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Drones and US Strategy: Costs and Benefits
US Strategy and Nuclear Weapons
Grand Strategy in Theory and Practice

Special Commentary
American Landpower and Modern US Generalship by LTC David G. Fivecoat

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US Army War College Quarterly/Parameters, a refereed journal of ideas and issues, provides a forum for the expression of mature thought on the art and science of land warfare, joint and combined matters, national and international security affairs, military strategy, military leadership and management, military history, ethics, and other topics of significant and current interest to the US Army and Department of Defense. It serves as a vehicle for continuing the education and professional development of US Army War College graduates and other senior military officers, as well as members of government and academia concerned with national security affairs.
From the Editor

It is my pleasure and honor to become the new Editor of the US Army War College Quarterly, Parameters. I have had the privilege of serving in a military career of more than twenty years, and am a graduate of the US Military Academy, the US Army Command and General Staff College, and the US Army War College. I hold a doctorate in modern history from Princeton University and recently completed a Visiting Research Fellowship at Oxford University. My publishing history includes four books and numerous articles on contemporary strategic thinking, strategic theory, and military history. My aim is to provide topical forums for debating strategic issues of regional functional significance to landpower, and to offer critical commentary and reviews of the latest scholarship relevant to the discipline of strategic and defense studies. We will actively encourage debate and endeavor to bring the views of scholars and practitioners together.

Readers will see our use of forums expand in future issues. Our topics will include: “Women in Battle,” “US Strategy in Afghanistan: Successes and Failures,” “Landpower and Contemporary Military Interventions,” and “US Strategic Choices Regarding Iran.” The Quarterly will offer its readers alternative views on contemporary strategic topics, even if those views are not always diametrically opposed. We will have more commentaries and review essays. We will continue to foster debate and encourage discussion. Toward those ends, we welcome your comments, positive or otherwise, as do our authors. Our “Commentary and Reply” section will expand, and we will soon offer ways for readers to engage us online. Our readers will also note that we are evolving toward a more reader-friendly and researcher-friendly format. The point of these changes is to make the journal more versatile for those who use it. We welcome your comments on that as well. What will not change, of course, is the Quarterly’s insistence on high standards of scholarship. We believe that is the best way to keep faith with our readers and do justice to the issues that concern them.

The Winter-Spring 2013 issue of the Quarterly features three forums focusing on contemporary strategic concerns. The first of these, “Drones and US Strategy: Costs and Benefits,” offers some scholarly grounding for a topic that has recently exploded in the media. Articles in the New York Times, TIME, US News & World Report, The New York Review of Books, and elsewhere, have treated drones not only as if they were new, but as if their use by the United States has destroyed a de facto tactical balance. To put it in classical terms, David’s sling, or kel-ab, could once offset Goliath’s greater physical strength; but now Goliath, too, has a sling, and it appears to have a much longer reach and to be more accurate than David’s. Media attention has thus focused more on Goliath’s sling than on David’s kel-ab. The fact is drones are not new: US military and paramilitary forces have used them for more than a decade, as have many of America’s allies and partners. A variety of drones are available off the shelf, and terrorist groups and violent nonstate actors are already acquiring and using them. In reality, the employment of drones and other remotely controlled aerial vehicles has outpaced the efforts of defense scholars and legal advisers to develop parameters for their use—a point made by Alan W. Dowd’s article: “Drone Wars: Risks and Warnings.”

As further evidence of this gap, W. Andrew Terrill’s essay, “Drones over Yemen: Weighing Military Benefits and Political Costs,” highlights...
the military contributions drones recently made in Yemen. He also considers their political downsides, one of which is their potential to add to anti-Americanism. It is important to ask whether the image of the United States as a global power is enhanced or harmed by the use of instruments designed to perform remote surveillance and targeting, while keeping US personnel out of harm’s way. That topic is tackled by Greg Kennedy, “Drones: Legitimacy and Anti-Americanism,” who reminds us that new weapons usually challenge the martial status quo in some way, and consequently must weather questions of legitimacy. Such questions may have delayed the fielding of new weapons, but rarely prevented it. They may at some point temper the use of drones, but they will not halt it.

Closing out the forum is Jacqueline L. Hazelton’s article, “Drones: What Are They Good For?” which takes on first-order questions concerning the use of remotely controlled aerial vehicles. She classifies drones as a form of air power, though with greater flexibility in terms of loiter time, precision strike, and surveillance. She also reminds us that much of what we think we know regarding the efficacy of drone strikes rests on incomplete information. As more evidence becomes available, we may well have to revise our assumptions about what drones can actually accomplish as instruments of policy.

The second forum, “US Strategy and Nuclear Weapons,” takes up a familiar but no less important debate regarding the utility of nuclear weapons. Since the end of the Cold War, the deterrent value of nuclear weapons has been disputed, and they have drifted increasingly into what defense analysts call the “trade-space.” By incrementally reducing the nuclear inventory (minus the costs of doing so), analysts can free some defense dollars for use elsewhere. However, it has proved difficult to achieve consensus on what the optimum level of our inventory should be. This forum features two essays representing opposing poles in that debate. On one side is Ward Wilson’s article, “Rethinking the Utility of Nuclear Weapons.” On the other side is an essay by Bradley A. Thayer and Thomas M. Skypek, “Reaffirming the Utility of Nuclear Weapons.” Wilson argues that many of the popular assumptions about the deterrent value of nuclear weapons rests on outmoded historical interpretations, particularly concerning the surrender of Japan in 1945 and the Cuban missile crisis of 1961. These cases, as he correctly points out, have been under revision for some time. Of course, we ought to learn from the past—our own as much as others—and history is our primary vehicle for doing that. However, learning from the past means revising our knowledge as new historical evidence comes to light or new interpretations are advanced and successfully defended. History has never been synonymous with the past: it is, instead, our active interpretation of the past. History, in other words, is an open rather than a closed system. That means the lessons we draw from the past depend on changing variables. Thayer and Skypek maintain that the present alone provides sufficient evidence for the strategic value of nuclear weapons. Nonetheless, it is worth asking whether their views may also be influenced by history. Even if a world without nuclear weapons is “an unpleasant dream,” as the authors contend, we would do well to consider the extent to which some long-held facts of nuclear deterrence might rely on leaps of faith.
The third forum, “Grand Strategy in Theory and Practice,” considers the problems inherent in implementing strategy. Strategy is not difficult in theory: we identify our interests and match ends, ways, and means to advance those interests. Putting strategy into practice is, of course, another matter. The practice of strategy is difficult not only because of the influence of Clausewitzian friction, but also because it requires prioritizing one’s interests, which can make for difficult choices. Samir Tata’s article, “Recalibrating American Grand Strategy: Softening US Policies toward Iran in order to Contain China,” illustrates the problem quite clearly. If the United States were to pursue a policy of containment toward China, one of the ways it could do so is to leverage Chinese economic dependence on Iran. That, however, would require softening some US policies regarding Iran, which would in turn mean reprioritizing US interests in the region. Given that, many of the author’s recommendations will be a tough sell, though the resultant dialogue itself would have merit. Richard D. Hooker’s essay, “The Strange Voyage: A Short Précis on Strategy,” summarizes the many factors that make the implementation of strategy difficult. Yet, we might well ask whether the fundamental difficulty has less to do with the prevalence of strategic friction, as it does with the tendency, all too common among great powers, to try to preserve or advance too many interests.

This issue of the Quarterly also features a Special Commentary by Lieutenant Colonel David Fivecoat on “American Landpower and Modern US Generalship.” Fivecoat argues that, contrary to popular claims, the US Army since 9/11 has maintained an unspoken but rigid form of accountability, actually holding its combat division commanders to a higher standard than their peers. The journal closes out with informative book reviews in the following categories: Recent Works on Afghanistan, New Scholarship on the Fall of South Vietnam, New Perspectives on World War I, Insights from Political Science, and The Human Face of War.—AJE
Unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs) are the wonder weapons of today’s wars. UCAVs have been credited with striking the convoy carrying Moammar Qaddafi; killing al Qaeda’s Abu Yahya al Libi and Anwar al Awlaki; eviscerating the Taliban’s ranks and other militants in the Afghanistan and Pakistan (AfPak) theater; and hitting targets from Asia to Africa—all without putting pilots in harm’s way.

The drone revolution promises many benefits, but there are also drawbacks to this nascent unmanned air force—drawbacks that few policymakers have contemplated. Just as drone detractors need to acknowledge what UCAVs bring to the table, UCAV advocates need to acknowledge the negative implications of drone warfare.

Today and Tomorrow

Whatever one’s view of UCAVs, the appeal of drones is understandable. As an Air Force report concludes, drones “are not limited by human performance or physiological characteristics . . . extreme persistence and maneuverability are intrinsic benefits.” In other words, drones can handle what humans cannot—G forces and speed, tedium and boredom. Among the other “intrinsic benefits” of drones: they deprive the enemy of human targets; they don’t get tired or thirsty or hungry; they are relatively inexpensive; and with the coming of nuclear-powered drones, they offer the possibility of nearly endless above-target operation.

It is no surprise, then, that drones are beginning to dislodge manned aircraft from the crucial role they have played in warfighting since World War II. Consider some of the evidence:

- There has been a 1,200-percent increase in combat air patrols by drones since 2005.2

- In the past decade, the US drone fleet has swelled from 50 planes to 7,500, though the vast majority of these drones are not UCAVs.3 Still, drones represent 31 percent of the Pentagon’s air fleet.4

- America’s unmanned air force—including drones deployed by the military and the CIA—has struck targets in Pakistan, Iraq, Libya,

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2 “Flight of the drones,” The Economist, October 8, 2011.
Afghanistan, Yemen, Somalia, and the Philippines. UCAVs are so central to US efforts in Afghanistan and Pakistan that some observers have dubbed this front of the antiterror campaign “the drone war.”

- Referring to the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, then-Joint Chiefs Chairman Admiral Michael Mullen declared not long before he retired, “There are those that see the JSF as the last manned fighter or fighter-bomber.” Raising more than a few eyebrows, he added, “I’m one that’s inclined to believe that.”

Two factors are accelerating the use of drones: the public’s growing distaste for US casualties and the Pentagon’s shrinking share of the budget. Regarding the former, it pays to recall the American people’s tolerance for casualties has waxed and waned over the decades. They obviously have had a high threshold for casualties at times. For example, despite far higher casualty levels than recent conflicts, public support remained high throughout World War II and during much of Vietnam. However, that changed dramatically after Vietnam. The result was a quarter-century of push-button, almost-bloodless wars (at least for Americans), each conditioning the American people to expect less bloodshed than the previous conflict. This, in turn, conditioned political and military leaders to deliver more push-button, bloodless wars. The 9/11 attacks briefly broke this cycle, having an effect on the American public not dissimilar from the attack on Pearl Harbor. Consider a CNN poll conducted after 9/11 asking Americans if they would support military action even if it meant 5,000 American troops would be killed. As a sign of their grim, if ephemeral, determination, 76 percent said yes.

Of course, those attitudes have shifted, predictably, during what one observer calls “the wars of 9/11.” Land wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have been lengthy and costly, with 4,485 American troops killed in Iraq and more than 2,147 killed in the still-unfinished Afghanistan war, America’s longest shooting war. In the wake of Iraq and Afghanistan, it’s no coincidence that UCAVs are playing a central role in US military operations as Americans grow weary of war’s toll. Instead of putting boots on the ground in Libya, for example, Washington unleashed swarms of drones. In fact, the missiles that hit Qaddafi’s escaping convoy were fired not by an artilleryman marching through the desert or an F-18 pilot prowling overhead, but by a remote-control warrior sitting in the safety of a nondescript building outside Las Vegas. Annual drone strikes in Pakistan increased from one in 2004 to 117 in 2010, when they peaked. The Brookings Institution estimates that as many as 2,769 militants have been killed by UCAV strikes in Pakistan. Today, the frequency and

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ferocity of US drone strikes in Yemen are following the same escalating trajectory that characterized the drone war in Pakistan.

As to the Pentagon’s diminishing share of the budget, “Drones, Not Marines” blared one headline after President Barack Obama unveiled his plan for scaling-back the US military. Defending the president’s vision of a smaller military, The New York Times assured its readers that “Many of the challenges out there can be dealt with by air power, intelligence, special operations or innovative technologies like drones.”

Media outlets are getting their cues from the Pentagon. “As we reduce the overall defense budget,” outgoing Defense Secretary Leon Panetta explained, “we will protect, and in some cases increase, our investments in special operations forces, in new technologies like . . . unmanned systems.” Similarly, an Air Force report suggests that drones promote “the wisest use of tax dollars.” A typical Predator drone, for instance, costs $4.5 million, while an F-35 costs $159 million, an F-22 $377 million, and a B-2 nearly $2 billion. Moreover, training UCAV controllers costs less than a tenth what it costs to train traditional combat aviators.

In short, the emergence of an unmanned air force is not far away:

- In addition to its growing fleet of reconnaissance and surveillance drones, the Army’s Grey Eagle/Sky Warrior drone—sharing bloodlines with the Predator—has been deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Army is asking industry partners to develop a small, hand-launched drone that can strike targets six miles away.

- The Navy is testing a carrier-borne UCAV, the X-47B, which is being put through its paces aboard the USS Harry S. Truman. (Related, the Navy is also developing missile-laden robot warships, such as the unmanned surface vessel precision engagement module.)

- The Air Force envisions deploying swarms of drones networked together to “operate in a variety of lethal and non-lethal missions at the command of a single pilot”—as many as five drones per pilot.

- The Air Force wants America’s next-generation bomber, the Long Range Strike bomber, to be “optionally manned.”

- UCAVs equipped with “target-recognition systems” and “autonomous attack systems” are on the horizon.

- The Pentagon plans to double the drone fleet by 2020, as the size of

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15 “Flight of the drones.”
the manned bomber and fighter force shrinks.\textsuperscript{20}

- In 2011, the Air Force trained more pilots to fly drones than fighter and bomber pilots combined.\textsuperscript{21} The Air Force Academy class of 2011 was the first to graduate cadets with specialties in operating drones.

In fact, “Hundreds of Air Force pilots are transitioning to drones from traditional manned aircraft,” according to an F-15E pilot interviewed for this essay. An Air Force Academy graduate with 20 years in the Air Force, including hundreds of hours of combat, the pilot concedes that he is biased when it comes to the drone debate, before adding, “Many of the veteran pilots I know that transitioned to drones were effectively forced there by having few desirable alternatives.”\textsuperscript{22}

An Air Force report on drones concedes that growth in demand for unmanned systems has made relying on “experienced pilots” to fly drones “unsustainable.”\textsuperscript{23} So the Air Force is tasking personnel with no flight experience to drone operations, developing a pilot career field with specialized drone training “distinct from current manned aircraft pilot training” and planning to task multiple drones to a single operator.\textsuperscript{24} In addition, the Air Force envisions programs that will increase use of “computer-based training and virtual instruction. . . . The goal will be to move all Air Force UAS [unmanned aircraft systems] training programs to accomplish 75 percent of all training through self-study, allowing virtual instructors to introduce and practice mission tasks with students.”\textsuperscript{25} In other words, not only will the planes be unmanned and automated, so will the training.

War, as Michael Walzer observes, is “a human action . . . for whose effects someone is responsible.”\textsuperscript{26} Yet who is held responsible when a UAV or UCAV goes AWOL? This is not exactly a rare occurrence. AWOL drones have crashed in eastern Iran, collided with cargo planes, smashed into Djibouti neighborhoods, and veered so dangerously off course and out of control that manned jets have been dispatched to destroy them. The Air Force concedes that its Predator, Reaper, and Global Hawk drones crash more than any other aircraft—nine are lost for every 100,000 hours flown.\textsuperscript{27} And sounding more like a sci-fi magazine than a newspaper, The Washington Post reports that a Predator based in Djibouti “started its engine without any human direction, even though the ignition had been turned off and the fuel lines closed.”\textsuperscript{28}


\textsuperscript{22} Confidential interview conducted November 28, 2011; the name of interviewee is withheld by mutual agreement.


\textsuperscript{24} Ibid., 28; Rachel Martin, “Drone pilots: the future of aerial warfare,” NPR, November 29, 2011.


\textsuperscript{26} Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument With Historical Illustrations (New York: Basic Books, 1977), 15.


In short, drones have real technological limitations. These limitations, it seems, will only be amplified as (a) increasing numbers of nonpilots take the controls and (b) each drone operator is shouldered with an increasing number of platforms to operate. However, that is not stopping Washington from deploying more and more of these wonder weapons.

More Willing to Use

As Michael Ignatieff asked in 2000, years before the drone war began, “If war becomes unreal to the citizens of modern democracies, will they care enough to restrain and control the violence exercised in their name . . . if they and their sons and daughters are spared the hazards of combat?” That question is directly linked to policymakers in the drone age. The risks policymakers take with UCAVs are greater because the accountability is less than with manned aircraft. After all, the loss of a drone is the loss of nothing more than metal. “More willing to lose is more willing to use,” as Daniel Haulman of the Air Force Historical Research Agency puts it. Yet as America’s deepening involvement in Yemen underscores, drones may actually make boots-on-the-ground intervention more likely. To identify new targets and authenticate existing targets for the drone war, Washington has quietly sent US troops into Yemen. According to unnamed military officials, the contingent of American troops is growing. As the troops identify targets, they become targets. Thus, far from preventing more direct and riskier forms of military engagement, drones are encouraging such engagement—even as many of their operators paradoxically carry out their lethal missions from the safety of bases in Nevada or New Mexico.

Make no mistake: this is a good thing for the airmen kept away from harm; however, it may be a bad thing for our republic. Because UCAVs remove humans from the battlespace, they remove the unique characteristics humans bring to the battlespace: deliberation, doubt, fear, gut instinct, and judgment. We need humans in the battlespace, in harm’s way, not just because humans make better judgments than machines—judgment is a very human action—but because having humans in the battlespace can help the commander-in-chief make better judgments about when, where, and whether to wage war. The temptation to gain all the benefits of kinetic military operations with none of the costs, consequences, or risks may be too strong for the Executive branch to resist. Even if the Executive’s inclination toward war is not new—recall Madison’s letter to Jefferson noting how “the Executive is the branch of power most interested in war and most prone to it”—the prospect of risk-free war afforded by pilotless planes is.

This has been decades in the making, of course. From World War II to Desert Storm to the war on terror, the United States has grown adept at striking its enemies with increasing levels of precision and decreasing levels of risk to those pulling the trigger. But UCAVs erase the risk. And

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without it, there is one less check on the commander-in-chief’s war-making power. President Obama, for instance, has employed drones in Libya, Somalia, Yemen, Pakistan, and Iran in ways that he has not—and arguably would not—employ manned aircraft. The political cost at home—and diplomatic fallout abroad—is high when a commander-in-chief loses a pilot, but negligible when a commander-in-chief loses a pilotless drone. Just compare the nonreaction to the loss of drones in Djibouti, Iran, and the Seychelles under the Obama administration with the bona fide crises other presidents faced when US pilots were shot down over or near enemy territory. President Dwight Eisenhower weathered international humiliation after the Soviets brought down Francis Powers’ U-2. President John Kennedy was pressed to go to war when Rudolf Anderson’s U-2 was shot down during the Cuban Missile Crisis. President Bill Clinton had to deal with a hostage crisis at home when Michael Durant’s UH-60 Blackhawk was shot down in Mogadishu, and he was forced to mount a massive rescue operation into hostile territory when Scott O’Grady’s F-16 was shot down in Bosnia. In sum, the absence or presence of US personnel in a military operation dramatically changes the calculus of war.

Not only do UCAVs lower the threshold for going to war, they also may make it easier to keep wars going, as Paul Miller, a former National Security Council official, observes. Noting that “endless war is unacceptable and dangerous,” Miller argues that the institution of the presidency needs to answer an important question: “When, and under what conditions, will the U.S. government stop using drones to bomb suspected terrorists around the world?”

Thanks to drones, as Miller’s question suggests, “endless war” is quite possible. In this regard, it’s worth noting that the drone war is an outgrowth of Washington’s post-9/11 campaign against terrorist organizations and regimes—a campaign authorized by the Use of Force Resolution of 18 September 2001. That measure directed the president “to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons.”

That final clause referring to “future acts of international terrorism” creates a loophole larger than a Reaper ground-attack drone—with a wingspan of some 66 feet—a loophole that should be tightened through legislation focusing on threats beyond Afghanistan. After all, it would be a stretch to say that the 18 September measure authorized—11-plus years later—an autopilot war against targets in Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, and beyond. Those targets may indeed be enemies of, and threats to, the United States. But few of the drone war’s intended targets today—not to mention the unfortunates simply in the wrong place at the wrong time—“planned, authorized, committed or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001.” Underscoring this point,

The Washington Post recently reported that a growing number of drone strikes in Yemen have targeted “lower-level figures who are suspected of having links to terrorism operatives but are seen mainly as leaders of factions focused on gaining territory in Yemen’s internal struggle.” (Emphasis added.) Yet the drone war goes on, largely because there are no Americans in harm’s way—at least not directly.

Developing a Complex

If we argue that drone pilots are not in the battlespace, which seems reasonable given that most of them are 7,500 miles away from the enemy, it invites friend and foe alike to draw an unsettling conclusion about American power. An example from history may be helpful.

Amid the Allied bombing raids on Germany at the end of World War II, British physicist Patrick Blackett worried that London and Washington had developed a “Jupiter Complex,” which historian Paul Johnson describes as “the notion of the Allies as righteous gods, raining retributive thunderbolts on their wicked enemies.” The Allies concluded, as Johnson explains, that strategic bombing “was the best way to make the maximum use of their vast economic resources, while suffering the minimum manpower losses.”

UCAVs take the logic of the Jupiter Complex to its ultimate conclusion—maximum use of economic and technological resources with zero manpower losses and zero risks—all buffered by the virtual-reality nature of the delivery system. Just consider The New York Times depiction of the inner workings of the drone war, which describes President Obama as “at the helm of a top-secret ‘nominations’ process to designate terrorists for kill or capture,” authorizing every strike in Yemen and Somalia and “the more complex and risky strikes in Pakistan,” often deciding “personally whether to go ahead” with a drone strike, and acceding to a method for tallying civilian casualties that “in effect counts all military-age males in a strike zone as combatants . . . unless there is explicit intelligence posthumously proving them innocent.”

The results are not for the squeamish. The Brookings Institution estimates that, along with the 2,700-plus militants killed by drones in Pakistan, some 400 nonmilitants may have been killed. The use of drones to cripple al Awlaki’s Yemeni branch of al Qaeda killed dozens of people, many of them apparently not affiliated with al Qaeda, including a 16-year-old relative of al Awlaki born in Denver. (This incident raises due-process questions, just as the proliferation of drones deployed domestically raises Fourth Amendment concerns, but that is beyond the scope of this article.)

In short, it seems Washington has been seduced by the Jupiter Complex. Being seen in such a light—as detached and remote in every sense of the word, especially in waging war—should give Americans

38 Livingston and O’Hanlon, 32.
pause. “Reliance on drone strikes allows our opponents to cast our country as a distant, high-tech, amoral purveyor of death,” argues Kurt Volker, former US ambassador to NATO. “It builds resentment, facilitates terrorist recruitment and alienates those we should seek to inspire.” Indeed, what appears a successful counterterrorism campaign to Americans may look very different to international observers. “In 17 of 20 countries,” a recent Pew survey found, “more than half disapprove of U.S. drone attacks targeting extremist leaders and groups in nations such as Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia.” Moreover, a UN official recently announced plans to create “an investigation unit” within the Human Rights Council to “inquire into individual drone attacks . . . in which it has been alleged that civilian casualties have been inflicted.”

This is not to suggest that either side of the drone debate has a monopoly on the moral high ground; both have honorable motives. UCAV advocates want to employ drone technologies to limit US casualties, while UCAV opponents are concerned that these same technologies could make war too easy to wage. This underscores there exists no simple solution to the drone dilemma. Converting to a fully unmanned air force would be dangerous. Putting the UCAV genie back in the bottle, on the other hand, would be difficult, perhaps impossible.

There are those who argue that it is a false dichotomy to say that policymakers must choose between UCAVs and manned aircraft. To be sure, UCAVs could serve as a complement to manned aircraft rather than a replacement, with pilots in the battlespace wielding UCAVs to augment their capabilities. That does not, however, appear to be where we are headed. Consider Admiral Mullen’s comments about the sunset of manned combat aircraft, the manned-versus-unmanned acquisition trajectories, the remote-control wars in Pakistan and Yemen and Somalia, and President Obama’s reliance on UCAVs. Earlier this year, for instance, when France asked for help in its counterassault against jihadists in Mali, Washington initially offered drones. The next president will likely follow and build upon the UCAV precedents set during the Obama administration, just as the Obama administration has with the UCAV precedents set during the Bush administration. Recall that the first shot in the drone war was fired approximately 11 years ago, in Yemen, when a CIA Predator drone retrofitted with Hellfire missiles targeted and killed one of the planners of the USS Cole attack.

Given their record and growing capabilities, it seems unlikely that UCAVs will ever be renounced entirely; however, perhaps the use of drones for lethal purposes can be curtailed or at least contained. It is important to recall that the United States has circumscribed its own military power in the past by drawing the line at certain technologies. The United States halted development of the neutron bomb in the 1970s and dismantled its neutron arsenal in the 2000s; agreed to forswear

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chemical weapons; and renounced biological warfare “for the sake of all mankind.”

That brings us back to The New York Times’ portrait of the drone war. Washington must be mindful that the world is watching. This is not an argument in defense of international watchdogs tying America down. The UN secretariat may refuse to recognize America’s special role, but by turning to Washington whenever civil war breaks out, or nuclear weapons sprout up, or sea lanes are threatened, or natural disasters wreak havoc, or genocide is let loose, it is tacitly conceding that the United States is, well, special. Washington has every right to kill those who are trying to kill Americans. However, the brewing international backlash against the drone war reminds us that means and methods matter as much as ends.

Error War

If these geo-political consequences of remote-control war do not get our attention, then the looming geo-strategic consequences should. If we make the argument that UCAV pilots are in the battlespace, then we are effectively saying that the battlespace is the entire earth. If that is the case, the unintended consequences could be dramatic.

First, if the battlespace is the entire earth, the enemy would seem to have the right to wage war on those places where UCAV operators are based. That’s a sobering thought, one few policymakers have contemplated.

