting the path to a free, safe, and prosperous society.

Final Thoughts.

We have relearned a lesson in Iraq that we have learned a thousand other times: Winning the peace is part of fighting and winning the war. Unless we build institutions, doctrine, organizations, traditions, and practices throughout the federal government, we will relearn that lesson again next time.

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Economic Empowerment Tasks for Stability Operations

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Introduction.

National security and Department of Defense (DoD) policies require that indigenous economic development and empowerment tasks are necessary elements to include in prospective missions in the persistent Long War that violent jihadism has imposed on the United States and our allies.

Prospective missions in the persistent war are characterized variously in U.S. Government policy documents as Reconstruction and Stability (RS) missions, or Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction (SSTR) missions; Stability Operations (SO); Counterinsurgency (COIN) missions; and sometimes as nation-building missions. A useful construct in which to include the economic empowerment and indigenous job creation features of these concepts is the term Stability Operations/Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction (SO/SSTR). The economic empowerment (EE) elements of such missions are referred to as SO/SSTR E² missions in this paper.

Whatever these kinds of missions are called and whatever their scope, there is neither disagreement nor confusion in any of the authoritative documents which guide policy that economic development and job creation for people in the host nation are essential elements. This paper identifies practical and

actionable economic empowerment tasks to achieve these objectives for use by Army units deployed to prospective SO/SSTR missions.

This paper seeks to inform a “gap analysis” to identify vital specific tasks necessary to fill the gap between general admonitions used in the planning documents and the specific implementing tasks required to conduct actual operations. The challenge is to answer this question: *exactly what* tasks and tools do Brigade and Battalion commanders need to conduct operations?

Economic empowerment elements for each prospective SO/SSTR mission are best executed in 5 Steps:

- **Step 1:** Fundamental principles to guide policy.
- **Step 2:** Intelligence and tool box imperatives for each mission.
- **Step 3:** Institutional infrastructure for economic empowerment.
- **Step 4:** Physical infrastructure for economic empowerment.
- **Step 5:** Capital infrastructure to fuel enterprise creation.

There remains uncertainty among policymakers—actually confusion is more accurate—as to exactly what tasks are to be carried out to implement these kinds of missions. Here is a brief synopsis of the current understandings of the respective players as to the kinds of general tasks that should be included in Stability Operations missions.

Department of State (DOS): National Security Presidential Directive 44 establishes DOS as the lead agency to establish and coordinate interagency support

for such missions. DOS refers to these missions as Reconstruction and Stabilization, and has appointed an Ambassador-level Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, or S/CRS, to supervise and direct an interdepartmental “Whole of Government” coordination planning process. DOS and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) focus is on empowering a legitimate national government in a failed or failing nation.

Department of Defense (DoD): DoD Directive 3000.05 uses the term Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction (SSTR) to describe these kinds of missions, and fully includes an indigenous market-based, private entrepreneurial sector as an essential element for DoD entities to develop.

U.S. Army: Army doctrine in a newly revised (February 27, 2008) Field Manual (FM) 3.0, *Operations*, uses the term Stability Operations (SO) as the inclusive, holistic term. Stability Operations is identified as an inherent functional element in a triad of Full Spectrum Operations that includes Offensive Operations, Defensive Operations, and Stability Operations. The revised, full spectrum FM 3.0 will regard each of the SSTR elements as subordinate subsets of the Stability Operations’ element of Full Spectrum Operations. FM 3-24, *The Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual* fully incorporates into current doctrine these Stability Operations concepts, including job creation and economic improvement for indigenous people in mission areas.

Defense Science Board: The report of the Defense Science Board Task Force boldly endorses the Army concepts in, “Institutionalizing Stability Operations Within DoD,” published in September 2005. The Task Force encourages “explicit embrace of stability

operations as a core activity of DoD on par with combat operations,” and says further, “We are defining ‘stability operations’ broadly to *include* security, transition, counterinsurgency, peacemaking, and other operations needed to deal with irregular security challenges.”

Practical Rationale for Economic Empowerment Tasks in Support of SO/SSTR Missions.

Experience drawn from counterinsurgency operations in Malaysia, Algeria, Vietnam, Northern Ireland, and elsewhere demonstrates the importance of increased economic well-being in forging a population’s interest in maintaining security. The perceived benefits of peaceful pursuits must outweigh the benefits from supporting or condoning a violent insurgency.

Economic opportunity-based operations are essential to the restoration of civil stability in the same way that lethal effects-based operations are essential to defeating armed threats against a population and legitimate governmental authority. To achieve economic and civil stability, it is crucial to design SO/SSTR E² activities and tasks for each respective mission that maximize private sector opportunities through the creation and support of indigenous enterprises in the host nation.

Government entities throughout the world tend to be very static, even in robust democracies like our own. It is fanciful to believe that commanders will have the opportunities or the capabilities to even attempt significant reform of existing national or local governments in their areas of operation during Army deployment rotations. Reform of previously controlling entities of the failed state will prove difficult enough in

the subsequent Reconstruction and Transition phases of stability missions, after the highly kinetic combat operations have receded to the background. SO/SSTR doctrine does not contemplate long-term societal and governance reform as a role for soldiers.

As a practical matter, only an indigenous private sector has the capability to rapidly and radically transform its own economic processes, organization, and activities when the “marketplace” changes through what economists call an on-going process of “creative destruction” inherent to entrepreneurial capitalism. For this reason, the dynamic and self-sustaining characteristics of private entrepreneurial entities make the community-level indigenous enterprises essential vehicles for achieving sustainable economic success in SO/SSTR missions.

Indigenous government agencies, U.S. Government agencies, and military officers are very rarely competent to make business or commercial judgments, simply because that is not their core competency or experience. For this reason, all too often government people do not fully consider the value of—and even the existence of—an indigenous, entrepreneurial private sector. For these reasons, it is essential that policymakers make explicit advance provision for the acquisition of planning and execution capabilities that are not organic to U.S. Government entities, and identify those specific tasks appropriate to implement for indigenous enterprise development in respective SO/SSTR mission environments.

A capital-empowered entrepreneurial sector focused on creating and marketing basic goods and services for which people are willing and eager to pay is the principal engine for job creation the world over. Entrepreneurs have always had to leap-frog over failed

institutions and ossified structures to rebuild, or adapt, or shut down, or recreate, or create-anew the kinds of sustainable business opportunities that will best serve their customers in a transitional environment. No government entity can adapt as quickly or as effectively to changing circumstances as can a private sector enterprise. Professionally deployed at-risk capital to make money available to entrepreneurial enterprises is the closest thing one can get to a “silver bullet” for counterinsurgency missions. One astute observer characterized the “gap” in the Brigade/Battalion commanders’ tool boxes as advance provision for each commander to carry along a “micro-enterprise accelerator” suitable for each mission.

If Commanders were to be provisioned with tools and money to be made available to the entrepreneurial elements of a local indigenous population, they – the indigenous population, not soldiers – will produce the deliverables necessary for establishment of their own business enterprises. These tools include key elements of basic institutional, physical, and technological infrastructures, accompanied by technical assistance and professionally managed capital.

While there is great emphasis at senior policy levels that interdepartmental government organizations ideally will identify and execute the specific tasks in collaboration with one another, the reality is that agencies outside DoD have neither the people nor the funds to execute prospective missions. Consequently, practical reality places this responsibility on the geographic Combatant Commanders at this time. Now is the time for appropriate DoD organizations to provision themselves to fulfill these requirements with practical means to achieve success – ‘cause ain’t nobody else gonna do it. There are five steps for

implementing Economic Empowerment elements for each prospective SO/SSTR mission.

Step 1. Fundamental Principles to Guide Policy and Programs for Economic Empowerment Missions.

Principles are necessary to inform policy. Policy sequentially informs goals and objectives from which plans, programs, and projects are established. Agencies responsible for SO/SSTR missions need to know exactly what the fundamental principles are so they can know how best to adapt their practices and programs to different situations as well as changing conditions and circumstances as they arise. Here follow seven principles drawn from previous counterinsurgency experiences that are entirely consistent with the currently operative policies, directives and doctrines:

Principle #1: America's Mission is Freedom. When indigenous people see an American Soldier, the first thought that must cross their minds is, "Hello, Freedom Man!" The basic principles of inherent human dignity, basic human rights, and the imperative of government by the consent of the governed—as articulated in the U.S. Declaration of Independence and the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights—must form the rationale for and practice of any U.S. Stability Operations mission, consistent, of course, with the concepts about what constitutes lawful authority, acceptable prescription, and the role of tradition in the culture of each host country or region.

Principle #2: "Always Ask 'em" Bottom-up Approach. Most people everywhere are sensible, practical, and pragmatic. They know what they want and need. The logical people to ask about such matters are most likely those already involved in private business, civil society, and government at the most local level possible—usually not the high profile politicians, and certainly

not corrupt individuals at any level of government or business.

Principle #3: Establish a Basic Rule of Law. FM 3-24 states, “Establishing the rule of law is a key goal and end state in COIN.” SO/SSTRE² and stable governance must have a foundation of practical, pragmatic common law appropriate for the indigenous population’s customs, courtesies, and traditions. This is essential because it provides for transparent adjudication and resolution of disputes between parties, and for the registration and confirmation of routine civil and commercial activities.

Principle #4: Strategies to Overcome Pandemic Corruption. The governments of virtually every failing state are plagued with massive corruption. U.S. and coalition forces cannot escape the compelling necessity to undertake tasks to deal with corrupt government officials and “crony capitalists” that use government bribes and contacts to create noncompetitive monopoly enterprises that diminish economic opportunities for those not favored by corrupt systems.

Principle #5: Property Rights. Economic empowerment cannot exist without specific provisions to protect individuals in the ownership and use of their real and personal assets – especially from having their property unlawfully expropriated by others. A bottoms-up means to accomplish protection, codification, and registration of property use and ownership, and an institutional infrastructure to settle disputes about such matters are essential.

Principle #6: Fiscal Systems Fuel Economic Activity. Capital cannot work to create jobs and economic growth if it is constrained by inadequate fiscal and transaction systems. Economic empowerment requires that national and local governments and especially

the indigenous private sector must have access to fiscal, monetary, and banking systems based upon modern concepts of budgeting, obligation of funds, a central bank that facilitates the clearance of electronic transactions, all enabled by the deployment of the incredibly robust, state-of-the-art, fiscal management technologies now available worldwide. Recent advances in transaction technologies make it easy to create effective fiscal systems to empower individuals and entrepreneurs anywhere.

Principle #7: Bottom-up Entrepreneurial Market-based Economies Work – State-run, Top-down Economies Do Not Work. It is a practical, pragmatic fact that no effort to make state-dominated economies work will ever be successful. Providing catalysts for development of the local private sector is crucial. This involves effective tasks and tools for providing capital to entrepreneurs; technical assistance programs to strengthen managerial skills; development of basic institutions that facilitate commercial activity; and the development of laws and regulations that encourage private business creation.

Step 2. Prerequisites: Intelligence and Tool Box Imperatives.

Intelligence: DoD Directive 3000.05 is very specific in prescribing that the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence shall ensure that DoD intelligence and counterintelligence capabilities are developed to fully support SO/SSTR missions. Chapter 3 of FM 3-24 provides 35 pages of detailed descriptions of the specific steps required for successful intelligence components of SO/SSTR missions and other counterinsurgency operations. However, it is not evident that Combatant Commands are fulfilling these mandates at this time.

A fundamental prerequisite for SO/SSTR E² missions is to understand what information is relevant to economic empowerment and to develop as much preliminary information and intelligence as possible from both overt and clandestine sources. Military assets may be the only practical way to develop some kinds of clandestine intelligence. This suggests that one key element of an SO/SSTR E² Mission will be to engage in extensive planning and coordination with Military Commands that possess clandestine intelligence capabilities in the SO/SSTR E² mission area.

