UNITY OF COMMAND IN AFGHANISTAN:
A FORSAKEN PRINCIPLE OF WAR

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PREFACE

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ABSTRACT

This Carlisle Paper discusses the traditional importance of unity of command in American doctrine and practice from World War I until now, and how this principle has been forsaken in the evolution of military command for Afghanistan. It examines the unprecedented departure from the principle of unity of command in Afghanistan in 2006, when Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan passed control of the ground fight to the International Security Assistance Force, and operations became split between several unified or “supreme” commanders in charge of U.S. Central Command, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and U.S. Special Operations Command. It argues for a renewal of understanding of the importance of unity of command, and recommends that the United States revert to the application of this principle by amending the Unified Command Plan to invest one “supreme commander” with responsibility for the current Operation ENDURING FREEDOM Joint Operations Area.
UNITY OF COMMAND IN AFGHANISTAN: A FORESAKEN PRINCIPLE OF WAR

Unity of Command: Unity of command is best achieved by vesting a single commander with requisite authority.

—Principles of War 1954

In Afghanistan today, want of moral singleness, simplicity, and intensity of purpose harp of military failure. This is attributable to an abrupt departure from a long-standing and distinctly American practice of insisting on unity of command. The United States is the only country where military doctrine recognizes the principle of “unity of command,” and has successfully applied it in multiple alliances and coalitions since 1918. It was the guiding principle during World War II that convinced Allied powers to invest “supreme command” upon singular operational level commanders in distinct geographic areas. Unity of command was the principle behind the 1946 Unified Command Plan (UCP), which institutionalized the practice of unifying forces under one commander-in-chief. This paper examines the departure from this principle that occurred in Afghanistan in 2006, when Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan (CFC-A) passed control of the ground fight to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), and operations became split between Commander U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), and Commander U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM).

The paper has three main parts. Part one defines “unity of command” and describes how the United States has tried to adhere to this principle since 1914. It contains a brief synopsis of the American experience of coalition warfare in both World Wars, and reviews the evolution of “unified command” as a continuous attempt to reconcile geographic, coalition, functional, and service differences. Part two focuses on the evolution of the command structure in Afghanistan since 2001. The third part analyzes the current command structure in Afghanistan. Historical documentary evidence is used here to analyze the divisive roles played by CENTCOM, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), SOCOM, and even the Department of State (DOS) and U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM), illustrating six areas where traditional unity of command has not been properly applied. Part three also provides a recommendation to revive unity of command in Afghanistan through an amendment of the UCP.

The American Tradition of Unity of Command.

American practice of unity of command requires the placement of all forces operating in a specific theatre to achieve a distinct objective under a single commander. This originated in the Civil War, and reached an apogee with the ascension of General U. S. Grant as General-in-Chief of the U.S. Army; an investiture of supreme command designed to unify all northern military efforts under one brain. By 1914, the idea had become a “Combat Principle,” articulated in Field Service Regulations as such: “Unity of command is essential to success. . . . All troops assigned to the execution of a distinct tactical task must be placed under one command.” It took the desperate situation created by the German offensive of March 1918 before allied generals could accept this essential principle. The Supreme War
Council granted General Ferdinand Foch “supreme command” over French, American, and British Imperial forces on March 25. This finally provided unprecedented singleness of purpose in allied planning. Foch’s July 24 memorandum became the blueprint for the coordinated offensives that defeated Germany that autumn.\(^8\)

But unity of military effort did not equate to abandonment of complete sovereignty of American or British Imperial forces to French design. The relationship between Generals John Pershing and Foch was often strained due to the caveats placed upon the use of American forces. As leader of an “Associated Power,” Pershing had Presidential mandate to resist piecemeal engagement of the American Expeditionary Forces. Pershing wanted to wait until an independent U.S. Army was ready to take the field (1919). Allied commanders desperately wanted American manpower deployed to their portion of the front, but acquiesced to Pershing’s overall demand to retain national identity of American forces. With mutual concession, Pershing recognized the crisis and granted the employment of U.S. divisions under French command in mid-1918.\(^9\) (See Figure 1.)

![Diagram of Supreme War Council](image)

**Figure 1. Unity of Command 1918.**

At the end of the Great War, allied senior leadership recognized that singular command over multinational forces, even allowing recourse to national authorities, was the sole means to achieve the operational level cognition and cohesion essential to unity of effort. Colonel T. Bentley Mott, Pershing’s Liaison officer at Foch’s combined headquarters, remembers presenting Foch with General Pershing’s concerns during the Argonne offensive. Foch whisked him to a billiard table covered with western front maps and said: “I am the leader of an orchestra. Here are the English Bassos, here the American baritones, and there the French tenors. When I raise my baton, every man must play, or else he must not come to my concert.”\(^10\) Foch spoke with authority invested by
political agreement, and his “supreme command” represented a singular unified military operational effort under a mutually accepted alliance strategy. While often at odds with his “orchestra leader,” Pershing later reflected: “I do not believe it is possible to have unity of action without a supreme commander.” The lesson was not lost to junior observers.

General George C. Marshall had been Pershing’s Chief of Operations and had witnessed his commander’s resistance to subordination under Foch. He had also witnessed the positive effect of Foch’s “strategic direction.” Upon assuming responsibilities as U.S. Army Chief of Staff in 1939, Marshall immediately began to shape the environment in Washington to embrace the principle of unity of military command under civil authority. In this, he relied upon U.S. Army doctrine formulated and instructed during the inter-war period.

Shortly after the December 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor, Marshall concluded that “unified command . . . would solve nine-tenths of the problems of British-American military collaboration.” Thereafter he worked tirelessly to establish unified commands in each major theater of the war, uniting all services of every participating nation under one commander-in-chief (CINC). Simultaneously, Marshall addressed the prospect of debilitating competition between CINC’s, whose individual horizons were too narrow to appreciate the larger war-management problem. He forced the U.S. military to adapt to the British committee system in managing the strategy of the war, in which he and Admiral Ernest J. King became part of the British-American Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS), holding unquestioned authority over the theater commanders. The CCS functioned through a system of standing committees and programmed meetings where the service chiefs and political leaders of leading alliance nations met to determine the course of the war. As such, it addressed “grand strategy” where national war aims were amalgamated to produce sanctioned military strategy to be implemented by theater commanders. (See Figure 2.)