Second, power-projecting nations are following America’s lead and developing their own drones to target their distant enemies by remote. An estimated 75 countries have drone programs underway. Many of these nations are less discriminating in employing military force than the United States—and less skillful. Indeed, drones may usher in a new age of accidental wars. If the best drones deployed by the best military crash more than any other aircraft in America’s fleet, imagine the accident rate for mediocre drones deployed by mediocre militaries. And then imagine the international incidents this could trigger between, say, India and Pakistan; North and South Korea; Russia and the Baltics or Poland or Georgia; China and any number of its wary neighbors.

China has at least one dozen drones on the drawing board or in production, and has announced plans to dot its coastline with 11 drone bases in the next two years. The Pentagon’s recent reports on Chinese military power detail “acquisition and development of longer-range UAVs and UCAVs . . . for long-range reconnaissance and strike”; development of UCAVs to enable “a greater capacity for military preemption”; and interest in “converting retired fighter aircraft into unmanned combat aerial vehicles.” At a 2011 air show, Beijing showcased one of its newest

44 US Department of State, Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (BWC), April 10, 1972.
46 Jonathan Kaiman and Justin McCurry, “Japan and China step up drone race as tension builds over disputed islands (drone skirmishes?),” The Guardian, January 9, 2013.
drones by playing a video demonstrating a pilotless plane tracking a US aircraft carrier near Taiwan and relaying targeting information.\footnote{China building an army of unmanned military drones ‘to rival the U.S.,’” \textit{The Daily Mail}, July 5, 2011.}

Equally worrisome, the proliferation of drones could enable non-power-projecting nations—and nonnations, for that matter—to join the ranks of power-projecting nations. Drones are a cheap alternative to long-range, long-endurance warplanes. Yet despite their low cost, drones can pack a punch. And owing to their size and range, they can conceal their home address far more effectively than the typical, nonstealthy manned warplane. Recall that the possibility of surprise attack by drones was cited to justify the war against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq.\footnote{“A Policy of Evasion and Deception,” US Secretary of State Colin Powell’s speech to the United Nations on Iraq, \textit{The Washington Post}, February 5, 2003, http://www.washingtonpost.com.}

Of course, cutting-edge UCAVs have not fallen into undeterrable hands. But if history is any guide, they will. Such is the nature of proliferation. Even if the spread of UCAV technology does not harm the United States in a direct way, it is unlikely that opposing swarms of semiautonomous, pilotless warplanes roaming about the earth, striking at will, veering off course, crashing here and there, and sometimes simply failing to respond to their remote-control pilots will do much to promote a liberal global order.

It would be ironic if the promise of risk-free war presented by drones spawned a new era of danger for the United States and its allies.
The future role of US drones has been the subject of considerable controversy due to their use in remote parts of the world to target individuals designated as terrorists. In his confirmation hearings, Secretary of State John Kerry expressed concerns about overseas perceptions of such activities by stating that, “American foreign policy is not defined by drones and deployments alone.” Additionally, within the United States, many issues surrounding drone use clearly need scrupulous legal and ethical consideration. Underlying all these factors, however, must be a consideration of the issue of military effectiveness. Regulating the use of a marginally valuable weapons-system is easy, while regulating a highly effective system in a way that forecloses options can be difficult since more is at stake. Careful consideration must be given to how effectively these systems can serve US interests as well as the negative consequences of overseas backlash to their use when evaluating their optimal place in US strategy.

In the case of Yemen, drones are not popular with the local population, but they do appear to have been stunningly successful in achieving goals that support the United States and Yemeni national interests by helping to defeat the radical group al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). This organization is one of the most successful affiliates of the original al Qaeda group led by Osama bin Laden until his death in 2011. AQAP became prominent in the early 2000s when it began terrorist operations in Saudi Arabia, though it was ultimately defeated in that country. Following this defeat, AQAP retained its name and regrouped in Yemen, merging with the local al Qaeda organization operating there in 2009. AQAP (which Yemenis simply call al Qaeda) has a recent history of challenging the Yemeni government as well as a long record of attempting to execute spectacular terrorist events in the United States. This agenda has made it vital for the United States to oppose AQAP and help the Yemeni government in a variety of ways, including drone use, when appropriate.

Clearly fearing a domestic backlash, former Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh, who remained in office until early 2012, consistently denied his government was allowing the United States to conduct drone operations over Yemen. Saleh’s denials regarding drones could hardly be considered credible since some extremely high profile strikes occurred while he was president. Of special importance was a successful February 2002 missile attack on six senior al Qaeda terrorists in Yemen. The Saleh government originally claimed these individuals were killed in a Yemeni

Air Force bombing attack, but this story unraveled after a senior US official revealed information about the drone strike during a CNN interview. In response to domestic pressure created by the CNN disclosure, Saleh eventually acknowledged that the February 2002 strike was conducted by a US drone, but he did not admit to any later strikes by the time he left power ten years later. The president’s continuing denials were almost universally disbelieved as there had been numerous Yemeni and international news reports of US drone warfare against AQAP, often citing seemingly credible sources on background. These press reports included a discussion of a fatal September 2011 US drone attack on AQAP planner Anwar al Awlaki. In response to such information, Saleh went so far as to claim that Yemeni forces had killed Awlaki, although virtually no one took such statements seriously. In sharp contrast to Saleh, current Yemeni President Abed Rabbu Hadi has spoken glowingly of US drones used in Yemen, describing them as an effective way to strike the enemy while minimizing collateral damage to innocent civilians through precision strikes. Despite Hadi’s assurances, drone use remains a hotly contested domestic issue in Yemen.

Achievements in Yemen Enabled by Drones

The history of US drone activity in Yemen is still subject to considerable secrecy and cannot be written in full until more information has been declassified and released. Nevertheless, there are a number of known examples where drones appear to have made a significant difference in helping the Yemeni government cope with AQAP while reducing that organization’s ability to conduct international terrorism. Two of these instances are especially compelling and deserve special consideration. They are:

(1) the September 2011 death of terrorist leader Anwar al Awlaki, and

(2) the use of drones to support Yemen’s May-June 2012 offensive against AQAP insurgents and members of the AQAP insurgent organization, Ansar al Shariah, which by early 2012 had seized power in a number of southern Yemeni towns and cities.

The death of Awlaki in a drone strike is especially informative when considering the value of these systems. Despite Awlaki’s US citizenship,

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2 This strike occurred before AQAP was founded as a separate organization in its current form. See Victoria Clark, *Yemen: Dancing on the Heads of Snakes* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2010), 195-196.


6 For a key example of AQAP directing actions by Ansar al-Shariah see “Militants free 73 captured Yemen troops,” *Gulf Times*, April 30, 2012.

7 Awlaki’s death is almost universally treated as the result of a drone strike throughout the media, and no credible alternative explanation has been proposed. Nevertheless, while President Obama has stated that Awlaki’s death was a “major blow” to AQAP, his administration has never formally stated that the United States eliminated him or that it used a drone to do so. Many observers attribute this approach to a U.S. willingness to support Saleh’s policies on secrecy. See “Remarks by the President at the ‘Change of Office’ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Ceremony,” September 30, 2011, http://www.whitehouse.gov.
President Obama was reported by *Newsweek* to have considered him a higher priority for capture or elimination than Ayman al Zawahiri, bin Laden’s replacement as the leader of “al Qaeda central.” Federal prosecutors, in a case involving an alleged Awlaki associate, maintain that he was the mastermind behind a variety of terrorist activities including the 2009 “Christmas bomber” plot. In this effort, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, a terrorist operative and Awlaki “student” attempted to demolish a Detroit-bound passenger jet that left Amsterdam with 280 people aboard. This plan failed, and Abdulmutallab was badly burned when a bomb sewn into his underwear did not detonate properly. He was then restrained by airline personnel and arrested when the aircraft landed. This unsuccessful plot appears to have had the diabolical purpose of provoking US leadership to invade Yemen in response to these innocent deaths. Such an intervention with ground troops could have produced catastrophic results. Yemen is a highly nationalistic country of 24 million people and 60 million firearms. Any intervention there could last for years and expand rather than diminish the ranks of AQAP. This disaster was well worth avoiding on both foreign policy and humanitarian grounds.

Another important, but less well-known, series of events relevant to these controversies involves what is believed to be the extensive use of drones to support a critical Yemeni government offensive against AQAP in May-June 2012. At this time, President Hadi unleashed an offensive against AQAP forces which had seized significant territory within several southern provinces and were administering them in what one AQAP leader described as “the Taliban way.” AQAP had been able to seize these areas due to the disorder in the Yemeni government brought about by a strong popular movement involving huge public demonstrations, against the regime of President Saleh. This movement was inspired by the “Arab Spring” revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt, but unlike those countries, the old regime in Yemen took more than a year to fall. When President Saleh did resign after 33 years in power, Yemen was left with a number of challenges resulting from government paralysis during the grinding effort to remove him. In addition, the military was deeply divided between pro-Saleh and anti-Saleh factions that had, on occasion, skirmished with each other and inflicted some casualties during the last year of the Saleh regime.

While military fragmentation was deep in the army, the situation in the air force had an additional complication. Large elements of this service were conducting a labor strike when President Hadi entered office due to severe problems with their pay. In Yemen, military pay passes through the hands of senior officers before it reaches service-members and is sometimes skimmed. Strikers claimed that former

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President Saleh’s half-brother, General Mohammed Saleh, the air force commander, had diverted large amounts of their pay to himself and his cronies making it difficult for them to survive.\textsuperscript{13} While Hadi relieved General Saleh from command in March 2012, the general resisted his removal and briefly ordered loyal troops to occupy and close Sanaa International Airport.\textsuperscript{14} When Hadi refused to compromise, the erstwhile air force commander backed down and left his position. General Saleh’s April departure ended the mutiny, but it is difficult to believe that the air force was up to its full operational capability by the time the offensive began less than a month later.\textsuperscript{15} Despite these problems, Hadi was not prepared to wait until the military could be rebuilt before liberating the southern territories controlled by AQAP. The situation in south Yemen was such that he saw a near-term military offensive as urgent.

At the beginning of President Hadi’s May offensive he, therefore, had a fractured army and a dysfunctional air force. Army leaders from competing factions were often disinclined to support one another in any way including facilitating the movement of needed supplies. Conversely, the air force labor strike had been a major setback to the efficiency of the organization, which was only beginning to operate as normal in May 2012. Even before the mutiny, the Yemen Air Force had only limited capabilities to conduct ongoing combat operations, and it did not have much experience providing close air support to advancing troops. Hadi attempted to make up for the deficiencies of his attacking force by obtaining aid from Saudi Arabia to hire a number of tribal militia fighters to support the regular military. These types of fighters have been effective in previous examples of Yemeni combat, but they could also melt away in the face of military setbacks.

Adding to his problems, President Hadi had only recently taken office after a long and painful set of international and domestic negotiations to end the 33-year rule of President Saleh. If the Yemeni military was allowed to be defeated in the confrontation with AQAP, that outcome could have led to the collapse of the Yemeni reform government and the emergence of anarchy throughout the country. Under these circumstances, Hadi needed every military edge that he could obtain, and drones would have been a valuable asset to aid his forces as they moved into combat. As planning for the campaign moved forward, it was clear that AQAP was not going to be driven from its southern strongholds easily. The fighting against AQAP forces was expected to be intense, and Yemeni officers indicated that they respected the fighting ability of their enemies.\textsuperscript{16}

Shortly before the ground offensive, drones were widely reported in the US and international media as helping to enable the Yemeni


\textsuperscript{15} Ahmaed al-Haj, “Yemen air force ends mutiny on vow to oust chief,” The Daily Star, April 19, 2012.

\textsuperscript{16} “Al-Qaeda in Yemen on the run as military regains control over 2 of its strongholds,” The Washington Post, June 12, 2012.
government victory which eventually resulted from this campaign. Such support would have included providing intelligence to combatant forces and eliminating key leaders and groups of individuals prior to and then during the battles for southern towns and cities. In one particularly important incident, Fahd al Qusa, who may have been functioning as an AQAP field commander, was killed by a missile when he stepped out of his vehicle to consult with another AQAP leader in southern Shabwa province. It is also likely that drones were used against AQAP fighters preparing to ambush or attack government forces in the offensive. Consequently, drone warfare appears to have played a significant role in winning the campaign, which ended when the last AQAP-controlled towns were recaptured in June, revealing a shocking story of the abuse of the population while it was under occupation. Later, on October 11, 2012, US Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta noted that drones played a “vital role” in government victories over AQAP in Yemen, although he did not offer specifics. AQAP, for its part, remained a serious threat and conducted a number of deadly actions against the government, although it no longer ruled any urban centers in the south.

The Political Cost of Using Drones in Yemen

Despite their successes, the use of US drones is deeply unpopular with many Yemenis, and anger over their employment is one of the primary drawbacks to using these systems. One of the most important reasons for Yemeni anger is a concern about national sovereignty. There is clear psychological pressure on Yemenis in areas where drones routinely operate, and considerable resentment that a foreign power is able to target and kill individual Yemeni citizens. Some Yemenis claim to see or hear drones at least once a week in what can clearly be a psychologically chilling process. Additionally, in areas where AQAP may be present, people often fear gathering in large groups such as wedding parties due to concern that the group will be mistaken for an AQAP assembly. A further complication is that relatives of those killed in Yemen’s highly tribalized society usually consider their kin to be “innocent” or at least not deserving of death from the skies even if they are members of AQAP. A more exasperating problem is a bizarre conspiracy theory popular with ultra-conservative Yemeni tribesmen that suggests drones are taking pictures of their wives and daughters, a deeply offensive act within Yemeni culture.

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18 At this time Fahd al Qusa was believed to be the third highest ranking member of AQAP. Eric Schmitt, “Militant tied to Ship Bombing is Said to be Killed,” The New York Times, May 7, 2012.
23 Ibid.
In a challenge to the sovereignty argument, President Hadi has strongly asserted that he makes the final decision on any drone strike that occurs within Yemeni borders, but it is not certain how many Yemenis actually believe him after Saleh’s long history of prevaricating on this topic.26 According to Hadi, US drone attacks on Yemeni targets are not allowed unless he first approves such strikes. The Yemeni president has, therefore, taken responsibility for the strikes while asserting that he does not allow the interests of the United States to supersede Yemeni interests. If a drone strike is not in the interests of Yemen, he refuses to authorize it.

Another reason for Yemeni anger is the widespread belief that drones produce a great deal of collateral damage and that many innocent people have been killed by these systems. Some innocents have clearly been killed, but US leaders including Senator Dianne Feinstein, Chair of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, have indicated that in recent years civilian death figures for each country where the United States operates drones are “in the single digits.”27 Systemic problems do, however, exist since it is sometimes difficult to discern AQAP operatives from other individuals simply on the basis of overflights. This issue is particularly problematic since many Yemeni civilians who have nothing to do with AQAP are armed, and some tribal forces have access to crew-served weapons including machine guns and mortars. The obvious way to address this problem is through reliable all-source intelligence which allows the drone operator to discern which targets are innocent and which are AQAP-affiliated. Nevertheless, intelligence is not always conclusive, and mistakes can be made.28 Consequently, extra care is always needed in these circumstances even if some targeting opportunities are lost.

In responding to concerns about collateral damage, President Hadi has admitted that some drone strikes have accidentally killed innocent people, but he has also claimed that Yemen and the United States have taken “multiple measures to avoid mistakes of the past.”29 Hadi has further stated that using drones helps ensure that only proper targets are hit and collateral damage is correspondingly minimized. According to Hadi, “[t]he drone technologically is more advanced than the human brain,” suggesting that these systems are more accurate than manned combat aircraft.30 He also stated Yemen’s air force cannot bomb accurately at night, but US drones do not have any problems doing so.31 Hadi thereby asserted that the drones were a better system for avoiding mistakes that could lead to innocent people being killed. These advantages are especially clear when compared with the dangers of using the aging Yemen military aircraft in similar circumstances due to its limited ground target identification capabilities as well as the difficulties for any air force in the developing world to use conventional bombing for precision strikes. Nevertheless, even if President Hadi’s assurances on drones are widely accepted, they could easily be undermined by one 

30 Ibid.
31 Ibid.
highly publicized mistake in which innocent civilians die. In this regard, Hadi is not a dictator, and his ability to maintain an unpopular policy would probably evaporate.

Conclusion

In considering the examples described in this article, it is clear that drones have played an important role in preventing the emergence of an AQAP state in southern Yemen and heading off a spectacular terrorist strike, either of which could create intense US domestic pressure for a risky and expensive military intervention in Yemen. Under these circumstances, drone use seems like an option that should be kept open, at least for the near term. Nevertheless, US leaders cannot become complacent. Yemeni domestic politics are volatile, and President Hadi does not have the political power to ignore this volatility. The Yemeni public’s distrust of drones and the potential for serious backlash over any drone-related disaster suggests that it is unwise to assume that the drone option will always be present to meet future national security requirements.

US leadership correspondingly needs to avoid viewing its drone program as a panacea for Yemen's terrorism and insurgency problems. The longer term solution for Yemen would be a reformed military that can address problems, such as the AQAP threat, without the need for direct US military intervention including the use of armed drones. It is of tremendous importance that the United States avoids civilian casualties resulting from drone strikes. This priority is not simply a humanitarian concern since such a disaster could cause the Yemeni government to curtail or end the drone program. Moreover, engaging in such strikes without Yemeni government permission is not an option since the United States is attempting to support the Hadi government and not undermine it.

In sum, drones are on probation with the Yemeni public, and even a friendly Yemeni president can still be pressured to disallow drone strikes. Drones can help manage instability but they cannot, by themselves, create stability in Yemen. Under these circumstances, the United States must move aggressively to help Yemen with an wide range of counterinsurgency and counterterrorism measures and also treat the moderation and professionalization of the Yemeni military as serious priorities. Drones, for all their value, cannot replace a legitimate government with a competent military in ensuring the national security of a strategically important country such as Yemen.
The appearance of new weapons’ technologies often gives rise to questions of legitimacy. The use of missile weapons against armored knights was considered illegitimate and unchivalrous by some, as well as a destabilizing influence on the conduct of civilized warfare. An acknowledged and accepted set of rules, designed to limit the vulnerability of the ruling elite in combat, made longbow and crossbow technology illegitimate in the eyes of that warrior-class. German U-boat actions against commerce in World War I, the use of aerial bombardment against civilian populations, and defoliation agents in Vietnam, are modern examples of new technologies whose legitimacy was contested in times of conflict.

Questions of legitimacy, however, have not always been linked to the condition of war or to a specific technology. British concentration camps curing the Boer War were examples of illegitimate policies related to warfare devoid of any specific technological change. Their illegitimacy came not from technology but from the legal and ethical questions raised by the implementation of those methods of waging war. Throughout these debates over technology and policies, the term legitimacy seldom meant the same thing. Legitimacy has been used in such circumstances interchangeably with concepts such as proportional, moral, ethical, lawful, appropriate, reasonable, legal, justifiable, righteous, valid, recognized, and logical.

The recent phenomena of using unmanned vehicles, or drones, to deliver lethality in situations of conflict is yet another instance in which a type of technology has proliferated before considerations of its legitimacy have been agreed upon:

The exponential rise in the use of drone technology in a variety of military and non-military contexts represents a real challenge to the framework of established international law and it is both right as a matter of principle,
and inevitable as a matter of political reality, that the international community should now be focusing attention on the standards applicable to this technological development, particularly its deployment in counterterrorism and counter-insurgency initiatives, and attempt to reach a consensus on the legality of its use, and the standards and safeguards which should apply to it.4

The current debate over the legitimacy of America’s use of drones to deliver deadly force is taking place in both public and official domains in the United States and many other countries.5 The four key features at the heart of the debate revolve around: who is controlling the weapon system; does the system of control and oversight violate international law governing the use of force; are the drone strikes proportionate acts that provide military effectiveness given the circumstances of the conflict they are being used in; and does their use violate the sovereignty of other nations and allow the United States to disregard formal national boundaries? Unless these four questions are dealt with in the near future the impact of the unresolved legitimacy issues will have a number of repercussions for American foreign and military policies: “Without a new doctrine for the use of drones that is understandable to friends and foes, the United States risks achieving near-term tactical benefits in killing terrorists while incurring potentially significant longer-term costs to its alliances, global public opinion, the war on terrorism and international stability.”6 This article will address only the first three critical questions.

The question of who controls the drones during their missions is attracting a great deal of attention. The use of drones by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to conduct “signature strikes” is the most problematic factor in this matter. Between 2004 and 2013, CIA drone attacks in Pakistan killed up to 3,461—up to 891 of them civilians.7 Not only is the use of drones by the CIA the issue, but subcontracting operational control of drones to other civilian agencies is also causing great concern.8 Questions remain as to whether subcontractors were controlling drones during actual strike missions, as opposed to surveillance and reconnaissance activities. Nevertheless, the intense questioning of John O. Brennan, President Obama’s nominee for director of the CIA in February 2013, over drone usage, the secrecy of their controllers and orders, and the legality of their missions confirmed the level of concern America’s elected officials have regarding the legitimacy of drone use.

Furthermore, perceptions and suspicions of illegal clandestine intelligence agency operations, already a part of the public and official psyche due to experiences from Vietnam, Iran-Contra, and Iraq II and the weapons of mass destruction debacle, have been reinforced by CIA management of drone capability. Recent revelations about the use of secret Saudi Arabian facilities for staging American drone strikes into Yemen did nothing to dissipate such suspicions of the CIA’s lack of

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Kennedy

The legitimacy in its use of drones. The fact that the secret facility was the launching site for drones used to kill American citizens Anwar al-Awlaki and his son in September 2011, both classified by the CIA as al-Qaeda-linked threats to US security, only deepened such suspicions.

Despite the fact that Gulf State observers and officials knew about American drones operating from the Arabian peninsula for years, the existence of the CIA base was not openly admitted in case such knowledge should “... damage counter-terrorism collaboration with Saudi Arabia.” The fallout from CIA involvement and management of drone strikes prompted Senator Dianne Feinstein, Chairwoman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, to suggest the need for a court to oversee targeted killings. Such a body, she said, would replicate the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, which oversees eavesdropping on American soil. Most importantly, such oversight would go a long way towards allaying fears of the drone usage lacking true political accountability and legitimacy.

In addition, as with any use of force, drone strikes in overseas contingency operations can lead to increased attacks on already weak governments partnered with the United States. They can lead to retaliatory attacks on local governments and may contribute to local instability. Those actions occur as a result of desires for revenge and frustrations caused by the strikes. Feelings of hostility are often visited on the most immediate structures of authority—local government officials, government buildings, police, and the military. It can thus be argued that, at the strategic level, drone strikes are fuelling anti-American resentment among enemies and allies alike. Those reactions are often based on questions regarding the legality, ethicality, and operational legitimacy of those acts to deter opponents. Therefore, specifically related to the reaction of allies, the military legitimacy question arises if the use of drones endangers vital strategic relationships. One of the strategic relationships being affected by the drone legitimacy issue is that of the United States and the United Kingdom.

Targeted killing, by drone strike or otherwise, is not the sole preserve of the United States. Those actions, however, attract more negative attention to the United States due to its prominence on the world’s stage, its declarations of support for human rights and democratic freedoms, and rule-of-law issues, all which appear violated by such strikes. This complexity and visibility make such targeted killings important for Anglo-American strategic relations because of the closeness of that relationship and the perception that Great Britain, therefore, condones such American activities. Because the intelligence used in such operations is seen by other nations as a shared Anglo-American asset, the use of such intelligence to identify and conduct such killings, in the opinion of many, makes Great Britain culpable in the illegality and immorality of

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10 Ibid.
those operations. Finally, the apparent gap between stated core policies and values and the ability to practice targeted killings appears to be a starkly hypocritical and deceitful position internationally, a condition that once again makes British policymakers uncomfortable with being tarred by such a brush.

The divide between US policy and action is exacerbated by drone technology, which makes the once covert practice of targeted killing commonplace and undeniable. It may also cause deep-rooted distrust due to a spectrum of legitimacy issues. Such questions will, therefore, undermine the US desire to export liberal democratic principles. Indeed, it may be beneficial for Western democracies to achieve adequate rather than decisive victories, thereby setting an example of restraint for the international order. The United States must be willing to engage and deal with drone-legitimacy issues across the entire spectrum of tactical, operational, strategic, and political levels to ensure its strategic aims are not derailed by operational and tactical expediency.

14 Conflicting attitudes towards the use of targeted killing and assassination created varying degrees of anti-Americanism on the British side of the Anglo-American intelligence world throughout the Cold War period, a result of such things as requests from the CIA to engage in assassination operations when MI5 and MI6 had renounced such tactics, as well as that anti-Americanism being “partly it was residual upper-middle-class anti-Americanism,” combined with a jealousy of the superior pay and benefits the Americans received for their services, as well as the British “seeing themselves as servants of the Crown, and their services as part of the orderly, timeless configuration of Whitehall. There was a streak of ruthlessness and lawlessness about the American intelligence community which disturbed many in the senior echelons of British Intelligence.” See Peter Wright, *Spycatcher: The Candid Autobiography of a Senior Intelligence Officer* (London, United Kingdom: Viking Penguin, 1987), 303.


The drone debate continues hot and heavy. Critical issues range from the morality of targeting choices and concerns about unintended casualties and anti-Americanism to matters of legal and bureaucratic oversight.¹ These are pressing questions; the United States’ use of drones as a weapon of war is on the rise, and other countries are interested in acquiring them.²

Less often raised are first-order questions, or examinations of first principles. These questions consider the fundamental nature of a concept or a tool.³ This article poses basic questions about the use of drone strikes as tools of the state. My goal is to spark further analysis of drone strikes as an instrument in the US foreign policy tool kit. I ask how drones compare to other weapons and what they may be able to achieve tactically and strategically, militarily and politically. These are also questions worth considering in the context of how other states’ acquisition of armed drones could affect the United States. In addition, I identify major unanswered empirical questions about the outcome of drone strikes. There is still a lack of empirical evidence about the effects of drone strikes, partly due to the secrecy of US drone programs and partly due to their relative novelty. But even without that research, it is possible to consider the utility of drones in attempts to increase US security.