Collection and analysis of overt intelligence to incorporate with clandestine intelligence should be contracted from research entities, think tanks, and other organizations competent in such matters. A holistic assessment (including culture, history, and other situation-specific information) of a mission area must illuminate what is possible and necessary to restore basic essential services and economic infrastructure in a way that enables subsequent private sector development and enterprise creation.

The current challenge for practitioners of SO/SSTR missions is to identify the tasks and provide the tools that will best equip deployed forces to accomplish successful Stability Operations missions. The tools with which the deploying force must be provisioned are generally articulated in FM 3-24. The unfulfilled challenge is to address the “Exactly What” suggested in the classic Lines of Operations graphic found in FM 3-24, reproduced below:




Figure 5-2. Example Goals and Objectives Along Logical Lines of Operations.

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Tools "In A Box": It is an important prerequisite for any E² mission to develop mission-specific tools that can be tailored in advance of a mission. Exactly and precisely what should comprise each of the basic civil society empowerment tasks for each prospective mission must be developed in advance, informed by actionable intelligence.

The Army most typically deploys in maneuver elements of about 1500 soldiers organized by battalions, which are assigned specific areas of operations to meet mission requirements and objectives. Army doctrine and practice is to rotate entire battalions, and even the brigades of which battalions are component elements, on 8- to 15-month cycles. As a practical matter, then, the Battalion and Brigade Commanders must be provided with tools specific to their mission that they can readily have at hand in accomplishing mission objectives. It is important that the tools are iterative, that is, that as one battalion departs the area of operations, its successor battalion can readily transition to assume responsibilities where its predecessor left off.

Pre-configured, situation specific "in-a-box" tool kits can provide commanders fundamental tasks to implement that are very basic and adapted to local traditions. Generalized cookie-cutter approaches will not work. Likewise, it would be a grave mistake to try to drop a full-blown, end-stage social or physical infrastructure scheme developed by State, DoD, or think-tank contractors on top of a local culture.

Yet, at this time commanders have no situation-specific tools to enable them to implement the institutional, physical, and capital infrastructures necessary for economic empowerment of the indigenous population. Such tool kits are necessary to provide the "exactly what" for mission success.

Step 3. Economic Stabilization Tasks: Institutional Infrastructure.

Economic empowerment of an indigenous private sector cannot occur without a modicum of basic institutional infrastructure—the institutional equivalent of physical infrastructure essential services such as potable water and sewerage, roads, electricity, etc. Terrorist violence, anarchy, criminal groups, extortionists, corrupt government operatives, dysfunctional and/or incompetent government, and other failed elements of society have become so acute in failed states as to have disrupted or corrupted the basic institutional infrastructures of civil society. It is this collapse of basic institutional infrastructure that causes many people in the mission area to become indifferent to or supportive of violent actions against lawful authority.

Rule of Law Tasks. Stabilization elements of an E² mission must include measures to restore the basic exercise of a just rule of law in which ordinary people can seek redress of their grievances and address personal/commercial relationships through institutions of civil society. Local authority must be possessed of competent tools if it is to have a functional legitimacy. This suggests that an E² mission must include provision for the following kinds of basic-level tools for a local government to exercise legitimate, just authority:

- Identify, secure and **safeguard existing crucial information** and documents – court documents, criminal records, land deeds, government regulations, tax records, etc.
- Local **criminal code** – “in a box.”
- Local **civil/commercial codes** – “in a box.”
- Local **criminal courts** to provide swift administration of justice – “in a box.”

- Local **civil courts** to provide prompt resolution of personal disputes and for the registration of contracts and other civil society documents—“in a box.”
- Local **jails** to incarcerate persons found guilty in lawful proceedings. These can be configured in advance and provided, literally, “in a box.”
- Local **sheriffs or judicial police** (armed officers of the courts to serve papers and enforce court rulings) to support a judicial system independent of other policy and government activity.
- Local **police and constabulary forces** to provide security for the public.
- Robust efforts to **remove corrupt officials**.
- **Anti-monopoly statutes and codes**—“in a box”—to allow new enterprises to leap-frog over ossified statutes and institutions (for instance, preexisting statutes may prohibit competition for state monopolies in electricity, water, schooling, medical services, etc.)

Confirmation of Property Titles and Ownership Tasks. Most failed states are disinterested in or incapable of protecting their citizens’ rights in real or personal property. This is inherently destabilizing as people will seek on their own to protect what they have built, earned, saved, stored, etc., through vigilante means or through hiding their activity in ways that are not conducive to general economic growth and sound civil society.

Confirmation of established property use or ownership rights through courts with the registration of titles, deeds, mortgages, liens, personal property security interests, and other instruments of ownership and contractual arrangement are fundamental essen-

tials to the stabilization of civil society. It must be accomplished under the banner of a legitimate government that confirms citizens' personal identity in law and in ownership and in use of what is properly theirs.

Establishing property security is actually more about adjudicating conflicting claims than it is merely registering titles. This suggests that an E² mission must include the following kinds of basic tools for a local government to confirm and protect property rights:

- **Secure existing property records.**
- **Property Occupancy and Registration forms** – "in a box."
- **Property Title and Deed forms** – "in a box."
- **Property transaction (sale, lease, rental, etc.) forms** – "in a box."
- **Contracts Registration forms** – "in a box."
- **Donkey/Camel/Motor Vehicle Registration forms, etc.** – "in a box."

Codification of Provisional Basic Civil Society Legitimacy Tasks. Beyond basic property-use certifications and rights, additional civil society stabilization tasks are important in establishing the legitimacy of a SO/SSTR mission in the minds of the host population.

Commanders need to know and understand what specific civil society tasks will be necessary to protect and empower individuals and private voluntary organizations from authoritarian government and the tyranny of petty bureaucrats or violent actors of all sorts. This suggests that an E² mission must include the following kinds of basic tools for a provisional local governing authority to confirm and protect the free exercise of lawful community-based individuals and organizations:

- **Local Codification of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights** as a new local covenant for personal liberty.
- **Personal identity in law** to codify the standing for each individual to have his or her access to rule of law infrastructure.
- Establish a useful mix of **local “Citizen Associations”** to listen and to communicate about local problems and needs to fulfill basic concepts of government by the consent of the governed.
- **Provide existing or new business** with commercial financing and technical assistance to improve their operations, modern management skills, and their commerce associations, providing them training tools to help them learn how to be effective in destabilized environments.
- Establish **communications/public affairs capabilities** to quickly counter negative media reporting and enemy propaganda.
- Establish **working relationships with local mayors, councils and other authorities**. Assist them in developing and leveraging funding for local infrastructure projects such as streets, roads, water, sewerage, etc.

Step 4. Stabilization Tasks: Essential Services Physical Infrastructure.

Many of the following types of essential services physical infrastructure can be carried out as local government projects and yet can include significant commercial venture elements. It is a mistake to think of these “reconstruction” elements as exclusively or entirely in the realm of “public works” projects owned and operated by national or even local governments.

The unique opportunity and compelling need is exactly how to mobilize and support a self-sustaining entrepreneurial private sector to carry out as much of these kinds of activities as possible.

The following list represents the Civil Support Lines of Operation in relative order of significance. However, concurrent projects in as many of the following areas as possible need to be undertaken when feasible.

- Potable water supply, properly scaled to conditions;
- Sewerage, sanitation and waste management, properly scaled;
- Shelter and housing;
- Food marketing, distribution, and production;
- Electricity production and distribution, including fuel;
- Transportation;
- Communications;
- Basic health and medical clinic services;
- Police and fire;
- Schools;
- Commercial and service enterprises to support and sustain economic activity.

When leveraged with private entrepreneurship whenever possible, government-based infrastructure projects can encourage indigenous entrepreneurial activity for enterprise and job creation.

Indeed, properly scaling basic infrastructure projects in both urban and rural areas to provide for opportunities for entrepreneurial enterprise creation for this kind of physical infrastructure is a fundamental strategy. The participation of local leaders and entrepreneurs in the design, construction, operation, maintenance, marketing, distribution, and

protection of key infrastructure they own is essential to enterprise development, job creation, economic empowerment and growth in a highly unstable and violent environment.

It is a big mistake to spend enormous sums of money to build large-scale government-run infrastructure projects in highly destabilized regions. Such projects are virtually impossible to protect from violence. Most failed or failing states lack the capability and suffer much bureaucratic ossification, outright corruption or other dysfunctional characteristics that render it foolish to assume that they can or will properly sustain large projects.

For these reasons, the Department of State Co-ordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), in its Essential Task Matrix, posits the use of public-private partnerships (PPP) as part of what it calls the “fostering sustainability” phase of economic stabilization activities. This includes establishing public works programs and providing government assistance and security to promote initial or continued employment to address immediate needs. Such measures may have short-term utility and may be useful as bridges in the transition to a market-based, free enterprise economy, but such steps are no substitute for real, sustainable economic growth and development.

Examples of specific measures that commanders can use to incorporate entrepreneurial job creation enterprises into essential services infrastructure include the following:

1. **Potable water wells and treatment systems** can be pre-designed or existing plants can be repaired and modified to have features scaled to provide small wells, small-scale water treatment for service vendors to sell and deliver locally produced clean water to

homes and businesses. Other small-scale water well and purification systems are available to be established as private or quasi-public entities to develop and sell water. “Potable Water Treatment in a Box” should be part of the E² mission planning.

2. **Sewerage plants** can be designed or modified to have features scaled to be depositories for sani-john/septic system/honey-pot service companies, both urban and rural. “Sewerage in a Box” should be part of the E² mission planning.

3. **Landfills** can be modified to have features scaled to be depositories for small-scale trash collectors/sorters/recyclers. “Trash Collection in a Box” should be part of the E² mission planning.

4. **Financial service technology centers/incubators** can be established to provide communications and business services to a range of small banks, micro-lenders, cooperatives, remittance firms, small business services (faxes, internet, etc.), check-cashing, etc. Astounding developments in transactional software and internet-worked technology make it possible for even the poorest of the poor to engage in modern financial services and business skill-building. Commanders have an obligation to know how these powerful tools can be used effectively to empower enterprise development and entrepreneurship in their areas of operations and should have these kinds of tools in their kit.

5. **Technical schools** are needed to train entrepreneurs in basic skills and in the operation of small enterprises to provide services to businesses that would enable them to properly maintain equipment. Training for specific purposes – not in the abstract – is the imperative.

6. **Agriculture extension service centers** can be established to provide training, demonstration,

and technology for small-scale irrigation and low-input farming practices that can provide livelihoods and income to hundreds of thousands of small farm families, even in urban areas on small plots. Succulent foodstuffs—melons, squashes, beans, coniferous vegetables, maize, etc., all based on the widely replicated indigenous Mexican *milpa* subsistence agricultural system—can do much to provide sanitary hydration, carbohydrates, fats, and proteins to the populace. The employment, wealth creation, and quality of life benefits of robust small-scale, low-input food systems are among the most significant activities that can be undertaken anywhere.

- “Ag Extension Center (mission specific) in a Box,”
- “*Milpa* in a Box.”

7. **Energy generation and distribution businesses** could utilize small-scale traditional generators or new technology solar, photo-voltaic and wind mills to create and distribute electric power in communities. “Energy and Electricity in a Box” should be part of E² mission planning. The literature on the practical efficacy of these emerging technologies is extensive.

8. **High-technology, low cost housing**, and construction materials suitable for undeveloped countries can offer new business opportunities for entrepreneurs in E² mission regions. The literature on the practical efficacy of these emerging technologies is extensive. The Mexican firm CEMEX developed a wildly popular “Patrimonio Hoy” program of savings clubs oriented to assist aspiring home builders with financing, technical skills, and suitable materials. The program is growing at 250 percent per year and expects to enroll one million Mexican families by the year 2010.

Essential tools to make these kinds of projects practical for SO/SSTR regions include these prerequisite tools:

- “Housing In A Box,”
- “Mortgages In A Box,”
- “Patrimonio Hoy In A Box.”