![Figure 2. CCS and Supreme Commands 1945.](image-url)
The CCS system also helped to overcome another obstacle to unity of command—service rivalry. Marshall contended with bitter interservice fights in the process of determining theater command constructs and strategic objectives in the Pacific, where the U.S. Army and the U.S. Navy held unbending and competing ideas of strategy and priorities. These rivalries led to division of the Pacific theater into service-oriented subtheaters; the Navy-dominated Pacific Ocean Area under Admiral Chester Nimitz and the Army-dominated Southwest Pacific under General Douglas MacArthur. However, this compromise garnered agreement for the overall global unified command structure. This structure was formally represented in a study conducted by General Dwight Eisenhower for the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) in early 1942 in which he divided the world into three major theaters of operations—the Pacific becoming an American area of responsibility (AOR); the Near and Middle East coming under British command; and Europe, the Mediterranean, and the Atlantic being shared between the United States and Great Britain.

To achieve success within the CCS committee system, all parties had to relinquish a degree of sovereignty. It was understood that in the ways, ends, and means debate, everyone had to give a little. Initially it was the United States that did so in larger measure. However, as time went on and as U.S. forces became the largest national entities within theaters, U.S. desires prevailed. Marshall was successful in harboring resources for the invasion of Europe despite British attempts to boost efforts in the Mediterranean, and put his chosen man—General Eisenhower—into the role of supreme commander Europe. Eisenhower’s character was well-suited for this coalition command, particularly in his ability to deal with his multiple political masters. This was important because the American experience of coalition warfare throughout World War II was one of constant subordination of military planning to political policy. Eisenhower answered to the CCS and frequently to issues raised by Winston Churchill. This appeared unusual to Eisenhower, but it reflected the need to handle political concerns from alliance partners whose finite resources could not be squandered, and was a necessary element of supreme command within an alliance. While it had taken several years to determine workable command relationships within the alliance, once they were established within the unified command structures, the result was enduring moral singleness and unity of purpose that led to the defeat of the Axis powers and Japan.

Marshall and Eisenhower affirmed two lessons by war’s end—the efficacy of a single CINC as essential to achieving military unity of effort in a given theater of war, and the requirement that theater commanders be responsive to a higher strategic body where the competing requirements of policy and military strategy come together to be debated. Experience in both world wars informed them that the advantage of military unity under singular geographic commanders was not in itself sufficient to sustain alliances; strategy formulation required compromises and pluralism beyond the capacity of a theater CINC. The first lesson was foundational in creating the UCP in 1946; the second guided the formation of NATO in 1949.

The UCP was established in the U.S. military to institutionalize joint theater command. It aimed to achieve unity of military effort by reducing the service rivalries that had characterized U.S. strategy formulation during the war. It helped simplify the command and control of U.S. Army, Navy, and Air forces in designated areas by placing them
under a single CINC, assisted by a joint staff “. . . with appropriate members from the various components of the Services under command in key positions of responsibility” answering to the JCS. Initially seven geographic unified commands were designated: Far East Command (FECOM), Pacific Command (PACOM), Alaskan Command, Northeast Command, Atlantic Fleet, Caribbean Command, and European Command (EUCOM). Because unified commanders were not entitled to perform unique-to-service functions—administration, training, supply, expenditure of appropriated funds, or construction—the tasks could not be performed in the unified headquarters and had to be delegated to subordinate component headquarters. Therefore, while the newly designated unified commanders had authority to execute joint and combined operations, the sustainment of these operations remained squarely in the hands of the JCS, because only they could manage overall global war strategy and set priorities between unified commands. Service influence was also exercised within the UCP through the practice of affiliating each unified command with a parent service chief of staff, guaranteeing that the U.S. Navy dominated PACOM and the U.S. Army EUCOM indefinitely.

The first proponent of the UCP was the U.S. Navy, which remained dissatisfied with the divided command of the Pacific in 1945, particularly after PACOM army forces were allocated to MacArthur for the occupation of Japan. With the UCP, Admiral Nimitz’s Pacific Ocean Area Headquarters quickly transformed into Headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief Pacific Command (CINCPAC), and was reassigned army units. However, rivalry between the services continued. USPACOM maintained a long-standing competitive relationship with FECOM, where the U.S. Army ran Japan, Korea, the Ryukyus, the Philippines, the Marianas, and the Bonins. (See Figure 3.)

The importance placed upon these arbitrary geographic boundaries and staunch service affiliations were conditioning factors that later had a negative impact upon the conduct of the Vietnam War. Early in that conflict, CINCPAC designated Commander U.S. Military Adviser Command Vietnam (COMUSMACV) as a subordinate unified commander within PACOM, but tightly circumscribed his responsibilities to land operations inside South Vietnam. While the war expanded, MACV’s responsibilities did not, and control over the air, sea, and special operations missions outside the borders of South Vietnam, and many nonmilitary operations inside of South Vietnam, remained under control of CINCPAC, Commander-in-Chief Strategic Air Command (CINCSAC), and others. COMUSMACV lacked command authority over all the forces working within the contested area, and

![Figure 3. Unified Commands in the UCP, 1950.](image-url)
because he was required to work all joint and single service issues through PACOM, he lacked agency in Washington. This led the U.S. Army to request the establishment of Southeast Asia as a separate unified command or, alternatively, to secure the assignment of General Creighton Abrams to the position of CINCPAC upon completion of his duties as COMUSMACV. The U.S. Navy vetoed these proposals. With failure in Vietnam, the limits of the UCP in dealing with the requirements of a protracted, complex, full spectrum operation became evident. Unity of command was not achieved during that conflict, costing the United States dearly. As a consequence, interservice rivalries and tensions between unified commands and service chiefs were studied extensively. The 1970 Blue Ribbon Panel reported to the President that unified commands had “too broad a span of control” and were “excessively layered, unwieldy, and unworkable in crises, and too fragmented to provide the best potential for coordinated response to a general war situation.” The observations were ignored in Washington until they were reviewed again under the Goldwater-Nichols’ initiative in 1986.

The other important geographic unified command was in Europe. Under the UCP, the senior American military headquarters in occupied Germany evolved to become U.S. European Command (EUCOM). This was commanded by the Commander-in-Chief Europe (CINCEUR) who was responsible for all U.S. forces on the continent. In a brilliant move to ensure unity of military command among allied powers, the USCINCEUR was also designated as Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), in command of all NATO forces.