Some of these questions may seem to have obvious answers, but for those who suggest there is broad agreement in the public debate on first-order questions and first principles regarding drone strikes, I offer the contrasting positions of The New Yorker editor David Remnick and retired Air Force General Charles Dunlap. Remnick states, “We are in the same position now, with drones, that we were with nuclear weapons in 1945. For the moment, we are the only ones with this technology that is going to change the morality, psychology, and strategic thinking of warfare for years to come.” Dunlap says, “It’s not particularly new to use long-range strike. David defeated Goliath with a long-range strike. In addition, I identify major unanswered empirical questions about the outcome of drone strikes. There is still a lack of empirical evidence about the effects of drone strikes, partly due to the secrecy of US drone programs and partly due to their relative novelty. But even without that research, it is possible to consider the utility of drones in attempts to increase US security.


³ Oxford Dictionaries defines first principles as “the fundamental concepts or assumptions on which a theory, system, or method is based.” (Oxford University Press, April 2010).
with a missile weapon. At Agincourt, the English bowmen destroyed the flower of the French knighthood with long-range strikes . . . and we have had long-range strike bombers for some time. This really is not new conceptually.4

This article considers the goal of US drone programs to be greater security for the United States and its friends and allies. Caveat: There are analysts thinking about a future of stand-off, plugged-in warfare. I make a more modest effort to consider what drone strikes may achieve in fundamental political terms as a forceful tool of the state. I also bracket issues of morality, legality, budgeting, and bureaucratic oversight. Answering practical questions requires understanding what states can do and want to do with drones, politically and militarily. Investigation into the morality of drone strikes is contingent on what states expect drone strikes to achieve and how those drones are deployed. Striking only targets in the act of mounting an attack on the US homeland, for example, presents different moral questions than so-called “signature strikes” against unidentified individuals judged to be behaving suspiciously.5

The first core question is whether drones are a unique weapon and whether they provide distinct advantages or disadvantages over other weapons. I categorize drones as a form of air power based on the following logic and evidence, which I detail expecting disagreement will advance the analysis. Like piloted armed aircraft, armed drones provide information as well as strike capacity. They can achieve a variety of military effects, as other air platforms can. They can kill, disable, support fighters on the ground, destroy, harry, hinder, deny access, observe, and track. Like pilots providing close air support, firing missiles, or dropping bombs, drone operators are expected to respect the laws of war, striking based on clear information, including assessment of potential human costs.

Drones provide several advantages over manned armed flights and sea-based launches. They are claimed to do less collateral damage than either missiles or manned aerial bombing; they can hover overhead for relatively long periods of time to gather information for a strike (up to 14 hours); they can strike quickly, and the missile can be diverted from its original target in an intentional miss.6 They are also less expensive than manned platforms. Unlike other delivery systems, however, they require a permissive environment, which is likely to limit their utility in some theaters.

Drones, like other air and sea platforms, are a form of power projection. They give the United States the ability to mount tactical assaults without necessarily putting US personnel directly in harm’s way, potentially evoking domestic opposition. They also allow the United States to avoid putting its forces in foreign territory, potentially eliciting a nationalistic response. Drones are similar to Special Forces in their direct

targeting ability, but they can reach remote locations and, again, do not place US troops directly in peril. Nevertheless, drone strikes do require cooperation by individuals and states on the ground. The United States needs, for example, basing rights, agreements to host launch and recovery personnel and search-and-rescue teams, and overflight permissions.7

A significant concern raised in the public debate is that drones make killing too easy. This is a critical issue that connects to questions about US grand strategy and whether drones encourage imperial overreach.8 But because the United States uses a variety of tools to conduct targeted killings—from the Special Forces raid on Osama bin Laden’s Pakistani compound to the missile strike on Dora Farms, where Saddam Hussein and his sons were believed to be sheltering early in the Iraq War—I suggest there is more to gain analytically by first focusing on understanding the tactic, that is, what targeted killing may and may not achieve as a foreign policy tool, then addressing concerns specific to the platform.9

The second core question pertains to the strategic utility of drone strikes for a state. What political goals can drone strikes achieve? In considering this question, I use a theoretical prism that identifies the fundamental political goals of the state’s use of force to defend, deter, compel, and, sometimes, swagger.10

It is possible to consider targeted killings, specifically those conducted by drones, as an element in a defensive strategy. This strategy would be intended to ward off attack and reduce possible damage by killing leaders and facilitators plotting violence against the United States, and disrupting their operations. It is also possible to argue targeted killings deter future attacks by denying armed groups the capability to conduct those attacks, and punishing those planning violence against the United States and its interests. The deterrence-by-denial argument requires consideration not only of targeted killings but also drone strikes to directly degrade targeted groups’ capabilities in other ways (e.g., cause equipment and supply shortages, operational and strategic paralysis, and disruption of operations). Drone strikes in this analysis might also deter cooperation with a group based on fear or doubt about the group’s likely success.11

It is harder to argue that targeted killings might exercise a compelling effect by threatening greater pain if the targeted organization does

7 Ibid., 7.
8 Derek Gregory has argued, for example, that the United States is using drone strikes much as the British used air power in consolidating their control over the empire in the late 19th century and the 20th century to World War II, “From a View to a Kill: Drones and Late Modern War,” *Theory, Culture & Society* 28:7-8 (2011), 188-215.
9 More broadly, Micah Zenko, *Between Threats and War: U.S. Discrete Military Operations in the Post-Cold War World* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press), considers drone strikes as a type of discrete military operation, “a single or serial physical use of kinetic military force to achieve a defined military and political goal by inflicting casualties or causing destruction, without seeking to conquer an opposing army or capture or control territory,” 2.
not change its behavior. Successful compellence requires displaying to the adversary the will and capability to cause terrible pain if the adversary does not change its behavior. The ethical and legal context of drone use by the United States make it unlikely at first glance that policymakers would choose to use drone strikes to cause pain to an adversary by deliberately targeting innocents. In terms of causing pain to the adversary directly, the death or threat of death to a plotter is an organization’s cost of doing business, not a taste of suffering to come if it does not change its behavior.

There are several other possible strategic effects of drone strikes. Swaggering, here displaying US military power and its seemingly effortless global reach, arguably demonstrates resolve, a quality that has been underlined as an element of US counterterrorism policy. Drone strikes can also be seen as the straightforward use of brute force to destroy those who would threaten the United States or its allies. In addition, they are an alliance tool supporting other states, such as Yemen and Pakistan.

It is an open question whether all drone strikes can be expected to have the same political effects at all times and in all places. If a drone strike was politically ineffective in Yemen in 2002, there is reason to investigate whether it will be politically effective in Yemen, Pakistan, or Somalia today, or in Mali, Syria, or the Philippines tomorrow. This possibility suggests the importance of considering drone strikes in their political context. This context may include, for example, theaters where the United States is at war, theaters in which it is not, theaters in which the United States has national or international permission to strike, theaters in which it does not, and so on. A matrix of types of targets and expected effects would be useful. There may also be interactions among these factors that shape the political effects of drone strikes.

The questions and theoretical answers posited here require empirical investigation. Many good minds are already at work, and more evidence should become available as time passes and, perhaps, as the United States makes its drone programs more transparent. Critical questions include whether drone strikes or targeted killings prevent or drive attacks on the US homeland; whether they reduce or increase attacks on US forces and interests elsewhere; whether they buttress client states, provoke

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upheaval, or hasten a client’s fall; and whether drone strikes increase radicalization and also anti-Americanism, or other forms of terrorism.

These questions are not unique to drones. They bear directly on the need for a counterterrorism strategy that begins by identifying critical US interests and threats, then systematically sorts through a realistic consideration of ends, ways, and means. This analysis requires answering first-order questions and identifying first principles while fostering rigorous research into the actual effects of drone strikes on US and international security.
The parameters of the discussion about nuclear weapons are well known and appear to be relatively fixed. It seems as if there has been little new on that front in forty years. Most civilian scholars have lost interest in nuclear weapons and moved on to other topics. But it is the habit of the military mind to learn from the past; even today there are lessons to be learned from Cannae, Waterloo, and Vicksburg. It will not surprise thoughtful military officers to find that the past has something important and interesting to tell us about nuclear weapons.

The conventional wisdom is that nuclear weapons are horrible, probably immoral, but necessary. We keep them because they have a unique ability to coerce and deter. There are psychological characteristics to the weapons—as Secretary of War Henry Stimson pointed out in the first semiofficial discussion of them in 1947—that make them unlike other weapons.  

Now new evidence is throwing doubt on these decades-old conclusions. Actually not “new” evidence, but additional evidence culled from a careful study of the past.

Hiroshima

The first and most important revision to history has to do with the efficacy of bombing Hiroshima and Nagasaki. This new evidence, however, has nothing to do with the “revisionist” school of Hiroshima history. The revisionist school ascended in 1964 with the publication by Gar Alperovitz of a book arguing that bombing Hiroshima and Nagasaki was unnecessary—the Japanese would have surrendered anyway. This debate has caused controversy and aroused passions for almost fifty years. But it is not really about nuclear weapons. The revisionists argue that the bombings were horrible and, since they weren’t necessary to win the war, they were immoral. The counterrevisionists argue that the bombings were required and were, therefore, moral. But this is a debate about whether the United States acted morally, not about whether nuclear weapons work. New evidence seems to suggest that while the bombs destroyed the cities, they didn’t play much of a role (or perhaps any) in convincing Japan’s leaders to surrender.

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Over the last twenty years, increasing access to records in Japan, Russia, and the United States has revealed that in the three days following the bombing of Hiroshima Japan’s leaders had little idea that they had to surrender as a result of the bombings. Meeting notes, diary entries, and the actions that various actors took during this period show that while Japan’s leaders knew Hiroshima had been destroyed by a nuclear weapon, they saw this as another problem in an already difficult war, not a war-ending crisis. The Foreign Minister, Togo Shigenori, actually suggested convening the Supreme Council two days after the bombing of Hiroshima to discuss it and found he could not generate enough interest on the subject to get it on the agenda.

When the Soviet Union, which had signed a five-year neutrality pact with Japan in 1941, broke that agreement and joined the war at midnight on 8-9 August, however, it touched off a crisis. Within hours of the news reaching Tokyo, the Supreme Council met to discuss unconditional surrender. It is clear from all the evidence now available that Japan’s leaders surrendered because of the Soviet entry into the war and not because of the nuclear bombings.

There are reasons to doubt the traditional story that the Emperor was horrified by the bombing of Hiroshima. The documentary evidence is thin, and if the Emperor was so moved, it begs the question: why was he moved by secondhand reports of a city destroyed in August when he was not moved by driving through Tokyo and personally witnessing the devastation of that city in March? Would it not be sensible to expect that firsthand experience would have a stronger emotional impact than a secondhand report?

In some ways, this new conclusion about Hiroshima makes sense. In order to believe that Hiroshima was the cause of Japan’s surrender, it was necessary to believe that Japan’s military men didn’t know their business. After all, the destruction of a city at that stage of the war was hardly militarily decisive. The United States Army Air Force had pounded 66 cities into rubble and ashes that summer using conventional bombs.

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5 At best what we know is that the Emperor sent several messages to his adjutant asking for more information about the Hiroshima bombing. This could indicate concern and horror. It could also signal something as unemotional as a desire to understand the strategic capabilities of the weapon.

6 Especially since after the bombing the streets of Tokyo were filled with the burned bodies of the more than 100,000 who died in the fires. The toll was so great that it took 14 days to clear all the bodies from the streets. The Emperor made his tour of the city eight days after the bombing, so it is possible he not only saw the damage done to the city but saw some of the bodies of those killed in the attack.
Why would the loss of two more cities make a difference? It is clear that the Soviet entry into the war decisively changed the strategic calculus, while the dropping of atomic bombs, no matter how horrifying, did not.

And the scale of the nuclear bombings was not that different from the conventional attacks that had been going on all summer long. If we graph the fatalities in all 68 city attacks that summer, Hiroshima ranks second after Tokyo (a conventional attack). If we graph the square miles destroyed, Hiroshima is sixth. If we graph the percentage of the city destroyed, Hiroshima is 17th. Clearly, the end result of the attacks was not outside the parameters of previous attacks.

Of course Japan’s leaders, beginning with the Emperor, repeatedly declared that the atomic bombings were decisive, forcing them to surrender. This makes a certain amount of sense, however. Put yourself in their shoes. Which would you rather say? “We made strategic mistakes. The Navy and Army could never cooperate properly on joint missions. Your government and soldiers let you down.” Or would you rather say, “The enemy made an amazing scientific breakthrough that no one could have predicted, they invented a miracle weapon, and that’s why we lost”? The atomic bomb made the perfect explanation for losing the war.

What does this reconsideration of the historical evidence mean today? The doctrine and tactics for using nuclear weapons have changed considerably in the last sixty-eight years. But it is important to remember that Hiroshima and Nagasaki are the only field tests of these weapons. Our belief in the special psychological ability of these weapons to coerce and deter—which forms the foundation for deterrence theory—is based almost entirely on this one event. We may have overestimated the ability of these weapons to deter or cow opponents. At any rate, simple prudence dictates that we undertake a fundamental reevaluation of nuclear deterrence policy if we are going to rely on these weapons for our security.

**Cuban Missile Crisis**

The second important revision to earlier ideas comes in the area of Cold War crises. Most people believe the evidence of Cold War crises uniformly demonstrates nuclear deterrence reliably controls violence in a crisis. The Cuban Missile Crisis illustrates the point. It is axiomatic that the crisis and its outcome support the conclusion that nuclear deterrence works. After all, the Soviets snuck missiles into Cuba, there was a risk of nuclear war, and then they took them out. This is the way nuclear deterrence is supposed to work—a leader sees the danger of nuclear war and pulls back; however, although Khrushchev’s behavior can be seen as supporting nuclear deterrence theory, Kennedy’s cannot.

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7 One could argue, of course, that our belief in nuclear deterrence is based on the success of ordinary deterrence—deterring people from committing crimes, for example. But ordinary deterrence fails quite often. There are many murders, even in states with the death penalty. One could argue that faith in nuclear deterrence comes from success in Cold War crises. But since deterrence occurs in the head of an adversary this is less than reliable evidence. The best evidence about the psychological impact of the use of nuclear weapons in wartime is the actual use of nuclear weapons in wartime.

8 Although even Khrushchev’s behavior is not necessarily proof that nuclear deterrence worked. It could be argued, after all, that Khrushchev withdrew the missiles because he liked the deal he got: a no invasion pledge for Cuba and a commitment to withdraw theater missiles from Turkey.
President Kennedy was confronted with a crisis. He knew that if he blockaded Cuba he would touch off a crisis that could lead to nuclear war. In the week-long secret discussions that led to his decision, he and his advisors alluded to the possibility of nuclear war 60 times. Yet despite the danger, Kennedy went ahead, undeterred. How does that align with nuclear deterrence theory?

Recent scholarship on the crisis, particularly Michael Dobbs’s fascinating book *One Minute to Midnight*, reveals the Cuban Missile Crisis came within a hair’s breadth of going nuclear three separate times. Nuclear war was averted not by the efficient functioning of nuclear deterrence, but by chance.

The clearest example comes from a routine air sampling mission over the North Pole by a U-2 spy plane at the height of the crisis. When the plane’s navigation malfunctioned and it flew 300 miles into Russia, Soviet MiGs were scrambled to shoot it down. US fighters in Alaska were scrambled to escort the U-2 back. This occurred at the height of the crisis, however, and conventional air-to-air missiles on the US fighters had been removed and replaced with nuclear air-to-air missiles. The US fighters had no other armament except nuclear missiles in the event of an encounter with Soviet fighters. Fortunately, none of them encountered the other.

It is clear, however, that Robert Kennedy was right when he later wrote, “President Kennedy had initiated the course of events, but he no longer had control over them.” President Kennedy took actions that risked nuclear war (and very nearly led to it). If nuclear deterrence causes leaders to see the risk of nuclear war and withdraw, how can we explain Kennedy’s actions?

There are two striking things about this reinterpretation of the Cuban Missile Crisis. First is the clear failure of nuclear deterrence—a failure that did not lead to nuclear war, but a failure nonetheless. More interesting is the fact that historians and policy analysts have tended to ignore these facts. A review of the Cold War reveals these same two elements recur again and again in other crises: risky and aggressive actions are taken despite the danger of nuclear war and a clear tendency to overlook or explain away the failures.

The conclusion drawn from this new research into Cold War crises is not that nuclear deterrence does not work. There is no question that ordinary deterrence works at least some of the time. It is not perfect. People still commit murder even when severe penalties ought to deter them; however, it clearly works some of the time. Nuclear deterrence works at least some of the time. Nuclear war is a scary prospect few can ignore. What this new scholarship reveals is that the failure rate of nuclear deterrence is potentially higher than theory admits.

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11 Ibid., 264.

Nuclear deterrence has to be perfect, or close to perfect. A catastrophic all-out nuclear war could result from any failure of nuclear deterrence, so there is little margin for error. One could say for nuclear deterrence, failure is not an option. Yet these documented cases of nuclear deterrence failure raise the possibility that we have been far luckier, and have run far greater risks, than we imagined. If nuclear deterrence has a high rate of failure, continuing to rely on it for the safety and security of the United States would seem to guarantee its eventual catastrophic failure.

One of the great strengths of the military mind is its insistence on experience-based thinking. In the case of nuclear weapons, there has historically been plenty of theory, but not as much sensible, pragmatic thinking. It is time for a little more pragmatic analysis.
A defining aspect of the present period in international politics is the lack of attention paid to nuclear weapons by United States’ policymakers. To the extent these weapons are addressed, it is to consider significant reductions in the size of the US nuclear arsenal, to perhaps as few as 300 deployed strategic nuclear weapons, to advance the administration's nuclear disarmament goal. This push for reductions is part of a broader call for major reductions by organizations such as Global Zero.¹ We argue that such reductions are strategically risky, signal weakness, and invite challenges from US foes and worry among US allies.

The time has come to state plainly—nuclear disarmament is an unpleasant dream that would jeopardize US security, make the world safe for conventional war, and undermine global stability. Further reductions in America’s nuclear arsenal have the potential to embolden aggression against the interests of the United States and its allies, as well as to encourage proliferation.

The United States’ strategic amnesia about the important role of nuclear weapons in international politics is unique to Washington—it is clearly not shared by the leadership in Iran, Russia, or China. Moreover, it stands in stark contrast to the Cold War period where nuclear deterrence and the nuclear arsenal served as the strategic lodestar for the national security policies of the United States. Long forgotten are the days when American statesmen understood that, in order to advance its interests and deter aggression, Washington needed a credible, flexible, and responsive nuclear arsenal.

Given their disappearance from national security debates, one could be forgiven for thinking nuclear weapons have no strategic value for the United States, and can be eliminated as the administration desires without cost or penalty. Only in the United States are nuclear weapons seen as passé, associated with the tools of the Cold War. Other nuclear and near-nuclear states see them as very useful tools of statecraft, today just as in the past.

This neglect of the US nuclear enterprise has been comprehensive, cumulative, and caused some novel problems: the aging of the nuclear force structure, the dead-end career paths for Air Force and Navy officers, the lack of attention paid to deterrence theory and its complexities by think tanks and academics, the retirement of much of the workforce, and with it the loss of knowledge and experience.

The United States has not addressed these problems with the force and urgency they require. The failure to solve these problems has been bipartisan, with both Congress and the White House sharing the blame. This article explains why nuclear weapons matter for the United States. To accomplish this, we explain the traditional roles of nuclear weapons for US foreign and defense policies—deterrence and coercion—and explain why these roles remain relevant.

Why Nuclear Weapons Matter for the United States

Nuclear weapons matter for purposes of deterrence and coercion—two of the major tools in the toolbox of the United States to advance and protect its interests in international politics. For deterrence purposes, nuclear weapons matter for five reasons. The first of these is deterrence of a nuclear attack on the US homeland. Nuclear weapons make the costs of such an attack prohibitive due to the consequences of nuclear retaliation. As in the Cold War, the United States is a target, and, just as then, it has enemies who wish its destruction. Nuclear weapons deter enemies such as al Qaeda who would deliberately attack the United States as well as countries like China that might be tempted to attack the US homeland as the result of escalation from a crisis (e.g., Taiwan in 1995-96).

Second, nuclear weapons—both strategic and tactical—allow the United States to extend deterrence credibly, effectively, and relatively inexpensively to its allies. This provides them with security and removes their incentive to acquire nuclear weapons. The United States’ extended deterrent is one of the most important nonproliferation mechanisms Washington possesses. If the United States significantly cuts its nuclear arsenal, and certainly if it disarms, powerful proliferation incentives will return for allies of the United States.

As is regularly on display in the East and South China Seas, the United States faces an increasingly hostile China. Chinese foreign minister Yang Jiechi observed at an Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) meeting in 2010, “China is a big country, and other countries are small countries and that is just a fact,” an argument Thucydides made 2,400 years ago in the Melian Dialogue—the strong do what they will and the weak suffer what they must.

If history is a guide, as China’s power continues to grow, so too will its ambition and its ability to advance its objectives. These will progressively conflict with those of the United States and its allies for three reasons: the numerous and dangerous territorial conflicts China has with its neighbors, which may escalate to involve the United States; the conflicting grand strategies of China and the United States; and the changing distribution of power between Beijing and Washington. The growth of Chinese military power will require a credible extended nuclear deterrent from the United States to reassure allies, prevent destabilizing nuclear proliferation, and intense security competition in Asia.

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Third, the United States possesses nuclear weapons to deter attacks against the United States military. Military bases in Guam and in other countries in Asia and the Pacific, or US ships, especially aircraft carriers, are inviting targets for China. US nuclear capabilities play an important role in deterring such attacks, and will become more important as China continues to develop sha shou jian, or “assassin’s mace,” capabilities which target US military vulnerabilities.

Fourth, nuclear weapons play a role in stability—the absence of an incentive to launch a major attack as well as deter the escalation of conflict, assurance that the United States is guarded against surprise, and the possibility it may wait rather than retaliate immediately. The role of nuclear weapons in aiding stability and promoting the de-escalation of crises during the Cold War is well established. Although deterrence is always complicated, nuclear weapons have kept the long peace the world has enjoyed since 1945. However, should deterrence fail and conflict begin, the United States will want to keep it from escalating to a higher level, and nuclear weapons aid the ability of the United States to accomplish this.

Fifth, approximately nine countries are suspected of having biological weapons programs, including China, Iran, and Syria, and approximately seven countries have known or suspected chemical weapons capabilities, again including China, Iran, and Syria. The United States has neither. Nuclear weapons deter the use of other weapons of mass destruction (WMD), biological weapons (BW), or chemical weapons (CW), against the US homeland, its allies, or the US military.

In contrast to deterrence, coercion involves a change in the status quo; the opponent must change his behavior, and so it is harder to coerce than to deter. In addition, the targets of coercion are likely to value the issue at stake, such as territory, more highly, and thus the balance of resolve is likely to favor them. Thus, the coercer needs superior and diverse military capabilities, such as tactical and strategic nuclear weapons.

Nuclear weapons aid the coercive capabilities of the United States in three major ways. First, the United States needs the capability to make coercive threats to advance its interests. For example, a mix of conventional, tactical, and strategic nuclear weapons provides the United States with the capability to fight its way into areas where opponents like China have strong anti-access, area denial (A2D2) capabilities. The target of coercion could never be certain the United States would not use all its options, including nuclear threats. Second, the United States needs to convince the challenger not to escalate to a higher level of violence, or “move up a rung” in the “escalation ladder.” Conversely, the United States needs to have nuclear capabilities not only to deter escalation, but also to threaten escalation including first-strike nuclear use—if necessary—to stop a conventional attack, or a limited nuclear attack, as well as to signal the risk of escalation to a higher level of violence, as the United States did during the 1973 Yom Kippur War. Third, although laden with risks, nuclear weapons also provide the possibility of attacking first to limit the damage the United States or its allies would receive in the event of conflict. Whether the United States would strike first is another issue. Nonetheless, an unfortunate fact is nuclear weapons may be used, and if so, the United States must have the capabilities to prevail.
Augmented strategic forces are the prodigious conventional capabilities of the United States. They are the best in the world, but conventional forces cannot replace the unique deterrent and coercive roles of nuclear weapons for advancing the interests of the United States and providing for its security. Only nuclear forces produce a great level of destruction with few forces in a short period of time. Even for the United States, it can take days, weeks, and even months to mobilize conventional forces—which are certain to be detected and countermeasures taken—for either deterrent or coercive purposes. The psychological impact, and scale, efficiency, and rapidity of destruction made possible by nuclear weapons, dwarf that of any conventional weapon. Moreover, the balance of resolve in likely crises with China over Taiwan or the Spratly Islands are more likely to favor Beijing than Washington, so nuclear weapons are essential for tipping the balance in Washington's favor by a willingness to raise the stakes and risk nuclear confrontation.

At the end of day, only nuclear weapons can deter China. What was true during the Cold War for Moscow remains true today for other adversaries—the fact the leadership in Beijing or Tehran could lose all they value in less than one hour affects their decisionmaking calculus in ways conventional weapons cannot.

Conclusions

Nuclear weapons remain an important tool to advance the interests of the United States. They are a force for stability and provide deterrent and coercive capabilities the United States has needed in the past, depends on now, and will in the future. To preserve these interests, a reliable, credible nuclear deterrent must become a national priority. If these weapons continue to be neglected, the horrific outcomes and terrible choices they are designed to deter—avoiding war and discouraging challengers—are far more likely to occur.

The end of the Cold War changed much, but did not change the need to deter and coerce to ensure stability for the United States and its allies. Those are old needs of “reason of state,” recognized throughout the course of history, and are as identifiable to the ancient Greeks as they are to strategists today. The prodigious growth in US conventional capabilities cannot replace the core functions of state power served by nuclear weapons.

The fundamental inability to acknowledge nuclear weapons as key tools of statecraft is understandable. Proclaiming the value of nuclear weapons too loudly could hinder proliferation objectives. But the United States is at a crisis point. By not acknowledging these weapons’ fundamental value, we have allowed bureaucracies to slight the responsibility to maintain a robust deterrent. The atrophy in United States strategic forces is a bipartisan national security problem, and one that must be addressed by focused and sustained leadership from both parties.