Small scale, bottom-up enterprises just like these are being implemented all over the planet in places where governments and crony capitalist/socialist economies shove people aside from more traditional business opportunities. Cornell University Professor of Sustainable Global Enterprise Stuart L. Hart has written extensively about how indigenous people do these things in his book, *Capitalism at the Crossroads: Unlimited Business Opportunities in Solving the World's Most Difficult Problems* (www.amazon.com/s/ref=nb_ss_gw/102-2230676-6974553?initialSearch=1&url=search-alias%3Daps&field-keywords=Capitalism+at+the+Crossroads&Go.x=4&Go.y=8). Another website that provides a smorgasbord of sustainable small enterprise technologies specifically designed for the Third World is [\other90.cooperhewitt.org/about](http://other90.cooperhewitt.org/about). The World Bank website for micro-enterprise that provides information on different cutting edge technologies now being placed into the hands of people at the bottom of the pyramid can be found at www.cgap.org/portal/site/cgap/.

Millions of uneducated, illiterate, ignorant (but by no means stupid) people have proven that they can figure out how to leap-frog over ossified institutions of government and crony capitalism and do the work of job creation and economic development. Hundreds of millions of people are doing just this all across the globe, under the radar screen (hence, the term “informal economy”). Currently about 800 million people live in the formal economy. Another 1.4 billion people are in

the active informal economy. Another 5 billion people ache every day to get active. Our commanders, so equipped, would be greatly empowered vis-à-vis the bad guys.

There are some 100,000 microfinance and SME financial institutions all over the globe that are providing capital to millions of small-scale, self-sustaining business. But they are NOT projects. They are living business enterprises—some, maybe most, fail on the first, second, and third tries, but they keep on trying and they eventually get it on their own. And of course, many do survive without failure and create previously unimaginable economic opportunity for themselves, their families, and their employees.

Without any tools whatsoever, empirical evidence is that commanders will turn to “top-down” ad hoc “projects” that do not work, because the projects are not sustainable in failed states, as in Iraq.

IRAQ SIDEBAR: If the \$13+ billion in U.S. funds spent for the Iraq Relief and reconstruction Fund (IRRF) infrastructure projects in Iraq had been used in great measure to leverage bottom-up entrepreneurship by direct business-to-business support in conjunction with complementary support to local municipal governments, several tens of billions of dollars worth of sustainable economic activity and basic services community assets would be the legacy. Much alone could have been accomplished through deposits in local private banks, combined with appropriate technical assistance programs to upgrade their capabilities and internal controls to help the local bankers prudently and professionally deploy their enhanced capital through the local private sector.

In Iraq, lack of authority and money to engage and invest in the private sector was a major shortcoming.

Loan and microfinance programs were difficult to establish, reducing their potential to impact the area coupled with other redevelopment projects. This lack of authority resulted in too many missed opportunities to count.

Loan capital extended to indigenous business enterprises, using sound credit policies and loan administration based on local bankers' intimate knowledge of local persons and conditions, could have launched thousands of basic services enterprises. Instead, hundreds of unsustainable and therefore potentially worthless projects – built for and intended to be operated by national government agencies – are nearing completion.

Many well-intended U.S. Government officials, including military officers, approached the basic services element of the SO/SSTR mission in Iraq as activities that are, and by rights ought to be, the exclusive functions of the national government. It seems to never have occurred to these officials that the Soviet/National Socialist-model government in place in Iraq has never worked anywhere, even with Gulags and Gestapos. Central Intelligence Agency Director Michael Hayden has said: "We have placed all of our energies in creating the center, and the center cannot accomplish anything." Fortunately, the directives and doctrines are now in place that should assure that such incredible errors of judgment and lack of understanding of how the world works are not repeated elsewhere.

According to combat officers, the principal lesson for SO/SSTR missions from Iraq is the flaw with the general U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) contracting model. There was too much reliance on third party contractors that too often provided insufficient and/or flawed data that did not match the

reality being observed by maneuver elements on the ground. Some combat officers have recommend that in prospective SO/SSTR missions, their commands either have a USACE Liaison Office assigned to each brigade or, alternatively, the maneuver elements should include Civil Affairs teams to conduct the daily project management and liaison with indigenous enterprises on their own authority. The Iraq experience was that the government project approach to economic development resulted in reliance upon many third party contractors who proved unreliable and were often corrupted by local officials and contractors. However, in Tal' Afar a USACE liaison officer, attached to the maneuver brigade, gave advice to the Commander and worked closely with the attached Civil Affairs Teams to manage projects and train the Iraqis in their construction, operation, and maintenance. Field commanders reported that this worked well. However, because of the complexities of finance and accounting, they recommend that for prospective missions each maneuver brigade be given a full-time Finance and Comptroller officer to manage contract payments and other deployment of funds so as to prevent problems with clearing and drawing money, and deconflicting issues with contracts that are awarded by either USACE or other SO/SSTR elements.

Step 5. Capital Infrastructure to Fuel Enterprise Creation: The Vital Role of Private Banking and Financial Services.

Without exception, sustainable job creation requires that entrepreneurs have access to professionally supervised risk capital in the form of equity investments and loans – even at the smallest scale.

In most E² mission areas, the financial management of the countries is likely to be dysfunctional and the banking systems are likely to be government dominated, and generally inaccessible to all but those politically-connected to the failed regime. Moreover, most existing financial institutions likely will lack the skills to make and manage equity investments in private businesses and will not possess state-of-the-art transaction systems and other basic capabilities to carry out effective cash-flow analysis in support of prudent lending practices. Overcoming these constraints is imperative for an SO/SSTR E² mission.

We now know, for instance, that policymakers failed to anticipate the need for a modern, functioning banking system in Iraq. The Government Accountability Office has found that every month large numbers of Iraqi soldiers and police temporarily abandon their units to carry cash home to their families because they have no way to deposit their salaries in bank accounts or to electronically transfer funds to accounts in their home villages or neighborhoods. This simple-to-resolve absence of basic payments and financial transaction services has proven to be a significant negative constraint on the success of the U.S. mission in Iraq. In just a few months' time, state-of-the-art payments, banking, and other transactional software can be deployed anywhere at relatively low cost so that this kind of serious dysfunction is utterly unnecessary.

It is worth repeating that a capital-empowered private sector will leap-frog over failed institutions and ossified structures to rebuild, or adapt, or shut down, or recreate, or create anew the kinds of sustainable business opportunities that will best serve their customers in a transitional environment. No government entity can adapt as quickly or as

effectively to changing circumstances as can a private sector enterprise. Professionally deployed risk capital is the closest thing one can get to a “silver bullet” for counterinsurgency missions and economic progress.

Do No Harm and other Pre-Mission Financial Prerequisites. Policies of the U.S. Departments of Treasury, State, Homeland Security, Commerce, and Defense as well as the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the host government that impose unintended adverse consequences that harm private deployment of capital, including banking, job creation, entrepreneurship, and economic growth, are legion. Such constraints need to be pre-identified for modification at the outset of an E² mission and addressed beforehand.

The prospect of unintended harmful effects arising from existing general policies even extends to current Army doctrine. For instance, the new (September 2006) U.S. Army FM 3-05.40, *Civil Affairs Operations*, seems to completely disregard the importance of private sector development. Incredibly, its sole specific guidance to commanders for economic stability is for Army Civil Affairs units to reach back to failed practices of the Nixon and Carter administrations to impose price and commodity controls, establish rationing programs (apparently to deal with shortages caused by price controls), and efforts to stamp out smuggling (which of course would be a consequence of the first two perverse actions). Correction of this kind of harmful and insurgency-inducing direction to soldiers is an urgent need.

- *Country-specific identification of harmful coalition policies.* It is imperative that each SO/SSTR mission specifically identify those country-specific

policies and practices that require modification in U.S. Government or other coalition policies for a SO/SSTR mission to be successful.

- *Patriot Act regulation review.* Until recently no U.S. bank had a correspondent relationship with an Iraqi bank. Officers of U.S. banks report that they believe the risks of criminal prosecution make it prohibitive for them or their customers to engage in financial business in Iraq. This is likely to affect SO/SSTR missions worldwide. These regulations must be reviewed and made compatible with effective SO/SSTR missions.
- *Remove U.S. Government funds restrictions that empower private business activity.* Current U.S. Government policies appear to restrict the use of the U.S. military (Title 10) and civilian foreign assistance (Title 22) funds only to directly benefit governments and government enterprises, and prohibit the use of U.S. Government funds to assist or leverage private investment. Such restrictions in law and regulation by the U.S. Government and other governments providing assistance are counterproductive and need to be changed now. Experience shows that it is the private sector operating with risk capital, deposited in banks or other financial entities, that make the most efficient use of capital resources. Correcting this policy dysfunction to allow for greater flexibility is an urgent imperative.
- *“OPIC in a Box.”* Advance provision for OPIC international trade arrangements with U.S. firms that are interested in trade and other ventures in mission areas which require political risk insurance and project financing is essential.
- *“Enterprise Funds in a Box.”* Pre-authorized and funded Enterprise Fund capital pools that have

proven so successful in transitioning former Soviet economies to establish specialized financial institutions and build robust private enterprises through direct equity investments, loans and the hands-on advice and counsel that experienced investment professionals can provide must be available.

Empower Private Banks with Capital. Private banks are important because they provide indigenous, professional deployment of risk capital. Private banks will undertake the due diligence for their own loan portfolios – they will not risk deposit capital with incompetent or risky business borrowers. They will serve as the conduit for bringing indigenous capital into the marketplace for investment and job creation.

- Diminish host government competition with private capital formation. Focus on sun-setting special privileges for state-owned banks that discourage indigenous private banks and the major international banks from pursuing policies to expand the private sector banking system, especially branches in the provinces.
- Government deposits. Task the host government to adopt a policy of making deposits in private banks based upon sound principles of securing collateral support of such deposits; for example, pledging capital and other qualified assets as one-for-one collateral supporting government deposits.
- Assist the private banks to increase capital by offering incentives which motivate both stockholders and potential domestic and foreign investors. These include programs for the World

Bank, the International Finance Corporation (IFC), and others to use creative forms of capital such as Trust Preferred Securities or similar instruments to increase risk capital of private banks. Host government, U.S. Government, and other donor nations or entities can deposit funds in private banks to manage payments to contractors, which will result in a capital capacity sufficient for small business enterprises to compete for contracted work.

Banking Systems Tools Tasks. Private banks in E² mission areas often operate as elements of family associations, tribes, parishes, etc. and often have access to significant amounts of hidden or “dead” indigenous capital. A vast array of new banking and transactional software makes it entirely practical to develop financial services for highly unstable regions. “Smart card” systems based on cellular telephone technology, bank customer “scoring” systems, and advanced “remittance” systems are just a few of the new break-through technologies that are increasingly commonplace in the Third World. The World Bank Consultative Group to Assist the Poorest, in conjunction with the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, is currently sponsoring a major project to more broadly test these new innovations (www.cgap.org/portal/site/Technology/menuitem.44afc13a9096bebe1519d010591010a0/). Here follow a number of E² mission tasks that are necessary to strengthen and empower the flow of private capital in mission areas:

- “Banking Regulation in a Box.” Basic banking regulations based on generally accepted banking practices need to be developed as part of banking templates.

