Special Commentary:
Prospects for Peace: The View from Beijing
Jacqueline N. Deal

Russian Military Power
Tor Bukkvoll
Bettina Renz

Challenges in Asia
Michael A. Spangler
Jin H. Pak

War: Theory and Practice
Christopher H. Tuck
Paul R. Norwood, Benjamin M. Jensen, and Justin Barnes
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Features</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Special Commentary</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **Prospects for Peace: The View from Beijing**  
Jacqueline N. Deal |
| **Russian Military Power** |
| **Russian Special Operations Forces in Crimea and Donbas**  
Tor Bukkvoll |
| **Why Russia is Reviving its Conventional Military Power**  
Bettina Renz |
| **Challenges in Asia** |
| **Preparing for North Korea’s Collapse: Key Stabilization Tasks**  
Michael A. Spangler |
| **China, India, and War over Water**  
Jin H. Pak |
| **War: Theory and Practice** |
| **The “Practice” Problem: Peacebuilding and Doctrine**  
Christopher H. Tuck |
| **Capturing the Character of Future War**  
Paul R. Norwood, Benjamin M. Jensen, and Justin Barnes |
| **Review Essay** |
| **Victory in Today’s Wars: New Insights on the Role of Communications**  
James P. Farwell |
| **Commentary and Reply** |
| **On “State-Building: America’s Foreign Policy Challenge”**  
Robert J. Bunker |
| **On “Rethinking America’s Grand Strategy: Insights from the Cold War”**  
William J. Gole |
| **The Author Replies**  
Charles J. Sullivan |
| **The Author Replies**  
Hal Brands |
COMMENTARY AND REPLY

108 On “Making Sense of the ‘Long Wars’—Advice to the US Army”
G. T. Burke

109 The Author Replies
Tami Davis Biddle

BOOK REVIEWS

Drugs and War

113 Shooting Up: A Short History of Drugs and War
By Łukasz Kamieński
Reviewed by Robert J. Bunker

Drones

114 The Drone Debate—A Primer on the US Use of Unmanned Aircraft Outside Conventional Battlefields
By Avery Plaw, Matthew S. Fricker, and Carlos R. Colon
Reviewed by Ulrike Esther Franke

Mercenaries and Private Contractors

116 The Modern Mercenary: Private Armies and What They Mean for World Order
By Sean McFate
Reviewed by Scott L. Efflandt

Military History

118 Jacob L. Devers: A General’s Life
By James Scott Wheeler
Reviewed by Conrad C. Crane

119 An American Soldier in the Great War: The World War I Diary and Letters of Elmer O. Smith
Edited by John DellaGiustina
Reviewed by Douglas V. Mastriano

121 Connecticut Unscathed: Victory in the Great Narragansett War
By Jason W. Warren
Reviewed by Matthew S. Muchlbauer

War and Ethics

122 The Ethics of Armed Conflict: A Cosmopolitan Just War Theory
By John Lango
Reviewed by Pauline M. Shanks Kaurin
Counterinsurgency

124 The Soul of Armies: Counterinsurgency Doctrine and Military Culture in the US and UK
   By Austin Long
   Reviewed by Ian C. Rice

ISIS

125 Black Flags: The Rise of ISIS
   By Joby Warrick
   Reviewed by W. Andrew Terrill

Human Terrain System

128 Social Science Goes to War: The Human Terrain System in Iraq and Afghanistan
   By Montgomery McFate and Janice H. Laurence, Eds.
   Reviewed by Ryan D. Wadle
Our Summer issue opens with a Special Commentary by our contributing editor, Jacqueline Deal, “Prospects for Peace: The View from Beijing.” Deal urges policymakers to engage in more “emulative analysis”—thinking more like our rivals and competitors— when developing foreign policies. Appreciating just how much China’s views of peace and international order differ from ours, she argues, will be instrumental in the months and years ahead.

Our first forum, Russian Military Power, presents two articles addressing Moscow’s military forces. Tor Bukkvoll’s “Russian Special Operations Forces in Crimea and Donbas” discusses Moscow’s much-improved special operations forces, how they have been used, and what impact they might have on Western defense policies. In “Why Russia is Reviving its Conventional Military Power,” Bettina Renz suggests Moscow’s recent revitalization of its conventional military forces has broader utility than merely preparing for offensive action. We must not forget, Renz contends, strong conventional forces are the stock-in-trade of great powers, and those aspiring to be great.

The second forum, Challenges in Asia, features two contributions regarding foreign policy issues in the Asia-Pacific Region. Michael Spangler’s “Preparing for North Korea’s Collapse: Key Stabilization Tasks” argues one way to increase the chances of China’s acquiescence to Korean unification in a post “Kim Family Regime” scenario is to offer Beijing a nuclear weapons ban on the peninsula. Jin H. Pak’s “China, India, and War over Water” describes the increasing importance of the shared waterways that flow between China and India, and their implications for security in the region.

Our third forum, War: Theory and Practice, offers two essays concerning recent and future conflict. Christopher Tuck’s “The ‘Practice’ Problem: Peacebuilding and Doctrine” revisits the question of state- or nation-building. Tuck maintains the problems of peacebuilding are not just matters of technique; they are also the product of an inadequate “theory of victory.” In “Capturing the Character of Future War,” Paul Norwood, Benjamin Jensen, and Justin Barnes introduce a theoretical framework for identifying, analyzing, and conceptually preparing for changes in war’s character. ~ AJE
One hundred years ago, on the eve of our entry into World War I, Americans faced a troubling set of developments at home and abroad that bear an eerie resemblance to today’s challenges. While 21st-century “home-grown” terrorists are associated with the Muslim faith, at the dawn of the 20th century anarchists and leftists of European and, particularly, Jewish descent were committing acts of violence against innocent civilians on US soil. This period was the last time immigrants made up such a large proportion of the US population, and the country was riven not only by domestic unrest, but also by disagreement over whether to intervene in conflict on the other side of the ocean. Woodrow Wilson prevailed in the 1916 election on the platform, “He kept us out of war,” but ultimately, even the most cosmopolitan occupant of the Oval Office before President Obama could not avoid sending American troops to defend US allies and interests overseas.

Then, as today, it was tempting to view the use of force through the prism of what it would mean for progressive American ideals. Opponents of intervening in World War I argued it would unleash nationalist, industrialist, profiteering tendencies at home, and thus the wise course was to refrain. Humanity would eventually converge on peace. Confronted with imperial Germany’s ambition to conquer Europe, President Wilson had to disabuse his own supporters of the notion that international comity was on the march. And though Wilson propounded “peace without victory,” Americans would have to give their lives to oppose German expansionism, not once, but twice over the next two-and-a-half decades.

At a time when domestic terrorism and tensions with immigrants appear to be returning to the fore, Americans would do well to remember this history. When we have turned inward in the face of domestic tensions and hoped international developments would go our way, we have been bitterly disappointed. While it is tempting to think we can retreat back within our borders and await the end of history, the other guys get a vote, and as it turns out they frequently have other plans.

For this reason, it is important for national security planners to perform emulative analysis—to try to think like the decision-makers of our rivals or adversaries, who may not share our cosmopolitan, progressive ideals. The recent record suggests today, as in the World War I period, we may be so caught up in domestic deliberations—or what the president calls “nation-building at home”—we have neglected the emulative analysis mission. The shock of 9/11 can, in part, be traced to the paucity of national security professionals who had read and internalized the writings of terrorist groups like al-Qaeda. The missing nuclear arsenal of Saddam Hussein after the Second Gulf War seems to have reflected a perspective few, if any, American national security experts considered—Saddam was bluffing because he wanted his near enemies, the Shia, to believe he was nuclear-armed and assumed the United States

Jacqueline N. Deal is President and CEO of the Long Term Strategy Group (LTSG). Her work has appeared in The New York Times, Foreign Policy, and The National Interest, along with academic journals. She earned her BA summa cum laude from Harvard and her MPhil and DPhil from Oxford. She was a postdoctoral fellow and award-winning lecturer at Harvard. Deal is a Senior Fellow of the Foreign Policy Research Institute and a term member of the Council on Foreign Relations.
had sufficient intelligence to understand this. And while the sinister creativity of Putin’s Crimea incursion may have stymied even the most sincere effort at emulative analysis, it would be more reassuring today if we could look back and cite indicators we had been tracking, but had discounted.

None of these episodes rises to the level of World War I, of course. We currently consider ourselves to be the beneficiaries of a “long peace,” one that has kept the world free of global conflict since the Korean War. But from 9/11 to Russia’s forays into Ukraine and Syria, we have at least learned important lessons about taking seriously the perspectives of decision-makers from Raqqa and Baghdad to Moscow. We may not be so lucky with Beijing. Of all our global interlocutors, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) seems most adept at employing a “salami slicing” or “silkworm” strategy; it is confronting our allies and partners in a way that does not breach the threshold of alarming us, even as the balance of power in contested areas, such as the South China Sea, now tilts in its favor.

It is thus especially important for us to understand how Chinese Communist Party (CCP) elites see the world. If the lesson of the 20th century is the other guys get a vote about the prospects for peace, we should focus on how Chinese decision-makers understand that set of questions. Fortunately, we can avail ourselves of a thriving Chinese-language publishing scene. Authoritative outlets in Beijing put out stacks of important works on historical and contemporary national security topics each year. A review of these official and quasi-official sources, along with secondary works citing them, indicates the PRC’s national security elites have a very different perspective from ours on the current long peace. They do not take it for granted and, unfortunately, I fear, they do not expect it to last.

For us, the long peace starts at home with a political system that is basically legitimate. The American people elect their leaders, who lead with the consent of the governed, or we throw the bums out, and they go back to their private lives, often making a lot of money. But one only has to observe the CCP’s ongoing anti-corruption campaign to understand the stakes associated with losing power in the PRC. Since 2013, roughly 200,000 party members and officials have been investigated, with a 99 percent conviction rate. That means once the Party’s Central Discipline Inspection Commission turns its eyes on you, you are finished. You go to jail or disappear; your assets are seized; and your family lives in penury and fear.

Xi Jinping, the current Chinese leader, has shown no hesitation to go after very senior people in the Party, from Bo Xilai, the famous princeling who may have been Xi’s key rival to succeed Hu Jintao, to Zhou Yongkang, the former internal security czar and oil baron, to Xu Caihou and Guo Boxiong, Chinese generals and former vice chairmen

---

1 Both the Academy of Military Science and the National Defense University in Beijing have publishing houses that put out journals and textbooks on security issues, the contents of which are vetted by senior officers within those institutions. The Chinese Ministry of Defense has also published Defense White Papers bi-annually since 1998. The Chinese military, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), boasts its own daily newspaper, and the individual service branches within the PLA also publish periodicals, as did the PLA’s old military regions, which were abolished at the end of 2015 in favor of new theater commands.
of the Central Military Commission (the 11-member body composed of officers and Xi himself that runs China’s military).

The current campaign Xi is leading has aroused fears he is recreating the climate that existed during Mao’s Cultural Revolution in the 1960s. Xi is what is called a CCP “princeling,” because his father was the Party’s head of propaganda when Xi was born (and later a vice-premier) who fell from favor and was sent to prison in this period, and Xi himself was rusticated during the Cultural Revolution, forced to do hard labor in the countryside. So he knows firsthand the rough and tumble of all-or-nothing, violent Chinese political campaigns. Xi is a survivor. And, he eventually turned the hardship he experienced because of his elite Communist pedigree into an opportunity to take over all of China. The person running the anti-corruption campaign was another “princeling” who was rusticated in the same area as Xi in the mid-1960s.

Think about this personal history. If Americans tend to take peace for granted, as the natural state of affairs in a civilized, cosmopolitan world, for Chinese elites like Xi Jinping, the world is both full of danger and freighted with opportunity. In fact, right after the 9/11 attacks, Chinese defense strategists designated the first two decades of the 21st century the “period of strategic opportunity” (重要 战略 机遇期, zhongyao zhanlie jiyuqi), signifying that it was a rare chance for them to restore China to its natural position as a world-leading power because the United States would be diverted and distracted by the War on Terror in the Middle East.

They do not believe we defend the current international order simply because we think respect for international law and free trade will boost prosperity and promote peace globally. Rather, they think we set up the system to benefit us and to keep everyone else down, because that is how hegemons (霸, ba) behave. By contrast with our cosmopolitanism, today’s CCP elites are the heirs of a kind of Darwinian nationalism imported from Japan in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. In other words, they see competition and conflict as endemic. Chinese defense strategists describe an ongoing global competition for resources and for control over key geographic points. This competition is zero-sum and cutthroat. It is very much a dog-eat-dog world, and Chinese culture even tends to describe this competition in racial terms. The CCP still oversees a “Patriotic Education” (爱国教育, aiguo jiaoyu) curriculum for all Chinese students, emphasizing this period as the “Century of Humiliation” (百年国耻, bainian guochi) when European colonial powers and the United States, Russia, and Japan conspired to prey on China at a moment of weakness, as the last dynasty, the Qing, decayed and declined. These outside powers stole Chinese money by taking over the revenues from trade through Chinese ports, and they also stole Chinese land—not only the ports, but also the 1.5 million square kilometers of Manchuria or Eastern Siberia Russia acquired through “unequal treaties.”

---

The “Patriotic Education” curriculum was promoted by the man we think of as the father of modern China, Deng Xiaoping. Deng launched Patriotic Education after the Tiananmen Square crackdown in 1989, when he wanted to fight an influx of dangerous Western, or American, democratic ideas into the country. To some extent, he knew, the Tiananmen Square protests were the logical culmination of the reforms he had pioneered. When Deng—who, like Xi was purged but came back from the political wilderness—took power after Mao’s death in 1979, he saw how weak the PRC was, even compared to Southeast Asian countries, and he knew something had to be done. The Soviet model of economics clearly was not delivering, so he launched a revolutionary policy of “Reform and Opening” to the West.

We now know Deng was no liberal; he viewed this policy purely instrumentally, as a means to ensure the CCP’s survival. The idea was to allow foreign (American, European, and Japanese) money and know-how into China, so the PRC would grow economically and, eventually, be able to modernize militarily. This would ensure China would finally be in the driver’s seat vis-à-vis outside rivals—such as the West and Russia and Japan—which had preyed on it when it was weak. It could coerce, deter, and, if necessary, defeat any potential opponent. Wealth and military strength were keys to staying in power and succeeding in a dangerous world.

It should be striking to us that one of Deng’s first moves upon taking power was to launch an invasion of Vietnam in 1979 that seems to have been the product of a very particular set of calculations about the balance of power. The Russians had signed a defense treaty with the Vietnamese in 1978, so Deng feared the PRC was going to be surrounded. Deng also appears to have believed he needed to fight the Vietnamese to ensure the United States would see China as a friend and back it against the Russians. And, Vietnam gave him the pretext by mistreating ethnic Chinese in Vietnam and invading Cambodia. What Deng was after by this time was American economic and technological support. By taking on our old foe, he wanted to prove the Chinese could be trusted allies against the Russians in order to get US investment, technology, and defense support.

The Chinese also worked with us in the period to defeat the Soviets in Afghanistan, gaining valuable defense support and establishing an important intelligence relationship with Washington. And, in 1986 Deng propounded the “State High Technology Research and Development Plan,” better known as the “863 Program” (standing for 1986, March), which entailed spending billions of dollars to improve the PRC’s technological position—gaining access to cutting-edge information technology, automation or computing power, space capabilities, lasers, energy technologies, and new materials. This initiative has been called

---

9 Mark A. Stokes, China’s Strategic Modernization: Implications for the United States (Carlisle, PA: US Army Strategic Studies Institute, September 1999).
the PRC’s “Sputnik” moment, and it worked, yielding the space weapons and high-powered lasers the PLA has acquired over the past decade.

Even after the turbulence of Tiananmen Square in 1989, Deng advocated a strategy of patience; he told the Party elites the PRC should “bide its time and hide its capabilities” while they built up wealth and power. Successive CCP leaders followed this advice closely, at least until the last few years. They were able to take advantage of massive investment from the outside world, and they benefited militarily from the fact we are in an era of dual-use information technology.\(^\text{10}\) The modernization of their civilian economy helped them upgrade their military for high-tech war. Any impulses to flex their growing strength were checked, at least in the 1990s, by evidence of how far ahead the United States still was, given the relatively easy American victory over Iraq in 1990-91 and the US campaigns in Bosnia and Kosovo, culminating in the accidental US bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999. These experiences demonstrated the potency of the American military’s penetrating, highly accurate weapons. So even after the accidental bombing, China’s leaders, now under Deng’s successor Jiang Zemin, elected to stay the course with hiding and biding.

In pursuit of wealth and power, Jiang encouraged Chinese firms to “go out” internationally through the decade, acquiring overseas technology, investments, and interests. China became a net energy importer back in 1993, and its appetite for energy from the Middle East, Central Asia, and Africa steadily grew as it industrialized to become the world’s leading manufacturer, ushering in a remarkable period of export-led growth. By 2000, China’s GDP was already the fifth largest in the world. And then, in 2001 the United States was hit with the 9/11 attacks, creating the aforementioned “period of strategic opportunity.”

However, several ominous developments have surfaced over the last few years. At home, the PRC’s economic growth has begun to slow down, potentially dramatically. The scale of corruption has become undeniable; environmental pollution is taking its toll on mortality rates and the health of new babies born in China; the crackdown on civil society and religious organizations suggests a major fear of civil unrest; and there have been a number of terrorist incidents involving Chinese Muslim Uighurs that suggest the situation in Xinjiang (Western China) is not stable.

So Xi has tightened his grip over the domestic situation, with human rights conditions deteriorating beyond anyone’s memory in recent years. Meanwhile, he is not only head of the CCP, head of the government, and head of the military, but he has also made himself the leader of the Party’s most powerful committees on foreign policy, Taiwan, and the economy, and he has created new bodies he runs to oversee the Internet, government restructuring, national security, and military reform. Xi has effectively taken over not only the country’s military and foreign policy, but also the PRC’s economy, courts, police, and secret police.

Abroad, Xi’s control is less clear. The United States and its allies have begun to realize there is trouble in East Asia. That Beijing doesn’t really accept the current map or boundaries. That, as the then-Foreign

Minister Yang Jiechi told Hillary Clinton in Hanoi in 2010, their view is “there are big countries, and there are small countries, and that’s just a fact”—the smaller countries in Southeast Asia should come into line and respect the PRC’s claims to most of the South China Sea.

As Yang Jiechi implied, Beijing hopes to achieve its aims peacefully, through deterrence or coercion. The smaller or more distant countries should defer to the PRC’s wishes. Chinese political-military leaders do not count on this. It is no accident Xi Jinping announced a major restructuring of the Chinese armed forces on December 31, 2015. Consistent with a decade of the People’s Liberation Army planning to take on a greater role in the world, the restructuring was designed to facilitate expeditionary joint operations along the PRC’s periphery and outside its borders. Other indicators of this new external thrust include the acquisition of increasingly long-range missiles, the deployment of the PRC’s first aircraft carrier and construction of follow-on carriers, the announcement of the PLA Navy’s first overseas base in Djibouti last year, and the PLA’s ongoing nuclear modernization.

Perhaps the most benign interpretation is Chinese decision-makers believe the best way to keep the peace is to prepare for war. Unlike us, Chinese elites seem to believe the global environment is naturally conflictual. The “period of strategic opportunity” was only projected to last for a couple decades at best. Our long peace has been an aberration, and successive CCP leaders have exploited it to amass the wealth and power they think the PRC will need to survive in a dangerous world. Western concepts of an international balance of power or convergence around cosmopolitan norms are not reassuring or even intelligible. In a highly competitive security environment, the PRC must strive to be recognized as dominant. For this reason, Chinese pessimism about the prospects for peace may be more realistic than American hopes for international stability and tranquility.

The US Department of Defense should therefore develop strategies for deterring Chinese aggression and out-competing the PRC over the long term. Since we cannot rule out the possibility the competition will devolve into another major-power war, American defense planners must also prepare to win such a conflict. Unfortunately, in this connection as well, the conditions of 1916 should serve as a warning: the dynamics of the conflagration in Europe defied the expectations of planners from each of the principal belligerents. Still, they were much closer to being prepared than they would have been had they simply hoped for peace.

Abstract: Special operations forces have played an important role in Russian warfare against Ukraine. In Crimea, they engaged in mostly covert action tasks, whereas in Donbas they engaged in more regular special operations functions such as special reconnaissance, military assistance, and direct action. The annexation of Crimea was the first time in which the new Special Operations Command took on a leading role. Based on the Ukrainian experience, there is little reason to doubt Russian capacity in special operations has increased. This may have consequences for the contingency planning of other countries, including the United States.