Failure to act now to correct this course weakens the relative power of the United States and hinders the ability of America to advance its objectives. Other states—most importantly China—choose not to be so restricted, and by their choice quicken the day when the United States will face the hard choice of withdrawing from its commitments or turning to its weakened nuclear force. Washington should appreciate
that the allies of the United States will face an equally hard choice—to stand with a diminished and strategically misguided United States or abandon it for a challenger who forsakes dreams of nuclear disarmament in favor of an unambiguous and realistic comprehension of the permanent value of nuclear weapons for the advancement of its national interests and strategy.

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Over the next decade, the United States will have to rethink its grand strategy as it addresses the challenge of maintaining its primacy as a global power in an increasingly multipolar world whose center of gravity has shifted to Asia. The task will be all the more daunting because significant fiscal and economic constraints imposed by a federal government debt that has mushroomed to nearly $16 trillion or about 100 percent of GDP, and a continuing economic slowdown that has been the deepest and longest since the Great Depression will force difficult tradeoffs as the United States seeks to realign and streamline vital national interests with limited resources. The overarching national security objective of the United States must be crystal clear: to counterbalance and contain a rising China determined to be the dominant economic, political, and military power in Asia.

While China’s rise will not be a straight line, its trajectory to great power status is obvious. A twenty-first century version of a Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere with China at the epicenter is emerging. China is the biggest economy in Asia, having surpassed Japan in 2010. China is the largest trading partner of Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Australia, India, and the ten countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Unquestionably, China is the economic engine of Asia, displacing both Japan and the United States. According to US government projections, China is expected to be the world’s largest economy by 2019 in terms of purchasing power parity (which adjusts for cost of living) with a forecasted gross domestic product (GDP) of $17.2 trillion compared to an expected US GDP of $17 trillion.

From a strategic perspective, the “Achilles heel” of China is its overwhelming dependence on Persian Gulf energy imports to fuel its rapidly...
growing economy. The sea lines of communication (SLOCs) over which these vital oil and gas imports are transported by tanker—from the Strait of Hormuz in the Persian Gulf to the Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean, continuing on to the Bay of Bengal and through the Malacca Straits into the South China Sea—is China's jugular vein. Virtually all Persian Gulf energy exports destined for China (as well as for Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan) flow through this route. Two important alternatives to the Malacca Straits are the Sunda and Lombok Straits in Indonesia linking the eastern Indian Ocean to the Java Sea which continues to the South China Sea. Another key energy route flows from Saudi ports on the Red Sea (principally the port of Yanbu) to the Bab el Mandab in the Gulf of Aden proceeding on to the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean and continuing to the Malacca Straits, or the Sunda and Lombok Straits. The five critical choke points—Hormuz, Bab el Mandab, Malacca, Sunda and Lombok—and the SLOCs linking them are controlled by the US Navy.

China's economic and military security is inextricably intertwined with its energy security. Since 2000, China has been a net importer of oil and gas, primarily from the Persian Gulf. China became the world's largest energy consumer in 2009, with 96.9 quadrillion British thermal units (BTU) of annual energy consumption compared to 94.8 quadrillion BTU for the United States.\footnote{US Energy Information Administration, Table A1 “World total primary energy consumption by region, Reference case,” in International Energy Outlook 2011, http://www.eia.gov.} By 2011, China surpassed the United States as the largest importer of Persian Gulf oil, importing 2.5 million barrels per day (bbls/d) from the region (representing about 26 percent of total Chinese oil consumption of 9.8 million bbls/d), overtaking the United States which imported 1.8 million bbls/d from the Persian Gulf (representing about 10 percent of total US oil consumption of 18.8 million bbls/d).\footnote{For total Chinese oil consumption and imports, see US Energy Information Administration (EIA), China: Country Analysis Brief, September 4, 2012, http://www.eia.gov; for total US oil consumption and imports see EIA, “Energy in Brief: How dependent are we on foreign oil?” July 13, 2012, http://www.eia.gov; and EIA, “Petroleum and Other Liquids: US Net Imports by Country,” August 30, 2012, http://www.eia.gov.} In fact, over half of US oil imports come from three countries in the Americas: Canada, Venezuela, and Mexico, with Canada being the single most important foreign supplier.\footnote{Ibid. In particular see “Energy in Brief: How dependent are we on foreign oil?”}

The US Energy Information Administration (EIA) projects that by 2030 oil imports, mainly from the Persian Gulf, will represent 75 percent of total Chinese oil consumption. By contrast, US oil imports are expected to decline sharply and account for only 35 percent of total US oil consumption by 2030.\footnote{Ibid. For further details regarding the forecasted dramatic drop in US oil imports, see figure 114 “US net imports of petroleum and other liquids fall in the Reference case” in EIA, Annual Energy Outlook 2012,” June 25, 2012, http://www.eia.gov.} Clearly, Persian Gulf oil imports will be far more crucial to China than to the United States. Accordingly, for China, ensuring access to Persian Gulf oil and gas will loom large as a vital national interest. By contrast, for the United States, a key strategic priority will be denial of access to Persian Gulf energy resources to its adversaries.

China, of course, which has domestic oil reserves of about 20 billion barrels and domestic gas reserves of 107 trillion cubic feet (Tcf), is seeking oil and gas resources which it can effectively control in its own
backyard. In the East China Sea, low-end estimated oil reserves are 60 billion barrels, and in the South China Sea, low-end estimated oil reserves are 11 billion barrels. Not surprisingly, the potential energy resources of these areas have generated intense rival claims involving China, Japan, South Korea, Vietnam, and the Philippines. However, the East and South China Seas have yet to be explored systematically, and their oil and gas resources are a long way from being developed and produced. By comparison, the proved oil reserves of Saudi Arabia alone amount to 263 billion barrels, and the combined proved oil reserves of Iran and Iraq are about 252 billion barrels. Thus, from the Chinese viewpoint, the strategic importance of access to Persian Gulf oil and gas resources is not significantly changed even with Chinese control over access to oil and gas resources in the East and South China Seas.

If the United States is to counterbalance China successfully, it must be able to threaten China’s energy security. Ideally, the United States should be in a position in which it can persuade the Persian Gulf oil producers, if necessary, to turn off the tap and decline to supply China with oil and gas. Furthermore, the United States must be able to put in place anti-access, area denial strategies (a) in the eastern Indian Ocean and Bay of Bengal to blockade the Malacca, Sunda and Lambok Straits; and (b) in the western Indian Ocean and the Arabian Sea to blockade the arc between the Bab el Mandab to the Strait of Hormuz. Indonesia, India, and Iran will be critical to the success of a recalibrated American grand strategy to contain China.

The United States, India, and Indonesia

Indonesia stretches across the eastern Indian Ocean gateways to east Asia. If US naval vessels are to travel the international waters in the eastern Indian Ocean and Bay of Bengal just outside Indonesia’s 12-mile limit to monitor shipping bound to or from China passing through the Malacca, Sunda, and Lambok Straits, it will need the support of Indonesia. Forging a cooperative relationship with Indonesia will require a major effort on the part of the United States, given the checkered relations between the two countries.

Indonesia’s strategic importance is based on three key factors. First, Indonesia’s location dominating the Malacca, Sunda, and Lambok Straits gives it control over the eastern Indian Ocean link to east Asia. Second, Indonesia is the world’s largest Muslim country, with a population of 250 million of which 86 percent are Muslims (overwhelmingly Sunni). Third, Indonesia is an emerging democracy. Indonesia has about 6,000 inhabited islands and 11,500 uninhabited islands. Guarding this archipelago nation is a daunting challenge for Indonesia’s armed forces. The United States can help by (a) expanding, modernizing, and training Indonesia’s coast guard and navy; (b) installing a network of anti-ship and anti-aircraft batteries to help Indonesia defend the three

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critical maritime chokepoints against Chinese attack; and (c) reorienting and refocusing Indonesian armed forces on asymmetric defense capabilities—the reality being that Indonesia could not hope to defeat an external invasion by China, but could mount an effective insurgency to defeat occupation. In addition to a robust military assistance program, which should be subsidized given Indonesia’s weak finances, the United States should support a major economic development program targeted at three strategically important areas of Indonesia: Aceh (which overlooks the Malacca Straits), Bali (which overlooks the Lombok Straits), and a corridor (on Java and Sumatra) bordering the Sunda Straits. The United States should persuade Japan and Australia to share the costs of this targeted economic development program, which could be managed and administered by the World Bank to ensure it is properly designed and implemented.

Indonesian government leaders and politicians have to be sensitive to popular sentiment in an increasingly democratic environment. Any cooperation with the United States would have to win broad public support. As the world’s largest Muslim country, Indonesia is unlikely to be supportive of any US policies perceived to be adversely aimed at or targeting Muslim countries. It is unrealistic to expect Indonesia would tilt towards the United States; rather, at best, Indonesia would be neutral in any conflict between the US and China. From the Indonesian perspective, the failed US attempt in the 1950s to overthrow Sukarno, independent Indonesia’s widely revered first leader; US support for the authoritarian and corrupt Suharto regime; and US acquiescence of Israel’s continued occupation of the Palestinian Territories, are three key elements that are obstacles to a pro-US orientation. Indonesia supports the Arab Peace Initiative of 2002 (also known as the Saudi Peace Plan of 2002), which has the unanimous support of all Muslim majority nations.

Indonesia, so far, has managed to contain Sunni Islamic fundamentalist pressures, which can erupt unexpectedly and violently as demonstrated in the Bali bombings of 12 October 2002. Also, Aceh province, which dominates the Indonesian side of the Malacca Straits, has been a Sunni Islamic fundamentalist stronghold for over 150 years and has hosted a separatist movement since the 1950s until 2000. On the other hand, Indonesia also has a strong undercurrent of anti-Chinese


ethnic tension, which exploded in violent anti-Chinese riots at the beginning and end of Suharto’s regime (as ethnic Chinese were blamed for Indonesia’s problems). This ethnic tension is likely to serve as an obstacle to a China-Indonesia alliance. From the US perspective, Indonesian neutrality should be quite satisfactory since it would mean that Indonesia would acquiesce to a major US naval presence just outside its maritime borders in the east Indian Ocean.

As the centerpiece to its Indian Ocean strategy, the US objective should be to encourage and support the peaceful rise of India to serve as a counterweight to China. India sits astride the strategic SLOCs connecting the Persian Gulf to Asia, and is the key to controlling the Indian Ocean, with Indonesia the eastern anchor and Iran the western anchor. The SLOCs stretch from the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab el Mandab in the west to the Malacca, Sunda, and Lambok Straits in the east. The United States should acknowledge South Asia as India’s sphere of influence: Afghanistan, Pakistan, Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, and the Maldives. In maritime terms, India’s sphere of influence would encompass the Arabian Sea to the Gulf of Oman down to the Gulf of Aden and south to the Indian Ocean to the Seychelles, Mauritius, and the Maldives, then across to Sri Lanka and on to the eastern Indian Ocean and Bay of Bengal to the Malacca, Sunda, and Lambok Straits. This Indian sphere of influence, which is comparable in scope to the British Raj, would serve as a counterbalance to China and block the expansion of Chinese influence to the Indian subcontinent. India shares its northeastern (Arunachal Pradesh) and northwestern (Kashmir) borders with China. In 1962, India fought and lost a land war with China over disputed borders in both regions. Since then, pending a negotiated resolution, the line of control serves as the de facto border. Clearly, in any future conflict with China, India would seek to choke off China’s access to oil imports from the Persian Gulf and Africa.

Historically, as K. M. Panikkar, a renowned Indian diplomat and strategist, has articulated in his seminal 1945 book, *India and the Indian Ocean: The Influence of Sea Power on Indian History*, control of the Indian Ocean has been the key to India’s power and influence over South Asia. Today, India is in the midst of a major naval expansion designed to establish the country as the South Asia regional hegemon. India (like China) is overwhelmingly dependent upon oil imports, primarily from the Persian Gulf. In 2010, oil imports of 2.2 million bbls/d accounted for 70 percent of total Indian oil consumption. Persian Gulf imports, mainly from Saudi Arabia and Iran, of 1.4 million bbls/d represented nearly 45 percent of Indian oil consumption. Moreover, as Iraqi oil production is restored, Iran and Iraq, which together have oil reserves


nearly equal to the oil reserves of Saudi Arabia, will make the Strait of Hormuz an even more vital choke point from India’s perspective. ²³ For India, there are no alternative land pipelines for oil and gas imports from the Persian Gulf—it is completely dependent upon the Arabian Sea SLOCs. A possible pipeline linking Iran to India via Pakistan would be hostage to India-Pakistan tensions and is unlikely to materialize until there is Pakistan-India détente and normalization. ²⁴

From India’s energy security perspective, oil imports from Iran are more reliable (in the sense that Iran is unlikely to be influenced by pressure from the United States, Saudi Arabia, China, or Pakistan to curtail oil exports to India). Shia Iran and Iraq are considered more independent suppliers of oil and gas to India than Sunni Saudi Arabia. Oil imports from Saudi Arabia are vulnerable to India-Pakistan tensions, given the close security and religious ties between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia (in extremis, the Saudis could suspend oil exports to India). Likewise, in view of Saudi dependence on the United States for its national security, India is highly sensitive to the possibility that the United States could pressure Saudi Arabia to cut off oil exports to India in order to coerce India to follow US policies.

Given the centrality of the Indian Ocean SLOCs to both US and Indian grand strategy, the navies of both countries will need to develop cooperative mechanisms to share dominance over the Indian Ocean. US-India strategic cooperation in five key areas can be particularly attractive.

First, the 2008 US-India Nuclear Agreement, which lays the foundation for nuclear cooperation in the energy field, should be actively pursued to help India expand its civilian nuclear energy program. Developing nuclear energy as an alternative to oil and gas imports is an important objective for India as nuclear power currently provides only one percent of India’s energy requirements. ²⁵

Second, to help India’s energy diversification objectives, the US should increase its cooperation in providing clean coal technology to take advantage of India’s abundant, but low quality, coal resources. ²⁶

Third, the United States should aggressively expand its support for the modernization and expansion of India’s military, particularly the Indian navy, through competitive supply arrangements, including by facilitating domestic production agreements that would assure technology sharing as well as an uninterruptable supply of military equipment. India is particularly sensitive to limitations on its strategic autonomy and, therefore, prefers arrangements that include technology transfer

²³ Saudi Arabia has estimated oil reserves of 263 billion barrels while Iran and Iraq together have oil reserves of 252 billion barrels. See EIA, “2011 World Proved Reserves,” http://www.eia.gov.
²⁴ A possible Iran-Pakistan-India pipeline has been discussed since 1994. EIA, India: Country Analysis Brief.
²⁶ About 70 percent of India’s electricity is provided by coal-powered generating facilities. Despite having the world’s third largest coal reserves, India’s indigenous coal is of such low quality the country must import high-quality coal for 10 percent of its total coal consumption. See EIA, India: Country Analysis Brief.
and domestic production as a hedge against a suspension of arms deliveries.\textsuperscript{27} India must have the capability of independently denying China access to the Indian Ocean SLOCs and repelling any Chinese military attack against India’s northern border.

Fourth, the United States should make an effort to encourage coordinated approaches among the US, India, Japan, and Australia with respect to economic development programs aimed at Bangladesh and Myanmar, since the stability of these two countries is important for peace in the northeastern part of the Indian subcontinent and in the Bay of Bengal, the gateway to the Malacca Straits.

Fifth, as the United States completes its withdrawal from Afghanistan and Pakistan by 2014, it will be particularly important for the United States to coordinate closely with India as a stable Afghanistan and Pakistan would be a vital national interest of India. Both India and Iran have a shared geopolitical interest in seeing that any future government in Afghanistan is not dominated by Taliban and other Pakistan-affiliated Islamic extremists. Likewise, India and Iran, both of which border Pakistan, have a shared interest in seeing that Pakistan, a nuclear-armed state, does not fall under the influence of Sunni Islamic extremists. Accordingly, the United States should be sensitive to the fact that, in addition to cooperating on energy issues, India and Iran are likely to cooperate closely on Afghanistan and Pakistan issues, including opening up their markets for trade.

Ultimately, Indonesia and India provide break-walls that, in case of US-China conflict, would facilitate (or at least not impede) a US blockade against Chinese oil and gas imports from the Persian Gulf and Africa. While having the ability to deny China access to these SLOCs is necessary, it is unlikely to be sufficient. The United States must be able to prevent China from obtaining Persian Gulf oil and gas via alternative land-based pipelines.\textsuperscript{28} For the blockade to be successful, therefore, the United States must be able to convince Iran, through persuasion or coercion, to suspend energy exports to China. Iranian cooperation, or at least acquiescence, will be critical to credibly threaten China with denial of access to Persian Gulf oil and gas at the very source. Accordingly, the United States should push the reset button, make a fundamental course correction, and pursue a path of cooperation and détente with Iran.

The United States and Iran

The United States should take the following six steps to a new and mutually beneficial relationship with Iran. First, the United States should sponsor a United Nations Security Council resolution that would terminate all United Nations (UN) sanctions against Iran in return for Iran’s agreement to cap voluntarily its uranium enrichment at the current 20 percent level of purity, and allow International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) monitoring of Iran’s enrichment activities under the provisions of the existing Safeguards Agreement in force and the Additional

\textsuperscript{27} The recent US failure to win a contract to supply India with fighter jets illustrates the fiercely competitive nature of military sales to India. See Rama Lakshmi, “US firms lose out on India’s fighter jet contract,” The Washington Post, April 28, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com.

\textsuperscript{28} The United States must also be in a position to shut down future Iranian pipelines that would connect to Turkmenistan for onward connection to the existing Turkmenistan-China and Turkmenistan-Kazakhstan-China pipeline network.
Protocols agreement (signed by Iran in 2003 but not approved by Iran’s Majlis or parliament). The termination would not be effective until the Additional Protocols agreement is declared to be in force by Iran upon approval by the Majlis.

Second, following passage of the foregoing UN Security Council resolution, the US president, through an executive order, should suspend all US sanctions against Iran, provided he issues a finding that Iran is in compliance with its agreement to cap uranium enrichment at the 20 percent level and is subject to monitoring by the IAEA under the Safeguards and Additional Protocols Agreements. The Supreme Leader would also issue a further declaration (perhaps in the form of an additional religious proclamation or fatwa) reaffirming that the use of nuclear weapons is contrary to the tenets of Islam and that Iran does not seek nuclear weapons.

Third, the United States should propose the mutual restoration of full diplomatic relations between the two countries, with an Iranian embassy in Washington, D.C. and a US embassy in Tehran.

Fourth, the United States should declare its willingness, in the interests of safety, to replace at cost the Tehran Research Reactor (which is currently used to produce medical isotopes) originally provided by the United States to Iran in 1967 with a new, safer reactor for medical purposes. The United States would also indicate its willingness, on a commercial basis, to sell to Iran a nuclear reactor for producing electricity, the fuel rods for which would be provided by an enrichment facility in Iran to be operated jointly by the United States and Iran.

Fifth, the United States should invite Iran (along with the various Afghan factions, Pakistan, and India) to participate in discussions relating to the stabilization of Afghanistan. A similar invitation would be extended to Iran (and the various Syrian factions, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia), if there are discussions with respect to the stabilization of Syria (and, possibly, Lebanon). Separately, the United States should also invite Israel to the talks on Syria and Lebanon.

Sixth, taking a leaf from President Nixon’s path-breaking visit to China in 1972, the US president should visit Iran. At that time, the president and the Supreme Leader would jointly declare the mutual interest of each nation in peaceful relations, and, in accordance with the provisions of the UN Charter and international law, neither nation

29 The fuel plates required to operate the Tehran Research Reactor (which produces medical isotopes) contain uranium enriched to a 20 percent level of purity. Weapons grade uranium requires enrichment to a 90 percent level of purity. Nuclear power plants to produce electricity require 5 percent enriched uranium. For the texts of the model safeguards and additional protocols agreements, see International Atomic Energy Agency, “Safeguards Legal Framework,” http://www.iaea.org.


31 The United States-supplied Tehran Research Reactor (TRR) was designed to operate with 93 percent enriched uranium (weapons-grade) fuel plates. In 1987, Iran, which was unable to obtain the required weapons grade fuel plates after the 1979 revolution, reconfigured the TRR to operate with 20 percent enriched uranium fuel plates. See “Nuclear Iran – Tehran Nuclear Research Center, Tehran Research Reactor (TRR),” The Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS), http://www.isisnucleariran.org.

32 Israel is an interested party since it occupies the Golan Heights (Syria) and Sheba Farms (Lebanon) as a result of the June 1967 Arab-Israeli war.
would initiate an armed attack against the other. Concurrently, the US president would acknowledge Iran’s right as a signatory of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) to pursue a peaceful nuclear energy program, and announce that he would submit a recommendation to Congress to repeal US sanctions against Iran. Separately, Iran’s Majlis would pass a resolution declaring Iran’s nuclear program would be guided by the Supreme Leader’s fatwa against nuclear weapons. The Majlis would also pass a resolution reaffirming Iran’s support of the Arab Peace Initiative of 2002 with respect to the Israel-Palestine (and the broader Israel-Arab) dispute.

The United States does not want Iran to possess nuclear weapons because such weapons are Iran’s only effective deterrent against a devastating attack. Ultimately, a nuclear-armed Iran limits US options to deny China access to Persian Gulf energy resources since the United States will be unable to compel Iran to suspend oil and gas exports to China. It is for this reason the current path of coercion involving crippling sanctions, covert operations including subversion and targeted killings, and public threats of an Israeli attack on Iran’s nuclear enrichment facilities, has been pursued so aggressively. The inexorable logic of coercive brinkmanship, however, is if neither side blinks, war is quite likely the unintended end result. Yet, an armed attack on Iran short of occupation will only mean Iran will accelerate its effort to enrich nuclear material to weapons-grade level so it can develop nuclear weapons as a deterrent. Moreover, an Iran for whom the United States has become a mortal enemy will not agree to refrain from supplying China with oil and gas in any future US-China conflict.

The harsh reality is that attacking Iran is not a viable option. If the United States cannot intimidate Iran to leave itself open to attack, the only realistic alternative is to persuade Iran to cooperate with the United States through a policy of détente so Iran is convinced that cooperation with the United States (or at least neutrality) does not adversely affect

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33 Linking a verifiable pledge against the possession of nuclear weapons with a pledge against armed attack was a key element in the ultimate resolution of the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. President Kennedy’s October 27 message to Chairman Khrushchev proposed that in return for the verifiable removal of nuclear weapons from Cuba, the United States would pledge not to invade Cuba: “We, on our part, would agree . . . to give assurances against an invasion of Cuba.” See, Ernest R. May and Philip D. Zelikow, eds., *The Kennedy Tapes: Inside the White House During the Cuban Missile Crisis* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2002), 387. Under the UN Charter, members must refrain from the threat or use of force in settling disputes (Article 2), but also retain the inherent right of self-defense against an armed attack (Article 51). See Charter of the United Nations, http://www.un.org.

34 Article IV of the Treaty states that: “Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination.” For text of NPT, see *IAEA Information Circular*, April 22, 1970, http://www.iaea.org.

35 Iran, along with all other members of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, originally endorsed the Arab Peace Initiative in May 2003 at the OIC foreign ministers summit in Tehran. See footnote 15 above.


37 In a sober assessment of the military attack option, a group of leading national security experts pointed out: “Even in order to fulfill the stated objective of ensuring that Iran never acquires a nuclear bomb, the US would need to conduct a significantly expanded air and sea war over a prolonged period of time, like several years. If the US decided to seek a more ambitious objective, such as regime change or undermining Iran’s influence . . . then an even greater commitment of force would be required to occupy all or part of the country.” See *Iran Project Report: Weighing Benefits and Costs of Military Action Against Iran*, September 1, 2012, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, http://www.wilsoncenter.org.
Iran's vital national interests. Indeed, an attack on Iran, short of an occupation of the country, will not achieve its objective of termination of Iran’s nuclear enrichment activities.\footnote{Five former national security officials have warned in an op-ed: “[W]ithout large numbers of troops on the ground, we doubt that US military attacks from the air—even if supplemented by other means such as drones, covert operations and cyberattacks—could eliminate Iran's capability to build a nuclear weapon, unseat the regime or force it to capitulate to US demands.” See William J. Fallon et al., “Iran talk: What's in a war?” The Washington Post, September 30, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com.} The very public and repeated assessment of senior US defense officials is that an attack on Iran will not lead to either behavior change or regime change, but just the opposite, with the opposition rallying around the current regime.\footnote{Phil Stewart, “Gates sees Iran rift, says strike would unite country,” Reuters, November 16, 2010, http://www.reuters.com.} There is no reason to believe any of the current leaders of the Iranian opposition have a fundamental disagreement with Iran’s nuclear program.\footnote{At least as far back as February 11, 2003, then CIA Director George Tenet, in testimony before Congress, advised that: “No Iranian government, regardless of its ideological leanings, is likely to willingly abandon WMD programs that are seen as guaranteeing Iran’s security.” See George Tenet, “The Worldwide Threat in 2003: Evolving Dangers in a Complex World,” February 11, 2003, Testimony Before Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, https://www.cia.gov.} Indeed, opposition leaders such as Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and Mohammad Khatami, both former presidents, and Mir Hossein Mousavi, a former prime minister, supported Iran’s nuclear program when they were previously in government and continue to do so now. In fact, when President Ahmadinejad tentatively agreed in October 2009 to a deal for shipping 5 percent enriched uranium for future delivery of fuel plates enriched to the 20 percent level for the Tehran Research Reactor, the deal was denounced by the opposition.\footnote{See Reza Derakhshi, Fredrik Dahl, and Robin Pomeroy, “Iran's Mousavi criticizes nuclear fuel plan: report,” Reuters, October 29, 2009, http://www.reuters.com.}

Iranian leaders are rational actors and can be expected to behave accordingly.\footnote{Gen. Martin Dempsey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has stated that: “[W]e are of the opinion that the Iranian regime is a rational actor.” See “CJCS Interview with Fareed Zakaria for 'GPS'” (CNN), February 14, 2012, http://www.jcs.mil. Gen. James R. Clapper, Director of National Intelligence, has reiterated the intelligence community assessment that Iran is a rational actor: “We judge Iran's nuclear decisionmaking is guided by a cost-benefit approach.” See James R. Clapper, “Unclassified Statement for the Record on the Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community for the Senate Committee on Armed Services,” February 16, 2012, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, http://www.dni.gov.} Certainly, US policy with respect to Iran is based on an assessment that Iranian decisionmakers are rational actors.\footnote{Office of the Director of National Intelligence, National Intelligence Estimate - Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities, November 2007, http://www.dni.gov.} A nuclear-armed Iran could be deterred just as other nuclear-armed adversaries are deterred—by the threat of mutual destruction. The effectiveness and applicability of nuclear deterrence with respect to a nuclear-armed Iran is occasionally acknowledged by leaders in Europe, the United States, and Israel. For example, then President Jacques Chirac of France observed in a 1 February 2007 interview: “I would say that what is dangerous about this situation is not the fact of having a nuclear bomb . . . It [Iranian bomb] would not have gone 200 meters into the atmosphere before Tehran would be razed.”\footnote{Elaine Sciolino and Katrin Bennhold, “Chirac Strays from Assailing a Nuclear Iran,” The New York Times, February 1, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com.} Former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton also asserted in a 21 July 2009 interview that: “[I]f the United States extends a defense umbrella over the [Gulf] region . . . it’s unlikely that Iran will be any stronger or safer . . . once they have a nuclear
weapon." Similar to this, Ehud Barak, a former prime minister and defense minister of Israel, in a 16 September 2009 interview declared that: “I am not among those who believe Iran is an existential issue for Israel . . . Israel is strong.” Accordingly, a nuclear-armed Iran would not necessarily pose an existential threat to the United States or Israel.