- “Electronic Transactions in a Box.” The state of art in wireless-based financial transactions is well advanced and can be implemented quickly and cheaply anywhere on the planet. Every citizen, every business, and even every government agency can become connected to digitized account management and other banking services at very low cost. Security of assets and ease and utter reliability of transfer of “funds” (i.e., account deposits, credits, and debits) is easy-to-accomplish infrastructure that should be “set up and ready to go” for every prospective mission area.
- Microfinance and Small and Medium Enterprise (SME) Accelerators—use private entities instead of government bureaucracies, state-owned banks, or private cartels that will end up failing because of cronyism and forgiveness of debts to curry political favor or corrupt practices. Private, at-risk loan portfolio managers will need technical assistance and possibly investment funding by competent, commercially-oriented entities to help them develop the skills to operate in this important financial niche.
- Training Tasks: Find, train and assist a cadre of host country nationals who can execute fiscal systems such as budgets, obligation of funds, capital accounts, cash flow projections, and replacement of “run it until it breaks mentality” with a preventive maintenance culture.
- Establishing correspondent banking relationships between private banks and U.S. and coalition partner banks is necessary to facilitate international trade. When Iraq bank licenses were offered in November 2003, not one American

bank asked for an information package nor applied for a license. It was not until mid-2007 that an American bank established a correspondent bank relationship with an Iraq-owned or based private bank.

CONCLUSION AND SUMMARY OF KEY FINDINGS

1. E² missions are key elements to be included in a holistic system of activities involving security, stabilization, transition, reconstruction, and counter-insurgency principles, policy, plans, programs, and activities.

2. E² mission tasks are best laid out in five steps:

- Step 1: Establish fundamental principles to guide policy.
- Step 2: Intelligence and Took Kit imperatives.
- Step 3: Institutional infrastructure.
- Step 4: Physical infrastructure.
- Step 5: Capital infrastructure to fuel enterprise creation.

3. E² missions must include robust involvement of host country business people, driven by practical principles supportive of indigenous private sector enterprise development, all carefully coordinated with essential military doctrine and activities.

4. Access to risk capital, other resources, and supportive institutional and physical infrastructure are the most effective tools for empowering—actually unleashing—indigenous private sector growth from which economic opportunity, enterprise development, job creation, and stability arise.

5. Many specific tasks for successful E² missions can be preplanned and prepackaged as “in a box” prior to a mission, insofar as each tool is informed by both overt and covert intelligence developed well in advance of any prospective mission.

6. Combatant commands and other organizations that require non-organic assets to accomplish the planning and execution tasks suggested by SO/SSTR E² missions should begin organizing and budgeting to provision their forces for such contracting now.

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PANEL 4

CHALLENGES OF ACTUALITY

Inasmuch as the U.S. military is currently engaged in stabilization and state-building operations, it seemed appropriate to have the challenges arising in these operations explained to the colloquium participants so these challenges could be examined, both on the spot and retroactively, by the colloquium participants in the light of the theoretical aspects already introduced. Major General Jeffrey Schloesser, Commanding General of the 101st Airborne (Air Assault) Division provided a concluding commentary for the colloquium participants only.

Tailoring a U.S. Embassy for Stability and Reconstruction Operations¹

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Introduction.

As a result of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11), the United States has adopted a more forward security stance. Because of this, U.S. embassies throughout the world are required to spearhead interagency, intergovernmental and sometimes multinational security efforts in support of the U.S. National Security Strategy and the strategies of our international partners. This requires a U.S. country team that is able to focus the efforts of all U.S. Government organizations to achieve the synergies needed to defeat our enemies. As such, we need to ensure that the U.S. Embassy is organized appropriately and capable of

running operations along a spectrum of conflict from 'normal' or peaceful circumstances to all-out conflict like Iraq. The embassy must be able to organize for war.

Modern Challenges.

The modern global milieu is fraught with challenges. In the post-Cold War era, opponents of globalization and the perceived hegemony of the developed countries have attacked not only developed countries but also our partners throughout the world.

Our opponents seek to use asymmetric means to attack us. Asymmetric approaches are the only way that they can attack us and survive due to the overwhelming conventional capability present in the modern developed state. They seek to undermine our credibility and our political will. Rather than overthrowing governments and replacing them, modern opposition groups use terrorist techniques to gain their political goals, which usually center on gaining the space to do what they will, whether making money like the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias Colombianas (FARC) in Colombia or seeking room to organize and build weapons like al-Qaeda.

Modern Approaches.

Modern challenges require modern approaches. It is no longer sufficient to unleash the might of the U.S. Armed Forces on the opposition. In modern warfare, use of military force is often counterproductive.² Even when the military is used, it is used as a part of a Joint/ Interagency/ Intergovernmental/ Multinational (JIIM) team. The U.S. part of the JIIM team is known as the interagency.

The interagency is a colloquial term for the collection of U.S. Government agencies. With the burgeoning challenges of the 21st century, an approach that only uses one or two agencies will be overwhelmed by the opposition. Therefore, the U.S. Government seeks synergies by mobilizing the resources of the entire government. This team can be very flexible and bring a wide variety of resources and capabilities to the table. On the other hand, it can be hidebound, hierarchical and shot through with rivalries. The first team described is the one that everyone wants to work with. The second is the team that we usually end up in.

Department of Defense.

The Department of Defense is organized with a series of headquarters in the Pentagon and forces in the field. Located in the Pentagon is the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, which serves the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and four service staffs—the Army Staff, the Marine Staff, the Navy Staff and the Air Staff, who serve the Secretaries of the Army, Navy and Air Force, as well as the four Service Chiefs in their missions to train and equip the forces. Ten Combatant Commanders are responsible for regional and functional areas around the world. The Geographic Combatant Commanders are responsible for forces deployed into their Areas of Responsibility. These are Northern Command (North America), Southern Command (Latin America and the Caribbean), European Command (Europe, Russia and Israel), Africa Command, Central Command (the Near East and Central Asia), and Pacific Command (as far west as Pakistan and the Indian Ocean). These commands are not aligned along the same lines as the Regional Bureaus within the State Department.

Each of these commands has their own Army, Marine Corps, Navy, Air and Special Operations component commands. The functional Combatant Commanders, who have global responsibilities, are Strategic Command, Joint Forces Command, Transportation Command, and Special Operations Command.³

Combatant Commanders have recently added an interagency capability within the command. Each of them has formed a Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG), which provides an interagency coordination capability. Although this does not give the interagency an operational-level capability, it is an admission that the interagency needs to have capabilities that parallel those of the Department of Defense.

Department of State.

The Department of State is organized with a headquarters at Main State in Washington, DC, with embassies and consulates throughout the world. Main State is organized along both regional and functional lines. There are six Under Secretaries of State who are in charge of Political Affairs, Economic Business and Agricultural Affairs, Arms Control and International Security Affairs, Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, Management, and Democracy and Global Affairs.

The Under Secretary for Political Affairs has eight Assistant Secretaries: six have Regional Bureaus that manage affairs in the different parts of the world. The other two include International Organizations and International Narcotics and Law Enforcement.⁴

The United States has 260 diplomatic and consular posts in 163 countries.⁵ The mission of the Department of State is to:

Advance freedom for the benefit of the American people and the international community by helping to build and sustain a more democratic, secure, and prosperous world composed of well-governed states that respond to the needs of their people, reduce widespread poverty, and act responsibly within the international system.⁶

In order to perform this mission, the State Department will “strengthen the capability of the U.S. Government and of international partners to prevent or mitigate, conflate, stabilize countries in crisis, promote regional stability, protect civilians, and promote just application of government and law.”⁷

The State Department does not have an operational-level capability that would match the capability of the Combatant Commanders. Each regional bureau executes these functions. The regional bureaus have to perform the functions that are performed by the regional offices in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the regional Deputy Directorates within the Joint Staff J5, and by the Combatant Commanders. This imbalance of capabilities puts the State Department at a significant disadvantage at the policy, strategic and operational levels where DoD has quite robust capabilities.

The head of each embassy is the Chief of Mission (COM). Usually the COM is the Ambassador; in the absence of the Ambassador the Chief of Mission is a designated Chargé d’Affaires. Although there are several other titles, this person is the senior U.S. Government official in the country and is the personal representative of the President of the United States. The various agencies within an embassy are called the Country Team. The head of the country team is the Chief of Mission.

Strategic Guidance.

Given the importance of this issue, there is a surprising lack of guidance on this subject. An examination of strategic level policy documents shows that many people do not conceptualize the importance of our overseas operations.

The National Security Strategy 2006 has an entire chapter on the interagency. It addresses the need to continue “to reorient the Department of State towards transformational diplomacy”⁸ but does not talk about country teams. It does address the need for “improving our capability to plan for and respond to post-conflict and failed-state situations.”⁹

The National Defense Strategy 2005 talks about partnerships, both international and domestic. Again, it does not address the country team, but does assert that:

The (State) Department is cooperating with this new office to increase the capacity of interagency and international partners to perform non-military stabilization and reconstruction tasks that might otherwise often become military responsibilities by default....to that end, the (Defense) Department will work with interagency and international partners to improve our ability to transition from military-to civilian-led stability operations.¹⁰

The National Military Strategy 2004 addresses the formation of the JIACGs mentioned above, but does not address the Department of State.¹¹ The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism 2003 provides some guidance on three goals that call for effort by the U.S. Embassy. They are “Deny sponsorship, support, and sanctuary to terrorists,”¹² “Diminish the underlying conditions that terrorists seek to exploit,”¹³

and “Defend U.S. citizens and interests at home and abroad.”¹⁴ The description of these goals does not identify what U.S. agencies have responsibility for them; however, upon close reading it is obvious that the State Department has the lead for many of the objectives.

The Quadrennial Defense Review Report 2006 dedicates an entire chapter to “Achieving Unity of Effort,”¹⁵ which emphasizes both domestic and international operations. It recommends “the creation of National Security Planning Guidance to direct the development of both military and non-military plans and institutional capabilities.”¹⁶ It also discusses the country team, saying that “for most other (i.e. non-DoD) agencies, the U.S. Chief of Mission in a specific country, leading an interagency Country Team, has an important field leadership role. Creating opportunities to help enable Combatant Commanders to work more collaboratively with Chiefs of Mission is one objective.”¹⁷ It also says that the Department of Defense will:

Support broader Presidential authorities to redirect resources and task the best-situated agencies to respond, recognizing that other government agencies may be best suited to provide necessary support in overseas emergencies. This new authority would enable the U.S. Government to capitalize on inherent competencies of individual agencies to tailor a more effective immediate response.¹⁸

These two statements contain a paradox that bedevils interagency planning and operations. Although the second statement seems to indicate that the State Department and other agencies might be better suited to lead certain types of operations, the first statement

clearly indicates that the Department of Defense considers that DoD assets are not subordinate to the Chief of Mission. This bifurcated attitude has caused significant problems with a lack of unity of effort in both Vietnam and Iraq.

As one could expect, the Department of State Strategic Plan 2007-2012¹⁹ addresses many aspects that refer to the country team. It addresses the need for transformational diplomacy and addresses cooperation with other agencies. It identifies the Departments of Homeland Security and Defense as “key U.S. Government partners with whom we will coordinate.”²⁰ Unlike Defense products that obliquely refer to the other Departments, this plan overtly articulates the need for cooperation with other departments by name, stating that:

(The Department of) Defense coordinates closely on counterterrorism and counter-narcotics programs, and provides the military-to-military contacts, assistance, and training that strengthen military and alliance relationships, plays an important role in the management of arms transfers and the Excess Defense Articles program, and supports the evacuation of non-combatants from crisis or disaster sites. Defense sponsors significant cooperative threat reduction programs and supports the Proliferation Security Initiative. Defense leads in providing security support, when needed, for stabilization and reconstruction activities and participates in government-wide stabilization and reconstruction planning and operations with other agencies.²¹

State also acknowledges that the country team needs to be reorganized. Indeed one of their seven strategic goals is highlighted in the section, “Strengthening Consular and Management Capabilities.”²²

Unfortunately, their strategic plan addresses consular and management functions but not the need to strengthen the country team, as exemplified by their strategic priorities in this section: visa services, passport/American citizen services, human resources, information technology, security, facilities, planning and accountability, administrative services, rightsizing/regionalization, and the Office of Inspector General.²³

We can see, therefore, that the policy-level documentation talks about the interagency, but actually provides little guidance. This makes it very difficult for people seeking to improve the situation in what is one of the most important manifestations of U.S. forward presence.

