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In this issue, we welcome three new members to our editorial board: Drs. Paul Kan, Janeen Klinger, and Marybeth Ulrich. All are accomplished professors from the US Army War College who broaden and deepen our pool of expertise. Sadly, we are also losing a long-standing and distinguished member of the board in Professor Leonard Fullenkamp; he is stepping down after more than twenty years of service. His thoughtful comments and candid insights will be missed.

Our summer issue opens with a Special Commentary, “The Lure of Strike,” by Conrad Crane. Crane reminds us where unfounded expectations have led us in the past. History never truly repeats itself, but sometimes it comes remarkably close. The practice of reducing strategic flexibility to save defense dollars has become something of a habit; but conditions have changed.

Our first forum, “Women in Battle,” builds on the recent decision by the US Secretary of Defense to rescind the 1994 Direct Ground Combat Definition and Assignment Rule (DGCAR). Rescinding the DGCAR means the tide has turned in favor of expanding the roles of women in combat. However, several critical issues remain, among which are adjusting military culture to accept new norms and developing objective standards to reflect modern combat tasks. Anthony King, “The Female Soldier,” shows the combat performance of women in Afghanistan and Iraq has, in fact, won over male counterparts. Ellen Haring, “What Women Bring to the Fight,” exposes the flaws in the most stubborn of arguments against full integration. Robert Egnell, “Gender Perspectives and Fighting,” suggests the US military would do well to reexamine all its traditional assumptions about war and gender as it assesses its performance in Iraq and Afghanistan.

If, as Socrates said, “the unexamined life is not worth living,” then surely “the unexamined war is not worth fighting.” In that spirit, our second forum, “A War Examined,” is the first in what will be a regular series for the Quarterly. It aims at assessing our own and others’ experience in war. This time, we take a look at our “Allies and Ethics” over more than a decade of war. Hew Strachan, “British National Strategy: Who Does It?” asks what has become of Britain’s capacity for making strategy. His essay reminds us that Americans are not the only ones who find it difficult to do strategy. We would also do well to remember our own failings in strategy have repercussions for some of our most valuable allies. George Mastroianni, “Understanding Abu Ghraib,” asks what “legitimate” lessons can be drawn from the Abu Ghraib events, and then offers six well-considered ones.

The third forum, “Dealing with Iran,” considers the prospects for easing tensions between the United States and Iran. There are no easy answers; however, Gawdat Bahgat, “The Iranian Nuclear Crisis: An Assessment,” lays out a reasonable path for rapprochement. Christopher Bolan, “The Iranian Nuclear Debate: More Myths than Facts,” clarifies some of the realities of the situation regarding Iran’s nuclear program. With the outcome of recent elections in Iran, pundits are cautiously optimistic. However, it is difficult to see whom time actually favors in this case.

Our fourth forum, “After the Arab Spring,” asks what changed in the Arab world as a result of the wave of reform that began in early
2011 and what it means for US interests. Zoltan Barany, “Revolt and Resilience in the Arab Kingdoms,” argues Arab monarchies in the Persian Gulf region survived largely intact. They managed to “purchase peace” through social programs and financial incentives, or ceded only minor concessions to a disjointed political opposition. Andrew Terrill’s review essay examines the latest scholarship on political reform in the Middle East, and offers some implications for the US military. The transitions in the Middle East work against US military intervention on any scale, especially in Syria.

We are pleased to feature some probing comments by Tom Ricks, Ulrike Franke, and Robert Gregory on articles from the previous issue. The authors’ replies appear as well. As always, we welcome comments and questions from our readers. Your participation benefits all of us. ~ AJE
Special Commentary

The Lure of Strike

Conrad C. Crane

ABSTRACT: An increasingly important part of the new American Way of War has been a reliance on standoff technology to project power. The “lure” is minimal friendly casualties and short, inexpensive wars with only limited landpower commitments. Unfortunately, inflated expectations for such an outcome have often led to strategic overreach and a dangerously unbalanced force structure, ultimately costing the nation more blood and treasure. As the United States tries to refocus its strategy and reduce defense expenditures, it must be careful to retain a balanced force with a full range of capabilities.

There are two approaches to waging war, asymmetric and stupid. Every competent belligerent looks for an edge over its adversaries. No country is more asymmetric in warfighting than the United States. An increasingly important part of the new American Way of War has been a reliance on stand-off technology to project power, with a promise of reduced friendly casualties and short, tidy wars with limited landpower commitments. Unfortunately, this predilection has often led to strategic overreach and a dangerously unbalanced force structure, eventually costing the nation much in blood and treasure.

Buoyed by the popular seapower theories of Alfred Thayer Mahan, and a new maritime strategy to exploit an expanding industrial base, the US Navy in 1898 showed itself to be a world-class force. In February of that year, Assistant Secretary of the Navy and ardent expansionist Theodore Roosevelt took advantage of an afternoon while his boss was away to order his Asiatic Squadron to wartime readiness. When war was declared against Spain in April, Admiral George Dewey sailed for Manila, where on 1 May 1898 his modern flotilla systematically destroyed Spanish naval power in the Pacific, suffering only one dead and nine wounded in the process. Though official planning had envisioned the Philippines as only a secondary theater, Dewey cabled for land forces to exploit his success. “For tenure of the land you must have the man with the rifle,” he stated, as Spanish forces still controlled the capital and the rest of the islands. The McKinley administration scrambled to mobilize soldiers to send to the Pacific. Already stretched by requirements for campaigns in the Caribbean, the Army was forced to cull together another 20,000 volunteers and regulars under the command of Major General Wesley Merritt. They arrived in the Philippines during the summer, soon launching combat operations to secure Manila. By the time the Philippine-American War ended in 1902, as many as 125,000


Dr. Conrad C. Crane is Chief of Historical Services for the Army Heritage and Education Center. Her has served as Director of the US Army Military History Institute and as Professor of History at the US Military Academy; He has authored or edited several books on the Civil War, WWI, WWII, Korea, Vietnam, and lectured widely on airpower and landpower issues.
American troops had participated, far more than in the projected main theater in the Caribbean; over 4,000 had died.²

Mahan and his seapower theories, along with burgeoning economic interests, inspired American leaders to modernize and expand the Navy, creating a technological impetus for an ambitious strategy during the Spanish-American War that did not pay adequate attention to landpower requirements. The invention of the airplane would bring more of the same. The earliest coherent body of airpower theory was created by the Italian Giulio Douhet. He advocated that nations invest their defense resources primarily in an independent air service that would first achieve “command of the air” over an opponent’s territory and then win wars quickly by bombing cities until panicked civilians forced their government to capitulate.³ American airmen in the 1930s, however, developed a different approach based on the promise of precision attacks. Studying New York City as a model, they concluded that destroying only seventeen targets within its transportation, water, and electrical systems would render the city uninhabitable without mass casualties. They expanded their war-winning theory to exploiting key vulnerabilities in the economies of industrialized nations and developed the precision-bombing concept that has shaped the evolution and application of American airpower ever since.⁴

Although not a part of official Army doctrine, the concept became a part of American plans for World War II when officers in the Air War Plans Division developed requirements for aerial munitions and resources to defeat Germany without an invasion and got them attached to the “Victory Plan” of 1941.⁵ The 1942 plans called for 273 air groups to conduct an ambitious bombing program against enemy homelands. Those demands, combined with the needs of American industry and the Navy, severely limited the number of ground divisions available for combat. Instead of the 334 Army divisions projected by the Joint Chiefs of Staff early in the war, they had to resort to the “Ninety Division Gamble.” By Victory over Japan (V-J) Day, all 89 active divisions were deployed and all but two had seen combat. When the Germans launched their surprise attacks in the Battle of the Bulge and Operation Nordwind, the American Army in Europe was already desperate for ground replacements, and was retraining thousands of airmen to be infantrymen. Even five more total divisions would have made a significant difference for the ground effort, providing a strategic reserve, more replacements, and flexibility for commanders. If Axis forces had been able to mount another ground offensive in early 1945, there would have been no additional American troops available to respond.⁶ Although the


⁵ Ibid., 24-27.

air forces made significant contributions to the war effort they were not as decisive as projected, and much effort was redundant or wasted. Even when the Army Air Forces reached their peak deployment level in April 1945, only 90 percent of available combat air groups had been deployed overseas, (and only 224 of the 273 planned), and not all to combat theaters. When the war ended, 12,000 unused first-line aircraft were sitting on airfields at home, one third of the total available for service.7

After the conclusion of the war, the US Strategic Bombing Survey, an apparently objective evaluation of airpower that in reality was stacked to support Air Force desires for independence, provided plenty of evidence so airpower supporters could trumpet its successes while blaming shortsighted targeting and bombing restrictions for its lack of decisiveness. They argued counterfactually that earlier focus on objectives like oil or electric power would have brought victory through airpower in Europe, and extended city bombing or transportation attacks would have forced Japan to capitulate without dropping atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.8

The other consistent theme for postwar claims was that new technology promised even better results from air attacks in the future, in this case through the use of atomic bombs; this lure proved especially attractive for decisionmakers trying to maintain American military power and save money. Despite postwar defense cutbacks, considerable expenditures were committed to strengthening Strategic Air Command for nuclear attacks on the Soviet Union. As a result, when North Korea attacked south in 1950, the United States had an Army unprepared for “that kind of war,” and an Air Force so focused on strategic bombing that it had to retrain and reconfigure to perform theater air missions or close air support. Concentrating on technological “silver bullets” can distort any service. With key strategic targets off limits for political reasons, alternative approaches like aerial interdiction failed to achieve desired results. One of the key findings at the MacArthur hearings was that “too much was expected of the air.”9

As airmen searched for valid targets that could influence enemy decisionmaking, they escalated operations against cities and “dual-use” military-civilian targets, a trend in most American air wars, including the Kosovo campaign. Asian expert Selig Harrison claims that a primary justification for the current North Korean nuclear and missile programs is the desire to deter another bombing campaign like the one that wrecked all their cities and towns from 1950-1953.10

Though there was no organized evaluation of American bombing in Korea, the United States Air Force (USAF) claimed without any real evidence that its “Air Pressure” campaign against hydroelectric plants, cities, and irrigation dams had been decisive in persuading the Communists to agree to the 1953 armistice. President Eisenhower

believed his threats to use atomic bombs had really done that, and the USAF took advantage of his leanings toward reliance on such weapons and desire to cut the defense budget to become the big winner in the “New Look” defense programs of the 1950s. The nation’s resulting decline in conventional capability encouraged adversaries to develop nontechnological approaches that were successful in Cuba, Laos, and Vietnam. Again Strategic Air Command benefited, and again the USAF entered a limited war in Vietnam with doctrine, equipment, and training inadequate for its combat requirements. The Army also suffered from its own abortive experimentation with the lure of the “Pentomic Division,” in addition to structural deficiencies resulting from budget reductions.

This time it was the Johnson administration believing in a technological chimera and placing high hopes on airpower. The subsequent failures of aerial interdiction and Operation Rolling Thunder repeated lessons from Korea. In 1954, in response to French requests for support, Army Chief of Staff General Matthew Ridgway warned that initial reliance on airpower to solve problems in Indochina would lead to extensive ground force commitments, and his prescience was very evident a decade later. The apparent success of Operations Linebacker I and Linebacker II near the end of the Vietnam War in 1972 allowed proponents of airpower to claim decisiveness in forcing enemy acceptance of peace terms. Mark Clodfelter, however, demonstrated that the bombing campaigns were probably most effective at reassuring South Vietnamese leaders and obtaining their approval of the Paris Peace Accords. The North Vietnamese did not lose anything after delaying their own signing of the agreement. President Nixon and Secretary Kissinger expected American airpower would be the guarantor of South Vietnamese independence, but by 1975 political constraints prevented its use to save the beleaguered country. Even if it had been available, the backlash from more bombing would have probably been counterproductive by coalescing domestic and international opposition against it.

USAF leaders complained that they could have won the Vietnam War by themselves in two weeks if allowed to bomb the way they wanted. Despite such arguments, the Carter-Reagan build-up produced a balanced force structure with multiple capabilities that performed brilliantly in Operations Just Cause and Desert Storm. AirLand Battle doctrine orchestrated a powerful synergy of joint forces. Fixed in place by the Allied ground threat in the Gulf War, the Iraqi army was pummeled by weeks of air strikes that severely weakened it. Still, the key Republican Guard was relatively untouched and needed to be decimated by the overwhelming 100-hour ground assault that drove out the invading forces. Before the dust settled on a liberated Kuwait, airpower proponents like Merrill McPeak and Richard Hallion were heralding the beginning of a new era where airpower using stealth and precision

14 Mark Clodfelter, The Limits of Airpower, 206-207.
munitions could defeat field armies, hold ground, and win wars on its own.\textsuperscript{15} When the Gulf War Air Power Survey found that many airpower claims were exaggerated, the USAF limited the report’s publication.\textsuperscript{16}

Operations in the Balkans in the 1990s again elicited a combination of triumphalist claims for modern technology and complaints about targeting restrictions. Misperceptions about the accomplishments of airpower in Operation Deliberate Force contributed to exaggerated expectations for Operation Allied Force. The key element that brought the Serbs to agree to the Dayton Accords was not the brief bombing campaign, but the rampage of the Croatian and Bosnian armies into Serb-held territory. Airpower without landpower had failed miserably to save Srebrenica, for instance, and USAF leaders were very cautious not to promise decisive results before Operation Deliberate Force started, but soon afterwards the most zealous airmen were using their interpretation of the bombing to make their usual claims of independent decisiveness.\textsuperscript{17}

These exaggerations reinforced perceptions in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) that airpower alone could achieve alliance goals in Kosovo. That unfortunate decision cost the lives of many Kosovars. President Clinton announced to the nation that the bombing operation had three primary objectives: to stop the ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, to prevent an even bloodier Serbian offensive against civilians there, and to “seriously damage” the Serbian military capacity to do such harm.\textsuperscript{18} Bombing did not achieve any of those goals, and in fact helped exacerbate the second.

There is a wide consensus that the air campaign did very little damage to Serb forces in Kosovo, and what success it did achieve in finally forcing a settlement came from the massive destruction it wreaked in the Yugoslav civilian infrastructure made possible by the bombing of the “dual-use” targets mentioned earlier.\textsuperscript{19} The president of the World Bank expressed concern about the ability of his organization to fund repairs of the billions of dollars in damage from the bombing, and the destruction of transportation and industrial facilities had economic repercussions throughout the region.\textsuperscript{20} Additionally, the Belgrade Center for Human Rights predicted, “the biggest collateral damage will be the shattered possibilities for democracy in Serbia,” because of the

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{16} Gentile, 188-190.
\end{itemize}
backlash against Western values resulting from the perceived brutality of the air campaign.  

Airmen again were cautious at the beginning of Operation Allied Force about predicting a quick victory, instead complaining that political restrictions were holding them back, as the air war expanded to 34,000 sorties over 78 days. However, afterwards they widely circulated the remarks by historian John Keegan that the results “proved that a war can be won by airpower alone.” The Air Force Association quickly published a well-illustrated pamphlet entitled “The Kosovo Campaign: Aerospace Power Made It Work,” which conveniently neglected to mention that the air campaign failed to meet the initial goals set for it or to achieve a settlement as comprehensive as the one President Milosevic rejected at Rambouillet. It also did not emphasize problems with weather, intelligence, bomb damage assessment, and technical failures that continued to affect air operations, and downplayed any contributions from diplomacy or the threat of ground action in ending the conflict. Overzealous proponents of airpower also ignore the international clamor always caused by their bombing. A study by the Project on Defense Alternatives concluded that excessive reliance on strategic air attacks leads to “more mistakes of strategic import, increased turmoil within coalitions, bigger postwar aftershocks, and international disapproval.” Much of this negative reaction comes from perceptions of excessive collateral damage. Enemies in recent conflicts have become very adept at displaying images of shattered mosques and dead children, and blaming them on American military actions. While landpower can be just as guilty as airpower in causing such damage, who controls the ground controls the message, and ground forces are much more able to quickly stabilize such situations and ensure they are properly reported.

In addition, it must be noted that although airpower was the main American military contribution to coerce successful negotiations ending the conflicts in Bosnia and Kosovo, extensive landpower commitments were still necessary to make the agreements work. The 1st Armored Division was part of a force of 60,000 NATO troops deployed to stabilize Bosnia. President Clinton’s announcement that US involvement in the operation would last less than a year was wishful thinking at best, political chicanery at worst. Although the Stabilization Force was finally terminated in 2004, the European Union maintains peacekeepers there today. The Kosovo Force (KFOR) in 1999 consisted of 30,000 NATO troops to keep the peace after Milosevic relented, not including the Russian forces who also raced into the province. The main American base there remains Camp Bondsteel. KFOR and the United

23 Rebecca Grant, The Kosovo Campaign: Aerospace Power Made It Work (Arlington, VA: Air Force Association, 1999). For some differing opinions on the results and impacts of the bombing campaign by two RAND researchers, see Benjamin S. Lameth, NATO’s Air War for Kosovo: A Strategic and Operational Assessment (Santa Monica: RAND, 2001) and Stephen T. Hosmer, The Conflict Over Kosovo: Why Milosevic Decided to Settle When He Did (Santa Monica: RAND, 2001).
Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, established for an initial period of 12 months in June 1999, still exist.26 In the long run the stability preserved by these extended ground commitments must be judged worth the cost, but they were not projected when American airpower was initially committed to the operations.

Inflated expectations from technology leading to strategic overreach and unexpected ground commitments, so evident in our past history, played out in both Afghanistan and Iraq over the last decade. The speed of the Taliban’s collapse in the former, facilitated by American Special Forces calling in airstrikes from horseback, surprised everyone, and encouraged Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and his supporters who envisioned a defense establishment relying heavily on precision strikes while saving money by significantly cutting ground forces. They were much attracted by the arguments about technological overmatch expounded by Harlan Ullman, James Wade, and others in their book Shock and Awe: Achieving Rapid Dominance. Despite warnings from analysts about drawing too many conclusions from the unique Afghan scenario or expecting too much from technology, Rumsfeld sent Douglas Macgregor to United States Central Command (CENTCOM) headquarters in early 2002 to argue that a 15,000-man armor-heavy ground force would be enough to conquer Baghdad, with an additional 15,000 infantry added later to stabilize the country after the regime fell.27

Under Rumsfeld’s unrelenting pressure, the number of ground forces planned for the invasion of Iraq declined substantially. In both Afghanistan and Iraq, nonexistent or inadequate plans for what happened after the end of major combat, “Phase IV operations,” and insufficient ground force commitments, resulted in messy aftermaths and a decade of complex counterinsurgency that no one wanted or expected, to a large extent the result of inflated expectations for the capabilities of military technology of political and military leaders.28

Recent security actions by President Obama and his administration demonstrate a strong inclination to avoid this historic pattern, primarily by choosing not to commit landpower, even though the lure of standoff strike remains an attractive military option. Emphasis on Air-Sea Battle with the “rebalance” to the Pacific implies that significant land activities will not be essential to achieve military objectives in that important region. The recent campaign to bring down the Gaddhafi regime in Libya shows a willingness to apply airpower to support indigenous forces, as in Afghanistan, while accepting continued turmoil in the country, the destabilization of neighboring states like Mali, and the proliferation of

weapons in the region, as acceptable risks or outcomes too difficult or expensive to prevent with our own ground commitment. The refusal to intervene at all in the morass of Syria is another way to avoid overreach, though the ongoing chaos is ugly and deadly. There is, however, another possible way to view these options. It is obvious that the United States cannot count on indigenous forces or allies to advance our interests. Though ground commitments are often very messy, an early deployment of sizeable professional American land forces can control a situation before it spirals out of control, preserve our interests, and allow others to take over long-term constabulary roles. The key question for American decisionmakers is “How much chaos are you willing to accept in the world, and where?” If stability in a region in turmoil is deemed in our national interest, that will not be achieved by long-range strikes.

As part of the usual national backlash against major wars, there will be an inevitable cut in the number of active American ground forces. The Army grew by 90,000 soldiers in the last decade to meet demands in Afghanistan and Iraq, and it is probably correct that there should be reductions as the wars wind down. The slowness of that growth, however, reveals an important truth about contemporary myths regarding how quickly the United States can expand its military forces. In the past, the armed forces were able to endure significant peacetime cuts and still meet increased requirements for a crisis because of an effective Selective Service system and a robust industrial base. Neither of those exists today. Force structure decisions made in the current fiscally constrained environment for the Total Force will be impossible to augment in a timely manner if the strategic assumptions on which they are based are flawed. Decisionmakers must be careful to maintain enough military power to handle all contingencies, even those involving major ground forces. A balanced joint force allows a choice of asymmetries to exploit. Eventually, chaos somewhere will be unacceptable to national interests, and again will require significant landpower involvement. Or the lure of easy results through standoff technology might again lead to an unintended complex conflict in an unexpected place. When that time comes, hopefully American political leaders seeking “more bang for the buck” will not have been seduced by exorbitant expectations of technology, or the nation and its allies will pay the price in blood and treasure, and perhaps even strategic failure. Those are the costs of an unbalanced force structure and a lack of the full range of military capabilities.
Women in Battle

The Female Soldier

Anthony C. King
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Abstract: Since the 1970s, women have been increasingly integrated into the military; in Iraq and Afghanistan many women served on the frontline in combat. This article argues women’s integration has been facilitated by the all-volunteer professional forces in which individuals are judged purely by competence. Female soldiers have been accepted in all military roles if they perform competently. There are serious limitations in the infantry, however, as only a small number of women pass the selection tests and it is likely no more than one percent of the infantry could be female at present. Moreover, masculine prejudices abound and women are still the victims of discrimination, harassment, and abuse.

The accession of women into the United States combat arms, announced on 24 January 2013 by Defense Secretary Leon Panetta following a unanimous decision by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has been welcomed by many. The decision, however, remains controversial and there are some who oppose it. Indeed, Martin van Creveld, a long-standing opponent of female integration, has anticipated some arguments that opponents of integration may use. Van Creveld claims that not only are male soldiers “often obliged to undertake additional hardship in order to compensate for women’s physical weakness” but because women are weaker, “for them [men] to undergo military training and serve alongside women represents a humiliation.”

For van Creveld, the inclusion of women into the armed forces corrodes the bonds among male soldiers, vitiating the honor of service. Indeed, David Frum, a contributing editor of Newsweek recently rejected Panetta’s ruling on similar grounds. Citing Kingsley Browne’s work Co-ed Combat: The New Evidence That Women Shouldn’t Fight the Nation’s Wars, Frum argues that women are too weak physically to perform as combat soldiers and they undermine the cohesiveness of all-male groups. Even women who are strong enough to serve in combat present a problem because the armed forces, focused on war-winning (not employment equality), are unable to apply gender-blind standards to women; they cannot treat them equally and tend to be too lenient. If van Creveld, Browne, and Frum are right, Leon Panetta and the Joint Chiefs of Staff have made a serious mistake.

It is pertinent and perhaps necessary to assess the issue of female accession. Drawing on archival research, and interview and fieldwork research in Britain, Canada, France, Germany, and the United States, this article attempts to identify the conditions most likely to expedite the successful integration of women into the combat arms following Panetta’s announcement—and to highlight likely obstacles and

problems. Precisely because it represents the most complex example, the question of the possibility of female accession to the infantry, the most demanding military occupation, is the focus of my examination.

The Possibility of Integration

Van Creveld’s objections and the general opposition to women in combat are based on a presumption that a traditional form of masculinity remains essential to the performance of armies as an organization. There is little doubt that masculinity has been central to the performance of armies in the past. Indeed, the social sciences have explored the connection between manhood and combat performance. In their famous article on the Wehrmacht, Morris Janowitz and Edward Shils ascribed the extraordinary performance of this doomed army to the intense personal male bonds within the primary military group: “spatial proximity, capacity for intimate communication, the provision of paternal protectiveness by NCOs and junior officers, and the gratification of certain personality needs, e.g., manliness, by the military organization and its activities” were critical to performance. Indeed, Sam Stouffer in his study of US soldiers in the Second World War concurred, concluding that “combat posed a challenge for a man to prove himself to himself and others.” Masculinity was a key motivating factor used to encourage solidarity on the line and “the man who lived up to the code of the combat soldier had proved his manhood.”

Masculinity has been an important factor in cohesion and combat motivation, yet it would be a mistake to be insensitive to historic transformations. The classical studies of cohesion from the 1940s to 1970s were not necessarily flawed but it is critical to remember they analyzed mass citizen armies in existence at the time. Such forces are now rare in the west. Canada and the United Kingdom abolished conscription in early 1945 and 1960 respectively. The United States abolished national service in 1973 following the debacle in Vietnam, as did the Australians. Conscription was retained in most of Europe until the end of the Cold War, but in an increasingly attenuated form. Since then, all major European powers have abolished national service including, finally, Germany in 2011. Many scholars have observed the profound reformation of civil-military relations implied by the move to all-volunteer forces but the development of professionalism has great significance for military culture itself and especially for cohesion even down to the

3 This article is based on a wider comparative research project. See Anthony King, The Combat Soldier: Infantry Tactics and Cohesion in the Twentieth and Twenty-First Centuries (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), Chapter 11; Economic and Social Research Council, “Combat, Cohesion and Gender,” ESRC Grant ES/J006645/1.


primary group level. Although it is easy to presume continuity with the past, and indeed that connection is actively imagined by today’s service personnel, cohesion in a professional force takes on a markedly different character to that in a mass citizen army, where opportunities for training and preparation were extremely limited.

While no one would deny the intense bonds often evident among professional soldiers today, scholars have increasingly argued that the performance of today’s professional troops does not only, nor even primarily, depend upon their personal friendships (deep though these may be). On the contrary, collective combat performance—cohesion—relies more on training and professional competence. Accordingly, individuals are judged not so much on their personal characteristics but their professional ability and they are accepted into the section, platoon, or company on this basis. Reflecting this changing ethos in the armed forces, there has been increasingly heated debate among scholars about the primary basis of cohesion. Some scholars have continued to emphasize social cohesion based on the intimate bonds of friendship among soldiers. Yet, increasingly, scholars have stressed impersonal task-cohesion in which solidarity depends on the requirements of immediate goals, not friendship. The social identities of soldiers, and especially their social homogeneity, is less important than whether each fulfills his or her allotted role. Whether they can do the job is more important than likeness; that is, whether soldiers like each other and are like each other.

Indeed, American soldiers increasingly understand themselves in this way. In his widely read account of US paratroopers in the Korengal Valley in 2007-08, Sebastian Junger records a peculiar kind of comradeship among 2nd Platoon, Battle Company, 173rd Airborne Brigade. In the course of a narrative ostensibly dedicated to extolling brotherly cohesion, Sergeant O’Byrne (one of the central figures in Junger’s account) made a surprising admission. Rather than expatiating on his soldiers’ love for each other, he observed: “There are guys in the platoon who straight up hate each other.” Yet O’Byrne noted a paradox: “But they would also die for each other. So you kind of have to ask, ‘How much could I really hate the guy?’”

The paradox is interesting but can be resolved if it is

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12 Ibid, 79.
recognized that among these professional soldiers cohesion was not necessarily dependent on personal affection; it was based on competence. Specifically, in combat, Junger’s paratroopers united around their training, their drills, and the execution of these collective practices, whatever their personal differences. Bound by professional pride, they performed together; they did not need to like each other personally.

**Professionalized Cohesion**

There is some evidence that the phenomenon of professionalized cohesion has intensified in the last decade. In their work on the Israel Defense Force (IDF) in *Second Intifada*, Eyal Ben-Ari et al made an important and perhaps surprising observation. Organic Israeli combat units were reassembled and merged due to the exigencies of specific missions and troop availability; “the units were split time and time again—battalions into companies and companies into platoons and sometimes squads.”\(^13\) In place of social familiarity, IDF soldiers relied on swift trust to generate cohesion. They were able to cooperate with each other by reference to common tactics and procedures and adduced whether their new partners were competent and trustworthy in executing these tactics by means of accelerated processes of mutual testing.\(^14\) “Instead of cohesion based on face-to-face ties and long-term, stable relations, the Israeli military created rather loose, ad-hoc coalitions for specific tasks.”\(^15\) Significantly, and against the classical theory of military cohesion, swift trust seemed to be as effective as deep social cohesion: “troops do not necessarily know each other, but the variety of capabilities, equipment, and perspectives they bring to missions allows much flexibility and the use of the lethal potential of the military to its fullest potential.”\(^16\) Indeed, the deepened professional solidarity which Ben-Ari et al have observed in the IDF seems to have been very evident among western troops in Afghanistan and Iraq with the emergence of “Forward Operating Base (FOB) cohesion”: that is, an impersonal cohesion among individual soldiers who patrol together but who may have had very little prior social contact. Western soldiers are very aware of the changing basis of solidarity on the frontline and, in interviews, were explicit about the transformation:

> There is no longer the need for section level cohesion. You go out with a platoon consisting of various elements; there is Patrol Based cohesion. There is FOB cohesion. From a psychological perspective, friendship is developed by professionalism not because someone is in your section.\(^17\)

The rise of impersonal professional cohesion has been important to the armed forces but it may also be critical to the question of gender integration in the infantry. Although great care needs to be taken, the rise of an impersonal professional ethos suggests that (a very small minority of physically capable) women could be incorporated into the infantry. Women might be integrated into the infantry if they are judged like their male peers purely on their performance, not their gender, just as

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\(^{14}\) Ibid, 81.

\(^{15}\) Ibid, 87.

\(^{16}\) Ibid, 87.

\(^{17}\) OPTAG team, interview by author, Camp Bastion Helmand, Afghanistan, June 27, 2010.
ethnic minorities and gay men have been before them. Arbitrary social criteria became less important for inclusion than competence. Indeed, there is some evidence from Iraq and Afghanistan this is precisely what has happened.

**Successful Integration**

There have been a number of successful instances of integration in the United States, although precisely because they remain so few in number, the evidence tends to consist of a series of individual case studies. Nevertheless, these cases are informative. Clearly, great care needs to be taken with the necessarily small sample which the armed forces and academics have at their disposal to assess female integration. In Iraq and Afghanistan, the official rule (rescinded in 2011) on women’s exclusion from combat units was regularly breached by the semantic method of describing female soldiers working on the frontline as *attached* rather than *assigned* to combat units. In the close confines of a patrol base or FOB, the distinction was academic. Indeed many female soldiers noted the distinction is unsustainable and by any coherent standard women have served in combat for the last decade. These women have understood their integration as a process of professionalizing. For instance, Captain Tammy Duckworth, an army aviator who lost both legs when her Black Hawk was downed in Iraq, has noted the commandments from the Soldier’s Creed that “I will always place the mission first, I will never quit, I will never accept defeat,” and “I will never leave a fallen comrade” are gender-neutral statements that get to the heart of what it is to be an American soldier today.\(^{18}\) Significantly, Duckworth defines women’s role in professional terms: “This is our job . . . we’re there [on the frontline] and there to stay.”\(^ {19}\)

As Duckworth suggests, there have been a number of successful cases of mixed gender cohesion in combat operations, facilitated by the professional ethos of the US military where attached women are judged on the basis of their competence, not their sex. In the last ten years, a growing body of evidence provided by journalistic accounts and personal memoirs attests to this professionalized accession. These resources must be treated with some care as it is not always easy to corroborate the evidence presented in them. However, the best sources are at least as reliable as interviews or survey techniques and they have become a useful, if not definitive, archive of the experiences of American women in combat, especially when negotiating access into the US military is difficult. The journalist and former servicewoman Erin Solaro has provided some insightful material here. She noted that military police women were successfully attached to a special operations forces (SOF) unit in the Parwan in Afghanistan. These women found the SOF teams highly professional in their orientation and were willing to accept female soldiers on a professional basis.\(^ {20}\) In addition, she observed the women of the First Engineers, 101st Forward Support Battalion, known as the “lionesses.” They were regularly posted to combat units as attachments and were an interesting example of gender integration in combat. The


\(^{19}\) Ibid., xxiii.

\(^{20}\) Ibid., 115-121.
commanding officer of a battalion to which “lionesses” were attached observed the appearance of women in the combat zone with striking phlegmatism: “I don’t think this is a door-opening experiment, what we’ve done here. It can’t be used as the only case study for women in combat, but it is an interesting chapter.”

Similarly, in her unvarnished memoir, Kayla Williams, a military intelligence linguist specialist, was attached to the 101st Airborne Division in Iraq in 2003 and 2004. She had a number of difficult experiences due to her sex but she also provides clear evidence of the possibility of competent women integrating with combat units. She stressed how she had tried to meet the male standards for physical training and avoided any fraternizing while on operations, believing that both were crucial to her being accepted as a professional. Indeed, on an operation with a fire support team observing the Syrian border from a high point, she won the respect of that all-male team by driving her vehicle to the observation post up a dangerously steep and rocky incline while her male colleagues, afraid for their safety, had dismounted and walked. In Baghdad, she worked closely with Delta Company 1/187th Airborne Infantry. At the end of the tour, members of this unit who had worked with her went to great lengths to find her before she left to personally award her an Army Commendation Medal. The sergeant who presented the award observed: “In recognition of your work with us back in the spring… for service above and beyond… you really deserve it.” Williams was gratified by the acknowledgement of the infantry who almost never recognize support elements. These male soldiers respected her and the work she did for them; she was not discriminated against because of her sex. Reflecting this sense of integration, it is interesting to note her final dedication: “I want to thank the wonderful men and women with whom I served—and who serve today.” Williams experienced some of the most intense problems of a mixed-gender force in combat and yet, at the end of her work, she recalls only the comradeship—male and female—she experienced in Iraq.

Similar processes of de facto integration have been evident in the US Marine Corps (USMC). A Marine major, serving in Regional Command Southwest Afghanistan in 2010, noted that the US Marines had developed a female engagement program with a platoon of specially trained female Marines. These female Marines were embedded in combat units and had gone on patrols and operations with Marine infantry units. He emphasized, however, that the USMC is pretty tight overall: men and women unite. He had some scepticism whether female integration in the infantry would work but he provided clear evidence of females operating with the infantry on the frontline. While maintaining the ban on women in the infantry, senior United States Marine officers have explicitly emphasized the importance of training and professionalism in integrating women into the Corps. For instance, discussing integrated

21 Ibid., 100.
23 Ibid., 161.
24 Ibid., 227-8.
25 Ibid., 289.
26 Interview with Major, USMC, June 27, 2010.
training including the US Marines training exercise, the Crucible, Lieutenant General Van Riper observed: “The key to building effective, cohesive, gender integrated operational units is in creating a training environment that builds progressively to that end.”²⁷ The result of this has been “Marines [male and female] see themselves as members of the same team committed to performing the same tough duties in the same dirty, mentally and physically demanding environment, and from that experience develop an appreciation of each other as professionals.”²⁸

Indeed, there have been a number of examples of female and male Marines not simply serving together on operations but fighting together in combat. Marine Corporals Carrie Blaise and Priscilla Kispetik were attached to 3/25 Lima Company US Marines in 2005 in Haditha where they were assigned to patrols on house-clearing missions; as females they were able to interact with women and facilitate unforced entries at various points. Although Blaise and Kispetik believed that “they were Marines and every Marine (male or female) was a rifleman,” their initial reception was hostile; male Marines were “disappointed” to be serving with women in Haditha.²⁹ However, later in the tour, the observation that all Marines whether male or female were riflemen became a reality. On 26 May 2005, the platoon to which Blaise and Kispetik were assigned was ambushed by insurgents as it cleared Haqlaniya; two Marines were killed by a rocket propelled grenade in the initial contact and the rest eventually trapped in a school. The platoon had to fight hard merely to survive with almost all its members involved in this firefight. Blaise was on the second floor, with a good field of vision, and was, therefore, able to identify a male Iraqi with a weapon approximately 400 meters away. Blaise was ordered to engage by her staff sergeant. She shot two rounds, killing the Iraqi:

Nice job he [the staff sergeant] yelled. . . . The staff sergeant must have known it was the lance corporal’s first kill because he grabbed her Kevlar, turned her head so she was facing him, looked into her eyes, and said, Think of all the lives you just saved.³⁰

Although troubled by the experience, Blaise recognized her status in the Marines was significantly advanced by having a confirmed kill. In training and on operations, gender barriers appear to be breaking down in the United States and women are increasingly accepted by the infantry (if not in the infantry) on the grounds of their performance.

In the United Kingdom, a similar reform in attitudes toward women seems to be occurring, even among elite infantry such as the Royal Marines and Parachute Regiment. Thus, a color sergeant believed that women could serve in the Parachute Regiment, despite its selection process and reputation, “as long as she passes the same course.” For this soldier, it would be inappropriate to drop entry standards but “if a woman had the same capability, why not?”³¹ Across western forces,
there is evidence that professional competence is becoming more important than gender to status and role in the military.

Obstacles to Female Integration

Van Creveld et al may be assertive about the effect of women on military performance and cohesion but, despite the changes documented above, the obstacles to female integration in the infantry are manifest and it would be irresponsible not to recognize them. There is considerable evidence many soldiers have been and are still opposed to the presence of females. Masculine self-conceptions remain central to the motivation of male soldiers. Despite extensive attempts to integrate women since the 1970s, women constitute only 15 percent of the US armed forces and it seems unlikely this figure will increase in the future significantly—even after total female accession. The armed forces are and will remain overwhelmingly male organizations. As a result, in her work on female integration, Judith Stiehm appositely asked: “How can one distinguish between male culture and military culture?”\textsuperscript{32} The problem of creating gender equality in organizations where women are a small minority has exercised a number of feminist scholars and Rosabeth Moss Kanter’s research on female corporate employment is one of the most insightful in this regard. Kanter is highly sensitive to the different dynamics which alternate gender proportions generate and she highlights the special problems which arise when women are badly outnumbered. Indeed, for Kanter, a female workforce of 15 percent or less constitutes not even a genuine minority but merely a token. As a token, it would seem plausible to predict women would find it difficult to integrate into the overwhelmingly male and very masculine military. This token status is compounded by cultural factors. Kanter suggests that the putatively rational modern western organizations have, in fact, always involved and presumed a “masculine ethic.”\textsuperscript{33} In modern western culture, men have been conceived as cognitively superior in problem-solving and decisionmaking while women have been represented as emotional, sensitive, and caring, in line with their maternal role.\textsuperscript{34} Consequently, women have been impeded from participation at the higher levels of management; the masculine ethic has been invoked as an exclusionary principle. For Kanter, male managers engage in “homo-social reproduction.”\textsuperscript{35} In the face of organizational uncertainty and “the need for smooth communication,”\textsuperscript{36} male managers prioritize trust and mutual understanding which is primarily presumed on the basis of similarity of social background and similarity of organizational experience: “People [i.e. women] who do not ‘fit in’ by social characteristics to the homogenous management group tend to be clustered in those parts of management with the least uncertainty.”\textsuperscript{37}

The processes which Kanter identified in the corporate sector have often taken a more extreme form in the armed forces. In her important

\begin{footnotes}
\footnotetext[32]{Judith Hicks Stiehm, \textit{Bring Me Men & Women} (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1981), 65.}
\footnotetext[34]{Ibid., 22-25.}
\footnotetext[35]{Ibid., 48.}
\footnotetext[36]{Ibid., 55.}
\footnotetext[37]{Ibid., 55.}
\end{footnotes}
work on integration in the 1980s, Judith Hicks Stiehm recorded extreme forms of bullying, harassment, and sexual abuse (including rape) among the US armed forces.38 The Tailhook and Aberdeen Proving Ground scandals in the 1990s remain infamous episodes, but routine bullying, abuse, and assault were widespread at the time. The problem is evident today. Erin Solaro, a journalist who had previously served in the armed forces, describes the actions as those of the small percentage of real criminals or others who think their manhood depends upon women’s subordination.39 Indeed, during her research in Iraq, Solaro felt physically threatened by certain men while staying in transit accommodation.40 Yet, it is not perhaps the extremists who are the most damaging or important constituency here. The everyday attitudes of male soldiers are likely to be more important in undermining female integration; for Kanter, homosocial reproduction does not primarily work through dramatic and public forms of denigration but through microsocial mechanisms of quiet social marginalization from often trivial forms of communion—the cigarette or coffee break, the side chat, or playing sports together. The recognition of these discriminatory processes does not justify them nor can it be used as evidence that women should be excluded no more than the existence of racism in the US Army in the 1940s and 1950s was a legitimate reason for excluding black American soldiers from combat units. Yet these cultural realities are likely to complicate the accession of women into the infantry.