NATO had been established in 1949 when Eisenhower’s former Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces (SHAPE) transformed into Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE). By that time, during European reconstruction and global decolonization, there was no questioning of American-led command constructs. Within the alliance, however, American military and political leaders understood that military command of a theater did not equate with American control of strategy formulation. This had to be done in a multilateral forum that could achieve results similar to the CCS committee system of World War II. Therefore, the NATO Military Committee was established, comprised of military representatives of each member; and the North Atlantic Council (NAC) was created, comprised of permanent representatives—or on occasion member states’ key leaders. The NAC became the civil-political forum for debate over combined strategy to which SHAPE was responsive. Within SHAPE, and in the military chain of command in each member nation, the sentiment favoring powerful supreme command was so strong that it became entrenched. Europeans have always since deferred to SACEUR, provided that alliance strategy formulation remains in the Military Committee and the NAC. United Nations (UN)-sponsored operations in the Former Yugoslavia in 1996 demonstrated how NATO operations under the UCP could be executed maintaining the principle of military unity of command under multilateral political oversight. SACEUR remained the singular operational level commander, responsive to both the NAC and to the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF). SACEUR accepted such frustrating factors as national caveats to sustain the alliance political support that has endured for over a decade. Operations in Kosovo in 1999 were far more problematic as lack of political agreement to attack Serbia created unprecedented caveats, yet SACEUR still maintained that: “The NATO process worked, . . . I was persuaded of the basic
Such conviction surprised many officers on the EUCOM staff who remembered how their CINC’s orders were not always obeyed, and who sensed a division in operational purpose that Eisenhower and Pershing would have recognized as normal within an alliance, but was constraining to those working within the parallel U.S. unified headquarters. They sensed a stark contrast between the constraints of the alliance and the success achieved by the ad hoc coalition through which CENTCOM executed operations in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait in 1990 and 1991. (See Figure 4.)

![Diagram of Unity of Command in NATO](image-url)

**Figure 4. Unity of Command in NATO.**

The first big test of the UCP in CENTCOM was Operations DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM. The CENTCOM commander, General Norman Schwarzkopf, approached the problem of coalition warfare understanding the dual requirement of military unity of command and a multilateral mechanism for strategy formulation. He wisely formed two coalition constructs, the first consisting of U.S.-led western troop-contributing nations, the second consisting of Saudi-led Arab troop-contributing nations. The Headquarters for both coalitions were collocated and managed through a Coalition Coordination and Communication Integration Center. Officially co-commanded by General Schwarzkopf and Lieutenant-General Prince Khalid Bin Sultan al-Saud, the technical functions of supreme command were exercised by the CENTCOM commander. In this construct Schwarzkopf operated like Eisenhower, assuring both his U.S. masters and European and Arab political leaders that military action was circumscribed by coalition policy, acquiescing to the JCS and national command authorities who engaged international partners to craft strategy. Schwarzkopf was left alone to function as the singular “combatant commander,” and was the center point that ensured singularity of purpose,
and simplicity in structure of command. It is reasonable to say that CENTCOM’s conduct of the operations was a realization of the intent of the UCP. The short duration of the war and its limited objectives granted a commonality of moral purpose that allowed unity of effort. Whatever problems that might have existed were also short-lived.

In several important aspects CENTCOM’s success was attributable to UCP practices before Goldwater-Nichols. The UCP has evolved constantly since 1946, adding and collapsing geographic commands, adding, renaming, and amalgamating functional commands, and continuously trying to reconcile tensions between the commands and the services. However, the narrative history of the UCP is one of a very slow but steady trend toward increasing the unified commanders’ authority vis-à-vis the service chiefs’, a relationship at the center of the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986. The Act enhanced the agency of the unified commanders by allowing them to report directly to the SECDEF. While this may be seen as reinforcing the principle of military unity of command, it is actually a significant challenge to the original UCP construct as it marginalized the JCS and set up the conditions where unified commanders and service chiefs would compete. By placing the combatant commanders squarely under the SECDEF, Goldwater-Nichols produced the command arrangement that was desired and achieved by Pershing in 1917, but was opposed by Marshall throughout World War II. It eroded the ability of the U.S. military’s strategic echelon to participate in strategy formulation and make the hard choices regarding ways, ends, and means between competing theaters, and has obstructed JCS’ efforts to work with allies to determine combined objectives in war management.

Ironically, the problems associated with Goldwater-Nichols remained masked by military success in Operation DESERT STORM. This, coupled with the remembered frustration of EUCOM in Kosovo in 1999, shaped U.S. thinking about coalition warfare in the aftermath of the tragic events of September 11, 2001 (9/11). Sentiment favored coalitions (defined by U.S. military missions) over alliances with constraining forums like the Supreme War Council, the Imperial Chiefs of Staff, the CCS committee system, or the NAC. In the post 9/11 world, war strategy would be confined within the Executive Branch of the U.S. Government, and executed by U.S. combatant commanders, with tactical support from “invited” coalition members. The problems this created surfaced in Afghanistan.

Coalition Unity of Command in Afghanistan.

At the commencement of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) in 2001, “supreme command” fell upon Commander CENTCOM who decided not to create a subordinate unified command in Afghanistan. In the absence of a combined strategic forum, CENTCOM also assumed lead role in coalition war management: a huge departure from past practices. Sympathy for the United States, and the assumption that operations in Afghanistan would be short, caused few nations to raise political objections to a CENTCOM lead, even though CINCCENT34 was not subject to any non-U.S. political scrutiny. Nor did CINCCENT feel compelled to subject himself to any political concerns other than those of the SECDEF or the President. Aside from guidance emanating from the Bonn conference, and from bilateral military-to-military relationships, war strategy for Afghanistan was made almost
entirely in Washington, DC, and Tampa, Florida (despite the fact that the Bonn Process
allowed four other nations—Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom [UK], and Japan—to
work individual initiatives for police, justice, counternarcotics, and disarmament reforms
in Afghanistan independent of CENTCOM or the SECDEF). From a purely army-centric
perspective, non-U.S. coalition contingents were “unified” under one CINC in Tampa,
where each coalition member had a liaison team. From a strategic perspective, no one
was in charge of the overall Afghanistan mission.