This article investigates the roles special operations forces (SOF) have fulfilled in Russian warfare against Ukraine—both in Crimea and in Donbas. It starts with a brief survey of the different types of Russian SOF and how these forces fit into the “hybrid” warfare paradigm. Russian special operations in both Crimea and Donbas are then analyzed in relation to standard categories of SOF tasks. Finally, the question of what lessons other countries, including the United States, may draw from the Crimea and Donbas examples is discussed.

First, a brief note on sources is necessary. Given the particularly secret nature of special operations, reliable data are difficult. This is even more so in this case due to the recent nature of the events and the current timidity of the Russian press. Barring a few media outlets and Internet sites, much investigative journalism is “scared into silence” in Russia today. Except for the officially admitted use of SOF in Crimea, and the arrest of two Spetsnaz GRU officers in Donbas in May 2015, there is little available in Russian open sources.

Hence, this study, relies to a large extent on Ukrainian sources. Since Ukraine is party to the conflict, these sources are obviously biased. The Ukrainian sources used are relatively independent from the Ukrainian government. Still, they are not objective. Most of them, understandably, display varying degrees of patriotism in the face of Russian military aggression.

Dr. Tor Bukkvoll is a Senior Research Fellow at the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment. He is a specialist on Russia and Ukraine, particularly in the areas of defense and security policy.
On the other hand, since the presence of in-service Russian military personnel on Ukrainian soil has been demonstrated beyond doubt, there is little reason to assume Russian SOF are not there. No modern army would engage in a foreign mission of this scale without having designated roles for its SOF in operations. Thus, it would be in the details of how they operate, rather than in the fact of their presence, that the bias in Ukrainian sources could skew the analysis.

**Russian SOF in the Serdiukov Reforms**

Russia has many military and paramilitary formations that are called special operation forces or *Spetsnaz* (short for *spetsialnoe naznachenie* or special assignment). For this study, the special forces of the armed forces’ Main Intelligence Directorate, *Spetsnaz* GRU, the special forces of the Federal Security Service (FSB), *Spetsnaz* FSB, the special forces of the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), *Spetsnaz* SVR, the Special Operations Command (SOC) and the 45th Special Forces Regiment of the Airborne troops are the most relevant. One should note special forces only make up parts of each of these organizations. GRU, FSB, and SVR have a number of agencies beyond special forces, such as spying bureaus (*Agentura*), SIGINT (signal intelligence) units and others. These latter agencies are also included in this study, since they often work in close cooperation with “their” special forces. However, belonging to the same super-structure is no guarantee of close cooperation. The rivalry between *Spetsnaz* and *Agentura* within the GRU is well known.

*Spetsnaz* GRU is probably the most famous of the Russian SOF. This organization was established in the early 1950s, and it played an important role in the Russian warfare in Afghanistan and Chechnya. Consequently, most of the operational experience of the organization is as elite light infantry rather than as special forces in the current Western understanding of the term. Thus, *Spetsnaz*-GRU may today better be compared to the US Rangers than to the US Delta Force. This supportive role for *Spetsnaz*-GRU was to some extent formalized as part of the Serdiukov reforms. Here, the responsibility of *Spetsnaz* GRU as a provider of services to the other branches of the military was enhanced at the expense of its former more independent position.

In parallel, a new Special Operations Command (SOC) was established to be the military instrument most directly at the hands of the political leadership. *Spetsnaz* GRU consists of seven brigades spread around the country, with approximately 1,500 servicemen in each—battle and support units combined. In addition, there are four naval *Spetsnaz*-GRU detachments, one connected to each of the fleets. These latter detachments most likely have up to 500 servicemen each, again battle units and support personnel combined. Thus, the total number of troops is probably plus/minus 12,000. All *Spetsnaz*-GRU were supposed to be contract soldiers by the end of 2014. So far, however, it has been

---

2. Minister of Defense Anatolii Serdiukov in 2008 initiated a fundamental reform of all the Russian armed forces. The main element of this reform was the transition from mass mobilization to high-readiness troops, but the reform also changed many other aspects of organization.


difficult to find verification as to whether this aim was achieved or not. Conscripts have traditionally played a significant role in Spetsnaz-GRU.

The establishment of SOC was announced by Chief of the General Staff, General Valery Gerasimov, in March 2013, but it had been under development since 2009. It is modelled directly on the US Delta Force and the UK Special Air Service. The organization is divided into five special operations divisions with about 50 service personnel in each, and the total number of troops, including support personnel, is probably no more than 1,500. The establishment of SOC was, and probably still is, resented within the GRU. SOC was seen as both a reason for, and a symbol of, GRU’s institutional loss of status. The new special force was initially part of GRU, then removed from GRU, and is now again officially part of GRU, but with a very significant degree of autonomy. Also, recruitment often comes from outside GRU. The main strategic idea behind SOC is for the political leadership to have a small and very competent military tool at its disposal for national and international contingencies where the use of force is needed, but where one does not expect larger scale military action to follow.

The FSB has two Spetsnaz units—Alfa and Vympel. Alfa consists of five sub-units at different locations in Russia, and the main responsibility of the organization is anti-terror operations. Vympel consists of four sub-units, and has protection of strategic objects, such as nuclear plants, as the main responsibility. These special responsibilities, however, do not in any sense mean these forces cannot also be used for other purposes. The size of Alfa and Vympel together is probably between 300 and 500 troops.

The 45th SOF Regiment of the Airborne forces basically fulfills the same type of SOF support for these forces as the army Spetsnaz-GRU does for the land forces and the navy Spetsnaz-GRU does for the naval infantry. Their number is probably around 700 troops.

Finally, the SVR has its own Spetsnaz with around 300 troops called Zaslon (covering force). Their primary mission is the protection of Russian official personnel around the world, but they will also be available for other assignments.

**SOF and “Hybrid” Warfare**

There have been numerous attempts to define the concept of hybrid warfare, and many also dismiss the concept. In terms of the Russian aggression against Ukraine, much of the focus has been on the use of non-military means for the achievement of strategic goals. It is, as pointed out by some scholars, important to keep in mind that “hybrid”

---


6 The exact figures are secret, but estimates such as these are available in open sources. See interview with former FSB colonel Sergei Shavrin at http://www.agentura.ru/press/about/jointprojects/mn/shavrin.


refers to the means, not the principles or the goals of warfare. SOF is by definition a military means. The use of SOF in regular battle would therefore fall outside most definitions of hybrid warfare. However, one could argue the use of SOF to attain political goals in non-combat settings would be an example of the use of these types of forces for hybrid warfare.

By NATO’s classification, special operations can be divided into three main types: direct action, special reconnaissance, and military assistance. This categorization, however, does not really accommodate some of the more covert “political” tasks that special forces sometimes execute. Since these latter missions are important in the present context, I use the concept of covert action in addition to the three NATO types to structure the analysis. It is primarily in this covert action role that Russian SOF become a hybrid warfare tool. In the two cases below, we will see that Russian SOF were parts of larger regular operations in both Crimea and Donbas, but also that they played the hybrid warfare covert action role of influencing local political events in non-combat settings.

Crimea

The Crimean operation, although most probably conducted according to existing contingency plans, was sudden and executed mostly without direct fighting. This means there was no direct action, and little time or need for military assistance from the Russian SOF. The operation was largely covert action, most likely based on intelligence gathered previously by units connected to the Russian Black Sea fleet and possibly local agents recruited by the FSB and GRU. Pre-deployment special reconnaissance by Spetsnaz-GRU may have taken place, but so far it has been difficult to find evidence of it in open sources. The Ukrainian military observer Dmytro Tymchuk claims both FSB and GRU became very active in Ukraine after Viktor Yanukovych became president in 2010. The latter made the Ukrainian security service, SBU, change its focus from counterespionage against Russia to counterespionage against the United States.

It would probably also be wrong to claim any significant military assistance role for the Russian SOF in Crimea, since the so-called “Crimea self-defense units” seem largely to have been décor, providing the Russian forces with a local image. The self-defense units did not play a very significant military role.

---

11 The United States defines covert action as “an activity or activities of the United States Government to influence political, economic, or military conditions abroad, where it is intended that the role of the United States Government will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly.” See Aki J. Peritz and Eric Rosenbach, “Covert Action,” Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs Memorandum, July 2009, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/19149/covert_action.html.
Since the operation in terms of SOF was largely a covert action, it was only to be expected that the newly created SOC would play the crucial role. According to Russian military observers Anton Lavrov and Alexey Nikolsky, the take-over of Crimea was the first operation of a significant scale undertaken by the SOC. In particular, SOC was behind the seizing of the local parliament on September 27. This act made it possible to elect the Russian “marionette” Sergei Aksenov as new Crimean prime minister. Furthermore, SOC also led the take-over of the Ukrainian military’s headquarters and a number of other hard-target military compounds. These were, however, operations that demanded more troops than SOC could provide. The organization was therefore aided by units from Spetsnaz—GRU and naval infantry. The SOC, however, was always in the lead.

The Crimean operation used speed and surprise to establish fait accompli on the ground, thus making a military response from the Ukrainian side difficult. True, the Russian victory was secured by the transfer of additional troops to the peninsula, but the initial action by SOC and other special and elite forces elements was the decisive element. From the take-over of the Crimean parliament to the signing of the treaty making Crimea a part of Russia it took only 19 days. Seven days later all Ukrainian military units had laid down their arms. Such a time schedule makes the Crimean operation very different from the follow-on operation in Donbas.

Donbas

Based mostly on “selfies” posted by Russian soldiers on the Internet, the volunteer Ukrainian group “InformNapalm” has identified by name a large number of individuals from different Russian SOF units on Ukrainian soil. These include all seven Spetsnaz GRU brigades, the VDV 45th Brigade, and the FSB. No open source, however, seems to claim the SOC has taken part in these operations. According to the Russian military observer Alexey Nikolsky, “based on what we know about how SOF forces are utilized and for what purposes, it appears that there is no need for their [meaning SOC] presence in eastern Ukraine.” So far this author has found no evidence to the contrary. Their absence in Donbas fits the image of SOC as an exclusive force used only where the chances of further fighting were small. It also underscores that SOC is a capability of such value and cost that it will be used mostly when others cannot do the job.

The first GRU operative was arrested on Ukrainian soil by the Ukrainian security service SBU in March 2014. He was arrested together with three others while gathering intelligence on Ukrainian military positions on the Chongar Peninsula just north of Crimea. His name was Roman Filatov, and he admitted to being an officer of GRU. As a result

16 “Special forces” are here understood as the ones listed under the subtitle Russian SOF and the Serdiukov reforms in this study. “Elite forces” are the airborne forces and the naval infantry. These are elite in the sense they have a much-higher degree of professional soldiers than regular army units, and the selection of personnel is much stricter.
of a personal deal between Russian Minister of Defense Shoigu and head of the Ukrainian presidential administration Serhiy Pashinsky, Filatov was sent back to Russia in exchange for Ukrainian Kontr-Admiral Serhii Haiduk and eight others then held hostage by the new Crimean authorities.\textsuperscript{19}

Besides Spetsnaz-GRU, the Russian Internet site Zabytii Polk (Forgotten Regiment) claimed the 45th Spetsnaz Regiment had been present with a base in the Ukrainian city of Novoazovsk. Furthermore, the Ukrainian general staff claimed to have evidence the SVR had been active doing political work in the area, and both FSB special units, Alfa and Vymple, had taken part in the fighting. This latter claim, however, has so far been difficult to corroborate from other sources.\textsuperscript{20}

Exactly when Spetsnaz-GRU first started to send operators into Donbas is still unknown. One of the first eyewitness accounts was provided by the Ukrainian war correspondent Inna Zolotukhina. In her book \textit{Voina s pervykh dnei} (The War From Its First Days), she claims the forces occupying the SBU headquarters in the Eastern Ukrainian city of Sloviansk in late April 2014 “were dressed and equipped exactly as the fighters from Ramzan Kadyrov’s Vostok Battalion I had seen in Crimea two months earlier.”\textsuperscript{21} She also contended “a highly placed representative of the local power structures [in Sloviansk] told me that about 150 instructors from GRU had been in place in the city for almost a month.”\textsuperscript{22} If this information is correct, Spetsnaz-GRU may have been on the ground in Eastern Ukraine as early as mid-March 2014. That is a month before the Donbas anti-Kiev rebellion became full blown.

Ukrainian oligarch Serhiy Taruta has also confirmed Russian special operations forces most likely had a role in the initiation of the rebellion. Taruta took part in the Ukrainian government’s negotiations with the rebels in Donetsk. According to him, on April 8 the Ukrainian authorities were able to bribe the rebels, who had taken over the town hall in Donetsk, to leave the building. However, as soon as that agreement was clear, “green men” came to Donetsk from Sloviansk and changed the mind of the Donetsk rebels. After that visit, a compromise was no longer possible.\textsuperscript{23} This evidence suggests Russia was involved in initiating parts of the anti-Kiev rebellion in Donbas, and Russian SOF was one of the main tools. This is a prime example of the use of SOF in a covert operation hybrid warfare role. At the same time, the evidence in

\footnotesize


\textsuperscript{21} The Vostok Battalion, consisting largely of Chechen fighters, was directly subordinated to GRU in the years 1999-2008. In 2008, it was officially disbanded, but according to Ivan Sukhov, a Russian journalist and Caucasus expert, it was “never really broken up, just re-profiled and incorporated into a Defense Ministry unit based in Chechnya.” See Claire Bigg, “Vostok Battalion: A Powerful New Player in Eastern Ukraine,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, May 30, 2014, http://www.rferl.org/content/vostok-battalion-a-powerful-new-player-in-eastern-ukraine/25404785.html.

\textsuperscript{22} Inna Zolotukhina, \textit{Voina s pervykh dnei} (Kiev: Folio, 2015), 70.

\textsuperscript{23} Sonia Koshkina, \textit{Maidan – Nerasskazannaya Istoriia} (Kiev: Brait Books, 2015), 400.
no way excludes that there also was significant local initiative for rebellion against Kiev.  

While Crimea for Russian SOF was mostly about covert action, their involvement in the Donbas war also saw them engaged in the full spectrum of regular SOF tasks from July-August 2014 onwards. The Ukrainian military observer Konstantin Mashovets claims Spetsnaz-GRU at any time have had from three to four combined units/battalions in Donbas. These units have contained roughly 250 to 300 fighters each, and have been provided to the theater of operations on a rotational basis among the seven Russian Spetsnaz GRU brigades. They have operated in groups of 10-12 individuals, and worked closely with GRU SIGINT units.

In terms of Russian SOF relations with the local rebels, the former trained and provided intelligence for the latter. At the same time, there has been a reluctance to operate together, especially in the cases where Russian not-in-service volunteers have been able to do the same job. Mashovets further claims each Spetsnaz-GRU group has been set up with “curators” from Agentura-GRU. Thus, the Russian tactic seems to have been to keep political and military assignments somewhat separate. Spetsnaz-GRU do special reconnaissance and military assistance, whereas the political work is taken care of by embedded “curators” from Agentura-GRU.

In terms of direct action, Russian SOF in general have tried to avoid direct combat in Donbas. This, however, has not always been possible. For example, one of the GRU officers identified in Donbas is an individual known as Krivko. He was wounded in battle at Sanzjarovka at the end of January 2015. Simultaneously, in May 2015, two soldiers from the 16th brigade in Tambov were wounded in battle by Stsjastry near Luhanskl. These examples suggest Spetsnaz-GRU has been only partially successful in avoiding participation in regular battle.

Another area of direct action has been sabotage in Ukrainian rear areas. One example, of a sabotage mission gone wrong, was the killing of an alleged Russian GRU-agent in Kharkov in September 2014. He was suspected of blowing up train wagons with air fuel at Osnova railway station, probably in order to create problems for Ukrainian military aviation.

Ukrainian sources additionally claim combined groups of rebels and Spetsnaz-GRU increased their activities in Ukrainian rear areas in


26 Ibid.

the summer of 2015. This activity included mine-laying and attacks at poorly guarded Ukrainian transport convoys.28

A somewhat different direct-action activity has been the responsibility of the FSB special forces. The Ukrainian military observer Dmytro Tymchuk states that the FSB special forces have had supervision and disciplining of the different separatist groups as a special responsibility. This has included both diplomacy and more “physical measures” against recalcitrant individuals.29

Finally, as in most countries, there are problems with the coordination of policies among different agencies. Russian observer Konstantin Gaaze claims there are at least three different agencies of the Russian state that implement policy in Donbas. Those are often neither willing nor able to coordinate their efforts. For example, presidential adviser Vladislav Surkov has supervised the DNR/LNR political leaderships, whereas the Russian military have been directing the DNR/LNR militaries. In addition, the FSB has done things on its own that very few have heard about. None of the three, according to Gaaze, have informed each other very much about their doings.30

In October 2015, however, according to Ukrainian sources, a joint coordination center was established between the GRU and FSB in Donetsk to deal with the problem.31

In summary, the Russian use of SOF in Crimea and Donbas may be illustrated by the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Crimea</th>
<th>Donbas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Direct action</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special reconnaissance</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military assistance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Covert action</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Implications for the United States**

As always will be the case, characteristics particular to these two operations will limit what other countries can learn from them. Both the presence of significant, largely ethnic Russian, pro-Russia elements in the populations, and the historical ties of these areas to Russia, set Crimea and Donbas apart from many other areas where Russia may get into conflict in the future. Despite this fact, at least three broad lessons can be learned.

First, the increased Russian ability to deploy SOF at high speed to a conflict zone is worth attention. It is especially the establishment of the

---

31 http://nv.ua/ukraine/events/vtorgshiesja-v-ukraine-fsb-i-gru-obedinilis-dlia-terakov-i-diversij--is-78415.html.
SOC that has strengthened Russia’s capability in this area. In Crimea they were very rapidly able to create a fait accompli on the ground that Ukrainian authorities found it hard to respond to. It is possible to imagine something similar also in Russia’s relations with other countries. If, in a conflict of interest between Russia and another state, Russia uses SOF to quickly establish a fait accompli, the host government may face a serious dilemma. Accepting what Russia has done will not be easy, but risking escalation to a full-scale conflict by striking back is not easy either. That is especially the case if the actual material and/or political damage of accepting the new status quo is limited. NATO countries, furthermore, must take into account how other members of the alliance are likely to judge the new situation. Just because the host government may think a military response is justified, this does not mean the other members of the alliance think likewise. There will be serious worries about escalation. The host government should probably secure clarity on the issue of assistance before deciding on its own type of response.

Second, Russian use of SOF in particular, and hybrid warfare in general, will probably look very different from case to case. Thus, training according to Ukraine-like scenarios may be of limited value. Instead, each country needs to identify what their particular vulnerabilities may be in the case of a potential conflict with Russia. Efforts to deal with these vulnerabilities should be the main focus.

Third, the effect of the use of SOF may be enhanced by the simultaneous use of other, non-military, tools. In the cases of Crimea and Donbas, this was propaganda by state-controlled Russian television and disruption of the normal information infrastructure. In other cases, it may be something totally different. The main lesson is to be ready for the fact that several threats are likely to manifest themselves at the same time.

Also for the United States, the increased Russian ability to conduct high-speed limited scope military operations with SOF against US allies should be of concern. Reaction will be easier if the right mix of military and/or political response has been given some thought in advance. In terms of NATO solidarity, the threshold for Article 5 assistance may become more blurred.

Another potential development with possible consequences for the United States could be that Russia exports its new model for SOF to other countries. Russia already has some experience in this field, helping establish SOF in Ethiopia in the late 1990s. Russia often cooperates in the military sphere with countries that have strained relations with the United States. Stronger SOF capabilities among potential US adversaries may have consequences for US contingency planning.

Unless there is a change of regime, Russia’s relations with many countries look set to be challenging for years to come. This means that even if Russia is not actively seeking confrontation, diverging interests and interpretations of political realities are likely to make conflict a real possibility. For many countries, until a broader understanding and more stable relations with Russia have been achieved, the danger of violent conflict remains a possibility. In this setting, growing Russian SOF capabilities are a particular concern.
Abstract: The revival of Russian military power poses certain challenges to NATO and to the West. However, the exact nature of these challenges is not straightforward. This article discusses why Russia is reviving its conventional military power and argues these developments are not limited to the intention of preparing for offensive action. NATO’s and the West’s policy responses to recent changes in Russian defense policy need to be based on a realistic and nuanced understanding of Russian motivations because ill-considered responses could have serious unintended consequences.

After almost 20 years of allowing Russia’s conventional armed forces to fall into disrepair, an extensive program of modernization announced in 2008 has yielded impressive results and started a process of Russian military revival. Following the military intervention in Ukraine, the annexation of Crimea, and Russia’s first expeditionary operation outside of the former Soviet region in Syria, recent developments in Russian defense policy have led to increasing concerns about a militarily resurgent Russia and the potential implications of this for its neighbors, NATO, and the West. In the words of the new NATO SACEUR, US General Curtis Scaparotti, who was sworn in in May 2016, “a resurgent Russia [is] striving to project itself as a world power…To address these challenges, we must continue to maintain and enhance our levels of readiness and our agility in the spirit of being able to fight tonight if deterrence fails.”