With growing professionalism and changing gender norms in civil society, it might be possible for overt and covert forms of discrimination to be reduced. It might be possible to condition even the most discriminatory men to accept women. Yet no amount of gender education—however successful—will overcome two central obstacles to female accession identified by van Creveld and Frum: the disparity in mean physical performance between men and women and the problem of sexual attraction. Physiological differences remain an enduring problem. Indeed, even Judith Stiehm, an advocate of integration, has noted the physical disparity between men and women. In the early 1980s, the highest women’s score on the West Point physical fitness test would have been a man’s C- and 87 percent of women would have failed.41 There is little evidence this physical disparity between the average female and average male performance has changed significantly in the last three decades. A British Ministry of Defence Report based on extensive physiological testing concluded: “approximately 1 percent of women can equal the performance of the average man . . . .” The study concluded “about 0.1 per cent of the female applicants and 1 percent of trained female soldiers would reach the required standards to meet the demands of these [combat] roles.”42 On purely physiological grounds, the exclusion of women from the infantry is still seen by many as appropriate, even necessary: “Why would you voluntarily want to make your units weaker

41 Stiehm, Bring Me Men & Women, 166.
when you are going into combat? The vast majority of women cannot be combat soldiers. Indeed, Sergeant Lizette Leblanc, one of the most successful female Canadian infantry soldiers, noted that the ratio of men to women in her regiment during some periods of her service has been one to a thousand; she was often the only woman.

The Issue of Sexuality

Sexuality is also a problem. A reservist, Jason Hartley, who served in Iraq in 2004, recorded the rise of a professionalized form of cohesion in his unit before deployment but, despite his liberal political views, he articulated a commonly held view about women in combat. For him, women cannot be in the infantry (not only because they are not strong enough) but because it undermines masculine motivations for combat: the main reason they [soldiers] fight is to be tough and therefore attract more women. The presence of women consequently corrodes the very possibility of cohesion: “As soon as there are any women within spittin’ distance, prime directive number one [sexual desire] kicks in, and all things, especially job discipline go straight to hell.”

James Webb, a retired US Marine officer and former secretary of the Navy, has made the same point differentiating ethnic integration from gender integration precisely because of the attraction between the sexes: “No edict will ever eliminate sexual activity when men and women are thrust together at close quarters.” The problem here is that the presence of a female in the ranks undermines the unity among male soldiers. Instead of focusing on their collective mission, they compete with each other for the sexual attentions of the female(s). Egalitarian solidarity, in which all soldiers are treated the same and everyone relates to everyone else as equals, is replaced by rivalry. Many soldiers have seen precisely this process at work when females have been attached to them. Indeed, many officers opposed the general principle of female integration because they had witnessed cases of fraternization and its nefarious effects. A British captain who had served in a reconnaissance unit in Helmand confirmed the point; whenever women had been attached to his subunit, they had slept with his soldiers to the detriment of unit cohesion.

Canadian female soldiers have themselves identified fraternization as extremely dangerous for the women who engage in it: “no matter how competent you are, if you sleep around, you will ruin your reputation, not only your own but of all women.” American servicewomen have made precisely the same observation. Williams recorded the promiscuity of one woman in her unit whose behavior “made it easy for guys over there to treat females as if they were less reliable.” Indeed, overly feminized female soldiers were seen as a threat. “When I saw a woman in uniform with too much make-up. . . . I was prejudiced. . . . As though all my fight to be seen as a competent, goal-oriented officer was denigrated by her obvious sexual appearance.” Evidence suggests that female

46 Interview by author, March 7, 2013.
47 Interview with Captain A, Canadian Army, October 17, 2011.
48 Williams, Love My Rifle, 14.
49 Melissa S. Herbert, Camouflage Isn’t Only for Combat: Gender, Sexuality, and Women in the Military (New York, NYU Press), 67.
Women in Battle

soldiers have to abjure from any sexual contact within their unit if they are to preserve their professional reputation. Indeed, even friendship with individual male soldiers had to be treated with care since it might be interpreted as a sexual relation and the reputational consequences for women equally catastrophic. The problem with fraternization for women is it inscribes civilian gender norms onto military relations, stripping the female involved of her professional status. She becomes once again just a woman; she cannot, therefore, be treated as a soldier and can no longer be the peer, still less the commander, of male troops. By contrast, and indicating a potential double standard, precisely because of the dominant masculine culture of the armed forces, male soldiers engaging in fraternization are rarely subject to this loss of credibility. They may engage in sexual relations with female soldiers (and, therefore, be equally responsible for undermining cohesion) and yet retain their reputation as professional soldiers. At the same time, although fraternization may be a problem, it is not an inevitability. Female soldiers who served on the frontline in Afghanistan reported that in patrol bases, the very fact that everyone lived so close together in arduous conditions meant neither males nor females had the time or inclination to engage in fraternization. In this situation, women became like “sisters” rather than potential sexual partners.

Indeed, the problem of sexuality far exceeds the issue of consensual fraternization and its effect on the credibility of women soldiers. The masculinized culture of the military may represent a structural impediment to female integration; because of sexualized male presumptions, it may be impossible for women to be treated as equals in the armed forces. Despite the advances which American service personnel have made in the last ten years, fraternization, harassment, and abuse have been widely recorded and these incidents do not appear as random occurrences. Kayla Williams records her attempts to conduct herself professionally in Iraq in 2005 and there is some evidence that male soldiers she served with regarded her highly. Yet, she also concluded on the basis of her service that sex is key to any woman soldier’s experience in the American military. However professional a woman might be, relationships with male soldiers were finally determined by their sexual availability. At its mildest, Williams was subject to the invasive stares of male soldiers throughout her tour, numerous lewd propositions, and an indecent assault when a soldier exposed himself to her and tried to force her to gratify him while on sentry.\(^5^0\) She suggested that, because it is a primarily male organization with a strongly masculine culture, women were either classified as “sluts” (they were open to sexual advances) or “bitches” (they were not). Others have confirmed the point noting, in addition, that “bitches” were often accordingly denigrated as lesbians in the US military.\(^5^1\) Indeed, in her invective against the US military and its failure to accord women true professional status while putting them into combat situations, Helen Benedict cites an informant who recorded that so irredeemably masculinized are the armed forces that “there are only three things the guys let you be if you’re a girl in the military . . . a bitch, a ho or a dyke.”\(^5^2\)

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\(^5^0\) Williams, *Love My Rifle*, 22, 72, 199, 207.

\(^5^1\) Ibid., 212.

Moreover, in order to assign women to one or other of these categories, means false rumors about the sexual availability of women abound in the US military to the detriment of their professional reputation.

Irrespective of the question of fraternization and outright sexual discrimination, the female reproductive role and position as mothers in civilian society generates additional questions which the armed forces need to consider. In a professional army, where women may serve as career soldiers from their late teens to early forties (i.e., during the reproductive decades of adult life), the question of pregnancy and motherhood is a critical—one. The only historical precedent is unhelpful. From 1727 to 1892, the Dahomey Kingdom of West Africa recruited, trained, and deployed an all-female combat unit (an “Amazon Corps”) as part of its standing army.53 The women in this formation were equipped with muskets and swords, were drilled regularly and, according to western observers, physically resembled men in size, musculature, and demeanor.54 Crucially, they were sworn to celibacy on pain of death. The Dahomey rulers obviated the problem of pregnancy for their women soldiers simply by outlawing all sexual activity. Such a policy is impossible among western forces but some strategy is likely to be necessary regarding pregnancy and childbearing. Civil society is now sufficiently mature enough to accept the combat-related deaths of female soldiers who happen to be mothers; certainly, the reporting of male and female deaths in the last ten years has been noticeably similar.55 Yet, issues remain. Female soldiers have sometimes been accused of becoming pregnant to avoid operations and unplanned pregnancies (the result of fraternization) have meant women had to be sent home from operations. In fact, excluding females from the infantry on the basis that a small number of women may have missed operations because they got pregnant (accidentally or not) does not seem particularly defensible; many male soldiers have avoided combat for often specious medical reasons. The real issue seems to be planned pregnancies with the inevitable gaps in service and possible unavailability of women for operations. Pregnancy is not an insurmountable obstruction, but in preparing for women’s integration into the career structure of the infantry, it is an issue.

Conclusion

In the First and Second World Wars, black American soldiers were regularly declared, on apparently scientific grounds, incapable of fighting. Presumptions about their inadequacies quickly evaporated—and indeed looked very foolish—when black soldiers were fully integrated during the Korean War.56 The case of women in the military has some parallels. In an all-volunteer force where cohesion is based on the impersonal criteria of competence rather than inherited social ascriptions, capable and proven women may serve no less effectively than black Americans before them.

54 Ibid., 61-4.
Yet, van Creveld’s challenge also usefully demands that the conditions for and limitations of women’s participation be recognized especially given that, unlike African-American men, women are physiologically different from men. If women, like ethnic minorities and gays before them, are to be integrated into the infantry, they have to be selected to the same standards as men. Gender-blind testing is essential but this necessarily means that a minuscule proportion of the combat arms will be female in the future. Physically, most women will be incapable of passing the selection tests for the infantry. Currently, just over 15 percent of the Canadian armed forces are women, but less than 1 percent of the infantry is female. Women’s integration in the combat arms may be possible but it is likely to involve a tiny number of women. Accordingly, despite the undoubted importance of Panetta’s announcement, the formal lifting of the ban on female service in the combat arms is unlikely to alter the culture or everyday reality of life in the US Army and US Marines to any great extent. Women have already been operating with the combat arms in numbers that will not drastically change after 2016. The legislation does little more than recognize in law a de facto reality. Yet this legal recognition is important for women because it is likely to be beneficial to the status of female soldiers. Of equal importance, it may advance the professionalism of the United States Army and Marines for whom objective standards of competence become finally and definitively the universal and ubiquitous reference point for all service personnel, whatever their race, ethnicity, gender, religion, or sexuality.
The recent decision to integrate women fully into the military was met with a range of controversy and emotions on several fronts. For women and many men in the military it was a quietly celebrated milestone. For women outside the military it was lauded as a step toward true equality. For others, it was viewed as a misguided decision that would ultimately erode the combat effectiveness of the military and have negative consequences for US national security. Before the current conflict, a veritable potpourri of objections was raised to justify keeping women out of combat units; almost all those objections have fallen away in the last ten years. The American public has not objected to women being killed or wounded in combat any more than it has to men. Personal hygiene and privacy has not been problematic. Women can keep pace on long-range patrols, and the performance of men overall does not degrade when fighting alongside women. Data from the 2011 class at West Point reveals over 52 percent of female cadets, albeit a select group, passed the Army Physical Fitness Test (APFT) using the male standards. In short, a percentage of women are just as physically capable as men.

Moreover, as new research suggests, women can enhance the combat capabilities of the military from the squad to the joint staff without impairing cohesion. Cohesion is not just linked to common traits such as race, ethnicity, or gender but is based on collective goals and objectives. Recent research also shows small-unit cohesion is not impaired by the addition of women, as once thought. The comments below are intended to reveal what new research says about the benefits of including women at all levels and all branches of the military.

Collective Intelligence

Carnegie Mellon and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) have partnered to examine group or collective intelligence to understand how to optimize team performance. The research shows groups are collectively more intelligent than individuals on a range of simple to complex tasks. Additionally, the research found that a group's
collective intelligence tends to increase as the percentage of women in the group increases. Researchers believe this may be due to a trait they call “social sensitivity” which reflects how well a person can read the emotions of other people. The ability to perceive and sense emotional changes leads to more collaborative patterns of group behavior and women tend to score higher than men in this category.\(^2\) The chart below shows the relational impact the percentage of women in a group had on the collective intelligence of 192 teams tested on a range of simple to complex tasks.

The study also revealed groups whose conversation is dominated by a single person, or a small portion of the population, are collectively less intelligent than groups where communication is evenly shared. Researchers found groups with more women tended to have a more even communications distribution pattern.\(^3\)

If this research is applied to the military, it suggests adding women can strengthen every organization. Our teams, from small unit infantry squads which as yet have no women, to the joint staff, which has less than 20 percent women, are potentially less intelligent than they could be if we were to optimize what women bring to the collective intelligence of groups. This intelligence need not come at the expense of physical strength, but rather can complement it.


\(^3\) Ibid., slides 17-18.
Organizational Success and Diversity

A number of reports provide clear links between organizational success and the number of women in the most successful organization. For instance, the Catalyst Information Center publishes “Why Diversity Matters” which tracks studies that demonstrate the link between diversity and corporate success. Collectively, these studies reveal, “Companies with the most women board directors, especially those with three or more women board directors, had better financial performance than those with the least women board directors.” In 2009, Naissance Capital, an international investment company, made gender diversity a screening criterion for future investment initiatives because they understand the link between performance and having a critical mass of women in boardrooms. Furthermore, the 2009 “White House Project Report: Benchmarking Women’s Leadership” provides a snapshot of where women are today in terms of leadership in the United States. According to this report, when women are present in significant numbers, “the bottom line improves—from financial success to the quality and scope of decision making.” Unfortunately, the military, as a profession, does not compare favorably in terms of women’s participation in leadership positions.

The military bar in the chart above is based on women’s participation in the top five military ranks and includes O6s. In the Army, women comprise only 6.73 percent of general officers. Access to leadership positions in the military, especially at the general officer level, is directly linked to combat specialties. Eighty percent of our general officers are drawn from combat specialties from which women have been excluded. Lifting the combat exclusion policy now allows women increased opportunities to compete for “boardroom” positions and,

7 Department of the Army, General Officer Female Report Total Force (unavailable to public).
as studies show, the results should be improved quality and scope of decisionmaking at the highest levels.

**Unit Cohesion**

During the 1992 Presidential Commission on the Assignment of Women in the Armed Forces, one TOPGUN instructor made the following statement to the commission, “We don’t believe that you can act as a unit unless you keep it the way it is, here it’s the bonding—it’s that intangible, the bonding, that makes a squadron good, better, and we don’t believe you can have that go on if we have females in aviation.”

Today, 65 women fly combat jets in every aviation unit in the Navy with no degradation in unit performance. This evidence is further supported by studies that demonstrate unit cohesion and performance are not dependent on common traits like race, ethnicity, sexual orientation, or gender.

In 2010, Rand conducted an extensive review of existing studies on unit cohesion. The review showed studies have generally focused on two distinct elements of unit cohesion: social cohesion and task cohesion. Social cohesion is the extent people like each other; task cohesion is the shared commitment group members have toward accomplishing a goal. This distinction between social and task cohesion is important and may clarify why the TOPGUN instructor believed women would negatively impact aviation units. He was likely basing his analysis on social cohesion not task cohesion.

All evidence indicates task cohesion is far more important to unit performance than social cohesion and some studies reveal high social cohesion is actually linked to negative group behaviors. High social cohesion is shown to lead to groupthink and polarized attitudes which often result in poor decisions by the group. The culture in the naval aviator community during the 1980s and early 1990s that led to events like the Tailhook scandal exemplifies excessive social cohesion that reinforced negative group behaviors. Furthermore, research shows extreme group cohesion is not an asset and group diversity can mitigate excessive commitment to social cohesion.

Women already serve in close combat specialties in the following countries: Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Israel, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Romania, Spain, and Sweden. Perhaps best known for its use of women in the military is the Israel Defense Force (IDF) where women comprise 34 percent of the force and are conscripted along with their male peers. Although the IDF restricts the service of women to 88 percent of available positions, women do serve in close combat positions in the Caracal Combat Regiment and in the Border Patrol. Women are excluded from some units

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8 Missy Cummings, Hornet’s Nest: The Experiences of One of the Navy’s First Female Fighter Pilots (New York: Writer’s Digest, 2000), 249-250.


due to religious considerations necessitated by orthodox Jewish rules. In a 2005 study of female combatants, Israeli commanders reported women “exhibit superior skills” in (1) discipline and motivation, (2) maintaining alertness, (3) shooting, (4) managing tasks and organization, and (5) displaying knowledge and professionalism in weapons use. Less well known is the Norwegian military which has employed women in all ground combat specialties, and in all units, since the early 1980s. The Norwegians report women increase operational effectiveness and there is no evidence that unit cohesion is affected. Similarly, the Canadians, who have also been fully integrated since the 1980s, report there is no “negative effect on operational performance or team cohesion” due to the presence of women in combat units.

Physical Requirements

A long-standing concern has been whether women possess the physical strength necessary to rescue male soldiers who are wounded, or whether they can perform other tasks requiring physical strength. However, the issue is not really that all women need to be as strong as all men. Rather, it is about letting those women serve who can meet the physical standards. In fact, many women can perform all the tasks required of infantry soldiers and many women have demonstrated physical prowess in the heat of battle. Just a few examples include the following:

- SPC Monica Brown, a combat medic, received the Silver Star in Afghanistan for bravery under fire when she rescued wounded male soldiers in the cavalry regiment to which she was assigned.
- MAJ Kellie McCoy, an engineer platoon leader, earned the Bronze Star with Valor when she ran through enemy fire not once but twice to rescue wounded soldiers in Iraq.
- SGT Julia Bringloe was awarded the Distinguished Flying Cross in Afghanistan for a particularly daunting 40-hour period in which she is credited with rescuing or recovering 11 wounded or killed soldiers.
- SSG Jessica Packard, US Air Force, scored the fastest course time of both sexes in the 2009 Firefighter Combat Challenge which included carrying a 175-pound victim while wearing full bunker gear.

Conventional combat arms specialties have been closed to female soldiers; therefore, evidence of their ability to perform physically in combat units in the United States is nonexistent. However, predictive evidence can be gained by examining women’s performance in support units with combat missions. For example, women in military police units routinely perform some of the same functions as soldiers in combat units including route security, cordon and search missions, and conducting raids.

Examples of their successful performance abound although it has not been documented in formal studies. SGT Leigh Anne Hester won the Silver Star in Iraq for actions that included operating individual and

11 Ibid., 24.
12 Ibid., 28.
13 Ibid., 20.
crew served weapons to locate, close with, and destroy an attacking enemy.\footnote{Military Times, Hall of Valor Award Citation: Sergeant Leigh Ann Hester, http://projects.militarytimes.com/citations-medals-awards/recipient.php?recipientid=3885} LT Brittany Meeks led a quick-reaction force to the site of a supply convoy under attack: she directed her team to suppress the enemy by fire while calling in close air support; she secured vehicles and a downed Apache helicopter; she evacuated wounded soldiers and conducted a cordon and search that yielded enemy weapons.\footnote{Peter Kilner and Nate Self, A Platoon Leader’s Tour, Google Books, http://books.google.com/books?id=Plv1AKHFrf5Y&pg=PA69&dq=lieutenant+brittany+meeks&hl=en&sa=X&ei=haNuUaDjDYvK9QTgw4DwBA&ved=0CC0Q6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=lieutenant%20brittany%20meeks&f=false} Women engineers graduate from the Army’s Sapper Leader Course, a physically demanding 28-day course that includes infantry training missions. The course requires successful completion of combat patrolling, urban breaching, mountaineering, water operations, and reconnaissance, raid, and ambush techniques. Students must complete distance runs of 3-7 miles at a 7-minute pace and a 12-mile, 35-pound ruck march in under 3 hours. Before every meal, students must do 6 chin ups and climb a 12-foot horizontal ladder and a 30-foot rope. By the end, Sapper leaders—male and female—are “hardened combat engineers . . . prepared to fight on today’s modern battlefield.”\footnote{U.S. Department of the Army, Sapper Leader Course Pamphlet, HHD 35th Engineer Battalion, 1st Engineer Brigade (Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri) (February 2010): 11. http://armyrotc.mst.edu/media/academic/armyrotc/documents/sapperschoolinfo/SapperPamphlet.pdf}

Despite these examples, which are further supported by more than 1,800 combat action badges awarded to women, some may argue that the gender-normed APFT is evidence that women are not physically able to perform in combat specialties. However, the combat arms branches have never established a single set of occupational physical standards required of all combat arms soldiers. Age-normed standards have long allowed for fluctuating physical performance for men based on age, not occupational requirements. It is time to reevaluate what the standards mean. Clearly, many women can meet the physical qualifications required of infantry soldiers.\footnote{A 42-year-old male infantryman is deemed fit to perform infantry duties if he can score 34 pushups and 38 sit-ups in 2 minutes and run 2 miles in 18 minutes and 42 seconds. Data from the West Point Class of 2011 reveals that over 96 percent of the female cadets met this standard.}

Conclusion

Women provide a vital contribution to critical and creative thinking and decisionmaking in our national security apparatus. This capability is unnecessarily missing in many military units where currently there are no women. If the US military wants to optimize its teams’ collective intelligence and make better executive-level decisions, we must tap into the half of the population that is underutilized. As recent studies reveal, and as our foreign partners have demonstrated, our units and US national security overall will benefit by adding women to combat branches.
Abstract: Many concerns related to women in combat roles stem from two related assumptions: (a) the existing structure and culture of the armed forces are well adapted to the requirements of combat; and (b) politically imposed change is harmful to the professionalism and effectiveness of the military. These can be dangerous assumptions. Instead, the traditional “truths” about the nature of unit cohesion and the optimal capabilities of individual soldiers and officers need to be periodically examined. Doing so can maximize the effectiveness of military organizations in a changing environment.

The response to former Defense Secretary Panetta’s recent decision to eliminate the ground combat exclusion rule for women in the US military obviously differs widely within the armed forces, from service to service, unit to unit, and individual to individual. However, with the risk of painting with a broad brush, there is clear apprehension about the consequences of this decision. Notable scholars like Martin van Creveld have provided fierce opposition, arguing that women in the military—not just in combat roles—is “part symptom, part cause, of the decline of the ‘advanced’ military.”

The concerns come in numerous shapes and forms, from practical and administrative issues regarding latrines, housing, and maternity leave, to the more serious concerns about the impact on the combat effectiveness of units. What will the inclusion of women in combat roles mean for the armed forces, and especially the organization’s “fighting power”—its effectiveness in the field of operations? After all, the main purpose of military organizations is to defend the constitution either as a deterrent force or by fighting and winning the nation’s wars.

This article challenges two common concerns related to the impact of women on combat effectiveness: (1) the idea that women, in general, are not fit for war; that their often lower physical abilities and/or supposed lack of mental toughness put at risk the combat effectiveness of the units; (2) the inclusion of women and gender perspectives will change the organization’s combat culture to reflect a civilian rather than a military ethos.

While these fears are understandable, they are based on a flawed assumption and are misguided. Their key assumption is that the existing military structure and culture are already well adapted to perform with


excellence in war; that the military organization looks like it does because of the objective requirements of warfare, or what Samuel Huntington has referred to as the functional imperative of the armed forces. Any changes—especially politically imposed changes like women in combat or the repeal of “don’t ask don’t tell”—therefore pose a danger to what is perceived as a functioning system.

Due to this assumption, including women in direct combat roles becomes a necessary evil: how can it be limited to avoid damage to the existing order. Even supporters of women in combat and gender perspectives ask how this can be achieved with as little damage to the organization as possible. Women who have served with combat units in the field proudly speak of the moment they were accepted as “one of the boys.” Commanders and soldiers who have served with or under women highlight that it is not a big deal and that it really does not change anything as long as they are competent. Integrating women with the aim of minimizing damage to the existing structure and culture of the organization provides a negative starting point for these processes. Instead, the introduction of women in combat units—or the implementation of a gendered perspective in military organizations—should be seen as an opportunity to revise the culture and structure of the armed forces for increased effectiveness in contemporary warfare. It should, therefore, be accomplished with the aim of maximizing the effectiveness of what the organization is supposed to be good at—using force, or the threat of force—for security, stability, or plain victory.

The Case of the Marine Corps’ Infantry Officer Course

Since the decision to lift the ban on women in direct ground combat units, much media attention has been directed at the Marine Corps Infantry Officer Course at Quantico. This gruesome training regimen has seen four women enter and none come close to finishing. Though its students tend to be top performers in basic officer training, more than one in five candidates are dropped during the infantry course. Interestingly, this 13-week course, considered among the toughest in the US military, is also described as “part of the Pentagon’s ongoing effort to determine which additional jobs in combat units should be opened to women.” Indeed, the Marine Corps began recruiting female volunteers for this course in 2012 as part of a broader effort to assess how female Marines might perform in assignments whose primary mission is ground combat. This means the Infantry Officer Course is seen as a viable test or indicator of the suitability of women in combat roles.

The greatest concern at Quantico appears to be the risk of lowering physical standards to accommodate women. The commander of the Infantry Officer School and the Basic Officer Course has categorically stated this will never happen. “They [the standards] are gender-neutral now. . . . They aren’t hard to be hard. These are the things they need to

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4 Lamothe, “Two more female Marines.”
be able to do to be infantry officers.” Clearly, the working assumption of military leadership is that existing physical standards are appropriate. Correspondingly, there is a distinct belief that the Infantry Officer Course, including the timed obstacle course of the first day that eliminated three of the four women, is a fairly accurate reflection of the physical requirements of infantry combat. Thus, if the course, or the physical standards it serves to test, is altered, it will presumably have a direct impact on combat effectiveness.

A Marine Corps major has argued that “[w]hile certain things that occur at Infantry Officer Course replicate combat, the worst days of infantry combat are much, much worse.” While this statement was clearly made in support of the nature of the course, it unwittingly also challenged it by raising the question why the standards, and the contents of the infantry course, are not raised to reflect the worst days of infantry combat. The simple answer is, of course, that there are always compromises involved. Raising entry standards, or making the course tougher, will lead to lower recruit numbers, increased risks of injury during training, and perhaps the need to lower other standards such as education, analytical capability, and problem solving. In the end, the major’s statement highlighted the fact that an obstacle course, or an entire training program, can never replicate the exact demands of combat and leadership in the field. Instead, these standards will always be based on a combination of lessons learned, tradition, organizational culture, and the availability of candidates. Indeed, how did we arrive at the current physical and mental standards and the contents of training courses? How long has it been since these were revised and updated based on objective assessments of combat effectiveness in the field?

This raises the question of why the physical standards are treated as sacrosanct. Other standards were lowered in 2005-06 to meet the Army’s recruitment goals, and while it was certainly discussed, the level of resistance was limited compared to lowered physical standards. Two standards changed at that time were the elimination of the high school graduation requirement and acceptance of lower aptitude scores. However, given the complexity of contemporary warfare, the notions of “three-block warfare,” and broad skillsets, as well as the importance of the “strategic corporal,” this reduction was remarkable. Why would these changes be acceptable if lowered physical standards are not? What do combat after-action reports highlight as the main problems in failed or successful combat situations in Iraq and Afghanistan? We need a clearer and more objective understanding of whether it is physical or cognitive capabilities that make a difference in combat.

British Lieutenant General Sir Robert Fry, then Deputy Commander of Multi-National Force – Iraq, argued that one of the greatest problems in Iraq was the failure to translate tactical behavior into operational effect in the pursuit of strategic goals. Despite what seemed to be a number of tactical victories, the intended effects at higher levels were

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6 Ibid.
7 Ibid.
missing. Solving these issues has little to do with physical standards or even combat effectiveness—it is about something much more subtle and intangible—understanding how certain events and conduct impact the local situation in a culture very far from home.

It is intellectually convenient to assume that our current standards, as well as the training and testing methods of our military organizations, are well adapted to the nature of modern warfare. It is also dangerous, however, as these assumptions may well be flawed and may seriously undermine the effectiveness of the organization. Instead, organizations seeking to perfect their conduct of warfare must constantly reconsider and adapt their standards. They must also be willing to experiment.

It may indeed be the case that the worst days of combat are worse than the Infantry Officer Course, or that the standards tested are perfectly adapted to match the requirements of effective leadership in the field of operations. However, there is also a risk that courses and standards are based on tradition or a conventional idea of what combat is supposed to look like and how it is effectively conducted. All standards and training methods need to be questioned as to what extent they reflect the capabilities needed in the field of operations. In the wake of the administration’s decision to allow women in combat roles, an objective evaluation of standards risks being tainted with the perception that they are being reevaluated to lower them for women. It is, therefore, of utmost importance that evaluations and new standards are truly objective and gender neutral. This will also mean that certain units will, in practice, be impossible or highly difficult to access for women. Then again, this exclusion will be based on objective minimum standards rather than gender bias. To grasp the problems of subjective standards, we need to take a few steps back and discuss the more fundamental questions of what military effectiveness is and how it is achieved.

**Military Effectiveness and Contemporary Operations**

There are two problems with the way military effectiveness is traditionally measured. First, too often military effectiveness is treated as “fighting power”—or the ability to succeed on the battlefield—and thereby separated from the larger political purpose of the military campaign. Second, within the debates about fighting power, traditional theories about military capability and effectiveness have often overemphasized physical military factors, such as troop numbers and the quality of equipment, while paying less attention to the more intangible factors that influence a state’s capacity to use its material resources effectively. However, cases where the numerically and technologically weak win battles and campaigns suggest that such explanations of military capability are misleading because they fail to acknowledge the importance of the policies for which the military instrument is used.10

An effective military organization is one that succeeds in performing the core tasks that the political leadership requests. Traditionally, or ideally, this has meant fighting and winning conventional wars—defending the nation. In the contemporary strategic context, and some

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would argue this was the case in the past as well, the most common
tasks involve different types of stability operations with the purpose
of establishing conditions from which broader political processes can
take place.\textsuperscript{11} The connection between military effectiveness and the
intentions of political leaders means we not only need to look at the
tasks most frequently asked of military organizations today, but also the
nature of civil-military relations.

This is not the place to answer the difficult question about the
character of contemporary and future warfare. As already noted, this
article highlights the idea that the most common forms of military
engagement the last few decades, and probably in the foreseeable future,
are different forms of stability operations, peace operations, counter-
insurgency, fourth generation, small, irregular, “new,” asymmetric, or
whatever adjective we more or less usefully place in front of the old
substantive “war.” These campaigns take place amongst the people
and involve both substate and suprastate actors in a struggle for legiti-
macy and far-reaching political changes—democratization, respect for
human rights, and long-term economic development. For the most part,
it involves low-intensity, counterinsurgency operations between regular
armed forces of the West and loosely formed networks of insurgents
employing asymmetric tactics. Contemporary campaigns are drawn-out
processes, often measured in decades rather than in months and years.
They involve a multitude of actors fighting for the hearts and minds of
the local, as well as global, population whose perceptions of the conflict
often determine the outcome.

Importantly, the conduct of contemporary operations entails a much
more complicated and diverse use of the military instrument. This means
that “new,” or at least nontraditional, tasks are asked of military units at
all levels of command. Recruitment and training has not been updated
to reflect the character of contemporary warfare and it is, therefore, time
to discuss not only what success means in contemporary operations,
but also what successful units look like, how they are trained, what unit
culture they possess, and what their cohesion is based on. At the individ-
ual level, it is also time to question traditional standards—cognitive
or physical—and examine what soldiers and officers need to succeed on
the “battlefield,” or what is probably better described as the complex
field of deployment. While there is no doubt that certain physical and
cognitive standards will be required for certain military occupational
specialties (MOSs), I suspect this analysis may provide revolutionary
results for the way the armed forces should recruit and train soldiers
and officers. As T. E. Lawrence famously put it, “Irregular Warfare is
far more intellectual than a bayonet charge.”\textsuperscript{12}

The connection between political aims and military effectiveness
means that the field of civil-military relations theory is a useful source
of inspiration. The purpose of this field tends to be normative, to maxi-
mize the protective value the armed forces can provide and minimize
the domestic coercive powers those same forces will inevitably possess.
The foundation of most civil-military relations theory is the assumption
that the military institutions of any society are shaped by two forces: a

functional imperative stemming from threats to a society’s security and a societal imperative based on the ideologies, social forces, and institutions dominant within the society. The functional imperative is the character of war and a nation’s geostrategic setting, which by necessity compels the armed forces to develop a certain structure and professional culture to be effective. Huntington argued that if the armed forces reflect only social values and societal culture, it is likely to be incapable of performing its military function. On the other hand, if it is shaped only by functional imperatives, it could become impossible to contain within the society it is supposed to protect.

The emphasis that theorists place on the issues of military effectiveness and democratic control differs greatly. One source of the divergence is a “zero-sum” view of the civil-military problem by thinking it is only possible to maximize either military strength or civilian control. An obvious example is provided by John Hillen while writing about the cultural gap between civilians and the military:

If the purpose of having a military establishment in the first place is to promote cozy civil-military relations, then military culture should be forcibly brought into line with civilian culture. If, however, the purpose of having a military is to provide for the common defense, then the military must nurture the unique culture developed for that purpose.

Equally, Huntington wrote in *The Soldier and the State* that to increase the professionalism and effectiveness of the US military, even American civil society had to adapt to the functional imperative of the armed forces and the more conservative and military values of West Point, which he describes as the military ideal at its best—“a bit of Sparta in the midst of Babylon.”

However, the very foundation of democratic societies lies in the notion that political and military leaderships are not equals. On the other side of the aisle are theorists who emphasize democratic civilian control more than military effectiveness—the societal imperative takes precedence. Christopher Dandeker warns “those of a liberal persuasion tend to expect the armed services to conform to civilian values and, in so doing, underestimate the unique character and demands of military life”. Dandeker, therefore, advocates a pragmatic approach that falls midway between the two extremes:

The challenge for civilian political and military leaders is to ensure that a balance is struck between these, sometimes competing, imperatives. Furthermore, in adjusting to changes in society and international security, they have to take into account the history and traditions of the individual

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14 Ibid.
17 Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, 466.
19 Dandeker, “Military and Society.”
Women in Battle

armed services, which are normally critical factors in sustaining their identity, sense of shared purpose and morale.\textsuperscript{20}

The conceptualization of the relations between functional and societal imperatives in zero-sum terms is misleading as it assumes that military adjustments to civilian values necessarily undermine military effectiveness, and that the focus on military effectiveness must certainly mean decreased civilian control or military nonadherence to the values of civil society.\textsuperscript{21} The aim should, therefore, not be striking a balance between the imperatives, but seeking synergies between the imperatives. One such example is provided by Morris Janowitz, who sought military professionalism and effectiveness, as well as civilian control, through the integration of military and political leaderships, and the development of officers who are aware of the military’s political and social impact.\textsuperscript{22}

The integration of women in combat roles does not respond to the conventional interpretation of the functional imperative. Not many military analysts study contemporary warfare and draw the conclusion that it has changed to an extent that requires the inclusion of women in combat roles to perform effectively. It should, nonetheless, be noted that the development of Female Engagement Teams in Iraq and Afghanistan is the result of such a “needs-based” analysis. Normally, however, ending the exclusion of women in direct ground combat units is seen as a politically imposed “societal imperative.” If seen through such a perspective, the integration of women in the armed forces can at best be achieved without ruining the existing, rather well-adapted military structure and culture. At worst it can ruin the very core of the military organization—its warrior ideal. It can weaken military fighting power and lose us the next war, or at least threaten the safety of fellow soldiers. Fear and rejection is perfectly understandable, albeit based on a flawed assumption about the functional imperative as a completely objective “given,” provided by professional military analysis. Instead, what constitutes the functional imperative should be seen as the outcome of a much more toxic brew of tradition, organizational culture, interservice negotiations, or what can be described as highly politicized processes of bureaucracies with limited analytical repertoires, selfish bureaucratic ambitions, and standard operating procedures.\textsuperscript{23}

The Potential Positive Impact of Women on Fighting Power

The question, then, is how to marry the aims of military conduct and effectiveness with a gender perspective within the military organization and female soldiers. Too often, a gender perspective and traditional military values are seen as opposites between which an acceptable balance must be found. While one should be careful about assigning special capabilities to female soldiers and officers, this article argues that adding women to combat units, and a gender perspective to military operations

\textsuperscript{20} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{21} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{23} This point is obviously inspired by the work of Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, \textit{Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis} (New York: Little Brown and Co, 1971).
more generally, have the potential to add new capabilities and improve the effectiveness of operations.\textsuperscript{24}

Women can play a role with regard to the \textit{means}, the material factor. Including the large numbers of women who are physically fit for military service in the armed forces allows societies to maximize the size of those forces. The emphasis on “lean and mean” organizations rather than mass in 21st century warfare indicates the potential contribution lies in how and with what conviction armed forces conduct operations.

Women can provide specific competencies and perspectives that improve the conduct of operations. Women in combat units, as well as implementing a gender perspective in the area of operations, clearly have the potential to increase the information gathering and analysis capabilities of units. Gaining access to local women not only allows a unit to develop a better understanding of local conditions and culture but improves the unit’s relationship with the community and the perceived legitimacy and force protection of troops. The most obvious examples are Female or Mixed Engagement Teams, intelligence officers, cultural analysts, and interpreters who provide access to populations and areas all-male units cannot engage or search. Another example is provided by the difficulty in achieving civil-military coordination and cooperation in campaigns involving a broad set of actors. Male dominance of the military has been pointed to as one of the cultural features that create friction between military and humanitarian organizations.\textsuperscript{25} Female liaison officers could potentially build bridges between organizations. Clearly, however, the impact is limited and should not be seen as a silver bullet. Moreover, without first changing the mindset of commanders and planners, the importance of women’s perspectives, information, and analyses is likely to be undervalued within a more traditional narrative. The impact is, therefore, likely to be limited until a more general mainstreaming of a gender perspective on operations is achieved.

The UN rightly highlights female soldiers as absolutely essential for certain tasks in peace operations. As an example, they help address specific needs of female combatants during the process of demobilization and reintegration into civilian life. They can interview survivors of gender-based violence, mentor female cadets at police and military academies, and, as highlighted above, interact with women in societies where women are prohibited from speaking to men.\textsuperscript{26} Moreover, female soldiers can serve as role models in the local environment by inspiring women and girls in often male-dominated societies to push for their own rights and participate in peace processes. While these competencies may be dismissed as unrelated to a traditional view of military fighting power, they may prove essential in what is the most common task of military organizations in the contemporary context—stability operations.

The more important and far-reaching consequence of adding women to combat units and implementing a gender perspective on

\textsuperscript{24} For a useful discussion on the positive impact of women and gender perspectives see Sahana Dharmapuri, “Just add Women and Stir,” \textit{Parameters} 41, no. 1 (Spring 2011): 56-70.


operations lies in their transformative potential. It could change the culture of combat units, the fabric of unit cohesion, and the way combat and violence is employed in military organizations. This is precisely what those who resent women in the military fear. If the starting-point is changed, however, from the idea of a perfect existing order to one that is problematic and needs improvement for operational effectiveness in the contemporary strategic context, then including women and gender perspectives provides a golden opportunity to change the way soldiers and officers are recruited, trained, and deployed for combat and stability operations. The complexity of contemporary operations means that soldiers and officers at all levels need good cognitive skills, problem-solving abilities, and a flexible mindset that can respond to a variety of challenges within a short time frame. The immature, ultra-masculine, and extremely aggressive character of the ideal warrior mindset has not done the armed forces any favors in Iraq and Afghanistan. The addition of women—and preferably in substantial numbers—may well provide a more mature and balanced unit culture. Women are not necessarily required for such adaptation, but they may help.

Conclusion

Rather than assuming the existing structure and culture of the armed forces are well adapted to perform in contemporary military campaigns, this article highlights what General Sir Rupert Smith called “the endemic flaws in the current approach.”27 The failures in Iraq and Afghanistan were not simply the consequences of flawed policies or strategic thinking, but also the nature of the military instrument at the disposal of political leadership and the conduct of its operations. The culture and structure of military organizations, their policies of recruitment, training, education, materiel procurement, doctrine writing, and deployments, all need to be carefully studied and potentially reconsidered. This involves the traditional “truths” about the nature of unit cohesion and the optimal capabilities of individual soldiers and officers. The issue of women in combat should not be approached through the lens of damage control, but rather with an emphasis on maximizing the effectiveness of military organizations in the contemporary strategic context.

A War Examined: Allies And Ethics

British National Strategy: Who Does It?

Hew Strachan
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Abstract: Since 2010, four Parliamentary committees have criticized Britain’s failure to promote its capacity for strategy making. Publicly, this failure is identified with the decisions of 2002-03, and especially with the invasion of Iraq. But the 1998 Strategic Defence Review was in trouble before the 9/11 attacks because it was underfunded. More culpable was Britain’s failure to learn and adapt in 2006. The formation of the National Security Council by the 2010 coalition has yet to deliver.