This does not indicate the absence of armed conflict between nuclear-armed nations. Such conflicts, however, will not involve vital national interests and thus will be limited. In the 1999 confrontation between India and Pakistan in the Kargil area of Indian-held Kashmir, both countries were on a trajectory leading to possible nuclear war. India and Pakistan quickly reconsidered their vital interests, recalculted their risk estimates, and drew back from the nuclear precipice. Moreover, the specter of a nuclear-armed Iran precipitating nuclear proliferation in the region is not credible. Turkey, a member of NATO, has the explicit US nuclear shield protecting all NATO members. Saudi Arabia, which does not have the technical capability or infrastructure, has relied on an implicit US nuclear umbrella (and, perhaps, ambiguity as to whether it may have access to nuclear weapons provided by Pakistan). A weakened Iraq is now closely allied with Iran, and Syria is in the throes of an incipient civil war. Egypt has no economic capacity to sustain a nuclear weapons program and is, for all practical purposes, bankrupt—it relies on generous US aid to the tune of $1.5 billion a year to keep the Egyptian economy afloat.

Also unlikely is the prospect of Iran transferring nuclear weapons to nonstate actors, particularly terrorist groups. Such transfers of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) have never occurred for the simple reason that no state possessing WMD is willing to lose control over their use (out of fear the WMD could be used against the transferring state by such uncontrollable terrorist groups). Nuclear blackmail against a nonnuclear adversary is also an unlikely scenario. None of the existing nuclear states have successfully intimidated a nonnuclear adversary with threats (implied or explicit) of a nuclear attack. Nuclear blackmail cannot succeed because the threat of a nuclear attack is not credible with respect to furthering the blackmailer’s nonvital national interests. Indeed, nuclear powers that seek to achieve objectives that do not rise to the level of vital national interests do so through conventional military means if all other nonnuclear options fail. The case of a nuclear-armed Iran would be no different.


48 Turkey reaffirmed its confidence in the US nuclear umbrella when it agreed to the withdrawal of nuclear-armed Jupiter missiles based in Turkey as part of the resolution of the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. For further background on this decision, see US Department of State Office of the Historian, State Department documents 358-397, contained in The Foreign Relations of the United States 1961-1963, vol. XVI, 1, http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v16/ch8. Turkey has given no indication that it has lost confidence in the US nuclear umbrella. In fact, in an effort to help resolve the Iranian nuclear issue, Turkey and Brazil jointly brokered a deal with Iran involving the swap of Iranian uranium enriched to the 5 percent level of purity for 20 percent enriched uranium fuel plates for use in the Tehran Research Reactor, which was rejected by the United States. See “Iran’s letter on fuel swap submitted to IAEA chief,” IRN-4, May 24, 2010, http://www.globalsecurity.org.
Détente with Iran will be opposed by Israel and Saudi Arabia since both consider Iran to be a strategic rival. In the case of Israel, the United States should offer to enter into a defense treaty pursuant to which an armed attack on Israel within its 4 June 1967 borders by any state (other than a NATO member state, Japan, and Australia—all formal US allies who are unlikely to engage in an armed conflict with Israel) would be considered an armed attack on the United States, provided that the attack on Israel was not in response to an Israeli preemptive or preventive attack on such state launched by Israel without prior approval of the president of the United States.\textsuperscript{49} Israel’s 4 June 1967 borders are its internationally recognized borders. If Israel’s borders are subsequently adjusted as a result of agreements reached with Syria, Lebanon, or the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), as appropriate, the US-Israel defense treaty would be automatically amended to reflect Israel’s revised borders. Ever since its founding in 1932, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has relied on a de facto alliance with the United States for its national security. The Saudi regime must be responsible for its own security with respect to conventional military threats. Accordingly, the United States should offer a formal defense treaty with Saudi Arabia pursuant to which a nuclear attack on Saudi Arabia by Iran, Russia, or China would be considered to be a nuclear attack on the United States.

The United States must also encourage Saudi Arabia to reorient its oil exports from port facilities on the Persian Gulf to port facilities on the Red Sea to eliminate Saudi vulnerability to the threat of Iranian closure of the Strait of Hormuz. The existing East-West pipeline currently carries oil from the Kingdom’s Eastern Province (the primary oil producing area) to the port of Yanbu on the Red Sea.\textsuperscript{50} Only about a quarter of Saudi exports flow through this pipeline, mainly for Europe.\textsuperscript{51} The East-West pipeline should be expanded and additional parallel pipelines constructed together with additional Red Sea port facilities so virtually all Saudi exports are loaded on tankers at these ports. Thus, Saudi oil destined for Asia would exit the Red Sea through the Bab el Mandab to the Gulf of Aden, and then to the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean.

The United States can continue to be the preeminent global power in the twenty-first century. The proposed recalibration of American grand strategy to contain a rising China will help achieve this goal.

\textsuperscript{49} In the unlikely event of an armed conflict between Israel and Turkey, the United States would intervene to separate them and resolve the conflict through diplomacy. Certainly tensions over the Israel-Palestine dispute exist between Israel and Turkey, such as the Israeli boarding of \textit{Mavi Marmara}, a Turkish registered vessel attempting to breach the Gaza blockade. See “Q&A: Israeli deadly raid on aid flotilla,” \textit{BBC News}, 2 September 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk.


“War is the father and the king of all.”
—Heraclitus

Try as we might, war and armed conflict remain at the center of international relations and state policy. Success in war requires many things, but surely effective strategy must top the list. Why is making good strategy so hard? It is perhaps the most difficult task facing senior leaders in any government. Despite a wealth of sources and millennia of useful historical examples, sound strategic thinking more often than not eludes western democracies. Why?

History has a way of making strategy look simple and even inevitable. In the common narrative, for example, Pearl Harbor forced America into World War II, the United States adopted a “Europe first” approach, went to full mobilization, led victorious coalitions to smash the opposition, and then won the peace. The reality was very different, the outcome at the time far from certain, and the costs required far higher than expected. Strategic reality is more accurately captured by Churchill’s term “the strange voyage.”

Often begun with confidence and optimism, strategic ventures frequently end in frustration and indecisive outcomes.

Good strategy begins with basic questions. What are we trying to do? How much will it cost? How should we use what we have got to achieve the aim? The questions are simple. But answering them—thoughtfully, comprehensively, honestly, and dispassionately—is by far the exception to the rule. Failing to frame the problem correctly at the outset may be the most common, and disastrous, strategic error of all.

The first minefield is one of definition. Students, theorists, and practitioners of strategy face a bewildering range of competing and confusing terms. Thus we find national security strategy, national defense strategy, national military strategy, grand strategy, coalition strategy, regional strategy, theater strategy, and campaign strategy—to name a few. Where does one end and the other begin? Do they overlap? Or are some just synonyms? The word “strategy” derives from the Greek strategia “generalship,” and stratiados “my leader.” Classically, strategy was quite literally “the Art of the General.” Webster defines strategy as “the science and art of employing the political, economic, psychological, and

1 "Never, never, never believe any war will be smooth and easy, or that anyone who embarks on the strange voyage can measure the tides and hurricanes he will encounter. The statesman who yields to war fever must realize that once the signal is given, he is no longer the master of policy but the slave of unforeseeable and uncontrollable events." Sir Winston Churchill, My Early Life: A Roving Commission (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1930), 214.
military forces of a nation or group of nations to afford the maximum support to adopted policies in peace or war. The military prefers "a prudent idea or set of ideas for employing the instruments of national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater, national, and/or multinational objectives." Clausewitz defined strategy as "the art of the employment of battles as a means to gain the object of war." The great Moltke used "the practical adaptation of the means placed at a general’s disposal to the attainment of the object in view," famously observing that strategy is most often "a system of expedients." Liddell-Hart favored "the art of distributing and applying military means to fulfill the ends of policy" while Colin Gray describes strategy as "the threat and use of force for political reasons." A short definition often used at war colleges is "relating ends, ways and means to achieve a desired policy goal."

The next minefield is the process. Even if we think we know what we mean by "strategy," we need a way to make it. Here good intentions intrude. In most western political systems, strategy is created both top down and bottom up. In theory, political leaders come into office with a few big ideas, departments and ministries are consulted, a deliberative process follows, and decisions are made. Alternatively, an unforeseen crisis occurs, desks are cleared, very senior people huddle, rapid decisions are reached, and action follows.

Actual strategy is more opaque than these simple, clean models. Egos disrupt rational analysis. Institutional agendas trump overarching national interests. Current crises crowd out long-term planning. Personal relationships dominate or shut down formal processes. Budgets constrain strategic choices. Media leaks frustrate confidentiality. Domestic politics elbows in, and reelection politics distort altogether. Real strategy-making is at best strenuous and exacting, and at worst muddled, frustrating, and decidedly suboptimal.

Strategy matters. In the domain of armed conflict (and here we are not discussing political, business, or diplomatic strategies, but strategy in its classical sense), the price of failure can be high. The extreme penalty for failed strategy can be the fall of governments, loss of territory, even the destruction of the state itself. But lesser penalties are exacted as well in the loss of power and influence, in economic collapse or distress, in less capable and credible political and military institutions, and in a failure of national confidence and will. Strategists must ever bear in

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8 An example is the very methodical “Afghanistan Review” of the new Obama administration in early 2009.
9 For one case study in crisis decisionmaking, see the author’s “Presidential Decisionmaking and Use of Force: Case Study Grenada,” Parameters 21, no. 2 (Summer 1991): 61-72.
mind that in taking the state to war, victory becomes an end in itself. Even apart from the aims of the war, defeat can shatter or debilitate the state for years to come, possibly leading to permanent and irrevocable decline. Put another way, avoiding defeat can become the overarching aim—indeed, independent of the original strategic objective.

Military leaders work hard to overcome the frustrations and unknowns of strategy through a deliberate planning process, a comprehensive and detailed approach to problem solving that can take months and even years to complete. Seasoned commanders know that no plan survives contact with the enemy—meaning every situation is unique and will require unique solutions. But the laborious study, assessment, and analysis that goes into a detailed plan provides context, understanding, and much useful preparatory work, particularly in the logistical and administrative preparations needed to move large forces to remote locations and keep them there. Good planning provides a foundation from which to “flex” according to the situation at hand.

Political leaders usually approach strategic problems differently. Most are lawyers or business people with substantial political careers behind them. They may lack patience with military detail, may distrust strong military types, are keen to assert civilian control, and focus more on broad objectives than on the ways and means of strategy. Naturally, past experiences and processes that have worked well in the political or business arenas are applied to military problems with quite different results. Casual observers might think that strategy-making at the highest levels is a sophisticated, deliberative process conducted by civilian and military officials who have been prepared by arduous academic training informed by practical experience. All too often it isn’t.

Ideally, both civilian and military leaders will forge synergistic, interactive, mutually dependent relationships. Good will and mutual respect will go far to reconcile different cultures and perspectives in the interest of teamwork and battlefield success. But the dialogue will always remain unequal. In this regard, the fashionable view that civilian leaders not only can but should intrude at will far into the professional military domain is both wrong and dangerous. While they may overlap, there are clear lanes that distinguish appropriate civilian and military areas of responsibility and expertise. All parties understand and accept the doctrine of ultimate civilian control; however, asserting civilian control is the poorest excuse for bad strategy.

Civilian leaders have an unquestioned right to set the aims, provide the resources and identify the parameters that guide and bound armed conflict. They have an unchallenged right to select and remove military commanders, set strategic priorities and, when necessary, direct changes in strategy. For their part, military leaders have a right—indeed, a duty—to insist on clarity in framing strategic objectives and to object

10 Eliot A. Cohen is a primary exponent of this view. See his “Supreme Command in the 21st Century,” Joint Force Quarterly (Summer 2002): 48-54.

11 An apposite example is Secretary Rumsfeld’s tinkering with military deployment orders in Afghanistan and Iraq. See Peter M. Shane, Madison’s Nightmare: How Executive Power Threatens American Democracy (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2008), 73.
when, in their best military judgment, either the constraints applied or the resources provided preclude success.\textsuperscript{12}

Prior to assuming office, many political leaders have little interaction with the military and with strategy itself. The lack of strategic training and practical experience cited above, if combined with a contempt for military expertise, can dislocate strategy altogether. Often in the post-war era, we see strategies advanced where the level of ambition outraces the resources provided, leading to protracted, costly, and open-ended ventures with decidedly unsatisfying outcomes.\textsuperscript{13}

In contrast, military leaders are generally cautious about use of force and, if ordered to fight, argue for larger and not smaller forces. The military preference for avoiding wars is based on an historical appreciation for how quickly violence gets out of hand, how devastating less-than-total victory can be for military institutions, and how painful and expensive success can be. The military preference for large forces is likely grounded in an intuitive understanding of the complexity and unpredictability of conflict.

One way to deal with these uncertainties is to overwhelm the problem with mass at the outset (Desert Storm being the obvious case in point). Larger forces, though harder to manage and more costly in the short term, provide more options and greater leverage amidst uncertainty, often leading to fewer casualties and lower costs than long, open-ended conflicts. In a sense they smother the friction of war and increase the chances of quick, decisive campaigns. Smaller forces, emphasizing air and sea power and special operations, may seem more transformational, but the historical record is on the side of the bigger battalions. “Transformation” has lost at least some of the glamour it enjoyed a decade ago, while more traditional approaches have grudgingly regained ground, as seen in the “surges” of Iraq and Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{14}

Political leaders and strategists should also be mindful of strategic culture, that mélange of history, tradition, custom, world view, economy, sociology, and political systems and mores that largely shapes how nations fight and for what causes. For example, there may be no agreed upon American theory of war, but an “American Way of War” surely exists, based on concepts of mass, firepower, technology, strong popular support, and a focus on decisive battle. “Good Wars” have historically followed this pattern, “Bad Wars” have not. While the analogy can be taken too far, it captures central truths that should inform our strategic calculations. Strategic culture is real and powerful, whether we acknowledge it or not.

So how do we to square the circle to make effective strategy? Clausewitz, of course, posited that the ideal solution was to combine the

\textsuperscript{12} This is the great lesson of H. R. McMaster’s classic Dereliction of Duty. It is now clear that the Joint Chiefs knew, early in the Vietnam conflict, that the strategy adopted would likely fail. But individually, and as a body, they both supported and enabled it, resulting in 58,000 US deaths, hundreds of thousands wounded, and a defeat that would take a generation to overcome. See H. R. McMaster, Dereliction of Duty: Johnson, McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies That Led to Vietnam (New York: Harper Collins, 1997).

\textsuperscript{13} The short, massive campaigns waged in Grenada, Panama, and the Gulf War stand in vivid contrast to Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan in this regard.

statesman and the commander into one—influenced, no doubt, by the experiences of Prussia at the hands of Napoleon. Those days are long gone, never to return. The challenge today is to optimize strategy in an interagency, highly political, multinational decision setting characterized by multiple threats, declining interest and knowledge of military affairs, financial stringency, and limited reservoirs of public support. Accordingly, the following strategic considerations might usefully be kept in mind.

Understand the Nature of the Conflict. This sounds easy but usually isn’t. Both in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as in Vietnam, the United States seems to have fundamentally misunderstood the nature of the conflict and to have persisted in the error for far too long. In each, intervention and initial success signaled not the end but the beginning of a long, expensive, tortuous conflict that dragged on far longer than most experts predicted. This is not Monday-morning quarterbacking. Strategists must be able to understand circumstances and make concrete assessments of the problems to be solved and how to solve them. Just as importantly, they must be ready to jettison failed policies and strategies and make new ones when needed.

Consult Your Interests First and Your Principles Always. Thucydides cautioned that states typically go to war for reasons of fear, honor, or interest. That doesn’t mean they always should. Interventions for moral or prestige reasons will always have a certain appeal; there will always be ample opportunities for that. When vital interests and national values coincide (as with the first Gulf War), the prospects of strong domestic support and ultimate success are immeasurably enhanced. When they don’t, expect trouble.

Unless You Have to, Don’t. Colin Powell kept the following quote from Thucydides on his desk: “of all manifestations of power, restraint impresses men most.” Military adventurism can be exhilarating when viewed from a distance.\textsuperscript{15} The sheer exercise of power for its own sake has an undeniable appeal, not often admitted by insiders. But all too often, war takes on a life of its own, and what seemed easy at the outset can become painful and difficult. Democracies, in particular, can tend towards “no win/no lose” approaches to conflict that seek to achieve grand strategic objectives with limited means, uncertain popular support, and a very low tolerance for casualties. This is not to say that only wars for survival should be fought (the Rwandan genocide comes to mind as a catastrophe that could and should have been prevented through the use of force). As a general rule, wars of choice should be avoided, and when fought, they should be fought to win quickly with crushing force.

Political Problems are Rarely Solved with Force. Throughout history we see attempts to use military power to solve political problems. Overwhelmingly, this approach fails unless the adversary is crushed absolutely and his society remade. Force can help eliminate or reduce violence and set conditions to support a political settlement, a valuable and important contribution, but it cannot solve ethnic, tribal, ideological, or inherently political conflicts in and of itself. This is

\textsuperscript{15} As aide-de-camp to the Secretary of the Army in 2001-02, the author personally witnessed this phenomenon in the Pentagon. After 9/11, there was much talk among political appointees about “putting heads on sticks.” The uniformed military were considerably more sober.
perhaps its most important limitation. Military power often appears to be useful because it is available and, superficially, both multipurpose and multicapable; however, it is best used to solve military problems.

Expect Bad Things to Happen in War. Clausewitz made much of the tendency of war and violence to run to extremes. The famous British Admiral John Arbuthnot Fisher echoed Clausewitz when he said “the essence of war is violence . . . moderation in war is imbecility.” That goes too far, but restraint is often the first casualty in war. For soldiers, but also for statesmen, war is a struggle for survival. And the struggle for survival is inherently impatient with limits. Strategists must understand and accept this basic truth. Civilians will be hurt, war crimes will occasionally happen, the press will likely not be an ally, and every mistake will be exploited by the political opposition. All these should be expected. Don’t think they can always be controlled or avoided.

If You Start, Finish—Quickly. It is, or should be, a maxim of war that the longer things take, the worse they tend to get. The US industrial base has declined to the point that sustained, high intensity conflict in particular may no longer be realistically possible. The Weinberger and Powell doctrines—essentially arguments to fight only for truly important objectives with overwhelming force—were largely discredited in later years by both political parties, with tragic results. Because popular support is finite and rarely open-ended, democracies can ill afford long, drawn out, inconclusive conflicts. In the end, they can cost far more in lives, treasure, political capital, and international standing. Extended conflicts provide time and space for war’s natural tendency to get out of hand. Short, sharp campaigns must ever be the ideal.

In War, the Military Instrument Leads. In peacetime (defined as the absence of armed conflict), diplomacy and diplomats have the interagency “lead” as first among equals, under the ultimate control of the head of government. Congressional or parliamentary support is also essential. During times of war, the interagency lead must pass to the defense establishment, personified by its civilian head. In a sense, all wars or conflicts represent a failure of diplomacy in that a judgment has been made that the state’s strategic objectives cannot be realized except through force. This does not mean diplomacy ceases, or it is unimportant. On the contrary, sound strategy demands that the type of peace we desire remains uppermost in our councils and deliberations, and that channels—often indirect—remain open even during war. But for all that, war has its own ineluctable logic, a logic that strains against the kind of modulated, nuanced “signaling” often favored by diplomats. Even as the battle rages, they must have their say, but the louder voice should be the secretary or minister heading the defense apparatus and his chief of defense.

Don’t Be Seduced by Airpower. When selecting strategic options, statesmen are often encouraged to choose “safer, easier, cheaper” options relying principally on airpower. The prospect of lower casualties and quick wins is always seductive. Airpower is the jewel in America’s strategic crown, but it is no panacea and, like all forms of military power,

16 Clausewitz, On War, 77.
it has real limitations—chiefly, its inability to control (as opposed to influence) the ground and the populations which live there. Almost always, a balanced application of military force will be needed to achieve decisive outcomes in war.

**More Money Does Not Equal More Defense.** In the United States, at least, it can be politically dangerous to argue that more defense spending may not equate to a safer America. The combination of extraordinarily powerful defense industries, strong congressional support, and willing military leaders means controlling defense costs is a herculean task. Yet responsible strategists must confront cost and risk as necessary elements of the game. When two B2 stealth bombers cost more than the entire inventory of main battle tanks in the active Army, something is wrong. Political dynamics and service advocacy cannot be removed from the politics of defense, but statesmen and strategists should still fight for strategic balance.

**Beware Partisan Politics.** Wars should always be waged to achieve political and not just military objectives; however, statesmen should also be aware of unduly politicizing armed conflict. American political debates and controversies used to “stop at the water’s edge.” Today, strategies may be adopted simply because they are not what the other party advocates. Democrats in Congress in 2008 strenuously opposed the Iraq surge mostly because it was a Republican idea. Republicans in 2011 fought President Obama over war powers in Libya for political, not strategic, reasons. A good rule of thumb is to set realistic, achievable political aims; get the strategy right; and then work hard to achieve consensus and bipartisan support. Policy should always drive strategy.

**One Crisis at a Time.** Historically, senior leaders struggle to cope with multiple simultaneous crises. By definition, every war is a crisis. Even in democracies, the circle of actual decisionmakers is surprisingly small. Though most won’t admit it, these few cannot devote their scarcest resource—their time—to effectively manage more than one complex crisis at once. This argues, whenever possible, for a limited and conservative approach to uses of force, or as Lincoln put it when urged to declare war on Britain during the Civil War, “one war at a time.”

**Keep Things Brutally Simple.** In 1944, General Eisenhower was given the following directive: “you will enter the continent of Europe and . . . undertake operations aimed at the heart of Germany and the destruction of her armed forces.” The mission statement in Afghanistan today is by contrast vastly more ambiguous and vague:

In support of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, ISAF conducts operations in Afghanistan to reduce the capability and will of the insurgency, support the growth in capacity and capability of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), and facilitate improvements in governance and socio-economic development in order to provide a secure environment for sustainable stability that is observable to the population.

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18 On taking office in 1992, the Clinton administration withdrew most US troops from Somalia then waged an aggressive kinetic campaign against factional leader Mohammed Farah Aideed. The result was a military and political disaster that prevented any response to the Rwandan genocide on grounds of “political” liability. See the author’s “Hard Day’s Night: A Retrospective on the American Intervention in Somalia,” *Joint Force Quarterly* 54 (July 2009): 128-135.

If soldiers and voters are to understand and support something as serious as war, it should be explained—and explainable—in brutally simple language. If we cannot do so, we should go back to the drawing board.

**Limit Your Level of Ambition.** US interventions in Korea, Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan evolved into protracted, painful, debilitating, and indecisive conflicts. In contrast, Grenada, Panama, and the Gulf War were quick, overwhelming successes. The difference between the two categories is apparent. A strategy with clear, achievable aims matched with ample resources usually wins. Fuzzy, overly ambitious goals supported by inadequate resources usually do not.

**Get Comfortable with Bad Options.** When President George W. Bush decided to send 30,000 additional “surge” troops to Iraq in late 2007, he did so against the advice of the uniformed military, the Secretaries of State and Defense, and his Vice President. “Doubling down” when most thought defeat was inevitable, was not popular. Few things in war are. A clearly optimal way ahead rarely presents itself. For strategists, reality can often mean choosing the least worst from a range of “bad” options. The courage to make hard decisions is necessary equipment for strategists.

**Be Careful When Choosing Sides.** Most conflicts will force us to choose sides, but rarely will our choices be savory. The history of conflict since the end of World War II has often been messy and ambiguous, with “allies” like Diem, Tudjman, Maliki, and Karzai often implicated in corruption and human rights abuses. This reality may force us to pit our values against our interests and to make hard and painful choices with unknown consequences. This judgment must be made by presidents and prime ministers as an inherently political calculation. Rarely can it be avoided or evaded. Sometimes, as in the Balkans, holding our nose and going with soiled allies can lead to better outcomes. In others, as we see in Iraq and Afghanistan, those choices may be our undoing.

**Challenge Your Assumptions.** Ideology can be a primary driver for use of force, and it is often buttressed with bad assumptions. In Vietnam, President Lyndon Baines Johnson and his principal advisers assumed North Vietnam was a proxy for Moscow, not a true nationalist movement. In Kosovo in 1999, both North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and US senior leaders presumed that a quick, one week air campaign would drive Serbian forces out. In Iraq in 2003, the administration believed the Shia would welcome US troops enthusiastically, the Iraqi army could be disarmed without consequence, and a makeshift transitional government could be quickly assembled to take command of postconflict responsibilities. Few of these assumptions underwent searching analysis, nor were contrarian views allowed to challenge the prevailing consensus. (In this regard, a “devil’s advocate” like Robert Kennedy during the Cuban Missile Crisis can be a game saver.) No strategy can overcome flawed assumptions. They are the foundation on which victory will stand or fall.