In 2001, CINCCENT deployed a CFLCC, a CFACC, and a CFMCC to the Arabian
Gulf, and a special operations task force (now called Combined Joint Special Operations
Task Force [CJSOTF]) into Afghanistan. However, unifying the tactical efforts of
these multiple service components and their coalition partners was very difficult, as
evidenced in Operation ANACONDA in March 2002. Therefore, in 2003, CFC-A was
established as the joint operational level headquarters for Afghanistan. A subordinate
unified command, CFC-A was also responsible for building the Afghan Army (through
the Office of Military Cooperation—now called Combined Security Transition Command
Afghanistan [CSTC-A]), pushing reconstruction efforts through their newly established
Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT), and managing the joint special operations
fight.

CFC-A was supported by the CENTCOM CFLCC, CFACC, and CFMCC, who were
also supporting Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF). Under this construct, tactical unity of
command existed for in-country ground combat; however, the CFC-A commander quickly
found himself competing for critical ground, close air support (CAS), and Intelligence/
Surveillance/Reconnaissance (ISR) assets against the OIF mission. While the CFLCC,
CFACC, and CFMCC considered him “supported commander,” he was not the primary
supported commander in CENTCOM, and his theater became an economy-of-effort
mission to operations in Iraq. Somewhat akin to the problem faced by COMUSMACV, the
commander of CFC-A found that his agency was limited by having to work his Title 10
concerns through a CFLCC and a CFACC serving dual missions, and his theater concerns
through a combatant commander preoccupied with other operations. (See Figure 5.)

Figure 5. Command Relationships, CENTCOM 2003.
Unity of command and political oversight of multinational forces emerged as issues with the growth of ISAF. Originally an independent, UN-mandated, British-led mission overseeing the post-conflict transition of Kabul, ISAF had no command relationship with the senior U.S. headquarters in Bagram. American staffs believed that ISAF was tactical control (TACON) to the CENTCOM CLFCC, but in reality ISAF worked through national channels to Britain and coordinated non-British assets through coalition representatives in Tampa. This independent approach was confusing, and it ended in 2003 when the ISAF mission was taken over by NATO and command and control moved to an entirely European chain of command from ISAF HQ in Kabul, Afghanistan, to NATO Joint Forces Command (JFC)-Brunssum in the Netherlands (commanded by a German four-star general), then upward to SHAPE. NATO assumption, however, did not clarify a relationship between the ISAF and OEF missions.

ISAF HQ changed every 6 months as designated NATO corps headquarters assumed the mission on a rotating basis, ensuring no continuity in command and little progress in establishing a standing relationship with HQ CFC-A. As the senior American headquarters in Afghanistan, CFC-A saw itself as the superior headquarters, functioning at the operational level. But from the NATO perspective, CFC-A was another tactical level headquarters, separate and distinct from the three-star ISAF tactical headquarters, and certainly not its superior. Unable to see or reconcile this difference in perspectives, and each side assuming it was correct, a decision was nonetheless made to expand the ISAF area beginning in 2004 to assume responsibility for the northern part of the country, the western part of Afghanistan in 2005, and all territory in Afghanistan in late 2006.

This decision was predicated upon the U.S. desire to reduce its military commitment to Afghanistan—backfilling American troops with NATO forces, and migrating U.S. functions to EUCOM. The final and most sensitive part of this expansion (bringing Regional Command South and Regional Command East under NATO) occurred between May 2006 and February 2007. At this time, the British and American-dominated NATO Allied Rapid Reaction Corps Headquarters assumed the role of HQ ISAF, and a Canadian-led Brigade accepted the task of working under OEF to oversee NATO deployment into Regional Command-South, allowing for its transfer to ISAF in August 2006. Once that was successfully accomplished, U.S. ground forces operating under OEF in Regional Command-East were placed under NATO/ISAF in November.

SHAPE looked to JFC Brunssum as the operational level headquarters under which ISAF was a tactical component. Yet Brunssum was ill-equipped for this task, and was too far removed from the realities of Afghanistan to provide the necessary planning or operational guidance. Most importantly, JFC-Brunssum had no authority over the U.S. headquarters remaining in Afghanistan, making unity of command impossible. In a benign stability operation, this might have been made to work, but events in 2006 emphasized the divisions. NATO found itself inheriting a growing insurgency they had previously dismissed as an American problem. Fighting produced a growing number of Canadian and British casualties, and NATO was unprepared psychologically for this development. NATO member nations had not been socialized for the combat requirements of Afghanistan, and balked when this realization occurred.
Despite this, CFC-A was disbanded in February 2007, and ISAF headquarters became responsible for the country before the unity of command issue was addressed. Although NATO assumed responsibility, SACEUR/CINCEUR was still not the combatant commander that the United States held accountable for Afghanistan. He had no relationship with critical supporting U.S. headquarters—especially the CLFCC, CFACC, and CJSOTF, and CSTC-A. These remained with CENTCOM. Through CSTC-A, CJSOTF, and the senior U.S. tactical headquarters in Afghanistan—at time of writing Task Force 82, soon to become Task Force 101—CINCCENT continues to exercise authority for six critical functions that historically would have been transferred to SACEUR/CINCEUR if unity of command was still important: (1) U.S. title 10 (including logistics and medical support) responsibilities; (2) capacity-building of the Afghan security forces; (3) special operations coordination; (4) ISR and CAS support, (5) counternarcotics coordination; and (6) regional engagement with neighboring countries, most importantly Pakistan. NATO and EUCOM have no part in these efforts.

The mixing of command authorities inside the Afghanistan theater is a second major departure from 60 years of practice in the UCP. The first occurred in Vietnam.

**Analysis and Recommendation.**

While SACEUR’s soldiers fight in Afghanistan, CINCCENT retains control of the U.S. service component contributions to the fight, including the CLFCC and CFACC, the CSTC-A functions, and development functions in the U.S. PRTs. CENTCOM works with SOCOM to coordinate the counterterrorist fight, and with the DOS to support counter-narcotics operations; and CINCCENT engages with Pakistan to coordinate counterinsur-
gency and counterterrorist operations. SACEUR has no involvement in these activities. The White House and CENTCOM have been reluctant to shift any of these functions to NATO and EUCOM because they fear being constrained by the alliance. At the same time, NATO members are suspicious of continued CENTCOM involvement, and have placed heavy caveats upon their forces to protect them from being sucked into OEF missions that are directed unilaterally by the White House and CENTCOM with no alliance input. U.S. reluctance to work within NATO and European refusal to support U.S. unilateralism have created a fractured command structure that is abetting the Taliban insurgency and the forces of corruption that plague Afghanistan.