On 10 April 2013, the United Kingdom’s (UK) House of Commons Defence Committee published its tenth report of the 2012-13 session, Securing the Future of Afghanistan. Few of the 39 numbered paragraphs of conclusions and recommendations could be described as laudatory, and most took aim at the British government and specifically the Ministry of Defence. The overall tenor of the report was evident in its paragraph on strategic communications.

It is vital that the process [of the hand over to Afghanistan of the responsibility for its own security] is seen as transition and not as a ‘withdrawal through fatigue.’ We have seen little evidence that the government’s communications strategy is fulfilling its objectives. The strategy should contain as a bare minimum the following: what we set out to do; what we achieved; what remains to be done including managing the continuing risk, albeit reduced, of UK casualties; and the manner of the departure of UK Armed Forces.

Currently, the British government has yet to reply, but it can safely be said that no one is holding their breath. A communications strategy is impossible without a security strategy, and the absence of both has been the subject of comment by parliamentary committees in addition to that on defense. In March 2011, the Foreign Affairs Committee, in its report on the UK’s foreign policy approach to Afghanistan and Pakistan, stated it “had gained the impression that the focus on tactical military gains in specific provinces is in danger of obscuring the very real security and other strategic challenges which exist beyond the immediate military campaign elsewhere in Afghanistan.” Tellingly, these words appeared under the overall heading “Tactical Rather Than Strategic Success?” A year later the Joint Parliamentary Committee on National Security Strategy examined the National Security Risk Assessment (NSRA) procedure which had been used to underpin the 2010 National Security Strategy. The latter had said Afghanistan had not been included in the

NSRA as the risk assessment process was designed to address only future security risks, not immediate ones. The committee expressed its surprise:

We remain to be convinced of the Government’s reasoning for not including Afghanistan in the NSRA. The Government has said that it is not including “immediate security issues”, but terrorism, accidents, flooding and cyber attack are included, though they are all current threats. While the date of troop withdrawal may be a firm policy, we take the view that Afghanistan and the surrounding region remain an area of risk for the UK’s security and this ought to be reflected in the NSRA.3

The Joint Parliamentary Committee’s comments about Afghanistan in particular were set against a wider worry: that the problem was not confined to Afghanistan alone. Over the last five years a consensus has developed that Britain is not very good at making strategy, and that this represents a fall from grace for a generation inclined to cite Churchill and Alanbrooke as evidence that once it was. The National Security Strategy (NSS) published in 2010 by David Cameron’s government, the Joint Parliamentary Committee opined, “does not yet present a clear overarching strategy: a common understanding about the UK’s interests and objectives that guides choices on investment across government departments, including domestic departments, as well as guiding operational priorities and crisis response.” When the Committee challenged Oliver Letwin, the Minister of State at the Cabinet Office, on this point, he dismissed the need for strategy in this overarching sense, replying: “It is important not to see the National Security Strategy as if it were a recipe book, from which one can draw how to make eggs Benedict.” The Committee accepted that a national strategy was “not a ‘recipe book’ which dictates our response to every event, but we would have expected to see some evidence that it had influenced decisions made since the Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) of 2010, including the government’s responses to the Arab Spring. We found no such evidence. As the NSS states, ‘a strategy is only useful if it guides choices’; it is about thinking in the longer term, and not simply doing what is in the UK’s short-term interest.”4

The report of the Joint Parliamentary Committee referred to an even harsher set of criticisms directed at Britain’s perceived lack of capacity to make strategy or to generate strategic thought. In May 2010, after the publication of the NSS and the SDSR, the House of Commons Public Administration Committee set out to ask who does UK national strategy? Its answer, published in October of the same year, was simple: nobody. “The overwhelming view from our witnesses,” it reported, “was that the UK is not good at making National Strategy and there is little sense of national direction or purpose.” The committee came “to the profoundly disturbing conclusion that an understanding of National Strategy and an appreciation of why it is important has indeed largely been lost.”5 The government’s response damned the Public Administration Committee’s report with faint praise. As is often the way with such things, its justifications reeked of self-assured complacency, not least through the device of using the

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4 Ibid, paragraphs 39, 41, 46,
5 HC 435, 27-8, conclusion paragraphs 8 and 9
same word, *strategy*, in contexts which clearly differed to such an extent that its meaning was inconsistently applied. The Public Administration Committee responded by promising a further report on the subject. In turn, it condemned the 2010 NSS as “more “review or plan than strategy,” and it specifically highlighted Afghanistan to make its points.

At the time of the Helmand incursion in 2006 only two British soldiers had been killed in battle in Afghanistan. The total is now 349—almost all as a consequence of the Helmand decision. Yet the Government has failed to respond to evidence given to us that that decision was taken in the absence of a coherent strategy at the politico-military level and without any grand strategic sense of our national interest.6

**Why Has Britain Failed?**

If weight of assertion is proof of guilt, then Britain has convicted itself. Within less than three years, four parliamentary committees have detected a British failure to do strategy well and none of them has minced its words in saying so. The obvious question is how and why this has happened. In 1990-91, John Major’s Conservative government responded to the end of the Cold War by conducting a review of defense called *Options for Change*. It did not so much represent a change in strategy, as it still needed Russia to be its putative foe, but a reduction in funding. In 1997, when the newly elected Labour government embarked on its Strategic Defence Review, it emphasized that it was strategy rather than Treasury led. Its underlying assumptions were more global than European, and it stressed its ethical basis, as befitted a member of the United Nations Security Council. Its core capabilities were air-maritime and expeditionary: Britain would build two new aircraft carriers, due to be delivered in 2012, and it would aim to project force at a distance, in wars in which British troops would be “first in” and “fast out.” Servicing this resuscitation of what Basil Liddell Hart might have recognized as the “British way in warfare” was the principal defense legacy of the previous government, a new joint operational headquarters located in Northwood, an hour away from the Ministry of Defence in Whitehall. Opened in 1996, the Permanent Joint Head Quarters (PJHQ) was adapted to sustain several simultaneous operations around the world, all of them presuming an expeditionary form of warfare rather than an enduring presence.

The strategy put in place in 1998 was almost immediately undermined, but not as a consequence of the 9/11 attacks in 2001. When the latter occurred, the British government saw them as reasserting rather than threatening the logic of the Strategic Defence Review. The Ministry of Defence, reflecting a similar response to that of the United States, stressed the need to preempt threats from terrorist groups abroad before they manifested themselves as dangers at home, and so confirmed the need for an expeditionary joint capability controlled by PJHQ. In 2002, the government contented itself with producing a new chapter to the Strategic Defence Review. It allowed for preemption through better intelligence and greater flexibility, using more light forces and greater air mobility. It assumed the operational tools were already optimized to fulfill that mission.

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6 HC 713, paragraphs 6, 12
What wrong-footed the strategy of 1998 was the fact that, while the review itself was not Treasury-led, its delivery was. Despite fighting two major and overlapping wars since 2002, Britain—unlike the United States over the same period—has continued to cut defence in overall terms. These trends were set long before the travails endured by the British economy since 2008-09. The assumptions of the 1998 SDR were shredded almost immediately by the subsequent Comprehensive Spending Review, and yet they have never been completely abandoned. The two aircraft carriers are still in the program, even if they are now not due for delivery until 2020. In practice, they may never be taken into British service, and could be either mothballed or sold abroad. Since 1998, the strength of the Royal Navy has declined from 32 frigates to 13, from 12 destroyers to 7, and from 10 attack submarines to 7. Many of these units are more capable today than were their equivalents in 1998 and in an equipment-dependent service the argument that the price of sophistication is worth the opportunity cost of losing mass has prevailed.

It is the Army, which is more manpower dependent than the Royal Navy or the Royal Air Force, that is most conscious that mass has a force all of its own. The British Army’s key procurement decision at the time of the 1998 Strategic Defence Review, the Future Rapid Effect System, an integrated package of vehicles with interchangeable and networked capabilities, has also not been delivered, despite its becoming the focus of attention after the 2002 new chapter. One reason for the delay has been that the requirement for air portability, seen as central in 2002, is now secondary to proper protection against improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Meanwhile, the Army’s regular manpower strength, which was set at 110,000 in 1998, fell to 95,000 in the 2010 SDSR, and was fixed at a target of 82,000 in 2012. In the latter year, the government maintained that the army’s overall strength would remain constant because its reserves would be expanded from their current strength of 20,000 to 36,000. Even if the new target is achieved, it will still be below the established strength of the Territorial Army in 1998, when it numbered 42,000.

Initially, both the Afghan and Iraq wars conformed to the expectations inherent in the new chapter. Both appeared to confirm that British forces would be first in and fast out. The initial success in Afghanistan, in which the Northern Alliance provided the mass that the coalition forces lacked, fed the hubris that underpinned what the British called “Telic 1” in Iraq. Confirming the memories of the speed and operational effectiveness of the first Gulf War, and helped by their deployment to the Shia south, the British army luxuriated in a good news story. Even when coalition forces finally acknowledged they faced an insurgency, the British were slow to digest its implications. Lulled by the army’s belief that it was expert in these sorts of operations, too many took comfort in what was familiar rather than wake up to what was unfamiliar. Basra was not Belfast; its levels of violence quickly outstripped those experienced in the latter stages of the Northern Ireland campaign; intelligence flows were not comparable; and Britain was not engaged on its own sovereign territory—it was a junior partner in a subordinate theater of the war.

The corollary was that the failure to deliver on the capability requirements of the 1998 review, in both the short- and the long-term, began to matter less. Protracted land conflict requiring an enduring presence undermined the strategy of expeditionary warfare. The armed forces, and most obviously the army, reequipped themselves under the need to meet urgent operational requirements at the expense of the Treasury, not the Ministry of Defence, but Defence has since borne the subsequent and unbudgeted running costs.

Less clear have been the intellectual consequences of the two wars, the sense of what lessons have been seen as enduring and transferable, and what as specific and transitory. Protracted land conflict has required both heavier equipment and more manpower, the latter generated either through proxies or through the creation of indigenous forces. At times, operations conducted by coalition forces, with their logistical needs and the temptation to use massed fires given their enhanced ability to acquire targets, seem to have attributes more of the First World War than of counterinsurgency doctrine. The metrics of insurgent deaths and the tactical control of terrain smack of attrition more than maneuver.

From 2006, many commentators began to call for a fresh defense review. When it finally came, four years later, they were disappointed. The coalition government, elected in May 2010, discounted not only the experiences gained after 9/11 but also the fact of an ongoing war. Instead, it used the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review to reset the 1998 SDR. Like its predecessor, the SDSR was air-maritime and expeditionary in focus, and its key strategic message was the need for flexibility and agility. By 2013, the Secretary of State for Defence, Philip Hammond, was emphasizing up-stream engagement with the argument that it is better to prevent conflicts in fragile states than to join them when they have become full blown. The cynic could be forgiven for seeing echoes both of the idea of defense diplomacy, first adumbrated in 1998, and of preemption contained in the 2002 new chapter.

2006: A Critical Year

What Britain has stubbornly refused to do is to reflect on the lessons of 2006. This was the year in which British strategic incompetence became evident. Its response to setback in Iraq was not to recalibrate, but to think about withdrawal just as the United States planned a surge. Critics of the Blair government and the British official inquiries into the invasion of Iraq have overwhelmingly concentrated on the decisions taken in 2002-03. In terms of strategy there are important points to be made about the opening stages of the fighting, principally to stress that neither Blair nor George W. Bush was prepared to recognize the type of war they were entering. They and their advisors denied reality for too long. On the other hand, their policies in 2003 were clear, even if they were contentious. By 2006, however, Blair’s policy was unclear. His enthusiasm for the fight dimmed. British forces on the ground were not adequately supported at home and often found themselves caught in a command crossfire. Whitehall focused on Basra, not Iraq, and then on Helmand, not Afghanistan. PJHQ continued to be their operational headquarters, and yet the war in Iraq was run from Baghdad not Northwood, and responded to Washington not London. The United States, albeit belatedly, revisited its doctrine for counterinsurgency in 2006-07, while the
British Army—after a succession of false starts—did not do so until 2009. In the same year the joint Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre, prompted by its new director, Paul Newton (significantly a major general with operational experience in Iraq), drafted a doctrine for the conduct of stabilization operations—Joint Doctrine Publication 3-40. This was a belated attempt to articulate strategy from the bottom up and to fill the vacuum at the top by providing shape from the middle.8

In 2006, both the British government and the British Army “fled forward,” embracing the “good” war in Afghanistan, rather than confront the conundrums of Iraq. In doing so neither paid much attention to the report submitted on 28 November 2005 by a Royal Marine, Gordon Messenger, who had been sent to Helmand by PJHQ, and Mark Etherington, a former Parachute Regiment officer who had previous experience in the Balkans and had been employed by the Foreign Office as a governor in Iraq. Earlier in the year, Etherington had published an account of his experiences which made clear that “interventions of the kind undertaken in Iraq in 2003 are brutally difficult, and impose the most ruthless of audits on the plans and individuals assembled to prosecute them.”9 He and Messenger stressed the need for more research on Helmand before British troops were committed to the province. They urged Britain to start in a small area before expanding, to integrate development with military action from the outset, and to shape a plan to run for ten years, not the three-year window which Whitehall had set. The Cabinet Office was dismissive of their report and the interdepartmental Post-Conflict Reconstruction Unit was stripped of the tasks of overall coordination which it had been specifically established to provide in late 2004. The Secretary of State for Defence, John Reid, sought reassurance from the Chief of the Defence Staff, General Sir Mike Walker, that the Army could handle both Iraq and Afghanistan simultaneously, and was given it on 19 September 2005 in words which suggest that one qualification for the making of strategy should be clear prose.

Our ability to fulfill our plan in Afghanistan is not predicated on withdrawal of such capabilities from Iraq and, notwithstanding those qualifications, in the event that our conditions-based plan for progressive disengagement . . . from southern Iraq is delayed, we shall still be able to deliver our . . . mandated force levels in Afghanistan.10

The accusation that the British government, the British Ministry of Defence, and the British Army were not learning by 2005-06, and that collectively they failed to adapt strategically between then and 2009, is in some respects much more serious than the accusation that it took the wrong decisions in 2002-03. To be sure, the latter was the precondition for the former; the point was that even three, and possibly as many as five years on, nobody had made good either the institutional or intellectual deficit in strategy-making that by then had become abundantly evident. The Chief of the Defence Staff, Air Chief Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup, pointed out the problem in a lecture delivered at the

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8 On all these themes, see Jonathan Bailey, Richard Iron and Hew Strachan (eds), *British Generals and Blair’s Wars* (Aldershot, 2013).


Royal United Service Institution in December 2009.\textsuperscript{11} He created both a Strategic Advisory Panel and a Strategic Advisory Forum early the following year. Outside the Ministry of Defence, however, there were no serious efforts to join what the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) tautologically calls “military strategy” with policy until after the election in May 2010.

Partial Solutions

When Gordon Brown succeeded Tony Blair as prime minister in 2007, the Labour government had created the National Security, International Relations and Development (NSID) subcommittee of cabinet, and its responsibilities included the updating of the National Security Strategy, the first version of which was published in March 2008.\textsuperscript{12} On one level, this was an attempt to take the wind out of the sails of the opposition’s growing criticism of the government’s making of strategy. But NSID did not meet with any regularity, its agenda seems to have borne little relationship to the National Security Strategy, and Brown did not evince much personal enthusiasm for its work. By contrast, David Cameron, on becoming leader of the Conservative Party in 2005, established expert working groups to look at areas of policy for possible inclusion in his party’s manifesto in the run-up to the 2010 election. In 2007, national and international security experts suggested Britain create a National Security Council, a recommendation implemented by Cameron when he duly came to power three years later.

Britain’s National Security Council (NSC) is not the same as the United States’ NSC, and in some respects it owes more to the Committee of Imperial Defence, which Britain established in 1902, and which is the grandfather of both organizations. As with the Committee of Imperial Defence (CID) a century ago, today’s NSC derives its authority from the fact that the prime minister chairs it; as with the CID, today’s Britain has no dedicated national security minister; unlike the United States, Britain’s National Security Advisor is a civil servant, not a political appointee, and exercises little initiative in shaping the government’s national security agenda. In 1902, the service chiefs attended meetings of the CID as equals of the ministers who also attended it, not least because the CID was only an advisory committee of the cabinet and presented no constitutional challenge to its authority. Today, both the Chief of the Defence Staff and the intelligence chiefs attend meetings of the NSC, but they are not full members. There is a paradox here since technically the NSC is also a committee of the cabinet. However, in practice, its decisions in regard to security matters have not been revisited by the full cabinet. During the intervention in Libya, it functioned less as a strategic body and more as a war cabinet: it met over 60 times, and focused on the operational rather than strategic level.

The implied criticism in the last sentence is one that has stuck. The NSC has not conducted a dialogue with itself, with other parts of government, or with outside opinion, as it has sought to think about

\textsuperscript{11} Sir Jock Stirrup, Annual Chief of the Defence Staff Lecture, Royal United Services Institute, 3 December 2009, http://www.rusi.org/events/past/ref:E4B184DB05C4E3/

security over the long term. Neither the restructuring of the armed forces’ reserves nor the reform of the Army, *Future Force 2020*, has been referred to the NSC by the Ministry of Defence, despite the clear constraints on political choices in the future which such changes could impose. Instead, the government has argued that both sets of reform have followed from decisions of the SDSR, and so has seen them as implementing government policies. Not only is that not strictly true (the SDSR was predicated on a bigger regular army and did no more than state that it would commission a review of the reserves), but it also obscures the iterative and deliberative process between politicians and the military that needs to shape the development of strategy and support its eventual decisions.

The failure to think through the relationship between policy direction and operational implementation, the institutional and intellectual heart of strategy, is highlighted by the current state of preparation for the next SDSR due in 2015. Since early 2013, work on its component parts has been in full swing in the Ministry of Defence, not least as the single services stake out their positions and as the British Army in particular plans for a world in which its core role ceases to be Afghanistan. Yet these detailed studies lack any overall strategic framework. The National Security Strategy that guides them is that of 2010, written before the Arab Spring. Predicated on a faster economic recovery, it assumed a regrowth of defense capability and asserted there would be no loss of British global influence. In 2010, the NSS followed, rather than preceded, the completion of over 50 detailed studies of defense capabilities for the SDSR which had begun under the previous government. This is the reverse of what common sense suggests: either strategy should precede more detailed study, or—more pragmatically—it should be developed in step with it. In 2013, Britain is doing neither. Instead, it is repeating exactly the same process as that implemented in 2009-10. Strategy is being made from the bottom up. The 2015 SDSR promises to continue precisely those faults which the creation of the NSC was designed to correct.

Nor has the Ministry of Defence been put in a better place to join together these separate elements. In 2010, the Cameron government seized on the criticisms of the Ministry of Defence to announce that Lord Levene, a businessman who had held government appointments, including in defense procurement, would chair a Defence Reform Group to examine the ministry and make recommendations as to its future organization. Perhaps predictably, Levene focused on the story of cost overruns, on the defense management of equipment acquisition, and on the structures appropriate for those processes. In other words, he addressed the Ministry of Defence in its capacity as a department of state, not as a strategic headquarters. When his report employed the word *strategy*, it did so in the business, not in the military, sense; and its proposals for restructuring the Defence Board prioritized the management of defense in peace, not the direction of operations in war nor the need to link the latter to strategy. Indeed, specific efforts to address the strategy deficit within the ministry were quashed at an early stage. In addressing the procurement challenge, Levene failed to address the Ministry’s other major problem: troops in Iraq and Afghanistan had found themselves pulled in different directions from Whitehall, and the
latter had not necessarily been travelling in the same direction as the American commanders in Baghdad or Kabul.

The Problems of Junior Partnership

Herein, however, is an excuse for Britain’s lack of strategic grip. Since at least 2001 Britain’s unspoken strategy has been to service its alliance with the United States and to act as the cement between Washington and NATO. Many of the failings rehearsed above would disappear if that rationale were more openly articulated by the British government. It is not, not least for domestic political reasons. However, even if it were, Britain would not have resolved its dilemmas. Reliance on the United States for strategy leaves British strategic direction vulnerable to three factors, none of them under London’s own control.

The first is that the United States does not on the whole consult its allies before it makes its decisions. The tone was set in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. Within 24 hours, NATO, guided by its secretary-general, George Robertson (the former British defense minister who had delivered the 1998 SDR) unanimously invoked Article 5 of the Atlantic Charter. For most of NATO’s existence, many—if not all—members had imagined they would use Article 5 to trigger US support, not to show their support for the United States. The United States ignored this manifestation of solidarity, fearful after the Kosovo campaign of a war by committee. Tony Blair discovered that even his unconditional commitment to Washington would only be acceptable on America’s terms. In 2005, when the United States did turn to NATO for support in Afghanistan, its surprise that this support was not more forthcoming showed that it had forgotten its own failure to maximize the opportunity it had four years earlier. Nor have things changed much since, despite President Obama’s efforts to make the behavior of America appear less unilateral and more consensual. As he sought to formulate a strategy for Afghanistan in 2009, none of America’s allies seems to have entered his or his advisors’ calculations. In 2010, the President’s decision, after the Rolling Stone article, to ask for the resignation of General Stanley McChrystal as Commander of International Security Assistance Force (COMISAF) was treated as an American constitutional matter not as an issue for NATO, despite McChrystal holding an alliance command in Kabul.

Second, Britain colludes in its own marginalization in the United States’ thinking. Too often it mistakes American flattery for strategic reality, and imagines it has more influence than it does. Americans are very polite people anxious to put others at ease. Britons are reserved and mistake warmth for sincerity. If they are reassured that they matter, they too readily believe it.

Third, and much more seriously, the United States’ own strategy has frequently been far from clear. The ambiguity in Washington about its objectives in Iraq and Afghanistan has had profound effects for an ally whose own strategy has been predicated on a presumption that America knows what it wants. The debate about the lack of strategy in Britain has been played out both in similar terms and to greater effect

14 A search of Bob Woodward’s book, *Obama’s Wars*, for a reference to the United Kingdom, or any of the United States’ other allies, is fruitless.
in America. This became evident in 2009 over Afghanistan, and it has been even more obvious in the wake of the Arab Spring. Britain and France accepted their roles in Libya in 2011; however, in 2013 the British press, even that on the left, has become frustrated with an administration that has led from behind on Syria. Nor does Britain know how to read the President’s strategic directive of January 2012, with its pivot to the Asia-Pacific.

Britain’s problems in these respects are for Britain, not the United States, to resolve. But Washington should not be surprised if it then does so in ways which reflect British priorities, rather than American, and which mirror a geopolitical divergence, just as the emphasis on the western Pacific represents a shift for the United States. What Britain has to realize is that those who argue that only great powers do grand strategy are wrong. If strategy is about making choices, and about prioritization, then small states, and especially those with diminished or declining resources, have to be more coherent in its formulation than are unipolar or global powers. The 2010 NSS recognized that principle, even if it manifested little appetite to follow it through. The unresolved big questions of the 2010 process are precisely why Britain’s lack of coherence in the making of strategy needs to be resolved by 2015.
A War Examined: Allies and Ethics

Looking Back: Understanding Abu Ghraib

George R. Mastroianni

Abstract: A decade ago, in the autumn of 2003, a small group of soldiers criminally abused detainees at the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq. Two divergent narratives explaining these events emerged: a “bad apple” narrative and a “bad barrel” narrative. Neither does justice to the complex interplay of policy, organizational, and individual factors that contributed to these tragic events. A perfect storm of poor leadership, chaotic and confusing policy changes, and a small group of corrupt and immoral soldiers produced this fiasco with global consequences.

It has been a decade since the world learned about Abu Ghraib. The abuses depicted in the photographs with which we are all now so familiar occurred in the fall of 2003. It was not until April 2004, when photographs of the abuses appeared on Sixty Minutes II, that the public became aware of what had happened.1 Seymour Hersh, in a 10 May 2004 article in the New Yorker, set the tone for much of the subsequent discussion. The subtitle of his article was, “American soldiers brutalized Iraqis. How far up does the responsibility go?” Hersh concluded his article with a quotation from Gary Myers, civilian defense attorney for one of the soldiers who committed the abuses: “I’m going to drag every involved intelligence officer and civilian contractor I can find into court. Do you really believe the Army relieved a general officer because of six soldiers? Not a chance.”2 From the outset, then, “Abu Ghraib” was construed as much more than a case of soldier misconduct. It was to be a story of the inevitable consequences of the administration’s misguided approach to interrogation, detainee treatment, and torture, and the plight of a few low-level soldiers fingered as fall guys for those responsible higher up the chain. It would eventually become clear, though, that there was responsibility at every level: policy, organization, and individual.

Why a Sensational Story?

There were other instances of detainee abuse in Iraq and Afghanistan, some of which were even more brutal than those that occurred at Abu Ghraib. On 26 November 2003, for example, a few weeks after the most infamous Abu Ghraib photographs had been taken, Iraqi Major General Abed Hamed Mowhoush was killed by American soldiers of the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment trying to extract information from him. He had been beaten and tortured for days, had refused to provide information, and was subjected to an unusual technique: he was stuffed into an Army sleeping bag, tied up with electrical cord, and laid on the

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floor where American soldiers sat on him. He died of suffocation and chest compression.  

This and many other examples of abuse in Iraq and Afghanistan, including the deaths of other detainees in US custody, should have and did raise legitimate questions about potential unintended consequences of US torture and interrogation policy. But it was Abu Ghraib that soon became the focus of this discussion. The photographs received worldwide publicity, and the revulsion they engendered had immediate and profound consequences—they fanned the flames of resentment of America in Iraq and throughout the Muslim world. Unfortunately, the Abu Ghraib cases were ill-suited to play the symbolic role they soon acquired.

The involvement of Seymour Hersh and Gary Myers (both were associated with the story of the My Lai massacre during the Vietnam War) probably contributed to the perception of the story as one of national and historical significance. In addition, the superficial similarity of some of the Abu Ghraib abuse photos to photographs from Dr. Phillip Zimbardo’s well-known Stanford Prison Study mobilized an immediate response from social scientists.  

At the outset, then, the stage was set for the development of at least two different and competing narratives according to which these events could be interpreted.

Competing Narratives

The initial response from the Army and the administration was to investigate these incidents and then allow the military personnel and justice systems to do their work. A number of high-level administrative investigations were conducted. Meanwhile, the interpretation favored by the Army and the administration was that these acts were those of a few bad soldiers whose misconduct was their own invention and not a part of any officially sanctioned method of interrogation. This is the “bad apple” narrative.

The alternate narrative suggested by the Hersh article was that the abuses were the result of the migration of “enhanced interrogation procedures” from Guantanamo Bay to Iraq. On this account, the soldiers at Abu Ghraib were simply doing what they had been asked or ordered to do. The few enlisted soldiers who were punished were scapegoats sacrificed to protect the Army chain of command and the high administration officials responsible for promoting these harsher policies and procedures. This is the “bad barrel” narrative.

The Most Accepted Narrative

It seems fair to say that the dominant interpretation of Abu Ghraib today is most consistent with the “bad barrel” narrative. Perhaps the most eloquent example of that narrative is Rory Kennedy’s 2007 film, “Ghosts of Abu Ghraib.” This film makes the case that the events at Abu Ghraib were not the aberrant acts of a few bad soldiers, but merely one set of events in a larger pattern of abuses resulting directly from

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administration and Army policy. The implicit interpretation of Abu Ghraib as an example of obedience to orders was made clear with both opening and closing clips from a documentary about the obedience experiments of Dr. Stanley Milgram.⁶

There have been a few dissenters from this view, but insofar as there is anything resembling a consensus on Abu Ghraib in the public square, it gives the soldiers who committed the abuses the benefit of the doubt. The soldiers were accused of committing specific acts with which some were charged and convicted, but many Americans continue to feel that they are less blameworthy than their superiors.

Do Facts Justify This View?

Two key elements of the bad barrel narrative are (1) the abuses for which the Abu Ghraib soldiers were prosecuted were “enhanced interrogation techniques” that had migrated from Guantanamo to Abu Ghraib subsequent to Major General Miller’s August 2003 visit to Iraq, and (2) the soldiers were acting under influence or orders to commit these abuses. The social science elements of the narrative focus as well on the idea that certain situations can transform otherwise good people into cruel and abusive people. Dr. Phillip Zimbardo, a psychologist famous for conducting the Stanford Prison Study in 1971, in which college students in a simulated prison became abusive after only a few days, testified on behalf of then-Staff Sergeant Ivan Frederick at his sentencing hearing. The thrust of that testimony was that the abuses resulted from a situation created by commanders, a situation which temporarily transformed Frederick and the others from the exemplary soldiers that they were and had been into the cruel and abusive ones seen in the photos.⁷

Background and Specifics

While the Abu Ghraib cases have generated an immense literature, it is worth reviewing the specifics briefly. At the time the abuses occurred, the facility known now as “Abu Ghraib,” the Baghdad Central Confinement Facility, contained approximately 6,500-7,000 detainees. A tent camp on the grounds of the facility surrounded by concertina wire, Camp Ganei, contained approximately 5,000-5,500 detainees suspected of civil crimes. Camp Vigilant, another tent camp, housed 750-1,000 members of the Saddam Fedayeen. The “hard site,” a brick-and-mortar facility, was used primarily for convicted criminals. Two tiers of this facility, Tiers 1A and 1B, were reserved for the mentally ill, women and children, disciplinary problems, and those being held for interrogation. The abuses that were prosecuted took place in the hard site, specifically Tiers 1A and 1B, though they mainly involved detainees brought to the hard site from the tent camps.⁸

The abuses which produced the photographs most of us have seen mainly occurred in October and November 2003. On October 25,

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the infamous “leash photograph” was taken, a picture of then Private Lynndie England holding a tank tie-down strap around the neck of a naked Iraqi detainee known as “Gus.” On October 25, three suspected criminals (with no intelligence value for the military) were lodged in the hard site when the guards suspected they had raped an Iraqi boy in the prison. Prison personnel, including Corporal Graner, stripped these men, physically abused them, and sexually humiliated them by handcuffing them together naked on the floor. On November 4, the infamous photographs of the hooded man on the box with wires on his fingers were taken by some of the prison guards. This man, known to the guards as “Gilligan,” was thought to possess information about the deaths of four American soldiers. On November 7, seven men who had been involved in a disturbance at Camp Ganci related to food were brought into the hard site. These seven men were physically abused and sexually humiliated. It was on November 7 that these same men were photographed stacked in a naked pyramid and then lined up against a wall and forced to masturbate while being ridiculed and photographed.9

These abuses produced many of the now-iconic photos that define “Abu Ghraib” in the public mind. They account for the lion’s share of the charges and the resulting prison time for the guards associated with Abu Ghraib. It is important to note there were other cases of suspected misconduct and abuse that have not been brought to widespread public attention because charges were never filed against the suspects. Some of these instances of misconduct do appear to have taken place in the context of interrogations in which these soldiers were encouraged to help “soften up” detainees.

Enhanced Interrogation Techniques?

In contrast to the prevailing narrative, however, of the eleven victims of these particular abuses, only “Gilligan,” the hooded man on the box, was ever interrogated at all, and he was questioned by military police, not military intelligence. The others were all either mentally ill or suspected common criminals. Thus, the idea the abuses were committed as part of a process of “softening up” detainees for interrogation could conceivably apply to only one of these detainees. In the other cases, the motivation seems simply to have been retaliation by guards for behavior of which they did not approve or for their own entertainment: on 25 October, the alleged rape of a boy; on 7 November, inciting a riot and attacking other guards.

The photographs eventually were made available to prosecutors after Sergeant Joseph Darby turned two compact disks over to the Criminal Investigative Division in January 2004, documenting many of the incidents described above. Both military police and military intelligence soldiers were charged with crimes related to the abuses depicted in the photographs. The incidents that resulted in charges were largely ones that occurred outside interrogations and without immediate supervision from leaders. Focusing on such incidents simplified the legal cases because the thorny issue of command influence was largely eliminated.

In addition to the military police guards, two of the military police dog handlers were also charged with abuses for the inappropriate use of their military working dogs in December 2003. The charged abuses included the following: using dogs to intimidate and frighten the detainees in the hard site for their own and the guards’ entertainment; using dogs to back a naked detainee up against a wall (where the detainee was eventually bitten in the leg); and finally, using the dogs to commit an indecent act in an incident in which the dogs were used to lick peanut butter off the genitals of a male and the breasts of a female US soldier.

The case against the dog handlers, however, proved to be an exception to the prosecution’s general rule of not charging low-level soldiers in situations where military intelligence could reasonably be said to have directed their actions. The prosecutors thought certain of the dog handlers’ actions, while occurring during interrogations, were both egregious and clearly far over a line of which these soldiers should have been quite aware. This belief resulted from a review of all of the circumstances including the fact there were several dog teams at Abu Ghraib, both Army and Navy. The abuses, whether during interrogation or not, were only committed by the Army teams; the Navy teams set clear boundaries with the leadership at Abu Ghraib regarding the use of their dogs. The two Army dog handlers were charged with using their dogs, at the behest of a civilian contract interrogator, to frighten a detainee known as “AQ” (for “al Qaeda”). At the time, this detainee was suspected of being an insurgent, and was interrogated dozens of times, though he was ultimately released. The dog handlers were asked to use their dogs during interrogations by a civilian contract interrogator. Consequently, their respective courts-martial were complicated by the involvement of this civilian contract interrogator who could neither be prosecuted nor compelled to testify. The two dog handlers received a split verdict at trial and relatively light sentences.

Not only did the abuses made famous by the Abu Ghraib photographs occur outside interrogations, but the particular bizarre and highly sexualized abuses shown in the photographs are not known to have been used elsewhere and (except for the use of dogs to intimidate detainees during interrogation) were not on the list of enhanced techniques brought by Major General Miller to Iraq. Is it possible that even though these abuses were not, for the most part, related to interrogations, that the soldiers who committed them thought they were acting under orders?

Several of the accused soldiers pled guilty to the charges against them. In order to be allowed by the judge to plead guilty, these soldiers had to swear they acted on their own and had not been ordered to do so, as following orders is a legitimate legal defense. In fact, Lynndie England’s initial attempt to plead guilty was derailed when Charles Graner testified the leash-photograph incident was a legitimate extraction technique, resulting in a mistrial and subsequent retrial.

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The Power of the “Situation”?

The facts of these cases do not comport with the interpretation of Abu Ghraib as an example of the pernicious consequences of American “torture” policy, or as evidence of the migration of enhanced interrogation techniques from Guantanamo to Iraq. But that has not stopped some from arguing that whatever the nature of the offenses committed by these soldiers, responsibility for them should lay primarily with those above them. Dr. Phillip Zimbardo made this case in his testimony before Ivan Frederick’s sentencing hearing. This social psychological, “situationist” analysis is based on Dr. Zimbardo’s famous Stanford Prison Study. This explanation relies on the putative power of “the situation” to transform good people and cause them to do bad things. In his Stanford study, most of the misconduct occurred on the night shift. Dr. Zimbardo quickly pointed out this and other superficial similarities to Abu Ghraib, such as the similarity in appearance between detainees with sandbags over their heads and his 1971 research subjects with pillowcases over their heads.

The persuasiveness of the transformation story central to Dr. Zimbardo’s explanation hinges on an actual transformation from good to bad. In the Stanford Prison Study, subjects were randomly assigned to be either prisoners or guards, so behavior was more readily attributable to the role rather than the person in that study. But the perpetrators of these abuses at Abu Ghraib were not randomly chosen to play a role. Contrary to the premise of Dr. Zimbardo’s transformation narrative, many of the perpetrators had long personal histories of misconduct, including sexual misconduct. They could not have been transformed from good to bad because the purity ascribed to them by Dr. Zimbardo appears to be little more than wishful thinking.12

Who to Blame?

In addition to the criminal charges filed and adjudicated against soldiers in the Abu Ghraib abuses, several noncommissioned and commissioned officers were punished nonjudicially. These sanctions can take many forms, including punitive letters inserted in the personnel files of these officers, a punishment which often effectively ends the career of the recipient. Officers were also fined and relieved of their commands. These sanctions would seem to represent a judgment that the conduct and performance of many of the leaders involved was substandard. Some of these officers had very promising careers to that point. While conditions at Abu Ghraib were as bad for the officers as for lower-ranking soldiers, the officers were clearly (very harshly, in many cases) judged by other Army officers to have fallen short of expectations. Every official report on Abu Ghraib indicts the leadership and supervision at the facility as having failed to establish an appropriate command climate, one in which these abuses might easily have been prevented. It is quite possible that had leadership and supervision been better, these abuses might not have occurred. But we do not assess the same penalties for dereliction and negligence as for willful criminal misconduct.

12 Graveline and Clemens, The Secrets of Abu Ghraib Revealed, 185, 187.
Legitimate Lessons

Most of what has been learned about the photographs taken at Abu Ghraib, and the events related to them, was learned within a year of the events having taken place. The Taguba, Fay, and Schlesinger reports, along with the evidence and testimony generated by the prosecutions related to Abu Ghraib, taken as a whole appear to provide a fairly complete picture of what went wrong. The following summary from the 2004 Fay Report is difficult to improve upon:

The physical and sexual abuses of detainees at Abu Ghraib are by far the most serious. The abuses spanned from direct physical assault, such as delivering head blows rendering detainees unconscious, to sexual posing and forced participation in group masturbation. At the extremes were the death of a detainee in OGA custody, an alleged rape committed by a US translator and observed by a female Soldier, and the alleged sexual assault of an unknown female. They were perpetrated or witnessed by individuals or small groups. Such abuse cannot be directly tied to a systemic US approach to torture or approved treatment of detainees. The MPs being investigated claim their actions came at the direction of MI. Although self-serving, these claims do have some basis in fact. The climate created at Abu Ghraib provided the opportunity for such abuse to occur and to continue undiscovered by higher authority for a long period of time. What started as undressing and humiliation, stress and physical training (PT), carried over into sexual and physical assaults by a small group of morally corrupt and unsupervised Soldiers and civilians.

“Abu Ghraib” became a cause and a symbol in the years following the release of the photos as the wheels of justice ground on and debate about torture policy raged. The narrative promoted and popularized insisted that the “small group of morally corrupt Soldiers and civilians” was in reality a small group of victims, encouraged by their superiors to behave in certain ways and then hung out to dry when things went bad.

In fact, the release of a report on detainee abuse commissioned by the Senate Armed Services Committee in 2008 was trumpeted by supporters of the perpetrators at Abu Ghraib as vindication of this narrative. Calls for presidential pardons for some of the soldiers convicted at Abu Ghraib were made (none have been granted). These developments have left many Americans, who have not taken the time to immerse themselves in the very distasteful details of these cases, with the mistaken impression that the perpetrators at Abu Ghraib were nothing more than pawns of US policymakers. Given this history, with the benefit of a decade of hindsight, what can we say about the lessons of Abu Ghraib?

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16 Executive Summaries of Abu Ghraib and the 205th Military Intelligence Brigade, AR 15-6.
Lesson 1: “I was only obeying orders” works best as a defense when you can prove you were ordered to do something that is not clearly unlawful, or at least that your superiors knew what you were doing and did not object.

In the cases where the “obeying orders” defense was at least plausible, the courts seem to have been relatively lenient. At Abu Ghraib, the prosecution was least successful with the dog-handler cases, which were prosecuted because the offenses were thought to be so egregious that the soldiers ought to have known they were improper, even if ordered (or suggested or influenced) to do so. But the courts seemingly gave the soldiers the benefit of the doubt, as the sentences were comparatively light. In the Mahwouz case mentioned earlier, the soldiers who killed this man received very light sentences. Interestingly, the technique that killed Major General Mahwouz, wrapping in a sleeping bag, was also free-lanced by the interrogators—it appears in no Army Field Manuals or “rules of engagement.” But there was clear evidence that the interrogators’ superiors knew that this technique was being used and approved.19

Seemingly the plausible evidence of command responsibility for these specific actions explains the much lighter sentence for a much more severe outcome than those charged at Abu Ghraib. If there had been plausible evidence that the soldiers had been ordered to commit these acts at Abu Ghraib, they would probably have not been charged at all, or if they had been charged, would have received much lighter sentences.

Lesson 2: The Abu Ghraib cases that were prosecuted should not have been the focus of the debate about torture and enhanced interrogation techniques.