**Think Through Second and Third Order Effects.** Thinking through the problem is not a strong suit of western strategists. When Baghdad falls, what can we expect on the day after? Will massive amounts of international assistance fuel widespread corruption? Can the host nation military maintain order, or should it be disbanded? Are
sanctuaries in Pakistan an unsolvable problem? In most cases, these are not unknowables. They are the bread and butter of responsible strategy-making. Senior political and military leaders must demand and enforce thorough and painstaking strategic assessments to think the problem through and beyond the initial objectives.

**Tomorrow’s Crisis is Not Predictable.** Despite a plethora of intelligence agencies and scores of “experts” in and out of government, forecasting the next crisis is unlikely, as the Arab Spring demonstrated yet again. Pearl Harbor, the German attack in the Ardennes, the North Korean attack across the 38th parallel, the collapse of the Soviet Union, Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait, 9/11, and the Arab Spring—these intelligence failures are the rule, not the exception. Broad, overarching strategies, as well as more tailored regional and theater strategies, must be flexible enough to react to the unforeseen. Crisis response mechanisms must be thoroughly rehearsed. Strategists must expect surprises and be ready.

**It’s Always Better with Allies.** Churchill loved to say “the only thing worse than fighting with allies is fighting without them.”²⁰ Going it alone may be necessary on very rare occasions, but in general, a lack of allies should give serious pause. Fighting with allies confers political legitimacy as well as extra troops. Often, allies can provide counsel and an outside perspective that can usefully enhance strategic decision-making. Sometimes, a threat may be so real and immediate that a unilateral use of force is the only resort. Still, when long-standing allies with congruent interests balk, maybe it’s time to take a deep breath and think again. Maybe they know something we don’t?

**Beware of Service Agendas.** Each military service has its own culture, and all will fight to maximize freedom of action and access to resources. If taken too far, weighting one service risks unbalancing the strategic equilibrium that represents America’s true military strength. A military that is only globally effective in one dimension, or at one gradient along the spectrum of conflict, is a military shorn of the versatility and synergism that underpins America’s true military dominance. Strategists should look for service agendas and ensure they do not corrupt military planning. In general, theater and operational commanders should control the military assets and activities present in their theater under the principle of unity of command (particularly true for Special Operations Forces). Service-specific strategic approaches should be viewed skeptically.

**Carefully Count the Cost.** We often hear the catch phrase “blood and treasure.” But we do not always think deeply about what it means. Experienced commanders know what it means to lose soldiers in war. Statesmen should also reflect on the terrible price of victory, and the terrible penalty of defeat, when contemplating the use of force. The prospect of casualties should not deter them from making the tough decisions when they are right and necessary. The prospect of needless or unnecessary casualties—and inevitably, this will include innocent civilians—absolutely should. The financial cost of war can also be tragic. The cost of the war in Iraq, projected by the US administration at $50 billion

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(financed, the public was told, largely by Iraqi oil revenues), approached $1 trillion—a truly colossal sum.\textsuperscript{21} The terrible irony is not only the price in lives and dollars, but also that so many “experts” were so far off the mark. Whatever that’s called, it’s not strategy.

This short paper is not a strategic tour d’horizon, but it offers practical observations and recommendations grounded in history and a classical understanding of strategic thought. Some will find it excessively cautious or conservative. But all questions of war and peace should be approached so. Military action remains an indispensable tool in what continues to be an unstable and dangerous world. Yet it is one of many, often exacting a terrible price. Statesmen and soldiers alike are well advised to think long and deeply before sowing the wind. Sound and sober strategy-making can show us how.

\textsuperscript{21} Total US government expenditures for Iraq are placed at $823 billion, with indirect costs far in excess of $1 trillion. See Amy Belasco, \textit{The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11} (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service RL33110, March 29, 2011), 3.
Like his earlier works, Tom Ricks’s *The Generals: American Military Command from World War II to Today*, is entertaining and provocative, and has deservedly been the topic of numerous reviews, blog posts, and discussions around the military. His central thesis is that, since the Korean War, the United States Army has failed to produce general officers who could link strategy with tactics. Ricks argues that one remedy for this deficiency is for the Army to resume publicly firing division commanders for operational shortcomings as a means to increase accountability, like it did under General George C. Marshall in World War II. Ricks is on solid evidentiary ground while documenting the patterns of relief for World War II division commanders, supplementing stories with data. But in his discussion of the leaders of every war afterwards, Ricks switches to anecdotes and assertions to make his case. He also shifts his reference group from division commanders to theater commanders. Much has changed in seventy years, but then, as now, there are significant differences between two and four star generals. Thus, his argument is on less-than-solid ground as he compares World War II “two-star apples” to modern “four-star oranges.”

A better framework to understand modern generalship must be constructed upon an examination of the quantitative data on the forty-one major generals who have led divisions in combat since 9/11. Building on that information, it is relatively easy to see the apples-to-apples comparison between the eras. Remarkably, statistics show that since 9/11 combat division commanders were promoted at a significantly lower rate than their peers. Contrary to Ricks’s assertion, there has been a subtle form of accountability as combat division commanders have been quietly asked to retire, or assigned to positions with little future, at a slightly lower rate than their World War II predecessors were relieved. Like the old barracks ballad quoted by General Douglas MacArthur, underperforming division commanders were quietly asked to “fade away.”

**Historical Background—World War II and Vietnam Division Commanders**

US Army divisions have marched off to fight every major conflict since World War I. As weapons, tactics, and enemies changed, so did the division structure from the Great War’s square, to World War II’s triangular, to the 1950’s pentomic, and to the 1980’s Army

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1 Data for the post-9/11 Division Commanders was obtained from the US Army General Officer Management Office (GOMO) web page https://www.gomo.army.mil and the Iraq and Afghanistan Order of Battles compiled by Wesley Morgan at http://www.understandingwar.org and http://www.understandingwar.org. It is as accurate as I could make it, as of 1 March 2013.

of Excellence.\(^3\) Though not so important as in the days before the brigade-centric “Modular Army,” the division headquarters is still a crucial echelon of command. It is the largest fixed organization and the lowest level of general officer command, placing it at the vital nexus of cohesion, combat effectiveness, and flag-rank responsibility. Typically commanded by a major general, a division contains between 17,000 and 21,000 soldiers organized in several subordinate brigades. The modern division works at the operational level of war, which, according to current doctrine, “[links] tactics and strategy by establishing operational objectives . . . .”\(^4\) For example, in Iraq in 2005, Multi-National Division-Baghdad (built around the headquarters of the 3rd Infantry Division commanded by Major General William Webster) planned, coordinated, and synchronized the actions of over a dozen US and Iraqi brigades in its counterinsurgency efforts across a city of over 5,000,000 people. Simply put, division headquarters—and their commanders—matter.

Measures of success for a combat division changed with each conflict. In a conventional campaign such as World War II, the success or failure of a division was easily measured through statistics such as terrain seized, casualties inflicted, casualties suffered, prisoners captured, and missions accomplished. In a counterinsurgency campaign, such as Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq, the performance of a division has been more difficult to measure—metrics such as terrain seized, body counts, public opinion, casualties suffered, money spent, intelligence tips received, taxes collected, and violence levels are still important; however, they tell only part of the story. Consequently, clear battlefield failure is tougher to discern. Personnel management systems were different as well: World War II used an individual replacement system, Vietnam was fought using an individual rotation system, and Afghanistan and Iraq employed a unit rotation system. While the size and organization of the US Army and the processes by which it managed its division commanders have changed over time, there still is utility in comparing and contrasting each period, but only as long as we acknowledge the differences between then and now.

During World War II, 155 different general officers commanded the 87 US Army divisions engaged in combat.\(^5\) This equates to roughly two commanding generals per division (some had a single commander; others had several). With an average combat command of 10 months, division commanders served until promoted, selected for corps command, fired, or were injured. This system forced Army leaders to make difficult decisions about division commanders. With such a large number of commanders, some who rapidly achieved their rank as the Army Ground Forces expanded from 800,000 to 2.7 million soldiers, sixteen division commanders, or only 10 percent, were not capable and were relieved of command. Ricks touts these public firings as an

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effective management tool, particularly when Marshall allowed at least five of those relieved a second opportunity to command elsewhere. Of course, only a small number of commanders were fired; indeed, twenty-four were promoted to command a corps, a selection rate of 15 percent. By using a crude comparison of promotions versus reliefs, the carrot was wielded slightly more often than the stick.

The Vietnam War’s protracted counterinsurgency provides some additional context. During that war, forty-six different commanders led the eight divisions that fought in Southeast Asia. Interestingly, as the war was winding down in 1969, two generals, Major Generals Albert Milloy and Harris Hollis, commanded a division for several months until it cased its colors (1st Infantry Division and 9th Infantry Division, respectively) and then took command of a second division in combat (the Americal Division and 25th Infantry Division, respectively). This was not a second chance like some commanders received in World War II; rather, it was an example of the Army ensuring its best commanders continued to lead soldiers in combat. The average division commander led his division for 9 months in combat, only a month less than their World War II predecessors. Among the forty-six, two retired as brigadier generals (4 percent), eighteen retired as major generals (39 percent), twenty retired as lieutenant generals (20 percent), and six retired as generals (13 percent). Overall, twenty-six were promoted, which was a 56 percent selection rate. Two were admonished (4 percent): one general was demoted to brigadier general for his role in the cover-up of the My Lai massacre, and one was relieved for his lack of leadership during the defense of Firebase Mary Ann. Two were killed in action. On the positive side, ten division commanders were selected for higher combat commands, a 22 percent promotion rate, slightly higher than their World War II predecessors. To continue the crude comparison, the carrot was used about five times more often than the stick.

Post 9/11 Division Commanders

Although there are a variety of two-star commands, the US Army’s eleven (the 7th Infantry Division was activated in 2012) active duty and eight National Guard divisions are widely considered the most prestigious of the commands at that rank. Additionally, two other organizations commanded by major generals, the Southern European Task Force, or SETAF, and Task Force Olympia performed division-like roles in combat, and will be considered divisions for this article. Of these divisions and commands, fourteen have served in Afghanistan or Iraq; three—3rd Infantry Division, 10th Mountain Division, and the

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8 The data set used for this analysis began with eighty individuals—all active duty division commanders since 9/11 (seventy-seven) and the three National Guard division commanders who led their divisions in combat. The current group of twelve serving division commanders (ten noncombat and two combat) were excluded from the analysis since they have not had the opportunity to be promoted.
82nd Airborne Division—have deployed five times each.\(^9\) After 9/11, the Army’s unit rotational system called for division commanders to train their formation for a year, deploy the unit, conduct combat operations, redeploy, and then move on to a different assignment. Even with the rotations, the average combat command was 12.3 months, several months longer than those of their World War II or Vietnam predecessors. At the height of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the theater commander was a general while operational command was exercised by a lieutenant general. These higher commanders also rotated on different cycles increasing the challenge of evaluating, promoting, and removing subordinate division commanders.\(^10\) The Army’s decision to allow underperforming division commanders to complete their deployment, rather than firing them midtour, minimized disruptions to divisions fighting complex insurgencies at the “graduate level of war.”\(^11\) It was a decision to create the best environment for success in a long, irregular war, rather than achieve a slight, temporary improvement. As Ricks rightly concludes, today’s rotational system decreased the impetus for the US Army to relieve division commanders.\(^12\) However, underachieving division commanders in the modern era did not get a second chance to command; indeed, some retired, others were never promoted, and others were promoted but not given the plum jobs. Thus, the combination of ambiguous metrics for success—longer commands, and no second chances—makes the modern era a more difficult environment than World War II in which to lead 20,000 soldiers.

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\(^9\) Forty-three separate commanders led these division headquarters. Two are currently deployed to Afghanistan—1st Infantry Division and 3rd Infantry Division. They have been excluded from the data set, resulting in forty-one.

\(^10\) The generals commanded longer than 12 months, while the lieutenant generals deployed for one year.


\(^12\) Ricks, *The Generals*, 277-278.
The current system of general officer management is complex and opaque. While the promotion to major general is a permanent action following selection by a promotion board, the promotion to lieutenant general is a temporary one, following selection by the Army and Department of Defense leadership for a 3-star billet. To move ahead after division command, a major general must be recommended by the Chief of Staff of the Army to the Secretary of Defense, who, in turn, recommends him to the President to serve in one of the approximately forty positions designated for a lieutenant general. The President then nominates the officer for appointment to both the rank and the position. Before the major general can assume the new rank and position though, the officer must be confirmed by the Senate. Most officers typically serve three years or longer at the new rank. With over 300 total general officers in the US Army and 100 major generals, division commanders have traditionally been seen as the US Army’s best major generals and those destined for the highest levels of responsibility. Promotion rates reflect this fact—division commanders have been selected for advancement to lieutenant general at a rate of more than 80 percent for the past twenty-five years.

Since 2001, however, this trend has changed, with combat division commanders experiencing a markedly lower rate of promotion than their garrison, or noncombat, colleagues. Excluding current division commanders, there have been sixty-eight division commanders since 9/11—among them, sixteen remained as major generals (24 percent) after completing division command, thirty-six were promoted to lieutenant general (52 percent), and sixteen were selected to be generals (24 percent).
percent). Overall, this is a 76 percent promotion rate. Interestingly, there is quite a difference in promotion rates among the three subsets: garrison, or noncombat, commanders enjoyed an 82 percent promotion rate, Afghanistan veterans had a 77 percent rate, and Iraq veterans had a 71 percent rate. Clearly, the combat veterans’ performance was evaluated differently than their garrison peers.

Since 9/11, as one would expect, most division commanders have deployed to Afghanistan or Iraq. Only twenty-seven division commanders, or 40 percent, did not. The bulk of these nondeploying commanders served prior to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, after the 2011 end of mission in Iraq, or as the commander of the 2nd Infantry Division in Korea. Quite unexpectedly, leading a division that did not deploy to combat was the surest path to promotion, with a promotion rate of 82 percent. Obviously, the promotion system created in a peacetime Army continued to recognize peacetime performance. While less risky, however, the ultimate rewards for these commanders were not as substantial as were those who commanded in combat; the commanders who never deployed generally did not ultimately end up in the top jobs in the military, although three did lead Combatant Commands and one was selected to lead the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan, but was later relieved.

The forty-one major generals who have led divisions in combat since 9/11 are an impressive group of officers. Most had experienced combat before taking command, with Lieutenant General James Huggins taking command with six prior combat deployments. Then Major General Martin Dempsey led the 1st Armored Division in Baghdad for seventeen months from 2003 to 2004, almost double the average of the Vietnam cohort. None came close to the twenty-seven months of division command amassed by then Major General David Rodriguez who first led Task Force Olympia in Iraq and then the 82nd Airborne Division in Afghanistan. It should be noted that Rodriguez’ second command was not a second chance following a relief, as was the case for some World War II commanders, but again a deliberate decision to give one of the Army’s best two opportunities to lead soldiers in combat. Thirty members of the group were selected for promotion while eleven went on to wear four stars. Overall, this represents a 73 percent promotion rate for former combat division commanders, which is well below the historic promotion rate for former division commanders but about fifteen percent higher than the Vietnam cohort’s rate of 56 percent. While the risk was greater for these commanders, the rewards were, too: this...
group was picked for the best jobs with five later serving as combatant commanders and five serving as theater commanders.\textsuperscript{20}

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Comparison of Division Commanders between the Eras\textsuperscript{21}

Afghanistan is sometimes referred to as the graveyard of empires; however, it was not the graveyard of many division commanders’ careers. Only three out of thirteen major generals who led divisions in the Hindu Kush were not selected for promotion. Overall, the promotion rate for the Afghanistan veterans was 77 percent, higher than those who fought in Iraq, but still surprisingly lower than their noncombat peers. This raises the question: Has the change in emphasis between the theaters had an effect upon the division commanders? Breaking Operation Enduring Freedom into two phases—the 2001-2008, or the “forgotten war,” to the 2009-2013, or “the Afghanistan Surge and later,”—reveals an interesting shift. Division commanders from the later phase have been promoted at a higher rate than their predecessors: 71 percent of the division commanders were promoted in the early phase (five out of seven), while 83 percent of the commanders were promoted in the later phase (five out of six).\textsuperscript{22} Still, Afghanistan division commanders were selected at a lower rate than their noncombat peers.

Those who commanded in Iraq have fared worse in terms of promotion—only twenty out of twenty-eight, or 71 percent, of division commanders were selected. This is the lowest promotion rate of the three subsets. There are obviously many differences between Afghanistan and

\textsuperscript{20} This is about 24 percent of the former combat commanders. The five Combatant Commanders were General Ham, AFRICOM; General Rodriguez, AFRICOM; General Austin, CENTCOM; General Petraeus CENTCOM; and General Dempsey, CENTCOM. The theater commanders were General Petraeus, MNF-I and ISAF; General Thurman, USFK; General Odierno, MNF-I; and General Austin, USF-I.

\textsuperscript{21} The data for the table was compiled from a variety of sources. For WW II, Wade, World War II Division Commanders, 1-3 and Ricks, The Generals, 7 and 37. For Vietnam, Stanton, Vietnam Order of Battle, 62-86; Olejniczak, ed., The Register of Graduates, USMA, 2006, 1-4-3-192; and numerous obituaries. For Post-9/11, US Army GOMO web page https://www.gomo.army.mil and the Iraq and Afghanistan Order of Battles by Wesley Morgan from the Institute for the Study of War.

\textsuperscript{22} The phasing construct is mine. It does not correspond to the five phases of the Afghanistan Campaign used by the US military.
Iraq, but the combination of two insurgencies, a higher level of violence, ethnic cleansing, a nascent civil war, and the presence of multiple divisions in-country, made Iraq the more challenging theater. To analyze the division commanders among the three phases of the war—the 2003 invasion, the 2004-06 “struggle,” and the 2007-11 “surge success and aftermath”—it would be expected that promotion rates would be higher for both the successful invasion and the surge and its aftermath.\textsuperscript{23} The 2003 commanders were promoted at a 66 percent rate (three out of five), the 2004-06 commanders were promoted at an 82 percent rate (nine out of eleven), and the 2007-11 group was promoted at a 67 percent rate (eight out of twelve). Remarkably, the commanders during the surge and afterwards, when the United States arguably achieved its greatest success in Iraq, were recognized for their contributions at a lower rate than those who led formations during the portion of the war when we were assessed to be losing! Ultimately, the crucible of combat in Iraq resulted in less division commanders selected for promotion than their peers.

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Post-9/11 Comparison Between Division Commander Subsets\textsuperscript{24}

Of course, even with this lower rate of promotion, many of the division commanders in Afghanistan and Iraq have been selected for promotion and command at even higher echelons in combat. Due to the operational and strategic skills they demonstrated as division commanders, eleven have gone on to command at least one higher-level combat command and four have commanded multiple higher headquarters. The modern selection rate of 27 percent for higher combat command is greater than the World War II selection rate of 15 percent and the Vietnam rate of 22 percent; however, that is understandable, with six higher combat commands between the military training and advising,

\textsuperscript{23} The phasing construct is mine. It does not correspond to the seven phases of the Iraq Campaign used by the US military.

\textsuperscript{24} The data for the table was compiled from a variety of sources, especially US Army GOMO webpage https://www.gomo.army.mil and the Iraq and Afghanistan Order of Battles by Wesley Morgan from the Institute for the Study of War.
operational, and theater commands in both theaters.\textsuperscript{25} Returning to the crude analogy a final time, carrots have been used about four times more often than sticks.

It is difficult to imagine that throughout two protracted, complex, and often frustrating wars, at least a few of the forty-one division commanders were not up to the job. Yet the US Army has not formally relieved any two-star commanders in Afghanistan or Iraq. During World War II, Marshall relieved one in ten commanders, which if applied to the modern cohort, would have resulted in the relief of four combat division commanders for operational shortcomings.\textsuperscript{26} Vietnam, a counterinsurgency with a rotational model, is perhaps a better comparison, but applying the rate from that war would mean that two of the modern commanders should have been removed.\textsuperscript{27} Public firings seem to have disappeared from the modern US Army. Or did they evolve?

This brings us back to the surprisingly low promotion rate for combat division commanders when compared both to historic rates and to their contemporaries who did not command in combat. If the combat division commanders had been promoted at the same rate as their noncombat peers, thirty-three combat commanders should have been selected to be three- or four-star generals. Yet, only thirty were, leaving eleven to remain as major generals. There are many reasons why former division commanders remain at or retire at the rank of major general—poor performance, personal reasons, a media gaffe, reaching retirement age, or a realization that no other job will compare to their combat experience. For the sake of the argument though, let’s assume that the eleven major generals desired to be promoted to lieutenant general. This suggests that three of the former combat division commanders were marginalized or given a soft relief after their command. Without further interviews and reviews of performance reports, it is pure speculation to discuss which of the eleven were marginalized. While not as public or dramatic as General Marshall’s approach, the US Army subtly removed underperforming division commanders from the ranks at a slightly lower rate than it did during World War II.

**Conclusion**

*The Generals* is a provocative contribution to the discussion about the US Army’s selection of senior leaders and it may help the Army improve its general officer management system. Based on my three-and-a-half years of combat experience in Afghanistan and Iraq, I agree with Mr. Ricks’s assessment that there was plenty of good and bad generalship exhibited in both theaters. But, Ricks blames poor generalship in Afghanistan and Iraq on the absence of accountability among general officers. He assumes, however, that public firings are the only means of ensuring such accountability.

\textsuperscript{25} The Afghanistan higher commands are ISAF, Combined Joint Task Force-180 (JCTF-180), the ISAF Joint Command (IJG), and the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan/Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (NTM-A/CSTC-A). The Iraq higher commands were Combined Joint Task Force-7 (CJTF-7), Multi-National Forces-Iraq (MNF-I), Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I), and Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I).

\textsuperscript{26} If 10 percent of the forty-one combat division commanders had been relieved there would be an attrition of four commanders.

\textsuperscript{27} If 4 percent of the forty-one combat division commanders had been relieved there would be two commanders removed.
Understanding the empirical data on division commanders provides a richer context to Ricks’s book and enables a better comparison between the eras. The Army has chosen to minimize disruption to divisions in combat while maximizing the opportunity for the unit to return to a higher level of performance prior to the next deployment. However, that has come at a cost of providing the stakeholder, the US Army and the American people, with visible signs of responsibility at the operational level. With public opinion so critical in long-term counterinsurgencies, it is understandable that the Army chooses optimum performance over transparency, though this subtle method is not the way Tom Ricks prefers.
Recent Works on Afghanistan

Afghantsy: The Russians in Afghanistan, 1979-89
By Rodric Braithwaite

Reviewed by Ali A. Jalali, Distinguished Professor at the Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies, National Defense University, former Interior Minister of Afghanistan and author of several books on Afghan military history

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and the decade-long military operation of the Russian forces in the remote Central Asian country has been the subject of numerous studies focused on how the Soviet Army fought and lost the asymmetric war against the Western-backed Afghan Mujahedin guerrillas. The US-led military intervention in Afghanistan, in the wake of the 9/11 al Qaeda-linked terrorist attacks in the United States from bases in Taliban-controlled Afghanistan, has spurred renewed interest in studying the military history of the turbulent land, particularly the Soviet war against the Afghan resistance in the 1980s.

Rodric Braithwaite’s Afghantsy: The Russians in Afghanistan, 1979-89 is one of the latest books on the subject and the most comprehensive story of the Soviet experience in Afghanistan. The author uses a variety of primary sources, which are all listed with full citations in the order of presentation at the end of the volume. As it is based almost exclusively on Russian sources, it is, in fact, the Russian perspective of the drawn-out conflict. From the Soviets’ “road to Kabul” to their entanglement in the “disasters of war” and eventually to “the long goodbye,” Braithwaite walks the reader through the minutiae of the Soviet soldiers’ saga, for the most part in their own words. It is a story of how the Soviet leadership, its military, and individual servicemen behaved in the face of a difficult situation. Further, the tome exemplifies the effect of the brutal war on Soviet soldiers, their families, and the Russian public at large.

The author shares the common assertion of Soviet military historians that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was defensive in nature and aimed at ending a “chaotic situation” in the Soviet Union’s immediate neighborhood. However, the author acknowledges the invasion came against a backdrop of a long history of Russian interests in Afghanistan. “It took the Russians two hundred and fifty years to go to Kabul,” he writes. The ambition to expand southward in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and efforts to secure its frontiers against “undesirable neighbors” and protect the pacified areas from lawless tribes beyond them have long been the hallmark of Russian strategy in the greater Central Asia and Afghanistan. Afghanistan was the ultimate prize of the Great Game that the Russian and British empires played in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and served as a peaceful battleground for the East-West ideological battle during the Cold War. The author takes note of a number of previous irritations in Russo-Afghan relations following the Russian conquest of Central Asia: Russian troops’ encroachment on the Afghan territory in 1885 and capture of Panjdeh—a border town between Herat and Marv; the Red Army’s furious pursuit of Central Asian rebels across the Afghan border in the 1920s; and Stalin’s military
intervention in northern Afghanistan in 1929 to support the beleaguered Afghan King Amanullah.

The bloody Communist coup of 27 April 1978, was led by the Moscow-backed People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), overthrew the Daud regime, and opened the way for wider involvement of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. But, as General Lyakhovski, a Soviet chronicler of the war and an Afghan war veteran, was quoted as saying: the April coup was the beginning of “tragedy not only for Afghanistan but for the Soviet Union as well.” Although Braithwaite does not see reliable evidence that the Russians were behind the coup, the PDPA leaders were closely linked to the Soviet Committee for State Security (KGB) since the early 1950s and were under Soviet control. Whatever role the Soviet Union did or did not play in staging the coup, the Communist takeover was not the immediate reason to put in motion the forthcoming Soviet invasion of the country. The actual milestone of the intervention came in March 1979 with the explosion of violence in Herat. The anti-Soviet uprising took a heavy toll on Soviet citizens and thousands of Afghans who died in the rebellion and its aftermath.

The author offers a compelling analysis that although the Afghan government was able to put down the Herat uprising, “a slow burning fuse had been lit,” leading to the invasion nine months later. Following the Herat disturbance, the Soviet leaders rejected the Afghan government’s persistent requests for the deployment of Soviet troops to counter rising insurgency. During the next several months, unrest and armed resistance continued to spread throughout the country. The author particularly highlights the infighting within the PDPA which grew increasingly bloody until it culminated in September with PDPA General Secretary Nur Mohammad Taraki’s murder by Prime Minister Hafizullah Amin. As Braithwaite writes, the murder of Taraki, a Brezhnev favorite, was the last straw and led to the mood in Moscow shifting in favor of military intervention to depose Amin and install a more reliable Afghan leader. The choice was Barak Karmal, the leader of the Parcham dissident faction within the PDPA who was living in exile in Eastern Europe. Meanwhile, Soviet military preparation for contingencies started as early as April 1979 with several special purpose units deployed to Afghanistan between April and September.