According to Gustav Gressel, writing for the European Council of Foreign Relations, “Europe’s military advantage over Russia” is now “undermined.” To counter “Russia’s new military boldness and adventurism” and its military vision that is “centered on the Eurasian landmass,” Europe is now in need of finding an urgent response to

Acknowledgements: The research for this article was conducted as part of a project funded by the Finnish Prime Minister’s Office, government’s analysis, assessments, and research activities fund. The opinions expressed in the article are those of the author. For the duration of the project the author was based at the University of Helsinki’s Aleksanteri Institute as a senior researcher. She would like to thank everybody at the institute for their support.

“Russian expansionism.” Although “a major military escalation on the European continent is not imminent,” according to Gressel, “Russia is clearly preparing itself for offensive operations.”

Russia’s conventional military capabilities are more impressive today than during the first two decades of the post-Soviet period, and these capabilities are likely to continue growing. It is also beyond doubt Russian foreign policy rhetoric and conduct today, particularly towards NATO and the West, is more forceful and aggressive than it was at any time during the post-Cold war era. However, the convergence of these factors does not necessarily mean Russia is rebuilding its conventional military exclusively to prepare for more offensive action or to pursue expansionist policies in direct confrontation with NATO.

This article argues this conjecture overlooks the fact that most states continue to see the maintenance of a powerful conventional military as essential. Conventional military power has remained highly relevant throughout the post-Cold war era not only as an instrument of policy, but also as an essential attribute of a strong state and global actor. From this point of view, Russia’s restoration of conventional military power was only a matter of time and money and is in many ways less surprising than the long neglect of these capabilities. Moreover, the assumption that preparation for offensive action and the pursuit of expansionist policies is the only motivation behind the revival of Russia’s conventional military power disregards the fact that the utility of military force is not limited to the fighting of wars and defeating of opponents.

Instead, conventional military power is routinely wielded to deter, compel, swagger, dissuade, or reassure. The idea that improvements in Russia’s conventional military capabilities have significantly increased the likelihood of offensive action, including against the West, also underestimates the limitations of Russia’s conventional military capabilities and overstates its likely willingness to take such a step in the first place. Theoretically, the scenario of a Russian offensive against a NATO member state is not impossible now or in the future, but it would be highly irrational given Russia’s persistent disparity in conventional military power and the risk of escalation into nuclear conflict. The revival of Russian conventional military power will increasingly affect the defensive balance in Europe and pose certain challenges. However, the implications of this development and how NATO and the West should respond are not straightforward. A more nuanced consideration of Russia’s possible motivations for rebuilding its conventional military power is essential. Basing policy responses on a skewed understanding of Russian intentions could have serious unintended consequences.

The Enduring Relevance of Conventional Military Power

A strong military is central to a state’s ability to project power on an international level. As Hans Morgenthau noted, as long as anarchy obtains in the international system, “armed strength as a threat or a potentiality is the most important material factor making for the political

---

Arguably, this is as true today as it was at the time this line was written. During the Cold War, strong conventional military power, in addition to nuclear deterrence, singled out the United States and the Soviet Union as the world’s two superpowers. Although some advocates of nuclear weapons believed nuclear deterrence would make conventional military power obsolete in the long run, such a view never took hold in the superpowers’ defense decision-making establishments. In fact, both countries continued spending the bulk of their military budgets on conventional forces because it was understood the political-military utility of nuclear deterrence was limited for dealing with threats to their interests below the threshold of a direct nuclear attack on their own territories. 

When the Cold War ended, many believed the centrality of military power in international relations would diminish. The dissolution of the Soviet Union and the threat of a global conflict had waned and, with the spread of democracy and economic interdependence, state competition in the future would revolve around economic, not military matters. However, such beliefs were short-lived. Military power continued to be seen as an essential instrument of statecraft, especially for great powers, even though economic competition had become more important and there was no longer an immediate threat of a global war. In the absence of an immediate adversary against whom to assess its conventional military capabilities, the United States defined the “two-war” standard as a measure to size its conventional forces in 1991. As there was no clear and present danger emanating from a specific state actor, conventional forces strong enough to deal with the eventuality of two simultaneous major regional contingencies were considered essential to ensure the country’s “ongoing demands for forward presence, crisis response, regional deterrence, humanitarian assistance, building partnership capacity, homeland defense, and support to civil authorities.”

Contemporary China is another important example demonstrating the enduring relevance of conventional military power in the eyes of states aspiring to great power status. Although China has established itself as one of the world’s economic great powers, growing economic strength has been accompanied by a massive drive to establish a competitive conventional military arsenal. As the world’s second largest military spender behind the United States, and with its budget continuing to grow, China’s development has evoked discussions similar to the Russian case about the country’s intentions and its potential transformation into a “revisionist state.” As Hew Strachan has noted,

---

7 Ibid., 8-9.
rather than causing a decline of the role of conventional military power in international politics, the end of the Cold War made permissible a situation where states, especially in the West, have displayed a growing readiness to use military force as an instrument of policy. The utility of conventional military power endures.

Russia and Conventional Military Power

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia always maintained a strong nuclear deterrent, and in this area remained equal to the United States. However, its conventional forces were left to decay for almost two decades. This drawn-out neglect of its armed forces should not be confused with a statement of pacifism in the sense that the projection of military power was no longer seen as important.

Russia’s quest for great power status dates back centuries, and its self-perception as such did not cease with the end of the Cold War in 1991. Military power was central to the making of the tsarist empire. It was also a strong military, above all else, which elevated the Soviet Union to superpower status during the Cold War years. Relinquishing armed strength and accepting the resulting loss of great power status was never a serious option for Russia. The first military doctrine of the Russian Federation issued in 1993 envisaged significant cuts to Soviet legacy force levels and prioritized the development of conventional forces able to deal with local conflicts, which were seen as the most immediate concern at the time. The idea that a global conventional deterrent was no longer needed was never a consensus view in Russia. Traditional military thinkers from the outset argued in favor of more open-ended defense requirements that would keep the country prepared for a larger variety of eventualities.

In fact, the 1993 doctrine already reflected ambitions to maintain a competitive conventional deterrent. It envisioned investments in research and development for the creation of high-tech equipment, including electronic warfare capabilities, stealth technology, and advanced naval weaponry. This was a direct response to the lessons Russian strategists had learned from the accomplishments of the “revolution in military affairs” demonstrated by superior US conventional forces in the 1991 Gulf War. Such ambitions were confirmed in the 2000 military doctrine, which explicitly reoriented priorities away from the focus on small wars-type scenarios and towards the need for the creation of conventional forces with global reach. This doctrine was published in the wake of NATO’s high-tech operation “Allied Force” over Serbia which, in the words of Alexei Arbatov, “marked a watershed in Russia’s assessment of its own military requirements and defense priorities.”

13 Richard Pipes, “Is Russia Still an Enemy?” Foreign Affairs 76 no. 5 (September/October 1997): 75-76.
Although the central components of the successful 2008 modernization program, such as the need to professionalize, create rapid reaction forces, and procure advanced technology, were considered in all reform attempts from the early 1990s, no program up until 2008 led to fundamental transformation. Unlike the 2008 reforms, which were backed up by realistic financial means and unprecedented political will, Yeltsin-era plans for military transformation faltered owing to the country’s dire economic situation and the lack of political clout required for pushing through changes unpopular with some elements in the military leadership.\[^{15}\] The inability to turn ambitions for its conventional military into reality did not mean the Russian leadership no longer saw strong conventional military power as desirable or important. Clearly, there was an understanding that a strong nuclear deterrent alone was insufficient to uphold Russia’s great power status in the long term, especially when other countries’ conventional armed forces continued to modernize at a rapid pace. Conventional military power persists as an important attribute of state power. It is deemed to have utility as an instrument of policy, even more so now than it was during the Cold War. As long as this is the case, it would be unrealistic to expect Russia not to want to remain a player in the game.

### The Utility of Conventional Military Power

The idea that the modernization of Russia’s conventional military capabilities can only be motivated by its intention to engage in ever more aggressive, expansionist, and offensive military action is based on a simplistic understanding of the utility of conventional military power. As Robert Art argued, “military power should not be equated simply with its physical use...To focus only on the physical use of military power is to miss most of what most states do most of the time with the military power at their disposal.”\[^{16}\] In other words, states maintain conventional military forces not only to fight offensive wars, but also to wield these forces in a variety of physical and non-physical ways to deter, coerce, compel, swagger, reassure, or dissuade other actors, depending on the situation and on the objectives to be achieved.\[^{17}\]

The prerequisite for a state’s ability to use its military power in any physical or non-physical way is the availability of a robust military organization in the first place. Following the serious neglect of the Russian armed forces throughout the 1990s, this availability was increasingly in doubt. The degree of decay of the Russian military and the possible domestic and international repercussions if this situation had been allowed to continue need to be taken into account when Russia’s reasons for rebuilding its conventional military power are considered. As Eugene Rumer and Celeste Wallander wrote in 2003, “Russia entered the millennium with its capacity to project military power beyond its borders vastly reduced and its ability to defend its territorial integrity

---


\[^{16}\] Art, “American Foreign Policy,” 10.

and sovereignty severely tested by the war in Chechnya.” Clearly, the fact that the once powerful Russian military struggled to defeat “a band of irregulars fighting with little more than the weapons on their backs,” as Jeffrey Tayler had put it, created a feeling of insecurity in Russia that cast serious doubts on its ability to defend against and deter potential external threats.

Although a stronger Russian conventional military poses certain challenges to NATO and the West, it is clear further decay would have been a poor alternative. When the Russian National Security Concept issued in 2000 permitted nuclear first use to “repulse armed aggression, if all other means of resolving the crisis have been exhausted,” it was widely assumed the nuclear threshold was lowered because there was no longer any faith in Russia that conventional options would be successful in the case of an armed attack. As Charles Glaser cautioned, there is the danger that insecurity can pressure an adversary to adopt competitive and threatening policies. This is particularly dangerous if the only tools available for pursuing such policies are nuclear weapons. It is also clear the modernization of Russia’s conventional military was a necessity not only to ensure defense requirements. Although a military coup was never on the cards, concerns over growing military opposition and mutiny became increasingly common by the end of the 1990s. The potentially catastrophic consequences of this for Russia, as well as for international security, are not hard to imagine.

Russian views on the utility of conventional military power are not limited to territorial defense and the peaceful deterrence of potential external threats. After all, Russia has used armed force to pursue a variety of policy objectives throughout the post-Cold War years, including various “peace enforcement” operations across the former Soviet region at the beginning of the 1990s, the Chechen wars, the war with Georgia in 2008, in Ukraine starting in 2014, and most recently in Syria. A reason why there is concern in the West about improvements in Russia’s conventional military capabilities is the conviction that better capabilities will inevitably lead to more offensive action in the future. As British expert on the Russian military Keir Giles has put it, “the more Russia develops its conventional capability, the more confident and aggressive it will become.” The influence of capabilities on the decision to use force is not as straightforward, however. As Benjamin Fordham argued, the “claim that capabilities influence not just opportunity, but also willingness…is implicit or explicit in a substantial amount of work in international relations, but has rarely been tested.”

---

22 Arbatov, “Military Reform,” 103 and 129.
Better military capabilities are likely to influence Russian foreign policy by providing more opportunity for the use of force. After all, as Fordham also noted, “decision makers cannot use force unless they have the means to do so.”\textsuperscript{25} Russia’s air campaign in Syria, for example, was certainly enabled by the opportunities created from improvements in its conventional capabilities. In Syria, Russia demonstrated it now had the capability to deploy and sustain a limited out-of-area operation for the first time in post-Soviet history. This came as a surprise to many observers, who did not believe Russia had the sea and airlift capabilities required for such an undertaking.\textsuperscript{26} This operation would not have been possible ten years ago, even if there had been the willingness in theory to launch a similar offensive.

The most likely area for future Russian military action continues to be the former Soviet region in cases deemed by Russia to pose significant threats to its interests, for example, the intrusion of IS terrorism into Central Asian states. It is unlikely better capabilities will result in the indiscriminate future use of military force by Russia or a proliferation of expansionist policies as improvements in Russia’s conventional military capabilities have not substantially changed the relative military power balance in this region. Even at its lowest point, Russian conventional military power far outstripped any of the other former Soviet states, at any point of the post-Cold War period, due to the sheer disparity in size and the fact that their militaries were besieged by similar levels of neglect.

Although the operational performance of Russian forces in conflicts fought up until the Georgia war in 2008 was far from stellar, especially when the Chechen wars stretched their capabilities in every possible way, the country never risked a situation that could lead to comprehensive defeat. In spite of its consistent military superiority over the other former Soviet states, Russia opted for the use of force in some cases, but not in others even when this was expected, such as the Kyrgyz-Uzbek clashes in 2010. Although long-term occupation and territorial expansion following the five-day war with Georgia in 2008 was within the realm of possibility, Russia decided to withdraw.

Better conventional capabilities have created more options for the Russian leadership to resort to the use of force. However, better capabilities \textit{per se} are unlikely to cause Russia to lose sight of the fact that the utility of military force is limited and not suited for the achievement of every policy objective. Rationality in Russian decision-making, when it comes to the use of force as an instrument of policy, is an important context for the fear that improved capabilities are pursued ultimately to prepare for offensive action against the West. This is not a new insight: in spite of the success of the 2008 modernization program, Russian conventional military power continues to lag far behind the United States and NATO in terms of size, spending, and technological sophistication. This fact has been conceded even by analysts who have warned about the dangers of a military resurgent Russia, as Gressel cited above. This issue tends to be brushed aside, however, as disparity is merely expected

\textsuperscript{25} Ibid.

to delay the threat of Russian offensive action. It should not be. Given
the relative weakness of Russia’s conventional military vis-à-vis NATO
and the likelihood of serious escalation and defeat, a military offensive
on a NATO member state would be highly irrational. It is also far from
clear what strategic objective such a move would serve.

There is no doubt that in absolute terms Russian conventional
military capabilities in 2016 are considerably bigger and better than they
were at any point during the post-Soviet period. The achievements of
the 2008 modernization program, which emphasized the efficiency of
command structures, the move from mobilization to rapid reaction, and
the modernization of technology, have been well documented and were
demonstrated during the conflicts in Ukraine and Syria.27 Relative to the
conventional military power of other great powers, the United States
and NATO in particular, Russia’s position remains far from impressive.
Although defense spending alone is insufficient as a measure of relative
military power, the sheer discrepancy in this respect is worth reiterating.

Although Russian defense spending has seen a steady increase since
Vladimir Putin’s election as president in 2000, the country’s military
budget today is still little more than 10 percent of United States military
budget—and a fraction of the NATO alliance as a whole. Even when
the Russian defense budget approached five percent of the gross domes-
tic product in 2015 at the peak of military spending, its entire budget,
inclusive of spending on nuclear capabilities, amounted to less than the
combined budgets of Germany and Italy.28

In terms of the number and quality of high-tech weaponry, Russia
continues to lag far behind Western competitors, especially the United
States. Although strides have been made in reforming the Russian
defense industry, persistent organizational problems need to be resolved
before Russia can start rivaling the West with advanced military tech-
ology. Regarding troop numbers, it is generally assumed Russian military
strength in 2015 comprised up to 800,000 personnel. This is sizeable
(even compared to the United States’ 1,400,000 active soldiers), but
the bulk of the Russian armed forces are poorly trained conscripts.29
When it comes to the combat readiness and operational experience of
Russian conventional forces relative to those of the United States, there
is little reason to fear Russia is catching up. Although Russian troops
have trained in the fighting of large-scale joint inter-service operations
in numerous military exercises in the past few years, Russia’s reformed
ground forces have never been tested in an actual conflict situation, as
both Crimea and Syria were limited in scope and scale.30

Fears over the possibility of Russian offensive action against a
NATO member state have not arisen out of the blue. Although long-
range Russian bomber flights close to other countries’ airspaces resumed
in 2006 and have caused concern for a while, such instances of military
provocation continue and have risen in number. Aggressive maneuvers

28 “Chapter Ten: Country Comparisons – Commitments, Force Levels and Economics,” The
29 Ibid.
by Russian fighter aircraft, like the buzzing of a US naval vessel in the Baltic Sea in April 2016, have exacerbated concerns Russia was willing to risk a military confrontation with the West. Moreover, the number and size of Russian military exercises and surprise inspections in its Western military district have mushroomed since the start of the 2008 modernization program. According to figures of the Russian Ministry of Defense, some exercises have involved up to 150,000 military personnel and have honed the country’s ability to fight a large-scale interstate war.  

It remains highly questionable whether preparation for offensive action is the most likely motivation behind these developments. Given the variety of possible ways in which states can wield conventional military power to achieve different objectives, there are more plausible explanations for Russia’s actions vis-à-vis NATO. One explanation, for example, is that Russia is using its military power for swaggering. This has been defined by Art as the conspicuous display by a state or statesman of one’s military might “to look and feel more powerful or important, to be taken seriously by others in the councils of international decision-making, to enhance the nation’s image in the eyes of others.” Clearly, after years of decay during which the West had written off Russia as a global military actor, such swaggering, coupled with the interventions in Ukraine and Syria, has been an effective way to enhance the international image of Russia’s shiny, new military power in a comprehensive manner. Given the importance for Russia of being granted great power status on a global level, this explanation makes a great deal of sense, asswaggering can bring prestige “on the cheap,” especially when the country is not in the position to project the image of being a great power by other means.

The idea that the revival of Russian conventional military power is motivated entirely by the wish to pursue expansionist policies and to build the offensive potential required to defeat the West is reminiscent of the Western school of thought that during the Cold War sought to explain the Soviet defense effort as the result of historical Russian paranoia, aggressiveness, and “mindless lust for territory,” thus depriving Soviet decision-making of any rationality. Such an interpretation of Russian motivations and intentions is even more remarkable because the decision to risk offensive action against a NATO state would be even more irrational today than it was at any point during the Cold War given the disparity of the conventional military power balance. Some observers have expressed the fear Russia, even in the face of military inferiority, might test NATO’s resolve with an attack on one of the Baltic states because a lack of commitment to Article V collective defense might mean the United States and other NATO members would not fulfill their treaty obligations.

31 Ibid., 62.
33 Ibid.
In fact, similar concerns were prominent during the Cold War when analysts expressed doubts about the United States’ willingness to escalate in the case of a Soviet attack on Europe. As Glaser noted, “the stronger argument in this debate held that US strategy did provide an adequate deterrent...because even a small probability of US nuclear escalation presented the Soviets with overwhelming risks.” The fact that a Soviet attack did not materialize in spite of a much more favorable military balance indicates this argument had a lot of truth in it.

The assumption of irrationality as the basis for Russian decision-making in the area of defense and foreign policy can only hamper the identification of appropriate policy responses. Certainly, measures such as sanctions imposed on the Russian regime would be useless as their success depends on the targets’ rational response. A more complex assessment of Russia’s reasons for rebuilding its conventional military force, not based implicitly or explicitly on questionable assumptions about Russian strategic culture, is required.

Implications

As long as conventional military power retains utility as an instrument of policy, and it is seen as an important attribute of a global power, Russia is unlikely to stop improving its capabilities. The neglect of Russia’s armed forces throughout the 1990s resulted from the leadership’s inability—not its principled lack of desire—to maintain a competitive conventional military. Given the persistent importance of great power status for Russia and the historical significance of military strength in its self-perception as such a power, the revival of Russia’s conventional military was just a matter of time.

This revival has implications for the global power balance and confronts the United States and NATO with an uncomfortable reality. Forcing Russia into reversing, or putting a stop to, this process per se is not an option. Western sanctions banning the export of defense technology and dual-use equipment into Russia are already in place and should be continued. The Russian defense industry is reliant on Western imports, especially for microelectronics and advanced production equipment, so the sanctions have the potential to slow down the modernization process. Although Russia has implemented measures to counter the impact of the sanctions with import substitution, according to the British expert on the Russian defense industry Julian Cooper, the completion of some weapons systems have already been halted or delayed.

The pace of further Russian military modernization will largely depend on economic developments within the country. When the ambitious rearmament program to the year 2020 was created in 2010, the pace of the program was based on the expectation of significant economic growth which would allow Russia to keep defense spending below three percent of the gross domestic product for the lifetime of the program. Economic stagnation, however, meant military expenditures ballooned.

to 5.4 percent of the gross domestic product in the amended budget for 2015, and the new armaments program was delayed until 2025.\textsuperscript{38} From this viewpoint, much will depend on the Russian leadership’s willingness and ability to prioritize defense over other crucial areas of state spending.