Most of the specific abuses prosecuted at Abu Ghraib and seen in the photos are not found in any official manuals, guidelines, or procedures relating to interrogation. Stacking naked prisoners in a pyramid, attaching electric wires to detainees, forcing men to simulate fellatio and stand against the wall and masturbate were all the “creative” work of the soldiers prosecuted and no one else. These acts were not performed at Guantanamo, and quite likely were unique to this group of soldiers. None of these techniques were included in the list of enhanced techniques transmitted by Major General Miller in his 2003 visit.

The only abuses prosecuted at Abu Ghraib that might plausibly be connected to a migration scenario were those involving the use of military working dogs. The use of dogs in interrogation was part of the list of techniques transmitted by Major General Miller in August 2003, and included in a list of techniques available to CJTF-720 interrogators (including those at Abu Ghraib) in September 2003. In October 2003, however, pushback from CENTCOM21 resulted in twelve specific items being removed from the list and the rest being reserved to the specific authority of Lieutenant General Sanchez, CJTF-7 Commander. Lieutenant General Sanchez never gave his permission for the use of military working dogs in interrogations at Abu Ghraib, and any such

20 Combined Joint Task Force 7, commanded by Lieutenant General Richard Sanchez.
21 United States Central Command, the immediate higher headquarters for CJTF-7.
use was thus improper and contrary to the regulations put in place by Army officials.  

On the other hand, many personnel involved in interrogations at Abu Ghraib and elsewhere had served in different geographical locations, including Guantanamo and Afghanistan, where rules varied from place to place and time to time as US policy evolved. There is the possibility that there was legitimate confusion about the rules in place at Abu Ghraib at the time the abuses occurred, though it is the responsibility of intelligence professionals to track changes in policy as best they can. Arguably, a culture in which playing fast and loose with the rules seemed to be tacitly approved and encouraged by authorities eager to gain control of a deteriorating situation in Iraq might have led soldiers to push the boundaries in interrogations. This might explain some of the abuses committed during interrogations, which occurred at Abu Ghraib and elsewhere, but were neither photographed (at least as far as anyone knows) nor prosecuted. Had there been photos of abuses that took place during interrogations, and had those photos been made public, a far more substantive discussion of the quite relevant higher-level policy issues might have taken place.

Lesson 3: The situationist explanation for the origin of the abuses at Abu Ghraib is not persuasive.

As explicated in Dr. Phillip Zimbardo’s book The Lucifer Effect, the abuses were a nearly inevitable consequence of a corrosive social situation created by those in authority above the perpetrators (the “barrel makers”). In order to locate the origin of the abuses in a set of conditions created by superiors, Dr. Zimbardo appears to blind himself to evidence that the perpetrators themselves were neither good soldiers nor very nice people, in at least some cases. Some perpetrators had histories of sexual misconduct, strange behavior, and abusive conduct which would seem to locate the origin of the bizarre abuses at Abu Ghraib much more convincingly in them than in some mysterious effect of working in a prison at night. Dr. Zimbardo’s conclusion that "Sergeant Frederick is guilty of the acts he stipulated to, but he is not responsible for it [sic]" exposes the fundamental weakness of the situationist narrative: despite Dr. Zimbardo’s insistence that "the situational approach is not excuseology," it is hard to reconcile this approach with common-sense notions of personal responsibility.

Other soldiers worked in prisons on the night shift all over Iraq and Afghanistan, laboring (to varying degrees) under the same morass of confusing rules and convoluted supervisory relationships as did the soldiers at Abu Ghraib without ever finding it necessary to stack naked men in a pyramid or line them up against a wall and force them to masturbate, or take photographs of one another performing sex acts, as did these soldiers.  

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22 Graveline and Clemens, The Secrets of Abu Ghraib Revealed; Strasser and Whitney, The Abu Ghraib Investigations.
23 Zimbardo, The Lucifer Effect.
24 Graveline and Clemens, The Secrets of Abu Ghraib Revealed, 178, 182.
25 Graveline and Clemens, The Secrets of Abu Ghraib Revealed, 187
Obedience is also part of the situationist interpretation—somber footage of the Milgram obedience experiments begins and ends *Ghosts of Abu Ghraib*. This is an especially unconvincing implied parallel given the halting, reluctant, conflicted responses of many of Milgram’s research subjects as compared to the laughing, leering, boisterous abuses at Abu Ghraib. It seems far more plausible to suggest there was too little rather than too much legitimate authority in play on the night shift. None of this is to suggest that social science has nothing to contribute to our understanding of these events, but the situationist approach, which is often most prominent in popular discourse, fails to account for crucial facts.

**Lesson 4: Believing what we see, or seeing what we believe?**

That Abu Ghraib became a domestic *cause celebre* owed something to a reservoir of distrust and dislike of the Bush administration, and especially its torture and interrogation policy. Abu Ghraib became a proxy for debate about the war itself, and invited comparison to an earlier unpopular war, the Vietnam War, through the connection to My Lai. Political zeal to score points against the administration may have blinded some to the fact that the Abu Ghraib prosecutions were simply not the right test case to expose the pernicious effects of enhanced interrogation techniques. Dr. Phillip Zimbardo, for example, who has arguably done the most to publicize Abu Ghraib within the social sciences and to shape the narrative to which our children will be exposed in their psychology classes for years to come, openly integrates his political views into his scholarly work. In an introductory chapter to a book on the social psychology of genocide, for example, Dr. Zimbardo attacked the Bush administration in such a way that a disclaimer was felt necessary, footnoting that Dr. Zimbardo’s political views are his own. Such a disclaimer is quite rare in scholarly works of this sort in psychology.

**Lesson 5: Context matters.**

In June 2011, an Air Force recruit at Joint Base San Antonio-Lackland reported she had been sexually assaulted by her training sergeant. This report set in motion a chain of events that has so far resulted in the conviction of sixteen noncommissioned officers for a wide range of offenses, including unprofessional sexual contact, assault, battery, adultery, falsifying official statements, and rape. One recruit reported that

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26 Many introductory psychology textbooks now contain references to Abu Ghraib that portray the abuses as the result of situational pressures. Arthur G. Miller, ed., *The Social Psychology of Good and Evil: Understanding Our Capacity for Kindness and Cruelty* (New York: The Guilford Press, 2004). Dr. Zimbardo’s chapter in this book, “A Situationist Perspective on the Psychology of Evil: Understanding How Good People are Transformed into Perpetrators” is disclaimed as follows: “The political views expressed in this chapter represent solely those of a private citizen/patriot, and in no way should be construed as being supported or endorsed by any of my professional or institutional affiliations.” The following quotations are taken from this chapter: “History will also have to decide on the evil status of George W. Bush’s role in declaring a preemptive, aggressive war against Iraq in March 2003, that resulted in widespread death, injury, destruction, and enduring chaos.” (page 22) “But who cares what the truth really is regarding the deceptive reasons for going to war, if the United States is now safer and the president (sic) is a commander-in-chief of decisive action—as his image crafters have carefully depicted him to be in the media. This national mind control experiment deserves careful documenting by unbiased social historians for the current and future generations to appreciate the power of images, words, and framing that can lead a democratic nation to support and even relish the unthinkable evil of an aggressive war.” Emphasis in the original, 36-37.
a group of 50 male recruits was forced to “remove all their clothes, get into an 8-by-10-foot shower space and, bodies touching, reach as high as they could and bend over and touch the wall.”

In other incidents, a recruit was kicked in the chest while doing push-ups; two recruits were forced to rub Icy-Hot on their genitals; and a recruit was forced to shave off all his body hair.

Superficially, these cases would seem to have a great deal in common with the Abu Ghraib abuses: basic training is not prison, but it is an isolated setting with an extreme power differential between recruits and their leaders. These abuses were bizarre humiliations with strong sexual content, and they seem to have taken place largely within one group of sergeants, without the knowledge or approval of their officer leaders. The sergeants were charged with criminal offenses, many convicted and imprisoned, and only one officer was sanctioned, nonjudicially.

Discussion of these events, in contrast to the Abu Ghraib abuses, has been framed from the outset as a case of some bad apples among the basic-training instructors. If a set of events eerily similar to those at Abu Ghraib can occur in Texas in 2009 and be readily accepted as the work of a small group of morally corrupt airmen, isn’t it possible that the Abu Ghraib abuses were cut from the same cloth?

Lesson 6: “Bad apples” vs. “bad barrels” was the wrong way to frame this discussion.

The metaphor oversimplifies a complex and troubling reality, which is that there is plenty of blame to go around. Clearly, both the apples and the barrel were to blame, but if it has to be one or the other, then the “bad apples” were personally and directly responsible for those abuses that were charged. But viewing the cases in this dichotomous light, a tendency promoted by some who wished to deflect attention from the guilt of the defendants, has an unfortunate exculpatory benefit for the Army and the administration.

Those who wished to see Abu Ghraib as an illustration of the consequences of shifts in torture and interrogation policy were ultimately frustrated. In hindsight, the reason is clear. The world needed to see a credible judicial response to what happened. Prosecutors suspected (correctly, as events would show) that it would be very difficult to win convictions and credible sentences in cases where there was evidence of significant involvement by military intelligence personnel. So prosecutors reviewed the hundreds of photographs, investigated the various incidents they represented, and prosecuted those incidents that reflected abusive behavior by the guards that occurred for no valid purpose.

Was this strategy the correct one? It certainly was a successful strategy insofar as convictions and significant sentences were won, and justice done, for the victims of the abuses which were prosecuted. The world saw our national willingness to punish those responsible for inflicting physical and sexual abuse on detainees. Had the prosecutors chosen to prefer charges in cases where abuses took place during interrogations, the result

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might have been much more like the one in the Mahwouz case—airing a
distasteful and embarrassing set of facts with an unsatisfying conclusion
as individuals were acquitted or given very light sentences.

The bad apple/bad barrel frame obscures legitimate culpability at
three levels. At the individual level, the soldiers charged and convicted
were indeed guilty of committing egregious abuses against detainees for
their own sadistic and sexual gratification. They deserved to be tried, con-
victed, and punished for these acts. The offenses they committed were
criminal in nature and appropriate criminal penalties were levied on them.

At the organizational level, there was leadership failure at many levels
at and immediately above Abu Ghraib. There was inadequate supervision
and leadership within Military Police and Military Intelligence units at
Abu Ghraib, and the sharing of roles and responsibilities between these
units was unclear and ineffective. Leadership immediately above Abu
Ghraib knew or should have known about the dysfunctional leadership
at the facility, but failed to adequately address the issue. These condi-
tions are the result of leadership failure, negligence, and dereliction.
Several officers were administratively sanctioned for these offenses, as
is appropriate for their lamentable, but noncriminal, conduct.

At the policy level, the challenging conditions at Abu Ghraib were
the direct result of major policy changes by the Bush administration.
Failure to plan for an adequate force to fight the war from the outset, and
failure to respond quickly enough as the insurgency rapidly expanded,
complicated and compromised the capacity of mid-level leaders to
accomplish their missions. Moreover, the administration’s insistence on
altering our long-standing national posture on torture and interrogation
on the fly inevitably created confusion at all levels as to what was accept-
able where, and to and by whom.28

The Real Meaning of Abu Ghraib

The Abu Ghraib cases were the wrong ones to be the centerpiece
in a debate about torture policy and enhanced interrogation techniques.
Early on, they were framed (by the soldiers charged and their attorneys
and supporters) as a choice between blaming the soldiers or blaming
their superiors. The real and obvious truth is that both were to blame.
Many of the early reports and investigations make this point again and
again. But this complex truth is drowned out by the simpler view that
the soldiers convicted were the victims. They were not.

Abu Ghraib has most certainly not resolved the torture debate. The
debate simmers mostly out of sight and below the surface, and bubbles
over only on rare occasions. Such an occasion was the appearance of
torture in the film Zero Dark Thirty.29 In many ways Abu Ghraib was
a missed opportunity: it is hard to imagine that photos will be taken
should such abuses recur, or that the photos will ever be made public if
they do come into existence. Did we squander our chance to debate the
morality and efficacy of torture and enhanced interrogation techniques

28 These criticisms of the Bush administration’s early planning for the war and the complex
and confusing changes made to long-standing government policy on torture and interrogation are,
I think, widely accepted across the political spectrum as having contributed to the problems at Abu
Ghraib and elsewhere. Others may disagree.

on a group of sexualized thugs? As counterterrorism supplants counterinsurgency as our strategic focus, warfare moves further into the shadows. What conceivable Abu Ghraib moment might there be in the age of drone warfare? Who will be there to take the photos?

The real meaning of Abu Ghraib is something we must each construct for ourselves. The incidents that became famous through the court cases that define “Abu Ghraib,” as well as those that did not, offer a potentially rich source of insights into policies, their implementation and implications, as well as our collective capacity to process these events in the public square. These insights might include but go far beyond policies about torture and interrogation, and encompass those that determine when and why we fight wars, who fights them, and how they are fought. Ten years on, perhaps we can now begin to disentangle “Abu Ghraib” from the symbolic web of suspicions, implications, and accusations in which the passions of the time have enmeshed it in the public mind. This will be the first step in achieving some measure of historical closure on these tragic events that have forever changed so many lives.
ABSTRACT: Iran’s nuclear program has become the major dispute between the Islamic Republic and global powers, led by the United States. This essay identifies the principal elements in any potential agreement, and outlines the steps needed to enhance the opportunity for a successful negotiation. Rapprochement between Tehran and Washington is not only possible, but indeed, desirable.

Since 1979, relations between the United States and Iran have been characterized by mutual suspicion and hostility. The areas of contention include human rights, the Arab-Israeli peace process, terrorism, and nuclear proliferation. In recent years few crises have attracted the attention of the international community as much as the controversy over Iran’s nuclear program. The claims and counter-claims by the Islamic Republic and its major rivals have pushed all sides to the edge of a military conflict and a range of uncertain and unpredictable scenarios. Western powers, led by the United States, accuse Iran of seeking to build nuclear weapons and Tehran categorically denies these accusations and asserts that the program is solely for civilian purposes.

In the last decade, several measures have been employed to curtail Tehran’s nuclear drive. These include assassination of the country’s nuclear scientists, cyberattacks, severe economic sanctions, and threats of military strikes. It is difficult to assess the success (or failure) of each of these measures. Rather, together, they suggest two conclusions. First, Iran is paying a heavy price in human capital and economic prosperity. Second, despite this heavy price, the Islamic Republic has continued to make progress on its nuclear program. True, it can be argued that the combination of these measures has slowed the progress, but it is also true that the nuclear program in 2013 is more developed than it was a few years ago. In other words, it is increasingly harder to sustain the current confrontation without some kind of a breakthrough or, at least, a gradual reduction of tension. Furthermore, despite Western powers’ suspicion, at present there is still consensus that an Iranian nuclear bomb is neither imminent nor inevitable. The Iranian leaders have not made the strategic decision to make the bomb and the country does not have all it needs to make a nuclear device.

In short, there is time for diplomacy. Based on open sources, it is difficult to determine if this time is long or short. Still, most parties in this controversy appear to agree that diplomatic efforts have not yet been completely exhausted. The uncertainty and unpredictability of a military operation (limited or otherwise) further underscores the significance of a diplomatic solution. There is no way to predict with any certainty that Iran and its international rivals would agree on a diplomatic outcome any time soon. Still, one can argue that major players on both sides understand that other options are, for the time being, more costly and less desirable. Finally, it is important to point out that

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pursuing diplomatic efforts does not mean suspending uranium enrichment or lifting economic sanctions. All parties are likely to retain all their options until they reach an agreement. The goal is to pressure the other side to comply with one’s demands.

Against this background, this article seeks to examine the American and Iranian stances on the nuclear dispute and highlight the main characteristics of a potential diplomatic agreement between global powers led by the United States and Iran. Again, reaching such an agreement is by no means guaranteed. Still, the argument of this article is the differences between the two sides are not unbridgeable. In the following sections, I examine the Iranian, American, and European stances on the nuclear dispute. The goal is not to assess the rightness or wrongness of each; rather, to understand Iran’s, the United States’, and the European Union’s perceptions of themselves and the other powers. This will be followed by a discussion of the main elements of a potential deal. The underlying conclusion is the global powers, led by Washington, should adopt a step-by-step approach with reciprocal actions. The policy objective should be to establish a robust verification regime that simultaneously recognizes Iran’s right of peaceful nuclear power and provides assurances to the international community that the Islamic Republic will not build nuclear weapons.

Iran

It is important to note the process of policy formulation and decisionmaking in Tehran is very complicated. True, the Supreme Leader Grand Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Hosseini Khamenei has the final word, but it is also true several institutions and top officials play an active role. The list includes the president, the heads of the legislative (Majlis) and judicial branches, and a number of ministers and military leaders, among others.

In a speech inaugurating the 16th Summit of the Non-Aligned Movement on 30 August 2012, Ayatollah Khamenei highlighted Iran’s stance on the nuclear confrontation. First, the Islamic Republic’s nuclear drive relies largely on Articles IV and VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The former states, “Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.” The latter says, “Each of the parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiation in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament.” This means, according to Tehran, “nuclear energy for all and nuclear weapons for none.” First, the Iranian leaders claim their nuclear program is legitimate while the nuclear weapons states (the United States, Russia, United Kingdom, France, and China) have not lived up to their NPT commitments. Second, Iranian officials have always accused Western powers of a double standard in pressuring their country to give up its “legitimate” nuclear rights while initially helping Israel to build nuclear weapons and


later avoiding any condemnation (Israel is widely believed to possess nuclear weapons and has never signed the NPT).

Third, since the 1979 Islamic revolution several grand ayatollahs have strongly spoken against the production, stockpiling, and use of not only nuclear weapons but all types of weapons of mass destruction. They see these weapons as incompatible with Islam. Ayatollah Khomeini, the founder of the Islamic Republic, suspended the nuclear weapons program which the Shah started before the revolution. His successor, Ayatollah Khamenei issued a *fatwa* (religious edict) in 1995 that considered all weapons of mass destruction as a great and unforgivable sin and declared them forbidden (*baram*). In order to prove that this *fatwa* is a legal and binding document, the Iranian government submitted it to the United Nations in early 2013.

Fourth, Iran insists on its “right” to enrich uranium based on at least two grounds: (a) there is a strong correlation between national pride in the country's scientific advances and the nuclear program. In other words, the nuclear program is perceived as an embodiment of national technological achievement. With the exception of Israel, Iran has the most advanced nuclear program in the Middle East; (b) history teaches Iran to reject dependency on foreign supplies of nuclear fuels. In 1973, Eurodif was founded as a joint venture of Belgium, France, Iran, Italy, and Spain. The Shah invested $1 billion in the company. This investment made Iran entitled to buy 10 percent of the enriched uranium produced by Eurodif. Iran did not receive any enriched uranium and after a long legal dispute was awarded reimbursement.

Finally, and probably most important, Iranian leaders see the nuclear dispute as part of a broader ideological and strategic conflict with Western powers led by the United States. Ayatollah Khomeini famously said the revolution was not about the “price of watermelon,” meaning it was not driven by economic hardship. Rather, it was in response to perceived American penetration of the Iranian nation and society. Thus, resisting US influence has been a significant drive of Iranian policy since 1979. Iranian leaders believe that Washington’s real goal is not nuclear limitation but “regime change” in Tehran. They argue the United States never accepted the Islamic regime and since 1979 has adopted a confrontational approach even before the nuclear program became an issue.

**United States**

In the last two years, the United States’ energy outlook has tremendously improved due to impressive technological advances known as hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling. The International Energy Agency projects that the United States, which currently imports approximately 20 percent of its total energy needs, “will become self-sufficient

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in net terms by 2030.” Strategically, this means the United States will continue to be less dependent on oil and gas supplies from the Persian Gulf region. This promising outlook has prompted some analysts and policymakers to call for disengagement from the Middle East. This argument, however, has at least a two-fold shortfall. First, the American economy is by far the largest economy in the world. The global economy is well-integrated; what happens in one region affects the rest. True, the United States is growing less dependent on oil and gas supplies from the Middle East, but China, India, Japan, and South Korea are moving in the opposite direction. Second, in addition to energy interests in the Persian Gulf region, Washington has broader geopolitical and strategic interests, including the security of Israel, counterterrorism, and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. In short, despite an improved energy outlook the United States is highly unlikely to disengage from the Middle East any time soon.

Against this background, the US concerns regarding Iran’s nuclear program are multidimensional. A nuclear-armed Iran would pose an existential threat to Israel. Tehran might give these weapons to terrorist organizations. Iran would become more aggressive, assertive, and intimidate its neighbors. Finally, the argument goes, other neighbors, particularly Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey would follow suit and acquire their own nuclear weapons. It is important to point out there is no consensus on these potential threats. Indeed, many current and former policymakers and analysts have recently refuted these concerns and offered the opposite argument.

These arguments and counterarguments aside, the United States’ objective was clearly articulated by President Obama, “I do not have a policy of containment; I have a policy to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon.” The President has also repeatedly stated there remains time to pursue a diplomatic solution, but, time is not unlimited. To prevent Iran from acquiring the bomb, different US administrations have adopted a “carrot-and-stick” approach, employing a variety of rewards and punishments. These include diplomatic negotiations, economic sanctions, and keeping the military option open, among others.

Initially, the United States preferred not to talk directly to Iran and encouraged the Europeans to take the lead. In his second term, President Bush expressed dismay at what he termed the outsourcing of our policy toward Iran. This option was reinforced in 2009 when President Obama announced his willingness to talk to the Iranian leaders to solve the nuclear dispute. In the following years, Undersecretaries for Political Affairs William Burns and Wendy Sherman led the US delegation as part of the so-called 5+1 (the five permanent members in the United Nations Security Council plus Germany) negotiations with Iran. Little success, if any, came out of these negotiations. According to Robert Hunter, a former US ambassador to the North Atlantic Treaty

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Organization (NATO), the reason for failing to make real progress is the negotiations “focused overwhelmingly on the nuclear file and on ‘technical’ arrangements, without going to core issues of security.” In the first press conference following his reelection, President Obama stated he will push for a dialogue and a diplomatic solution.

Iran has been under various economic sanctions since 1979. In the last few years, President Obama succeeded in enlisting support of sanctions from many countries and the United Nations Security Council. It is difficult to provide an accurate assessment of the full impact of these sanctions. Still, economic and geopolitical facts draw a mixed picture. Despite holding some of the largest oil and natural gas reserves in the world, Iran’s volumes of production and export have fallen since early 2012. In March 2013, the International Energy Agency (IEA) reported that Iran’s maximum sustainable crude production capacity is off by 700,000 barrels a day. High oil prices have encouraged exploration and production in most oil-producing countries. Meanwhile, some of the major international oil companies have suspended operations in Iran. In the long run, however, some doubt the effectiveness of these sanctions. Having lived under sanctions for more than three decades, Iran has learned to mitigate their impact. Furthermore, as Paul Stevens—a leading oil expert—argues, oil embargoes simply do not work. The international oil market is “too complex, with too many players and too many options to disguise transactions.” Stevens cites examples of failed oil embargoes such as Cuba; Rhodesia and South Africa; the Arab oil embargo in the aftermath of the 1973 Arab-Israeli war; and the embargo against Iraq in the 1990s.

There is no doubt these comprehensive and severe economic sanctions have seriously hurt Iran’s economy as demonstrated by the massive drop in the country’s currency and its oil production and export. In a speech in the holy city of Mashhad to mark the beginning of the new Iranian year (21 March 2013), Ayatollah Ali Khamenei acknowledged the banking and oil sanctions have hurt Iran. It is important, however, not to underestimate Tehran’s ability to mitigate their impact in the long term. Some Iranians argue that the country confronted much harder circumstances during the 1980-88 war with Iraq than under any sanctions Western powers can impose. Finally, how far sanctions can impede the nuclear program is uncertain. Sanctions are clearly increasing the price Iran pays to maintain its nuclear program. However, despite the high and mounting price, there are no indications of change in the country’s nuclear policy. In June 2010, commenting on economic sanctions, then Director of Central Intelligence Agency Leon Panetta said, “Will it deter them from their ambitions with regard to nuclear capability? Probably not.”

President Obama, like his predecessor President Bush, has repeatedly stated that a military option will be considered if diplomacy and sanctions

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fail to prevent Iran from making nuclear weapons. It is highly speculative to predict the shape of such an option (i.e., a limited strike on nuclear installations or a broader attack on centers of power). What is certain, however, is several factors would weigh on the decision to attack Iran. These include the short- and long-term impact on the nuclear program; stability in Iran and the broader Middle East; Tehran’s potential retaliatory options; and the reaction of global oil markets among others. In late 2012, a group of highly influential former diplomats, members in the Congress, and military leaders published a report called *The Iran Project* in which they urged the United States’ administration to consider all these issues before making a decision to attack Iran.\(^{13}\) Raising doubt about the credibility of a military option, Michael Hayden, former Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, stated, “Attacking Iran would guarantee what we are trying to prevent—an Iran that will spare nothing to build a nuclear weapon and that would build it in secret.”\(^{14}\)

Finally, as the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq suggest, wars take a life of their own and it is much easier to start a war than to end it. Underscoring these points, then Secretary of Defense Robert Gates told an audience of West Point cadets, “In my opinion, any future defense secretary who advises the president to again send a big American land army into Asia or into the Middle East or Africa should ‘have his head examined,’ as General MacArthur so delicately put it.”\(^{15}\)

To conclude, US administrations have considered economic sanctions and potential military action as means to pressure Iran to engage in diplomatic efforts to reach a satisfactory solution to the nuclear issue. In testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Undersecretary William Burns stated, “Sanctions and pressure are not an end in themselves; they are a complement, not a substitute, for the diplomatic solution.”\(^{16}\)

**European Union**

The goal of the European Union’s policy on Iran’s nuclear dispute is to “achieve a comprehensive, negotiated, long-term settlement which restores international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of the Iranian nuclear program, while respecting Iran’s legitimate right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy under the Non-Proliferation Treaty.”\(^{17}\) This declared objective is not different from that of the United States. Brussels, however, had initially adopted a different tactic than Washington. Since the early days of the 1979 revolution, relations between Washington and Tehran have been dominated by mutual hostility and mistrust. The United States has sought to isolate and contain Iran. On the other side, the Europeans have taken a less confrontational approach and sought to influence Iran’s domestic and foreign policies by engaging the country in commercial and diplomatic relations.

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Stated differently, the Americans played the role of “bad cop” while the Europeans played the role of “good cop.” Eventually the two roles converged and neither has succeeded. Iran has continued to make progress on its nuclear program.

The difference between American and European policies on Iran can be explained by historical, commercial, and geopolitical factors. Generally, Tehran has had warmer relations with some European countries than with the United States. The European Union has been Iran’s major trade partner for many years with Iran exporting a large portion of its oil and petroleum products to European markets in return for machinery, transport equipment, and chemicals. Finally, Iran and the broader Persian Gulf/Middle East region are in Europe’s backyard—what happens there has a deeper and direct impact on Europe than on the United States. These differences between Washington and Brussels, as well as some differences among the European Union (EU) member-states, have provided Iran with opportunities to overcome attempts to isolate and weaken its international economic and political outreach.

Against this background Tehran and Brussels sought to establish cooperative relations in the aftermath of the Iran-Iraq war (1980-88). These efforts, however, were restrained by disagreements over the fatwa (religious ruling) against Salman Rushdie and allegations of Iranian involvement in terrorist activities. Despite these obstacles and setbacks, the Iranian and European sides initiated the so-called “critical dialogue,” which later evolved into a comprehensive one. The Europeans sought to use growing trade and commercial ties as well as flourishing political dialogue to change Iran’s policy in four areas: human rights, the Arab-Israel conflict, allegations of sponsoring terrorism, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Gradually, the nuclear issue dominated relations between the two sides, particularly since the early 2000s when more information on the nuclear program became available.

The revelation of previously undeclared nuclear activities in 2002 was coupled with two other developments. First, the EU became more concerned about the proliferation of WMD and articulated a broad strategy signaling a rising European role. This strategy was officially declared in the mid-2000s. Second, the United States’ invasion of Iraq in 2003 heightened tension in the Middle East. Europe was concerned that Washington might start another war against Iran, which would further destabilize its “backyard.”

The combination of all these developments laid the foundation for European-Iranian nuclear negotiation. These diplomatic efforts were led by France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, and started in 2003. In the following year, Javier Solana, then the EU high representative for common foreign and security policy, joined the negotiations. In November 2004, the Europeans and Iranians signed an accord known as the Paris Agreement under which Tehran agreed to suspend uranium enrichment and the E3/EU recognized that the suspension was a

voluntary confidence-building measure and not a legal obligation. This Agreement did not last for a long time. The two sides accused each other of not living up to their commitments.

Following the election of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in 2005, Tehran resumed enriching uranium and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) referred Iran to the United Nations Security Council. In 2006 and 2008, Solana presented offers for a negotiated solution that included several economic and diplomatic incentives. These incentives, however, fell short of Iran’s expectations and demands. Within this context the United Nations Security Council issued four resolutions (1737 of December 2006, 1747 of March 2007, 1803 of March 2008, and 1929 of June 2010). These resolutions imposed strict and comprehensive economic sanctions on Iran. In parallel, the European Union added extra sanctions. Meanwhile, the negotiating track has not been completely abandoned. High Representative Catherine Ashton has led several rounds of negotiations with Iran in what became known as the 5+1 or E3+3 (France, Germany, United Kingdom, China, Russia, and the United States).

Two conclusions can be drawn from this brief European-Iranian nuclear negotiation history. First, since the late 2000s the European policy on Iran’s nuclear power has moved closer to the US stance, what the Iranians perceive as “less carrots and more sticks.” Second, a major reason for failing to reach tangible progress is the EU’s inability to address a major Iranian concern—security. Iranian leaders perceive the nuclear dispute as a pretext for regime change. The United States is better positioned than the EU to offer security guarantees to the Islamic Republic.

Potential Diplomatic Deal

Shortly after his reelection, President Obama highlighted the basic elements of a negotiated deal, “There should be a way in which they (the Iranians) can enjoy peaceful nuclear power while still meeting their obligations and providing clear assurances to the international community that they’re not pursuing a nuclear weapon.” After three rounds of negotiations with little success, Iran and the global powers held a new round of talks in Almaty, Kazakhstan, in late February. No official

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account was given of offers and counteroffers. It was reported, however, that negotiations focused on several points:

- Suspending Iran’s uranium enrichment at 20 percent purity, which is considered near weapons grade.
- Restricting Iran’s stockpile of 20 percent enriched uranium.
- Freezing enrichment at the underground Fordo site, near Qom.
- Increasing the monitoring of Iran’s nuclear activity.
- Cooperating with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in a more transparent manner.
- Recognizing Iran’s legitimate rights to enrich uranium.
- Pledging not to impose new sanctions and gradual removal of existing ones.

The two sides agree on a number of issues but there are fundamental differences regarding the sequence of actions and the timing and magnitude of sanctions relief. Thus, it is important not to exaggerate the relatively positive outcome of this latest round of negotiation. Still, the Iranian negotiators issued a statement underscoring they “consider these talks a positive step which could be completed by taking a positive and constructive approach and taking reciprocal steps.”\(^{23}\) Iran and the global powers convened a meeting of experts in Istanbul (March 2013) and another meeting of top negotiators in Almaty (April 2013). How much they can agree on, if any, would be determined by their negotiating strategies and, more importantly, by economic, political, military, and strategic facts on the ground.

**The Way Ahead**

The next several months appear crucial in addressing Iran’s nuclear program. On one side, the country continues to make progress, including developing the skills and proficiencies of enriching uranium. On the other side, severe economic sanctions have inflicted economic hardship, reduced oil exports, and brought economic growth to a standstill. The legitimacy and survival of any regime depends on its ability to meet the basic needs of its population. Both Iran and global powers claim that time is on their side. These claims and counterclaims aside, it is certain that a diplomatic solution would serve the two countries’ and the entire world’s interests. Moving forward, Iranian, American, and European negotiators should consider the following:

First, after more than three decades of hostility, the two sides should have realistic expectations and limit negotiations to the nuclear issue. Other significant strategic grievances and disagreements need to be addressed; however, in the current environment, a grand bargain seems highly unlikely. Instead, an agreement to defuse tension over the nuclear stalemate can prepare the foundation for confidence-building and encourage both sides to consider other issues. The negotiations to address the nuclear issue are not only technical; political and strategic concerns are equally important.

Second, since the 1979 revolution, Iran has had a unique political/religious system based on the concept of *velayat-e faqih* (guardianship of the religious jurist). A close examination of the Iranian leaders’ statements and policies illustrates regime survival is their overriding concern. Indeed, regime survival is at the core of the nuclear dispute. Many Iranian leaders believe the United States is using the nuclear issue as a pretext to pursue regime change. They make the point that when the nuclear program started under the Shah, the United States supported it, sold nuclear reactors to Tehran, and provided education and training to Iranians. They claim that Washington’s real goal is to change the Islamic regime in Tehran, not the nuclear program. Ayatollah Khamenei recently stated, “If the Americans want the issue to be over, there is one simple solution which is the US should put aside its enmity with the Iranian nation.” This perception needs to be addressed. US officials need to assure their Iranian counterparts that the US goal is to change Iranian policy not the regime.

Third, if the negotiators reach an agreement, they will have to convince the public and political leaders in Washington and Tehran to accept it. The public perception on both sides is extremely hostile. For more than three decades, Iran has been seen as the major threat to US interests in the Middle East and South Asia and the United States has been portrayed as the “Great Satan.” Leaders on both sides need to fundamentally alter these perceptions. Major initiatives to build confidence are needed.

Finally, the decades-long enmity between Washington and Tehran obscures the fact that American and Iranian interests are not always mutually exclusive. There are several areas of potential and promising cooperation including energy, counterterrorism, drug trafficking, regional security, Iraq, Afghanistan, and many others. An American-Iranian rapprochement is not only possible, but desirable. It would serve the interests of both sides and contribute to regional and global stability. On the Iranian New Year’s Eve (*Nowruz*), President Obama sent a congratulatory message to the Iranian people and leaders saying he would “continue to work toward a new day between our two nations that bears the fruit of friendship and peace.” In late March 2013, Ayatollah Khamenei said he is not optimistic about talks with the United States, but not opposed to them either. These statements suggest a breakthrough is not likely and key strategic and psychological hurdles need to be addressed. Still, a diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear crisis and reducing tension between Washington and Tehran is worth the effort.

DEALING WITH IRAN

The Iranian Nuclear Debate: More Myths Than Facts

Christopher J. Bolan

ABSTRACT: Much of the public debate surrounding US policies regarding Iran has been distorted by myths that obscure the actual status of Iranian nuclear programs. Similarly, discussions about the implications of a nuclear-armed Iran are often built on questionable assumptions requiring more thorough examination. This article dispels these myths, questions these assumptions, and draws important implications for US policymakers in this critical strategic debate.

International negotiations with Iran over its nuclear program are once again in limbo. At the conclusion of the February talks in Almaty, Kazakhstan, Iran’s Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi characterized them as a significant “milestone” that had reached a “turning point,” and left him “very optimistic and hopeful.” Meanwhile, reactions from representatives of the so-called P5+1 (United States, Great Britain, France, Russia, China, and Germany) were notably more measured, but hinted at an optimistic assessment as newly confirmed US Secretary of State Kerry characterized the February sessions as “useful.”

As so frequently happened in the past, however, subsequent talks in April crashed against the reality of significant gaps in the substantive negotiating positions of the P5+1 and Iranian teams. The European Union representative to the talks, Catherine Ashton, cast a decidedly downbeat assessment of the April sessions observing that “the positions of the [P5+1] and Iran remain far apart on the substance. . . . We have therefore agreed that all sides will go back to capitals to evaluate where we stand in the process.”

This pause in negotiations offers American policymakers the opportunity to reassess strategic options regarding Iran’s nuclear program. The recent election of Hasan Rouhani as President of Iran gives the Obama administration another reason to reconsider America’s current approach. A coherent strategy requires the establishment of clear objectives and a design for employing the nation’s instruments of power to achieve those objectives. In the case of Iran, the overriding strategic objective of current US policy has been made exactly clear by President Obama and Vice President Biden. In his speech to the American Israel Public Affairs Committee one year ago, President Obama said the objective of US policy is “to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon.” Vice President Biden reiterated this position nearly verbatim to the same

2 Ibid.

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audience on 4 March 2013 saying the goal of US policy is “to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon.” While others outside the White House have suggested alternative US policy objectives ranging from preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapons capability to ousting the current regime in Tehran, these statements by the President and Vice President have effectively ended this portion of the strategic debate. US policies under President Obama will be guided by the paramount objective of preventing Iran’s acquisition of a nuclear weapon.

Nevertheless, the public and internal debates over how the United States can best marshal its diplomatic, economic, informational, and military instruments of power to accomplish this expressed policy objective will continue for some time. The default option would be to maintain the current US dual-track approach of offering negotiations while imposing ever-tightening economic and financial sanctions in the hope of compelling Iranian concessions on its nuclear program. Others have made the case for preemptive military attacks designed to destroy Iran’s existing nuclear facilities or facilitate a regime change in Tehran. Still others have advocated a strategy emphasizing a diplomatic approach exchanging United States and international recognition of Iran’s right to enrich uranium in return for commitments from Tehran to limit enrichment activities and subject them to an intrusive international inspection regimen ensuring nuclear materials are not diverted to military purposes.

It is the contention of this author that the quality of these public and internal debates would be improved significantly by dispelling some of the most misguided myths surrounding Iran and clarifying the status of its current nuclear program. Additionally, this article examines some of the more questionable assumptions about a nuclear-armed Iran and offers some preliminary implications for US policymakers as they struggle to implement a coherent strategic approach toward Iran.

Mythbusting

Myth 1: Iran is an irrational actor.

This myth is especially popular among those pushing for immediate military action to attack Iran’s nuclear infrastructure. Their argument is that Iranian leaders are crazed, hot-headed, and messianic actors who do not respond to logic or reason; therefore, they cannot be negotiated with or trusted with weapons of mass destruction. These claims are based on cultural ignorance and prejudices that would be routinely dismissed as out of bounds in virtually any context outside US policy debates on Iran. Fortunately, several senior US and Israeli officials have...

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6 See, for example, Matthew Kroenig, “Time to Attack Iran: Why a Strike is the Least Bad Option,” Foreign Affairs 91, no. 1 (Jan/Feb 2012): 76-86.

publicly dismissed this myth as false. America’s senior military officer, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Dempsey, asserted in a television interview with Fareed Zakaria that “we are of the opinion that the [Iranian] regime is a rational actor.” Israel’s retired Mossad director Meir Dagan similarly opined that “the regime in Iran is a very rational one.” Ehud Barak, Israel’s Defense Minister, in a meeting with senior Obama administration officials elaborated on this basic point, stating “I don’t think the Iranians, even if they got the bomb, [would] drop it in the neighborhood. . . . They are radical but not totally crazy. . . . They have a quite sophisticated decision-making process, and they understand reality.” Moreover, the US Director of National Intelligence recently confirmed the rational nature of the regime in Tehran judging that “Iran’s nuclear decisionmaking is guided by a cost-benefit approach.”

Of course, even rational actors can make serious miscalculations with horrific consequences (witness Saddam Hussein’s ill-advised invasion of Kuwait in 1990). This problem is exacerbated by the opacity of the decisionmaking regime in Tehran. Nonetheless, recognizing leaders in Tehran are rational actors has important policy implications: namely, that a negotiated compromise settlement is at least theoretically possible assuming a minimum degree of overlapping interests; and containment and deterrence are viable strategies should Iran at some date decide to acquire a nuclear weapon. In the meantime, it becomes critically important for senior US officials to continue to communicate clear “red lines” of unacceptable actions to those rational actors in Tehran. President Obama’s observable and measurable policy objective of preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon while eschewing calls for broader regime change in Iran or adopting the much more amorphous goal of preventing Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapons capability is a positive step in this direction.

Myth 2: Iran is an existential threat to Israel.

This is a claim frequently accepted at face value in many American circles, but is vigorously debated in Israel. Israel is widely assessed to have several hundred nuclear bombs with the capability to deliver them anywhere in the region, and is demonstrably the region’s strongest and most capable military power. Admitting to this basic reality, Ephraim Halevy, former Mossad Director, noted, “I think Israel is strong enough to protect itself, to take care of itself. I think ultimately it is not in the power of Iran to destroy the state of Israel.” Similarly, Dan Halutz,

former Israeli Defense Forces Chief of Staff, has concluded that “Iran poses a serious threat but not an existential one.”