Realignment of all U.S. functions under USEUCOM and empowerment of SACEUR/CINCEUR would solve all six of the issues currently fracturing command in Afghanistan. Officers in Washington and Tampa realize that the CENTCOM CLFCC and CFACC supporting Afghanistan and Iraq is highly efficient for controlling U.S. force rotations, logistics, medical support, ISR, and CAS allocations within the CENTCOM AOR. However, retention of these functions in CENTCOM makes full NATO integration and involvement in Afghanistan impossible. Unity of command would be better achieved by the establishment of a EUCOM/NATO JLFCC and JFACC, supporting a U.S./NATO JFC for Afghanistan. All U.S. Title 10 responsibilities would be fulfilled, with the added benefit of NATO alignment in securing troop contributions, coordinating troop rotations, integrating logistics, and reducing redundancies (benefits realized by the creation of Eisenhower’s SHAEF headquarters in February 1944).  

CSTC-A’s Afghan National Army (ANA) capacity-building function and CENTAF’s Afghan Air Corps capacity-building initiative should be realigned to USEUCOM and integrated with NATO staffs. They should directly support the commander ISAF, with headquarters ISAF and CSTC-A reporting to the same boss, SACEUR/CINCEUR. This would allow for needed synchronization of ANA training and fielding with ISAF operations, something that has been dysfunctional under current command arrangements. Forces under ISAF mandate have a problematic relationship with CSTC-A (under OEF mandate). The training, equipping, and fielding of ANA battalions (Kandaks), their integration into operations, and their continued mentoring and sustainment are essential elements to ISAF mission success. But ISAF controls nothing in the process. Each NATO operation relies upon ANA. Yet, the allocation of ANA Kandaks is controlled by the United States. For the past 3 years, this has been largely disproportional, with U.S. SOF and U.S. conventional forces in Regional Command East getting the majority share. This has left NATO nations scrambling to get a bilateral commitment from the United States for Kandak partnerships. NATO members resent this. While the United States has stated a desire for the “NATO-ization” of the CSTC-A mission, its Title 10 and Title 22 funding (NATO will not assume the two billion dollar price tag) necessitates that it have more U.S. national and less alliance accountability. But this could be served under EUCOM, allowing the integration of NATO money and personnel considerably easier and more palatable to Europeans.

Realignment under U.S. EUCOM (with EUCOM JFLCC and JFACC) would require the establishment of a coalition air operations center (CAOC) for operations in the Afghanistan JOA. This would alleviate current problems associated with reliance upon a singular CENTCOM CFACC/CAOC that provides ISR and CAS for competing missions.
in Afghanistan and Iraq. In the current construct, ISAF is severely disenfranchised, as there is no formal relationship between NATO and the CENTCOM CFACC (NATO officers are not even allowed into Qatar to serve in the CAOC as there are no standing forces agreements between NATO and Qatar). Presently, ISAF must work diplomatically through U.S. officers to secure the CENTCOM assets. This creates a perception among NATO partners that they are not receiving proper allocation of this support. This is unfair, because CAS remains one of the most reliable assets in Afghanistan, but the perception remains that NATO efforts are second fiddle to OIF and OEF by virtue of a command structure that cannot alleviate the suspicion. Creation of a EUCOM/NATO CAOC would give the ISAF commander a supporting air component that would be responsive to the same chain of command (SACEUR/CINCEUR), and create unity of command so lacking today.

ISAF commanders work beside U.S. SOF daily, and there is significant mixing of all forces in certain areas of Afghanistan. However, that these forces operate under different mandates and report to different combatant commanders remains problematic. U.S. SOF are governed by OEF and GWOT missions that emphasize foreign internal defense (FID) and counterterrorism, with reporting through the CJSOTF to either CENTCOM or SOCOM. ISAF does not involve itself in FID or counterterrorism, but is fighting in a counterinsurgency role in the same geographic area. This superimposition of different missions and chains of command upon the same piece of terrain is problematic. Most often these superimposed operations are well-coordinated and executed. However, recurring friction is inevitable when ISAF troops unintentionally compromise a SOF mission, or when SOF missions produce adverse effects that impact negatively upon ISAF soldiers. Unity of command is the central issue here, and the obvious improvement to be made is realignment of all special operations under a U.S./NATO CJSOTF responsible to EUCOM, who would coordinate with SOCOM. This would once again allow the ISAF commander to trust his boss—SACEUR/CINCEUR—to represent his concerns in Washington, while at the same time reduce allied suspicions about who was really in charge in Afghanistan.

Currently the CENTCOM JIATF attempts to coordinate with DOS to synchronize counternarcotics efforts in Afghanistan. Europeans remain frustrated with U.S. counternarcotics initiatives, and see the involvement of CENTCOM as indicative of a desire to continue U.S. unilateralism. The record high yields for opium production during the past 4 years attest to the failure of this effort, and reinforce European skepticism. It is difficult to argue that theater unity of command under SACEUR/CINCEUR will solve the issues of counternarcotics coordination; but centralization of the U.S. effort in Europe would certainly help. The opium problem is one of strategic import, and requires a unified strategy that can only be produced by a multilateral body that can formulate strategy and prioritize in a manner similar to the work of the CCS during World War II. It is an issue for the NAC. So, too, is the concern about how best to engage Pakistan and other regional neighbors. Currently, CINCCENT has the U.S. lead with regard to this critical function, and SACEUR, whose troops are bearing the brunt of perennial insurgent offenses from Pakistan, remains as hamstrung as COMUSMACV was in dealing with communist force incursions into South Vietnam. The problem is that the Taliban insurgency, like that of opium, has regional dimensions and requires multilateral strategy and commitments. These problems are by their nature long term, necessitating commitment of multinational
resources for decades to come. The NAC has 60 years of verifiable success in dealing with these sorts of complex issues, and, once it passes through the frustrating process of strategy formulation, offers the advantage of an enduring alliance as the mechanism to ensure that such commitments can be sustained. Its longevity and its ability at formulating acceptable strategy give it a clear advantage over the ad hoc coalitions that are currently eroding in OEF, OIF, and the GWOT.