Russia is likely to continue using military force as an instrument of policy. Better capabilities have given it a wider range of options, including outside of the former Soviet region. It is another uncomfortable reality for the United States and for NATO—as long as the right of states to use force persists in international politics, there is no easy way of stopping Russia from resorting to force in certain situations.

This is the case even if Russia does so in ways deemed to go against internationally accepted norms on when intervention is justified, as it did in Ukraine in 2014. In this sense, the United States and NATO can only lead by example in using military force strictly as a last resort and within the parameters of international law to condemn Russia when it does not do the same. It is clear Russian military actions in Ukraine have already had serious consequences for the country’s international image. Negative views of Russia in Europe have risen from 54 to 74 percent and no region of the world has improved its perspective of the country.\textsuperscript{39} As complete isolation is not in Russia’s interest, there is hope international repercussions and likely condemnation when international law is clearly violated will be a factor in its future decisions to use military force.

On a more encouraging note, there are limitations to Russia resorting to the use of military force in an offensive capacity and to the effectiveness of relying on this instrument as a means to regaining the status of a world power. It is unlikely improved conventional capabilities will blind the Russian leadership to the fact that military force is not a panacea for the achievement of all policy objectives and that in certain cases, especially if it could lead to direct confrontation with a militarily superior actor such as NATO, this could have devastating consequences that would not serve its interests. Although Crimea demonstrated Russia does not in principle shy away from using military force in support of territorial expansion, it is unlikely a “mindless lust for territory” has become the driver for Russian defense and foreign policy. If the experience of the post-Soviet era is anything to go by, Russia has not used military force for territorial expansion in the past, even in cases when the opportunity presented itself—and its military power would have allowed it to do so.

When it comes to Russia’s use of conventional military power to re-establish itself as a serious actor in global politics, it is clear “swaggering” has already yielded considerable results. Although Russia’s relative conventional military power is nowhere near the strength of the United States and NATO, international reactions to the display of its revived armed forces have arguably enhanced its global image to an extent that far exceeds its actual material capabilities. This should be kept in mind when decisions on US and NATO force deployments on Russia’s

\textsuperscript{38} Ibid., 51-52.
western borders are made. Reassurance measures, especially for NATO’s most eastern member states, are inevitable. If the motivations for these measures are not clearly communicated, they could potentially lead to a situation whereby increasingly aggressive posturing by Russia could be encouraged rather than discouraged by indirectly inflating the image of its military power internationally and amongst the Russian population.

Reliance on conventional military power will only get Russia so far in its quest to regain international recognition as a great power. In an article published in 1996, Richard Pipes noted financially unattainable ambitions for conventional military power in the 1993 Russian military doctrine. In his view, Russia was at a crossroads between the lengthy path of turning the country into a genuine world power that projected strength in all areas of statecraft and the alluring shortcut towards recognition as a great power based entirely on military might.40

If Russia did indeed choose the second path, as seems probable given recent developments, this is unlikely to serve its interests well in the long term. The collapse of the Soviet Union demonstrated the hollowness of international status based entirely on military might. The loss of the latter inevitably signified the loss of great power status for Russia which, unlike the United States, had not maintained strength in other important areas of statecraft and foreign policy.41 Although recent Russian defense reforms cannot be compared to the defense efforts of the Soviet Union in terms of scope and size, even comparatively modest military spending has significantly strengthened Russia’s ability to project the image of power on an international level. This is a double-edged sword, however. If Russia continues to use military force in ways condemned by large portions of the international community and neglects the development of other instruments of statecraft for both domestic and international use, it will isolate itself further, rather than gain the respect it craves.

NATO’s Options

NATO’s and the West’s options for stopping the ongoing revival of Russia’s conventional military power, or to prevent potential future Russian military interventions, are limited. There are choices to be made in deciding how to respond to these developments, especially when it comes to Russian military posturing vis-à-vis NATO, and potential consequences of any responses made need to be weighed up carefully.

As indicated in NATO SACEUR Scaparotti’s May 2016 statement and also by NATO’s actions since the start of the Ukraine conflict in spring 2014, the alliance has decided to take an uncompromisingly tough stance towards Russia, strengthening its presence and posture alongside its eastern borders in order to demonstrate strength, unity, and resolve to deter any potential Russian military aggression or expansionist move against NATO members and allies. While these measures are likely to reassure NATO member states in eastern and central Europe that have been historically fearful of Russian intentions, their potential long-term consequences for NATO and the West should not be ignored. It is already obvious Russia is not interpreting NATO’s actions in the spirit intended

40 Pipes, “Is Russia Still an Enemy?” 78.
41 Ibid.; and Art, “American Foreign Policy,” 41.
by the alliance, that is, as defensive measures aimed predominantly at reassuring NATO member states close to its borders.

Continuing to perceive NATO troops stationed and exercising close to its borders as a threat to its security and national interests, Russia has reacted by stepping up its military posture and presence, as well as its aggressive rhetoric vis-à-vis NATO. The experience of the Cold War has taught us what an ever-more intense security dilemma can lead to. If the current trend of uncompromising rhetoric and military posturing on both sides continues, a renewed arms race is a likely outcome. Given Russia’s economic situation and comparative conventional military weakness, the West would probably emerge victorious yet again in such a race. From this point of view, the scenario of a new arms race would be less disastrous for the West than it would be for Russia, but nonetheless it would be costly for all states and societies involved. Moreover, the danger of intended or unintended escalation in the face of spiralling tensions is worth bearing in mind.

Doing nothing is clearly not an alternative to NATO’s current policies towards Russia. Even if a convincing case can be made that Russian intentions are probably not driven by expansionist policies and that an attack on a NATO member state is highly unlikely, chance and uncertainty make the fears felt by Russia’s closest neighbors understandable and justified. The question is whether a middle ground between a policy (that will inevitably lead to another arms race with all the costs this involves), and “doing nothing” or a weak response (that could be interpreted as “appeasement”) can be found.

The intensity of current East-West tensions cannot yet be likened to those of the Cold War and rhetoric about a “New Cold War” is not helpful as it “makes it harder for the West to craft realistic policies with respect to both the Ukraine crisis and Russia generally,” as Andrew Monaghan has argued. However, certain lessons from the Cold War might be instructive, especially when it comes to NATO’s and the West’s handling of aggressive Russian military posturing.

George F. Kennan’s Cold War doctrine of containment, with its emphasis on strength, unity, and readiness to defend against and deter potential Russian expansion, has already experienced a revival and is being discussed amongst some Western leaders and within NATO as a relevant framework for creating responses to Russia. As Matthew Rojansky cautioned, there is a tendency to interpret this doctrine falsely as an exclusively military approach. In fact, Kennan’s understanding of containment was a complex and long-term political strategy. Focusing on recognition of the opponent’s vulnerabilities at the same time as strengthening the West’s capacities to find long-term solutions to pressing problems, Kennan explicitly warned against the use of “threats or blustering or superfluous gestures of outward toughness” as this could back the Kremlin into a corner and inadvertently exacerbate the situation.

---

44 Ibid., 2 and 7.
The intensity of current East-West tensions will make a renewed attempt at resetting relations with Russia a much more difficult undertaking for the soon-to-be elected new US administration. The new administration will have the opportunity to consider whether a policy of increasingly tough military containment of Russia will serve the future interests of the United States and NATO better than a more balanced approach as advocated by Kennan. The latter will be the more difficult choice because it requires a complex understanding of developments in Russia, as well as the willingness of both sides to communicate. This effort appears worthwhile because as Rojansky argued, it will allow the United States and the West to strike a balance “between demonstrating the collective political will necessary to maintain a credible deterrent, and charting a way forward for negotiated settlement of differences, selective cooperation, and eventual reconciliation in Russia-West relations overall.”

45 Ibid.
Preventing for North Korea's Collapse: Key Stabilization Tasks

Michael A. Spangler

ABSTRACT: North Korea’s hereditary rulers have been under a “death watch” for decades, with many pundits regularly predicting the demise of the “Kim Family Regime.” Recent collapse scenarios are predicated on the sudden death of Kim Jong-un, the 32-year-old Supreme Leader, and an ensuing succession struggle ranging from an internal-faction “winner-takes-all” fight to a more chaotic transition where factions clash with assistance from outside powers. Offering China a ballistic missile defense ban on the peninsula might persuade the Chinese to acquiesce to eventual Korean unification and denuclearization.

North Korea’s hereditary rulers have been under a “death watch” for almost 30 years, with pundits regularly predicting the demise of the Kim Family Regime. At present, Kim Jong-un, the 32-year-old Supreme Leader (so far without an heir apparent) appears to be effectively consolidating his power through a combination of brutal acts, tentative economic reforms, and beneficent giveaways. He executed his uncle, National Defense Commission Vice Chairman Jang Sung-taek, and 70 other senior officials and generals since assuming power in December 2011. Concomitantly, Kim opened glitzy amusement parks (including a water park, a dolphinarium, and a ski resort) for use by the rising, increasingly affluent entrepreneurial class mainly located in “Pyonghattan” and other privileged enclaves of Pyongyang. These emerging Donju (masters of money) are relatively well-off, a result of leveraging government ties, Chinese connections, and tacit market-based reforms introduced over the last 15 years that permit them to earn private incomes primarily in trade and agriculture.

Internal Collapse

Despite Kim’s carefully calibrated moves to cement his rule, the internal collapse of his regime remains possible, plausible, and predictable due to its reliance on a single point of potential failure, namely, the Kim bloodline. Without another male Kim in the wings, Kim’s
sudden assassination or death is likely to precipitate a succession struggle ranging from an internal-faction “winner-takes-all” fight to a more chaotic, uncertain transition where factions clash over time with help from major outside powers.

North Korea’s collapse remains a question of “if, not when,” chiefly because Kim seems to be in good health despite a persistent weight problem. In addition, roughly one-third of North Koreans appear to be bolstering his regime, mainly in return for food security and other privileges. One-tenth of North Koreans have officially registered cell phones, and another tenth may have unregistered ones. The rest of society constitutes a silent, hard-to-assess majority, increasingly exposed to foreign criticism of its leader, but voicing no opposition as a result of their isolation, deprivation, powerlessness, or imprisonment. The imprisonment of dissidents applies not only to offenders, but often to their extended families—with up to 120,000 currently interned in hard-labor camps. On balance, the Kim Family Regime appears to be ruthless in protecting its survival as the most prominent authoritarian dynasty in the world, except for Cuba’s single-generation Castro leadership.

Recent collapse scenarios conjure two potentially interrelated events: first, the sudden death or assassination of Kim Jong-un, and second, the emergence of alternative power centers within the secretive Kim Family clan itself and among key security organizations. These power elites, failing to accommodate each other in North Korea’s highly authoritarian system, could clash and break up the brittle, centralized regime. Given this worst-case scenario, the “internal collapse” school anticipates a new territorial partition if internal groups align strongly along diverging Chinese and South Korean/Western interests. The formal demarcation between North and South Korea might then be redrawn north of the Demilitarized Zone, where it has existed since 1953.

Korean Unification

Reunification of, by, and for the long-divided Korean people has been a basic assumption of Korean studies for the last 60 years. It was reaffirmed by North and South Korean leaders at a summit held in Pyongyang in June 2000. At that time, North Korean Leader Kim Jong-il and South Korean President Kim Dae-jung declared:

1. The South and the North agreed to resolve the question of reunification independently and through the joint efforts of the

---

4 Human Rights Watch, World Report 2015: North Korea, https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2015/country-chapters/north-korea. On July 6, 2016, the Obama administration froze property or interest in property within US jurisdictions that belongs to Supreme Leader Kim Jong-un and 10 other regime officials. This is the first time the US government has designated specific North Korean officials for their alleged complicity in human-rights abuses.
6 Assistant Secretary of War John McCloy formalized the 38th parallel on the Korean peninsula in August 1945 in order to demarcate the areas of US- and Soviet-supervised disarmament of Japanese troops. The United States had previously invited the Soviet Union into Korea to continue the fight against imperial Japan. The 38th parallel roughly determined the 2.5-mile-wide Demilitarized Zone established in 1953.
Korean people, who are the masters of the country.

2. For the achievement of reunification, they agreed there was a common element in the South’s concept of a confederation and the North’s formula for a loose form of federation. The South and the North agreed to promote reunification in that direction.7

Unfortunately, these goals remain vague and aspirational, flying in the face of the long history of foreign influences on the Korean peninsula.8 To date, few concrete achievements have been recorded that would block the emergence of a new major power rivalry on the Korean peninsula, one that carves out spheres of influence for China and the South Korean/Western alliance. A renewed major power rivalry could lead to a repartition of North Korea, as many of the country’s elite seek help from China to carve out a new authoritarian state underpinned by Communist and Worker Party of Korea ideology.

China after a North Korean Collapse

China has many reasons to feel conflicted about Korean unification. Removing North Korean nuclear weapons from the Korean peninsula as a result of unification would eliminate a major threat underpinning the US-South Korea-Japan military alliance. Weakening the alliance would, in turn, allay Chinese fears of encirclement by the United States and its allies. In addition, unification would relieve China from supplying the bulk of foreign aid to North Korea since the breakdown in Six-Party Talks in 2009.9 China might also be tempted to reinvigorate those talks, pursuing both denuclearization and unification, to burnish its status as a senior statesman above regional power-brokering and to draw attention away from its actions in the South and East China Seas.

On the other hand, China has long relied on North Korea as a buffer state to protect its northeastern flank. If the United States were to rebalance its military forces elsewhere in East Asia while enabling a unified Korea to deploy the latest ballistic missile defense system (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense – THAAD), China would be left with fewer offensive options and only Russia as a potential defense partner. On balance, China may have concluded it is better to leave the North Korean card on the table in some form following the possible collapse of the Kim Family franchise. As the Chinese proverb goes, “Kill the chicken to scare the monkeys.” In other words, Beijing may have calculated its national security risks are more manageable if Korean unification is sacrificed in order to prevent a resurgent, stronger Korea from joining the United States and other potential adversaries. In light

9 Six-party talks were initiated in 2003 to pursue dismantlement of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program in the wake of its withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The talks included the United States, China, Russia, Japan, and North and South Korea.
of its “containment” anxiety, China seems likely to frustrate Korean unification efforts if the Kim Family’s third generation collapses.\(^\text{10}\)

Over the past decade, Chinese analysts of North Korea have emphasized the inability of Beijing to influence or restrain its neighbor, primarily because of Chinese concerns about “destabilizing” the regime and precipitating larger migrant flows into China.\(^\text{11}\) The “Middle Kingdom” already has 2.3 million ethnic Koreans, the largest Korean population outside of the two Koreas, according to official South Korean estimates.\(^\text{12}\) As argued below in assessing North Korean trade inspections, Beijing’s passive line of thinking allows it to go only so far in levying economic sanctions against North Korea, thus helping prop up its nuclear-armed neighbor. Chinese analysts also seem to believe China can do “little to influence” any newly emerging North Korean authoritarian leaders because those leaders would fear for their personal safety, much less their privileged status, in the event of unification. China, therefore, appears to be in denial about the leverage it can, and does, exert on North Korea.

**The Tumen River Valley and Below**

In a post-Kim North Korea, China seems best able to influence and shape the emerging government of the four North Korean provinces along its border, notably the Tumen River Valley, as well as two mid-located provinces and Pyongyang.\(^\text{13}\) China has four major reasons to do so. First, as noted earlier, it has a long-standing national security interest in maintaining a security buffer there. Second, it enjoys widespread economic dominance in the area and remains keen to continue exploiting the region’s rich mineral resources. Third, China is likely to seek a controlling economic interest in North Korea’s eastern seaports close to Russia; and finally, China may be able to draw on a large number of supportive North Korean officials, military officers, and refugees to help set up a pro-Chinese governmental system in the region. Indeed, Robert Kaplan argues China has already made the political contacts and the infrastructure investments needed to establish a “Tibet-like buffer state in much of North Korea.” He opines that any new post-Kim

---

10 Andrew Scobell and Mark Cozad, “China’s North Korea Policy: Rethink or Recharge?” *Parameters* 44 no. 1, (Spring 2014): 51-63. The authors indicate China will stay the course in bolstering the Kim and any follow-on authoritarian regime and call for the United States to persevere in a dialogue with China to avoid “misunderstandings.” Exploring their call for “US perseverance,” this paper contends South Korea and the United States could offer China a demunuclearization-missile defense trade-off that enhances China’s security in return for its acquiescence on Korean unification.


13 The Chinese may indeed be interested in establishing a new enclave as far south as, and including, Pyongyang. In the trial of South Korean spy Pak Chae-seo in 2010, Pak claimed a Chinese intelligence officer told him about a Chinese contingency plan named “the Chick Plan,” referring to North Korea as China’s chick. See Nick Miller, “China’s War Plans for Pyongyang,” *SinoNK*, March 12, 2012, http://sinoatk.com/2012/03/10/pla-plans-for-pyongyang/. This alleged plan is based on a new line of demarcation between the towns of Nampo and Wonson, including Pyongyang. Above this line, the Chinese would establish a new security buffer against South Korean and US troops and prevent refugees from entering China. Pak also claimed Chinese investment is not permitted south of this line and People’s Liberation Army divisions stationed in Shenyang are trained to execute the Chinese plan across the Yalu River and Tumen River bridges. Bennett, op.cit., adds that China’s Northeast Project study, completed in 2007, claims Manchuria and North Korea were “originally Chinese,” enhancing the case for Chinese intervention.
authoritarian state will be “less oppressive than the morbid, crushing tyranny it will replace.”

South Korea, after soliciting substantial international aid, would be poised to set up a rival system in the southern part of North Korea that could attract most of North Korea’s populace. Indeed, North Korea’s “voiceless majority”—mainly the relatively malnourished, poor, and deprived—is very likely to migrate closer to South Korea in search of food and medical care. While South Korea may end up controlling a large swath of territory, the costs of pushing further north against regrouping North Korea Army units could prove too high, especially in light of possible Chinese support for an emerging North Korean polity. If this scenario were to play out, the South Korean Assembly Hall would still have seats vacant that have long been reserved for all of North Korea’s district representatives.

Talking to China

To help avoid a new major power rivalry unfolding on the Korean peninsula, it is essential for South Korea and its key allies to work out a division of labor with China (and possibly Russia) on key stabilization challenges. Such talks would be difficult to foster, but should be pursued in light of North Korea’s fourth nuclear test in January 2016. North Korea remains a dangerous repository of weapons of mass destruction that could be smuggled out to third-world countries and terrorist groups in the chaotic aftermath of a collapse.

After this fourth nuclear test, The Wall Street Journal reported the United States had agreed secretly, just prior to the test, to peace-treaty talks with North Korea. In the wake of the test, the United States reportedly walked away from its commitment. The State Department corrected this press report, noting North Korea had reached out to the United States on peace-treaty talks before the test. At that time, the United States rejected talks because North Korea would not agree to the peace talks taking place in tandem with denuclearization talks.

This State Department response is striking as it indicates the United States had relinquished its long-held position that denuclearization talks should precede peace-treaty talks. China had long urged the United States to do this, and apparently, the United States has shown the flexibility the Chinese sought. The United States seems ready to engage in peace talks with North Korea, if those negotiations include a denuclearization component.

The United States may have shown this flexibility in return for China’s support for United Nations economic sanctions levied against North Korea’s weapons programs. In addition, South Korea might also have temporarily backpedaled on the proposed US introduction of a

new missile defense system into South Korea. If the United States and South Korea were to renounce their current plans to introduce THAAD on the peninsula, this proposal might entice China to support a leading South Korean role in Korean reunification.

The THAAD trade-off may prove unworkable for South Korea over time, however, if it increasingly believes Chinese ballistic missiles seriously threaten its national security. Moreover, Beijing might conclude a Korean commitment to forego major defensive missile investments will not stand for long. Could the prohibition of defensive missile systems be negotiable in the context of a truly denuclearized Korean peninsula? The United States may also need to renounce its military role above the 38th parallel in return for China not crossing the Yalu River. On balance, this proposal, coupled with the THAAD trade-off, might provide the Chinese with enough security assurance to risk the resurgence of a unified Korea. Beijing’s role, either positive or negative, appears to be crucial for a more secure northeast Asia.

US and South Korean talks with China can be pursued through a series of consultations held within existing bilateral diplomatic exchanges or via multi-national deliberations under a Six-Party-Talks-like framework. These talks should be held before any collapse, but remain a long shot with the Kim Family Regime still going strong, and are more likely to unfold with emerging North Korean leaders after a collapse. The Korean focus group will need to stand up a sub-group immediately tasked with sharing critically needed information on the evolving attitudes and dispositions of North Korea’s security apparatus and the country’s formidable standing army and related organizations.