Busting both of these aforementioned myths allows policymakers and intelligence analysts to develop a more honest assessment of both the scale and urgency of any potential threat from Iran to either US or Israeli interests. For now, Iran is a middling regional military power with limited capability to threaten its neighbors. Furthermore, any Iranian attack on American or Israeli interests could be met quickly with a devastating blow from the superior conventional and unconventional military might of either the United States or Israel. A nuclear-armed Iran would change these calculations somewhat, but primarily by providing Iran a meaningful deterrent to a massive military intervention designed to overturn the regime in Tehran—something for which neither the American public nor the Obama administration would likely have any appetite.

At the same time, dismissing these myths does not mean that Iran has not or will not aggressively compete with the United States and Israel for regional influence. US military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan eliminated two of Iran’s major regional competitors and have consequently provided Tehran a relative advantage. The misnamed “Arab Spring” has dislodged important American allies and created regional instability that Iran will undoubtedly seek to exploit to its own advantage. Iran will continue to foster its relationships with Hezbollah in South Lebanon and Syria; Shi’a political leaders and local militia forces in Iraq; Shi’a communities in Bahrain and elsewhere in the Gulf; and Hamas in Gaza as a means of extending its own influence at the expense of American and Israeli interests. However, such strategic gamesmanship is not unique to Iran and virtually every player in the competitive game of international politics seeks to extend leverage over other parties. It is worth recalling modern Iran has no history of invading its neighbors. Iran has thus far pressed its advantages primarily by exploiting its “soft power” relationships with regional Shi’a groups and by seeking asymmetric advantages through financing, training, and equipping nonstate actors such as Hezbollah (and more recently the Asad regime in Syria) as a counter to the superior conventional military forces of the United States and Israel.

**Myth 3: Iranian civilian nuclear activities are a cover for nuclear weapons program.**

This charge has been repeatedly dismissed by the best available US intelligence assessments. The 2007 US National Intelligence Estimate assessed Iran suspended its nuclear weapons program in 2003. Then Secretary of Defense Panetta confirmed the continued validity of this assessment in February 2013 saying, “the intelligence we have is they [Iranian leaders] have not made the decision to proceed with the development of a nuclear weapon.” Instead, the ultimate objective for Iran’s civilian nuclear program, according to US Director of National

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Intelligence James Clapper, may be to develop “various nuclear capabilities that better position it to produce such weapons, should it choose to do so.”

He went on, however, to emphasize that “we do not know . . . if Iran will eventually decide to build nuclear weapons.” In other words, Iran (like several other countries) may be seeking a latent nuclear capability or what is often referred to as the “Japan option”—the ability to produce a nuclear weapon on a relatively compressed timeline should the security situation warrant a nuclear deterrent. It is in this sense that repeated US and Israeli threats to attack Iran’s existing civilian nuclear facilities may well be counterproductive by underscoring the potential need for just such a deterrent. In fact, Britain’s former Foreign Secretary Jack Straw recently explained that the veiled military threat of keeping all options on the table “is a hindrance to negotiations, rather than a help.”

Finally, Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei has formally and publicly renounced nuclear weapons in a binding religious ruling or fatwa that “considers the possession of nuclear weapons a grave sin.” Reversing such a pledge is, of course, not impossible. However, all available evidence confirms that Khamenei has thus far made good on his pledge to “never pursue nuclear weapons.”

Myth 4: Iran has sufficient nuclear fuel to make a bomb.

This claim has been advanced by sloppy analysts and others interested in hyping the urgency of an Iranian nuclear threat. However, there is no evidence Iran has produced any weapons-grade fissile material. All publicly available evidence suggests Iran is producing low enriched uranium at roughly the 5 percent and 20 percent levels (for energy production and medical treatments), but not to the 90 percent level required for weapons-grade fissile material. Moreover, while Iran is openly increasing its capacity to produce more of this low enriched uranium with additional centrifuges, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in February and May verified Iran is simultaneously converting some of its enriched uranium to fuel stocks thereby reducing the amount of fissionable material potentially available for a nuclear bomb. Iran is, therefore, deliberately limiting the amount of its enriched uranium stocks below that required for a nuclear bomb.


Myth 5: Iran is on the brink of producing a nuclear weapon.

US, Israeli, and other western intelligence agencies have been predicting an imminent Iranian nuclear bomb since 1979. A Christian Science Monitor article summarizes the lengthy history of these assessments:

Breathless predictions that the Islamic Republic will soon be at the brink of nuclear capability, or—worse—acquire an actual nuclear bomb, are not new. For more than a quarter of a century Western officials have claimed repeatedly that Iran is close to joining the nuclear club. Such a result is always declared "unacceptable" and a possible reason for military action, with "all options on the table" to prevent upsetting the Mideast strategic balance dominated by the U.S. and Israel. And yet, those predictions have time and again come and gone.19

This long and inconvenient trail of errant predictions is not likely to persuade those who are absolutely convinced Iran is bent on acquiring nuclear weapons. After all, in Aesop's fable The Boy Who Cried Wolf, the wolf is real and it does attack the shepherd's flock. However, equally plausible explanations for the fact that Iran has thus far failed to acquire a nuclear weapons capability include: (a) Iran has no intent of doing so; or (b) existing policies, sanctions, and other activities including suspected covert operations (assassinating Iranian scientists and infecting Iran's nuclear facilities with computer viruses) have effectively deterred, delayed, or prevented Iran from producing a nuclear weapon.

Myth 6: Iran's enrichment activities are a violation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

One could readily find talented lawyers who persuasively argue either side of this case. Former Secretary of State Clinton publicly claimed Iran violated the terms of the NPT. However, the international watchdog responsible for monitoring nuclear developments stops short of describing Iranian actions as a formal violation of its NPT obligations.

The confusion on this score is a direct result of the ambiguity of the deal struck by the NPT and deserves an extended treatment here since these divergent interpretations of the treaty explain the essence of the current disagreements between Iran and the P5+1.

Article IV of the NPT explicitly states, "Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I and II of this Treaty." This article provides the statutory basis for Iran's insistence any negotiated outcome must, as a minimum, recognize Iran's unquestionable right to enrich uranium for civilian purposes. Recent polling suggests the Iranian public continues to endorse this view despite the current pain of sanctions.20

However, Article III of the NPT simultaneously requires non-nuclear-weapons states to also accept safeguards as negotiated by the IAEA to verify and prevent diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons. US negotiators can cite this article and Iran’s failure to comply fully with IAEA demands as a basis for claiming Iran has violated the NPT. Moreover, the IAEA does expressly criticize Iran for failing to implement its Additional Protocol. This bilateral agreement was negotiated between the IAEA and Iran in 2003 and provided for more stringent safeguards including expanded access by IAEA inspectors to nuclear facilities beyond the original terms of the NPT. Iran suspended its implementation in 2005 to protest continued sanctions despite its cooperation with the Additional Protocol.

So who has the better side of the argument? On balance, Iranian nuclear activities appear largely consistent with its NPT obligations, although Tehran could do more to remove existing doubts about prior activities and improve transparency with IAEA inspectors. The latest formal IAEA report on Iran never uses the word violate in assessing Iran’s compliance with the NPT. In fact, repeated IAEA reports specifically explain “the Agency continues to verify the non-diversion of declared material.” Additionally, the IAEA continues to actively monitor and inspect Iran’s declared nuclear facilities with a system of installed cameras and through physical on-site inspection teams. The IAEA report of 22 May 2013 expressly confirms that "all of these [enrichment related activities] are under Agency safeguards, and all of the nuclear material, installed cascades, and the feed and withdrawal stations at those facilities are subject to Agency containment and surveillance." In other words, after literally thousands of hours of international inspections there is absolutely no evidence that Iran is diverting enriched uranium for a weapons program.

More recently, disputes over IAEA access to an Iranian military facility at Parchin have added to international concerns about a lack of full transparency. These conditions, along with Iran’s suspension of the Additional Protocol, have left the IAEA ultimately unable to provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material. These uncertainties provide the immediate basis for recent UN Security Council resolutions sanctioning Iran.

This situation is eerily reminiscent of that confronting international inspectors and Iraq in the aftermath of Desert Storm throughout the 1990s. At the conclusion of this war, the United Nations demanded the disarmament of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction and created an international inspections regime (the United Nations Special Commission and its successor United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission) to ensure the destruction of Iraq’s chemical and biological weapons and to coordinate with the IAEA to eliminate Iraqi nuclear weapons facilities. Although much verifiable progress was made in dismantling Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD) stocks and facilities, there were disagreements between Iraqi officials and international inspectors over the extent and degree of access required. These frictions

multiplied over time and resulted in occasional stand-offs as inspectors were delayed or altogether denied permission to enter certain sensitive facilities. These delays and obstructions were used as justification for both imposing increasingly harsh sanctions and for limited bombing attacks by the United States and Britain in 1998 (Operation Desert Fox). It was this lack of transparency and what came to be characterized as a cynical game of “cat and mouse” between Saddam and inspectors that ultimately provided the rationale for the American invasion of Iraq in 2003. US leaders and intelligence officials assumed Iraq’s failure to cooperate in the face of stringent sanctions could only indicate Saddam was actively maintaining WMD stockpiles that would eventually target American interests. In hindsight, of course, we know that the combination of international inspections and sanctions had effectively contained Saddam and prevented him from reconstituting his WMD programs.

The present IAEA stand-off with Iran over access to Parchin is a close parallel with the situation of Iraq in the 1990s. International inspectors are demanding renewed access to a facility within the Parchin military compound based on unattributed intelligence claiming that Iran at one time conducted nuclear tests with possible military dimensions. Iran has denied the IAEA access noting that IAEA inspectors had conducted a successful visit to the facility in 2005 without incident. Iran further asserts this complex has no connection to nuclear programs and is used only for conventional military purposes. Without renewed access, however, the IAEA argues it cannot confidently conclude that Iran is not conducting illicit nuclear activities. Essentially, this places Iran in the extremely difficult position of having to prove a negative. In other words, it is not enough that the IAEA finds no concrete evidence of illicit nuclear weapons activities. Instead, Iran must provide the IAEA unrestricted and immediate access to any and all Iranian facilities for an undetermined amount of time before the IAEA will give Iran anything resembling a clean bill of health. Of course, it is precisely the extent of the cooperation required of Iran that has been and will continue to be the focus of ongoing negotiations with the IAEA and P5+1. US policymakers must decide what levels of uncertainty regarding Iran’s nuclear activities they are willing to tolerate. Iran is simply unlikely to provide international inspectors carte blanche to inspect everywhere at any time.

Finally, Iranian leaders make use of these disagreements over NPT obligations to attack US policies as imposing a double standard that unfairly targets Iran. Leaders in Tehran frequently point out that while the United States is leading the charge to punish Iran for its [peaceful civilian] nuclear activities, America simultaneously offers substantial military, economic, and political support to nuclear-armed states such as Israel, India, and Pakistan who are not signatories to the NPT and do not allow international inspections of their nuclear facilities. This apparent double standard fuels concern among Iranian politicians that America’s true aim is to curb Iranian power and to foster internal domestic dissent that will ultimately lead to the overthrow of the current regime in Tehran. These leaders also observe that several other countries with advanced civilian nuclear programs, including Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, Israel, Pakistan, Syria, and Venezuela, refused to agree to the Additional Protocols; however, these countries are not subjected to the same rigorous scrutiny as Iran.
Beyond these misleading myths about Iran and the current state of its nuclear activities, American policymakers would be well advised to examine fully all assertions about the potential consequences of Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons. The net effect of these dubious assumptions is a worst-case analysis that exaggerates the likely consequences of a nuclear-armed Iran and thus increases prospects for an American overreaction leading to military confrontation.

Assumption #1: A nuclear-armed Iran will lead to regional proliferation.

While it is possible that a nuclear-armed Iran could spur other regional countries to acquire nuclear weapons of their own, policymakers should not simply assume this will be the case. Recent analysis by the Center for New American Security challenges “conventional wisdom that Iranian nuclearization will spark region-wide proliferation,” observes that historical cases of reactive proliferation are “exceedingly rare,” and ultimately concludes that “neither Egypt nor Turkey, nor Saudi Arabia is likely to respond . . . by pursuing the bomb.”22 A recent study from the War Studies Department of King’s College London draws similar conclusions noting Turkey, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia “have little to gain and much to lose by embarking down such a route.”23 Moreover, there is ample historical evidence both inside and outside the Middle East that one nation’s possession of nuclear weapons does not necessarily lead to further proliferation among presumed competitors. For instance, China conducted its first nuclear weapons tests in 1964 and neither Japan nor South Korea have yet opted to “go-nuclear” although both countries certainly have long possessed the technical capability to do so. Ironically, the most powerful incentive for nuclear proliferation among Arab nations has been Israel’s undeclared nuclear weapons capability since the late 1960s. Nevertheless, despite several Arab-Israeli wars, neither Iran nor any Arab state has developed nuclear weapons in the subsequent 50 years. Finally, there are any number of deliberate actions US policymakers could take to minimize prospects for further regional proliferation including providing friendly militaries with capable defensive missile systems and perhaps even extending America’s nuclear umbrella to threatened allies.

Assumption #2: A nuclear-armed Iran will destabilize the region

As with the previous assumption, the prospect of further destabilization of the region in the wake of Iran’s development of a nuclear weapon cannot be ruled out. However, Kenneth Waltz, a prominent American international relations scholar, in a recent provocative Foreign Affairs article entitled “Why Iran Should Get the Bomb” makes precisely

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23 Straw, “Even if Iran Gets the Bomb, It Won’t be Worth Going to War.”
the opposite argument.²⁴ Waltz argues the overwhelming preponderance of historical evidence suggests nuclear weapons have been a stabilizing influence on international politics imposing a tremendous degree of rationality and caution on the part of nuclear powers. The most obvious case in point: The US-USSR nuclear arsenals contributed to what diplomatic historian John Lewis Gaddis aptly dubbed The Long Peace—a period of history uniquely characterized by the absence of violent conflict between the major powers. Indeed, since the advent of nuclear weapons there has not been a single major armed confrontation between nuclear powers. The same logic would likely apply to Israel and Iran.

Assumption #3: A nuclear-armed Iran will destroy the global nonproliferation regime.

There is little doubt that the immediate impact of Iran becoming a member of the nuclear club would represent a setback to global nonproliferation efforts. However, it would be a huge distortion to suggest this single event would cause the collapse of the entire nonproliferation enterprise. By any reasonable historic measure, international nonproliferation efforts have been successful. In his third presidential debate with Nixon in 1960, John F. Kennedy predicted that “10, 15, or 20 nations will have a nuclear capacity . . . by the end of the Presidential office in 1964.” Despite this alarming prediction, only 9 nations currently possess a nuclear weapons arsenal (Britain, China, France, Russia, United States, Israel, Pakistan, India, and North Korea). Not a perfect record over the span of more than 50 years, but a substantial record of accomplishment nonetheless. The addition of Iran would not upset this remarkable record.

Implications

Taken as a whole, the foregoing analysis strongly suggests there is room for a diplomatic resolution to the issue of Iran’s nuclear programs. Official US intelligence estimates indicate Iran suspended its nuclear weapons research program in 2003. Top US officials have publicly underscored their assessment that Iranian leaders have not yet made a decision to develop nuclear weapons. Furthermore, Iran’s Supreme Leader has issued a binding religious fatwa declaring the possession of nuclear weapons is a grave sin against Islam. In the meantime, international inspectors remain active at all of Iran’s declared nuclear sites and continue to verify enriched uranium is not being diverted to military purposes. All of these indications suggest there is a window of opportunity to convince Tehran to accept effective limits on its nuclear ambitions in return for a meaningful easing (and eventual lifting) of sanctions.

Just how long this window of opportunity will last is open to debate. Nevertheless, the long trail of erroneous assessments by Western intelligence services reaching as far back as 1979 that Iran will soon possess a nuclear weapon should cause policymakers to approach present-day alarmist calls with a high degree of skepticism. In any event, there is more to developing and deploying a nuclear weapon than assembling a sufficient number of centrifuges to produce an ample quantity of highly

enriched uranium. According to a recent analysis by several former senior US officials and national security professionals, Iran would need several months to produce sufficient weapons-grade uranium for even a single bomb and then “up to two years, according to conservative estimates, would be required for Iran to build a nuclear warhead that would be reliably deliverable by a missile.” The report further observes these activities would likely be detected by US intelligence providing policymakers a month or more to respond. The US Director of National Intelligence recently confirmed the ability of the intelligence community to give policymakers advance warning noting, “we assess Iran could not divert safeguarded material and produce a weapon-worth of WGU [weapons-grade uranium] before this activity is discovered.”

Clearly, there is time—perhaps years—to fashion a negotiated solution that serves both American and Iranian interests. The essential outlines of a negotiated deal are well known. The United States will need to recognize formally Iran’s right to enrich uranium while Iran will have to limit its enrichment activities and agree to an intrusive regimen of international inspections (something along the lines called for in the Additional Protocol previously agreed to in 2003 by both Iran and the IAEA) in exchange for the graduated lifting of sanctions.

As with any negotiation, the devil resides in the details. For the United States, however, a successful deal in the near term offers the best prospect Iran will willingly remain a nonnuclear weapons state. Serious negotiations now would take full advantage of the current international consensus behind sanctions—a consensus that history suggests will likely only fray over time. A diplomatic solution would also avoid the dangerous pitfalls of military strikes against widely dispersed, and in many cases well protected, Iranian nuclear facilities. Many military analysts are convinced these attacks would at best only delay Iran’s nuclear programs for two years or so while simultaneously strengthening the position of hardliners in Iran and bolstering their conviction that Iran desperately needs a nuclear deterrent against future military attacks. For Iran, a negotiated resolution would ease the burden of sanctions and offer some degree of validation by the international community of nations.

US policymakers should also thoroughly scrutinize many of the worst-case assumptions about a nuclear-armed Iran. Disastrous outcomes are not preordained. In any case, the most significant of these could be mitigated through existing diplomatic, informational, economic, and military instruments. Allegations that other regional states will respond to a nuclear Iran by seeking their own nuclear weapons capability have been refuted by recent analyses. States have many reasons to eschew nuclear weapons (that is why only nine states have chosen to do possess them) and smart US policies could amplify those costs (sanctions) and provide additional political and military incentives to reassure threatened allies so they do not feel the need for an independent nuclear weapons capability. Policymakers should also derive comfort from knowing the history of the Cold War demonstrates that, by virtue of their massive destructive

27 For an example of this analysis, see Weighing Benefits and Costs of Military Action Against Iran.
power and the horrific scale of likely retribution, nuclear weapons are far more likely to impose a stronger sense of rationality and caution on states than they are to encourage reckless aggressive military action.

Finally, even as policymakers remain fully committed to a policy of prevention, they would be well advised to recognize that containment and deterrence remain viable strategic options should prevention fail. Iranian leaders have proven themselves to be rational actors primarily concerned with securing their own physical and political survival. Deterrence and containment successfully achieved US interests when confronting ugly, violent, and dictatorial leaders in Moscow and Beijing. There is little reason to suspect artful US strategy could not achieve similar results vis-a-vis a nuclear-armed Iran.
Abstract: The eight Arab kingdoms, aside from Bahrain, have weathered the Arab Spring with remarkable ease when compared to presidential republics. What explains the relatively modest upheaval and the ruling elites’ success in preserving the status quo? This article suggests that the popular legitimacy of the region’s monarchies complemented by fragmented political opposition and deep social cleavages limited the appeal of radical revolt.

Even a perfunctory survey of the states where the Arab Spring was marked by mass demonstrations and substantial violence—Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, Libya, Syria, and Bahrain—reveals that, with the exception of the last, they are all presidential republics. North Africa and the Middle East is also home to eight Arab monarchies, from Morocco on the Atlantic Ocean to the emirates on the Persian Gulf, that have escaped the brunt of the upheaval that rocked the region since early 2011. Why have these states been seemingly immune to major revolts? How have their rulers responded to popular demands for reform? What explains their overall success in preserving the status quo and keeping the agents of radical change at bay?

Seven of the eight Arab monarchies—Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE)—have managed to stave off the recent turmoil. The eighth, Bahrain, a tiny island off the coast of Saudi Arabia, is the notable exception: it is the only Shi’a-majority population Arab monarchy ruled by a Sunni Muslim royal dynasty and it has experienced considerable unrest. The endurance of the Arab kingdoms is all the more remarkable because only a few decades ago experts entertained serious doubts regarding their long-term survival. After the end of royal rule in Egypt (1952), Iraq (1958), Yemen (1962), and Libya (1969), it did seem that the days of the Arab monarchies were numbered. Royal rule was threatened by coup attempts (Saudi Arabia and Morocco) and civil war (Jordan) but the only Middle Eastern monarch unseated in over three decades was not an Arab king but the Shah of Iran.

A number of scholars explored the reasons behind the survival of the Arab monarchies prior to the Arab Spring. These studies explained the monarchies’ resilience through their unique historical backgrounds and their success in spreading family members throughout senior posts across governmental and security agencies—a trait that led to widespread revulsion when nonmonarchs in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya tried the same thing. In this context, then, it is tempting to consider the Arab Spring as a major test to the endurance of the Arab world’s remaining

kingdoms, a test that, with the exception of Bahrain, they passed with remarkable ease. How to account for their success not just to survive but, perhaps more importantly, to continue to resist introducing substantial political reform? The challenges to these states, which range from virtually none in the United Arab Emirates to large-scale protests aiming to unseat the regime in Bahrain, were as different as the states themselves.

Four factors that explain the successful management of the political challenges in 2011 pertain to all Arab monarchies save for Bahrain. First, protesters in the kingdoms wanted reform and not revolution as in Tunisia or Egypt. Instead of calling for the abolition of the royal regimes, activists sought a shift from absolute to constitutional monarchies. Second, opposition forces in all of these states were largely disorganized and fragmented; consequently, their capacity to offer a clear alternative or to bring about change was heavily compromised. Third, as in other contexts, the fear of widespread disorder that accompanied regime collapse in states like Libya and Yemen reduced the appeal of radical approaches. Lastly, security forces avoided the overreaction seen in several Arab republics and performed their tasks effectively without causing excessive casualties.

Several explanatory variables are unique, however, to the different kingdoms. Most importantly, given their vast financial reserves, the prosperous dynastic monarchies of the Gulf were able to buy social peace with economic incentives and expensive social programs accompanied by minimal, if any, political concessions. In Morocco and Jordan, on the other hand, rulers needed to rely on political skills because their resources were inadequate to purchase sociopolitical tranquility, even if they were financially assisted by Saudi Arabia and other Gulf kingdoms. Both continued their decade-long practice of promising major political reforms while in reality making only modest concessions.

In this article, I first discuss the main thrust of the Arab Spring as experienced in the Gulf and examine how the royal governments reacted to it and why, with special attention to the outlier, Bahrain. In the second section, focus shifts to Morocco and Jordan and why these two states could quickly defuse threats to their political stability and preserve their rule with only minor concessions. My argument is that, while the Gulf kingdoms’ stability, given their plentiful financial reserves, appears assured in the foreseeable future, the rulers of Jordan and Morocco need to make real concessions to safeguard their long-term rule.

The Arab Spring in the Gulf Kingdoms

Compared to the full-blown uprisings elsewhere in the Arab world, two of the Gulf Cooperation Council’s member states (Qatar and the UAE) were essentially unaffected by turmoil while two others (Oman and Saudi Arabia) faced only minor demonstrations. In Kuwait, however, important political red lines were crossed although they have not shaken the emir’s hold on the country. Bahrain, where the Al-Khalifa family’s rule has been challenged and threatened, is the outlier.

Political Mobilization

In the richest Gulf state, Qatar, no demonstrations took place at all. A few activists criticized the emir’s pro-Western foreign policy but
the main domestic threat remained the long-standing infighting within the several thousand strong Al Thani ruling family. In the UAE, some intellectuals signed a petition demanding free elections to the Federal National Council, the main federal authority of the country. In Oman, small groups of approximately 200 demonstrated, at first mostly in the port city of Sohar but later in the capital, Muscat, as well. Most protesters sought jobs, pay raises, and anticorruption measures but a few called for a new constitution leading to a parliamentary monarchy.²

The Arab Spring was rather more eventful in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Both countries have substantial Shi’a Muslim minorities: in Saudi Arabia they make up approximately 10-15 percent of the population (2.8-4.2 million) and 33 percent in the Eastern Province while in Kuwait they number about 800,000 (30 percent).³ Organizers promised a “Day of Rage” in Saudi Arabia that never materialized due to the extensive deployment of security forces.⁴ On numerous occasions in the spring and fall of 2011, in the Eastern Province town of Qatif, several hundred demonstrators called for the end of religious discrimination, the expansion of women’s rights, and the lifting of restrictions on freedom of speech.⁵ The reduction of unemployment, particularly youth unemployment, was another common demand of demonstrators (39 percent of Saudis between the ages of 20 and 24 are unemployed).⁶

Of the five states considered in this section, only Kuwait can be said to have anything resembling an organized opposition. The ruling Al Sabah family introduced quasi-representative institutions to serve as safety valves for dissent and in the past decade the National Assembly has become a dynamic and occasionally raucous body. It is permitted to “grill” cabinet ministers and, since 2009, has even included female members. As the legislature’s political authority gradually increased, the ruling elites have become somewhat more accountable to the citizenry.⁷ Starting in February 2011, a number of the country’s relatively independent nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) organized demonstrations to demand political reforms, to dismiss the unpopular prime minister, and to denounce the mismanagement of public funds and growing income inequalities.

Elsewhere in the Gulf states, opposition groups, if they exist at all, have no coordination and are divided over several fundamental issues, starting with the concessions they expect from the state. Most importantly, demonstrators did not call into question the kingdoms’ basic political and economic arrangements. Instead, they sought political

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changes such as electoral reform; an independent judiciary; guarantees of freedom of expression; removal of corrupt cabinet members; and some economic concessions. The demonstrations were small, peaceful, and nonconfrontational.

State Responses

Even though the protests signified only modest domestic challenges to the dynastic monarchies, their governments left nothing to chance. The most widely used approach was to buy social peace through awarding cash bonuses, lowering food prices, creating jobs, and providing housing. The sovereign wealth funds of these rentier states allowed them to make major concessions to their populations, an option not available to their less fortunate fellow rulers in Morocco and Jordan.

In Kuwait, every citizen received $3,500 in February 2011 and the emir announced basic food items would be free until March 2012. The government approved a record budget of $70 billion, most of which was set aside for fuel subsidies and salary increases for public employees, including military personnel. Nonetheless, demonstrations continued and, in November 2011, culminated in the storming of the National Assembly building by demonstrators and some members of parliament. Later that month the emir accepted the resignation of the much-criticized prime minister, Sheikh Nasser Al-Sabah, and his cabinet, thereby satisfying one of the key demands of the opposition. Sultan Qaboos of Oman mollified the protesters by concessions such as making several personnel changes in his government, removing corrupt ministers, and introducing unemployment benefits. Bowing to popular pressure, he also announced a number of amendments to the Basic Law. Nevertheless, the limited personnel reshuffle and the token reforms did not address the concentration of near-absolute power around the Sultan nor did they stop the expression of discontent manifested by continuing waves of strikes and unprecedented public criticisms of Sultan Qaboos.

Qatar’s rulers made a similar gesture when they announced that in 2013 two-thirds of the seats of its Consultative Assembly will be contested. Other concessions included expanded political rights for women and a constitutional amendment to split the powers of the prime minister from those of the emir—although both of them are senior members of the ruling family. In the relatively calm UAE, the government committed $1.55 billion to infrastructure improvements and made arrangements with food suppliers to keep prices low. More importantly, the number of eligible voters for the September 2011 Federal National Council elections was raised from 6,000 to nearly 130,000. The barely 28 percent turnout rate seemed to indicate, however, that citizens were “either not interested in political participation or considered the advisory body to be meaningless.”

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10 Noueihed and Warren, 251; Valeri, 135; and Ottaway and Muasher, 19.
12 Noueihed and Warren, 251.
In terms of financial enticements, the Saudi government went even further than its neighbors. In February 2011, it took preemptive action, promising to spend $37 billion on raising civil service salaries, and building low-income housing units even before protests broke out in its troubled Eastern Province. Following demonstrations there, Riyadh earmarked an additional $93 billion for various socioeconomic projects, including the creation of 60,000 government jobs.\(^{13}\) Furthermore, the kingdom announced, starting in 2015, women will be allowed to participate in municipal elections and will be eligible for appointments to the Shura Council, an advisory body to the king.\(^{14}\)

Besides using the carrot to alleviate tensions, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states also employed the stick when necessary. Regular armed forces were seldom involved in suppressing demonstrations; that task was executed by regular police and security forces. Only in Oman did the need arise to deploy the country’s highly professional and restrained military. Police personnel, particularly in the richest Gulf kingdoms, are often composed of citizens of less prosperous Sunni Muslims from Jordan, Yemen, and Pakistan (especially from Balochistan). The police were ordinarily reinforced by various security forces or the equivalent of a National Guard, while the regular armed forces stayed in their barracks. As elsewhere, military personnel in the Gulf kingdoms abhorred the idea of involvement in internal police operations against demonstrators.

The GCC, as the main political and security organization of the oil-rich Arab monarchies, played an active role in responding to upheaval in member states and beyond.\(^{15}\) The Council promised a $20 billion aid package to two of the less wealthy member states, Bahrain and Oman, to finance development projects to alleviate social discontent. The GCC’s most important activities during the Arab Spring targeted Bahrain and the two nonmember Arab monarchies.

The Bahrain Exception

The fundamental reason Bahrain has been such an outlier is that the Al Khalifa family lacks any legitimacy with the majority of the country’s citizenry. Bahrain is a Sunni Muslim state with a Shi’a Muslim majority population. According to the 2010 census, 56 percent of Bahrain’s population are foreigners, while its citizenry is composed of 60 percent Shi’a and 40 percent Sunni Muslims, though most sources put the Shi’a’s proportion closer to 70 percent.\(^{16}\) The ruling elites—the royal family, members of political and business circles, and virtually the entire military-security establishment—are Sunni who have marginalized those of the Shi’a Muslim creed. Many Sunnis believe that the Shi’a are a potential fifth column for Iran that, if given a chance, would replace the state with a Shi’ite theocracy. In Manama, the Bahraini capital, a major


\(^{15}\) On intra-GCC dynamics, see Matteo Legrenzi, The GCC and the International Relations of the Gulf (London: I.B. Tauris, 2011).

uprising began with a decidedly sectarian character on 13 February 2011. The royal family responded with a $2,700 grant to every Bahraini family, but this gesture did not stifle the accumulated frustrations and energies of the demonstrators. On 17 February, the regime changed tactics and resorted to violence—security forces used rubber bullets and tear gas on peaceful demonstrators, many asleep at what had become something like a street fair, killing at least four and injuring many. In response, the uprising escalated and took a decidedly antimonarchical character, in spite of King Hamad’s offers of dialogue and the government’s release of some political prisoners. Some continuing demonstrations were quite large, with over 100,000 people (from a population totaling less than 1 million) participating. The regime, no longer confident of its ability to restore peace, asked for the GCC’s assistance which arrived on 14 March, consisting of over 1,500 security troops from Saudi Arabia and the UAE. On the following day, King Hamad declared martial law. The GCC contingent secured strategic locations and buildings while domestic forces suppressed resistance. Following the fierce repression of the protests, however, a growing proportion of the Shi’a community shifted support to radical opposition activists, emblematized by the Coalition of February 14th Youth. Their principal objectives are to liberate Bahrain from Saudi occupation, overthrow the Al Khalifa regime, and let the population choose their own political and economic system. At least forty-six people died in the conflict, including some police officers. Approximately 3,000 people were arrested, 700 of them were still behind bars at the end of 2011, and over 4,000 lost their job as a result of participating in the conflict. In June, the king lifted the state of emergency and appointed M. Cherif Bassiouni, an independent Arab-American legal expert, to head the newly created Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry (BICI). The commission was tasked to investigate the security forces’ handling of the protests. BICI’s surprisingly candid report, broadcast to the nation in November 2011, charged the regime with violating human rights; using excessive force in breaking up protests; torturing demonstrators in custody; and punishing the Shi’a community collectively. The king promised to consider the report’s recommendations and dismissed the head of Bahrain’s much criticized National Security Agency, Sheikh Khalifa bin Abdullah, a member of the ruling family. Since then, some lower-level policemen were held responsible but sentences against the uprising’s leaders were upheld and only token reforms have been introduced, though the government has signaled substantive changes to come.

There is, of course, an important regional dimension to the turmoil in Bahrain, which is also a proxy conflict between Saudi Arabia and Iran.\textsuperscript{23} First, the Saudi state has a tremendous influence on Bahrain, which is only accessible on land from Saudi Arabia through the 15-mile-long King Fahd Causeway. Second, the Saudis are understandably worried about the effect of Bahrain’s Shi’a uprising on their own large Shi’a minority in their Eastern Province where, incidentally, the bulk of the country’s oil deposits are. Third, Shi’a-majority Iran, the Sunni monarchies’ arch enemy, has not only been keenly interested in the fate of its religious brethren in Bahrain but Iranian officials have claimed Bahrain as Iran’s province in public statements.\textsuperscript{24}

**Morocco and Jordan: The Shrewdness of Kings**

Not having the financial resources to purchase social peace, King Mohammed VI of Morocco and King Abdullah II of Jordan responded to demands for reform with tactics they have long mastered: manipulation, co-option, and minor concessions masked as major reforms. They projected willingness to compromise and carefully calibrated the actions of their coercive agencies to avoid the clumsy overreaction of other rulers in the region.

**Political Mobilization**

The two countries share a history of regime-tolerated protests, usually occasioned by socioeconomic grievances, starting in the 1990s. The first major Arab Spring demonstration in Morocco took place on 20 February 2011, organized on Facebook by a youth group that called itself February 20th Movement for Change. On that day, 150,000 to 200,000 Moroccans took to the streets in 53 towns and cities across the country.\textsuperscript{25} Smaller, mostly uncoordinated, demonstrations continued for months. The protests in Jordan started as, and for the most part remained, sit-ins after the Friday prayers. As in Morocco, individual demonstrations remained relatively small. The largest demonstration occurred 24-25 March and attracted approximately 7,000 to 10,000 people,\textsuperscript{26} nothing like the mass rallies in Tunis or Cairo. In fact, according to a Jordanian poll, 80 percent of respondents did not support the protests, 55 percent thought they led to chaos, and 15 percent viewed them as unnecessary and useless.\textsuperscript{27}

The participants in the Moroccan demonstrations were mainly young, educated, and urban middle class men and women. The mostly co-opted political parties, with the partial exception of the fringe United Socialist Party (PSU) and the banned Islamist group, Justice and Charity, not only did not participate but actually advised their youth organizations

\textsuperscript{25} See “Ça ne fait que commencer…,” *Tel Quel*, February 26-March 4, 2011, 24-25.
\textsuperscript{26} Sarah Tobin, “Jordan’s Arab Spring: The Middle Class and Anti-Revolution,” *Middle East Policy* 19, no. 1 (Spring 2012), 101.
\textsuperscript{27} Samuel Helfont and Tally Helfont, “Jordan: Between the Arab Spring and the Gulf Cooperation Council,” *Orbis* 56, no. 1 (Winter 2012): 90.
to stay away. Once Justice and Charity became involved, however, the February 20th Movement started to lose momentum because many activists worried the Islamists would hijack the demonstrations.\textsuperscript{28} Moreover, following the constitutional referendum and the expedited parliamentary elections, the Movement saw its popularity decline which, in turn, was the main reason Justice and Charity withdrew its support in October 2011.

In Jordan, the demonstrators were urban intellectuals, tribal-based people from the south, and members of the moderate Islamist Action Front (IAF), the political wing of the Muslim Brotherhood, which is well integrated into Jordan’s political landscape. The deep social divide between Transjordanians and Jordanians of Palestinian origin effectively limited the protests because few Palestinians would join demonstrations that, to a considerable extent, were directed against their ostensibly disproportionately large influence on the state.

The protesters demanded socioeconomic programs and political reforms. Marchers carried signs asking for jobs, effective antipoverty measures, social justice, and condemning rising food and fuel prices, and the endemic corruption in public life. Jordan’s King Abdullah II received plenty of criticism: he is considered by many to be far too Westernized and tolerant of the extravagant lifestyle of his Palestinian-born wife and the shady business deals of her relatives.\textsuperscript{29} Although no one publicly suggested abolishing the monarchy, many activists in both countries appealed for new electoral laws and elections. Many voiced their desire for a parliamentary monarchy in which “the king reigns but does not rule.” Divisions in the opposition ran deep in both countries; ultimately, protesters could agree only on their disapproval of authoritarian rule. Major disputes between incrementalists who were afraid to appear too radical and those who called for rapid and sweeping reforms could not be resolved.\textsuperscript{30}

\textit{State Responses}

There are many similarities in the Moroccan and Jordanian regimes’ reaction to the protests. Both states allowed peaceful demonstrations under heavy police presence. When rallies threatened to become too unruly, when the organizers were not known to the authorities, or when the location of the protests was inconvenient—for instance, a demonstration could not be contained to a certain area or it could paralyze a business or government district—both regimes clamped down with security forces and progovernment thugs (baltagiya) causing a number of casualties.\textsuperscript{31}

Morocco’s king quickly realized the protests posed a potentially serious test of his rule and, brilliantly, placed himself at the forefront of reform taking the momentum away from the opposition. Mohammed VI played Morocco’s Arab Spring skillfully, staying a step ahead of and outsmarting the opposition at ever juncture. In his now-famous 9 March

\textsuperscript{28} February 20th Movement leaders, interview by author (Rabat and Ifrane), April 2012.
\textsuperscript{29} See, for instance, Helfont and Helfont, “Jordan,” 89.
\textsuperscript{31} Tobin, “Jordan’s Arab Spring,” 101-102.
2011 speech, the king, not wanting to alienate politically moderate activists, acknowledged the validity of the protesters’ demands. He made several gestures to strategically important groups such as unions, unemployed university graduates, and political parties. The king appointed a constitutional commission headed by one of his advisers and a panel of intermediaries between the constitution’s drafters and political parties, nongovernmental organizations, human rights organizations, labor unions, etc. Much of this was just a ploy, however, since no substantive consultation took place.\(^32\)

On 17 June, the monarch introduced the new constitution and announced a national referendum on it only two weeks later. Such a tight schedule made it impossible for the opposition to seriously analyze the draft let alone to organize a public debate on it. In the meantime, the regime unleashed a major media campaign and pressed political parties, imams, and local authorities to urge people to vote and to vote “yes” on the new constitution. The operation succeeded: on 1 July 2011, 73.5 percent of eligible voters went to the polls and, apparently, 98.5 percent of them endorsed the document.\(^33\) The new constitution extends official recognition to the Tamazight language (spoken by the Berber minority), grants citizens access to an independent constitutional court, and requires the monarch to select prime ministers from the members of the party that won the election.\(^34\) Still, the king remains unaccountable to any institution and free of legal constraints on his power. He still heads the armed forces, the constitutional court, and, as Commander of the Faithful, is the spiritual leader of the country’s Muslims. In sum, the new constitution, though announced with much fanfare, offered few substantive improvements and made little difference in the fundamental nature of the absolute monarchy. This was a perfect example of top-down constitutionalization.

Jordan’s King Abdullah II is less popular and rules a far weaker state than Mohammed VI. He, too, correctly calculated that he could take the sting out of the opposition movement by showing flexibility and promptly addressing the protesters’ demands. He promised $500 million to increase public sector salaries, raised the minimum wage, augmented fuel subsidies, removed unpopular prime ministers (three in fifteen months),\(^35\) met with leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood, visited strategically important constituencies, and formed a committee to prepare a new electoral law and to consider constitutional reforms. Moreover, he played to public sentiments by detaining the shamelessly corrupt former chief of the intelligence service.