Strategic and Operational Challenges.

In the 21st century, there are a series of specific challenges that an embassy faces. During large-scale operations, these are particularly important. These challenges include the size of operations of different departments, an imbalance in the elements of national power, cultural and size issues between departments, personalities, the need for additional capabilities during contingency operations, the span of control, unity of effort, lack of doctrine, lack of guidance, and the ability to assess operations.

The sheer size of operations in the modern world can be difficult to handle. Although some military operations in countries in Latin America and Africa can consist of only a few military people working with the host nation, in Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq, the size of deployments can overwhelm embassies. There are currently 160,000 U.S. troops on the ground in Iraq. The U.S. Embassy there employs over 1,000 people.

These types of operations require a robust capability that many agencies, including the State Department, have trouble handling.

This is reflected in the imbalance in the elements of national power. Regardless of whichever conceptual construct for elements of national power one uses, it is obvious that the military is only one of many aspects in any given operation. Other agencies must be able to address the other requirements of current operations. Currently operations tend to be quite imbalanced towards the military. They must become balanced by strengthening the other elements before we can return to normal operations there.

Cultural and size issues are very important as well. The entire State Department is smaller than a U.S. Army mechanized division. No State Department planning community nor think tank performs policy-level deep thinking. Very little reach-back capability exists. What does exist is located in the regional bureaus. But the State Department is not the only agency with cultural foibles. The Defense Department is a huge, unwieldy organization that lacks flexibility. Because Defense has so many assets, it tends to throw more at problems rather than seeking different routes or non traditional approaches. Although some would say that State lacks doctrine, they would also say that Defense is hobbled by excessive dependence on doctrine. Seeking to impose a conventional solution on Iraq in the early 2000s is a very good example of this. Another example of cultural problems is the attitude that Defense personnel tend to have towards others, mainly due to a lack of understanding of cultural differences. In the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad, many field grade officers treat interagency and coalition partners with contempt bordering on disdain.

Personalities have a huge impact on operations forward. There is a spectrum from bad relations between Lieutenant General Sanchez and Ambassador Bremer to a better relationship between General Casey and Ambassador Kalilizhad to the other end of the spectrum with the current relationship between General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker.

During a contingency operation, there is a need for additional capability within an embassy. The non-military aspects of these U.S. efforts must be handled by someone. In Vietnam the U.S. Government created the Civil Operations and Rural (or Revolutionary) Development Support (CORDS); in Afghanistan, both the U.S. and international efforts have created Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) which assist the Afghan government in development efforts. In Iraq, the U.S. Government developed the Iraq Reconstruction Management Office (IRMO) to provide oversight on the \$20 billion provided by Congress in support of Iraq reconstruction. As this money was expended, IRMO changed to the Iraq Transition Assistance Office (ITAO) which concentrates on capacity-building at the national level in Iraq. Another organization created in Iraq is the Office of Provincial Affairs (OPA) which supervises the efforts of PRTs as well as capacity-building in at the provincial and municipal levels.

Unity of effort is another aspect that must be addressed during these operations. As previously mentioned, the Chief of Mission is the senior U.S. Government official in a country and is the personal representative of the President of the United States.

There can be three types of relations in a country. The COM can be in charge, the military can be in charge, or they can each be in charge of their own areas. The first example is the most ubiquitous. It is the

international norm. It is also how we have executed operations in countries like El Salvador in the 1980s and Colombia today. The second example is quite rare. It applies in places where the military obviously needs to be in charge, such as Germany and Japan at the end of WWII. The third example is fairly rare but has been used twice recently: Vietnam and Iraq. Each provides a lesson in what happens when we have a lack of unity of effort.

The U.S. Government has faced these challenges over the years in trying to plan and execute interagency operations overseas. It is impossible to develop a comprehensive list of difficulties as each agency, each country and each situation presents its own challenges. However, these issues illustrate the difficulties faced by U.S. officials on the ground.

Recommendations.

To resolve these problems, the government must address a wide variety of issues: embassy structure; education; selection of leaders; cultural issues; reach-back of strategic planning capability; and the need to achieve legitimacy for both U.S. presence and local government.

Changes will require two major shifts in the way that the State Department does things. First, State needs to establish a personnel account that allows for a “float” capability, similar to the U.S. Army “Trainee, Transient, Holdee, and Student” (TTHS) account. That would allow the State Department to function at full potential while simultaneously training and educating its personnel.

The second major shift will have to be in the relationship between State and Congress. These changes will require significant resources, all of which will have to come from Congress. State should revamp its ability to communicate its agenda to Congress. The premier government organization that generally has the greatest success in communicating with Congress is the United States Marine Corps. State should examine how the Marine Corps develops and executes its plan and adopt the best practices that can apply.

Conclusion.

The United States is challenged at the beginning of the 21st century. Our opponents are ruthless, flexible groups who seek to use asymmetric means to delegitimize U.S. efforts around the world. Only by creating synergies through the focused use of the interagency can the United States hope to prevail. This will require providing policy-level guidance, resources to improve interagency capabilities, and a flexible, rational approach to designing country teams.

ENDNOTES - Panel 4, Crowther

1. Originally published as "The Embassy at War" in *Campaigning*, The Journal of the Joint and Combined Warfighting School, Summer 2008, pp. 43-50.

2. See Rupert Smith, *The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World*, New York: Knopf, 2007, for a more detailed analysis.

3. See www.defenselink.mil/pubs/dod101/.

4. Department of State Home Page at www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/rls/dos/99494.htm.

5. U.S. Department of State, "Strategic Plan – Fiscal Years 2007-2012," www.state.gov/documents/organization/86291.pdf, p. 4.

6. *Ibid.*, p. 9.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 12.

8. George W. Bush, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, Washington, DC: The White House, March 2006, p. 44.

9. *Ibid.*

10. *The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America*, March 2005, p. 15.

11. *The National Military Strategy of the United States of America: A Strategy for Today; A Vision for Tomorrow*, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2004, p. 24. Lack of addressing the State Department is appropriate in a military strategy.

12. George W. Bush, *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*, Washington, DC: Executive Office of the President, February 2003, p. 17.

13. *Ibid.*, p. 22.

14. *Ibid.*, p. 24.

15. *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 2006, pp. 83-92.

16. *Ibid.*, p. 85.

17. *Ibid.*

18. *Ibid.*, p. 86.

19. *Strategic Plan Fiscal Years 2007-2012*, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, U.S. Agency for International Development, 2007.

20. *Ibid.*, 16.

21. *Ibid.*

22. *Ibid.*, p. 38.

23. *Ibid.*, pp. 38-42.

Managing Provincial Reconstruction Activities

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The initial duty of statesmen confronted with the task of state-building is to recognize the essence of a client state's sociopolitical system rather than what the state fancies it to be. The political context behind state collapse may differ (e.g., conventional war, insurgency, or even gradual disintegration), but the resultant tendency is a disintegration of centralized governance and often national society.

As defined by William Zartman, a collapsed state is one which can no longer perform the basic functions expected of a sovereign government.¹ The reach of central authority dwindles, law and order break down, domestic legitimacy disappears because the government can no longer provide any socioeconomic services to the citizens, and even national identity becomes a myth. The tribe becomes the center of social cohesion, and citizen allegiance devolves to warlords or tribal chiefs.²

State-building then, according to Zartman, is a matter of reversing the process of collapse: the central government must gain control of its state agents (e.g., military and police forces); government authorities must practice positive politics (e.g., platform, elections, and legislation); the government must make progressive reforms and not avoid difficult problems; the central government must expand its political power base beyond the immediate circle or capital; and the central government must extend its authority throughout the state so that indigenous power brokers and external states do not fill the vacuum.³

However, Zartman's thesis contains two fundamental flaws, which if not acknowledged by practitioners, may lead to false measurements of success and hence the perception of failure when they prove unachievable. First is the assumption of preexisting state sovereignty, suggesting a political entity along the lines of a first or second tier state (i.e., states which have reached a high level of political, economic, and social development and stability). Simply because a state is an internationally recognized political entity does not mean its sovereignty has ever extended to the political borders. The reality is a "state" may be nothing more than a collection of tribal communities functioning autonomously. Second is the assumption that states, especially liberal democracies, can achieve complete sovereignty. The idea that modern states at one time enjoyed *inter alia* inviolable borders, a monopoly on violence, and control of commerce is a romanticization of an ideal. Moreover, the increasing effects of globalization, complex interdependence, and information technology underscore the fragility of sovereignty.⁴ In general, practitioners may attempt to project their conceptualization of sovereignty on a society that has no comparable experience and may compound the misguided approach by creating expectations which are unattainable. Together, these two assumptions may lead practitioners to conclude that the proper approach to state-building is predominantly at the federal level with little or no attention paid to the community level.

Worse, the problems attendant on state-building are compounded in the midst of an insurgency. By their nature, insurgencies attempt to rupture whatever governance exists and exploit the existing fissures in sovereignty, accelerating state collapse. Today's

insurgencies are the antithesis of state-building, disrupting security, basic services, development, and construction. Because it is relatively easier and cheaper to disrupt progress, such a strategy is compatible with insurgency warfare. The irony is the population does not lay the blame on insurgents for the calamity they cause; rather they blame the government for its failure to counter insurgent actions.

In light of this backdrop, state-building requires a dual-track approach, one at the federal-level and the other at the community level. Generally, international focus remains at the federal-level, building political and security institutions, while largely ignoring the community level. In abstract, this amounts to trickle down state-building, with the expectation that security and development will eventually spread to all parts of the country. Admittedly, the federal-level approach is a critical long-term component of state-building, but if the short-term challenges at the community-level are largely ignored, long-term fulfillment may never come to term.⁵

In an attempt to strike a balance in the conduct of state-building, this paper explores the community-level track, arguing that this track has the more positive and enduring impact on society regardless of the political context and security environment, and hence should initially receive the lion's share of effort. In making the case, this paper addresses the critical nature of the community-level, the empowerment of the community, gaining the consent of the governed, and creating self-sufficiency. This approach is state-building via managed decentralization, improving the whole by making the parts prosperous.

Why Community-Level Focus Is Critical.

Congressman Tip O’Neil’s quote that “All politics is local” reflects a truism that individual loyalty is reserved primarily for local leaders and community. This makes sense, especially in countries like Afghanistan, where the family and tribe provide the majority of needs as exemplified from Maslow’s hierarchy of needs.⁶ In this sense, the local community represents the basic building blocks of society regardless of the condition of higher government.

Conversely, populace mistrust or even cognizance of the central government is apparent when one considers the dearth of benefits local communities enjoy from a distant federal authority. Political corruption, incompetence, patronage, tribal or ethnic discrimination, nepotism, limited capacity, and finite resources conspire to deprive small communities of economic assistance, not to mention construction and development initiatives. In short, surfeiting dysfunctional or weak federal governments with large economic packages often serves the purpose of lining pockets rather than aligning loyalties.

Insurgents take full advantage of weak governance, particularly in the outlying regions to establish cells and create networks. Insurgents pursue various ways and means to gain control of the population in their areas of operation. These can range from ideological inspiration, education, and recruitment to terrorism, coercion, and oppression. Whatever works to keep the affected populace within insurgent ranks or acquiescent drives insurgent behavior. What drives the behavior of the populace is self-preservation, as Thomas Hobbes argues in *Leviathan*.⁷ If the government cannot provide security, then the population will acquiesce to the demands of insurgents.

The swiftest way to protect the local communities is to provide them with the means to protect themselves. The use of local militias and police has often proved effective in countering insurgent incursions into population centers. However, experience suggests that deficiencies in training and professionalism may result in the exchange one set of oppressors with another. Haphazard or ad hoc empowerment of local security forces without instilling discipline and values is likely to result in mixed loyalties, corruption, and weak commitment to the communities they are tasked to serve and protect.