**Key Stabilization Tasks**

A leadership succession crisis, engendering widespread social instability, will almost certainly lead to a single Korean federation or another two-state solution. The execution of key stabilization tasks will set the stage for the eventual outcome. What should an international focus group pursue with the North Korean authorities who will quickly emerge after a collapse? What are the key stabilization challenges that could arise in

---

17 On July 8, 2016, the South Korean Defense Ministry announced it would deploy THAAD by the end of 2017 and complete site selection soon. While the South Korean side stressed THAAD would be focused solely on the North Korean missile threat, China immediately urged South Korea and the United States to halt deployment, arguing it would destabilize the regional security balance without achieving “anything to end North Korea’s nuclear program.” See Reuters, “South Korea, the US to Deploy THAAD Missile Defense, Drawing China Rebuke,” July 8, 2016, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-southkorea-usa-thaad-idUSKCN0ZO084.

18 Even if the United States and China were to renounce any major military intervention, they may still agree to joint operations to secure North Korea’s weapons of mass destruction, as discussed below in this article.

19 Bennett, op. cit., argues China would have a strong preference for talks within the United Nations Security Council, seeking UN authorization for any foreign troops dispatched to North Korea in the event of instability. He acknowledges, however, that a UN Security Council Resolution would “take time” and China would probably intervene first if North Korean instability unfolds rapidly and the international community did not react.

security, humanitarian assistance, justice, economic infrastructure, and governance. Key tasks in order of priority are discussed below.

Near-Term Priorities (Undertaken Immediately)

**Weapons of Mass Destruction Control** – Identifying the highest priority task, analysts are unanimous in calling for securing North Korea’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD) as soon as possible. Some analysts assume US Special Forces should play a “significant” role in searching for North Korea’s nuclear and biological-chemical weapons. A Special Forces mission would entail “teaming up” with South Korean experts as well as friendly North Korean Army units possessing the weapons who could be under siege by other North Korean Army units.

When confronting WMD issues, it is not safe to assume the United States and South Korea would be first on the scene or best situated to gain control of North Korea’s weapons of mass destruction. China is likely to be in first contact for two reasons. Most of North Korea’s weapons fabrication and storage facilities appear to be closer to China, and the responsible North Korean military units would be more disposed to Chinese influence than that of South Korea, the United States, Russia, and, most certainly, Japan. China’s natural lead on this task, if correct, clearly puts it in the driver’s seat in terms of whether denuclearization can be achieved.

Beijing’s role in demobilizing and disposing of weapons of mass destruction, even if agreed upon, could still be carried out ambiguously in order to preserve China’s options to promote a North Korean polity. Chinese hesitation or refusal to help disarm North Korean Army units may be easily obscured by the fog of instability rolling in after the collapse of the North Korean regime. Will China persuade North Korean units to account for their weapons caches, much less surrender them? China’s response to this task will, in turn, shape the conditions for either setting up a new buffer state or reunifying Korea.

Since both geography and political links appear to put China at point on this stabilization task, multi-party talks with Beijing should seek agreement on the rules of engagement with North Korean Army units in the event of a Kim collapse, the procedures for reporting and securing the weapons, and the verification of their final disposition. In this regard, China may actually prefer to work with the United States rather than risk South Korea “inheriting” North Korea’s weapons.

Ultimately, all parties should commit to implementing a denuclearized

---

21 Bennett, op. cit., leads the way in thinking about stabilization tasks. Please refer to his monograph for an alternative assessment of these tasks.

22 South Korean officials and journalists have periodically expressed sensitivity that US Special Forces planning not restrict South Korean sovereignty, that is, the United States not “take command” of securing weapons of mass destruction and other installations in North Korea. See GlobalSecurity.org, “OPLAN 5027 Major Theater War - West,” http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/oplan-5027.htm.


24 Bennett, op. cit., adds that any US effort to reach WMD facilities north of Pyongyang would force China to secure these sites “before the United States can reach them.”

25 Bilateral disarmament talks with the United States might hold more allure for China, but, once public, would alienate South Korea.
Korean peninsula, a long-standing goal of the international community. However, other parties simply do not know whether China would help to carry out this key task or support other parties in doing so.

Humanitarian Aid – North Korea’s collapse will confront the international community with the world’s greatest humanitarian disaster, due to the populace’s malnutrition and lack of medical care. South Korea has the responsibility here as the putative leader and well-off sibling of its poorer northern neighbor. Further increasing the stakes, South Korea’s initial effectiveness in providing relief will likely be decisive in shaping North Korean perceptions of a transitional government.

North Korea cannot adequately feed its estimated total population of 25 million people. In 2013, more than 84 percent of the households across North Korea were described as borderline or poor in terms of food consumption. A third of North Korean children under five evince substandard growth, particularly in rural areas. Chronic diarrhea is the leading cause of infant death due to inadequate sanitation. Shipments of food, medicine, and potable water will demand a large-scale logistics plan and significant contributions. The size of the North Korean demand for aid indicates South Korea will need considerable help from the international community.

Displaced Population Camps – In the midst of a post-collapse environment that frees up travel, North Korea’s most vulnerable populations are likely to migrate south where they will expect to find badly needed food and medical aid, housing, and education services. Most North Koreans would literally vote with their feet on for a new transitional government if they migrated closer to South Korea, whose ability to provide temporary housing will set the stage for the future of a unified Korea. The rapid installation of displaced population camps would become an urgent priority, calling for hard structures in the event migrations begin in the fall or winter.

South Korea and the international community may wish to tap humanitarian aid organizations (as well as divided families) to put a human face on first-contact groups with the North Korean side, as the community proceeds into North Korea and approaches Pyongyang. Regardless of the basic unmet needs of the North Korean people, some North Korean Army units may resist South Korean or Western soldiers providing security to humanitarian workers, while other units may opt to cooperate (hence the need for withdrawal or integration procedures discussed below).

Peacekeeping and Demobilization – To ensure freedom of movement for international-relief operations, multi-party talks must reach quick agreement on the disarmament, integration, and/or relocation of artillery, missile, and armored units close to the border with South Korea. This task represents a complex challenge in demobilization and transformation, possibly entailing the initial withdrawal of many North Korean units rather than their disarmament. Withdrawal agreements may be the only way to avoid possible conflict between South and North Korean forces, which would then open the way for swifter cross-border

---

access to vulnerable segments of North Korean society. As important, North Korean units that choose to support demining operations along the border would make a significant contribution to good will and unification.

Over time, a number of North Korean conflict groups could emerge to seize financial assets, armories, supply depots, and ports. Multi-party talks will need to carve out areas of responsibility for the international security actors involved to isolate and disarm malign North Korean Army units or relocate them to other areas. The multi-party group will also need to develop coordination procedures for separating conflict groups and conducting peacekeeping and related policing actions undertaken by multinational forces.

**Export/Import Inspections and Human Trafficking** – In the immediate aftermath of a collapse, international actors will need to maintain and tighten vigilance on North Korean export shipments and channels for human trafficking. Export shipments may contain nuclear materials or financial assets that rogue elements are seeking to remove from the country, while human trafficking is likely to step up. Imports will need to be inspected to interdict weapons shipments slated for conflict groups and criminal gangs.

United Nations Security Council economic sanctions levied against North Korean weapons programs in March 2016 are not a substitute for a more robust inspection regime at North Korea’s border points and ports. Until a reliable Korean border authority is in place, however, any cargo to and from North Korea will need to be inspected by UN members outside of the country.27 Beijing helped draft the UN sanctions guidelines and is publicly committed to their vigorous enforcement. China accounts for more than 70 percent of North Korea’s total trade volume. Unfortunately, China’s border area abutting North Korea is home to burgeoning communities of smugglers who believe their business is now better than ever as North Koreans are compelled to move more goods through their illicit networks.28 A post-collapse environment will only aggravate this situation.

As a result, official Chinese support for inspections remains crucial. China’s current support of UN Security Council economic sanctions against North Korea do not portend a widening break in Sino-North Korean trade relations. The sanctions permit Beijing considerable discretion in how much pressure to apply against its neighbor. China could quickly take its foot off the sanctions brake if it, inter alia, assesses the United States will go ahead with the installation of a new missile-defense technology in South Korea and elsewhere over the near term. Beijing can explain its volte-face by reasserting its prior claim that sanctions are ineffective in deterring North Korean weapons programs while deepening the tribulations of the long-suffering North Korean people.

**Rule of Law and Police** – Long before any formal ratification of an inter-Korean justice system (preferably under a unified constitutional arrangement), new North Korean leaders will need to consider a

27 Under the current sanctions regime, UN members are also banned from purchasing North Korean coal and minerals if any profit might go to weapons programs.

partnership with international policing units to enforce order. As these talks unfold with emerging North Korean leaders, South Korea and the United States will have a strong interest in promoting a law-enforcement partnership that is consistent with the principle of a unified Korea. Ideally, North Korean and South Korean police officers should assume the lion's share of enforcement work, with more specialized international teams brought in to advise border posts and ports in interdicting the shipment of weapons and other contraband. At the outset of these policing operations, the Chinese intent to either support or oppose an inter-Korean policing operation is likely to be determinative, at least in the northern half of North Korea. If Beijing does not recognize or permit South Korean police officers to strengthen North Korean law-enforcement bodies near the Chinese border, other international parties will be put on notice that China intends to promote a separate North Korean polity.

North Korean officials and troops involved in running the Kim Family Regime's notorious internment camps—jailing up to one percent of North Korea's population—are likely to abandon these camps in the wake of a collapse. These internal security groups may seek sanctuary or anonymity to avoid possible public retaliation against them or Korean-style Nuremberg trials. Unsurprisingly, many of these camp overseers and enforcers could be reabsorbed into other North Korean security or military units and reconstituted as hard-core resistance elements opposing Korean unification. The effective demobilization and reintegration of these and other North Korean security organizations into a transitional system may partly depend upon foregoing trials for “crimes against humanity” in favor of “truth and reconciliation” hearings. These hearings would require only public attestation of internment practices, rather than entail any judicial punishments, as long as camp prisoners were not killed.

**Medium-Term Priorities (Undertaken in First Three Years)**

**Governance** – Reunification, pursued in the wake of the decapitation of the Kim Family leader, has daunting odds stacked against it. Diverse segments of North Korean society, not to mention China, may reject the mutual benefits of what they perceive to be a South Korean-dominated political system. In this light, South Korea and the United States should consider advocating the establishment of dual North-South parliaments with a suggested timetable for gradual federation under a single chief executive within three to five years. The United States and South Korea should avoid advocating the rapid introduction of a powerful chief executive-led system as it resembles the Kim Family past, disregards North Korean sensitivities about domination, and could retard reconciliation efforts. A powerful chief-executive system


30. John Feffer, “Korean Reunification: The View from the North,” *The Huffington Post*, June 17, 2015, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/john-feffer/korean-reunification-the_b_7597430.html. Feffer reports 34 out of 100 North Korean respondents—working or visiting in China—favored the South Korean system, 26 a hybrid system, and 24 did not care which system the unified country adopted. Incidentally, only seven percent thought reunification would follow a North Korean regime collapse, although 95 percent believed it was necessary for economic reasons.
might also impede bottom-up efforts to instill greater transparency and accountability in North Korean political and economic life.

Once convened with emerging North Korean leaders (likely to include North Korean Army senior officers), the transitional governmental system’s first order of business calls for decisions on how to certify elections, recognize North Korean representatives, and ratify a “unified” Korean constitutional arrangement under which criminal and civil law can be enforced. It is ironic to propose launching this process with North Korean representatives that will not be elected and may indeed be guilty of crimes against their own people. However, failing to include such leaders (or to extend provisional amnesty to them) is likely to set back the governance task, since these leaders would then be free to work against the system rather than be co-opted within it.

Immigration Policies – Unlike the Berlin Wall, the Demilitarized Zone will not come down overnight because of the difficulty in extricating North Korean Army units stationed nearby and the number of migrants that could flood over the border to an unprepared South Korea. Over the medium term, South Korea will need to resolve the thorny issue of how to offer interested North Koreans the opportunity to relocate and reside permanently in South Korea. (China is likely to remain relatively closed to Korean immigration.) Many divided families may be quickly reunited in South Korea based on previous government-sponsored contacts. However, the great majority of North Koreans will require considerable long-term investments in housing, medical care, and job retraining.

At present, many South Koreans remain wary of North Koreans, widely seen as deprived and isolated, and uncertain about South Korea’s financial ability to fund “Korean reunification.” Indeed, South Korea’s younger generation—especially those born after North Korean leader Kim il-Sung’s death in 1994—believe reunification, while necessary in the long term, cannot be accomplished in the near future. “The South Korean economy would be unable to support the North Korean economy.”31 This view has become even more entrenched in the past three years due to rising unemployment among young South Koreans.32

Security Sector Reform – Security sector reform in North Korea means downsizing its bloated army—more than double the size of South Korea’s army. A new transitional governmental system will need to transform the world’s fourth-largest standing army, numbering about one million (and 7.7 million reservists).33 Over the first one to three years, this army could be employed in a new National Service Corps, helping to improve basic infrastructure, housing, and health services for the North Korean populace. In this way, soldiers could be constructively engaged while continuing to support themselves and their families.

32 Avaneesh Pandey, “South Korea’s Unemployment Rate Jumps to 6-Year High of 4.1%” International Business Times, March 16, 2016, http://www.ibtimes.com/south-koreas-unemployment-rate-jumps-6-year-high-41-2337301. The data revealed youth unemployment (for those between 15 and 29 years of age) stood at 12.5 percent in February 2016, the highest on record; and the number of unemployed college graduates surged 19.2 percent over the year.
Without a livelihood or income, these soldiers are likely to present a serious security or crime issue.

Over the longer term, converting North Korea’s warriors into productive citizens will require greater economic development. With the North Korean security apparatus no longer soaking up to one third of the country’s gross domestic product, those finances could be diverted to more productive uses. Former military personnel may also band together to form private companies, as in similar countries with relatively large standing armies. Since this task is linked to uncertain trends in economic growth and reorganization over the medium term, it appears to be one of the most interdependent stabilization tasks facing a unified Korea. Bridges to a more prosperous future must first be built, as discussed next.

**Long-Term Priority (Persisting Beyond Three Years)**

**Economic Development** – North Korea’s population suffers from chronic food shortages, but the country is rich in mineral resources. In a post-collapse environment, many countries, likely led by South Korea, would rush to compete with Chinese firms in developing these resources, which include zinc, gold, copper, iron, coal, graphite, tungsten, and magnesium.  

In late 2013, an Australian geologist claimed North Korea possesses the largest rare-earth oxide deposits in the world. Rare-earth elements are used in key technologies ranging from cell phones to guided-missile systems.

These deposits, if they exist, are extremely attractive. Beijing currently controls about 90 percent of the world supply of strategic metals and has demonstrated its willingness to ban exports for political reasons. Foreign investment in North Korea could break China’s hold on this market. North Korea might have more than six times the amount of rare-earth elements as does China, and could be brought online relatively quickly after improving basic infrastructure.

Despite the overwhelming need to diversify rare-earth sources, international investors should not press quickly for foreign leases to exploit these and other resources. Foreign investment in infrastructure coupled with stronger environmental protection regulations are first needed to guard against the potential for environmental pollution and degradation. Regulatory efforts should be spearheaded by transitional governmental bodies, with the support of the World Bank and other international financial institutions. These cooperative efforts are essential to sustain long-term mining operations and to dampen local fears of North Korea’s foreign exploitation. If these efforts are not shortchanged, the resulting regulatory and infrastructure improvements

---


should garner more North Korean buy-in for expanded mining operations and help generate stronger foreign exchange revenues.

**Cultural Assimilation** – Even if China is supportive of a “reunified Korea” and international donors assist South Korea in funding the huge welfare, educational, and medical needs of the North Korean people, that population will still require one or two generations to assimilate fully into a unified Korean culture that accepts them with greater trust, inclusiveness, and acceptance. A large majority of South Koreans currently believe significant socio-economic and cultural chasms separate the two Koreas. These gaps are found in election practices, legal systems, dialect, standard of living, way of life, and sense of values. North Koreans may be just as aware of these cultural differences.

A Seoul National University scholar concludes increased exchanges and visits between North and South Korea “do not guarantee mitigation of political, economic, and cultural differences. In fact, more exchanges could possibly cause more troubles.” Problems could include North Korean unrest over its perceived unmet needs and much-lower income levels. On the South Korean side, labor union and youth protests could spring from the perception South Korea’s economic development and social safety net are being compromised by the relatively high costs of North Korean assistance.

In light of these cultural differences and risks, North-South assimilation will require gradual inter-generational changes over time. Perhaps, the growing recognition that a unified Korea will exhibit greater economic strength as a result of wedding the North and South’s comparative advantages (in mineral resources and technological advancement, respectively) will help to facilitate cultural assimilation. In other words, North-South cultural convergence should increasingly be underpinned by the peninsula’s stronger, self-sustaining economic growth.

**Conclusion**

Harking back to his grandfather’s party-centric doctrine and marking a milestone in his own consolidation of power, Kim Jong-un presided over the seventh congress of the Worker’s Party of Korea in Pyongyang in May 2016. This congress was last held in 1980 under his grandfather. At that time, 118 countries attended the congress; this time, none were invited. Foreign press were welcomed, but only allowed in the hall when the North Korean leadership convened to confirm Kim as Party Chairman. One analyst speculated foreign journalists were permitted into the hall only to serve as a human shield in the event of an improbable South Korean or US missile attack. Kim made a point of denying

---

37 Phillips, op. cit.


39 Some scholars prefer to compare Korean to Vietnamese unification since both cases involve large income differences between North and South. See William H. Thornton, Fire on the Rim: The Cultural Dynamics of East/West Power Politics (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002), 161.

the first use of nuclear weapons unless North Korea’s sovereignty was threatened “by invasive hostile forces with nuclear weapons.”

Contrasting jarringly with the 1980 congress, the Chinese Communist Party’s message of congratulations to the 2016 congress—released by the (North) Korean Central News Agency—was very short, did not mention Kim Jong-un by name, and carried no Chinese party official’s signature. Presumably, China was signaling its concern with Kim’s fourth nuclear test and trying to distance itself, if not discourage Kim from conducting a fifth test. It is looking ahead to the risk of an East Asian nuclear-arms race provoked by North Korea’s weapons development. Beijing apparently fears South Korea, Japan, and other neighbors might pursue nuclear weapons programs, possibly first developing shorter-range missiles under both the US strategic umbrella and enhanced missile-defense systems.

More revealing, China—keeping pace with US and South Korean planning processes—has reportedly drawn up a new contingency plan in the event of possible North Korean upheaval. In May 2014, the Japanese Kyodo News published “leaked People’s Liberation Army Plans” to deal with upheaval caused by, inter alia, “an attack by foreign forces” on the “country next door with the hereditary system.” The plan highlights the need for greater surveillance along the Chinese border, calling for “reconnaissance groups” to observe the situation, “investigation groups” to question those entering China, “blockage” groups to prevent the entry of malign actors, and armed groups to “defend against hostile powers.” The plan anticipates key North Korean figures may attempt to regroup inside China. These figures must be protected from “assassination attempts” while ensuring they cannot command any military activity or join “other forces within China.”

In light of Beijing’s concerns about North Korean upheaval and a regional arms race, it may now be a good time for South Korea and the United States to propose a new multi-party dialogue with China on post-crisis stabilization measures that all parties can recognize as mutually beneficial. In particular, US- and South Korean-led initiatives to pursue denuclearization with China risk little—and may make major headway in spurring greater information sharing and cooperation if a ballistic missile defense trade-off is offered to the Chinese. China likely calculates that multi-party talks, once grasped by the North Korean side, risk provoking hostile acts against South Korea that would require pro-

42 Everard, op. cit.
43 In August 1999, the United States acknowledged its military planning for North Korea. Then US Forces Korea Commander, General John H. Tilelli Jr., noted “it would be unusual if we didn’t have a plan.” See GlobalSecurity.org, “OPLAN 5027 Major Theater War - West,” http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/oplan-5027.htm.
44 China has reportedly drawn up earlier versions. In the trial of South Korean spy Pak Chae-seo in 2010, Pak claimed a Chinese intelligence officer told him about a Chinese contingency plan named “the Chick Plan” (referring to North Korea as China’s chick). See Miller, “China’s War Plans for Pyongyang,” http://sinonk.com/2012/03/10/pla-plans-for-pyongyang/.
46 Indeed, most Korean studies experts have consistently called for South Korea and the United States to seize every opportunity to share perspectives with China on a potential North Korean collapse.
portionate responses. Over time, however, the talks might nudge North Korea’s Supreme Leader into taking positive steps on denuclearization that could break his country’s increasing isolation.

Whether brought on by a sudden regime decapitation, a serious pandemic, or a nuclear accident, North Korea’s collapse demands multi-party attention in light of the WMD stakes involved, the array of daunting tasks requiring urgent attention, and the overriding need to foster greater international cooperation. North Korea’s hereditary ruler will see such talks as undermining his stature. But, heading the only 21st-century authoritarian dynasty, the North Korean leader should realize he sets up far more serious challenges for the world in the event of his demise. Addressing these challenges will hinge on constructive engagement with Chinese and emerging North Korean leaders.