In June 2011, the team of constitutional experts presented 42 mostly minor changes to the constitution. If anything, there was even less public debate on this constitutional reform than in Morocco. The amendments established a constitutional court, restricted the government’s power

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to issue temporary laws, limited extrajudicial trials, created an election oversight committee, and restrained the power of the shadowy State Security Court. Other than losing the ability to indefinitely postpone elections, no restrictions were placed on the king’s authority.36

The long-delayed and much-anticipated electoral law, passed in June 2012, also proved controversial. Although it increased seats in the Chamber of Deputies from 120 to 140 and expanded seats reserved for women from 12 to 15, all members of the Senate continue to be royal appointees. Uniformed personnel of the military-security establishment are allowed to vote for the first time. The opposition roundly decried the new law because it gives every voter two votes, one for a local candidate and one for political parties on a closed proportional representation list. They claim this favors pro-government loyalists as only 17 seats can be contested by party and coalition candidates.37 The Muslim Brotherhood, by far the most influential opposition movement, announced the Islamic Action Front, its political arm, planned to boycott the elections scheduled for December 2012.38

The political concessions, including the constitutional changes and the electoral reforms, did not alter the distribution of political power in the two monarchies in any appreciable way. The lack of truly independent political institutions also means that even if they were interested in substantive changes, the kings would not have any reliable institutional partners with whom to pursue them until they allowed such institutions to develop freely.

Implications for the United States

For decades now, and particularly since the First Gulf War and 9/11, the Arab monarchies have been reliable allies of the United States; with the passage of time these relationships have become infused with more substance. The kingdoms’ for-the-most-part restrained reaction to the recent protests has further confirmed their importance as strategic allies. This is not to say Washington does not have areas of concern with the kingdoms. For instance, Saudi Arabia was sharply critical of US policy that evolved to support the Arab revolutions, in particular the uprising in Egypt. In fact, Riyadh threatened to bankroll the Mubarak administration if Washington withdrew its support and, once the regime in Cairo fell, offered financial aid to the military-led transitional authority, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces.39 Qatar, on the other hand, took an independent role in shaping the international response to the civil war in Syria and Yemen, urged the Arab League to support the United Nations-sanctioned action against Gaddafi’s crumbling regime

in Libya, and committed its own F-16 aircraft to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-led bombing campaign.\footnote{Guido Steinberg, “Qatar and the Arab Spring,” \textit{German Institute for International and Security Affairs, SWP Comments 2012/C 07} (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, February 2012), 1; interview by author with Arab League officials (Tunis, 3 December 2011) and Elsadig Elfaqih, Secretary General of the Arab Thought Forum (Amman, April 26, 2012).}

The bottom line is the Arab monarchies, given their political stability (with the notable exception of Bahrain) and the views they share with Washington with regard to the threat of Islamist extremism, remain solid pillars of US foreign policy in a complex and difficult region. One of the ways cooperation between the monarchies and the United States has deepened is through military-to-military contacts, a growing number of joint maneuvers and training courses between elements of the US Central Command and the armies of the Arab monarchies, and an expanding contingent of Arab military officers participating in educational programs in the United States and in other NATO countries, particularly the United Kingdom and France. Senior officers of the Gulf armies confirm the value of such programs and the role it plays in increasing their professionalism.\footnote{Military officers in Gulf states, interviews by author (December 2012).}

Bahrain is a special case not only because of its dubious distinction of being the only monarchy with serious domestic security challenges, but also because it has provided a home to the US Navy’s Fifth Fleet since 1995. In March 2011, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates visited Manama and held talks with King Hamad and Crown Prince Salman. He urged the Bahraini government to exercise restraint in its response to the demonstrators. Gates and other American politicians have warned that if Manama did not introduce political reforms to diminish the marginalization of the Shi’a community, the ensuing instability might strengthen the appeal of radical opposition groups and create a fertile ground for Iran to interfere and create more chaos.\footnote{Miriam Joyce, \textit{Bahrain from the Twentieth Century to the Arab Spring} (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 117.} The radicalization of the Bahraini opposition was not inevitable; in large part it was the result of the heavy-handed and uncompromising attitude of ruling elites. American politicians, including Secretary Gates and former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, encouraged moderate, gradual political reforms to address the grievances of Bahrain’s Shi’a majority.\footnote{Ali Aliche, “Between Reform and Revolution: Sheikh Qassim, the Bahraini Shi’a, and Iran,” \textit{American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, No. 4} (July 12, 2012): 8; author’s interview with Bahrain’s Ambassador to the United States (Washington, DC, 8 January 2013).}

\section*{Conclusion}

Compared to the full-fledged revolutions of several Arab republics, the kingdoms of the region have experienced only mild upheaval. The turmoil has been relatively minor because the monarchies have been able to respond with a mixture of financial incentives, coercive action, and modest political concessions to whatever challenges were posed to them. Furthermore, external diplomatic, financial, and security aid augmented ruling elites’ ability to cope with the unrest.

The Gulf monarchies were positioned to counter the mostly feeble challenges they faced with economic incentives. They also made minor
political concessions that posed no risk to their power, and, in the rare cases when it was necessary, forcefully repressed challenges to their authority.\textsuperscript{44} It appears, at least in the near-to-medium term, the royal families of the Arabian Peninsula will be able to follow this tactic to maintain their rule: they sit on approximately 46 percent of the world’s proven oil reserves and, more crucially, have a production-to-reserve ratio of approximately 90 years.\textsuperscript{45}

What about the two resource-poor monarchies? The purchasing-social-peace approach is obviously well beyond their capabilities. In 2011, both Morocco and Jordan managed protests with what seemed like a model of reasonableness.\textsuperscript{46} There is, however, a wide gap between the actual political performance of Morocco and Jordan and the mostly positive notice they gather from Western leaders. The political reforms Mohammed VI and Abdullah II offered were not reforms; they were little more than gestures, ploys, and short-term solutions to alleviate social tensions. They are unlikely to change the two countries’ political landscape in any meaningful way. Moroccan and Jordanian political elites have taken no real steps to solve the fundamental and long-standing political, social, and economic problems their regimes face: acute rural poverty, rampant corruption, inadequate political rights, and limitations on social mobility, among others.

The big question, then, is just how long can the rule of the Moroccan and Jordanian royal families be sustained without implementing major political, economic, and social reforms. The monarchs in Rabat and Amman are locked in what Samuel Huntington called the “king’s dilemma.”\textsuperscript{47} They must introduce meaningful reforms expeditiously to prevent more dangerous socio-political upheavals in the future, yet that reform process might lead to the collapse of their regimes. Assuming the opposition keeps the pressure up, the best strategy for these two kings is the slow but steady, step-by-step devolution of their absolute power leading to a constitutional monarchy in the next fifteen to twenty years. They are in a much more favorable situation than the Shah of Iran was before promoting his white revolution, or Mikhail Gorbachev at the beginning of glasnost and perestroika. Neither Reza Pahlavi nor Gorbachev enjoyed anything near the sort of deep-rooted domestic support that continues to surround Mohammed and Abdullah. That support, however, will not last indefinitely: “prestige” the great Tunisian thinker Ibn Khaldun warned, “decays inevitably.”\textsuperscript{48} It needs to be complemented and enriched with real reforms that would grant citizens a stake in the long-term survival of these monarchies.

In the meantime, the United States government should continue to advocate thoughtful and incremental political and economic reforms that contribute to the monarchies’ stability and diminishes the appeal of radical political, social, and religious forces and ideas. Military-to-military

\textsuperscript{44} Niethammer, 16.
\textsuperscript{45} Legrenzi, 69.
\textsuperscript{47} Samuel P. Huntington, \textit{Political Order in Changing Societies} (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1968), 177-191.
contacts, training courses, shared maneuvers, and cooperation in a number of areas have played a beneficial role in the professionalization of the Arab monarchies’ officers. One can be confident that maintaining and, if possible, expanding these programs, will be an excellent investment in this region, so crucial for American national interests.
In a speech delivered on 19 May 2011, President Obama identified the following US “core interests” in the Middle East: (1) “countering terrorism,” (2) “stopping the spread of nuclear weapons,” (3) “securing the free flow of commerce and safeguarding the security of the region,” and, (4) “standing up for Israel’s security and pursuing Arab-Israeli peace.” The US military and intelligence presence in this region are designed to support these objectives and to reassure US allies while deterring potential adversaries such as Iran. Currently, it is not clear if the changes brought about by the Arab Spring uprisings will require the US military to find new ways to protect these interests or what adjustments to US basing and other military activity may be required. The ongoing civil war in Syria and the still unfolding political results in Arab nations that have successfully overthrown the despots that once ruled them add to the uncertainty. Understanding the development and evolution of the Arab Spring is, therefore, an important prerequisite for addressing some key aspects involving future US national security requirements. Fortunately, there are a number of excellent works on the subject that can be useful for US Army professionals and others seeking to do so.

In examining these books, this essay seeks to help address an ongoing concern of US Army Chief of Staff General Raymond Odierno, who in March 2012 stated, “We have learned many lessons over the last 10 years, but one of the most compelling is that—whether you are working among citizens of a country, or working with their governments or Armed Forces—nothing is as important to your long term success as understanding the prevailing culture and values.” Tremendous insight into these cultural issues and values can be gained by examining the history, and especially the recent history, of the countries we view as partners and also those we view as potential adversaries. At this time, it is particularly important to consider the goals and aspirations of the Arab publics that participated in the Arab Spring and to find ways in which the US national interest can be advanced while respecting the concerns and values of Arab populations. To be engaged partners, US Army personnel must be informed partners, and the Arab uprisings are perhaps the most important set of events to occur in this region since at least the June 1967 Arab-Israeli war. Moreover, a strong understanding of the regional trends will help US Army leaders provide valuable and relevant advice to the civilian leadership on when and how the use of landpower options is a reasonable idea and when it may be especially problematic.

How the Arab Uprisings Developed, Succeeded, and Sometimes Failed

One of the most important studies addressing recent events in the Middle East is *The Arab Uprising* by Marc Lynch. This work presents an interesting and insightful overview of the Arab uprisings which began in Tunisia in December 2010 and spread to a number of other Arab states. Lynch examines the origins and development of these uprisings with special attention given to how the actions in various countries influenced other Arab states. Lynch views the Arab uprisings beginning with Tunisia as part of a process evolving regionwide and defines the Arab Spring as the span of time in which that process began and moved forward. While Lynch speaks of a unified narrative among protestors, he does not overgeneralize and is careful to highlight the differences among the numerous countries involved with the Arab uprisings. As an expert in Arab media, Lynch also examines the ways citizens were able to access information and coordinate protest activities. In doing this, he avoids the trap of viewing these struggles as the result of social media, which he instead treats as an enabling technology. In examining the role of technology, he remains alert to the possibility that activists using social media may not be good representatives of the mainstream of their societies. Lynch is also attentive to the importance of the Pan-Arab media, with a special focus on the role of the Qatari-based al Jazeera television station in influencing the events of the Arab uprisings.

Lynch maintains the main reason people came out to demonstrate in authoritarian Arab countries after the Tunisian revolution was a newfound belief their actions could actually make a difference as had occurred in Tunisia. Other Arab publics were stunned when a 23-year-old police state was defeated in less than a month by an enraged public, and the Tunisian example strongly indicated such success was possible elsewhere. Lynch also notes improved communications and new sources of information frequently allowed the public of one state to identify with and applaud the actions of protestors in other states confronting and seeking to oust undemocratic regimes. Here the role of al Jazeera television appears to have been especially important. Al Jazeera’s talk show guests overwhelmingly sympathized with the revolutionaries, and the station characterized the fall of Tunisia’s Ben Ali as an “unmitigated good.” As the effect of the Tunisia uprising became apparent, the increasingly worried Egyptian government jammed al Jazeera’s signal, but the news of the Tunisian revolution was too big and exciting to minimize. Moreover, the Egyptian public had a number of pent-up grievances now moving to the fore including decades of corruption and repression. Lynch notes the *fait accompli* of the president’s son Gamal Mubarak’s expected succession to the presidency helped “galvanize unusual levels of popular outrage,” since Gamal was broadly viewed as an unacceptable choice to lead the country.
Lynch also examines the importance of the US military role in maintaining “near-constant” dialogue with the Egyptian army, pressing it not to fire on unarmed demonstrators. This dialogue reinforced the army’s self-image as the protector of Egypt’s citizens rather than its oppressor. This viewpoint was already deeply ingrained since the Egyptian military is composed of a largely depoliticized professional officer corps, indoctrinated to help minimize the danger of a military coup. Correspondingly, and following the Tunisian example, the Egyptian military remained unwilling to move outside its traditional role to help the Mubarak regime survive. This restraint encouraged Egyptian demonstrators to act more assertively in demanding the end of the regime, sometimes using the slogan, “the army and the people are one hand.” Without military backing, Mubarak had only the hated security police and various paid thugs between his regime and the popular will. This situation led to the fall of his government in January 2011. While at least 840 protestors were killed in the Egyptian revolution, this number could have been much higher had the army backed the president, and the regime may then have limped along until a more radical solution was undertaken.

Lynch moves on to what he refers to as “the second phase of the Arab uprising.” This phase followed the quick and relatively easy ousters of long-standing dictators in Tunisia and Egypt. This new environment included much tougher problems faced by protestors including grinding struggles with security forces and failures to overturn unpopular governments. Some protest movements faded quickly due to government suppression. Others, in places like Bahrain and Yemen, became protracted struggles which sometimes appeared as stalemates in which the security forces and sometimes the army emerged as tough adversaries against revolutionary forces. States with access to wealth also fared differently. Oman, for example, experienced the largest demonstrations of its modern history but was able to calm the situation with the aid of money provided by the richest of the Gulf Arab states.

The third phase of the uprising began in March 2011, a point in time Lynch identifies as a high point of counterrevolution and the use of force. He considers Saudi Arabia as an important leader of the counterrevolution, although he also indicates that the scope and extent of this leadership has often been exaggerated. He further designates two March 2011 events as key pivot points from the second to the third phase of the Arab uprisings. These are the Saudi-led military intervention in Bahrain and the beginning of NATO operations against regime forces in Libya. Also in March 2011, Yemeni President Saleh sharply escalated violence against demonstrators seeking his ouster. This brutality was so severe it led to the fragmentation of Yemen’s army into pro-Saleh and pro-demonstrator camps that deployed against each other and occasionally engaged in armed skirmishing with casualties on both sides. In this stalemated environment, Yemen’s president Ali Abdullah Saleh was able to remain in office until early 2012 despite a prolonged struggle to remove him. Also in March 2011, the Syrian uprising began to catch fire in response to especially horrific regime bloodshed including violence directed at children in the southern town of Deraa.

Lynch calls Bahrain “the first great battlefield of counterrevolution.” He solidly identifies with the demonstrators and is aghast at the repressive measures employed by the Bahraini government and its Gulf
allies. Although generally pleased with the Obama administration’s policies toward the Arab uprisings, he is unsparing in his criticism of US policy toward the Bahrain struggle. Yet, this anger is not solely directed against US policy. He also states that al Jazeera surrendered its previously heroic Arab Spring role by ignoring the Bahraini intervention in apparent response to the foreign policy priorities of the Qatari government, which views Bahrain as an ally. He calls the security campaign against Bahraini demonstrators the first clear cut victory for repression in the course of the Arab uprisings. Lynch does acknowledge that many Sunni Bahrainis truly believe the demonstrations were part of a larger Iranian plot, although he considers such beliefs totally unfounded. Turning to Libya, Lynch is more upbeat. He praises the remarkable Arab League consensus in favor of Western military intervention to help the Libyan people. He also states that the mostly united Arab opposition to the Syrian regime’s brutal crackdown indicates a new norm whereby regimes would lose their region-wide legitimacy when they pushed forward to an unacceptable level of domestic violence.

Lynch comments extensively on US foreign policy in the Middle East throughout the work and especially at the end. Unsurprisingly, he sees strong reasons to avoid Americanizing Middle East problems with military interventions in pursuit of unclear goals. He does, however, see an occasional need for force and strongly agrees with the US-supported NATO intervention in Libya. In considering Libya, Lynch presents a strong case that intervention represented a low-cost/low-risk decision to prevent a bloodbath in Benghazi with virtually no down side. He is particularly unsparing of leftist critics of the Libyan intervention, whom he views as so hopelessly mired in anti-imperialist ideology they can no longer make the easy choice to avert a massacre at almost no cost. Conversely, Lynch also asserts that a quick US response to the Syrian uprising would have been “propaganda gold” for the Assad regime in its effort to blame the uprising on an American-Israeli plot. Indeed, strong US relations with Israel, which Lynch does not disagree with, would make it devilishly difficult for the United States to become deeply involved in Syria without appearing to be doing so on behalf of a larger pro-Israeli agenda. Without this intervention, Assad’s efforts to blame foreign plots for the uprising have largely and correctly been dismissed as propaganda.

Consequently, if Lynch has any disagreement with the Obama administration it is not over Syria or Libya. He asserts the United States acted with reasonable speed and agility on giving support to Egyptian demonstrators seeking the fall of Mubarak (in a view that sometimes contrasts with the assertions of the Egyptian activists who maintain Obama was too slow). Rather, as noted, Lynch takes the strongest exception to the Obama administration’s policy over Bahrain, which he often returns to throughout the book. Still, one wonders how strongly the United States should have asserted itself on this issue since Bahrain has less than a million citizens, and it is at least possible that many of the protestors’ grievances might be partially addressed by aggressive antipoverty measures should the wealthy Arab states wisely choose to provide money for such projects. Furthermore, if the United States had a complete break with Bahrain, it would only lead to Manama’s almost total dependence on Saudi Arabia, which would hardly improve the human rights situation there. Nevertheless, Lynch addresses objections such as these by
asserting that the United States’ unwillingness to denounce the March intervention badly damaged its regional credibility by establishing a double standard for the actions of allied states as opposed to states such as Syria and Libya. Lynch is also worried about the changing narrative from populations struggling for freedom to sectarian populations fighting each other. Indeed, this problem already seems to be intensifying in Bahrain, Syria, and potentially Iraq.

The Arab Uprisings in Context and Aftermath

An excellent companion volume for the Lynch work is Adeed Dawisha’s *The Second Arab Awakening*, which is the newest of the books considered in this essay. In this work, the author adds considerable perspective on how the Arab uprisings unfolded by placing them in a larger context beginning with the rise of Arab nationalist regimes in the 1950s and 1960s. He makes a case that many of these earlier regimes and their leaders started out well in efforts to address problems of social and economic justice, making strides in education, fighting illiteracy, and helping impoverished citizens improve their prospects for a better life. Yet these regimes also contained a tragic flaw because they were unwilling to open up the political system in any meaningful way. This lack of freedom festered in the Arab political psyche and became more troubling as once-promising nationalist regimes became increasingly self-serving, less interested in social and educational progress, and more grandiose, incompetent, and reckless in their decisionmaking. Regimes that had never been free managed to plunge their citizenry into deepening poverty and unmerciful exploitation by government officials, thereby undermining any social or economic justifications for continuing the dictatorships. As regime legitimacy declined, repression and public alienation in these states correspondingly increased, and some leaders, including Saddam Hussein and Hafez and Bashar Assad, descended into barbarism.

The Arab uprisings were one potential response to increasingly intolerable conditions in many states. Nevertheless, important as these uprisings have been, they are not universal in the Arab World, and some governments (particularly monarchies) may still be able to reform sufficiently or at least provide a decent enough life for their citizens to accept their continued rule. In considering the future, Dawisha also provides comprehensive analysis of the aftermath of the ouster of the Mubarak and Ben Ali regimes and the ways in which these countries have evolved since the end of their dictatorships including their potential for success. The electoral process in Tunisia including the role of political parties, campaigns, and voting outcomes are scrupulously analyzed with special emphasis on how the Islamist Ennahdha party was able to connect with the voters using a number of tactics including promises of moderation. Turning to Egypt, Dawisha examines a number of instances of conflict and confrontation between the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces
(SCAF) and the activists who originally challenged the Mubarak regime. He then considers Egypt’s elections which were characterized by the almost complete marginalization of the activists who led the uprising. Young people who brilliantly organized protests showed no interest in acting as political operatives contesting elections until much too late in the game. Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood, by contrast, built on years of organizational skills and long-standing relationships with key segments of the public, won both the parliamentary and presidential elections. Moreover, hard-line Islamists, known as *salafis*, finished in a strong second place in the race for parliament in a complicating factor for liberal policies and perhaps economic recovery.

Dawisha also considers Yemen and Libya where uprisings occurred, but the strongman was able to retain power for some time before he was ousted. Dawisha has strong praise for the Libyan opposition leaders who led the effort against the Qadhafi dictatorship and were able to assemble a coherent opposition leadership structure in the Transitional National Council (TNC). The TNC was able to coordinate the political, economic, and military support revolutionary forces received from a number of countries and present a reasonable and mature face of the Libyan Revolution to the outside world. Dawisha also agrees with Lynch that without NATO intervention, the revolution would have been crushed by heavily-armed government forces in a bloodbath directed against anti-Qadhafi rebels and probably anyone else in areas controlled by anti-government forces. As the war turned around, Qadhafi broadcast increasingly hysterical radio rants that could hardly have bolstered the morale of his supporters. When his forces were defeated and he was summarily killed, the TNC then faced the challenge of organizing a government in a country with at least 40 large and powerful militias that had participated in the destruction of the old regime but were not usually willing to give up much of their power. Under these conditions, and without any strong government institutions, Libya had an urgent need for elections to fortify a new national government. When these elections occurred, the Islamists did surprisingly poorly. While huge problems with order and stability remain in Libya, Dawisha suggests that its small population, great wealth, and commitment to “finishing the job properly,” may give Libya at least some chance of becoming a peaceful, prosperous state.

Dawisha further indicates Yemen faces tremendous problems as it recovers from a president who remained in power for 33 years without doing much for the country. Throughout his time in office, President Saleh engaged in both force and extensive political maneuvering to stay in power, although he was ultimately unable to do so. Unfortunately, Yemen could not easily afford the final power struggle, which lasted for over a year and ravaged the already weak economy. Yemen now faces both deepening poverty and intensified regional tension between the central government and the northern and southern regions of the country. It will, correspondingly, need intense international help to remain a politically viable state.

While Yemen’s revolutionaries eventually removed that country’s strongman from office, other examples Dawisha considers in this work include countries where uprisings occurred but were either co-opted, crushed, or fizzled out. Like Lynch, Dawisha worries that the Bahraini
crackdown has deeply discredited Shi’ite moderates who had been able to work with the king, making reconciliation appear as a distant dream. He also quotes the fact-finding commission led by American international lawyer and scholar Cherif Bassiouni that there was no compelling evidence linking Iran to the unrest in Bahrain. Dawisha, like Lynch, nevertheless notes that Bahraini Sunnis are convinced of this link. He shows little optimism for Bahrain predicting that the schisms there will become even deeper and more entrenched without intense and serious attention to Shi’ite grievances.

Dawisha is also deeply concerned about Syria, where civil war has now been raging for over 2 years. This portion of the book is not pleasant reading due to his vivid description of the measures the regime has taken to remain in power. Dawisha notes that Assad, like Qadhafi, has no compunction about butchering his own people. Unlike Qadhafi, he also has the means to do so on a much larger scale. Dawisha quotes a number of witnesses to the fighting who make some truly chilling statements. One Western reporter smuggled into the country is quoted as saying, “There are no targets. It’s a pure systematic slaughter of a civilian population.” Other witnesses include medical professionals from international organizations and “citizen journalists” who have sent reports of their plight often with video footage to the outside world. Dawisha describes the plight of the destruction of the Homs neighborhood of Baba Amr as particularly poignant. Baba Amr was considered an important rebel stronghold by the Assad regime, which singled it out for special punishment with intense shelling and bombing followed by house to house advances by government troops in which thousands of civilians were slaughtered. Baba Amr had a population of around 50,000 people before the rebellion, but it was reduced to a depopulated wasteland by these regime actions.

Turning to the governments that have survived the Arab Spring, Dawisha maintains the monarchies of both Morocco and Jordan had enough legitimacy to convince significant portions of their publics that these systems can be reformed from within. Dawisha has some particularly interesting insights on Morocco where the reasonably popular King Mohammad VI managed to preempt a revolution by undertaking what at least for now appears to be promising change. In Jordan, similar efforts to open the political system are also occurring, although they are less dramatic and more gradual. Dawisha also discusses Lebanon and Iraq. He suggests that the Iraqi public has shown increasing political maturity over time in a series of elections. In particular, Dawisha maintains many Iraqis want a more nonsectarian government and have been moving toward less divisive candidates in successive elections. Unfortunately, he cannot be optimistic about Iraq due to the polarizing and increasingly authoritarian government of Prime Minister Nuri al Maliki as well as the development of a timid and ineffectual parliament. Dawish also notes the Lebanese political system, despite numerous shortcomings, is far from the suffocating authoritarianism found in many other Arab states. He states all of Lebanon’s major political factions and parties, including Hezbollah, are struggling to prevent the Syrian civil war from spilling over into Lebanon.
Chief Losers of the Arab Spring: The Arab Presidents for Life

In another useful book, Harvard’s Roger Owen considers the Arab uprisings by dissecting the types of regime challenged, and in some cases overthrown, in the Arab Spring. It is hardly secret that the Arab world has historically been filled with undemocratic governments, but Owen highlights subtle changes in how these dictatorships have organized themselves over time. In the post-World War II era, monarchs and revolutionary autocrats dominated the region, although the strategies for maintaining these regimes in power were continuously adjusted through trial and error. Many of these early “republics” were established by military coups, and they remained vulnerable to being overthrown by new cliques of ambitious officers leading some Arab states to become chronically unstable and coup-ridden. This system eventually changed with new and often more powerful strongmen and with the development of what Owen calls the Arab “presidential security regime,” which came to dominate a number of Arab states and carry the process of nonmonarchical autocracy to a new level of presidential dominance. Owen traces the history of how these systems of military autocrats evolved into presidential security regimes by considering the examples of a number of Arab countries that have developed largely coup-proof regimes. Various dictators have accomplished this through tools such as parallel armed forces, multiple and competing internal security forces, sham elections, and expanded cults of personality, which in more recent times can include the leader’s family. Once Arab rulers have foreclosed the possibility of losing power to a new coup by rising military officers, the temptation to establish oneself as president for life often seems irresistible.

Owen also states that Arab leaders have learned from each other’s systems of regime maintenance causing monarchies to borrow the legitimizing institutions of the revolutionary republics such as weak or even rubber-stamp parliaments. Also, over time, the self-described republican states have in many instances acquired key elements of monarchy. Two of the monarchical features that are most interesting to the presidents for life have been: (1) the establishment of a ruling dynasty, and (2) the previously noted expectation that the president will rule as long as he is physically able to do so. The concept of a republican president for life who then passes power to a favored son while viewing neighboring monarchies with condescension clearly seems a bit odd. It took considerable time to reach this point since some strong Arab presidents retained at least the vestiges of republican principles for years after taking power. Many powerful Arab strongmen, such as Egypt’s Anwar Sadat and Tunisia’s Habib Bourguiba, probably expected to hold office indefinitely, but these leaders never seemed to have considered their sons might succeed them. More recently, emulating key aspects of the monarchies...
Terrill has often been poorly received by the public of these states, which often consider themselves to be part of more politically developed systems. Yet, on the eve of the Arab uprisings, father/son succession had already occurred in Syria and seemed to have been planned or at least considered by the presidents of Egypt, Libya, and Yemen. Saddam Hussein also seemed intent on having his younger son Qusay eventually succeed him, but any steps in this direction became moot when he was removed from power by the US-led invasion in 2003. Some presidents for life who do not have sons who could succeed them have turned to other relatives. In Algeria, President Abdelaziz Bouteflika’s younger brother was, at least for awhile, the front-runner to take power when the current president leaves office. In Tunisia, former president Ben Ali’s son-in-law seemed to be carving out a role as heir apparent until the events of 2010-2011 swept the regime away.

Owen also contrasts the presidential security regimes with other systems of government in the Middle East. In doing this, he suggests reasons why Lebanon and post-Saddam Iraq have not developed presidents for life. He maintains that, in these cases, there is a diffusion of influence throughout their respective political systems that makes it difficult for a president to accumulate the kind of authority found in security regimes. This analysis clearly has relevance for Lebanon, although in the case of Iraq one needs to be more careful about drawing premature conclusions concerning the still-evolving political systems there. Turning to the monarchies, he suggests some of these states have adopted features of the presidential security regime beyond simply maintaining a king who is the functional equivalent of a president for life, albeit with a more straightforward form of legitimacy and none of the staggering level of hypocrisy of the presidential security regimes. Still, Owen stresses monarchical legitimacy is often too weak to guarantee the survival of any government without strong security institutions as well. Other regime maintenance strategies borrowed from the republics included managed elections for those countries with elected parliaments and large and powerful domestic security establishments. One cannot help noticing that, whatever their shortcomings, the Arab monarchs have done a much better job of maintaining themselves in power than the presidents for life. The Bahraini monarchy came the closest to collapse, but its fortunes dramatically changed following Saudi-led military intervention.

Owen contends the Middle Eastern uprisings have now largely ended the era of the Arab presidents for life, with only Syria having a limited chance of maintaining such a system. He maintains the era ended with “an almost complete rejection of this form of semimonarchical government” by “populations no longer able to stomach either the personal sense of humiliation this method of rule involved or the way in which it alienated them from their fellow citizens.” Owen, like Dawisha, strongly asserts the systems of Arab presidents for life did little to compensate people for their existence under brutal repression. No sterling economic achievements stand to justify the leader’s time in office in any of these countries. Corruption flourishes, unemployment, and especially youth unemployment, are astronomical, and collapsing or underfunded educational systems challenge the future leaders of these states. The ugly legacy of the presidents for life, therefore, remain for
future governments to address in what can only be seen as a herculean struggle where a positive outcome is by no means guaranteed.

The Ongoing Nightmare in Syria

Moving from the entire region to an extremely important case study, longtime Syria watcher, David Lesch has made a valuable contribution to the literature on the Arab uprisings by examining what is probably the most heartbreaking and complicated country experiencing serious unrest and fighting. Unlike the relatively easy victories in Tunisia and Egypt, the struggle to rid Syria of its dictator has been long, miserable, and incredibly bloody. In late 2010 and early 2011, both the Damascus government and most informed observers considered Syria to be a stable country and unlikely to experience significant upheaval. Syrian officials arrogantly stated that the Arab Spring found fertile ground in Egypt and Tunisia due to their governments’ subservient relationship to the United States, their unwillingness to provide significant support to the Palestinians, and their rule by elderly, out-of-touch autocrats in contrast to the much younger Bashar. Left unstated was the repressive apparatus of the Syrian state which was significantly more brutal, comprehensive, and intimidating than those of Tunisia, Yemen, Egypt, or even Libya. When the Arab Spring revolts first broke out, Assad felt comfortable enough with the situation to praise the uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt in the comfortable belief that they had no implications for his regime. Then things changed in ways the regime’s leadership never expected.

Lesch has met with Bashar Assad on numerous occasions prior to the civil war as part of his ongoing research into Syrian politics. Partially based on this experience, Lesch maintains it “is almost certain that Bashar al-Assad was absolutely shocked when the uprisings in the Arab world started to seep into his country in March 2011” after earlier Syrian demonstrators had failed to gather any kind of critical mass of supporters in January and February. In a country with 70,000 security officials, and a program of systemically applying intimidation and preemptive fear, this seemed unbelievable. In asking how this could happen, Lesch explores the theme of citizens coping with arbitrary repression on a daily basis and presents a portrait of a police state where unflinching oppression is both casual and reflexive. Lesch notes that Syrians have consistently been forced to swallow the brutality of the regime, but sometimes a line is crossed and outrage gushes forth. Just such a transgression occurred in the southern city of Deraa when a number of school children were apprehended by security forces for writing anti-regime graffiti on various buildings. These children, possibly including some as young as 9, were beaten, imprisoned, and reportedly tortured for an offense any humane political system would have treated as childish mischief. Spontaneous demonstrations occurred over the brutalization of the Deraa school children with Syrian authorities responding with
virtually automatic violence as the crisis escalated and protests spread to other parts of the country. The Syrian leadership was caught off-guard by the rapidly increasing intensity of the protests and continued to make a police and military solution the centerpiece of the government response. Later, as it became clear that peaceful opposition could not defeat the Syrian regime, an armed opposition emerged, which obtained weapons wherever it could.

Assad’s violent response to the initially peaceful uprising was characteristic of his regime. Afraid any loosening on the reins of power would lead to the beginning of a process of ending the political dominance of his minority Alawite sect, the president was prepared to offer little in the way of actual democratic reform. Instead, he offered cosmetic changes and endless propaganda about foreign hands guiding the opposition. Regarding foreign plots, Bashar is quoted as saying, “They will say that we believe in the conspiracy theory. In fact there is no conspiracy theory. There is a conspiracy.” The alleged conspiracy was supposed to involve an effort to weaken and dismember Syria because it is “the last obstacle facing the Israeli plans.” Such talk clearly indicated the regime’s unwillingness to seek any kind of meaningful compromise and instead engage in an effort to demonize the opposition. Indeed, Lesch suggests the Syrian leadership may have believed the confused and vacillating efforts to compromise with the opposition led to the fall of the Tunisian and Egyptian regimes by showing weakness when resolve was needed.

Lesch also makes a number of important points about the resilience of the Syrian regime and the Syrian dictator’s drive to stay in power seemingly at all costs. He states that Bashar has evolved into a much more confident and cynical leader over his almost eleven years in office prior to the outbreak of civil war. While Bashar was initially surrounded by powerful old-guard ministers when he took office in 2000, by 2011 his authority had been completely established. Lesch also notes that, “the Assads have skillfully played the minority card over the years” and in doing so have usually been able to guarantee at least a 20-30 percent loyal base of regime supporters. In this regard, it would surprise no one the Alawite community is largely in Assad’s camp, but other minorities have some difficult choices in assessing what kind of government will best serve their interests. The Assads have been aware of these concerns and are portrayed by Lesch as reaching out to Syria’s Druze and Kurdish communities in an effort to generate more internal support. More importantly in terms of numbers, the regime has consistently manipulated the insecurities of the over 2 million Syrian Christians about their possible future under a Sunni-dominated or perhaps even Islamist government. Although the Syrian regime has usually been skillful in such efforts, one has to wonder how much manipulation is really necessary after the terror unleashed against Iraq’s Christians following the ouster of Saddam Hussein. The rise of the al Qaeda affiliated al Nusra Front within the Syrian opposition occurred after this book was published but certainly stands as another key factor terrifying Syria’s Christians.

Lesch notes the Syrian regime’s excessive and reflexive use of violence squandered opportunities to damp down the unrest. He also discusses the nature and development of the opposition including the local activists who have often worked within the framework of Local Coordination Committees. He notes that these local activists have made
considerable use of social media and the internet just as their counterparts did in Tunisia and Egypt. This activity has caused the regime to respond by creating a special unit of computer experts called the Syrian Electronic Army (SEA). Other sources are less certain the SEA is actually controlled by the regime, though all sources understand it is virulently pro-Assad. Lesch, however, is almost certainly correct in that a centralized regime such as the one in Syria would seek to maintain direct control over its propaganda message. Moreover, the role of the Internet in the Arab Spring has been so prominent it seems impossible Assad (a self-described computer enthusiast) would delegate his strategy for defeating the online protesters to a band of loosely affiliated well-wishers.

Lesch also expertly delineates a number of compelling reasons to expect the Syrian regime will resist a future diplomatic settlement. These reasons include Assad’s concern that a number of his closest collaborators, including his pitiless younger brother, Maher, may be subjected to revolutionary justice even if he escapes it. Basher appears to believe he has a good chance of outlasting the opposition. The Syrian leader appears doubtful the United States and other Western powers will intervene in Syria with ground troops given the recent US experience in Iraq. Lesch suggests a key factor inhibiting Western intervention is the cost of rebuilding Syria, which will probably be greater than the cost of rebuilding Iraq since at least Iraq has substantial oil reserves. Additionally, this scenario for rebuilding assumes the civil war will actually end with the defeat of the regime, which Lesch acknowledges is by no means certain since the opposition is deeply divided and may be unable to maintain even a fragile unity once the regime is no longer a threat. Lesch thus describes an escalating conflict that has continued to escalate since the publication of his book. Bashar remains unwilling to make serious reform or to take steps toward actual power sharing. The regime will either fall or prevail, but it does not appear it will compromise. Given this situation, one hopes an updated edition of this book will be possible since the situation in Syria is changing rapidly and Lesch’s insights will continue to be of tremendous value, including after the regime’s probable fall.

Conclusion

The full meaning of the Arab Spring is still unfolding. The complexity of the problems that exist in this part of the world defy easy solutions, but there are times when US involvement can play an important role in helping friendly states without Americanizing their conflicts. The professionalism shown by the Tunisian and Egyptian armies during peak times of crisis was clearly encouraged by their longstanding relationship with the US military as well as their willingness to listen to US Army officers who spoke to them as friends during the upheaval. It is also interesting that some Arab sensitivities about cooperation with the West can be set aside briefly in a time of crisis such as when the Arab League supported the establishment of a NATO-enforced no-fly zone in Libya. Such action should not be taken as a green light for all sorts of interventions, but it does indicate more potential for expanded US Army

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activities in some countries in times of urgent need. The current deployment of US Special Forces units and some headquarters personnel from the 1st Armored Division to Jordan to help prevent a widening of the Syrian civil war may be a useful example of how to support a regional ally. On a more limited scale, the US Army’s efforts to help reorganize and train some units of the Yemeni army are clearly useful in supporting the country’s efforts to recover from the scars of President Ali Abdullah Saleh’s 33-year rule.

All the books reviewed reveal the grinding attrition of the Syrian civil war, which is now in its third year. No feeling person can be without sympathy for the Syrian population, but increasing US involvement in this crisis could be foolhardy if good intentions are allowed to wish away the a full consideration of the potential problems of such action. President Assad has been unyielding in his insistence that the uprising against him is the result of foreign powers acting in the interests of the Israelis. While such assertions are absurd, this does not mean they cannot gain traction should the United States widen its involvement in ways that include ground troops. These propaganda tools will almost certainly not be confined to the Assad government but could also be taken up by Syrian Islamist radicals in the struggle for control in post-Assad Syria. Such reasoning is one indication that ground troops should be used in Syria under only the more dire circumstances and in ways that will not cause them to become bogged down so withdrawal is difficult later. The United States especially does not want to become an occupation force in such circumstances.

Above all, the Arab Spring and its aftermath should be viewed as a time of tremendous transition in the Middle East, where well-informed US Army leaders may be called upon to find ways to help friendly forces in useful and creative ways. In doing so, the US Army should seek to provide helpful options to the US civilian leadership in ways that offer reasonable rewards for wise rather than massive commitments.
Thank you for running Lieutenant Colonel David G. Fivecoat’s essay on “American Landpower and Modern US Generalship” (Winter-Spring 2013). I don’t agree with everything he writes, but nonetheless am pleased to see Fivecoat’s article because it is exactly the type of work I hoped my book *The Generals: American Military Command from World War II to Today* would provoke. I had thought that General Brown’s articles in ARMY magazine might launch such a discussion, but that magazine shied away from engaging, without explaining why, as if discussing the quality of leadership in today’s Army somehow was impolite.

Most of all, I am fascinated by Fivecoat’s finding (page 74) that leading a division in combat in Iraq seems to have hurt an officer’s chances of promotion. That worries me. What does it mean? That discovery of his indicates that the Army of the Iraq-Afghanistan era is out of step from the historical tradition that for an officer, time in combat is the royal road to advancement. I cannot think of other wars in which service in combat hurt an officer’s chance of promotion. It is, as Fivecoat almost (but not quite) says, worrisome evidence that the Army for close to a decade persisted in using a peacetime promotion system in wartime.

In addition to breaking new ground intellectually, Fivecoat’s article is also courageous. It is one thing for me, a civilian author, to question the quality of American generalship in Iraq and Afghanistan. It is quite another thing for an active duty lieutenant colonel to do so, especially since the Army’s official histories have tiptoed around the issue of the failings of senior leadership in our recent wars.

Two final observations:

- I think Lieutenant Colonel Fivecoat lets today’s Army off too easily on its lack of transparency. To me this reflects a bit of drift in the service, a loss of the sense of being answerable to the nation and the people. Being close-mouthed about its leadership problems gives the impression that the Army’s leaders care more about the feelings of generals than the support of the American people.

- Finally, I have to question Fivecoat’s assertion that minimizing disruption optimizes performance. It wasn’t the case in World War II. Why would it be the case in Afghanistan or Iraq? It may be—but it remains an unproven assumption, and to my mind, a questionable one. The opportunity cost of averting disruption can be large, because such passivity (or “subtlety,” as he terms it) results in the apparent rewarding of risk-averse or mediocre commanders. What would Matthew

Mr. Thomas E. Ricks is a Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist, winning twice for National Reporting in 2000 and 2002. He writes an influential blog at ForeignPolicy.com and is a member of the Center for a New American Security, a defense policy think tank. Educated at Yale University, he is a respected lecturer and author of several best-selling books including *Fiasco*, *The Gamble*, and *The Generals*. 
Ridgway say about such a policy of minimizing disruption?

