Serious study of the American approach to waging war began in the early 1970s with the publication of Russell Weigley’s The American Way of War: A History of U.S. Military Strategy and Policy. Examining how war was thought about and practiced by key U.S. military and political figures from George Washington to Robert McNamara, Weigley concluded that, except in the early days of the nation’s existence, the American way of war centered on the desire to achieve a “crushing” military victory—either through a strategy of attrition or one of annihilation—over an adversary. U.S. military men and political leaders typically saw the destruction of an opponent’s armed might and the occupation of his capital as marking the end of war and the beginning of post-war negotiations. Thus, Americans—not unlike many of their European counterparts—considered war an alternative to bargaining, rather than part of an ongoing bargaining process, as in the Clausewitzian view. In other words, the American concept of war rarely extended beyond the winning of battles and campaigns to the gritty work of turning military victory into strategic success. Consequently, the American way of war was—to rephrase Weigley’s argument—more a way of battle than a way of war.

Although Weigley’s interpretation has stood the test of time—with most of the criticism only highlighting the exceptions that prove the rule—one recent counter-argument deserves mention. Max Boot’s Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power, published in 2002, contends that Americans have more than one way of war. Boot maintains that U.S. involvement in history’s “small wars”—such as the Boxer Rebellion, the Philippine Insurrection, and contemporary interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo—actually outnumbers its participation in major conflicts and is, therefore, deserving of inclusion in any description of the American style of warfighting. These small wars were fought not to attain decisive victory over an opponent, but for reasons related to inflicting punishment, ensuring protection, achieving pacification, and benefiting from profiteering. Boot’s interpretation, then, complements rather than displaces Weigley’s by broadening its focus. The American way of war thus looks like the proverbial coin with two sides.

In some respects, these two sides of the same coin are at diametrical odds with one another. One side—the Weigley interpretation—ultimately provides the intellectual foundation for the Powell Doctrine, which, briefly stated, says that wars should be fought only for vital national interests and must have clear political objectives and popular support. It further emphasizes that the military should be allowed to use overwhelming force and that the political leadership must have a sound exit strategy...
for bringing the troops home. Put simply, the Powell doctrine tends to constrain how
and why political leaders employ military force. Some might argue that this approach
leaves the grammar of war to dictate its logic. The Boot interpretation, in contrast,
describes a way of war that runs counter to the principles of the Powell Doctrine: it
rarely involves vital interests, clear political goals, popular support, or overwhelming
force, and routinely entails committing U.S. troops abroad for extended periods of time.

In one critical respect, however, the two interpretations agree: the American way of
war tends to shy away from thinking about the complicated process of turning military
triumphs—whether on the scale of major campaigns or small-unit actions—into
strategic successes. In part, this tendency stems from a systemic bifurcation in
American strategic thinking—though by no means unique to Americans—in which
military professionals prefer to concentrate on winning battles and campaigns, while
policymakers elect to focus on prevailing in the diplomatic struggles that precede and
influence, or are affected by, the actual fighting. In other words, both the Weigley and
Boot interpretations implicitly portray the American way of war as a way of battle more
than a way of war.

This aspect of the American way of war becomes even more important when one
considers that Boot’s writings go further than just describing another aspect of the
American way of war. In an article published in Foreign Affairs in 2003, he became one
of the heralds of a new American way of war—one based to a certain extent on his thesis
about the prevalence of small wars in U.S. history and their importance in the rise of
American power. This new American way of war, according to Boot, eschews the
traditional, industrial-age dependence on overwhelming force in favor of information-
age characteristics, such as “speed, maneuver, flexibility, and surprise,” all enabled by
greater use of “precision firepower, special forces, and psychological operations” and
jointness. Indeed, these characteristics bear a striking resemblance to the qualities of
“speed, jointness, knowledge, and precision” currently championed in the Office of the
Secretary of Defense.

However, this new American way of war risks falling into the same trap that snared
both the Weigley and Boot versions of the traditional one because it also tends to
confuse winning campaigns or small-scale actions with winning wars. After years of
self-examination in the wake of Vietnam, U.S. strategic thinking finally reached the
conclusion that winning a war really amounts to accomplishing one’s strategic objec-
tives. While this realization is taught in the higher echelons of professional military
education and is subscribed to by leading defense intellectuals, recent events suggest
that it is not yet a conscious part of the American way of war. The current capabilities-
based approach to defense planning, for example, is ultimately about the hardware
needed to move, shoot, and communicate across a global battlefield; in other words, it’s
about winning battles in the information age.

To move from a way of battle to a way of war, Americans must devote more time
and energy to thinking about the capabilities needed to turn combat successes into
favorable strategic outcomes. Happily, there is some reason for optimism. Recent
studies have outlined a few tentative steps the United States might take to improve its
performance in post-conflict operations, such as creating a force specifically trained and equipped to conduct them. One can debate the merits of this answer and whether it would work without a corresponding change in military culture, but solutions have to start somewhere. Another possibility is revamping the capabilities-based approach into one based on achieving strategic outcomes. Without too much difficulty one could modify the emerging concept of effects-based planning, which is oriented more toward tactical and operational planning, into something useful at the strategic level of war as well as in force programming. This measure would help harmonize strategic planning with force design. Nonetheless, recognizing the value of such suggestions is still a considerable step from implementing them. Until the American way of war develops the capability to make the leap from victory on the battlefield to strategic success, it will remain merely a way of battle.