Addressing the Chinese side, South Korea and the United States will need to offer hard transactional trade-offs that provide adequate security assurances to China in return for its acquiescence on unification. For emerging North Korean leaders, the socio-economic weight of South Korean and international aid, coupled with co-equal integration, may be enough to bring in most, if not all of North Korea.

Let us try to persuade these power-holders to turn away from North Korea’s unproductive WMD stockpile, stark deprivation, and worsening isolation—and begin to unify Korea and build a more peaceful northeast Asia.
CHALLENGES IN ASIA

China, India, and War over Water

Jin H. Pak

ABSTRACT: This article examines the likelihood of water insecurity causing war between China and India. Water insecurity itself will not likely lead to armed conflict. But when coupled with other international and domestic factors, it could increase the likelihood of war. China’s water scarcity and its widening north-south water gap have increased pressure to execute controversial water diversion plans. These plans will threaten India, especially since the Brahmaputra River flows through a disputed area. These factors, plus changing domestic conditions in China, may increase the likelihood of war.

Over the past decade, numerous analysts and scholars have speculated about the likelihood of India and China going to war over water. Some maintain a future “water war” will occur—and others call such fears overblown.¹ These arguments focus on how water is unevenly distributed and how China’s upstream behaviors, such as its damming activities, could instigate conflict with its downstream neighbor.

To determine if water scarcity could cause military conflict between these two states, an extensive analysis of factors affecting relations between India and China, as well as domestic conditions within China, are needed. Such analyses suggest water scarcity itself will not likely lead to war. However, coupled with other factors such as increasing water scarcity in China, linkages between water scarcity and national sovereignty, and decreasing political stability in the upstream state, war may become more likely.

The glaciers in China’s Tibet are melting at a faster rate, and coupled with growing water scarcity and a widening north-south regional water gap, China will face increasing pressure to implement a controversial upstream water diversion plan in its western provinces. This plan will threaten India since the downstream portion of the Brahmaputra River flows through a disputed area with strong implications for national sovereignty. Both states will then increase their security postures in an already heavily militarized border region. As China’s economic growth continues its downward trajectory, popular nationalism will threaten the Chinese Communist Party’s ability to pursue a foreign policy


COL Jin H. Pak was commissioned in 1994, and since then he has served in multiple leadership roles, to include battalion commander and military assistant to the Army G-4. He has also taught international relations at West Point. Pak earned a BS in Economics from West Point and a MPP from the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University.
uninfluenced by populism and public opinion. The likely net result: a likely water war between the two states.

**Water Scarcity and Conflict**

The idea of water security has gained traction over the years, and is defined as “the availability of an acceptable quantity and quality of water for health, livelihoods, ecosystems, and production, coupled with an acceptable amount of water-related risks to people, environment, and economies.” This idea includes the negative effects of having too little water, or “water scarcity,” and damage from having too much water such as floods, contamination, erosion, and epidemics. This article focuses on the scarcity component of water insecurity and assesses six driving factors that make it more likely China and India will fight over water in the future. But, first, let us discuss how water scarcity is related to conflict.

People can survive plague, war, and natural catastrophes, but they cannot survive without water. Unfortunately, fresh water is an increasingly scarce and precious resource. Less than 2.5 percent of all water on earth is fresh water, and more than half of it is trapped in polar ice and high-altitude glaciers around the world. This precious-little amount is declining due to increasing consumption, pollution, and climate change. “Global per capita freshwater availability has unstoppably declined for more than a century, plummeting more than 60 percent since 1950 alone.”

At the turn of the millennium in 2000, more than one billion people could not access clean drinking water. According to a recent article co-authored by the chair of the Department of Water Engineering at the University of Twente in the Netherlands and a water scarcity expert from the Johns Hopkins Water Institute, approximately 66 percent of the world’s population, or more than four billion people, live in areas under severe water scarcity. Of these four billion people, one billion live in India, and 900 million live in China; the majority of their populations thus live in areas of severe water scarcity. In 2006, a World Bank Working Paper on water scarcity claimed “China will soon become the most water-stressed country in East and Southeast Asia.”

Water scarcity is also linked to food availability. Agriculture accounts for 70 percent of all global water consumption, compared to 19 percent for industry and about 11 percent for drinking. The Strategic Foresight

---


5 Mesfin M. Mekonnen and Arjen Y. Hoekstra, “Four Billion People Facing Severe Water Scarcity,” *Science Advances* 2, no. 2 (February 12, 2016): 3. The two authors assessed water scarcity on a monthly basis using a ratio between water consumption and water availability. A water scarcity (WS) ratio of greater than 2.0 meant consumption far exceeded water availability and severe water scarcity. By their calculations, more than four billion people live in areas with a WS score greater than 2.0.


7 Chellaney, *Water, Peace, and War*, 64.
Group, a prominent India-based think tank that publishes extensively on climate change and environmental issues, projects both India and China will face a 30 to 50 percent decline in rice and wheat yields by 2050 due to “the cumulative effect[s] of water scarcity, glacial melting, disruptive precipitation patterns, flooding, desertification, pollution, and soil erosion.”

Brahma Chellaney, Professor for Strategic Studies at the New Delhi-based Center for Policy Research and a noted scholar on water security, asserts water is now the world’s most extracted resource. In fact, water is already more expensive than oil. According to the US Energy Information Agency, the average retail price for gasoline for all grades in the United States on February 1, 2016 was $1.93 per gallon, or $0.51 per liter, well below the retail price US consumers pay for a liter of water.

In the scholarly literature regarding water security, one common refrain is, “no nations have ever gone to war strictly over access to water, nor are any likely to do so in the future.”

Juha Uitto, at the United Nations Human Development Program, and Aaron Wolf, professor of geography at Oregon State University, find only one war was fought over water, and only seven cases exist of acute water-related violence between states. Moreover, there have been more than 3,600 water-related treaties over the years, reflecting a strong record of cooperation.

Yet, there is a growing body of work suggesting water security will cause war. Peter Gleick theorizes environmental security issues will become a more dominant part of international discourse in the post-Cold War era. He claims rapid population growth, increased migration, greater demands on environmental resources, and future climactic changes will increase international tensions over shared fresh-water resources.

In 1978, when Ethiopia publicized its intention to construct dams in the upstream section of the Nile River, Egypt’s President Anwar Sadat said, “We depend upon the Nile 100 percent in our life, so if anyone, at any moment, thinks to deprive us of our life, we shall never hesitate to go to war] because it is a matter of life or death.” Furthermore,
water has contributed to fighting in the Middle East between Israel and its Arab neighbors for decades. Located in one of the driest areas on Earth, Israel relies on the Jordan River for much of its water, a resource it shares with the four other riparian states: Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, and the Palestinian Authority.\textsuperscript{15}

In the late 1950s, Israel began a project to divert water away from the Jordan River for distribution elsewhere in Israel. Arab states responded with their own project to divert water into Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan. In 1964, the year the Arab project was supposed to commence, the first of a series of border clashes between Israel and Syria occurred that targeted water facilities. These clashes contributed to the state of heightened tensions between Israel and the Arab states during which time Egypt mobilized its military along the Sinai Peninsula. Israel responded with a preemptive attack, and the 1967 Six-Day War.\textsuperscript{16}

Rebecca Lowe and Emily Silvester’s report on water shortages threatening global security argues water can spark conflict when other destabilizing factors already exist: “combine water scarcity with political instability, increasing resource demands and climate change, and the ‘perfect storm’ for conflict can be created.”\textsuperscript{17} While water can help cause war, it is surely not the sole reason for a war: “when territorial disputes overlap with water wrangles—as has been the case in a number of prominent post-World War II feuds—water is usually an underlying driver, rather than an overt instigator of conflicts.”\textsuperscript{18} Miriam Lowi, noted scholar on water scarcity in the Middle East, argues the geographical positions of states along a transboundary river system also affect the level of cooperation over water distribution—with clear advantages going to the upstream state which could use the water unilaterally without regard to the needs of the downstream state.\textsuperscript{19}

Despite considerable evidence of cooperation over water usage, a number of arguments link water scarcity and armed conflict. While states have not fought exclusively over access to water, increased water scarcity, when combined with other factors such as upstream-downstream positioning, sovereignty linkages, and political instability, may lead to war. These factors provide the foundation for examining the driving factors linking water security to the possibility of war between China and India:

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{17} Rebecca Lowe and Emily Silvester, “Water Shortages Threaten Global Security,” \textit{International Bar Association Global Insight} 68, no. 4 (August 2014): 48.
  \item \textsuperscript{18} Chellaney, \textit{Water, Peace, and War}, 54.
\end{itemize}
1. China’s growing water scarcity.
2. China’s future upstream activity.
3. Sino-Indian dispute over Arunachal Pradesh.
4. Increasing political instability in China.

Driving Factor #1: China’s Growing Water Scarcity

China’s Tibetan plateau, nestled in the Himalayas, is the source of Asia’s 10 major river systems, including the Yellow, Yangtze, Indus, Sutlej, Brahmaputra, Salween, and Mekong. It is no wonder many refer to Tibet as the “Water Tower of Asia.” These rivers traverse 11 countries and support 2 billion people stretching from Afghanistan to India in South Asia, and to Vietnam in Southeast Asia. Due to its upstream position, China enjoys a potential monopoly over the supply of fresh water for most of South and Southeast Asia. In the case of India, both the Indus and Brahmaputra Rivers flow downstream from China into its borders. In fact, China is the source of more transnational water flows than any other upstream power in the world.20

Consequently, despite the wealth of water in Tibet, China faces an emerging water crisis further aggravated by overuse and pollution. In 2004, China’s available water per capita was one of the lowest in the world for a populous country, just one-third of the average for developing countries, one-fourth of the world average, and one-fifth of the US average. This comparison reflects a 23 percent decline in China’s available water per capita over the past 20 years. Meanwhile, the demand for

---


water is growing more than 10 percent annually in Chinese cities—and more than five percent annually for its industries.22

This precipitous decline in available water has worsened an already critical shortage in drinking water for China’s huge population. More than 25 percent of all Chinese are without access to drinking water. Almost half of China’s 668 largest cities are short of water with 108 identified as “serious” and 60 as “critical.” By 2030, the Chinese government predicts the country’s annual freshwater shortage will reach 200 billion cubic meters.23

China’s worsening water shortage is exacerbated by increased pollution on a historic scale. More than 90 percent of China’s underground aquifers, which supply 70 percent of the country’s drinking water, are polluted. More than half of China’s population drinks water contaminated with organic waste. More than 75 percent of surface water flowing along China’s rivers is unsafe for drinking or fishing, and 30 percent is unsuitable for agriculture and industry.24

China’s water problem has a stark regional dimension as well; the south has the preponderance of water while the north has the higher demand. This has created a significant regional disparity that is getting worse with time. While 45 percent of China’s population and 60 percent of its agriculture are in the north, the region has only 13.8 percent of the fresh water. In per capita terms, the amount of available water in the north is about 25 percent of that available in the south.25

Driving Factor #2: China’s Future Upstream Activity

To remedy the great north-south water divide, China started a massive South-North Water Diversion Project to transfer a total of 38 to 48 billion cubic meters of water annually. Officially announced by China’s State Council in 2002, the project called for diverting waters along three different routes—an eastern route, a central route, and a western route. The water diversion projects along the first two routes are already completed and are transferring water from China’s Yangtze and Han Rivers in the south to the Yellow River in the north. The third route is still under development. It will divert tributaries to the upstream portion of the Yangtze River in western China to the Yellow River. However, in the last 30 years, Chinese scholars and officials have proposed going above and beyond this project by diverting water from

the upstream portions of the Mekong, Salween, and Yarlung Tsangpo Rivers that flow from China's Tibet.

India views this additional diversion plan with great trepidation because it would affect the downstream flow of water into the Brahmaputra River; the Yarlung Tsangpo River becomes the Brahmaputra River once it flows across the Indian border. The Brahmaputra River holds special importance for India. First, it accounts for almost 29 percent of all surface water in India's rivers. Second, it encompasses roughly 44 percent of India's total hydropower potential. Of course, China’s upstream activities will reduce both the run off and hydropower potential India could expect from the Brahmaputra River. Considering India's population is expected to grow by another 500 million by 2050, it is no surprise water diversion is a serious issue.

Thus far, the Chinese government has not officially approved plans to divert the Yarlung Tsangpo River. However, India remains concerned about China's future intentions. In 1999, China's State Council established a special task force of experts from the Ministry of Water Resources, the Ministry of Land and Resources, the Science Academy, and other agencies, to conduct a major field study of the Grand Western Water Diversion Plan (GWWDP). After a 36-day field research trip, the task force published a report in support of the water diversion plans outlined in the GWWDP. After listening to the report in October 2012, General Zhao Nanqi, deputy chairman of the ninth Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference and a former president of the Military Academy of Sciences, stated, “Even if we do not begin this water diversion project, the next generation will. Sooner or later it will be done.” In 2005, Li Lang, an officer from China’s second artillery corps, published a widely read book which listed various reasons and options for diverting the Yarlung Tsangpo River.

Many Chinese experts have refuted the technical feasibility of the Grand Western Water Diversion Plan. In 2000, the minister of water resources told China’s state council the project was technically and economically impossible, and his successor echoed these concerns. In 2006, China’s Engineering Academy, in consultation with numerous academics and experts, produced a report refuting the findings from the 1999...
task force, and asserted the GWWDP is “not technically feasible in the foreseeable future, and given the development trajectory of China, it is neither practical nor necessary.”

These conflicting indicators have led to an ongoing debate over the true intentions of Chinese water diversion plans for its western route. Meanwhile, China officially announced plans to build a network of up to five massive dams on the Yarlung Tsangpo River for the purpose of generating hydroelectricity—not water diversion. In Fall 2014, it completed construction of the Zangmu Dam, the first of these hydropower dams along the Yarlung Tsangpo River. Many in India believe these hydropower dams are the first step in the process to construct the additional infrastructure needed to divert water in accordance with the GWWDP.

While it does not appear likely China will go through with its water diversion plan due to cost and engineering difficulties, there is growing concern Beijing will change course if its current water-diversion plans do not resolve its growing water-scarcity problem. Should China proceed, it would increase tensions with India. This dynamic is all the more worrisome when one examines the linkage between the Brahmaputra River and national sovereignty.

**Driving Factor #3: Sino-Indian Dispute over Arunachal Pradesh**

The area in which China’s Yarlung Tsangpo River becomes India’s Brahmaputra River is called the Arunachal Pradesh. Both China and India claim this region. This territorial dispute is all the more sensitive because it is linked to the sovereignty of both countries. China cannot give up its claim without simultaneously weakening its claim of sovereignty over Tibet, which it took by force in 1950. For India, the Arunachal Pradesh is the site of a humiliating defeat by the Chinese in 1962.

From China’s perspective, political control over Tibet is a matter of sovereignty, territorial integrity, and security. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) claims China’s sovereignty over Tibet traces back 700 years to the Yuan (Manchu) Dynasty. Furthermore, the CCP perceives its sovereignty over Tibet as an essential part of restoring China’s national pride and security. After the fall of the Qing Dynasty in 1911, Great Britain exploited China’s weakened condition by recognizing Tibet as an independent state and negotiating new borders. Shortly after the Qing Dynasty fell, the government of India, which was still a colony of Great Britain at the time, hosted a meeting between its representatives and

---

those from Great Britain and Tibet in Simla, India. There, they drew up the borders of a newly independent Tibet in the Simla Accord of 1914.\textsuperscript{35}

This agreement created two sets of borders between India and Tibet, one on either side of Nepal. The western border, known as the Johnson Line, divided Kashmir from Tibet, and the eastern border, called the McMahon Line, divided Arunachal Pradesh from Tibet. Both lines were named after British diplomats.\textsuperscript{36} China refused to acknowledge the agreement because it claimed Tibet was still part of China at the time and did not have the authority to make international agreements.\textsuperscript{37} In fact, the Chinese leadership determined recognition of the Simla Accord, and its McMahon Line, would imply Tibet was an independent state with treaty-making powers. This status would undermine the legitimacy of China's centuries-long claim of sovereignty over Tibet.\textsuperscript{38}

In this manner, the Arunachal territorial dispute became linked to a core issue—China’s claim of sovereignty over Tibet. Once China invaded and occupied Tibet in 1950, both the Johnson Line and the McMahon Line became contested borders between India and China.

\begin{center}
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{China-India-Border-with-Arunachal-Pradesh-Outlined.png}
\end{center}

The Arunachal Pradesh is also the scene of the 1962 Sino-Indian War during which China wrested more than 20,000 square kilometers of territory from India and inflicted heavy casualties.\textsuperscript{40} Since then, the

\textsuperscript{35} Ramachandra Guha, “The Dalai Lama’s War,” \textit{The National Interest} 115 (September/October 2011): 47; and Sikri, “The Tibet Factor in India-China Relations,” 59; and Sikri, “The Tibet Factor in India-China Relations,” 60.

\textsuperscript{36} Bruce Riedel, “JFK’s Overshadowed Crisis,” \textit{The National Interest} 120 (July 2012): 55.


\textsuperscript{38} Sikri, “The Tibet Factor in India-China Relations,” 60.

\textsuperscript{39} “South Asia’s Water Unquenchable Thirst.”

\textsuperscript{40} The Indian government acknowledged the loss of more than 7,000 personnel—with 1,383 dead, 1,696 missing in action, and 3,968 captured. See Gyanesh Kudaisya, “Beyond the Himalayan Pearl Harbor,” \textit{History Today} 62, no. 11 (Nov 2012): 3.
dispute over the Arunachal Pradesh remains a point of contention in Sino-Indian relations and serves as a potential trigger for renewed military conflict despite a period of warming relations and increased trade between the two countries.\(^{41}\)

Even before President Hu’s historic visit to India in 2006, the Chinese ambassador to India made a statement on an Indian news channel asserting Beijing’s claim to the entire Arunachal Pradesh area, casting a shadow over Hu’s visit.\(^{42}\) To further emphasize this point, China refused to give a visa to a visiting Indian official from Arunachal Pradesh on the grounds that, as the region was a part of China, the official did not need a visa.\(^{43}\) In 2009, China refused to endorse an Asian Development Bank project in Arunachal Pradesh on the grounds that the area for the project was in China.\(^{44}\)

Meanwhile, India continues a steady military build-up in and around the Arunachal Pradesh. In 2008, when Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh visited the province, he announced a major infrastructure development package, and appointed a retired army chief of staff to the post of governor. In 2009, India deployed an additional 60,000 soldiers to Assam, near Arunachal Pradesh, bringing the total number of troops in the area to 100,000. It also built three new airfields in the Himalayan foothills. In 2014, India announced plans to build 54 border posts in Arunachal Pradesh. Meanwhile, China has heavily invested in improving its military infrastructure in Tibet, establishing “five fully operational air bases, several helipads, an extensive rail network, and 36,000 miles of roads—giving them the ability to rapidly deploy 30 divisions (approximately 15,000 soldiers each) along the border, a 3-to-1 advantage over India.”\(^{45}\)

In addition to the military build up on both sides of the border, incursions into disputed areas are common. The Indian government reported, from 2012-2015, Chinese soldiers conducted 600 incursions into disputed areas along the India-China border.\(^{46}\) In recent years, the Chinese-Indian border has become an increasingly dangerous hotspot,

---

\(^{41}\) From the 1980s to recently, India and China entered into a period of detente highlighted with the signing of the “Declaration of Principles for Relations and Comprehensive Cooperation” in 2003 and then the “India-China Strategic and Cooperative Partnership for Peace and Prosperity” in 2005. Despite this, the territorial dispute over the Arunachal Pradesh remained unresolved. See Sikri, “The Tibet Factor in India-China Relations,” and Sujit Dutta, “Revisiting China’s Territorial Claims on Arunachal,” Strategic Analysis 32, no. 4 (July 2008).

\(^{42}\) Jing-Dong Yuan, “The Dragon and the Elephant: Chinese-Indian Relations in the 21st Century,” The Washington Quarterly 30, no. 3 (Summer 2007): 138. Also in 2007, the Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jieshi reiterated the PRC’s claim on Arunachal Pradesh during his talks with the Indian External Affairs Minister Pranab at the sidelines of the G-8+5 meeting in Germany, see Dutta, “Revisiting China’s Territorial Claims on Arunachal,” 556.


\(^{46}\) Ibid. The Indian government routinely tracks and reports incursions by Chinese military patrols into various disputed areas India administers and which China claims. This number covers all of these areas, not just Arunachal Pradesh.
the net result of this military build up, aggressive patrolling, and border incursions.