Solving the command problem in Afghanistan requires renewal of our understanding of the principle of unity of command. It requires recognition of the wisdom of Pershing, Marshall, and Eisenhower, and of reaching again an appreciation for the importance of singularity of purpose, and simplicity that comes with investiture in a “supreme commander.” It is, therefore, the conclusion of this research that we must amend the UCP and invest supreme command over Afghanistan in SACEUR. In order to galvanize NATO alliance partners and begin the difficult process of coalition building around a NATO-run fight, while keeping parallel American capabilities in-theater, the entire OEF joint operating area (JOA) must be realigned under EUCOM, and EUCOM must be designated as a supported combatant command. The ISAF Headquarters in Kabul should be designated as an integrated sub-unified command under EUCOM to report directly to SHAPE. Separate EUCOM CFLCC, JFACC, and JFSOCC must be established so that the Afghan fight can receive proper Title 10, air, ISR, and SOF support without having to go to Tampa for arbitration over which major operation—OIF or OEF/ISAF—gets priority. While hardly efficient from an American perspective, it is the only way that NATO partners can be integrated to fight under their traditional supreme commander, and under the alliance’s normal strategic war-management system.

Conclusion.

This Carlisle Paper has discussed the traditional importance of unity of command in U.S. doctrine and practice from World War I until now, and how this principle has been forsaken in the evolution of command construct in Afghanistan. It has argued for a renewal of understanding of the importance of unity of command, and recommends that the United States revert back to application of this principle by amending the UCP and granting responsibility for the current OEF JOA to USEUCOM. This would see two immediate improvements. First, it would invest SACEUR with the “supreme” authority over operations in Afghanistan that he presently is denied; second, it would make full use of a long-standing alliance to ensure the formulation of strategy and the sustainment of commitment that is obviously missing in the region today. This realignment would require designation of EUCOM as a supported combatant command, establishing EUCOM/NATO JFLCC and JFACC, the embedding within ISAF HQ the necessary elements to create an integrated subordinate unified command in Kabul, and streamlining the chain of command to have HQ ISAF report directly to SHAPE and SACEUR. To ensure full unity of command, the United States should transfer its counternarcotics and regional engagement functions to the NAC and NATO military council, and consolidate Title 10 and special operations functions under EUCOM.

Failure to address the current problems of unity of command will result in the failure of the alliance—and the coalition—in Afghanistan. The threats posed by the large-scale
and enduring cross-border insurgency, steadily growing opium production, and endemic corruption, are sufficient to defeat our bifurcated military and civilian efforts in that conflicted country. We should heed the words of Eisenhower:

Alliances in the past have often done no more than to name the common foe, and “unity of command” has been a pious aspiration thinly disguising the national jealousies, ambitions and recriminations of high ranking officers, unwilling to subordinate themselves or their forces to a command of different nationality or different service. . . . I was determined, from the first, to do all in my power to make this a truly Allied Force, with real unity of command and centralization of administrative responsibility. 52

ENDNOTES


Unity of Command. The decisive application of full combat power requires unity of command. Unity of command results in unity of effort by coordinated action of all forces toward a common goal. Coordination may be achieved by direction or by cooperation. It is best achieved by vesting a single commander with requisite authority.


4. This reliance upon anecdotal evidence is regrettable but necessary to keep this paper unclassified. Evidence is drawn from interviews with U.S. and allied officers with experience in Afghanistan, HQ CENTCOM, HQ JFC Brunssum, HQ ISAF, and various other headquarters. The author’s own experience is contributory in the part three analysis. He is a graduate of the U.S. Army C&GSC and SAMS, 2000; has worked within the USEUCOM Joint Planning Group 2001-2002; was a special adviser, plans to Commander ISAF V Lieutenant-General Hillier in 2004; commanded the Canadian Task Force Orion (OEF) in Kandahar 2006; was the Canadian Liaison Officer to HQ USCENTCOM 2006-07; and graduated from the U.S. Army War College in 2008.


9. For a review of the dynamics of supreme command under Foch, see Dominick Graham and Shelford Bidwell, *Coalitions Politicians & Generals: Some Aspects of Command in Two World Wars*, London: Brassey’s, 1993, pp. 63, 142-149. Pershing objected strongly to Foch’s demand for American divisional participation (under French command) in the offensives of September 1918. Pershing remembers countering this: “Marshal Foch, you may insist all you please, but I decline absolutely to agree to your plan. While our army will fight wherever you may decide, it will not fight except as an independent American army.” Quoted in John J. Pershing, *My Experiences in the World War*, New York: Frederick A. Stokes Co., 2 Vols, 1931, Vol. II, pp. 246-247. General Foch recorded exchanges with Pershing in a more favorable light, remembering Pershing’s offer of troops during the dark days of March 1918:

   General Pershing had come to see me and, with magnificent spirit, spontaneously offered to throw immediately into the battle all the trained American divisions. General Bliss, the American representative on the Versailles committee, animated by a similar sentiment, exclaimed to me: “We have come over here to get ourselves killed; if you want to use us, what are you waiting for?”