In pursuance of the Soviet General Staff classification, the author divides the conduct of the Soviet war into four phases: the invasion (December 1979-February 1980), military operations to pacify the country (March 1980-April 1985), Afghanzation of the war (April 1985-end of 1986), and the withdrawal (November 1986-February 1989). The nature of combat action, structure of forces, command and control issues, and level of cooperation with Afghan government forces are outlined in each phase. The study is rich with the personal experiences of the Soviet fighters and brief on actual military operations, which are mostly anecdotal. It reviews only two large-scale operations in detail: the Panjsher Operation in 1984 and Zhawar/Magestral Operation in 1985-86 in Paktia-Khost provinces.

Braithwaite’s chapter on “Nation Builders” is the most unconvincing part of the book. In line with official Soviet assertions, the author gives the impression the occupiers were involved in nation-building projects even while the war against the Afghan resistance was ongoing.
However, the amount of Soviet building effort pales in comparison with the destruction caused by the occupation. This period would be better described as nation spoiling than nation building. High on the delusion of revolutionary makeover of a traditional society, the “nation-building” project was ideologically driven and, as the author agrees, was an “ultimately futile attempt to build socialism.” The Soviets and their Afghan allies were so out of touch with the realities of Afghan society that President Taraki told a visiting Soviet official in July 1978 to “come back in a year, by which time the mosques would be empty.” What actually happened was the opposite—protesting attempts to impose alien values on them, most Afghans moved closer to their Islamic faith—a shift eventually exploited by religious extremists to influence the political scene. The occupiers were determined to destroy the socio-political system the resistance was tried to preserve.

The author provides many examples of the brutality of Soviet soldiers who deliberately killed members of the civilian population. Yet the author sounds apologetic by asserting that civilian casualties during the civil war of the 1990s and the American-backed campaign to expel the Taliban in 2001, “equaled, if not exceeded, the horrors that occurred between 1979 and 1989.” On the contrary, during the civil war the number of civilians killed was estimated in tens of thousands, while conservative estimates by the United Nations and Amnesty International of Afghan deaths during the Soviet war are over one million. The Soviets never attempted counterinsurgency but made efforts to destroy the rural areas to deny sanctuaries to the resistance and force the population to move to major cities for easier control or to drive them into exile. Twenty percent of the Afghan population (more than five million people) was driven into exile in Pakistan and Iran during the Soviet conflict.

Since the study draws heavily on Russian sources and narratives, it emphasizes the Soviet experience of the war, thus limiting the Afghan perspective and misrepresenting certain realities. The book offers the most comprehensive and useful details of how the Soviet Union became entangled in the Afghan imbroglio, why it decided to invade, how it fought the Afghan resistance, and how and when it made the decision under Gorbachev’s leadership in 1986 to leave. However, when the study does reference the Afghan narrative, it often makes ill-founded assertions based on historical inaccuracies. The references on the Afghan Mujahedin forces are the most disappointing part of the book. They are impaired by unrealistic assessment.

The author’s dash through Afghan history and culture is also replete with factual errors and problematic interpretations about the political system of Afghanistan and its ethnic issues. One of the most serious mistakes is to list the Taraki-Amin crackdown on the Karmal-led Parcham faction as having occurred in 1979; it actually took place a year earlier in the summer of 1978. Barak Karmal was not a Pashtun. Anahita Ratebzad was not the first Afghan woman appointed to a senior political position under the Communists as the author asserts; there were many women serving as cabinet ministers, parliament members and other senior officials in the 1960s and 1970s before the Communist takeover. Tashkent is in Uzbekistan, not Turkmenistan; Yakub, the head of the Afghan Army under Amin was not Amin’s son-in-law nor was Ahmad Akbar, the security chief, his cousin; and the 40th Army was
under the Turkistan Military District, not the Turkmenistan Military District. Shaving the heads of Afghan recruits is not against the Afghan culture. The 21 February 1979, demonstration in Kabul was a spontaneous public uprising, not an event staged by an American Central Intelligence Agency agent. There has never been an Anglican Church in Afghanistan near the Pakistani border. Soviet prisoners were never incarcerated in the Afghan Pul-e Charkhi Prison. The author’s acceptance of the Soviets’ claims that despite the brutalities they committed the Soviet soldiers “got on with the Afghan population rather well—better than the NATO soldiers who succeeded them” is incongruous. Finally, throughout the book Afghan geographic names are inaccurately transliterated from Russian into English. “Punjsher,” a well-known location has been distortedly spelled as “Pandsher.”

Despite the various inaccuracies, Afghantsy: the Russians in Afghanistan, 1979-89 has its own merits and is the best available source for a comprehensive account of the Soviet experience in Afghanistan. No doubt the study dispels many myths of the Cold War and clarifies many unanswered questions about the Soviet military occupation of Afghanistan during the 1980s. However, because of its exclusive focus on the Soviet side of the story, it does spawn many misrepresentations about the realities of the Afghan battleground where the Soviet-Mujahedin struggle was played out. For a more balanced view, this book should be read along with other studies such as Peter Tomsen’s The Wars of Afghanistan: Messianic Terrorism, Tribal Conflicts, and the Failures of Great Powers.

Operation Anaconda: America’s First Major Battle in Afghanistan
by Lester W. Grau and Dodge Billingsley

Reviewed by Colonel Robert M. Cassidy, US Army, a military professor at the US Naval War College, served as a special assistant to the operational commander in Afghanistan in 2010-11

Les Grau and Dodge Billingsley offer keen insight in their historical account of Operation Anaconda. Both authors are eminently qualified to write such a book. Les Grau is an Afghanistan expert and has written prolifically about the Soviet-Afghan War. Dodge Billingsley is a daring combat journalist who covered the first Russian-Chechen War of 1994-96 and was on the ground in the Shar-i Kot Valley during Operation Anaconda. This book focuses on the tactical level, much like Grau’s earlier work The Bear Went over the Mountain. This poorly planned and executed operation shines a light on the conspicuously regrettable arrogance and ignorance engendered in the Pentagon and US Central Command during the first years of the Afghan War. The detailed anatomy of the March 2002 debacle in the Shar-i Kot Valley is an enduring testimony to strategic failure of significant magnitude mainly because various officials and planners in the Pentagon did not comprehend or plan for any long-term outcome in Afghanistan or Pakistan. To be certain, in the 2001-02 period, US military thinking, doctrine, and organization were focused almost exclusively on potential adversaries. Ultimately, this book recalls the fundamental risks in engaging in wars without fully understanding
the enemy, our own capabilities, and the type of conflict we were about to enter into.

The book’s beginning includes a cogent quote attributed to Field Marshal William Slim: “preparation for war is an expensive, burdensome business, yet there is one important part of it that costs little—study.” This aptly sets the context for *Operation Anaconda*; there were few people in the US defense community in early 2002 who knew much about Afghanistan or about fighting irregular forces in the Hindu Kush. As a result, the Pentagon and CENTCOM failed to understand and apply the many lessons from the Soviet-Afghan War. The United States undertook the early Afghan War with too few forces and ad hoc and convoluted command and control arrangements. The leadership in the Pentagon mistakenly inferred the Soviets had failed in Afghanistan because they had committed too many forces. A large part of the explanation for the Soviets’ failure, however, was that they had too few of the right type of forces, fought with the wrong tactics, and were hamstrung by a convoluted command and control. Anaconda was, to a degree, a metaphor for the first eight years of the war—years that saw forces employing untenable tactics encumbered by ludicrously complicated command and control arrangements. Anaconda violated almost every axiom that students of military art and science learn. It was an ad hoc and poorly planned fight, with terrible interservice coordination, abysmal command and control, and far too few forces. In fact, these forces essentially occupied the enemy’s engagement area in a disastrously piecemeal manner. *Operation Anaconda* does a good job of detailing the poor command and control interservice coordination between the Army and the US Air Force, and the almost cavalier attitude that characterized a number of the Sea, Air, Land (SEAL) teams. These self-imposed obstacles to effective military operations combined with the inexorable friction and fog of combat to make Operation Anaconda a close-call in terms of which side was victorious. It was really only the audacity and tenacity of some very good junior and mid-level tactical leaders that prevented the operation from becoming a debacle. The alarming and incredible insight that comes from this account is how closely many of the mistakes in the battle mirrored the blunders evident in Operation Urgent Fury in Grenada two decades earlier. Similar operational omissions and errors that cost lives in Grenada were repeated. It was the experience of Grenada that precipitated the US Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. Indeed, this legislation’s primary purpose was to improve joint command and control and cooperation among the services, and between special and conventional forces. Yet, 16 years after Goldwater-Nichols, identical command and control blunders and fratricidal gaffes were repeated in a remote Afghan valley.

The positive side of this story is that since that forsaken battle, now almost a decade ago, the current campaign, resources, and leadership in Afghanistan are the best since the war began in October 2001. The combined operations of coalition and Afghan forces have taken away the Taliban’s momentum and sustained unambiguous gains, having driven the Taliban out of key areas and safe havens in places like Helmand and Kandahar. Even still, command, control, and interoperability of the services, conventional forces, and all types of special operations
forces, have truly witnessed unprecedented effectiveness and lethality in places like the Helmand River Valley.

This reviewer needs to make two final points. One is that this book comes with an excellent documentary assembled by the authors. This video amplifies some interesting facets of the operation and is a useful supplement to the book. The second aspect is there are some factual errors in the book. An example appears in the beginning of the book where it mistakes the date for Pakistan's 1971 war with India as 1973. Another example is an error that lists the date of the 1991 Persian Gulf War to repel Saddam Hussein's forces from Kuwait as 1981 (on page 47). Finally, in the concluding chapter, the authors claim that until this battle, the US military had not had a major fight in more than a decade. But the October 1993 Battle of Mogadishu was a major battle of commensurate intensity resulting in a number of casualties and deaths.
KONTUM: The Battle to Save South Vietnam

By Thomas P. McKenna

Reviewed by Sean N. Kalic, is an Associate professor in the Department of Military History at the US Army Command and General Staff College and the author of US President and the Militarization of Space 1946-1967

Thomas McKenna in Kontum writes a thorough and insightful account about the Easter Offensive launched by the North Vietnamese in Spring 1972. McKenna rightfully asserts that the massive operation conducted by the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) was the largest military offensive since the Chinese incursion across the Yalu River in Korea in October 1950. Furthermore, he makes the argument that the NVA launched the massive invasion “because they thought that the Vietnamization was succeeding.” Additionally, he makes a very strong point that this major combat action took place as President Nixon announced a reduction of 20,000 troops in Vietnam. This point becomes significant as McKenna highlights the fact that no US ground forces participated in the fight. So as to not confuse the point, McKenna provides a detailed discussion of the role of Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MAVC) advisors in the Easter Offensive. In addition, McKenna, who was an Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) advisor in Kontum, highlights the role the United States Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, and Army aviation assets played in the fight to blunt and repel the North’s attack. For McKenna the triumph of ARVN and US advisors during the Easter Offensive serves as a critical success within the larger public understanding of Vietnam as a failure, especially in the post Tet Offensive period.

To advance his sound and well-supported argument, McKenna focuses on providing the reader with a detailed understanding of the overall strategic situation in Vietnam in the spring of 1972. In addition to balancing the demands of the desire of the United States to withdraw and significantly reduce its military commitments to South Vietnam, while preparing and building ARVN forces for the eventual overall withdrawal of all US forces, McKenna skillfully elaborates on the tactical capabilities and organization of the NVA. For McKenna, a significant point is that the North Vietnamese Army was equipped with weapons from the Soviet Union and China. The NVA possessed modern T-54 tanks and shoulder-fired SA-7 anti-aircraft surface-to-air missiles. Yet these modern advancements contrasted with the recruiting needs of the NVA which required harsh impressment tactics to build the necessary manpower to launch the North Vietnamese invasion. Beyond just providing statistics and commentary on the nature of the NVA prior to the invasion, the chapters in which McKenna presents these significant points become critical to understanding that the war in 1972 was far from over and that despite the typical narrative that ARVN could not stand and fight, he highlights that they did with the support of US air power.

McKenna’s analysis is spot-on and at times almost seems to provide some hope that the South Vietnamese can ultimately defend themselves against the expanding capabilities and strength of the NVA. However,
McKenna is quick to note that these hopeful sentiments are quickly tempered by the reality that ARVN forces range from totally incompetent to very capable and strong fighting units. The main problem he points out was that South Vietnam failed to have a unified and committed military that could readily defend itself against additional attacks from the North without the aid of the United States. In the end, he conveys a tragic story in which the eventual downfall of South Vietnam is inevitable.

Although McKenna's objective is to highlight the actions that took place at Kontum, he also provides a general overview of the entire Easter Offensive as it raged in the II and III Corps across South Vietnam. Even though McKenna admits that his book is not a complete history of the Easter Offensive and he strives to present only enough information to understand its context, he does indeed end up providing a very strong understanding of the situation in South Vietnam in the spring of 1972. However, as a result of his intent, McKenna leaves the reader wanting a more comprehensive account of the actions taking place in other areas. To satisfy this wish, it would be best to read McKenna's book in conjunction with *Abandoning Vietnam* and *An Loc* by James H. Willbanks. Willbanks, who also served as a US Army advisor in Vietnam during the Easter Offensive, provides a thorough understanding of the broad military and political context in *Abandoning Vietnam*, and a specific history of the battle of An Loc, which took place during the Easter Offensive as well. In many ways these two additional works provide complementary material to McKenna's and reinforce his overall thesis. Together, these works provide a comprehensive understanding of the nature of the war in Vietnam at a time when many people did not realize that a significant conventional military fight was occurring. This is not to say that McKenna's work does not stand on its own but rather, in conjunction with the works written by Willbanks, the reader gets a more detailed understanding of the overall significance of the Easter Offensive in the history of the US involvement in Vietnam.

Beyond being just a history of the Battle of Kontum, McKenna's well-written and balanced account provides exceptional insights in the NVA, ARVN, and the withering commitment of the United States. Kontum deserves serious attention by people interested in understanding the political, military, and tactical history of the major conventional operations that took place in the Spring of 1972. In the end, McKenna impressively supports his thesis. He logically argues that although the NVA launched the Easter Offensive to end Nixon's presidency, break the willingness of ARVN to continue fighting, and test the commitment of US air power, they failed to achieve any of their objectives. They were ultimately forced to negotiate with the United States, while refitting and rebuilding for their invasion in 1975 which was ultimately successful.
Black April: The Fall of South Vietnam, 1973-75
By George J. Veith

Reviewed by Dr. William J. Gregor, Professor of Social Sciences at the School of Advanced Military Studies, US Army Command and General Staff College

Black April: The Fall of South Vietnam, 1973-75 is the first of two volumes in which the author, George J. Veith, intends to provide a comprehensive analysis of the last two years of the war in Vietnam. This first book covers the military aspects of South Vietnam’s defeat and addresses five critical questions: (1) when did the North Vietnamese decide to renew the war; (2) how did they disguise their decision and construct a surprise assault on Ban Me Thuot; (3) why did President Nguyen Van Thieu withdraw his regular military forces from the Central Highlands; (4) what triggered South Vietnam’s fall militarily in 55 days; and (5) was the South Vietnamese military inept? The second volume will discuss the political and diplomatic efforts to implement the Paris Peace Accords and the social and economic events that had a profound impact on the war. Given the length and detail of this military account it was probably necessary to divide the work into two volumes. Unfortunately, limiting this volume’s scope to military decisions, actions, and events prevents the author from presenting a totally convincing explanation of South Vietnam’s collapse. Readers might supplement their understanding of this excellent volume by reading Dr. Henry Kissinger’s Ending the War in Vietnam while awaiting volume two.

Although many books explaining the fall of South Vietnam have been published, most of them date to the 1980s and none of their authors could take advantage of recently declassified documents, both American and North Vietnamese, that detail high-level decisionmaking. George Veith has exploited the newly available archive materials along with translations of North and South Vietnamese published general and unit histories, and interviews with the senior military participants. For example, his bibliography lists memoirs published in Vietnamese after 2000, and an account of the fall of the Saigon government through South Vietnamese documents published in 2010. Mr. Veith acknowledges in the introduction the problems that arise with the use of Communist official histories and the skepticism needed when trying to use journals published by Republic of Vietnam military associations. However, when the author deals with high-level military decisions and orders to subordinate commands, the text is usually drawn directly from archival documents and messages. Regrettably, the reader might not notice this because quotations taken from documents sometimes appear between quotation marks, other times in block quotes.

Despite the author’s claim, Black April is more a detailed, narrative account of military actions, events, and decisions than a clinical analysis of those decisions or an explanation of the events. This fact does not diminish the value of the book because it allows readers to interpret the facts themselves and mitigates what some might consider this book’s anticommunist bias. However, it does mean that some evidence a reader might expect in a military history is not present in the book. For example, despite the fact that 72 percent of the book deals with the 55 days of the...
Great Spring Offensive, there is no detailed assessment of the overall availability of supplies, repair parts, operational ready rates of aircraft, or air and sea lift capabilities. The impact on operations of those factors are discussed in the accounts of various battles and actions, but absent that aggregate data, the assessments about the impact of those factors on military capability are qualitative and relatively subjective. Nevertheless, the author’s judgments are reasonable given his account.

Following Mr. Veith’s historical account may initially be difficult for anyone not familiar with the Vietnam War or Vietnam’s geography. The author succeeds in presenting the military situation and military decisions from the perspectives of both the North and South Vietnamese, and, where applicable, the American perspective. He does this by discussing operations in each corps or front area and by weaving back and forth in time and in ever-shorter time periods. Thus, for example, the text might discuss North Vietnamese operations in II Corps from 12 to 15 March, then visit politburo decisions in Hanoi during that period, and then turn to South Vietnamese tactical actions in II Corps in the same period. Paying close attention to the shifting time periods is an absolute must. Some readers may also find keeping track of Vietnamese place-names daunting. Fourteen maps aid the reader, but even though they are very well designed, the reader might still wish to use the Internet to supplement the maps. Fortunately, the author’s clear style and skillful weaving of the full account will ultimately result in the reader being able to assemble a clear picture of the campaign and the military commanders. Veterans and students of the Vietnam War will find the detail rewarding.

Many of those who will read this book never experienced either the Vietnam War or the acrimonious antiwar political debate. The passage of time has undoubtedly faded the memories of the military veterans and antiwar activists. Removed from the heated arguments of the time and armed with currently available documentary evidence, many of the assessments made in the 1970s appear foolish or naïve. For example, congressional Democrats called for formation of a coalition government containing communists as a precondition for peace. However, in the event a coalition government formed, North Vietnam’s politburo planned to use it to infiltrate and overthrow the government of South Vietnam. The American left argued that the Saigon government suppressed the will of the people and absent the dictatorial Thieu regime, the South Vietnamese would quickly reconcile with the North. However, nowhere were the advancing Communist forces greeted as liberators and in the few instances when the Communist forces called for local populations to rise up, they refused. Democrat members of Congress opposing assistance to South Vietnam appear to have been dupes of the North Vietnamese regime because they argued that cutting off aid to South Vietnam would bring President Thieu and the North Vietnamese to the bargaining table. They were not aware that in April 1973, Le Duan and General Vo Nguyen Giap had formed a secret committee to plan the conquest of South Vietnam within a two-year period. Every congressional denial of aid reinforced the North’s determination to conquer South Vietnam by force and by October 1973, the return to military struggle was finalized and the small political-struggle faction silenced. After that
decision, the North Vietnamese government adjusted its public posture to reinforce the empty arguments in the US Congress.

*Black April* makes clear that the military forces of South Vietnam were neither inept nor cowardly and that during the Great Spring Offensive they often got the better of their North Vietnamese opponents tactically. Unfortunately, the effect of two years of active North Vietnamese preparations and of declining military aid to South Vietnam could not be reversed. The Paris Peace Treaty in January 1973 had created military planning constraints that a South Vietnamese government could not ignore if it hoped to obtain much needed American assistance. Adhering to those constraints led President Thieu to deploy his forces in positions where they could not be easily extracted or supported. Thus, when North Vietnamese tanks and artillery attacked and seized Ban Me Thuot in March 1975, the South Vietnamese government had neither the forces required to regain the city, nor the reserves nor transportation needed to cover a withdrawal. The South Vietnamese army might have fared better by stoutly defending its forward positions, but to what avail? The United States Congress had abandoned the US commitment to South Vietnam. Absent US assistance, the government of South Vietnam could not prevail. This detailed military account of the final days of South Vietnam provides a valuable correction to previous accounts. Given the numerous myths that have been perpetuated within the military about the Vietnam War, *Black April* is a must read for serving soldiers and Marines.
NEW PERSPECTIVES ON WORLD WAR I

The School of Hard Knocks: Combat Leadership in the American Expeditionary Forces

By Richard S. Faulkner

Reviewed by Colonel Dean A. Nowowiejski, PhD, United States Army, Retired, whose dissertation analyzed the American military governor of the Rhineland, MG Henry T. Allen, who previously commanded the 90th Division in the AEF

With The School of Hard Knocks, Shawn Faulkner has made a long overdue and critical addition to the historiography of American combat in World War I. He joins the recent contributions of Mark Ethan Grotelueschen, The AEF Way of War: The American Army and Combat in World War I; Edward G. Lengel, World War I Memories: An Annotated Bibliography of Personal Accounts Published in English Since 1919 and To Conquer Hell: The Meuse-Argonne, 1918, The Epic Battle That Ended the First World War; and Mitch Yockelson, Borrowed Soldiers: Americans Under British Command, 1918, in substantially expanding our understanding of just what happened to the United States Army in World War I. Faulkner’s emphasis is on the development and performance of small unit combat leaders during World War I, and his analysis is so thorough, the ultimate story so depressing for those who have led American soldiers, that the result is compelling but tragic. Faulkner mines his sources thoroughly and excellently, and covers all aspects of junior combat leader development, from training before commissioning through leadership of small units on the battlefield. His focus is on captains, lieutenants, and sergeants at the tip of the spear, principally infantry leaders of platoons and companies. Faulkner’s exegesis really falls into two parts. The first is a very thorough explanation of how combat leaders were selected, trained, and sent to Europe. The second is about what happened to them when they arrived.

Faulkner begins by analyzing the legacy of officership in the American Army leading into World War I. He lays bare the ineptitude and class prejudice of the Regular officer corps, who were not prepared for the rapid expansion of the Army, and imparted to officer trainees pride in their rank and disdain for enlisted soldiers. Though Regulars readily adopted the ideals of progressivism, they did not know how to lead citizen soldiers in a mass Army. Similarly, the officer corps never learned to overcome the inherent tension between initiative by subordinates and control by superiors. Control by senior officers won out, and imaginative, competent junior leadership died.

This legacy passed through the various officer training programs into the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF). Faulkner explores in depth the commissioning programs, the Officer Training Camps (OTC) and Central Officers’ Training Schools (COTS) that produced the bulk of the infantry lieutenants for the AEF. He gets inside the life experience of the recipient through cogent analysis of demographics of the training population and schedules. Faulkner reveals that these programs produced officers who really did not know what they were doing. The Army’s make-shift officer training system produced combat leaders neither technically
nor tactically proficient because of shortages in instructors, equipment, and facilities, exacerbated by flawed tactical doctrine.

Part of what makes this book unique is that Faulkner goes inside the doctrinal literature of the time, successfully tracing important evolutions in tactical concepts, but giving the explanation from the standpoint of training's effect on the receiver. He reveals the contradictory and confusing nature of the tactical doctrine of the AEF, beginning with officer training stateside, and ending with updated concepts that were attempted in the Meuse Argonne. What reveals is that there was no uniform doctrine, formation, or common understanding for infantry companies and platoons regarding how to fight. One of his best chapters is on the combat physics of World War I. To succeed would have required infantry leaders who knew how to properly employ their machine guns, mortars, and cannon as supporting weapons. They would have had to adjust artillery while attacking, because this was what the physics demanded. They did not possess the means to do so.

A principal contribution of this work is Faulkner's ability to take present-day understanding of what is required to lead men in combat, and then details how American leadership in World War I failed to meet those standards. What he reveals is what one would expect to contribute to unit cohesion in forces today. Care for soldiers, identification and respect between leader and led, common identity forged through shared hardship, and simple leader competence, all failed in the American forces. Incredible turbulence meant that American soldiers in combat often did not even know who their officers were. The AEF's elaborate school system disrupted the development of unit cohesion while contributing little to tactical competence, as it robbed junior leaders from units repeatedly and at the wrong time. Officers cared for themselves before their men, and did not know the basics of leadership and tactics. Fear of failure and a leadership climate where officers did NCO business condemned all to failure. Faulkner lays bare the problem of straggling in the AEF and why it existed. The end results of all these problems were needless casualties while officers bungled to find their way toward the basics of leadership.

Faulkner's prose is clear and often elegant. His research is meticulous, and his explanations so thorough as to be sometimes exhausting. If there is one salient suggestion for this work, it is that any future editions will add a bibliographic essay so that the tale of how Faulkner mined his sources and how he broke the code of variety and depth in World War I materials can be told. He clearly is a master of the extensive literature and source material. Most of the photographs in the book are from the author's personal collection. He must have collected these strikingly appropriate images over time, and that in itself might be part of the bibliographical tale.

This book is essential reading for professional Army officers because of its revelations about flaws in our institution, for those with interest in the history of leadership and World War I, and for national defense policymakers to know what organizational mistakes never to repeat when mobilizing the nation for war.
The Romanian Battlefront in World War I
By Glenn E. Torrey
Reviewed by Colonel James D. Scudieri, Department of Military Strategy, Plans, and Operations, US Army War College

This book, amongst a steady publication of Great War titles lately, contributes to a far-less-studied theater among western works. Historian Glenn E. Torrey pledged to present a balanced survey of military operations and events on the Romanian Front, as well as to showcase the long-neglected Romanian Campaign in 1917. In seventeen chapters plus epilogue and conclusion, he does so admirably.