Empowering Communities.

The use of coalition cadres to conduct stability operations has the most enduring impact in addressing civil security, civil control, essential services, governance, and economic and infrastructure development at the lowest level, throughout the country.⁸ In effect, the use of cadres reflects the modus operandi of an insurgency in reverse. The use of cadres entails risk, so their insertion should follow in the wake of a military sweep of the area. In high-threat areas, Special Forces cadres are more suited because of their specialized training and independent nature. In low- and medium-threat areas, conventional forces (e.g., military police, civil affairs, etc.) and even policemen (e.g., the 5,000 Police Contingent of the European Union (EU) Rapid Reaction Force) are well-suited. Regardless, the idea is to have a self-defense force established before the insurgents attempt to infiltrate again into population centers.

The cadre's first task is to meet with the local authorities (i.e., chieftain, tribal elders, mayor, etc.) to explain its presence, gain permission to operate,

and establish good rapport. Rapport is especially critical to the cadre's mission since it depends on the authorities' cooperation and protection. If the security situation and logistics permit it, cadres should live in their assigned village. In this case, the cadre rents a safe house with a compound, as well as vetting and hiring safe house security guards. If on the other hand, the security environment is too volatile or the logistical requirements too daunting, cadres will need to commute from a local base in which security and logistical support are assured (e.g, Forward Operating Base [FOB] or Provincial Reconstruction Team [PRT] camp).

In regards to establishing civil security and civil control, the cadre recruits, organizes, equips, trains, and pays the local police force.⁹ The cadre has the essential task of instilling discipline and values in the force as well. Without ethical underpinnings, the police force will likely operate as a rabble and worse, degenerate into an oppressor (i.e., death squads, criminals, or freelancers for power brokers). Cadre-led forces also ameliorate the problems associated with pre-existing local police and auxiliary police forces in terms of mixed loyalties, corruption, and weak commitment to the community they serve and protect.¹⁰ After a period of evaluation and consultation with the local authorities, the cadre selects those personnel with the greatest leadership potential for formal police training.¹¹ Upon their return from training, they assume the leadership positions, permitting the cadre to step back and assume a mentor role.

During the training and evaluation period, cadres must assess the security situation to determine civil control requirements. The taking of a census is an essential step in gaining civil control. The need for

other instruments, such as martial law, curfews, neighborhood watch, and use of checkpoints, need to be weighed as threats wax and wane.

It is quite likely that in a number of cases, sufficient cadre teams may be unavailable for all population centers, particularly in the early post-conflict phase. Hence, a cadre may have responsibility for multiple villages in a district. Training and mentorship may involve cycling through the villages to monitor progress.

There should be no doubt; using cadres requires a tremendous investment in manpower and resources. However, their potential for stability operations at the lowest level complements the counterinsurgency effort. Empowering local communities becomes the number one counterinsurgency imperative; how it is done becomes a matter of strategy.

While the task of local police forces is to defend population centers proper, the task of national security forces, coalition forces, and perhaps provincial militias is to drive insurgent forces increasingly away from population centers. Whenever expelled from population centers, insurgents are vulnerable to military small unit actions (e.g., patrols, ambushes, and raids). As Roger Trinquier assessed, the insurgent "cannot live among a populace he has not previously organized and subjected to his will."¹² Extending the distance between insurgents and population centers is critical since insurgents may operate out of base camps in the surrounding area and visit local villages periodically to maintain their control over the population.¹³ Once insurgents are driven to the border regions and beyond, their power begins to ebb, and the insurgency becomes manageable.

The PRT is an excellent vehicle for managing stability operations. Cadres are actually their agents for action. As the name implies, every province should have a PRT, ideally near the provincial capital. If sufficient PRTs are available, major cities should also have a PRT due to their substantial needs. PRTs provide the quick reaction force, a place of cadre refuge if required, the depository for police force salaries and immediate impact funds, and the cadre's command and control hub as well as its logistical base. Having a keen appreciation of the local security situation, the PRT commander assesses whether cadres should live in their assigned population centers or operate from the PRT camp.¹⁴ Regardless, cadres must have daily contact with their assigned communities.

In the larger sense, PRTs demonstrate multilateral solidarity in a coalition, associated burden sharing, and shared risks/shared prestige. Nevertheless, multinational contingents that deploy with barely enough security to defend the camp and not much else consign themselves to a flag pin on the map. A minimum capabilities package is needed so contributing states will live up to obligations.¹⁵ In addition to a maneuver component (e.g, infantry battalion), a PRT contingent must have civil affairs, psychological operations, and construction units as well as civilian offices (e.g., United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), UN Assistance Mission, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), etc.) to provide the necessary support for local essential services, governance, and economic and infrastructure development. The camp must be located and designed for expansion, ideally near an airfield, so that subsequent, and sometimes unforeseen, necessities can be brought in. For example,

a natural disaster may require the staging of significant supplies and equipment for humanitarian relief, so the camp requires sufficient space for warehouses and containers. Additional space for accommodations requires close consideration as well, particularly during the changeover periods of PRT contingent rotations. Hence, a PRT needs to have twice as many accommodations (living quarters, showers, toilets, etc.) during these transition times. A key consideration is allotting sufficient time for a seamless changeover of PRTs in order to enhance continuity of effort and minimize disruption.

Multinational PRTs require a lead-nation responsibility for unity of command, implying smaller contingents of allies fall under the command. Leading a PRT is a substantial matter of prestige for coalition partners, but if the donor nation is unwilling to fulfill its obligations entirely, the coalition must refuse the offer. Half-hearted measures and national caveats only lead to acrimony, ineffectiveness, and frustration, not only among the other coalition partners but more significantly with the indigenous population.

Gaining the Consent of the Governed.

Once a sphere of security is created in a local community, the core tasks associated with establishing essential services, construction, political and economic development, and reconstitution of society can proceed coherently and with greater effect, at least without incurring a profligate waste of resources, money, and time. Because these initiatives are reserved for secure communities, they serve as incentives for other communities to accelerate their security posture.

As previously mentioned, one of the perceptions that poison attitudes is the uneven distribution of benefits to the local communities. As agents of PRTs, cadres are ideally placed to determine exactly what the local authorities want and to coordinate through the PRT immediate impact projects with the various governance, reconstruction, and development agencies (e.g., UNHCR, USAID, International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), etc.). Cadres must recognize that most projects are actually package deals. If a community wants a clinic, it needs to have the doctors, nurses, medicines, and equipment to make it functional. If the community wants a school, it needs teachers, books, and school supplies. Without them, the buildings will serve as monuments to naïve intentions. Cadres should be aware that many communities, and Afghanistan serves as an example, eschew roads because they permit criminals and vices greater access. Consequently, a dialogue between the cadre and local authorities is essential in order to promote a greater understanding of options and to ameliorate frustrations.

A critical underpinning of construction and development projects is the provision of resources, material, and skills training for local labor (e.g., carpentry, construction, electrical, plumbing, maintenance, etc.). This approach instills a sense of accomplishment and pride among the populace, as well as rousing a call to arms to defend community-built projects from insurgent attacks. Just as important is the provision of salaries for the workers, which instills hope in the future for families and serves as a catalyst for the local economy. In this sense, the insurgent recruitment pool shrinks due to greater societal gratification. This is the way to satisfy expectations and enhance community confidence in the government. Naturally,

the federal government should continue to concentrate on capacity building (i.e., infrastructure, agriculture, industry, etc.), but at the same time, it cannot ignore local expectations without invoking grievances which feed the insurgency.

Reconstituting local society through civic action has a practical objective, whether performed by cadres or Civil Affairs teams.¹⁶ Just as the insurgents sever the authority of the government (both central and local) and gain control of local communities by creating a sense of desperation, hopelessness, isolation, and paranoia, the cadres must mend these fractures, particularly in areas that were under insurgent control for an extensive period. The establishment of sports clubs (e.g., soccer and volleyball), social clubs (e.g., sewing, music, and games), and schools encourages social interaction. These create the sense of community worthy of self-sacrifice and commitment among the citizens, which include the local authorities, police, and militia. Under these conditions, local police are less likely to leave fellow citizens in the lurch if insurgents attack.

Cadres also serve as a reporting conduit for acts of criminal activity, human rights violations, and low level corruption. Generally, addressing these activities directly with the perpetrators would endanger the cadre position or even personal safety, but the cadre should inform the local authorities that it is aware of the activities and has submitted reports. Bringing in appropriate agencies to investigate misdeeds sends the signal that such activities will not go unnoticed. The intent is to deter improper behavior by addressing it openly, and to create greater confidence among the population by reporting illicit behavior.¹⁷

Creating Self-Sufficiency.

Over time, the development of the smaller communities creates functionalism, the interaction and creation of higher institutions and infrastructure, which eventually conjoin with federal institutions. The natural economic and political development from the local communities, provinces, and regions eventually creates a middle class, which is the sine qua non of a functional modern state.

In light of the tremendous effort for building a state from the ground up, an umbrella organization is needed to harmonize the efforts of the multitudinal government, nongovernment, international, and military organizations. To coordinate and oversee reconstruction and development efforts, the UN should establish a Reconstruction and Development Agency headed by a UN Super Envoy.¹⁸ Recently, the UN recognized the necessity for such an overarching agency as it considered the position of Super Envoy to Afghanistan, whose mandate included “coordinating responsibility not only for the badly fragmented civilian reconstruction and development efforts of the UN and the EU but also for North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) operations.”¹⁹ In view of cadres submitting thousands of construction and development project requests, such an agency is needed to manage the needs versus resources problem. It follows that an essential task of the Reconstruction and Development Agency would be to eliminate redundant projects, harmonize efforts among the various organizations, and reduce fraud as well as abuse (e.g., fraudulent nongovernment organizations [NGOs], corrupt contractors, and power broker patronage).

Counterinsurgency coalitions should be wary of and avoid creating a relationship of mutual dependence with the client government. Too large of a military contingent can create host government complacency, militating against the government assuming a greater share of the burden. Consequently, urgent political, social, and economic reforms consistently remain a lower priority. Enormous military, economic, and political investments into a client state can have the effect of entangling the benefactors to such a degree that they become prisoners of the enterprise. Any hint of failure often results in greater commitments and expenditures.²⁰ Hence, large contingents and large, multiple headquarters tends to send the wrong signal regarding sufficient assistance. Not only do they require a large overhead to operate (meaning fewer resources and money are available to the communities), but they also spend an inordinate amount of time and resources collecting and briefing information. Conversely, maintaining a minimum military presence provides greater political leverage for patron governments, and, if necessary, disengagement if a host government refuses to institute essential reforms.

Conclusion.

Too often, efforts at state-building focus inordinately at the federal level, to the detriment of the local level of society. Attempting to conduct state-building exclusively at the national level can be rather frustrating for all involved, at least when attempting to apply unrealistic standards of sovereignty. Insurgents operate at the community level, aiming to build a movement and military machine at the grass roots. If left unchecked, insurgents eventually reach sufficient

strength to challenge and perhaps overthrow the federal government. Counterinsurgency governments frequently err in concluding the population has a choice between the insurgents and the government. In reality, the people are hostages of the insurgents and victims caught in the middle of the conflict.

The use of cadres and PRTs seeks to reverse the deleterious effects of an insurgency and provides the most enduring and immediate means of creating prosperity and stability among the local communities. In this manner, state-building and counterinsurgency coincide, for as Bard O'Neill concludes, "No matter how hard insurgents try, they will be frustrated if a competent and capable government administration dispenses services, controls the population, and effectively coordinates a multitude of political, economic, and security policies."²¹

PRTs represent one of the best vehicles for all members of a coalition, large and small, to make meaningful contributions to a counterinsurgency and state-building. Focusing on smaller communities, PRTs from smaller member states can accomplish tasks within their capabilities and without feeling their efforts are insignificant vis-à-vis the great powers. In this sense, PRTs are prestigious, but the coalition must require a minimum PRT capabilities package so contributing states fulfill their obligations. The NATO force generation conference is a logical vehicle for determining PRT packages, but any agency within a coalition can serve this function so as to preclude an ad hoc approach.