13. The evolution of the principles of war in U.S. Army doctrine follows closely similar developments in Europe and is intricately connected to the progressive intellectual movement. The U.S. Army began in 1892 to attempt to codify enduring standards, establishing for the first time proper army regulations in War Department; *Troops in Company Regulations for the Army of the United States*, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1892. These were augmented in the early 20th century by field regulations that addressed enduring standards in the conduct of war, beginning in 1905 with War Department; *The Field Service Regulations, United States Army*, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1905. The first discovered use of the principle of “unity of command” was found in the 1914 version of *Regulations*; see War Department, Office of the Chief of Staff, *Field Service Regulations, U.S. Army*, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1914, pp. 67-68, in Article V Combat Principles. After World War I, the U.S. Army moved away from the field service regulations, replacing them with “training circulars,” “training manuals,” and “training regulations.” In professional military curricula, the principles of war were officially adopted. However, the army was heavily influenced by European thinking, and the articulation of exact principles oscillated between American, British, and French percepts. J. F. C. Fuller’s principles dominated in the immediate post-war era, and the American principle of “unity of command” was replaced in the 1920s by “cooperation.” See War Department, TR-10-5, *Doctrine, Principles, and Methods*, Washington, DC:
War Department, 1921, pp. 1-2. Fuller’s influence however, only went so far in America. When British principles changed in 1923 from “cooperation” to “unity of effort,” the U.S. Army retained “cooperation” until 1931. See Great Britain, War Office, Field Service Regulations, Vol 1, Administration, London; The War Office, 1923, pp. 4-6. Under Colonel George Marshall, Chief of Infantry in the 1930s, the U.S. Army reestablished “unity of command” as a key principle, first in infantry manuals. See U.S. Army Infantry School, Tactics and Techniques of Infantry in Offensive Operations, United States Army Extension Course, Fort Benning, GA; Publication Section of the Infantry School, 1931, pp. 2-4. The U.S. Army retained the principle of “cooperation” until 1939. See U.S. Army Command and General Staff School, The Principles of Strategy for an Independent Corps or Army in a Theater of Operations, Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff School, 1936, p. 9. In 1939, Marshall’s influence prevailed, and the Staff School replaced Fuller’s “cooperation” with the French principle of “unity of effort” which stated: “Complete unity of a nation in war implies a single control over each effort and a uniting of all efforts under one head. In the armed forces, it is attained through unity of command.” See U.S. Army Command and General Staff School, The Offensive, Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff School, 1939, pp. 9-13. This was reiterated in the revamped Field Service Regulations of 1939. Here, “unity of effort” is defined as “…necessary to apply effectively the full combat power of the available forces. It is obtained through unity of command.” See Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army, War Department, Field Service Regulations (Tentative) Field Manual 100-5, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1939, pp. 27-29. This is changed again in the final version of the reinstated regulations as the principle of “unity of command.” See Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army, War Department, Field Service Regulations Operations, Field Manual 100-5, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1941, pp. 22-23. The principle of “unity of command” has been accepted since this publication. In many doctrinal manuals the principle of “unit of effort” reappears periodically, not to replace “unity of command” but as a descriptive principle. For instance, see U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Field Service Regulations Operations, Large Units, ST 100-15-1, Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1963, p. 7. As well, the principle of unity of command has been somewhat diluted by the emergence of unified action doctrine in the 1990s, which too often overshadows “unity of command” in doctrine manuals. See Peter Pace, Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations, Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, September 17, 2006, p. xiii, GL-32. Here “unity of command” is forsaken in adherence to much more abstract “unified action.” Only in descriptions of “unified command” does the principle of one supreme commander over joint forces shine through. However, despite muddying the doctrinal waters, the principle still remains the formal U.S. Army principle of war codified in U.S. military doctrine. See Department of the Army, Operational Terms and Graphics, Field Manual 1-02 (FM 101-5-1) MCRP 5-12A, Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, September 21, 2004, pp. 1-150.


15. Forrest C. Pogue, George Marshall: Ordeal and Hope 1939-1942, New York: The Viking Press, 1965, p. 375. See also Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning, pp. 123-127. At the Arcadia Conference in December 1941, Marshall had been successful in convincing prominent opponents of the “unified command” concept (most notably Winston Churchill) of the necessity of putting Lieutenant-General Sir Archibald Wavell in charge of all multinational army, navy, and air force units in the newly designated Southwest Pacific Area, descriptively named the Australian-British-Dutch-American Command (or ABDA). This command was short-lived after the losses incurred in subsequent Japanese offensives, but the principle of unified commands endured.

16. Marshall had witnessed the rivalry between Pershing and the CSA, General Peyton March, in 1917, due to Pershing’s insistence that he worked directly for the President, through the Secretary of War, and not the CSA. His understanding of his command function was exactly that of General U. S. Grant—the only civil authority he need report to was the President. This was easy to argue in a war being fought by the United States on only one front. Marshall faced a war of multiple theaters of operations, each with competing demands for resources, and he understood the role of the JCS in defining which theater had
priority. It is interesting to compare this understanding to the current UCP construct, where the Goldwater-
Nichols Act has robbed JCS of the function of prioritizing between theaters competing for requirements.
For an interpretation of the Marshall-Pershing relationship, see Graham and Bidwell, *Coalitions*, pp. 159-
163.

17. This system was an evolution from the Committee of Imperial Defence and the Imperial General
Staff systems that had proved effective in mobilizing, training, equipping, and fighting millions of British
imperial soldiers during World War I. See John Gooch, *The Plans of War: The General Staff and British Military

18. Graham and Bidwell, *Coalitions*, pp. 150-156. See also Matloff and Snell, *Strategic Planning*, pp. 166-
169.


23. For a full treatment of this relationship, see James C. Humes, *Eisenhower and Churchill: The Partnership

24. USN support for geographic unified commands containing personnel from all services was
predicated on reversing this decision in the Pacific. See Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,


the component commanders as deputies to the unified commander to ensure that the chain of command
was not being circumvented around the CINCs to the service chiefs.


the Air Component Commander, was more frustrated when non-U.S. aircraft refused to bomb certain
targets. As Clark states: “We paid a price in operational effectiveness by having to constrain the nature of
the operation to fit the political and legal concerns of NATO member nations, . . . but the price brought
significant strategic benefits.” See p. 476. SACEUR himself was frustrated with alliance operations when
his orders to seize the Pristina Airport (to prevent Russian entrance into Kosovo) were not executed by the
British national commander, General Jackson (see pp. 394-403).
32. This was not the view of SACEUR, who is extremely clear in his commitment to the Alliance. See Ibid., p. 447.


34. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld broke with American tradition and UCP practice by insisting upon redesignation of unified commanders from “commanders-in-chief” or “CINCs” to simply “commanders” in 2002. However, this paper will continue to use the term CINC in its original context to promote consistency of thought and practice and to avoid confusion.

35. These are a coalition force air component commander (CFACC), a coalition land force component commander (CFLCC), and a coalition force maritime component commander (CFMCC). For definition of Joint Force Commander (JFC) and breakdown of responsibilities of JFC and service component commanders, see Peter Pace, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 1-0, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, May 2006, pp. GL-8, and V-5 to V-18. For CLFCC, CFMCC and CFACC functions, see Peter Pace, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations, Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, September 2007, p. GL 19-20.


38. The U.S. military perspective until late 2003 was that the politics of Kabul would interfere with proper military operations in Afghanistan and should be avoided. See Ibid., p. 34.