**Driving Factor #4: Increasing Political Instability in China**

China is facing growing domestic political instability due to an economic slowdown and rising popular nationalism, making it increasingly difficult for the CCP to pursue national interests objectively in a non-confrontational manner, especially with issues linked to national sovereignty and quality of life. In the case of water scarcity, and especially with the case of the Brahmaputra River, both of these dimensions are present. As water scarcity in China grows, the CCP will find it harder to ignore the cries for more-drastic solutions, such as diverting the Brahmaputra River and other transnational rivers, to alleviate the suffering of its people. And, because the Brahmaputra River flows through a disputed area, the CCP’s ability to make decisions in a collaborative manner with its neighbors will become even more important.

**China’s Slowing Economy**

Ever since the economic reforms ushered in by Deng Xiaoping in the 1980s, the CCP has focused on promoting economic growth to build its national power and to maintain its legitimacy as China’s ruling political party. This concentration resulted in tremendous economic growth and rising living standards, but it also increased the income gap between rich and poor, the expectations by the Chinese people for better services, and environmental degradation.47 But now, China’s gross domestic product growth is slowing, and an increasing number of analysts are worried China will enter a prolonged period of slower growth—or an outright recession. This result would severely test the CCP’s ability to deal with environmental issues, such as water scarcity, increased social unrest, and rising popular nationalism. A major contributing factor to China’s declining economy is the tremendous growth of non-government debt and overcapacity China has accumulated since the 2008 Global Financial Crisis.

In response to the 2008 crisis, the Chinese government announced a major fiscal stimulus package and adopted measures to relax monetary policy.48 A main component of this effort was to encourage local governments to increase funding for infrastructure and public works projects.49 In order to raise these funds, local governments looked to the commercial sector to fund public projects by establishing Local Government Financing Platforms, which are treated as municipal State Owned Enterprises under Chinese law.50

Local Government Financing Platforms focus primarily on public-welfare projects such as affordable housing construction, infrastructure

---

development, social services, and environmental protection. To finance these projects, local governments provide Local Government Financing Platforms with capital through the direct transfer of government revenue, land-use rights, or other real-property assets such as roads and bridges.\(^{51}\) Local Government Financing Platforms then use this capital as collateral to obtain the financing they need from Chinese banks to finance the projects the local governments want them to execute.

This relationship between local government, Local Government Financing Platforms, and state-owned banks has produced far more capacity than is demanded by foreign and domestic markets in housing, steel, cement, construction, iron, and other goods. More than one in five homes in China’s urban areas are vacant. At the macro level, China’s real-estate activity is as much as 20 percent of the gross domestic product. To put this in perspective, at the height of the US real-estate market prior to the 2008 crisis, real estate was six percent of the US gross domestic product. As an indicator of over-investment in construction projects, China used more cement in 2011-2013 than the United States did in the entire 20th century.\(^{52}\)

Not surprisingly, this rising overcapacity has coincided with extraordinary growth in China’s commercial debt-to-GDP ratio which, in 2015, exceeded 200 percent of the gross domestic product, almost double the 125 percent reported in 2008.\(^{53}\) When coupled with government debt, China’s total debt-to-GDP ratio approached 300 percent, according to a 2015 report by McKinsey Consulting.\(^{54}\) Small wonder that on March 3, 2016, Moody’s downgraded its outlook on Chinese debt from “stable” to “negative.”\(^{55}\)

This over-capacity and debt has slowed China’s GDP growth rate. Its nominal GDP growth rate declined from more than 15 percent in 2011 to around seven percent in 2014, but many analysts believe the actual figure was closer to four percent.\(^{56}\) This slowdown is problematic in terms of political stability due to the growing income gap in China, an uncomfortable irony for a party whose originating ideology was based on communism. Between 2008 and 2010, the Chinese government dealt with more than 90,000 protests annually.\(^{57}\) As the economy continues to slow and social unrest rises, the government will need to resort to nationalism to maintain political stability. This action, however, will entail its own risks, especially in the realm of foreign policy.

\(^{52}\) Vague, “The Coming China Crisis,” 17; and Ibid., 21.
\(^{56}\) Vague, “The Coming China Crisis,” 22; and Qi, Juniper, and Zhang, “‘Minsky Moment’,” 279.
Rising Popular Nationalism in China

Ever since the capitalist reforms under Deng Xiaoping, the CCP has based its legitimacy on economic growth and nationalist ideology. In fact, up until the mid-1990s, the party was able to “decide the direction, content, and intensity of Chinese nationalism, and then to mobilize the people…[it] could appeal to nationalism whenever it so wished, and dismiss it whenever it needed to shift its policy.”

A slowing economy and rising popular nationalism are impacting a leadership that is more exposed to public opinion than ever before, and constraining the ability of China’s political elites to coolly pursue China’s national interests. The CCP originally supported this rising wave of popular nationalism in the 1990s, when a series of incidents contributed to the perception the West (with Japan included) harbored ill intentions toward China: the selling of advanced fighter planes to Taiwan; the search of a Chinese cargo ship; opposition to China’s bid to host the 2000 Olympics; the accidental bombing of a Chinese embassy in Kosovo; and Japanese claims on the Diaoyu Islands, denouncing China in the name of human rights, and the deployment of aircraft carriers in the vicinity of the Taiwan Strait.

In the past, when rising popular nationalism threatened national interests, Chinese leaders applied pragmatic controls, at times constraining or promoting depending on the national and political interests at stake. For example, at the height of the 2005 anti-Japanese demonstrations, the Chinese government took measures to halt them because the growing size and publicity of the protests influenced the government’s foreign policy interest in maintaining productive relations with Japan.

In the words of a prominent Chinese scholar, “Talking tough but acting in a calculated manner helped Chinese leaders prevent the rise of popular nationalism from damaging China’s relations with the United States and Japan.” The CCP also took steps to halt anti-US demonstrations after the 1999 accidental bombing of the Chinese embassy in Kosovo, as well as the 2001 mid-air collision between a US EP-3 and a Chinese jet fighter in the South China Sea.

China’s ability to exert this pragmatic control of popular nationalism has declined since the 2008 global financial crisis and the slowdown of China’s economy. As Chinese elites lose the ability to leverage economic growth to maintain legitimacy, they will become more unwilling, or even unable, to control popular nationalism. China’s current president and party leader, Xi Jinping, is particularly exposed to nationalist opinion because of the way he has consolidated power. Prior to assuming office as president in 2012, he witnessed the “collective presidency” which distributed power across the CCP Standing Committee and constrained...
then-President Hu Jintao’s influence so completely he was nicknamed the “woman with bound feet.” To reverse this, Xi surrounded himself with “a shadow cabinet that was defined less by a single ideology than by school ties and political reliability.”

Xi has limited collective leadership and marginalized traditional institutions of governance, and he relies on a small group of advisors who are more loyal than experienced. The National Security Commission, for example, is led by two figures loyal to Xi, but who have little foreign policy experience. And with regard to foreign policy decision-making, Xi has reduced the roles of the State Council, the Foreign Ministry, and the military. He has consolidated so much power, he is personally at the center of every major policy decision, and is arguably China’s most authoritarian leader since Mao.

Because Xi established such clear dominance in the national decision-making process, it has left him with near-total responsibility for the government’s economic policies. As these policies continue to prove ineffective in reversing China’s declining economic growth, Xi becomes more exposed to popular nationalism as he will have to “address countless domestic challenges for which he is now explicitly accountable,” and a major misstep on any of them could be costly to his political popularity and position.

As Xi and his small group of policymaking elites continue to grapple with declining economic growth and rising social unrest, concerns over political instability will become a driving factor for foreign policy. “For this reason, Xi will most probably stimulate and intensify Chinese nationalism—long a pillar of the state’s legitimacy—to compensate for the political harm of a slower economy, to distract the public, to halt rivals who might use nationalist criticisms against him, and to burnish his own image.” This is evidenced by his development of an image as an assertive strongman, not unlike that of President Putin to whom Xi reportedly said in 2013, “We are similar in character.”

As water scarcity continues to grow in China due to over-consumption, climate change, and pollution, rising popular nationalism will pressure the CCP to seek drastic solutions. Water diversion of rivers originating in Tibet will become more attractive to the detriment of China’s relations with its downstream neighbors.

Conclusion

This article examined a diverse set of factors when assessing the relationship between water insecurity and war. It is not enough to focus purely on the dynamics of how water is shared, how water scarcity is growing, or how the overall natural environment is deteriorating. War, as a human and a political endeavor, is a more complex matter.
Consequently, water scarcity, by itself, will most likely not lead to war. However, water insecurity when coupled with other factors, such as increasing water scarcity at the source of transnational rivers, threatening behavior by the upstream state, overlapping linkages between water insecurity and national sovereignty, and decreasing political stability in the upstream state, will increase the likelihood of war. In the case of China and India, all these conditions exist.

So why should the Department of Defense care? It should care because history has shown the United States could be drawn into a war between these two powers. On November 19, 1962, when the Sino-Indian War was at its worst point for India, Prime Minister Nehru wrote two letters to President Kennedy describing India’s situation as desperate and requesting comprehensive military aid. He specifically asked for a minimum of 12 squadrons of supersonic fighters, radar support, and US Air Force personnel to man them.68 Although the United States did not provide direct air support to India, probably having to do with the timing of the request being on the heels of the Cuban Missile Crisis, it did send C-130s, laden with military equipment and ammunition, and dispatch the USS Enterprise to a nearby location.69

The Department of Defense should also recognize Tibet’s impact to regional security as it becomes the strategic high ground of Asia for fresh water due to increasing glacier melt; growing water consumption in China, South Asia, and Southeast Asia; and increasing pressure for China to divert water away from its downstream neighbors. While this article covered these issues with regard to China and India, the same lessons learned can apply to countries in Southeast Asia.

As water becomes increasingly sought after among states in that region, and even around the globe, it is time for the United States and the Department of Defense to elevate environmental security issues to a level on par with national security interests such as countering WMD proliferation and preventing attacks on the homeland. It is increasingly important to promote confidence-building measures between certain states to ensure military missteps do not aggravate territorial sovereignty issues like the one over the Arunachal Pradesh. Finally, it is time for the Department of Defense to invest in more water purification/treatment capabilities so it is not focused only on sustaining the health of US and coalition forces, but also on mitigating water shortage crises.

69 Riedel, “JFK’s Overshadowed Crisis,” 56.
War: Theory and Practice

The “Practice” Problem: Peacebuilding and Doctrine

Christopher H. Tuck
© 2016 Christopher H. Tuck

Abstract: Military doctrine on stability operations reflects a “planning-school” approach, which assumes rebuilding the capacity of weak or failed states is a matter of preparation and technique. This article argues the problems of stabilization are not just those of process; they reflect deep-rooted philosophical differences surrounding the viability of these operations and the approaches used. When it comes to state-building, military doctrine lacks a basis in an untested “theory of victory.”

Stabilization is out of fashion. Burned by experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan, Western states have little appetite for engagement in complex nation-building tasks. But, if the international community is serious in its commitment to provide political solutions to such crises as in Syria, it will be difficult to avoid confronting the problems of stabilization experienced in the recent past. For example, the motion passed by the British parliament giving agreement to air attacks in Syria also identified explicitly military action as “only one component of a broader strategy to bring peace and stability to Syria,” and this commitment “underlines the importance of planning for post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction.”

Western militaries have responded to the challenges of the last decade and a half with a process of doctrinal revision. For example, the United States produced a specific doctrine for stability operations in 2008, revising it in 2014; the latest iteration of the United Kingdom’s doctrine for stability operations was published in March 2016. In theory, this process of learning lessons should ensure future operations go much more smoothly than those of the past. This article contends this is likely not to be the case. Colonel Charles Callwell noted in his 1906 treatise on small wars, “Theory cannot be accepted as conclusive when practice points the other way.” The difficulty for military doctrine is there is no


3 Colonel C. E. Callwell, Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice, Third Edition (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska, 1996), 270.
consensus on the practice of complex nation-building. This is evident in
the many debates outlined in the literature on peacebuilding, such as the
one featured in the previous issue of this journal.

Military doctrine on stability operations reflects predominantly
a “planning-school” approach. Consciously or unconsciously, this
approach assumes rebuilding the capacity of weak or failed states is a
matter of preparation and technique. It is about planning, inter-agency
cooperation, and a whole-of-government approach. It assumes success
is a matter of the right principles and the right techniques. It reflects a
rationalist, problem-solving approach. Military doctrine on stabilization
reflects Western liberal assumptions on how these operations should be
conducted. However, as the wider literature on peacebuilding illustrates,
there is a sustained argument surrounding the validity and viability of
Western liberal approaches to international intervention.

For some commentators, stabilization operations require funda-
mentally different approaches if they are to be successful. For others, the
notion external interventions can create functioning democratic states
is not viable. In consequence, the whole enterprise rests on uncertain
foundations. Put another way, the challenges of stability operations and
stabilization are not the result of the wrong strategy or the wrong tech-
niques, tactically or operationally. Instead, the difficulties derive from
fundamental uncertainties about whether such operations can be done
at all.

This article is divided into three parts. The first part looks at the
“planning-school” approach that underpins military doctrine on sta-
bility operations, highlighting some of the key strands associated with
this perspective. Next, the article examines the views of those who
reject fundamentally the viability of liberal approaches to intervention.
Finally, the article addresses the views of those who believe complex
nation-building interventions can be executed effectively, but with radi-
cally different philosophical approaches required. While the notion that
complex nation-building operations are difficult is hardly new, military
organizations continue to believe revised doctrines can provide a solu-
tion. Ultimately, this article concludes, despite the development of more
sophisticated doctrines for stability operations, there continues to be a
lack of an uncontested “theory of victory” for them: a clearly understood
consensus on how success can be achieved. On that basis, no matter how
rigorous military learning processes are, future military performance in
such operations is unlikely to improve radically, and policy-makers need
to expect less from such operations.

The “Planning-School” Approach

Military organizations need doctrine. Doctrine comprises “what is
believed officially to be contemporary best military practice.” Doctrine
reflects a distillation of the lessons of past operations. For this reason,

4 Rory Stewart and Gerald Knaus, Can Intervention Work? (New York, NY: W. W. Norton &

5 As an example, see Charles J. Sullivan, “State-Building: America’s Foreign Policy Challenge,”
Parameters 46, no. 1 (Spring 2016): 51-65; and M. Chris Mason, “Nation-Building is an Osmorron,”

6 Paul Latawski, Sandhurst Occasional Papers No. 5 – The Inherent Tensions in Military Doctrine
(Camberley, UK: Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, 2011), 9.
the Soviet strategist A.A. Svechin (1878-1938) referred to it as “the daughter of history.” Doctrine plays a crucial role in interpreting history for a military organization, providing intellectual guidance on how to solve military problems and a common framework of thinking. It ensures military problems do not have to be addressed each time from first principles.

For some, the value of having a specific doctrine to conduct large-scale state-building operations might be open to question. The strategist Colin S. Gray has noted, “Stability operations, the demand for them and the provision of new capabilities to perform them well, are the downstream product of larger decisions on foreign policy and strategy.” At the moment, Western foreign policymakers seem keen to avoid generating the demand for such operations. Even if President Obama has asserted “isolation is not an option,” he has also labelled interventions to deal with terrorism as “naive and unsustainable.” His focus instead is on building the capacity of local partners.

Circumstances evolve over time, and it cannot be presumed these kinds of operations will not be needed in the future. For example, the United States has a long history of trying to resist involvement in complex nation-building activities, but at some point it has been dragged into them because contexts change and government policies have been altered. The consequence of ignoring the potential need for such operations has been military organizations that have been left, as was the case in Bosnia in the 1990s, conducting “roll-your-own” campaigns, trying to adapt techniques and generate solutions “in contact.”

Nor are there necessarily easy alternatives to nation-building. Light-footprint interventions have advantages and, for some, interventions, such as in Mali in 2012, are the way to go. As one commentator has noted, “If you are looking at future military interventions, it will not be like Iraq and Afghanistan.” Light-footprint interventions are no silver bullet, and they may only mitigate the worst outcomes, rather than achieve positive success. As the light-footprint operation in Libya has demonstrated, even overwhelming short-term military success in no way guarantees light-footprint operations will achieve longer-term stability.

This reflects, in part, the paradox inherent in land power—putting extensive “boots on the ground” gives the greatest opportunity to

---

influence local people. Precisely because of this, it also exposes troops to the highest risks.\textsuperscript{15} Mitigating risk in intervention operations can therefore mitigate against achieving the most ambitious outcomes. It would be dangerous to assume complex nation-building operations will never reoccur. As analysts at RAND have noted, “If future wars will not look exactly like Iraq, many of them are still likely to resemble Iraq more than they will the great wars of the 20th century.”\textsuperscript{16}

Whatever their initial objectives, international efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan became exercises in liberal peacebuilding, the dominant intellectual framework currently applied to post-Cold War policies and practices of post-conflict intervention. They were large-scale interventions by external actors, with the objective of promoting long-term, stable peace using multi-dimensional activities across political, economic, security, and social sectors. They became associated, particularly, with the idea of state-building: the foundations of long-term stable peace lay in giving war-torn societies effective national governance. They assumed liberally constituted states were internally more peaceful, prosperous, and humane, and sustainably so, and therefore focused on building states that featured liberal democracy, the rule of law, and the promotion of human rights—and that were market-orientated, centralised, and secular. These operations proved to be problematic, and militaries have attempted to learn from their failures, generating new concepts and techniques for achieving their goals.

These responses assumed liberal peacebuilding could work. Based on this assumption, the principal question for militaries became what sorts of techniques and practices could best deliver liberal peacebuilding goals. The answer reflected an assumption that complex nation-building required a capacity to deliver on a hierarchy of themes: the provision of security; humanitarian relief; governance; economic stabilization; democratization; and development, covering the immediate needs of the crisis (such as personal protection and access to food and clean water) through to longer-term initiatives designed to deliver stable political and economic development, including security sector reform, the building of local political parties, and the promotion of economic growth.\textsuperscript{17}

This approach has been reflected in the actual development of military doctrine in the US Army’s Field Manual 3-07, \textit{Stability Operations}, and the United Kingdom’s Joint Warfare Publication 3-40, \textit{The Military Contribution to Stabilization}. In performing complex state-building tasks effectively, contemporary military doctrine highlights the importance of host-nation ownership; legitimacy; a whole-of-government approach; effective multi-national coordination; understanding of the human terrain; and flexibility and adaptability in approach.\textsuperscript{18}

\textsuperscript{15} Tuck, \textit{Understanding Land Warfare}, Chapter 1.


\textsuperscript{17} James Dobbins, Seth G. Jones, Keith Crane, and Beth Cole DeGrasse, \textit{The Beginner’s Guide to Nation-Building} (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2007).

Doctrine is supposed to be “what is taught, believed, and advocated as what is right (i.e., what works best).” But, is success in peacebuilding activities simply a matter of getting the right principles and honing tactical and operational methods?

Building Democratic States: Can It Be Done?

What if liberal peacebuilding cannot be done reasonably? For one perspective, termed in some quarters the “critical approach,” complex nation-building operations, such as those conducted in Iraq and Afghanistan, are fool’s errands. They are too complex a task to be executed effectively, irrespective of the methods one uses. For this reason, attempts at peacebuilding are at best irrelevant and at worst counter-productive.

For some peacebuilding literature, the proof for this perspective lies in the empirical evidence. If one examines external interventions in the past, one struggles to find concrete evidence of success. Some writers have examined UN peacebuilding efforts. In general, and drawing on the wider peace-support literature, there are three benchmarks used to measure success in such operations: violence reduction, violence containment, and conflict settlement. The first measures the success with which an operation reduces armed violence; the second, the success with which violence is prevented from spreading to neighboring countries; and the last measures an operation’s effectiveness in removing the underlying causes of an armed conflict.

Liberal peacebuilding has ambitious objectives that focus, especially, on the last of these three goals. But it is difficult to find examples of unequivocal success in this regard. For example, operations in El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Guatemala succeeded in ending the civil wars there, but the imposition of economic liberalization and structural adjustment programs produced many negative second- and third-order effects. These included a growth in urban poverty; increases in the wealth gap between rich and poor; higher levels of violent criminality; and increasing political tensions. Similarly, operations in Cambodia and Timor-Leste ended fighting, but the political settlements achieved did not succeed in embedding liberal democracy in those countries. Where successes have occurred, local actors, not external intervention, seem to lie at the heart of the success.

Other writers have examined the historic record of military occupations designed to promote nation-building or to embed significant political change. Looking at 24 case studies beginning in 1815, the political scientist David Edelstein found only seven major successes: the occupation of France in 1815, and six other occupations clustered around

---

19 US Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, Joint Publication 1 (March 25, 2013), ix.
the end of World War II (Germany, Italy, Japan, West Austria, North Korea, and the Ryukyu Islands). He concluded the key sources of success were exogenous. They did not relate to the doctrine of the occupiers, but instead to the strategic context. He also noted, in particular, the role common external threats can play in helping the intervener and the host population to define a community of interest (in the case of Germany, for example, the threat posed by Communism).  

