


faiths, cultures, and civilizations. They quoted scripture, posited a Manichaeian world of good versus evil, and never ceased to evoke the Almighty and portray themselves as His righteous and wrathful agent. Both were deeply religious men who lived in realms of certitude fortified against doubt and criticism.”

If *Cultures of War* has a downside, it is Dower's attempt to keep too many themes and narratives in the air at the same time. *Cultures of War* can be read as several smaller books sheltered in a single volume. It is occasionally repetitious and somewhat disorderly. It is not on par with his magisterial *Embracing Defeat* or compelling *War Without Mercy*. That said, *Cultures of War* is an outstanding historian's convincing employment of Pearl Harbor, Hiroshima, and the American occupation of postwar Japan to improve our understanding of 9/11 and why things went so wrong for the United States in Iraq. It is reasoning by historical analogy at its best.



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256 pages

\$28.95

## ***Navy Strategic Culture: Why the Navy Thinks Differently***

by Roger W. Barnett

**Reviewed by Albert F. Lord Jr., CAPT (USN Retired),**  
former US Navy Senior Service Representative to the US  
Army War College

Roger Barnett is a master at describing the “peculiar psychology” of the Navy. Why naval officers look at the world in a unique way has mystified fellow military officers and civilians since at least the time of Henry Stimson's famous quote about the “dim religious world.” The author peels back the curtain and very effectively shows why the maritime environment shapes the world view and shows the tactical, operational, and strategic thought process of those who live and fight at sea.

The strength of this treatise lies in the first two-thirds of the book. He weaves naval history, an appreciation of the ocean environment, today's complex geopolitical situation, and military science throughout. Barnett builds his argument carefully, and his language will be familiar to recent graduates of US military war colleges.

The book starts with the recent ascension of Navy officers to the chairmanship of the joint chiefs of staff and the highest visibility combatant commands. He asserts the unique background of senior Navy officers and their appreciation for the day-to-day nature of military influence in the worldwide security arena allows them to think strategically. Culture specific to the US Navy is examined in depth and placed within that of the larger military. Not surprisingly, the demanding ocean domain is the greatest influence that gives the Navy its singular outlook. The ship is the embodiment of Navy culture and it builds teamwork, self-reliance, and an independence that culminates in the governing concept of command-at-sea. The faith and confidence placed in ship captains, those closest to the action, fosters a disdain for doctrine and limits to

freedom of action. Naval officers are comfortable with overarching concepts rather than definitions and know, like conditions at sea, the situation at hand is apt to change suddenly and without warning.


Barnett breaks down the maritime environment into physical, political, legal, and economic aspects. His examples are well-chosen but he fails to address the international tension of late concerning resources specifically in the Arctic or South China Sea. He continues by providing a primer on the differing strategies for employment of naval forces and rightly focuses on the expeditionary characteristics of naval forces and their unique contribution to the capabilities required of a modern joint force. He could have greatly strengthened his argument by highlighting how those strategies fit into current joint doctrine and he overstates the logistic self-sufficiency of naval task forces a bit. The role of technology has been and continues to be important to sailors and Barnett effectively convinces the reader why this is so. The genesis of network centric warfare (NCW) is the early work on Naval Tactical Data exchange developed in the 60s and continually refined since. In his description, however, he comes perilously close to over promising that NCW will cut through the fog of war to provide near 100 percent situational awareness to commanders. The maritime environment will never be fully transparent, above, on the surface, or under the sea. The above small criticisms do not detract from a valuable contribution which provides a window into the DNA of US naval officers.

The author also decided to address what he considers dangers to the Navy culture. In a chapter called “Retrospective” he decries the tendency to see the terrorist challenge as one of law enforcement and sees this as diluting the warfighting focus of the Navy. He states, “The Navy Strategic Culture is about the conduct of war; it is definitively not about law enforcement.” Nothing could be further from the truth. Throughout its history the Navy has had an international policing function. Safeguarding commerce against piracy, combatting the slave trade, enforcing international sanctions, counter drug and counter proliferation operations, and exercising freedom of navigation are core competencies—an essential part of the Navy’s ethos. The Navy’s ability to be an effective and credible interagency partner is essential to its 21st century defense identity. In addition, he takes on jointness by saying the Navy is inherently joint because of Naval aviation and the Marine Corps and can be described as “indifferent” to working in the joint arena. This contradicts his earlier supposition concerning the selection of Navy officers to the chairmanship and to lead the combatant commands. He also discounts the missions of mine and riverine warfare, seeing them as sideshows and not worth the investment they clearly deserve.

The greatest error is where Barnett addresses civil-military relations. Seemingly a proponent of the Powell Doctrine’s use of overwhelming force, he sees limitations put on the use of the military instrument of power or restrictive rules of engagement as too constraining. He also criticizes the apparent feminization of the Navy—the mixed-gender crews of ships—as having a deleterious effect on warfighting capability. His footnotes refer to sources that assert that any differences, physiological or psychological, between men

and women automatically disqualify women for combat roles. The USS Cole had a mixed-gender compliment in October of 2000 and the heroism on the part of the entire crew saved that ship. This reviewer served with women in combat during Operation Enduring Freedom and the fighting efficiency was not impaired, even during the longest at-sea deployment (158 days without a port visit) since World War II. Mixed-gender crews have served on combatant ships since the early 1990s; lessons were learned early on and, simply stated, good leadership and an effective command climate is essential to training a combat capable team and conducting operations. The ship has sailed on this issue.

There is much to recommend in *Navy Strategic Culture*. The author has written eloquently on the unique role of the Navy and its contribution to national defense strategy. In particular, the Navy's sister service officers will gain an education in the capabilities and thought processes required to put together a joint team. Barnett dilutes his powerful message, however, when he editorializes and tries to speak for current Navy strategists.



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## ***Blood on the Snow: The Carpathian Winter War of 1915***

by Graydon A. Tunstall

**Reviewed by Colonel James D. Scudieri**, Deputy Dean,  
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The Eastern Front of the Great War has arguably been the poor cousin of the Western Front as the First World War has been compared with the Second, in terms of renown. Tunstall has gone much further afield in his emphasis on just the Austro-Hungarian Carpathian Winter Campaign of 1915. His work is quite concise, a mere 212 pages of text in only six chapters. The first is the “Introduction,” takes about 15 percent of the space, and sets the stage for several key points. He returns to these key points throughout the text. Indeed, he reinforces them immediately and at length in the first chapter entitled “Background to the Battles,” which describes the preliminary operations and preparations for the “First Offensive.”

Tunstall soon establishes his focus on the Austro-Hungarian forces. He devotes considerable effort articulating the seemingly-insurmountable challenges that confronted the army of Franz Joseph. First, the author reiterates several times that the devastating losses by December 1914 had reduced the Hapsburg army to a militia. The casualties had been crippling, not merely in terms of simple numbers, but in particular among the professional officer corps, trained and educated to deal with a multi-ethnic military. Troops were increasingly older, less hardy, and lacked adequate training. In essence, the Austro-Hungarian Army suffered some 50 percent casualties overall in the opening operations during 1914.