41. This is from personal experience of the author while participating in planning for ISAF expansion in 2004-2005 as a member of HQ ISAF V, working through JFC Brunssum. Commander JFC Brunssum refused continuously to acknowledge an operational level function inside of Afghanistan, believing that the operational level resided fully at Brunssum. This caused considerable friction between the two HQs, and further confused relations between these HQs and CFC-A.


43. U.S. constitutional and budgetary limitations, particularly Title 10 and Title 22 responsibilities held within specific CENTCOM service component headquarters, could not be mixed within NATO headquarters. Therefore, it was necessary to retain a parallel U.S. command structure, but this was done without any defining relationship with JFC Brunssum or SHAPE.
44. CENTCOM commander still maintains responsibility for the following “Focus Areas” for Afghanistan: expand governance and security; support to counternarcotics efforts, resource and policy of PRTs; counterthreat finance work; and train and equip programs for Afghan security forces. Commander CENTCOM’s authorities extend also to supporting efforts to degrade violent extremist networks in Afghanistan and Pakistan and the hunt for High Value Targets; roles assumed by SOCOM and STRATCOM under their own mandates. STRATCOM’s functions in this fight include the provision of targeting support for—and prosecution of—global strike and global intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance missions, controlled by JFCC Bolling Air Force Base. U.S. budgetary and constitutional obstacles prevent Commander CENTCOM from assuming overall control of counternarcotics and Afghan National Police training efforts (directed by DOS). Therefore, he works through his Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) for visibility onto these nonmilitary issues. There are no relationships between the JIACG and NATO. This situation is exacerbated by the fact that there has never existed a coherent interagency plan for Afghanistan, something that debilitates both U.S. interdepartmental cohesion and multinational efforts. See William Flavin, “Planning for Conflict Termination and Post-Conflict Success,” Parameters, Vol. 33, No. 3, Autumn 2003, pp. 95-111.

45. Pogue, Supreme Command, pp. 56-97.

46. Commander Central Air Force (CENTAF – whose commander is also the CFACC supporting Afghanistan) has assumed responsibility for developing the Afghan Air Corps and created the Coalition Air Power Task Force (CAPTF) to execute this task. This Task Force is not part of CSTC-A, and has no relationship with NATO. CSTC-A also has no formal relationship with NATO, although its mission is essential to NATO tactical success.

47. U.S. military authorities will state that allocation of Kandaks resides solely with the Afghan Minister of Defense; however, in practice CSTC-A and the Regional Command Advisory Groups control Kandak allocation, training, and operations cycles. NATO nations must lobby at the national level to gain Kandak partnerships.

48. Throughout 2006, Canada, bearing most of the responsibility in RC-S, could not secure a single ANA company to partner with the large Canadian Task Force. As a result, that Task Force (Orion) conducted 27 offensive operations between January and August, supported by an average of only 20 ANA soldiers. Seven operations were conducted without any ANA involvement whatsoever, creating a situation where the only consistent “Afghan Face” on operations was that of the Taliban. A squad of senior Canadian generals had to broach this issue repeatedly with U.S. senior military authorities before Canada secured its first partnership, 15 months after deployment of forces to RC-S. The British experience in Helmand Province was the same. As the commander of Task Force Orion, the author can attest to the frustration and resentment this caused.

49. This would also make it easier for commander ISAF to soften U.S. SOF resistance to creating partnerships between ANA units and NATO forces, U.S. SOF believing that NATO is ill-suited for Foreign Internal Defense (FID), and that NATO forces will withdraw within a few short years, leaving their Afghan charges unsupported. This attitude is reflected in that the majority of ANA Kandaks are still partnered with U.S. SOF units in Afghanistan. To NATO, the CSTC-A issue regarding allocations of Kandaks is indicative of a U.S. preference for a CENTCOM-run OEF mission over support for a NATO-run ISAF mission. On another issue, migrating CSTC-A to EUCOM would allow NATO members already contributing to the train and equip mission of CSTC-A to formally alleviate some of the 2 billion U.S. dollar price tag associated with building to ANA, while not jeopardizing U.S. accountability for Title 10 funding.

50. At time of this writing, a military court of inquiry is still convened to look into the incident of March 4, 2007, in Nangahar Province where 19 civilians were killed and 50 injured during a Marine Corps special operations unit operation. The unit opened fire after its convoy was attacked by a suicide bomber. The Army brigade commander responsible for the region where the incident occurred, Colonel John Nicholson Jr., was not aware of the Marine special operations unit patrol in his area. “I was not aware that they
were out doing a mission. We weren’t sure who it was,” said Nicholson. He later learned the unit had conducted more than 30 operations, only five of which he had been notified of at the time. Nicholson had to subsequently apologize to local Afghans for the deaths and approve payments to families. This incident reflects several that have occurred during the past 3 years involving poor coordination between special operations missions and OEF/ISAF missions. See William M. Arkin, “Early Warning: Secret Operations: Supporting or Undermining the War on Terrorism?” available from [blog.washingtonpost.com/earlywarning/2008/01/secret_operations_undermine_th.html](http://blog.washingtonpost.com/earlywarning/2008/01/secret_operations_undermine_th.html) Internet, accessed January 15, 2008. See also “No Way to Win Hearts and Minds—America Apologizes for Killing Civilians,” Economist.com, May 9, 2007; and Carlotta Gall and David E. Sanger, “Civilian Deaths Undermine Allies’ War on Taliban,” New York Times, May 13, 2007, p. 12.

51. For instance, the 1942 revision of the 1936 U.S. Naval War College text cites the following:

Within the limits of human capacity, an organization can exert its combined effort with greater effect the more closely the exercise of command represents the act of a single competent commander. To divide the supreme command in any locality, or to vest it in a body rather than in an individual, is necessarily to diffuse responsibility. In that degree, there is then incurred the danger, through confusion of wills and ideas, of delaying decision and of creating corresponding diffusion of effort.


The first principle is that command must be vested in one individual. Applied to unified commands, this principle means that all organizational activities must conform to the fact that all assigned ground, naval, and air forces will be singly led and prepared to fight as one. The unified commander must have unquestioned authority over all units of his command to enable him to accomplish his mission and thereby discharge his responsibilities. Application of this principle further implies that the lines of authority be definite, clear-cut, and understood by all. Every individual should be indoctrinated with the fundamental concept of one boss at each level.

There must be centralized direction and decentralized execution; no plural or divided authority over one area of responsibility; and a minimum of levels of authority, and diffusion of responsibility.