Cadres are logical agents of PRTs for community empowerment and development. They help the people protect themselves and give them a sense of hope for the future. Once energized, the citizen is motivated to

improve family life (e.g., education and livelihood), and in turn contribute to the community and society. One should not forget that states are a relatively new political construct, whereas small communities have dominated the political landscape for millennia. A bottom-up approach appears the more logical course in state-building.

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1. William Zartman, *Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 5.

3. *Ibid.*, p. 10.

4. Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, among many other scholars, underscore the degree to which complex interdependence is challenging Realism's assumptions with state sovereignty. See Robert O. Keohane and Joseph Nye, *Power and Interdependence*, 3rd Ed., New York: Addison Wesley Longman, 2001. Thomas Friedman's insightful observations on the effects of globalization are also noteworthy. See Thomas L. Friedman, *The World is Flat: A Brief History of the Twenty-first Century*, New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2006; Thomas L. Friedman, *The Lexus and the Olive Tree*, New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1999.

5. Critical components of state-building are the national army and national police forces, which epitomize the nation's security institutions. On a practical level, without them, coalition forces could never withdraw without risking the entire enterprise. These forces need years to mature as institutions, and this maturation is necessary for the confidence of the people. Not only do the national security forces assume a greater security burden over time, they also serve as a symbol of pride for the citizens. National military and police advisory agencies should resist rash timelines and unrealistic milestones for progress though. Creating local community security capacity permits the maturation of federal capacities.

6. These needs are prioritized as follows: (1) Biological and Physiological needs, e.g, air, food, drink, shelter, warmth, sex, and sleep; (2) Safety needs, e.g, protection from elements, security, order, law, limits, and stability; (3) Belongingness and Love needs, e.g., work group, family, affection, and relationships; (4) Esteem needs, e.g., self-esteem, achievement, mastery, independence, status, dominance, prestige, managerial and responsibility; and (5) Self-Actualization needs, e.g., realizing personal potential, self-fulfillment, seeking personal growth and peak experiences. "Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs," Internet: www.businessballs.com/.

7. Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, Edwin Curley, ed., Indianapolis: Hackett, 1994, p. 78.

8. The U.S. Army/U.S. Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual, U.S. Army Field Manual No. 3-24/Marine Corps Warfighting Publication No. 3-33.5, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2007, p. 35.

9. It should be clear that training the local population to defend itself also deprives the insurgents of recruits. As Robert Tabor observed,

The population, as should be clear by now, is the key to the entire struggle. . . . it is the population which is doing the struggling. The guerrilla, who is of the people in a way which the government soldier cannot be, for if the regime were not alienated from the people, whence the revolution?, fights with the support of the noncombatant civilian populace: It is his camouflage, his quartermaster, his recruiting office, his communications network, and his efficient, all-seeing intelligence service. Without the consent and active aid of the people, the guerrilla would be merely a bandit, and could not long survive.

Robert Taber, *War of the Flea: The Classic Study of Guerrilla Warfare*, Washington, DC: Brassey's Inc., 2002, pp. 11-12.

10. The cadre can recruit from the existing police force, if one exists, but it must persuade the local authorities to give it the authority to hire and fire.

11. DynCorp operates Regional Training Centers in Afghanistan and Iraq, offering a 6-week basic training course for police as well as specialized training courses for select policemen. The Germans run a 6- to 8-month course for higher law enforcement functions.

12. Having served in Indochina and Algeria, Trinquier's experience with counterinsurgency is profound. Roger Trinquier, *Modern Warfare*, Daniel Lee, trans., New York: Praeger Publishers, 1964, p. 63.

13. This appeared to be a prevalent feature of Algerian insurgent operations during the Algerian insurrection. Anyone who collaborated with the French was executed in front of the other villagers to serve as an example. Alistair Horne, *A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962*, New York: New York Review Books, 2006.

14. American military leadership will question whether the Brigade Combat Team (BCT) commander should not have this authority since the PRT commander is subordinate to the BCT. Under these circumstances, this authority is logical. However, not every province has a BCT, especially in regions assigned to coalition partners. Hence, it follows that cadres should be agents of the PRT commander rather than the BCT commander.

15. This is a political-military issue, which is far beyond the capabilities of the DoD to resolve. However, DoD can specify the minimum criteria for PRT capabilities and missions. U.S. experience with NATO suggests member states seek to suboptimize contributions by claiming they are overextended and shouldering more of a burden than other members. State behavior in alliances places a premium on prestigious weapons systems and leadership positions, but gives short shrift to mundane needs, e.g., maintenance, logistics, etc. By their relatively high profile in international eyes, PRTs are prestigious organizations, but their capabilities are considered mundane. For an excellent examination of this phenomenon, see Wallace J. Thies, *Friendly Rivals: Bargaining and Burden-Shifting in NATO*, New York: M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 2003.

16. The French use of civic action teams (*Sections Administratives Spécialisées*) during the war in Algeria has become one of the lesser known footnotes in history. According to Alistair Horne,

Some 400 S.A.S. detachments were created, each under an army lieutenant or captain who was an expert in Arabic and Arab affairs and could deal with every conceivable aspect of administration; from agronomy, teaching and health, to building houses and administering justice. The *kepis bleus*, as they were affectionately called, were a selflessly devoted and courageous band of men, who made themselves much loved by the local populace, and for that reason were often the principal targets of the F.L.N., suffering the heaviest casualties of any category of administrator.

Horne, p. 109.

17. Reporting illicit activity is a delicate matter for the cadre. Some of the local authorities will likely have corrupt ties, so it is not in their interests to cooperate with the cadre. Nevertheless, this is important information for higher headquarters, which can take appropriate measures to compel compliance or co-opt the recalcitrant authorities.

18. It is disturbing and counterproductive for President Karzai to have rejected Britain's Paddy Ashdown as the UN Special Envoy because he had the knowledge and experience to harmonize the disjointed construction and development efforts in Afghanistan. Hopefully, the selection of Norway's Kai Eide as the new envoy will carry forth the original intent.

19. Jim Hoagland, "A Pair Of Allies, Self-Destructing," *Washington Post*, February 3, 2008, p. B7.

20. This mutual dependence is fairly frequent between small countries and their larger benefactors. For example, the Soviet Union's dependence on East Germany's success as a socialist state had a tremendous influence on Soviet foreign policy, especially over the status of Berlin and the building of the Berlin Wall. U.S.-Vietnam, France-Algeria, and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

(USSR)-Afghanistan mutual dependence relationships resulted in the propping up of chronic regimes.

21. Bard O'Neill, *Insurgency and Terrorism: From Revolution to Apocalypse*, 2nd Ed., Revised, Washington, DC: Potomac Books, Inc., 2005, p. 191.

KEYNOTE: THE FUTURE OF GLOBAL TERRORISM

John Robb

Introduction.

In this briefing, I will present models and frameworks that prove helpful when thinking about the future of terrorism. I believe these to be valuable in the decisionmaking process. Specifically, I will detail six models and three potential pathways to solutions.

Superinfrastructure.

How to think about future wars. The superinfrastructure is the sum total of all global connectivity, from communications to economics. It will change the nature of conflict by diminishing conventional warfare, weakening the nation-state, and driving conflict to the sub-state level.

Super-empowerment.

How to think about terrorists. The radical increase in personal productivity created by a combination of rapidly improving technology and improved connectivity. This trend will ensure that the ratio of damage per unaided person will increase exponentially over time.

Black Swans.

How to think about threats. New threats will be surprises. We will not be able to accurately predict the source and timing of the next threat. Further, due to changes in the global environment, these “black swans” will be larger, faster, wider, and more frequent than in the past.

Emergence.

How to think about the organizational dynamics of terrorism. An exploration of new organizational forms driving terrorism: open-source warfare and tinkering networks.

Systems Disruption.

How to think about future avenues of attack. Increasingly, terrorists will use attacks on critical nodes to increase the damage they inflict. This method, whether it be against critical nodes in infrastructure or social systems, provides rates of return that can top one million to one.

Catastrophe.

How to think about terrorist attacks resulting in mass deaths. The dynamics of terrorism imply that future catastrophic attacks will use weapons that are best suited to open-source warfare.

Resilience.

We are moving quickly from a mindset of defense to one of security and resilience. Resilience offers a way to mitigate the impact of numerous potential “black swans.”

Proactive Efforts.

The new dynamics of terrorism indicate a future focus on criminal elements and tinkering networks. This will take a new approach.

Progress.

The best way to enable a hierarchical organization with the flexibility and responsiveness of an open-source network is through the use of platforms.

CONCLUSION

Dr. Dewey A. Browder
Austin Peay University

This academic colloquium brought together civilian academics, experienced governmental and nongovernmental agents, and military practitioners to examine the state-building process by incorporating theoretical foundations, historical examples, and contemporary challenges. Two basic ideas were behind the colloquium. First, if there are principles of war that, if followed, can enhance the possibility of victory on the battlefield, then there should be principles of peace that should be honored as we strive to rebuild failed or defeated states. Second, one must distinguish between “state-building,” which can be facilitated by external forces, and “nation-building,” which can only be accomplished organically.

Each invited speaker was asked to nominate nine or ten principles of peace that will enable the state-building process. The principles were explicated as deemed appropriate by each speaker. The collected principles were then subjected to a distillation process by six breakout groups. Each group was interdisciplinary in nature. The six distilled lists were then further distilled by a plenary session to arrive at a core list of principles. As a by-product, the distillation process produced a list of practices and procedures that might prove useful in future state-building situations.

APPENDIX I
ROSTER OF PARTICIPANTS AND SPECIALTIES
(WHERE KNOWN)

Group A:

Dr. Christos Frentzos,* Military History
Mr. George Dunlop, Principal Deputy Assistant
Secretary of the Army (Civil Works)
Dr. Minoa Uffelman, History
CWO Manuel Vasquez
Dr. Chuck Render, Colonel (Ret), USAF and author
Dr. Bert Randal, Philosophy
Mr. David Abbott, Graduate Student in Military History
Dr. Hassan Said, Economics

Group B:

Dr. David Snyder,* Military History
Dr. George Pesely, Ancient History
MAJ Aaron Bazin
Dr. Greg Parlier
Dr. Rhonda Smith, Military History
Dr. Richard Gildrie, Intellectual History
Mr. Jeff Pennig, Graduate Student in Military History
COL Alex Crowther, National Security Studies

Group C:

Dr. Jeff Roberts,* Military History
Dr. David Nelson, East Asian History
COL Terry Saltsman
Mr. Peter Schaefer, President, Globaland Group, LLC
Mr. John O'Brien, Military History
Dr. Lowell Roddy, Psychology
Mr. David Ogan, Graduate Student in Military History
Dr. Roger Clark, Business

Group D:

Dr. Leo Daugherty,* Military History
Dr. Phil Kemmerly, Geology
LTC Greg Lane

Mr. Joe McMenamin
Dr. Jordy Rocheleau, Philosophy
COL Randy Hurtt
Mr. Doug Doss, Graduate Student in Military History
Dr. Alvin Hughes, American History

Group E:

Dr. Greg Zieren,* Economic History
Dr. John Foote, Chemistry
MG Steven Hashem
Dr. James Carafano, History and National Security Studies
Mr. David Henrikson, Graduate Student in Military History
Mr. Phil Grey, U.S. Army (Ret) and Graduate Student in Military History
Mr. John Robb, Global Counterterrorism and Warfare

Group F:

Dr. Don Barlow,* American History
Dr. Michele Butts, American History
Dr. Gayle Robinson-Oturu, Music
LTC Ray Millen, Foreign Affairs, Western Europe
Dr. Bonnie Baker
Mr. Marc Tyrrell, Interdisciplinary Studies
Mr. Joe Bailey, Graduate Student in Military History