The early chapters set the stage. There is sufficient background on the Romanian state and pre-war politics. King Carol died in October 1914. His nephew Ferdinand generally has a reputation of being weak and indecisive. He was quite aloof socially, the opposite of popular Queen Marie, granddaughter of Queen Victoria and Tsar Alexander II, and very pro-Entente. Given Ferdinand’s general reticence, Torrey categorizes Premier Ion C. Brătianu as a virtual dictator.

The tightrope diplomacy in which a minor power had to balance key interests and allies is a case study in its own right. Strained relations with Russia from the 1880s over the loss of southern Bessarabia ultimately did not trump the pre-eminent drive to acquire Transylvania with its ethnic Romanians, territory in the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

The text provides a comprehensive assessment of the Romanian Army, the military instrument to deliver the prize. Bloodied in the recent Second Balkan War, it had some significant liabilities. There was a top-heavy officer corps and a relatively weak noncommissioned officer corps. More significantly, its training and doctrine had not benefited from sophisticated, ongoing, comprehensive assessment on the nature of the next war. There were few opportunities to incorporate the painful experience of other armies during two years of war, 1914-16. A weak industrial base precluded widespread force modernization (e.g., the proportion of machine guns, field, and heavy artillery). Convoluted diplomacy often prevented imports to fill the void in any significant numbers. Inadequate force modernization and levels were severe constraints in an army built around massive (27,000 soldiers) infantry divisions. Torrey assesses that mobilization was excessive. The navy was essentially a riverine force for operations on the lower Danube; the Austro-Hungarians dominated the upper Danube. The aviation service was only a year old at the time of intervention in the war.

Planning highlighted the challenges from volatile diplomacy. Romania was a secret member of the Triple Alliance from 1883 until 1913. Hence, war plans had focused against Russia. Concerted planning for a war against Austria-Hungary began in the tumultuous summer of crisis in 1914. Unsurprisingly, the main effort would be the northern front, an attack northwest across the Carpathians into Transylvania. The southern front, Romania’s recently-acquired Dobrogean region, was secondary.

Romania’s road to war was long. The text reviews the two-year neutrality, replete with a host of domestic issues and much diplomatic
haggling. The chances that Romania would side with the Central Powers were slim. The conditions of her entry still occupied the Allies for some time. Ferdinand rose to the occasion; he essentially told the formal Council that the country was going to war. Romania joined the Allies in August 1916. A French Military Mission under General Henri M. Berthelot would exercise a strong influence, along with Russian and British advisors.

Despite long-running strategic challenges, Romania’s leaders committed to the prosecution of a two-front war. Torrey covers these operations very well, essentially a chapter for each major effort. The Romanians achieved strategic and operational surprise and hence great, initial success in their long-awaited, popular offensive into Transylvania. The same was not the case for the Dobrogea to the south. Available Romanian troops, an economy of force, were still committed to a forward defense, with no plan to trade space for time. Combined operations with the Russians proved difficult. Bulgarian elements attacked with the same fervor which the Romanians demonstrated in Transylvania, seeing the Dobrogea as long-lost, national lands.

There is comprehensive examination of the Romanians’ elementary, strategic choices in the fall of 1916 and their consequences. The Romanians opted for an ambitious counteroffensive in the south, on the Dobrogean front, known as the Flămânda Maneuver. It failed and Central Power retribution was sweeping and swift. Romania faced powerful, combined offensives. German Gen Erich von Falkenhayn led Austro-Hungarian and German forces in the north, ejected Romanian forces from Transylvania within forty days, and entered Romania proper. To the south, German General August von Mackensen led German, Bulgarian, and Turkish troops through the Dobrogea and into the heart of Romania. He captured Bucharest on 6 December 1917.

Success for the Central Powers was neither easy nor cheap, but they had broken the Romanian Army and shaken the nation state to its foundations. Romania survived, but lost two-thirds of its territory and vast resources, largely Wallachia besides the Dobrogea. Torrey reviews the cost with some fascinating statistics, including casualties; lost equipment; and expropriated resources, especially grain and oil.

The Entente rallied to the aid of the rump Romanian state, a little-known case study in building partner capacity quickly under adverse circumstances. The text provides a thorough analysis of this reconstruction of the Romanian Army with thematic topics (e.g., reconstruction [reorganization], epidemics, morale, instruction [training], and rearmament), backed by detailed statistics, all well documented. The Danube fleet and aviation service received similar attention. The overwhelming bulk of military trainers were French, with due recognition of national and cultural clashes.

 Romania fought with skill and determination in 1917, and Torrey recounts these actions with flair in detail. Three major battles at Mărăşti, Mărăşeşti, and Oituz between late July and early September stymied complete enemy conquest. Romanian success had come with much effective Russian help, despite the March Revolution. The Bolsheviks, however, left Romania isolated and too weak to continue the war alone. Romania agreed to an armistice at Focşani on 5 December 1917, yet
provided “peace-keeping” forces to ensure order in the newly-declared “Moldavian Republic” in Bessarabia. Further, tortuous negotiations resulted in the “Preliminary Peace” of Buftea on 5 March 1918. The Treaty of Bucharest followed on 5 May.

The events of 1918 were no less amazing than the last two years. Domestic and external events reflected complex chaos. Romanian leaders struggled to achieve some unity and maintain national spirit with viable institutions. They conformed to treaty obligations to concede only minimums as late as possible. Accommodation rested upon realistic pragmatism, not a genuine spirit of cooperation. Army demobilization, perforce gradual, did not preclude the preservation of a properly-equipped core. Somewhat hesitantly and at the proverbial eleventh hour, Romania mobilized formally on 9 November 1918 and reentered the war on the side of the Allies on 10 November, less than twenty-four hours before the armistice took effect on the Western Front. The King and Queen returned to Bucharest five days short of the two-year anniversary of von Mackensen’s triumphant entry.

American readers tend to focus on that Armistice and the Treaty of Versailles, but the Great War required many more armistices and treaties to end conflict around the world. Indeed, fighting continued. Moreover, even major combat operations in the region had very much been for, with, and among the people. Romanian troops now fought to stem the rising tide of Bolshevism from a broken Russia amidst the breakup of the Hapsburg empire and the receding tide of a defeated Germany, and within the context of a web of multitudes of ethnic tensions. Romania’s major effort was against the new Soviet republic declared in Hungary by Béla Kun. While balancing constantly-changing diplomatic imperatives, Romania advanced all the way to Budapest, taking the Hungarian capital on 3 August 1919.

Romania’s war had been a painful see-saw between ecstatic victory and abject defeat, but the Treaty of Trianon in March 1920 nearly doubled the country’s territory and population. Romanian diplomats had argued vociferously for the Allies to honor the promises from 1916. The Army had been the key instrument to achievement.

Torrey’s monograph is a major case study in the constant exchange between politicians and generals, and how they wielded landpower to accomplish well-known, long-held, and ambitious policy goals. Torrey tells this story carefully and well. His mastery of Romanian sources was already well established; he consulted French and German materials, along with very select British and American, as well. The selection of photos laced throughout complements the text most effectively. The style of maps, many adapted, can be rather busy, but they are important. This work represents a commendable effort to recount a forgotten front and close a long-incomplete account.
Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty
By Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson

Reviewed by Janeen Klinger, Professor of Political Science, who teaches a seminar on nation-building at the US Army War College

The causes of political instability and state failure have become growing concerns for strategic leaders and national security professionals because the United States is much more likely to deploy force in countries experiencing such conditions than to engage a peer competitor in a conventional war. The authors of *Why Nations Fail* provide a compelling explanation for state failure that is all the more rare because it has value for both practitioners and scholars of national security. The good news to be derived from the authors’ thesis is that problems associated with state failure need not be viewed with a sense of fatalism because the causes do not grow from some immutable material factor like geography or ethnicity, but rather are manmade. The bad news is that the causes of instability lie with institutional configurations which, while manmade, can prove intractable. Consequently, the prospects for successful stability and nation-building operations may be quite slim. The authors begin to support their thesis by comparing conditions between Nogales, Arizona, and Nogales, Mexico, to show that neither geography nor ethnicity can account for differences. The value of the analysis provided by the authors for both the academic and policymaking audience will become apparent from the following summary of their thesis and the evidence they use to support it.

The authors begin by noting that today’s successful states share common institutional configurations that they label inclusive. In the economic realm, inclusive institutions include such things as a patent system and a guarantee of property rights which, among other things, encourage investment and innovation thereby laying the basis for economic growth and generalized prosperity. Inclusive political institutions are those characterized by a pluralism that ensures power is constrained and broadly diffused. The interaction between inclusive economic and political institutions generates a self-reinforcing virtuous circle. Because prosperity is generalized throughout the social system, no single group has an incentive for concentrating political power in its own hands to perpetuate its rule. The evolution of the United States illustrates the consequences of inclusive political and economic institutions.

In contrast, today’s weak and potentially unstable states are those with institutional configurations that the authors label as extractive. As the label itself suggests, extractive economic institutions are predatory in the extent to which they concentrate and channel wealth into the hands of a narrow elite. Because such extractive economic institutions create wide disparities in wealth, the elites have little interest in investment or innovations that diffuse prosperity in a way that jeopardizes their affluence. Examples of extractive economic institutions include grants of monopoly or serf-based agriculture. In a setting where wealth becomes
excessively concentrated, political control is necessary to protect eco-
nomic interests, so elites will resist any pressure for broadening political
participation. Therefore, extractive economic arrangements are rein-
forced by extractive political institutions generating an interaction that
creates a self-reinforcing vicious circle where wealth is channeled toward
one narrow elite that has too much to lose by expanding political power
to other groups. The evolution of Hispanic America with the legacy of
the encomienda system introduced by the conquistadors illustrates the
consequences of extractive institutions.

But what accounts for the origin of institutional configurations in
the first place? Here the authors introduce historical contingency with
the notion that key events—or critical junctures in their terminology—
interact with existing conditions that may mutate institutions in the
direction of inclusive or extractive ones. One example of a critical junc-
ture that affected institutional development in Europe was the Black
Death. The plague, which significantly reduced populations and there-
fore the labor supply, was a major factor contributing to the divergence
of institutions in Western and Eastern Europe. In the West, there was
a gradual dissolution of feudalism’s reliance on serf-based agriculture
while in the East, labor shortages led elites to double down on extrac-
tive arrangements. Another example of a critical juncture and one with
far-reaching consequences for conditions today, was European colonial-
ism that, as the authors point out, left a legacy of extractive institutions
throughout the world.

While the analysis provided in the book contains some repetition in
elaboration of the thesis, the reader who is patient working through it
will be rewarded by the extensive variety of examples the authors use to
illustrate their thesis. The examples range from the ancient world of the
Aztecs and Romans to the western revolutions in England and France,
providing a rich historical narrative. Other examples focus on countries
of current policy concern like Somalia and China. The reader will come
away from the book with a greater historical appreciation of the pro-
cesses of economic and political development and an understanding of
the relevance of historical experience for countries facing development
challenges today.

Although a brief book review cannot do justice to the many nuances
in the theory presented, this book’s ultimate strength lies with the fact
that it is valuable for both scholar and practitioner. From a scholarly
standpoint, the book is broadly comparative in a mode that is rarely
attempted today. As such, the authors combine the best of a social
science approach in an effort to derive generalizations that apply across
time and space with the best of history through their recognition of the
role of contingency. Moreover, the authors incorporate concepts from
some classic social science like Robert Michels’ notion of the iron law
of oligarchy and Joseph Schumpeter’s idea of “creative destruction” as
a reminder of the lasting value of older scholarship. For the national
security professional, the book offers a caution about using their frame-
work to make predictions or policy prescriptions. Despite the fact that
the analysis does not provide a handbook for those engaged in nation-
building operations, it goes a long way toward explaining the contours
of today’s world.

The thesis of the book is that, over the last century, sudden crises or major policy initiatives have significantly altered the direction of foreign policy. While this is not a startling revelation, the authors extrapolate four hypotheses from this position. First, they make the point that political and historical context matter. Nojeim and Kilroy do a nice job of setting the political, historical, and strategic context in each of the case studies examined. Second, they suggest that foreign policy is usually left to the elites until a crisis brings US foreign policy into the domestic spotlight. For example, the Arab-Israeli War and subsequent oil embargo in 1973 turned America’s attention to the Middle East, where it has been fixated ever since. Until that crisis, the public was generally ambivalent about the region. Third, while elections are primarily determined by domestic issues, a president’s historic legacy is most often determined by foreign policy triumphs or failures. (The most glaring exception in the book was the 1968 election, in which the Tet Offensive and civil unrest in the United States doomed Johnson’s prospects for re-election.) Finally, the authors present the argument that foreign policy debates among top ranking governmental officials are an integral component of major policy shifts, thus dispelling the rationalist notion that states are monolithic entities that act on well-defined power interests. In fact, these debates demonstrate that interests and policy are often contested. These four hypotheses are addressed in each of the case studies examined in the book (the sinking of the Maine, the Lusitania crisis, the attack on Pearl Harbor, the Korean War, the Sputnik crisis, the Cuban missile crisis, the Tet Offensive, the United States opening to China, the Arab-Israeli War, the Islamic revolution in Iran, the fall of the Berlin wall, and the attacks of 11 September 2001). The case studies were selected because they sparked considerable debate within the government, brought foreign policy into the national spotlight, and led to a significant change in the direction of US foreign policy.

Perhaps the most relevant case study for contemporary strategists deals with the opening of relations with China. The authors provide a nice summary of the historic tensions between the United States and China. The authors also make the point that President Nixon’s previous anticomunist stance gave him the domestic credibility to pursue closer relations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Through a series of well-timed signals and progressive concessions, President Nixon and his administration were able to mend fences with a seemingly implacable
foe, dramatically changing the global strategic environment and establishing the foundation for future cooperation ultimately facilitating our close (albeit wary) economic relationship with China today. While there was no definitive crisis bringing this change in foreign policy about, Nixon was able to move his new China policy into the domestic spotlight, first through an unlikely interaction with China (ping-pong) and then through Nixon’s high visibility, election year visit to China. This was a key achievement in the president’s tarnished legacy.

For policymakers and strategists looking for an alternative to the ongoing containment of Iran, the China case holds some hopeful parallels. The crisis in Syria and growing isolation of Iran due to its nuclear activities might provide a permissive environment for both the United States and Iran to reassess their current policies. The American public is focused on continuing domestic economic issues and weary of tremendous expenditures of blood and treasury in both Afghanistan and Iraq. This environment echoes the public mood of exhaustion and mistrust of the government in the aftermath of the Tet Offensive. The US withdrawal from Iraq, and pending departure from Afghanistan, might also ease Iranian suspicions and provide them with some domestic political space for compromise. Reaching a strategic accommodation with Iran would enable the United States to conserve scarce military and economic resources and invest them more productively in Asia, just as the breakthrough with China in the aftermath of Vietnam allowed the United States to restore its international reputation and permitted a more intense strategic focus on the Soviet Union.

While insightful and well-written, the individual hypotheses are not particularly new to the study of foreign policy. For example, most practitioners understand that political and historic context matter when foreign policy is being decided. (This was a theme throughout the America’s First Battles case studies as well.) It is also not a revelation that domestic politics often trumps foreign policy during election cycles, nor that foreign policy often determines a president’s legacy. That said, this book is an instructive review of turning points in US foreign policy. It provides a well-reasoned framework for analyzing current crises and preparing for potential shifts in policy direction. The four hypotheses provide a logical framework for assessing our current strategic pivot towards Asia, or our response to the global financial crisis. This book is worth reading for foreign policy enthusiasts and senior political and military leaders who are struggling to develop effective policies and strategies during times of crisis.
Voices of the Bulge: Untold Stories from Veterans of the Battle of the Bulge
By Michael Collins and Martin King

Reviewed by Colonel James R. Oman, USA Ret., Director, Senior Service College Fellowship Program, Defense Acquisition University, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland

The exceedingly popular genre, characterized by a collection of veterans recounting their personal experiences accrued during the course of a particular operation or campaign as exemplified by Voices of the Bulge: Untold Stories from Veterans of the Battle of the Bulge is clearly coming to an end. The US Department of Veterans Affairs estimated that 740 World War II veterans perished on average each day in 2011. Stated another way, approximately 270,000 veterans are believed to have died in 2011 with a projection of 248,000 or 679 veterans expected to die per day in 2012. At the end of World War II, there were 16 million members in uniform. At the beginning of 2012 these numbers dwindled to an estimated 2.9 million survivors, with the youngest in their mid-80s. I suspect this epic tome represents one of the last of its kind as the relentless passage of time silences their once vibrant voices.

Authors Martin King and Michael Collins spent more than a decade conducting interviews, walking the ground throughout the Ardennes region, and completing their research. The data they collected would become the Voices of the Bulge. Their work provides fresh insight into this massive, pivotal battle that was fought throughout Belgium from the middle of December 1944 through the end of January 1945. King is a military historian, serves as a lecturer, and is a consultant for the History Channel. He currently lives in Belgium. Undoubtedly, his many visits to the battlefield as a tour guide for groups of veterans, military members, dignitaries, and the like have deepened his understanding of the ebb and flow of the battle as well as contributed to his extensive research. Collins lives in Connecticut, serves as a historical interpreter and museum staffer for the Veterans Research Center and four museums. Collins also has a familial tie to the battle through his grandfather who fought in World War II while serving as a member of Patton’s Third Army within the European Theater of Operations. The motivation to see where his grandfather fought inspired him and his parents to visit the Ardennes in June 2006. As luck would have it, their tour guide was King. The seeds planted during this chance meeting inspired a partnership that flourished and produced this epic tale. Their work honors those who did not survive the conflagration as well as veterans living and deceased.

The massive German counteroffensive, code name Wacht am Rhein (Watch on the Rhine), is often called the Von Rundstedt Offensive or the Ardennes Counteroffensive; however, it is most commonly referred to as the Battle of the Bulge by Americans and the British. This operation represented Adolf Hitler’s strategic gamble to reverse Germany’s fortunes and stave off defeat by fracturing and destroying the Allied forces advancing from the West. Hitler struck through the Ardennes
for a variety of reasons, not the least of which was his hope to replicate his earlier successes, specifically those events that occurred in May 1940, when a similar dash led to the capitulation of France and the evacuation of the British Expeditionary Force from the Continent. Germany would throw more than 200,000 soldiers assigned to 14 infantry and five panzer divisions into the fray. These forces were supported by more than 1,600 artillery pieces and nearly 1,000 tanks as they attacked westward across an 80-mile front. Ultimately, more than 600,000 American soldiers would be involved in the ensuing response that unfolded over the upcoming thirty plus days. The US forces would sustain nearly 90,000 casualties—killed, wounded, and missing. The Battle of the Bulge was the largest operation, with the most casualties, in the long history of the US Army.

Collins and King recount day-to-day actions, reactions, and responses. They begin with the opening German salvos on 16 December 1944 as the Germans attacked across the weakly held Belgian front and conclude with the reduction of the Bulge and stabilization of the front at the end of January 1945. The vast majority of the book is focused on the first twelve days of the battle. The authors use a variety of sources to recount the daily operations and allocate one chapter for each day of the battle through 27 December 1944. The recollections, vivid accounts, and dramatic descriptions of the fighting provided by the veterans, more than 60-plus years after the fact, indelibly illustrate the highly personal human dimension and lasting impact on each participant. The accounts come primarily from US Army soldiers, both enlisted and officers; a handful of Belgian civilians; and a few German soldiers. The manuscript concludes with a brief review of events from 28 December 1944 through the end of January 1945, a time frame which the authors aptly call “The End Game.”

Prominently featured in the book are numerous firsthand accounts shared by a diverse collection of veterans, many of whom demonstrated extraordinary feats of courage, as they fought in the Battle of the Bulge. Several of these veterans are Lieutenant Colonel (Retired) James “Maggie” Megellas, who fought as a member of H Company, 3rd Battalion 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment, 82nd Airborne Division in Italy, Holland, Belgium, and Germany, and is recognized as the most decorated officer in the history of the Division; Francis Curry, a Medal of Honor recipient and a member of the 30th Infantry Division who was recognized for his heroic stand near Malmedy on 21 December 1944; and Ted Paluch, who as a member of the 285th Field Artillery Battalion was one of a mere handful of survivors from the infamous Malmedy Massacre, to name just a few.

Adding to the richness of the *Voices of the Bulge* are the more than 90 black and white photos taken at the time of the fighting or in its immediate aftermath, five detailed maps, and several biographical sketches. One relatively unique feature is the inclusion of a 47-minute DVD that accompanies the book. The DVD highlights Paluch, Megellas, Curry, and several other veterans and provides the “voice” to go along with their stories and pictures found within the text.

While the events of the Battle of the Bulge have been examined and written about by many, Collins’ and King’s approach of having veterans share their highly emotional experiences both honors and records the
deeds of their service as these members of the Greatest Generation fade onto the pages of history. As such, *Voices of the Bulge: Untold Stories from Veterans of the Battle of the Bulge* is worthy of a thoughtful read.

**What It Is Like To Go To War**
By Karl Marlantes

Reviewed by Henry G. Gole, whose biography of Colonel Truman Smith, the military attaché in Berlin, 1935-39, to be published in the Spring of 2013 by the University Press of Kentucky

Karl Marlantes wrote the bestseller and prize winning novel *Matterhorn*, based on his experiences as a Marine Corps platoon commander in a rifle company in Vietnam in 1969-70. In his nonfiction, *What It Is Like To Go To War*, he takes his readers back to that time and place and to the four succeeding decades in which he examined his conscience and came to terms with killing and reentering civil society. This absolutely unique and lucid personal account and analysis will be read with profit by scholars, general readers, and most particularly, by veterans of close combat.

Note that Marlantes is very specific in defining just what he means by “close combat”: close enough to throw a hand grenade at a foe or to fire a rifle at another human being the shooter can see. Clarity on this point is important to him and essential to the book. Laymen tend to lump all Vietnam veterans in one heap. Those who have engaged in close combat do not. In a “combat zone” there are relatively safe places. A rifle company is not one of them.

The author is qualified by experience, education, temperament, and skill as a writer to make penetrating observations. Many are graphic, bold, and shocking. Some are erudite; some are ethereal; all are worthy of careful consideration.

Maturation from the late 1950s and into the 1960s cultivated two strains in his personality constantly visible in his writing. One is an intellectual appetite fed in his Yale and Oxford years and demonstrated on almost every page of the book. The other is an aspiration to join King Arthur’s court of noble men—or to accompany Don Quixote on a quest—manifest in both his choice of military service and his display of courage in Vietnam.

He tells us that he wrote the book to come to terms with his experience of close combat. That could have been accomplished in a personal journal, but he believes he might help other combat veterans “integrate their combat experiences into their current lives.” He also thinks he might provide young people contemplating joining the military “with a psychological and spiritual combat prophylactic, for indeed combat is like unsafe sex in that it’s a major thrill with possible horrible consequences.” (He is too wise to expect young men to read and heed his advice.) Finally, he wants policymakers to know what they are asking of the young.

His method is to reflect on a point important to him, to illustrate it with an anecdote or a combat experience, and to mull it over in sparkling prose that has the reader hanging on every word. His chapter headings

Mastery of our language and the creative use of poetic devices and images make his pronouncements memorable. To illustrate: Asking warriors to “adjust” to home after close combat “is akin to asking Saint John of the Cross to be happy flipping hamburgers at McDonald’s after he’s left the monastery.” And regarding military training: “Boot camp doesn’t turn young men into killers. It removes the societal restraints on the savage part of us that has made us the top animal in the food chain.”

His title might have been "What It Is Like To Return From War." He writes that it was ten years after killing a man that he felt any emotion about it. Then deep remorse lasted months, a pattern for the next three decades. He knows that warriors must learn how to integrate the experience of killing, to put the pieces of their psyches back together again. But, “It is unfortunate that the guilt and mourning reside almost entirely with those asked to do the dirty work.” He believes that “drugs, alcohol, and suicides are ways of avoiding guilt and fear of grief. Grief itself is a healthy response.” Those called upon to fight violate many codes of civilized behavior. They must come to terms with stepping outside conventional behavior. He cites T. E. Lawrence (Seven Pillars of Wisdom, 1922): “What now looks wanton or sadic seemed in the field inevitable, or just unimportant routine.” Then a truism in his own words: “The least acknowledged aspect of war, today, is how exhilarating it is.”

This reviewer gives this book very high marks. The most comparable works are philosopher and World War II veteran J. Glenn Gray’s The Warriors: Reflections on Men In Battle and professor of English and WW II veteran Samuel Hynes’ The Soldiers' Tale: Bearing Witness to Modern War, both of the highest quality. A small sample of other first-rate accounts of close combat and the reactions of warriors are commended—from WW I: Graves, Goodbye to All That, a memoir; Remarque, All Quiet on the Western Front, a novel constantly in print since 1929; and from WW II: Sledge, With the Old Breed; Fraser, Quartered Safe Out Here; Masters, The Road Past Mandalay; Fussell, The Boys' Crusade; from the French war in Indo-China: Grauwin, Doctor at Dien Bien Phu, and from the American war in Vietnam: Nolen, Ripcord.

Another small sample of books dealing with shell shock, battle fatigue, post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD)—whatever name is given the after-effects of the combat experience on young psyches—is particularly appropriate at this time. It would include these from WW I: Moran, Anatomy of Courage; Barker, Regeneration; Remarque, The Road Back; from WW II: Manchester, Goodbye Darkness; from Vietnam: Shay, Achilles in Vietnam.

One deeply regrets the current clear need to understand what it is like to go to war and what it is like to return from war. Karl Marlantes has joined a short list of authors whose experience, sensitivity, and skill enable them to share wisdom with those among us who would understand.


Contributors' Guidelines

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Length: 4,000 words or less (15-16 double-spaced pages).

Concurrent Submissions: Do not submit a manuscript that is being considered or has been published elsewhere, including on the Internet.

Documentation: Documentation is to be placed in footnotes; a bibliography is not necessary. Indicate all quoted material by quotation marks or indentation. Reduce the number of footnotes to the minimum consistent with honest acknowledgement of indebtedness, consolidating notes where possible. Lengthy explanatory footnotes are discouraged. Parameters generally uses the conventions prescribed in the most current version of the Chicago Manual of Style.

Illustrations: Charts and graphs should be used only if they are absolutely essential to clarify or amplify the text. Photos are seldom used, but illustrative grayscale photos at a minimum size of 640 x 480 pixels are considered.

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