Thank you again for running such an illuminating and thought-provoking article.

The Author Replies

David G. Fivecoat

Mr. Thomas Ricks’s book *The Generals* did a superb job at generating discussion across the military on the merits of American generalship since World War II. My article, “American Landpower and Modern US Generalship” in the Winter-Spring 2013 edition of *Parameters*, was my attempt to add depth to the dialogue about the major generals who led division-sized formations in Iraq and Afghanistan since 9/11.

To be sure, the article is not all encompassing. Although the post-9/11 group of major generals is a small data set, it is almost one-third the size of the World War II cohort and will continue to grow while the United States military assists the Afghanistan government’s counterinsurgency operations for the next several years. Strictly speaking, it might not be significant by the mathematical definition; but the division commanders of Iraq and Afghanistan are a notable group in the historical sense. While I concede the mathematical limitations of the evidence presented in the article, there is enough hard evidence to allow us to move beyond questions of correlation and to discuss the matter of causation, which, in the end, is far more important.

I acknowledge Mr. Ricks’s questioning whether military organizations should place a premium on reducing disruption. In forming my thoughts on the adverse outcomes of firings, intellectually I drew upon literature studying similar experiences in business and professional sports. During a year as a battalion commander in Afghanistan, I (and I’m sure my higher headquarters) wrestled with how to improve the performance of subordinate units in an extremely ambiguous environment. Reliefs rarely seemed the best way forward for my unit or our counterinsurgency campaign. There is a finer line to be drawn on this measure than Ricks concedes.

Thanks again for the opportunity to contribute to the discussion. I hope others are able to expand on and contribute to the conversation.
On “Drones and US Strategy: Costs and Benefits”

Ulrike Franke

This commentary is in response to Alan W. Dowd’s “Drones Wars: Risks and Warnings”; W. Andrew Terrill’s “Drones over Yemen: Weighing Military Benefits and Political Costs”; Greg Kennedy’s “Drones: Legitimacy and Anti-Americanism”; and Jacqueline L. Hazelton’s “Drones: What Are They Good For?” All articles were published in the Winter-Spring 2013 issue of Parameters (vol. 42, no. 4/vol 43, no. 1).

In the Winter-Spring 2013 issue of Parameters, four authors discussed the new military tool the media has dubbed “drone” and which military officials prefer to call Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) or Remotely Piloted Vehicle (RPV). Alan W. Dowd, W. Andrew Terrill, Greg Kennedy, and Jacqueline L. Hazelton assist the reader in gaining a better grasp of one of today’s most debated issues—the increasing use of UAVs by the US military and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in countries such as Pakistan and Yemen.

Unfortunately, there is not as much scholarship on drones as one might think. Consequently, the articles in the forum, in particular Alan Dowd’s “Drones Wars: Risks and Warnings,” are predominantly based on newspaper editorials and other media reports. Academia has indeed been slow to respond to the unmanned (r)evolution in warfare. This can be explained in part by the scarce source material—information on military UAVs and their use is largely kept secret; reliable information on missile strikes via UAVs is difficult to find, but is becoming more available. The relative lack of scholarly work on the military and political impact of UAVs, however, illustrates a general problem academia confronts when working on current affairs: the difficulty, if not inability, of the academic peer-review process to keep abreast with fast-changing, constantly developing current affairs. Jacqueline Hazelton should, therefore, be given credit for using a considerable amount of scholarly literature in her article “Drones: What Are They Good For?”

It is understandable, therefore, if authors sometimes revert to using general media sources when academic literature is sparse. There is, however, no excuse for using notoriously unreliable media reports for information such as casualty assessments after drone strikes or for the number of UAV users worldwide. In the last few years, several organizations started to gather more accurate information on these issues in a methodologically sound fashion. Instead of using BBC News information on Pakistani drone strike casualties, Greg Kennedy should have referenced numbers from the New America Foundation, the Long War Journal, or the Bureau of Investigative Journalism (which incidentally is...
where *BBC News* gets its numbers). Instead of quoting *USA Today* concerning numbers of countries with UAVs, Alan Dowd could have used the International Institute for Strategic Studies publication *The Military Balance* or governmental information such that provided by the United States Government Accountability Office.

All four papers share one major—admittedly common—flaw: the implicit equation of drones, MALE (Medium Altitude, Long Endurance) UAVs, and armed UAVs/UCAVs. It is immensely important to make these distinctions clear: “drone” is a term being used (incorrectly) to describe all kinds of unmanned aerial vehicles. (The better term to describe modern unmanned aircraft is Unmanned Aerial Vehicle [UAV].) Modern UAVs, or drones, range from insect-sized aircraft to airplanes the size of commercial airliners. A very small number of UAVs can be armed, mostly with air-to-ground missiles. Accordingly, the terms drone and UAV can describe both the Black Hornet—a small (4.7 inches, 16 grams) reconnaissance drone—as well as the Global Hawk, a 14 ton aircraft with a 130.9 ft wingspan. Because UAVs come in so many different forms and can be used for a large variety of tasks, an increasing number of classifications and categorizations has been introduced. Usually, a distinction is made between mini, tactical, MALE, and HALE (High Altitude, Long Endurance) UAVs. The most notorious UAVs—the General Atomics Predator and Reaper which get by far the most attention in the media—are both MALE UAVs. The term UCAV (Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle) describes armed UAVs. Armed UAVs can theoretically come in all sizes; for the moment, however, most armed UAVs are MALE UAVs. The Reaper is the most potent UCAV currently in use and can be armed with up to fourteen Hellfire missiles or a combination of missiles and laser-guided bombs.

All four authors use the term drone, but none of them believes it necessary to define what exactly is meant by it. By their writing it becomes clear, however, they are not discussing drones in general, but rather a very specific type of UAV used for a very specific purpose. Jacqueline Hazelton notes “They can kill, disable, support fighters on the ground, destroy, harry, hinder, deny access, observe, and track.” This is not exactly false—but most of these attributes pertain to only a small fraction of today’s drones, namely armed MALE UAVs. She also writes,


3 The definition of a drone is “an unmanned vehicle which conducts its mission without guidance from an external source.” This means that once launched, a drone’s flight path cannot be changed. Modern unmanned aircraft are, therefore, better described by the term UAV, “a powered, aerial vehicle that does not carry a human operator, uses aerodynamic forces to provide vehicle lift, can fly autonomously or be piloted remotely, can be expendable or recoverable, and can carry a lethal or nonlethal payload. Ballistic or semi-ballistic vehicles, cruise missiles, and artillery projectiles are not considered unmanned aerial vehicles”. (All definitions taken from the “NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions (English and French),” NATO Standardization Agency (NSA) 2008, AAP-6(2008), http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/other/nato2008.pdf. These definitions are also used by the US Department of Defense and other governmental agencies.)
“They are claimed to do less collateral damage than either missiles or manned aerial bombing,” practically equating UAVs and missiles. Alan Dowd writes that drones are “hitting targets from Asia to Africa,” equipped with missiles fired “by a remote-control warrior sitting in the safety of a nondescript building outside Las Vegas.” He considers them “a cheap alternative to long-range, long-endurance warplanes.” None of these statements applies to the large majority of drones, which are small to medium-sized unarmed tactical surveillance UAVs. The statements are only true for MALE UCAVs.

The misuse of the term drone is not only an analytical nuisance—it has direct implications for the readers’ understanding of the issues surrounding UAV use. When Alan Dowd discusses UCAVs over nine pages and then mentions an “estimated 75 countries have drone programs underway,” there clearly is a risk readers will assume that 75 countries have or will soon have armed MALE UAVs. In reality, of these 75 countries, only three are known to have UCAVs (the United States, the United Kingdom, and Israel) and two (China and Iran) are suspected to have UCAVs. Most states do not have MALE UAVs. It might be the author was unaware of the distinctions. Quoting an Economist article which states, “Training UAS [Unmanned Aerial System] controllers . . . costs less than a tenth as much as turning out a fast-jet pilot,” Dowd replaces UAV with UCAV and writes “training UCAV controllers costs less than a tenth what it costs to train traditional combat aviators.”

Most importantly, it is crucial not to confuse the tool, i.e., armed UAVs, with the strategy—targeted killing. A drone is an aircraft that can be used (and is indeed being used) in conventional war settings or for civilian purposes. It is not synonymous with targeted killings or signature strikes, nor with surveillance or tapping, crop dusting or real estate photography (all of which drones have been used for). Using the term in a way that makes the reader confuse the tool and the task, especially if the task is highly contentious and potentially illegal, holds a risk of public opinion turning against the tool which can be, if used the right way, of considerable military value.

The military and political value of using armed UAVs for missile strikes in undeclared conflict zones is a question all four authors approach. The shared sentiment is that the undeniable tactical victories of targeted killings and signature strikes via UCAVs are lessened or even neutralized by strategic setbacks. Andrew Terrill, in his excellent study of US UCAV use in Yemen, states the use of military armed drones “appear to have made a significant difference in helping the Yemeni government cope with AQAP [al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula] while reducing that organization’s ability to conduct international terrorism.” He, however, identifies the drone program as “deeply unpopular with many Yemenis.” UAVs have been criticized for violating national sovereignty, for putting psychological pressure on local populations in areas routinely monitored by UAVs, and for causing high numbers of civilian casualties. Terrill assesses there is, therefore, the “potential for serious backlash over any drone-related disaster.” Greg Kennedy draws attention to the risk of fuelling anti-American resentment and alienating allies through the inconsiderate use of UCAVs. Alan Dowd cites former US ambassador to NATO, Kurt Volker, who warns drone strikes might play into terrorists’ hands by helping them recruit new followers.
Unsurprisingly, because of this mixed picture, none of the authors unequivocally argues in favor or against the increasing use of UCAVs. Alan Dowd seems most favorable towards the new technology, but underlines “there exists no simple solution to the drone dilemma.” Andrew Terrill puts it best, indicating “drones are on probation” for the moment. Much will depend on the United States’ handling of its growing unmanned air force. It is important that academia actively participate this discussion. It is insufficient to observe the development from afar and to hide behind academic impartiality and objectivity. “Sparking further analysis of drone strikes,” as Jacqueline Hazelton aims to, is not enough. More pathbreaking scholarship on US drone use is needed. Of the four articles presented in this issue, Andrew Terrill’s detailed analysis of US drone use in Yemen and its military and political benefits and costs meets these requirements best.

These four articles provide a useful introduction and overview of central issues surrounding U(C)AV use. More analysis is to come, and, as Hazelton points out, “Many good minds are already at work, and more evidence should become available as time passes and, perhaps, as the United States makes its drone programs more transparent.” Those interested in the future of drone use in the United States and worldwide have a lot to look forward to.

On occasion, we receive commentary to articles published in the journal. We offer our authors the opportunity to review and respond to that commentary. The following reply is from Alan W. Dowd, author of “Drone Wars: Risks and Warnings.”

One Author Replies

Alan W. Dowd

Although Ms. Franke does not appear to challenge the central premise of my essay—that drone warfare opens the United States to a range of geostrategic, geopolitical, constitutional, and public policy challenges the American people and their elected representatives have not fully considered—she offers some helpful insights. Among the most important of these is the notion that we should “not confuse the tool, i.e., armed UAVs, with the strategy—targeted killing.” Regrettably, that appears to be what is happening in policymaking circles, as targeted killing with UCAVs—a tactic—has taken the place of strategy. Even so, I share her view that UCAVs can be a tool of considerable military value, but only if their use is more restrained and better defined by policymakers.

Her commentary emphasizes the importance of distinguishing between UAVs and UCAVs. This admonition is well taken. My essay made sure to note, “In the past decade, the US drone fleet has swelled from 50 planes to 7,500, though the vast majority of these drones are not UCAVs,” and made a distinction between the Army’s fleet of reconnaissance/surveillance drones and strike drones. I did use the “UCAV” acronym in discussing the disparity between manned and unmanned
training costs. It is worth noting that even some Pentagon documents use the umbrella term “UAS”—or “unmanned aerial systems”—in discussing strike and nonstrike drones. Moreover, there is a significant difference in the costs of training drone operators and traditional pilots. A recent Air Force report discussing MQ-1 Predators and MQ-9 Reapers—importantly, the report describes the MQ-1 as focusing on “interdiction and armed reconnaissance against critical, perishable targets” and the MQ-9 as “a persistent hunter-killer”—concluded that using nonaviators to operate these armed drones could save several hundred thousand dollars per pilot/controller.

Ms. Franke takes issue with my mention of 75 countries having drone programs underway. My essay did not say that all of them are UCAV programs, but some are. In fact, Russia is developing what it calls “automated strike aircraft.” Germany is procuring armed drones. After its experience in Libya and Mali, France is keenly interested in acquiring the Reaper. And then there are the known unknowns: Are Hezbollah’s drones armed? Has North Korea retooled its drones into offensive weapons? To whom will China sell its armed drones? Moreover, a drone does not have to be armed to trigger an international incident, as the United States and Iran have learned, which is one of my broader points: Drones could usher in a new age of accidental wars.

A final caveat on sourcing—the commentator writes, “There is not as much scholarship on drones as one might think; most of the articles . . . are predominantly based on newspaper editorials and other media reports,” and warns against using “notoriously unreliable media reports.” First, I am aware of no “notoriously unreliable media reports” cited in my essay. Second, owing to the nature of this new, evolving weapons system, the use of media reports as supporting material is unavoidable. Third, just as it is problematic to conflate “UAV” and “UCAV,” it is problematic to conflate “editorials” and “media reports.” Of the 49 footnotes in my essay, one comes from an editorial: a New York Times editorial expressly cited to convey how armed drones are being promoted by the press. Two come from authoritative essays penned by topic experts: a former US ambassador and a former National Security Council official. There are 20 news sources cited, 6 Defense Department reports, 5 books, 3 scholarly journals/reports, 2 military briefings/interviews, 2 polls, one State Department briefing, one treaty, and one statute.
On "Reaffirming the Utility of Nuclear Weapons"

Robert H. Gregory

Bradley Thayer and Thomas Skypek make the following assertion: “Nuclear weapons deter enemies such as al Qaeda who would deliberately attack the United States as well as countries like China that might be tempted to attack the US homeland as the result of escalation from a crisis (e.g., Taiwan in 1995-96).” This assertion groups together state and nonstate actors in a problematic manner. Both components of the assertion are questionable. The claim that nuclear weapons can deter al Qaeda from attacking the US homeland, or China from attacking the US homeland in a potential Taiwan Straits crisis, lacks both nuance and evidence.

There are no historical examples to support the assertion that al Qaeda is deterred by nuclear weapons. On the contrary, al Qaeda has made several attacks against the United States despite our nuclear status. In those cases, the use (or threat of use) of nuclear weapons was not feasible because these weapons are too blunt to target anything of significance to a terrorist organization. Al Qaeda seems to be unaffected by traditional conceptions of deterrence as forged during the Cold War. Terrorist organizations may be deterred more by Special Operations Forces (SOF) raids, drone strikes, or the vigilance of local law enforcement than by fear of a nuclear strike. In fact, a nuclear strike might play into terrorist hands. Fear and credibility are central elements of deterrence. Deterrence and coercion require credibly putting something at risk an adversary holds dear. Some terrorists do not even fear losing their lives, so they are impossible to deter; however, this does not mean their efforts cannot be foiled, though not with nuclear weapons.

Would Chinese military strategists be “tempted” to consider attacking the US homeland with nuclear weapons to advance interests in Taiwan during a crisis? It was actually the other way around during the First Taiwan Straits Crisis when the Eisenhower administration considered using nuclear weapons against China. By the Third Taiwan Crisis, China was a well-established nuclear power, capable of putting some American cities at risk. That crisis involved two nation-states with nuclear weapons, yet these weapons did not alter the strategic calculus of either side. It started when the United States granted a visa for Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui to visit and present a speech at Cornell University in May 1995. The speech was intended to trumpet the accomplishments of democratization in Taiwan and was seen by China as a public display of Taiwan’s ambition towards diplomatic recognition and independence. China responded to this visit with a show of force.
Commentaries and Replies

consisting of missile launches into waters near Taiwanese ports, and live fire artillery exercises off the coast of mainland China adjacent to the Taiwan Strait. The United States subsequently responded with the deployment of two carrier battle groups to the region in March 1996. At no time during the crisis did either side make decisions solely based on the deterrent effect of nuclear weapons. Instead, both sides reacted to each other’s deployments of conventional naval and land forces while simultaneously engaging in high-level diplomatic exchanges.

The United States’ tit-for-tat strategy, with proportional displays of conventional force, eventually deterred further escalation—when combined with reassurance that the decision to grant a visa to Lee was not a change in the United States’ official position regarding Taiwan. During the crisis, then President Clinton privately communicated in a letter to then President Jiang Zemin, “that U.S. policy opposed Taiwan independence, did not support Taiwan membership in the UN and did not support a two-China policy or a policy of one China and one Taiwan.” Neither side delivered a fait accompli during the crisis. Essentially, China’s show of force caused the United States to reaffirm its refusal to recognize Taiwan, and the United States’ reciprocal show of force affirmed America would not back down from its decision to grant Lee a visa. Even today, the United States does not formally recognize Taiwan; it continues to perform a similarly delicate balancing act with its position on Taiwan independence. This position is more one of diplomatic ambiguity to save face in a crisis rather than one of extended nuclear deterrence. Extending the nuclear umbrella to Taiwan does not serve as a credible deterrent. Should the United States risk American cities in a nuclear exchange with China to save Taiwan from a Chinese onslaught? During the Cold War, would we have risked losing New York to save Berlin? These are the dilemmas that would be created by the type of nuclear brinksmanship the authors espouse. Raising the stakes ever-higher to even the playing field is a strategy that stems from weakness.

The authors make reckless assertions regarding the utility of nuclear weapons. The rapid ability to cause massive, indiscriminate damage is not always militarily useful, particularly when dealing with a terrorist organization or another nuclear power. The authors contend that having less than 300 nuclear weapons will make the United States impotent. They do not consider the possibility that nuclear weapons have diminishing marginal utility for deterrence and coercion when possessed in ever-greater quantities. The highly destructive power of nuclear weapons, combined with the possibility a conflict may escalate to the point of nuclear exchange, demands a higher level of academic scrutiny when making assertions regarding the utility of these weapons. Unfounded assertions raise the potential for miscalculation in a crisis.

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The Authors Reply

Bradley A. Thayer and Thomas M. Skypek

We thank Robert H. Gregory for raising several excellent points and welcome the opportunity to respond. Gregory raises two objections: first, that nuclear weapons do not deter terrorists; and, second, that China would not attack the United States over Taiwan. We address each in turn in this brief reply.

We agree that deterrence of terrorists is a complex and multifaceted issue as terrorists are motivated by many ideologies and beliefs. In addition, we concur that deterrence of terrorism requires many tools in the toolkit, including those he suggests. Where we disagree is in the nature of the threat. First, if we focus specifically on al Qaeda and associated movements, we see they are dynamic and evolving organizations, whose motivations and capabilities might be even more dangerous and potent in the future. We would not want to dismiss the role that nuclear weapons—in this instance, low yield nuclear weapons—may play in targeting a potential underground facility, or providing US decisionmakers with the option of doing so. Second, as state sponsorship is a likely path for al Qaeda and associated movements to acquire fissile material or nuclear weapons, we recognize the important role nuclear weapons may play in deterring state sponsors of terrorism. It is critical any potential state sponsors of al Qaeda and associated movements know the United States will hold them accountable if weapons of mass destruction are shared with terrorist groups. Indeed, this has been proclaimed by senior US national security decisionmakers and was a major motivation for the French declaration in 2006 that limited nuclear strikes might be employed against a state that launched a terrorist attack against it.

Concerning China, there are two reasons we are less sanguine than Gregory about the willingness of the Chinese to escalate over Taiwan. The first reason is the balance of resolve: the Chinese believe Taiwan is a part of China, thus making their threats and readiness to use force more credible. The second reason is the Chinese are not transparent in strategic matters so we do not know in what circumstances the Chinese would believe escalation served their interests. We do not know if the Chinese conceive of escalation as the Soviet Union and the United States did during the Cold War, if escalation may be controlled, or what its thresholds are. Gregory ascribes the peaceful resolutions of the Taiwan crises to diplomacy alone. However, he fails to acknowledge the role played by nuclear weapons in establishing the environment that led to peaceful resolutions.

Accordingly, it is essential to acknowledge that the role of US nuclear weapons is to deter escalation over Taiwan or other significant territorial disputes. The United States must have the capability to deter Chinese escalation and coerce Beijing into deescalating. International stability, prudence, and the credibility of the United States require strategic superiority. This superiority requires robust strategic capabilities, including an arsenal large enough to meet multiple present and future
threats—coupled with the appropriate declaratory policy, doctrine, training, and other critical support.

No strategic tool solves all strategic problems. US nuclear weapons did not prevent America's loss in Vietnam, and, at present, China and the United States are fighting a cyberwar unclouded by their strategic arsenals. Yet, it would be a disastrous mistake to yield to a proclivity to minimize or dismiss the contributions of nuclear weapons to the security of the United States in the past, present, or future. The United States must have robust conventional and strategic forces to meet its many strategic commitments in a host of circumstances. Fundamentally, international politics has not changed. The role of military power and the need to deter and coerce opponents is the same today as in Metternich's or Sun Tzu's time. The strategic arsenal of the United States plays a major role in protecting the American people and its allies, and allows the United States to advance its interests against those who oppose it. Indeed, the lack of any great power wars since 1945 can be largely attributed to the environment, fraught with risks to be sure, created by these weapons. The value of the absolute weapon identified by Bernard Brodie almost 70 years ago remains true today.
For my promotion, John Nagl gave me a copy of Fred Kaplan’s The Insurgents: David Petraeus and the Plot to Change the American Way of War signed by the military journalist himself. And so, the book opens: “A few days shy of his 25th birthday, John Nagl saw his future disappear.” The book chronicles a small group’s attempt to shift the American way of war from one of high-tech, big weapons focused on enemy combatants, to one that held people as the center of gravity. Kaplan’s account—there are others, and there will be more—is worth a read, even if Nagl isn’t your friend.

The Insurgents is a readable and informative account of a critical time in the history of American involvement in conflicts overseas, regardless of whether or not you accept the conclusions. Throughout the book, Kaplan weaves descriptions of the Department of Defense culture—including examples like Andy Marshall’s Revolution in Military Affairs, and Bosnia not being a “real war”—with the academic and military background of a small group of thinkers, many anchored in West Point and its Department of Social Sciences. This group includes David Petraeus, John Nagl, David Kilcullen, Mike Meese, Ike Wilson, H. R. McMaster, Sarah Sewell, Gunner Sepp, Bill Hix, and their most important professional and academic influencers—Jack Galvin, David Galula, Alexander George, T. E. Lawrence, and others.

Kaplan provides the reader a play-by-play account of the intellectual wrangling that occurred within the Pentagon, inside the national security decisionmaking apparatus of the Bush and Obama Administrations, and on the ground in Iraq. He builds to the implication that the consequence of the group’s effort was the replacement of one doctrine (air-land battle) with another (COIN). This took a herculean effort by a unique group of true believers to recalibrate the machine, but once accomplished, the machine could not get the entire job done. He excuses the leaders of the COIN movement by concluding that some wars are winnable (Iraq) and some are not (Afghanistan).

Good as this tale is, I admit to feeling a “here we go again” exasperation about halfway through: more glorification of a certain set of people, chief among them General David Petraeus. Kaplan is guilty of marginalizing other leaders who were instrumental in developing and implementing COIN strategy. Two kinds of contributions were required to change the military: those who drove an intellectually rigorous process that required bureaucratic and political savvy; and those who implemented the policy in the field and then fed back necessary adaptations. The Insurgents emphasized the thinkers, not the doers.
The overlap of the two sets is mostly limited to one man, David Petraeus—a conceptual thinker who starts with an understanding of the problem and the big ideas associated with it, values academia and multiple perspectives, is hyper-efficient in his habits, made it his job to master his role in the body politic, and has the personal fortitude to operationalize all of it. So I am able to put a better point on the exasperation expressed above: it is the rarity of the combination Petraeus embodies that damns the military culture, and so we have yet another author criticizing the dearth of creative thinking and courage among the military’s ranks.

Indeed, Kaplan cannot help but take jabs at the military as he chronicles the struggle it took to adapt. He says “only the most confident and nurtured young officer” would take on the Army establishment as Petreaus did with an article he ghost wrote for Galvin. He implies Nagl’s retirement as a lieutenant colonel had to do with writing that the Army was not a learning organization. He characterizes the “Sosh” Department as comprised of officers who doubted the judgment of their superiors, implying they were correct to do so. He states that during the Cold War, being an MP or a Civil Affairs officer was “no way to get ahead, so the best officers steered clear”. He writes, “TRADOC got a new commander who saw no point in long range thinking” during the 1990s. Is Kaplan correct in his commentary about the Army? Where there’s smoke there’s bound to be fire, but the truth is almost always in the middle. Those who cling to the centrality of force-on-force do so for good reason; but given that military power alone will be decisive only in the most limited-objective scenarios, DOD must ensure the conventional force culture does not preclude the agility and creativity required to provide a full range of options essential to safeguarding the interests of the American people.

The book has one other major flaw: it digs deep into Iraq but skims over Afghanistan. Let’s set aside the questions of whether or not we really “won” in Iraq, and whether we thoughtlessly conflated COIN planning and doctrine with the strategic objectives we tried to achieve in Afghanistan. Did the “COINdinistas” get it right? Perhaps so in Iraq and Kaplan explains that well. Afghanistan was, and is, another matter, and his explanation is unsatisfying on two levels.

By the surge in Afghanistan, operationally, COIN had perhaps turned into “dogma,” but not because the COIN leaders held onto it as written in 2006. Rather, because, as Kaplan does not quite say, they did not hang onto it . . . and did not proclaim this rejection publicly. By publicly espousing a comprehensive COIN strategy and privately rejecting all but the emphasis on security (and indeed, General Petraeus put significant personal energy into the Afghan Local Police program), the opportunity to adapt the broader COIN doctrine and strategy was precluded. To my mind, watching and participating one level down, General Petraeus accepted Galula’s necessary preconditions for success in a counterinsurgency campaign, and finding none of them in Afghanistan, changed course. He inherited a COIN campaign plan that may or may not have been right, and then quietly used members of the original COIN team, Jack Keane and the Kagans in particular, to focus almost exclusively on kill-capture. The potential result is ironic and harmful: no more COIN.
But Kaplan also does not quite say that General Petraeus was astutely reading the political writing on the wall and probably knew the mission was not going to be resourced as much or as long as required—which was the biggest problem of all with Afghanistan. And here Kaplan really comes up short: he seems to credit and even applaud the administration with out-foxing its military leaders, and provides no further analysis on whether or not that was the correct thing to do with regard to mission accomplishment. In fact, I could not help but feel I was taken on a bit of a ride. Kaplan spends a good deal of the book building up Petraeus and the group, only to take some glee by ultimately implying not only that they got what they deserved in Afghanistan, but that the Obama administration was brighter than the best of the brightest.

Kaplan writes of the eventual recognition that “Afghanistan is not Iraq.” Right, it’s not. But understanding did not lead to meaningful adaptation operationally or politically. We simply have to understand where we went wrong in Afghanistan in all realms. We cannot thoughtlessly throw the COIN bathwater out with the Afghanistan baby. Kaplan tap-dances around these most critical issues. Perhaps he had a foregone conclusion about the Afghan mission; perhaps he felt he had to tread carefully with regard to General Petraeus while lauding the Obama administration.

Nor is it my intent to tarnish anyone’s armor. Simply because a mentor and role model reaches a super-human limit (in part due to the bottom-line principle under which we operate—civilian control of the military), does not negate his super-human contributions. The Insurgents throws something else into stark relief—as indefatigable as General Petraeus is, it is somehow unbelievable and unfair that we as a nation should have been so dependent on the energy, intellect, leadership, and savvy of one man for so long. Regardless of whether or not he cultivated that position, when he was finally “beat” we should take no satisfaction in it. I can’t help but think of lives lost.

The “plot to change the American way of war” had a larger point: the requirement to meet national objectives in situations in which an adversary’s military forces are not the center of gravity is enduring. Regardless of “we won’t do long, big COIN operations anymore” proclamations, the country will undoubtedly need those skills for small, short missions . . . or, indeed, another unexpectedly long, big war.

An interagency group should conduct a comprehensive lessons-learned analysis of this toughest of COIN scenarios—the strategic case study that is Afghanistan. In this reviewer’s opinion, the required security-governance progression was much less linear in Afghanistan than Iraq; the development effort should have started with strengths instead of the bottomless “needs” pit; the effort needed rational decisiveness from Washington with regard to handling the Karzai regime; and “Af-Pak” should have gone beyond titular.

If we arrive at a dead end, only then should we say Kaplan’s conclusions were right after all—some wars are not winnable no matter what brain power you throw at them. Call it countercultural for an Army officer to believe mission accomplishment of any kind is impossible. Or call it a necessary part of being a member of a learning organization.
War From The Ground Up: Twenty-First-Century Combat as Politics
By Emile Simpson

Reviewed by Dr. Richard M. Swain, Colonel, USA Retired

War From the Ground Up is a theoretical reflection on the meaning of the Afghanistan counterinsurgency for war theory. It was written during an Oxford Defense Fellowship by a wonderfully literate infantry officer who served in Helmand with the Royal Gurkha Rifles. The author’s core insight is that counterinsurgency differs from traditional interstate war in the sense that, whereas the latter seeks to create, by battle and maneuver, a military condition that can be the basis of a political result; military action in counterinsurgency “directly seeks political, as opposed to specifically military, outcomes . . . .” The result, at least in Afghanistan (elaborating on David Kilkullen and Antonio Giustozzi), is a conflict more like a domestic political contest than a Clausewitzian “bipolar” struggle. The value of the book is less this observation than what the author does with it, and how well he does what he sets out to do. He presents an argument that stands, as Sir Michael Howard has observed elsewhere, as a “coda” on Clausewitz, filling out the master’s description of limited war in the particular context of the early twenty-first century.

Simpson points out that Clausewitz’s simplifying description of war as a two-sided (“bi-polar”) confrontation does not fit the highly fragmented, largely “domestic,” political struggle in Afghanistan or the expansion of the relevant strategic audience imposed by the ubiquity of immediate global communications. He adopts the view that combat becomes a form of public communication. From this, he draws a distinction between the idea of strategy as the instrumental use of force, and the now especially critical function of providing an interpretive framework within which to convey a desired meaning to critical audiences. Not just battle, but war itself is instrumental.

In addition to constructing a sophisticated updating of Clausewitzian theory, Simpson addresses the importance of what this reviewer might characterize as “dialogic command,” an authoritative relationship sensitive to the need for negotiating the tension between the desired and the possible outcomes from policy to execution. Simpson calls this “Strategic dialog . . . the reciprocal interaction between policy, in the sense of the political decisions and intentions of the state, and how policy is articulated as actual operations . . . .” His concern involves the compound danger of naive decisionmakers at the top and the ubiquity below of the figure Americans call the “strategic corporal,” the relatively minor tactical leader whose actions or inactions can advance or derail the grander efforts of which they are part.

Here again, Simpson shows his mettle with a critique, perhaps a bit rigid, of Samuel Huntington’s 1957 treatise on civil-military relations, Soldier and the State. Simpson’s point, very much like Eliot Cohen’s Supreme Command, is that strict separation of the military function and civil direction has long since become counterproductive. He might have, but does not, observe that the descriptive social science on which Soldier...
and the State was based was old at the time Huntington wrote, and the character of professions has evolved a good deal since 1957. Simpson makes a minor historical error subordinating Moltke to Bismarck in their famous struggle outside Paris in 1871. In that event, the struggle took place because the general and chancellor were parallel officials, both directly subordinate to the Prussian King. To use Huntington to draw a sharp distinction between constitutional and strategic imperatives of civil-military relations, Simpson ignores the advisory function that professional soldiers owe to their constitutional masters as well as final obedience, Cohen’s “unequal dialog.”

The structure of the book seems a bit out of balance, first between emphasis on the particular case of counterinsurgency as opposed to the broader category of limited war, then on the relative importance of action versus interpretation. In the first case, a fine chapter on the “British Strategy in the Borneo Confrontation, 1962-6” approaches making the more general case, but never quite closes on the point. In the latter, the penultimate two chapters, which address strategic narrative, leave a sense that the entire discussion has been pointed toward predominance of interpretation over action. Grounded on concepts from Aristotle’s Rhetoric, they are excellent in their own right, but might better have been located earlier in the text.

Neither the introduction nor conclusion conveys fully the great wealth of thought that lies between. The great strength of the book is in the author’s clarity of explanation and his theoretical sense, firmly based on useful definition and clear, didactic distinctions. This book should find an important place in War College, School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS), Marine Corps School of Advanced Warfighting (SAWS), and Air Force School of Advanced Air and Space Studies (SAASS) seminars.
Although the war in Afghanistan has lasted appreciably longer than America’s war in Iraq, the shorter conflict has generated both more and better literature and analysis. There are a stack of books on Iraq that will bear the test of time, from George Packer’s *The Assassins’ Gate* and Tom Ricks’s *Fiasco* to Michael Gordon and Mick Trainor’s comprehensive trilogy on the war. The longer Afghan campaign can claim no such body of work is likely to last. Carter Malkasian’s *War Comes to Garmser* is a sparkling depiction of the conflict in a province, but there is as yet no overview of the war as a whole that will endure.

Army Colonel Bob Cassidy has attempted to fill the gap with *War, Will, and Warlords: Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan and Pakistan, 2001-2011*, published by the Marine Corps University Press and freely available on the internet. Bob is well placed to do so, having written two previous books on counterinsurgency and spending a year working at the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Joint Command, which coordinates the campaign at the operational level of war. The book meets some of the need for a comprehensive analysis of the Afghan conflict, but is hobbled by two shortcomings—one unavoidable, one not—that leave the field at least partially open for a great campaign history.

The unavoidable shortcoming of *War, Will, and Warlords* comes in its subtitle; the book only carries the reader through 2011, concentrating most heavily on fighting since the Obama administration prioritized Afghanistan over Iraq in 2009. While Cassidy is correct in noting that before late 2009, “the war in Afghanistan lacked both a comprehensive counterinsurgency campaign plan and an operational-level headquarters to orchestrate the campaign,” the Afghan campaign has become more interesting, not less, since he completed his analysis in 2011, and the trend is likely to continue. Although the Afghan endgame cannot yet be written, the president decided to draw down the American troop commitment and turn over responsibility for the continuing counterinsurgency campaign to the Afghan security forces by the end of 2014. This is high adventure; while the Anbar Awakening and the Surge broke the back of the insurgency in Iraq before the American drawdown there, the Pashtun insurgency in Afghanistan and Pakistan is likely to remain a significant threat to Afghan governance when the American combat role ends. Cassidy deserves credit for attempting to capture the history of the war up until 2011, but the climactic acts of this play have not yet happened.

The avoidable shortcoming is Dr. Cassidy’s writing style. Bob is an old friend and former partner in crime at the US Military Academy, where we taught international relations together at the Department of Social Sciences; from that time through today, Bob has never been able to
resist inserting the most complicated possible word in his writing. Thus, on the second page of his Preface, Bob explains that his book “posits that explanations for the catalysts of these two insurgencies relate to a paucity of analysis and resources that exacerbated or created grievances among the local populations, excessive or inappropriate applications of lethal force, and ill-prepared approaches to information operations that failed to integrate information narratives with the use of military force.” This rather convoluted sentence is in fact a road map to the major lenses through which Bob analyzes the counterinsurgency campaigns in Afghanistan and Pakistan: legitimacy; use of force; and information operations, both during the enemy-focused period from 2001 through 2009, labeled “The Pursuit of Evil,” and during the population-security focused “Pursuit of Peace” from 2009 through 2011. The lenses work well and provide significant insight, as does the bifurcation of the campaign into two phases.

There is much more goodness in the book, and it fully meets its self-described purpose of exploring “the U.S.-led Coalition and the U.S.-supported Pakistani efforts in countering the Taliban/al-Qaeda insurgencies in both of these countries to date.” Bob does a real service by pointing out not just how under-resourced the AfPak campaign was until President Obama’s arrival, but also to what extent the Durand Line fails to demarcate a conflict that America and her allies have to conduct in very different ways on different sides of the Afghan/Pakistan border. Here his eloquence is both appropriate and enjoyable: “If Afghanistan is a challenging conundrum, Pakistan is the puzzle nested within the enigma that relates directly and inexorably to security and stability in Afghanistan.” After asking whether Pakistan is “With Us or Against Us?” in Chapter 3, he concludes that the Pashtun Belt in Pakistan is “Hard and Not Hopeful” in Chapter 5. The more one learns of Pakistan, here and from other sources, the more discouraging—and more correct—this conclusion appears.

Cassidy is on firm ground when he notes that “Very few counterinsurgencies throughout history have met with success when the insurgents have benefited from unimpeded sanctuary and external support.” Given that fact and Pakistan’s long track record of perfidy, it is hard to echo Cassidy’s cautious optimism about “being more sanguine, albeit in a qualified way” about Pakistan’s willingness to stop supporting, much less begin fighting against, the Taliban who pass freely from the Federally Administered Tribal Areas into Afghanistan and back.

The last chapter of *War, Will, and Warlords* is a history of the ISAF Joint Command (IJC) titled “Operational Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan until 2011.” While Bob is somewhat more impressed with the significance of the IJC’s contributions than am I, his first-person and on-the-ground perspective make this chapter—like the book as a whole—a significant contribution to the analysis of America’s longest war, regardless of the fact that it remains too soon for even the most perspicacious interlocutor to conclusively determine the ultimate trajectory of the conflict.
David Crist’s *The Twilight War* is a methodical and comprehensive description and analysis of the US-Iranian relationship from the 1979 Iranian revolution until the first three years of the Obama administration. As such, it is an important contribution to the effort to understand the US-Iranian relationship which comes at a time when serious commentators throughout the world routinely speak of the possibility of war between the two nations. Crist is particularly qualified to write this study as a US government historian who wrote his doctoral dissertation on this subject and continued his research on this subject for a number of additional years. He is also an officer in the US Marine Corps Reserve with extensive Middle East service and the son of a former commander of US Central Command (USCENTCOM). As preparation for writing this book, he conducted a substantial number of interviews with US government officials involved in formulating Iranian policy, including many people at the top level of the policymaking process. He also made extensive and productive use of large numbers of declassified documents. The result of this effort is a masterpiece, developed through his skills as a historian as well as his understanding of US governmental processes and military operations and strategy.

Throughout the work, Crist notes the activities and views of various personalities in the White House, the State and Defense Departments, USCENTCOM, and other organizations involved in formulating and implementing Iran policy. An additional strength of the book is Crist’s discussion of efforts by various regional allies to influence US policies toward Iran. Saudi Arabia is a particularly important player in this effort, although a number of other regional countries including Israel have sought to influence Iran policy as well. More to the point of the title, Crist uses declassified information to provide surprisingly comprehensive discussions of US espionage and covert actions in Iran as well as the activities of the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS). He further provides an extensive and fine-grained analysis of the numerous confrontations at sea between US and Iranian naval forces as well as Iranian-sponsored terrorist attacks against US targets in Lebanon. All of this is done with a straightforward and compelling writing style.

The actions of the Reagan administration consume a significant portion of this work. There are some solid intellectual reasons for this approach, since the 1980-88 timeframe witnessed a prolonged US confrontation of an energized Iran as well as the Iran-Iraq War. This was also one of the most critical eras for individuals in both nations to decide if reconciliation was possible or not. The Reagan administration leadership, especially the president, basically believed most of the problems the United States faced overseas resulted from the efforts of the Soviet Union. The US administration correspondingly viewed Iranian
events through the filter of the Cold War, and Reagan had hoped the two religious nations could align against the Soviets. This improvement of relations clearly did not occur, and the two countries instead entered into a quasi-war involving confrontations at sea, armed clashes involving Iranian proxies in Lebanon, and extensive efforts at covert action. Yet Reagan was never fully prepared to give up on Tehran and is described as deeply hopeful that the secret supply of weapons provided to Iran during the Iran-Contra Affair could yield important results. Instead, the initiative declined into nothing more than a weapons-for-hostages swap and then a major political scandal. Future presidents would take these events as a warning of the dangers of dealing with Iran.