Conference Organizers:

Dr. Dewey Browder, Military and European History
Dr. Kip Muir, Military History
Dr. Tom O'Connor, Criminal Justice and Homeland Security
Ms. Pam Allen

* Facilitator for group breakout sessions

APPENDIX II

INITIAL SUBMITTED LISTS OF “PRINCIPLES TO WIN THE PEACE”

Gildrie:

1. Security
2. Dynamic stability
3. Rule of law
4. Continuous participatory consent
5. Sense of justice
6. Complex, robust public
7. Shared prosperity and opportunity
8. Liberal constitutionalism

Rocheleau:

1. Necessity
2. Protect human rights
3. Secure peace
4. Allow national self-determination
5. Establish the rule of law
6. Internationalization: authorization and acceptance
7. Beneficence to and non-exploitation of the reestablished state
8. Compensate victims
9. Limited retribution
10. Promote reconciliation

Randall:

1. No stereotyping
2. No personal agendas
3. No forced state-building
4. Respect religion
5. Inclusiveness
6. Co-opt violent groups
7. Protect sacred places and relics
8. Support moderates
9. Mediate fairly
10. Be compassionate

Dunlop:

1. Intelligence imperative
2. Always ask 'em
3. America's mission is Freedom
4. Rule of law
5. Property rights
6. Strategies to overcome corruption
7. Fiscal systems fuel economic activity
8. Bottom-up entrepreneurial capitalism works

Millen:

1. Creating self-sufficiency through empowerment of the communities
2. Strengthening the state through local prosperity and stability

Tyrrell:

1. Mission
2. Ethics/morality
3. Legitimacy
4. Failed institutions
5. Required institutions
6. Supported institutions
7. Cultural basics
8. Cultural narratives

Carafano:

1. Develop human capital
2. Create common space
3. Fight the fog of peace
4. Determine clear, concise national objectives
5. Establish interagency coordination
6. Ensure unity of effort
7. Understand the country
8. Delegitimize bad ideas
9. Create credible alternatives and the will to prevail

Browder:

1. Security
2. Rule of law
3. Respect for culture
4. Common interest
5. Grassroots strengths

6. Isolate trouble spots
7. Public support
8. Realism
9. Patience

Schaefer:

1. Indigenous effort and wealth
2. Whole of government
3. DoD leadership
4. Identity
5. Customary laws
6. Sustained growth
7. Consent of governed
8. Real capitalism

APPENDIX III

BREAKOUT GROUPS' RESULTS

Group A:

1. Inclusiveness/consent of the governed
2. Intelligence imperative/understand culture
3. Protect human rights/property rights
4. Rule of law/legitimacy
5. Security: civil, military, economic
6. Co-opt violent groups
7. Grassroots strengths/work bottom-up
8. Clear, concise national objectives
9. Strategies to overcome corruption
10. Indigenous effort/wealth

Group B:

1. All-encompassing: rule of law, respect, lack of hubris
2. Contextual understanding
3. Security
4. Legitimacy
5. Indigenous participation
6. Social cohesion
7. Development
8. Provision of basic needs: food, water, shelter, sanitation, healthcare, education, jobs.

All accomplished through international, national (especially business), and customary law, social/civil rights, and religious communities

Group C:

1. Establish security, to include criminal code
2. Establish economic stability, to include civil codes
3. Planning: Ask 'em/Tell 'em
4. Intelligence: respect for culture

Group D:

1. Security framework
2. Empower the individual
3. Protect the individual's empowerment
4. Ensure the common defense
5. Codify a common basis for licit trade
6. Build capacity for community identity (includes religious aspects, as well)

Group E:

1. Maintain security: sufficient force on ground
2. Promote respect for rule of law: establish clear procedures to protect people/personal property
3. Inculcate in occupying force respect for cultural, linguistic, religious, and historic differences in host country
4. Coordination between governmental agencies, NGOs, and contractors to promote common goals and procedures
5. Occupying force must be referee/honest broker when disputes erupt between indigenous population
6. Approach mission with realism, patience, and understanding of difficulties on the ground
7. Protect common spaces to promote belief in security
8. Strategic communication between military, governmental, and civilian forces essential for success

Group F:

1. Security: self-policed
2. Basic, life-support services
3. Transparently, no personal agendas
4. Common rule of law: civil and property law
5. Tolerance: promote reconciliation
6. Patience: take the long view
7. Promote reestablishment of institutions
8. Promote/support self-empowerment and self-sufficiency

APPENDIX IV

FINAL PLENARY-APPROVED LIST OF “PRINCIPLES TO WIN THE PEACE”

1. Ensure rule of law
2. Seek security: civil, military, economic
3. Pursue legitimacy
4. Encourage development
5. Foster self-empowerment and self-sufficiency
6. Foster communications

APPENDIX V

POLICIES AND PROCEDURES UNDERPINNING THE PRINCIPLES

During the course of the breakout groups' discussions, as well as in the plenary sessions, there was a constant thread of discussion as to what constituted a principle and what constituted those policies and/or procedures which would support the implementation of a principle. The following list represents such policies and/or procedures as culled by the plenary from the original list of possible principles.

1. Be ready for a fight after the fight.
2. Enlist reconcilable groups.
3. Control population.
4. Advise, rather than force, when appropriate.
5. Prevent disease and unrest.
6. Be an honest broker.
7. Punish egregious violators, insofar as it promotes national healing.
8. Reconstruct institutions so that abuses cannot be repeated.
9. Secure sacred places, relics, and cultural features.
10. Empower a culturally-nuanced judiciary.
11. Facilitate appropriate sustainable development.
12. Facilitate coordinated efforts with lead agency (both national and international).
13. Respect culture.

14. Define a clear, concise national mission with associated objectives.

15. Pursue bottom-up policies where applicable, thereby creating self-sufficiency through individual empowerment.

APPENDIX VI

COLLOQUIUM PRESENTERS, SPEAKERS, AND MODERATORS

Colonel William “Trey” Braun

Affiliations: Deputy Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College. Chairman, Strategic Studies Institute Art of War Department.

Areas of Expertise: Strategic studies, military science, business administration

Thomas P. M. Barnett, Ph.D.

Affiliations: Senior managing director, Enterra Solutions; visiting scholar, University of Tennessee Howard Baker Center; contributing editor, *www.esquire.com*

Areas of Expertise: Forecast of global conflict, military transformation, international security and economic globalization, strategic thinking.

Publications: *The Pentagon’s New Map. Blueprint for Action*

Dewey Browder, Ph.D.

Affiliations: Professor of History and Chair, Department of History and Philosophy, Austin Peay State University.

Areas of Expertise: The Holocaust, American Occupation experience in Germany, modern European history, military history

Publications: *Americans in Post-World War II Germany: Teachers, Tinkers, Neighbors and Nuisances* (1998.) “First Encounters: Conquest and Initial Occupation,” in *Neighbor America: Americans in Rhineland-Palatinate, 1945-1995* (1995). “The GI Dollar and the Wirtschaftswunder,” in *The Journal of Economic History* (Winter 1993.)

James Jay Carafano, Ph.D.

Affiliations: Assistant Director, Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies and Senior Research Fellow, Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies. Visiting Professor, National Defense University and Georgetown University. Defense affairs, military operations and strategy and homeland security expert at the Heritage Foundation.

Areas of Expertise: Defense affairs, military operations and strategy, joint operations, future combat systems, post-conflict operations, nuclear weapons, homeland security.

Publications: *GI Ingenuity: Improvisation, Technology and Winning World War II* (2006); *Winning the Long War*. Coauthored *Lessons from the Cold War for Defeating Terrorism and Preserving Freedom and Homeland Security* (McGraw Hill).

Col. Glen A. Crowther, Ph.D.

Affiliations: Research Professor of National Security Studies, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College.

Areas of Expertise: Western Hemisphere issues, insurgency/counterinsurgency, joint/interagency/intergovernmental/multinational (JIIM) issues.

George S. Dunlop

Affiliations: Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Civil Works)

Areas of Expertise: Department of the Army policies affecting Civil Works activities, Clean Water Act, natural resources and environment

Richard P. Gildrie, Ph.D.

Affiliations: Professor, U. S. History, Austin Peay State University

Areas of Expertise: U. S. history, Clarksville history, theories of state-building, American Revolutionary War.

Lieutenant Colonel Raymond A. Millen

Affiliations: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute
Director of European Security Studies.

Areas of Expertise: Foreign Affairs, Western Europe

Publications: *Command Legacy* (2002).

Malcolm "Kip" Muir, Jr., Ph.D.

Affiliations: Professor of History, Director of the John A. Adams, '71 Center for Military History and Strategic Analysis, Virginia Military Institute. Holder, Henry King Burgwyn, Jr. Chair in Military History, VMI.

Areas of Expertise: Military history, naval history

Publications: *Black Shoes and Blue Water: Surface Warfare in the United State Navy, 1945 – 1975* (1996). *The Iowa-Class Battleships: Iowa, New Jersey, Missouri, and Wisconsin* (1987).

Tom O'Connor, Ph.D.

Affiliations: Associate professor of public management, Austin Peay State University. Director, APSU Institute for Global Security Studies. Director, APSU criminal justice/homeland security degree programs. Carnegie Council. Claremont Institute. HSDECA.

Areas of Expertise: Computer forensics, intelligence reform, psychological profiling, war crimes investigation, ethical use of technology for security applications, terrorism.

Publications: Articles in the *Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice*, *Varieties of Criminology*, *Journal of Security Administration*, *Journal of the Institute of Justice and International Studies*, Law Enforcement Executive Forum.

Albert (Bert) Randall, Ph.D.

Affiliations: Professor of Philosophy, Austin Peay State University.

Areas of Expertise: Islam, comparative religion, religious extremism

Publications: *The Mystery of Hope in the Philosophy of Gabriel Marcel* (1993). *Theologies of War and Peace Among Jews, Christians and Muslims* (1998). *Strangers on the Shore: The Beatitudes in World Religions* (2006). *Holy Scriptures as Justification for War: Fundamentalist Interpretations of the Torah, The New Testament and the Qur'an* (2008).

John Robb

Affiliations: U. S. Air Force. Past CEO, UserLand Software. Author and speaker.

Areas of Expertise: Global counter terrorism, terrorism and warfare.

Publications: *Brave New War* (2007). Articles include "The Open Source War," *New York Times Op-Ed* 2005; "Power to the People," *Fast Company Magazine*, 2006; "The Coming Urban Terror," *City Journal*, 2007; "Nation-states, Market-states and Virtual-states," *Global Crime*, 2006; "When Bots Attack," *Wired*, 2007.

Jordy Rocheleau, Ph.D.

Affiliations: Associate Professor of Philosophy, Austin Peay State University

Areas of Expertise: Just War theory, ethics and social philosophy, military ethics.

Publications: *Rights and Wrongs in the College Classroom: Ethical Issues in Postsecondary Teaching* (2007). Article on preventive war and the role of the international community in justifying interventions—*Rethinking the Just War Tradition*, 2006.

Peter F. Schaefer

Affiliations: President, GlobalLand Group LLC

Areas of Expertise: Public policy strategies for economic growth and nation-building.

Major General Jeffrey J. Schloesser

Affiliations: U.S. Army, Commanding General, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) and Fort Campbell, KY.

Areas of Expertise: Military cooperation, counterterrorism strategy.

Marc W. D. Tyrrell, Ph.D.

Affiliations: Institute for Interdisciplinary Studies, Carleton University. Innovation, Collaboration and Networking (ICAN) research center at the University of Technology, Sydney, Australia. Anthropologist in residence, Insignia Research. Moderator, Small Wars Council.

Areas of Expertise: Social effects of technology, organizational management, organizational culture, Job Search and Recruiting Technology, social ritual.

Publications: *Handbook of Organizational Culture and Climate*, Sage (2000).