Crist also writes a valuable and insightful account of the relations between later administrations and Iran, but his access to declassified source material clearly thins out over time. President George H. W. Bush is portrayed as cautiously seeking improved relations with Tehran for some of the same reasons as the Reagan administration, but mutual suspicions made this effort impossible and the president backed away from promised goodwill gestures that were to follow the release of remaining US hostages in Lebanon. President Clinton and Iranian President Khatami also showed some interest in accommodation, but Khatami was too internally weak to respond to the modest American hints about improving relations. Things changed again after Clinton left office. Relatively early in his administration, President George W. Bush included Iran in a rhetorical “axis of evil.” This statement took the Iranians by surprise since they had been working in tandem with US interests in Afghanistan, and did not expect such a harsh denunciation from the administration. The rapid defeat of Iraq’s conventional military in 2003 also alarmed the Iranians and caused them to show an increased interest in a rapprochement with the United States. Such a rapprochement had no appeal for the Bush administration, which expected US interests to be secured by a post-Saddam, democratic Iraq that would inspire other Arab nations and Iran to overthrow undemocratic leaders. The administration, therefore, rejected the concept of dialogue on the basis of neoconservative ideology, although it remains uncertain what accommodations Iran would actually make. According to Iranian documents provided through Swiss intermediaries, they were prepared to give up a great deal, but these suggestions of accommodation were never tested. Also, as the United States became more bogged down in Iraq, the Iranians became much less fearful that they faced a serious threat from the United States. Their interest in an accommodation declined accordingly.

President Obama came into office openly hoping to improve US-Iranian relations but eventually shifted to a policy of sanctions and preparations for war, which Crist describes as “a policy nearly identical to that of his predecessor.” Crist does not directly assert US involvement in the Stuxnet computer malware attack on Iranian sites as David Sanger does in Confront and Conceal, but he does state that “[s]ecurity experts believed the evidence pointed to a joint US and Israeli program.” Obama had initially hoped that Iran might be willing to respond to his entreaties for better relations with at least some limited gestures of goodwill, but Tehran chose instead to behave in ways that the US State Department described as “disappointing and unconstructive.” Crist, nevertheless, identifies Obama’s policy of seeking negotiations as a much more
sophisticated approach than has been widely realized. Once the initial policy of diplomacy failed to gain the desired results, Obama’s credibility in seeking global sanctions against Iran was dramatically greater. Thus, the United States and Iran were again locked in a hostile relationship that threatened to become more difficult as the Iranians continued to move forward on a nuclear capability.

Crist’s book does not end optimistically. He suggests that anti-Americanism remains a pillar of the Iranian government policies and that this approach is unlikely to change while members of the revolutionary generation remain in power. But does that mean that war is inevitable or even likely? Crist’s study ended long before the most recent policies of economic sanctions really caught fire. Obama has now applied a very serious stick, and Iran can hardly ignore its contracting economy or the significant drop in the value of its currency. While anti-Americanism may be popular among the Iranian leadership, economic misery may be even more unpopular than agreeing to US demands on nuclear weapons issues. The shah of Iran was overthrown in 1979 partially because he lost the support of the urban poor. These people are now struggling under sanctions, although not starving due to the artificially low price of staple foods. The lesson of a discontented underclass would not be lost on the revolutionary generation, and the rise of new and more pragmatic Iranian leaders is also at least vaguely possible. Meanwhile, the United States and Iran remain engaged in something at least akin to a twilight war.
THE RISE AND FALL OF AMERICAN MILITARY POWER

Drift: The Unmooring of American Military Power
By Rachel Maddow

Reviewed by Colonel Charles D. Allen, USA Ret., Professor of Leadership and Cultural Studies, US Army War College.

Rachel Maddow is probably the best well-known woman commentator in the twenty-first century. Host of The Rachel Maddow Show on MSNBC, her brand is one of biting humor and striking analysis from a liberal perspective. I expect she would be amused and flattered that a review of her book, Drift, is included in Parameters. To dismiss Maddow out-of-hand as a liberal policy wonk would be imprudent given her credentials as a Rhodes Scholar who holds a Doctorate of Philosophy in Politics from Oxford University.

Drift is her first book and could easily have been written as a string of half-hour commentaries on the state of the US military. Given the nine chapters with prologue and epilogue, this would fit the format of a week-long series for her news show. As the “Unmooring” title suggests, Maddow’s premise is the manifestation of American military power is insufficiently linked to the national discourse on its use. Her concerns are American military power has migrated from that envisioned by the founding fathers, debate between the executive and legislative branches on its use is ineffective, and, perhaps most important, there is a dangerous lack of engagement and accountability with the American people.

Accordingly, Maddow opens the book with a 1795 quote from then-Congressman (and “Father of the Constitution”) James Madison, “Of all enemies to public liberty, war is, perhaps, the most to be dreaded. . . . War is the parent of armies; from these proceed debts and taxes. . . . In war, too, the discretionary power of the Executive is extended . . . and all the means of seducing the minds are added to those of subduing the force of the people.”

Her focus is on military power that emerged with the national experience of the Vietnam War. Two key items sprung from that conflict—the restructuring of the Army Guard and Reserve by then-Chief of Staff Creighton Abrams and the War Powers Resolution of 1973—serve as the foundation of Maddow’s discourse on the American attitude toward persistent conflict and war. She contends it is, “as if peace . . . made us edgy, as if we no longer knew, absent an armed conflict, how to be our best selves.”

Her analysis of modern US history has four main tenets that interested this reviewer, which individually and collectively decoupled the US military from its society. The reforms of General Abrams were designed to ensure that citizen-soldiers were inextricably bound to deployments for major military operations, such that when the president and Congress committed to war, the nation was also committed across a wide swath of its population. Concurrently, the War Powers Resolution was a clear attempt by Congress to check the presidential power to commit US forces without informing Congress and obtaining its authorization. While enacted during the term of a Republican president (Richard Nixon), the challenge to executive power existed prior to and since with
presidents of both political parties. Maddow provides several examples from Grenada, Iraq, and Bosnia to contemporary operations.

The restructuring of the US military as a volunteer force with limited numbers to perform the “inherently governmental in nature” functions of warfighting led to the understandable emergence of outsourcing other functions with programs such as the Logistics Civilian Augmentation Program (LOGCAP). The use of contractors has become an accepted practice where the number of contract personnel (those that can be counted) routinely exceeds the number of deployed uniformed servicemembers in the operations of the past two decades. Maddow has two issues with this—first, this shadow military in the guise of contractors exists with little or no oversight and, second, its members are not held accountable for their misdeeds in theaters of operations. The results, she posits, is the president and Congress can deploy the military without directly affecting the majority of the US population. If uniformed members performed the contracted functions, then a larger number of reserve component servicemembers would be involved in military operations—hence, more “skin in the game” for our citizens. The last tenet is the overlapping responsibilities of warfighting between the US military, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the National Security Agency, where the latter two have little oversight from Congress and virtually no visibility with the American people who fund their operations.

Conservatives will take issue with Maddow’s deconstruction of President Ronald Reagan, who is their icon of executive leadership and power. Military readers may be uncomfortable with her examination and critique of military operations over the past two decades. The value of Maddow’s work is the presentation of facts and her journalistic interpretation of their impact. The reader may be distracted by quips and stinging commentary—focus instead on the themes and the logic of her argument. This reviewer found several parallels to the analysis and conclusions of conservative scholar Andrew Bacevich in his *The New American Militarism: How Americans Are Seduced by War* (see *Parameters* review Winter 2005-2006).

What we see is the incremental adjustment of policy to adapt to changing environmental conditions and to address existing problems. The rationale for individual decisions are understandable—presidents want the power to respond to developing problems and crises, senior military leaders seek to have the will of the nation (read people) supporting the force, and both civilian and military leaders have been educated to protect core competencies by otherwise sourcing enabling functions. The collective impact is a loosely coupled manifestation of military power in its institutional structure, its delineated responsibilities, and the national discourse of how it is applied.

Maddow effectively makes the case “drift” has occurred and provides the challenge to US leaders to examine our current position in the global landscape and, with intentionality, to firmly reattach the lines to our dock of national values and interest. As such, this book is a highly recommended addition to the library of national security professionals who value diverse perspectives and well-reasoned analysis.
Honor in the Dust: Theodore Roosevelt, War in the Philippines, and the Rise and Fall of America’s Imperial Dream
By Gregg Jones

Reviewed by Leonard J. Fullenkamp, COL (USA Retired), Professor of Military History, US Army War College

America went to war in 1898 for a noble cause—to lift the yoke of Spanish colonial oppression from the peoples of Cuba and the Philippines. Although ill-equipped for expeditionary warfare, the United States Army, Navy, and fledgling Marine Corps, managed in short order to deploy forces sufficiently capable of securing victories in both the Caribbean island and distant archipelago in the Pacific. Flush with the spoils of its easy victories, the United States quickly installed a compliant government in the Philippines, with the objective of developing the former Spanish colony into a distant outpost from where parochial national interests could be looked after. Filipino nationalists, led by Emilio Aguinaldo, objected to the replacement of one colonial power with another, sparking an insurgency that spread throughout the islands. Years of counterinsurgency warfare followed, during which time American values were sorely tested as allegations of torture and brutality toward enemy soldiers and the civilian population who supported them became a daily staple of reporting in the newspapers of William Randolph Hearst and Joseph Pulitzer. American honor, so highly trumpeted at the onset of the war, became mired in the dust of discouragement and disappointment as victory in the war against the insurgents proved elusive.

Gregg Jones’s account of America’s well-intentioned, but ill-fated, experiment with colonialism is told in a narrative style that reminds the reader of the author’s roots as a journalist. There is much in the story that appeals to these sometimes prurient instincts, such as the prologue, which begins with a vivid description of US troops using a form of interrogation euphemistically referred to as “the water cure” on a suspected insurgent. From the outset it is clear that Jones finds many parallels between the War in the Philippines and America’s experiences in later wars in general, and the Global War on Terror in particular.

For many readers this will be an introduction to a forgotten chapter in our nation’s history. The book begins with an overview of events leading to the outbreak of war; fighting in Cuba, to include an account of Roosevelt’s Rough Riders and Kettle Hill; and Dewey’s defeat of the Spanish navy in Manila Bay. With the onset of a counterinsurgency campaign, the narrative gathers a momentum that carries through the rest of the book. How American values fell victim to the charges that would tarnish the nation’s honor is the question Jones finds morbidly interesting. In short, at the tactical level of war, the answer lies with badly trained and poorly led troops confronting an unfamiliar style of warfare and resorting to brutal tactics, including torture, in their efforts to defeat the insurgents. At the strategic level, the explanations are far more complex, involving a moral struggle over American values and interests. The fighting in the Philippines leads to a war of ideas and values, where factions within Congress, the press, and interest groups
collectively known as Imperialists and Anti-Imperialists, debate the wisdom, legitimacy, and morality of a minor war in a distant land.

Jones finds all this fascinating and his enthusiasm for the subject infuses the narrative. His accounts of soldiers and marines burning villages, shooting unarmed insurgents, and torturing suspects for information crackle with an energy common to investigative journalism. Is he, the reader is given to wonder from time to time, commenting on some aspect of the counterinsurgency effort in the Philippines, or none too subtly inviting us to consider our recent experiences in the Global War on Terror, with its allegations of water boarding, civilian casualties and collateral damages, and the untidy and seemingly open-ended commitment to an endeavor of an uncertain and perhaps unwise outcome? Intended or not, one finds in Honor in the Dust familiar parallels with America’s experiences in Vietnam, Somali, Iraq, and Afghanistan. They all started so well and ended so badly. Why did we not know better? Haven’t we been there before?

For many readers this will be their first encounter with the history of this period, which is an unfortunate commentary on so many levels. For most, this will inform them on an obscure chapter of American history. Military readers with more than casual interest in counterinsurgency would do well to look to the expert on this period. Professor Brian Linn’s The Philippine War, 1899-1902 is without doubt the best, most informed, and balanced account of America’s effort to subdue the Philippine insurgents. Linn’s account of the fighting is sophisticated, nuanced, and brimming with insights on counterinsurgency warfare.

As the subtitle suggests, there is more to this book than a discussion of the war itself. Theodore Roosevelt, whose rise to national prominence catches fire on the notoriety he gained for his heroic exploits in Cuba, transformed success on the battlefield into success in politics. When the assassination of William McKinley catapulted him into the White House, T.R. was left to grapple with the untidy, unconventional war he had helped create. Domestic politics, and the struggle between the Imperialists and the Anti-Imperialists, dominates the last quarter of the book. Among the many interesting characters who shape the debate are Senators Albert Beveridge, Indiana, who gives voice to the Imperialists, and Massachusetts Senator George Frisbie Hoar for the Anti-Imperialists, a member of Roosevelt’s own political party who asserted that acquisition of territory by force of arms “has been the ruin of empires and republics of former times,” and, moreover, was “forbidden to us by our Constitution, by our political principles, by every lesson of our own and of all history.” One need only reflect briefly on the US war against Mexico to see the wind in his argument, though few at the time bothered to do so. The “yellow press” sorted out those for and against the war, and those for and against the factions. Roosevelt eventually tired of the war, but had to be led to an “honorable exit,” for which he was indebted to his brilliant Secretary of War, Elihu Root. For much of the material on Roosevelt, Jones looks to the work of Edmund Morris. Rightly, he recommends that readers with a taste for more on Roosevelt’s soldier exploits, as well as his direction of the war, his battles with Congress, and the opponents of imperialism, look to Morris’s three-volume biography on the twenty-sixth president.
If there is a disappointment with this book it is with the missed opportunity to introduce the reader to the transformational changes that took place within the Army as a result of the war. Two legacies of the Philippine War are with us today. Intent on reducing the influence and authorities of the Commanding General of the Army, Nelson Miles, with whom Roosevelt was at odds over the handling of reports of “torture, summary executions, and other extreme actions by US soldiers in the Philippines,” the President transformed the Army’s senior general officer from a Commanding General to Chief of Staff to the Secretary of War. Jones glosses too quickly over this bit of bureaucratic maneuvering and fails to see its significance. The second missed opportunity is particularly glaring to this reviewer as Jones makes no mention of the creation of the Army War College as a direct result of the shortcomings in preparing for, executing, and ending the Philippine War. Secretary of War Root was dismayed that the superb Union Army of 1865, capable of fighting distributed, long-duration operations, over vast distances, had simply dissolved in the decades after the Civil War, taking with it the hard-learned insights and lessons so painfully acquired during the war. Root, determined not to repeat the errors of the past where knowledge and experience was allowed to evaporate, ordered the establishment of the Army War College, where professional officers would meet and discuss what he referred to as the three great problems of war—command, strategy, and the conduct of military operations—three subjects that still form the basis of the War College curriculum. Moreover, it is from Elihu Root that the Army War College received its motto, “Not to promote war, but to preserve peace.” The scaring experiences of the Philippine War shaped Root’s views, and those in turn shaped the Army War College.

Jones can be forgiven for overlooking these opportunities. *Honor in the Dust* is a readable, interesting, entertaining, and cautionary account of yet another of America’s forgotten wars. As such, I recommend it.
**U.S. Army Doctrine: From the American Revolution to the War on Terror**

By Walter E. Kretchik

Reviewed by Dr. John A. Bonin, Professor of Concepts and Doctrine, US Army War College

*K.S. Army Doctrine: From the American Revolution to the War on Terror* is an ambitious book. Walter Kretchik attempts to capture a previously ignored complex and esoteric subject in a comprehensible manner. He is a member of a small group of contemporary military historians who are unafraid to study previously unappealing topics in institutional history, in this case, Army doctrine. Kretchik is a retired Army officer and an associate professor of history at Western Illinois University.

Kretchik seeks to provide an overview of the US Army’s dominant doctrinal publications and some of the individuals who shaped its operations from 1779 to 2008. Kretchik considers doctrine to be a subcategory of military literature distinguished by two characteristics: approval by a government authority and mandatory use. As an approved and prescribed publication, doctrine stands juxtaposed to “informal practice” which evolves from custom, tradition, and actual experience. His primary focus is how Army leadership perceived the conduct of military operations, with less attention paid to administration or sustainment. The author acknowledges he does not consider every Army doctrinal publication during this long period, but establishes what constituted the service’s “keystone” manual during a particular era and judges its impact in preparing the Army to accomplish its mission.

Prior to 1779, no American warfighting doctrine existed as Colonial militia and Ranger units followed “informal practice.” According to Kretchik, General George Washington realized by 1778 that the Continental Army needed a standardized doctrine to regulate tactical warfare procedures. Baron von Steuben’s *Regulations for the Order and Discipline of the Troops of the United States Army* were approved by Congress in April 1779 and constituted the US Army’s first doctrine. Adaptations of French or Prussian tactics, essentially branch tactical drill manuals, constituted the first era of Army doctrine from 1779-1904. This changed in 1905 when the Root reforms fixed doctrinal responsibility with the new Army general staff. The *Field Service Regulations of 1905* shifted from pure tactical branch matters to regulating broader combined arms service behavior in the field, with the division as the basic combat organization. Post-World War I, the *Field Service Regulations of 1923* captured the lessons of that war and emphasized field forces within a theater of operations from groups of armies to divisions, while including considerations of tanks, the air service, and chemical weapons. On the eve of World War II in 1939, the Army split *Field Service Regulations* into three parts: FM 100-5, *Operations*; FM 100-10, *Administration*; and FM 100-15, *Large Units*. Unfortunately, from this point on, Kretchik only traces FM 100-5 and its successor, FM 3-0. In 1944, FM 100-5 became multiservice with the acknowledged requirement for mutual support from the Navy or Air
Force. Later, in 1962, Army doctrine in FM 100-5 became noticeably more multinational. General Donn Starry’s 1982 AirLand Battle version reversed the defensive posture of General William DePuy’s 1976 manual and assumed a more maneuver-oriented offensive stance. After 1991, and the end of the Cold War, Army FM 100-5, *Operations*, contained more interagency considerations. In addition, as a concession to the growth of joint doctrine in 2001, the Army renumbered FM 100-5 as FM 3-0, *Operations*. Overall, Kretchik believes that doctrine has served the Army well in preparation for conventional war, but the Army has noticeably neglected unconventional operations. General Petraeus’s FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, from 2006 was a notable exception.

While the research for this book is extensive, I believe Kretchik fails to completely identify the Army’s dominant publication in all eras. For example, he selects the *1891 Infantry Drill Regulations*, and its update the *1895 Infantry Drill Regulations*, as the keystone publication of its era. “Tactics were explained in clearer language.” He acknowledges, however, this manual deleted “divisional and brigade movements.” In addition, Kretchik didn’t consider the *1896 Drill Regulations for Cavalry* that described “independent cavalry” which had strategic raids among its missions. In addition, by not tracing the evolution of the 1939 FM 100-15, *Large Units*, or its successor doctrinal publication such as FM 100-7, *Decisive Force: Theater Army Operations* of 1995, Kretchik fails to adequately describe the evolution of the Army’s doctrine at the operational to theater strategic level, but instead follows the more tactically oriented FM 100-5/3-0 doctrinal evolutions. Unfortunately, Kretchik ended his account with FM 3-0, *Operations* of 2008 and thereby lacks the entire revision of Army doctrine started in 2010 and resulted in FM 3-0 split into Army Doctrinal Pub (ADP) 3-0 and Army Doctrinal Reference Pub (ADRP) 3-0, *Unified Land Operations* by 2012. Finally, Kretchik missed the increasing significance of FM 100-1, later FM 1 and now ADP 1, *The Army*. This has been the Army Chief of Staff’s personal document and now provides a superior presentation of the Army to external audiences than does ADP 3-0.

Regardless of this criticism, *U.S. Army Doctrine: From the American Revolution to the War on Terror* is a valuable book for serious students of the history of the US Army and a must for readers interested in the evolution of FM 100-5/3-0, *Operations*. However, what is still needed is a companion history of the evolution of the Army’s doctrine for larger units at the operational level.
All for the King’s Shilling: The British Soldier Under Wellington, 1808-1814
By Edward J. Coss

Reviewed by Colonel James D. Scudieri, Department of Military Strategy, Plans, and Operations, US Army War College

This volume is not another narrative history of Wellington’s Peninsular War. Rather, it is an analysis of the demographics and behavior of the famed British redcoats. The gist of Coss’s thesis is that these soldiers were not Britain’s societal rejects. Moreover, their unmatchable cohesion rested upon a loyalty and mutual trust developed within their small groups.

The book begins with the Duke of Wellington’s famous quote about his army’s common soldiers being the scum of the earth. Coss provides Wellington’s later observation in an endnote, i.e., that the Army had made fine fellows of them. However, this oft-quoted, initial comment forms the basis for the work’s thesis.

Coss has accomplished phenomenal research. He compiled a British Soldier Compendium with demographics on 7,300 soldiers, the great majority from line infantry regiments. He uses a three-tiered model of compliance theory developed by Steven Westbrook to help interpret this voluminous data for individuals and small groups. Coss places these statistics and interpretations in the larger sphere of British society, e.g., the severe stresses of industrialization and their costs, both individual and collective. No less than 78 tables accompany the text. These statistics range from the usual to analyze social origins and economic status to a fascinating, sweeping examination of soldiers’ nutritional intake. He admits that he cannot verify how many of the 7,300 served in the Peninsula between 1808 and 1814. This inability does not detract from the work, which is a micro-analysis of an army’s soldiery.

The work balances demographics with individual accounts, e.g., memoirs and journals. He is well aware of both their benefits and pitfalls. Coss focuses on one man in particular, William Lawrence, as a case study. His use of these primary sources is generally astute, and adds a genuinely human dimension. One caveat is that commentaries from soldiers in rifle and light infantry units do not represent “typical” soldiers.

He places his interpretation within the context of one the most concise analyses of the famed British two-deep line’s battle tactics in print, indicative of his effort to dissect this force in action. He agrees that the British possessed no such light troops to support that line until 1800. Such agreement should not dismiss the major accomplishments of British light troops in the previous century, especially as they often performed as both skirmishers and shock troops. He deals frankly and honestly, as best as the extant evidence permits, with the excesses in the hellish sieges of the Peninsular War.

The work’s comparative analysis states that the British Army of the Napoleonic Wars was unique with its life-long period of service for soldiers. Granted, the French term of service of 6 years became standard with the Jordan Law of 1798. The discussion omits the Russians, but they represent a stark difference. Indeed, the fatalistic farewell from
family, household, and village for a conscript was terminal in nature, given the term of service was 25 years. The Austrians conscripted for life. The reforms initiated by Archduke Charles reducing the term to 10 years in the infantry began in 1808. The Prussians, humbled and humiliated at Jena and Auerstädt in 1806, initiated necessary, but carefully and circumspectly, reforms afterwards.

The larger issue is that comparison of terms of service can skew perspective without a commensurate understanding of the effects. The allies changed recruiting practices well in the midst of prolonged conflict. There is no indication what proportion of soldiers served shorter enlistments or when. Such a study is certainly well beyond his scope, but an understanding is necessary for an effective comparison. The only release for lifers was death or incapacitation.

The British Army, conversely, went through the greatest fluctuations in strength upon the outbreak of war, only to shrink as dramatically at war’s end—as it had in previous conflicts. During the American Revolution, some 27 percent of British infantry were war-duration and three-year recruits. For the unprecedented effort against Napoleon, a force of just over 150,000 in 1804 exceeded 200,000 after 1807, surpassed 250,000 in 1813, fell to 233,852 in 1815, only to drop to an authorized 150,000 after Waterloo, a decrease of 38 percent—after the cumulative losses of nearly a decade of war against just the First Empire. Coss shows that only a quarter of the men opted for the optional 7-year term for soldiers after 1808, but there is no discussion of the ramifications of the inevitable drawdown to which the British Army had become accustomed. Some life-long recruits were not. There remain questions on the wider impacts of resort to the militia as a recruiting pool for transfers, whether a substitute or not.

The work exhibits some hyperbole due to excessive focus on the demographic statistics with the small-group dynamics. Richard Holmes in Acts of War (1985) and Holmes with John Keegan in Soldiers (1986) highlighted the paramount need for multiple factors to promote cohesion, obedience, and collective aggression vice apathy among soldiers’ groups. M. Snape in The Redcoat and Religion (2005) covers the period of “horse-and-musket” warfare. J. E. Cookson’s “Regimental Worlds” in Soldiers, Citizens, and Civilians (2008) considered the range of experiences of British soldiers during the Napoleonic Wars. Coss may deem these interpretations excessive or flawed, but the monograph takes little account of them and none of religion as motivating, unifying, and steadying factors.

Philip Haythornthwaite in The Armies of Wellington (1994), Holmes in Redcoat (2001) and Haythornthwaite again in Redcoats (2012) are the latest recognitions of the social and economic qualifiers for the “lowly origin” of British rank and file. Wellington’s infamous comment reflected upon the army’s widespread looting when long out of action, at the expense of the wounded and follow-on operations after Vittoria. Moreover, he showcased the differences between Britain’s voluntary enlistment and European conscription. The fact only one quarter of British recruits took advantage of a 7-year vice life term of service after 1807 to take a bigger bounty is a telling commentary. How many faced pre- and post-war life in the Georgian workhouse was likely significant. These realities
reinforced society’s low regard for soldiers, an attitude which the British Army’s internal police function merely compounded.

There is insufficient consideration of institutional contributions to positive group behavior. There is no comprehensive commentary on the role of company and battalion officers to unit cohesion. Similarly, there is no assessment of the centrality of the British regimental system or the increased identification with the infantry division after 1810, the latter as presented by Antony Brett-James in *Life in Wellington’s Army* (1972). Conversely, Coss’s detailed account of periods of prolonged deprivation is telling yet hardly unique among the armies of the time and their predecessors for decades. Soldiering was a hard life. An old saying about campaigning in Spain was that small armies perished and large ones starved.

*All for the King’s Shilling* has blazed a new trail. It provides very detailed, demographic data set in a wider context. The major effort to link those statistics with the battlefield, behavioral dynamics, and small-group psychology makes it a praiseworthy contribution in multidisciplinary studies, but excessive in emphasis, at the expense of other evidence. The book is still a key monograph on the maintenance of an army during prolonged, major combat operations for a society with Anglo-Saxon political reservations on the nature of a regular, standing army—the essence behind voluntary recruitment vice conscription.
Are you thirsting to find evidence that Otto von Bismarck is the greatest master of state power politics of all time, and Neville Chamberlain the worst? You’ll find that and more in this rich anthology providing seven case studies on the forging—successful and un成功的—of grand strategy by statesmen over the ages.

Beginning with some “Thoughts on Grand Strategy” and how the phrase may be understood—the “intertwining of political, social, and economic realities with military power as well as a recognition that politics must, in nearly all cases, drive military necessity”—the collection of insightful essays first leads us to explore historical examples of ineffective strategic approaches.

Interestingly, an analysis of Louis XIV is the first such study, and it largely focuses on Louis’s strategic failure in abandoning alliances in favor of unilateral actions that overstretched his state’s resources and military, bearing striking resemblance to current US travails. “British Grand Strategy, 1933-1942” is another provocative case study underscoring what not to do, as it details Neville Chamberlain’s strategic blunder in focusing on preventing war even as Germany rearmed, ignored the Munich Conference, and marched on and occupied Czechoslovakia. Both are great lessons underscoring the importance of matching strategy with reality, and describing what happens when that does not occur.

Reversing course and providing examples in effective grand strategy, the authors then take us on a journey detailing the strategic acumen of Bismarck, Winston Churchill, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, and Harry Truman. From Bismarck’s diplomatic and military genius in establishing Prussia’s dominant power status in Europe, to Roosevelt’s decision in prioritizing the European theater over the Pacific, and finally to Truman’s containment policy, there is much to learn from what they got right, making this a valuable tome in the professional libraries of scholars and statesmen alike.

The authors, who comprise university professors and scholars alike, are compelling and thoughtful in their detailed analyses, and the implications for US grand strategy are clear, if not explicit. In the chapters detailing the reign of Louis XIV and the British strategic shift prior to World War I, references to US overstretch are plainly stated and mostly convincing. Also implied in the effective strategies of Roosevelt and Truman is the importance of prioritizing world challenges, though there are no notable recommendations given for US policymakers and thinkers today.

The authors are also careful to point out that grand strategy is largely determined by uncertainty, such that, in the words of Bismarck, “man
cannot create the current of events. He can only float with it and steer.” This is an important point that gains attention throughout the work. It is certainly nice to see an acknowledgement of the lack of control world leaders may have over their states’ affairs and the unpredictable dynamics of the international system, but if there is a shortcoming in this collection, it is in its almost apologetic tone for the predictive value of its own case studies.

For example, one editor observes that “conditions encouraging even the formulation, let alone the prolonged execution, of grand strategy as deliberate method seem to be uncommon at best, and even then impermanent.” The reader is first led to believe in the political talent of Bismarck only to be let down when he later learns that the Prussian leader’s artfully-constructed European balance of power was uniformly and unabashedly dismantled by Kaiser Wilhelm II. In the book’s summarizing chapter, we are told that only two of the seven cases—both involving the United States—suggest a deliberate, preconceived strategy that resulted from analysis of the challenge in question. The lesson all too frequently seems to be that successful grand strategy resides at the intersection of chance and luck, with intellectual prowess, vision, and leadership playing only a combined secondary role. This is a bitter pill to swallow for earnest visionaries.

Although it is quite evident the editors intended each chapter to be a stand-alone study in grand strategy (the book is wonderful for the university professor or military instructor in this regard), the organization of the anthology would likely benefit from smoother transitions. It is quite an intellectual jump from “The Grand Strategy of the Grand Siècle: Learning from the Wars of Louis XIV” at the beginning to “Harry S. Truman and the Forming of American Grand Strategy in the Cold War, 1945-1953” at the end. This is a lot of ground to cover in 269 pages, and it requires some mental agility from the reader, particularly with the rich and dense nature of each chapter. As Lieutenant Colonel Frank Slade, played by Al Pacino, says in Scent of a Woman, “Too big a leap for me right now, Charlie.”

All told, The Shaping of Grand Strategy is a worthwhile read, for both the historian and the strategist. Strong in theory and concrete in its examples, the work serves as a practical guide for avoiding the pitfalls of some and seizing on the attributes of others. It would be desirable to find a second volume of this work, perhaps with case studies examining the grand strategy—or lack thereof—of world players in the post-Cold War era. The authors have done a nice job of setting the conditions for such a follow-on work that could connect the dots between Bismarck and statesmen and women today who must strategize in a modern era when the nation-state lines are not as clear, and the role of nonstate actors is more prominent.
Foreign Powers and Intervention in Armed Conflicts
By Aysegul Aydin

Reviewed by CPT(P) Charles D. Lewis, Instructor of American Politics, Policy, and Strategy, Department of Social Sciences, United States Military Academy at West Point

Reasons are always abundant when the United States decides to intervene in an internal conflict. Politicians justify responses out of national interest. The media provide lasting images from the conflict, sometimes turning public opinion. International organizations react to violations of their laws or articles. While each reason might play a small role in intervention, Aysegul Aydin in Foreign Powers and Intervention in Armed Conflicts demonstrates domestic politics and economic concerns dominate intervention decisions.

Aydin advocates a framework emphasizing the role of domestic economic interests in international affairs. Viewing intervention through the lens of economic liberalism—explaining issues “around the core relationship of economic interests and their reflection on foreign policy through domestic political processes”—this book brings to the forefront internal dynamics in intervention. Beginning with the classification and definition of many frameworks, Aydin takes the reader through a literature review of scholarly intervention work to highlight liberalism as a substitute for realism. Shifting to quantitative data to stress the role of international trade, Aydin closes with a series of case studies highlighting the United States’ involvement in both civil wars and international conflicts.

For any reader outside the academic community, the beauty of the book does not appear until Chapter 5. The previous chapters present the reader with an exhaustive and dense theoretical framework that creates a link between economics and a state’s international role. Aydin then uses Chapter 2 to clarify multiple versions of intervention. Ranging from the classic response to war, to postconflict involvement to preserve peace, this chapter discusses the timing of the intervention, international law through the United Nations, and when coalitions are involved.

Once through the meticulous and tedious definition of intervention, Aydin breaks liberalism down in Chapter 3, “Defending Economic Interests Abroad.” Liberalism—at least to Aydin—is not meant to replace other theories, nor does it suggest that force must be eliminated from conflict. Instead, liberalism describes the circumstances surrounding the likelihood of force and highlights the relationship between foreign policy and economic interests. This understanding comes from a “bottom-up view of political decision making” that identifies the fundamental role individuals and private groups play. While the influence individuals have on public policy and intervention might seem distasteful—especially given the effects of any intervention—this chapter clarifies the role of small groups in different types of governments. Overall, Aydin does an excellent job of highlighting the strengths and weaknesses of economic liberalism, but loses readers due to this section’s length, which would benefit from a consolidation of definitions.
Unfortunately, the reader turns the page to Chapter 4, "International Conflicts," and is faced with a slog of quantitative data. While empirical data is needed to prove the validity of Aydin’s hypotheses, the presentation challenges any reader unfamiliar with regression tables. As a result, the amount of models tested can overwhelm some and limits this book’s audience to only those familiar with, or interested in, these techniques.

The book closes strongly with a case study analysis as a test of Aydin’s theory. Aydin reengages readers by intertwining economic liberalism with a brief history of American intervention. Through cases on twentieth-century conflict, Aydin focuses on two themes of US involvement: containing regional aggressors who threaten stability and keeping “direct military involvement at the minimum level possible.” At first glance, the second theme appears weak but is later clarified as Aydin uses case studies to demonstrate influence through trade and ally relationships. Taking readers back through American history, Aydin uses Central American policy and Eisenhower’s actions in the Middle East to invite the reader back into this book. Readers in the defense community will appreciate the successful application of Aydin’s theory without the need to overemphasize quantitative data. In reading these cases, we come to understand the role trade and preserving the status quo plays in international policy.

Taking the case study analysis one step further, Aydin provides a chapter relevant to ongoing intervention debates in countries like Syria. Aydin ties together both quantitative and case study analyses to show that economic liberalism can also explain intervention in civil wars in Africa. Through this chapter’s analysis, the book provides the reader insight into the decline in international conflict and today’s increase in “civil violence.” Despite the change in the type of conflict, intervention still occurs through diplomacy to maintain the same themes—status quo and limited direct military intervention—potentially explaining current American policies.

Not for all readers, Foreign Powers and Intervention in Armed Conflicts provides an economic view of intervention where states try to limit involvement until conflict affects the public good. Not quite providing the reasons most Americans are used to hearing on the nightly news, Aydin’s book is also not what the reader expects when picking up a book this size. While the book would benefit from combining the data with the case studies, Aydin’s economic liberalism proposal provides another alternative to when countries intervene, allowing the defense professional to add another perspective.
Beyond Guns and Steel: A War Termination Strategy
By Dominic J. Caraccilo

Reviewed by Major Ruth A. Mower, Instructor of International Relations and Comparative Politics, Department of Social Sciences, United States Military Academy

As the United States continues to fight in the Global War on Terror over a decade after its start, Dominic J. Caraccilo’s Beyond Guns and Steel: A War Termination Strategy is long overdue and a welcome addition to the literature on war termination and conflict resolution. Much too often in today’s ambiguous operational environment America’s national command authority lacks concise strategic objectives, which is why the United States unfortunately finds it is merely conducting crisis management, at best resulting in a murky transition from conflict to peace. Colonel Caraccilo ultimately hopes that with his words the “fog of postwar” activities can finally lift.

While Colonel Caraccilo led multiple Army units in combat during Operation Iraqi Freedom, he noticed that a fine line existed between the tasks the military was expected to perform in comparison to those under the purview of civilian agencies and locally elected governance. Needless-to-say, a plan that went beyond simply defeating the enemy was not established prior to the start of the war in Iraq as Rajiv Chandrasekaran, Thomas E. Ricks, Bob Woodward, and many other authors have since revealed in embarrassing and excruciating detail. Therefore, Colonel Caraccilo asserts nations need a grand strategy when it comes to conflict: clear and concise objectives prior to the start of actual conflict should become a required part of the planning process and remain an absolute necessity.

To arrive at how nations can determine these objectives, Colonel Caraccilo first describes why nations choose to conduct war and what events usually occur that ultimately affect how and when nations decide to end conflicts. Specifically, Colonel Caraccilo defines and provides examples of the six general categories that war termination rationale fall under as devised by B. G. Clarke in his rational model for conflict termination. Colonel Caraccilo then maintains that ten additional categories dedicated to conflict resolution, instead of only the six which address war termination, should also be used by nations during initial planning phases to include: nation building, economic development, humanitarian relief, and establishing democratic nations just to name a few. Next, Colonel Caraccilo defines in great detail many of the strategic terms used when discussing war termination, as well as briefly discussing how strategy, grand strategy, policy, and strategic communications relate.

Colonel Caraccilo offers “good” examples of when nations successfully plan war termination, conflict resolution, and definitive exit strategies as a part of their formulation and execution of national policy. Positive case studies analyzed include: the United States’ Marshall Plan following WWII; Operations Just Cause and Promote Liberty as a part of American action in Panama; Operation Desert Storm; the Global War on Terror and its use of COIN theorems; Operation Iraqi Freedom; and even a non-US example involving Uruguay and the Tupamaro. Of
course, “bad” examples are also needed to help prove why the fusion of war termination and conflict resolution is so vital: the Korean War; the 1956 Suez Crisis; the Global War on Terror and its focus on ideology; US involvement in Vietnam, Somalia, and Bosnia; and America’s on-going involvement in Afghanistan. After these case studies, Colonel Caraccilo reveals how interagency inadequacies in the US government are the primary culprits as to why war termination and conflict resolution are often overlooked. Hence, Colonel Caraccilo stresses such agencies need to better nest their goals and objectives to observe and realize how these desired end-states relate to the nation’s grand strategy. Finally, Colonel Caraccilo describes how extensive interagency planning teams are needed to define how and when military transition after conflict should occur, which will also simultaneously address the frequent absence of a fully developed approach to conflict termination within America’s warfighting doctrine.

Colonel Caraccilo’s chapter on definitions, as well as the extensive list of references used throughout the book, are some of his work’s most impressive attributes; if one wishes to analyze any aspect of conflict resolution and war termination, this is the book to refer to to find pivotal publications on the matter, and to fundamentally understand government agencies’ jargon. Yet some of his case studies are a bit confusing since they tend to weaken his overall argument. How can the War on Terror, regardless of what aspect of it is analyzed, be considered both a success and a failure? Plus, why is Operation Iraqi Freedom presented in the introduction as a massive failure when it comes to war termination and conflict resolution, and then placed in the success chapter regardless if new, effective leadership is what helped bring the longer than initially expected war to a close? Additionally, the entire chapter on the categories of war termination seemed redundant; if the six war termination classifications of B. G. Clarke are widely accepted, more emphasis should have then been placed on why Colonel Caraccilo feels so strongly his additional ten categories for conflict resolution are more important even if frequently overlooked. Had Colonel Caraccilo cut this portion, he would have also had more space to dedicate to further enhancing his subsequent chapters.

While Colonel Caraccilo did touch on the fact that resources frequently dictate necessity, he can and should analyze in greater detail and define what America’s current grand strategic objectives are. Only when those objectives align with nation building, establishing democracy, humanitarian assistance, economic development, and the many other conflict resolution classifications that Colonel Caraccilo presents, will money transition from one national agency to another, thus lowering some of the competing interests that various components of the US government have. Then, many more levels of the American government might actually feel compelled to work toward both war termination and conflict resolution if and when the nation finds itself at war, which Colonel Caraccilo correctly highlights as one of the most pressing issues facing both military and civilian planners today.
**Contributor's Guidelines**

**Article Submissions**

The editor welcomes unsolicited works that adhere to the following criteria:

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<td><strong>Scope:</strong> The manuscript addresses strategic issues regarding the theory and practice of land warfare. Visit our website (<a href="http://www.strategic-studiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/">www.strategic-studiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/</a>) to gain a better understanding of our current editorial scope.</td>
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<td><strong>Audience:</strong> US Army War College graduates and other senior military officers as well as members of government and academia concerned with national security affairs.</td>
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