Or, as Ann Hironaka discusses in her book *Neverending Wars*, the problem might be that since the end of World War II the international community has become a slave to the idea states cannot be allowed to fail. As a result, international efforts have been trying to sustain through intervention policies that do not deserve to exist—“zombie states.” Historically, states have risen and fallen; often the former has been tied to the processes of the latter. Interventions fail because they provide life support for political structures that are dead in their current form.

A second angle of attack on the viability of liberal peacebuilding efforts derives from the argument that liberal political and economic systems are culturally specific. Liberal peacebuilding is often presented as a neutral, non-partisan and non-ideological intervention. It often uses the language of “common sense” and humanitarianism, offering to intervene in a dispassionate manner; it is presented as a value-free, practical task. Critics of this view argue these assumptions lead to the imposition of generic templates that do not fit the complex realities extant in each particular context.

History demonstrates there is no single route to liberal democracy, and recent Western attempts to create liberal democracies have tried to impose a generic technical template onto a process that is slow, organic, and the product of complex local conditions. For example, European state formation has not conformed historically to top-down neo-liberal approaches. European states were created through a lengthy process of contestation, often violent in nature. They have not developed according to a single template, but have instead followed different paths shaped by differing contexts. Local elites, rather than external agents have often been decisive, and the outcomes have often been contingent and unexpected.

Moreover, state reconstruction is “inherently political in nature (rather than a neutral or technical process).” Focusing on the problem of ethno-centrism, these commentators argue Western approaches ignore local customs that might have the potential to mobilize more grass-roots legitimacy than alien Western forms of government. Tradional conflict-resolution methods include a focus on consensus decision-making and compensation or gift exchanges to ensure reciprocal and harmonious
relations between groups\(^\text{29}\). However, critics argue liberal interventions have tried to freeze in place political arrangements that do not reflect the underlying social patterns of the host population and which are therefore unsustainable. As one exasperated Afghan explained to a Westerner:

\> You are listing all the problems in Afghanistan—and heaping up buzzwords like “tribalism” and “corruption.” But actually, these words have no connection to Afghan reality. You are trying to force Afghan reality into your theory—cutting the suit to fit the cloth.\(^\text{30}\)

Thus, a state is not just a formal apparatus of government. A state is an assembly of forces, institutions, relations, actors, practices, and boundaries. Like the roots of a plant, much of the state is not immediately visible; and in ignoring this, Western interventions, in effect, have been trying to graft the stem of one plant onto the roots of another.\(^\text{31}\)

A final perspective on the inherent implausibility of Western liberal interventions argues it entails too many internal contradictions. The principles of liberal peacebuilding cannot be reconciled and inevitably produce contradictory and unwelcome outcomes. For example, can one reconcile the need for persistence in such operations with the need to maintain legitimacy? On the one hand, writing on liberal approaches to statebuilding emphasizes the need for long-term external engagement in order to build peace effectively in failing states; it cannot be done quickly.\(^\text{32}\) But, inevitably, the long-term presence of foreigners tends to alienate the local population, stoke a nationalist backlash, and undermine the legitimacy of the operation. Rory Stewart notes the fundamental problems caused by the peacebuilding intervention by foreigners, commenting, “The Afghans disliked the US-led intervention because it was a US-led intervention, and no change in tactics would alter that fact.”\(^\text{33}\) Thus, the longer one stays, the less legitimate a given intervention is likely to be.

Alternatively, can one reconcile the need in a weak or failed state for a large-scale infusion of resources, with the need to encourage local ownership of the state-building process? Building the capacity of failed states requires huge resources, resources that are beyond the means of the host-nation government to produce. For example, 80 percent of the Afghan government’s official expenditures are from foreign aid.\(^\text{34}\) This scale of aid can undermine local ownership. It discourages local government from generating its own fiscal resources. It encourages the development of “rentier” states, in which the key form of wealth creation is skimming off foreign transactions, and it distorts the local economy, creating a “war-and-aid economy” marked by pervasive and entrenched corruption.\(^\text{35}\)


\(^{30}\) Stewart and Knaus, *Can Intervention Work?*, 11.

\(^{31}\) Goodhand and Sedra, “Rethinking Liberal Peacebuilding,” 243.

\(^{32}\) US Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-07, x.

\(^{33}\) Stewart and Knaus, *Can Intervention Work?*, xxii.


These contradictions also extend into other principles. How does one reconcile the need for peace with the need for justice and reconciliation? Reaching a political settlement may require cooperation with individuals and groups that have been, or are perceived to have been, complicit in serious human rights violations. In Cambodia, for example, reaching a peace settlement required negotiating with the Khmer Rouge, a group responsible for millions of deaths. Is peace reached through such deals likely to be viewed as just by those who suffered at the hands of such perpetrators? Can one have reconciliation without the sense of justice? Equally, can the need to promote physical security be reconciled with the need to sustain the legitimacy of an operation? Here, the argument is that a focus on security leads inevitably to militarized approaches to peacebuilding in which military responses then crowd out non-military peacebuilding strategies.

Liberal peacebuilding then segues into a counterinsurgency strategy augmented by reconstruction tools, diluting and confusing its purpose. The needs of security may, for example, result in the arming of militias (as was the case in Afghanistan) but these militias may undermine the host state’s monopoly on the means of coercion and strengthen non-state actors. There is no clear-cut way of getting around these problems. The complex methods and objectives associated with liberal peacebuilding operations cannot help but impede one another.

The critical approach argues liberal peacebuilding is pointless—either it cannot work or the context has to be a very particular one for it to succeed. For some hyper-critics of liberal peacebuilding, it is designed not to work. As an exercise in “imperial nation-building” or “Empire-Lite,” doctrines of liberal peacebuilding are simply mechanisms to legitimize the creation of neo-imperial zones of political and economic influence. On that basis, alternative strategies may be required: allowing conflicts to continue until they reach a natural conclusion (sometimes euphemistically called “indigenous state reconstruction efforts”); or varieties of non-liberal intervention, such as permanent trusteeship or direct international government; or empowering strong local leaders; or reliance on traditional or indigenous practices of peacemaking and governance, such as tribal assemblies.

Building Democratic States: Are We Doing It the Right Way?

If there was a consensus surrounding the critical approach to liberal peacebuilding, the conclusions would be negative, but at least clear: do not do it. This would make it clear doctrines for such activities would largely be irrelevant; however, this consensus does not exist. An alternative approach, the “problem-solving” approach, takes a different view. It argues peacebuilding can be done if a radically different approach is
taken. Looking at the problems experienced in Iraq and Afghanistan, this perspective would argue the difficulties experienced there are not because of intervention, but because intervention was conducted in the wrong manner. This approach also argues critical perspectives undervalue the successes of liberal peacebuilding and present alternatives that do not work.

Recognizing liberal peacebuilding interventions have rarely been complete successes, proponents still argue, on balance, they have caused more good than harm. Acknowledging the difficulties in counter-factual assessment, Roland Paris still argues, for example, that where peacebuilding has taken place, the evidence suggests “these countries are probably better off than they would have been without such missions.”

Bosnia provides a good example. While the results there have been more problematic than hoped for, external intervention has still achieved many worthwhile objectives, not least the fact that Bosnians are no longer killing one another.

Most countries that have hosted liberal peacebuilding interventions are no longer at war. Ending armed conflict matters. In Africa, countries that are not peaceful experience five years less life expectancy, 50 percent more infant deaths, and have 15 percent more of the population undernourished. Liberal interventions have also achieved many other worthwhile goals—in Bosnia, external intervention helped in a progressive reversal of ethnic cleansing. Supporters of peacebuilding argue ceasing to engage in such interventions would condemn many millions of people to substantially worse conditions.

At the same time, advocates of intervention argue the alternatives to liberal peacebuilding interventions often are not really alternatives. There is a reason why such interventions have evolved over time, and it is more than casually related to the limitations of other options. For example, the idea we need to “give war a chance” assumes it is politically acceptable to do this, but this may not always be the case. The British government, which was very lukewarm on intervening in Bosnia, did so because of domestic public pressure. At the same time, as the conflicts in Syria, Iraq, and Libya today demonstrate, conflicts have all kinds of destabilizing ripple effects, and they do not necessarily end swiftly.

Alternatives to liberal interventions also have their own difficulties. Non-liberal interventions may be difficult to sell domestically. Direct international government looks very much like neo-colonialism, with all the problems of legitimacy that entails (and is often a version of liberal peacebuilding). Supporting local authoritarian leaders because they can enforce stability was a staple of the Cold-War period that, as the evidence of President Mobutu in Zaire and President Siad Barre in Somalia demonstrates, often produced negative outcomes in the long term. As for relying on traditional or indigenous practices of peacemaking and governance, the recurrent difficulty here is, if these were strong enough

42 Ibid., 352.
43 Marcus Cox, “Bosnia and Herzegovina: The Limits of Liberal Imperialism,” in Call, Building States, 256-257.
to be effective, there would not be serious armed conflict in the state in the first place.44

The problem for military doctrine is the lack of agreement concerning whether liberal state-building interventions are, or are not, a viable tool of policy. If they are, then having a doctrine for conducting them is important; if it is the latter, then no amount of tactical- or operational-level military excellence will deliver the desired results. But the situation is even more complex. Even writers who argue liberal peacebuilding is a viable option if it is conducted in the right way cannot agree on how these operations should be conducted.

One constructive critique of current approaches argues ambitious peacebuilding can work if democratization needs are downgraded in importance in peacebuilding efforts. Instead, first priority should be placed on developing the institutional capacity of the host nation government. This “institutionalization-before-liberalization” perspective notes democracy and free markets are adversarial and conflictual phenomena. Processes of political and economic liberalization, therefore, can exacerbate social tensions and undermine stability in the short and medium terms.

Weak democracies find it difficult to manage the cut-and-thrust of market liberalism. For example, in Iraq democratization reinforced sectarian identities. In order to overcome this problem in the future, this perspective argues liberal interventions should ensure elections take second place to strengthening the host government institutions: the judiciary, police, legislative, and executive frameworks. Only when a state has the ability to manage, through peaceful means, the conflicts caused by democracy should political liberalization be pursued.45

The difficulty with this approach is, without elections, peacebuilding may quickly lose its legitimacy; it risks establishing authoritarian regimes, not representative ones. In particular, it is argued the “institutionalization-before-democratization” approach will not end the destabilizing power struggle within a host nation. It will simply relocate it to the institutions of government, as each faction seeks to exert control over the new regime.46

An alternative perspective argues the real problem with liberal peacebuilding efforts is they are too centralized and too top down. They have focused too much on centrally coordinated activities directed towards local elites, crushing true local participation from the wider population and emasculating locally driven reforms.47 For example, in Kosovo from 1999, some have argued international efforts undermined the emergence of Kosovar civil society and created conditions of dependency. In doing so they built obstacles to democracy, self-government,

and reconciliation. Success requires we adopt emancipatory approaches to intervention in which the interveners play the roles of counsellors or therapists, facilitating self-knowledge and supporting reconciliation and healing at the grass-roots level.\textsuperscript{48}

But here, too, there are difficulties. It may be politically impossible to engage with certain constituencies in this way. In 2001, for example, the US government could not have sanctioned bringing the Taliban into this type of transformatory peacebuilding process. Moreover, this approach assumes there are grass-roots organizations to work through. One problem with this assumption is armed conflicts often undermine the structures of local society so there is no guarantee there are coherent grass-roots actors to work with. In addition, these local actors are likely to be politically and/or morally compromised—militias, warlords, or other partial participants to the conflict. Do we work with them, thus legitimizing them? Or, do we exclude them, creating potential spoilers to any agreements? Finally, do these emancipatory approaches provide answers to difficult issues such as economic development, humanitarian crises, or security sector reform?\textsuperscript{49}

For others, liberal interventions of the future should take the form of “hybrid solutions” or “cosmopolitan interventionism.” Here the idea is that liberal approaches should be blended with local institutions, making for a more nuanced and context-sensitive approach to intervention. This might involve working through tribal organizations or using local conflict-resolution methods, where appropriate.\textsuperscript{50} As reasonable as this approach sounds, there is no consensus it works.

In many respects, this was the strategy adopted in Afghanistan. The problems there demonstrated two key weaknesses. First, the strategy assumed the intervening party in a country understood how local politics works. Often, however, this understanding is faulty and based on stereotyped, overly romantic images of traditional societies.\textsuperscript{51} Second, local players have their own agendas, and they use the resources and opportunities provided by intervention for personal gain. No matter the means used to engage with local players, many players will always manipulate the processes to benefit themselves. For example, the establishment of an interim government and constitution in Afghanistan in 2001 followed the broad processes and mechanisms of the Loya Jirga, which is rooted in Afghan traditions. But, warlords used their participation in the process to reconstitute a ruling order based on tribal elements and strongmen that legitimized the positions of existing local and regional powerholders. Another example was the establishment of the Afghan Local Police, a militia force raised to fight the Taliban. It was

\textsuperscript{49} Ibid., 224.
intended to be controlled by local Shura’s and tribal leaders. In fact, the militia was subverted by local warlords.\(^{52}\)

**Conclusion**

Military doctrine for stabilization operations is dominated by the planning-school approach. General Sir David Richards, Britain’s then Chief of the Defense Staff, commented in 2009 about Afghanistan, “It is doable if we get the formula right, and it is properly managed.”\(^{53}\) As this article has identified, there is no guarantee of success. The problems of stabilization are not just those of process. They reflect deep-rooted philosophical differences surrounding the viability of such operations and the approaches that might be used. Militaries, as problem-solving organizations, have focused necessarily on the tactical and operational techniques, processes, and structures to perform liberal intervention tasks. This focus in no way guarantees future operations will be more successful than those in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The practical evidence for the best way to rebuild shattered nations remains ambiguous. Examination of the debate within the critical and problem-solving schools indicates it might be impossible to conduct complex peacebuilding effectively—except through luck or very specific conditions; or that it might be possible to do so only if a different general approach is adopted, though there is no consensus on what that might be. When it comes to state-building, military doctrine lacks a basis in an uncontested “theory of victory;” a clear sense of how one goes about successfully constituting a liberal state through external intervention. Because of this lack of an objectively verifiable strategy for successful nation-building, we cannot assume the problems that bedevilled the operations in Iraq and Afghanistan will not be repeated again. Improved tactical and operational stabilization techniques for the future, in the context of these difficulties, may simply mean it will take longer to lose.


ABSTRACT: This essay proposes a conceptual framework combining elements of Clausewitz's *On War* with trend-forecasting techniques to describe future operational environments. This framework captures how the interaction of megatrends—the rate of technological change, the composition of the international system, and the strength of state governance—shapes the character of competition, confrontation, and conflict in each period. We argue this framework can help military officers build the future force.

How should military officers describe the future operational environment? In February 25, 2016, testifying before the House Armed Services Committee, US Air Force General and EUCOM Commander, General Philip M. Breedlove referred to a resurgent Russia as an existential threat. Moscow continues to challenge multiple NATO members while investing in a military-modernization program that includes significant increases in autonomous systems. Despite those facts, Russia has a gross domestic product the size of Italy, and it spent less on defense in 2015 than Saudi Arabia.

The Islamic State continues to hold terrain in multiple countries, and it has been a magnet for foreign fighters. The group is pressing a 21st-century terror campaign by attacking European cities and waging complex operations in the cyber domain, including the use of social media and hacking the names and addresses of adversaries in an effort to encourage lone-wolf attacks. Yet, the group has lost, by some estimates, as much as 40 percent of its territory in Iraq and Syria, multiple leaders, and as many as 10,000 fighters since 2014.

From the Islamic State's use of cyber and traditional guerilla and terror tactics to Russian experiments of combining massive fires with drones and broad-spectrum information warfare in Ukraine, there are signs the future of warfare may already be here. Just as the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939) and the 1973 Arab-Israeli Conflict were harbingers of future conflict, we may be at the juncture where events from Eastern


2 Russian GDP (USD, market prices) in 2014 was $1.8 trillion while Italy was $2.1 trillion based on World Bank data, April 30, 2016, http://data.worldbank.org/, and Russian defense spending according to SIPRI was $66 billion. SIPRI, April 20, 2016, http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/milex_database.


Ukraine to Syria and Iraq signal how warfare is likely to evolve and shape the world of 2030 to 2050.

Describing the future character of war should be a central task for the military profession. As bureaucracies, resourcing strategies, and programming processes increase in complexity, often unnecessarily, senior leaders need to make long-term bets on whether to innovate by combining legacy forces with new concepts and incremental improvements or to invent breakthrough capabilities for future contingencies. The future force is built now to be used later. Failing to meet that task abdicates a central responsibility of the military profession.

This article introduces an analytical framework for describing the future operational environment based on integrating Clausewitz’s concept of the character of war unique to each period with trend analysis techniques common in scenario-planning. We contend macro-trends—specifically, the rate of technological change and through it the available means of coercion, the composition of the international system, and the degree to which political units in that system can secure their internal domains—interact in a trinity-like manner. As these trends interact, they produce an emergent character of war. To describe the future operational environment, military professionals should first define the likely future character of war and use the resulting forecasts to develop new concepts and modernization priorities.

The article proceeds by establishing what the character of war is and uses the construct to situate a new approach to describing the future operational environment. From this vantage point, we look at major findings in future studies by the Army and the broader US national security community since the 1970s, highlighting how the interaction of technology, the international system, and governance tends to produce evolutionary as opposed to revolutionary change. Of the three legs of this triad, two are composed of institutions, and institutions exist, in part, because they resist change. This resistance to change—whether derived from cultural, legal, moral, etc., reasons—means even significant technological breakthroughs are incorporated into the character of war incrementally resulting in a gradual evolution of that character. The effect is that, to borrow from Shakespeare, the past remains the prologue. The article concludes with a discussion of the importance of expanding Army efforts to describe the future operational environment.

The Character of War

The idea that while war has an enduring nature, it also has a changing character unique to each historical period comes from On War. In Book One, Clausewitz stated that “from the enemy’s character, from his institutions, the state of his affairs and his general situation, each side, using the laws of probability, forms an estimate of the opponent’s

---

5 For an overview of the military as a profession and how it influences innovation, see Benjamin Jensen, Forging the Sword: Doctrinal Change in the US Army (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2016).


7 For an overview of the difference between evolutionary and revolutionary change in military theory and practice, see MacGregor Know and Williamson Murray, eds., The Dynamics of Military Revolution, 1300-2050 (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
likely course of action.” In Book Three, Clausewitz linked the idea of an identifiable character of war to planning, asserting that “all planning, particularly strategic planning, must pay attention to the character of contemporary warfare.” In Book Eight, Clausewitz argued that “the aims a belligerent adapts and the resources he employs, must be governed by the particular characteristic of his own position; but they will also conform to the spirit of the age and its general character.”

In numerous places, Clausewitz highlighted how failing to understand the character of war leads to disaster. In discussing the Prussian defeat in 1806, he chastised Prussian generals for misapplying the tactics of Frederick the Great, the oblique order, against a Napoleonic enemy waging a new type of warfare.

The character of war, the co-mingling of the motives and circumstances governing uses of force to compel an adversary to do one’s will, is an emergent phenomenon. In Book Six, Clausewitz stated “in war, more than anywhere else, it is the whole that governs all the parts, stamps them with its character and alters them radically.” In other words, when forecasting the future operational environment, analysts should start by charting how broad trends condition the choices available to actors engaged in strategic competition, confrontation, and conflict.

The idea of a unique character of war features prominently in military studies historically. Helmuth von Moltke the Elder (1800-1890) hypothesized new material conditions, such as railroads and telegraphs, changed the speed of mobilization and the character of war. Despite their differences, Russian military theorists Marshal Aleksander A. Svechin (1878-1938) and Marshal Mikhail Tukhachevsky (1893-1937) believed the material conditions of the industrial age called for a departure with the Jominian conceptualization of ground maneuver prevalent since Napoleon. Major General J.F.C. Fuller, architect of Plan 1919, sought a science of war based on technology and mysticism. For Stephen Biddle, victory on the 20th-century battlefield was a function of the modern system of force employment (combined arms maneuver).

After the Cold War, numerous scholars and practitioners sought to define the character of what former Army Chief of Staff General Gordon Sullivan called “post-industrial warfare.”

9 Ibid., 220.
10 Ibid., 594.
11 Ibid., 154-155.
13 Clausewitz, On War, 484.
17 General Gordon Sullivan first used the term in a 1992 speech at the Land Warfare Forum.
David Ronfeldt hypothesized the emergence of netwar as non-state actors structured as networks engaged in transnational competition. Observing the complexity of conflicts in West Africa and the Balkans in the early 1990s, Robert Kaplan argued there was a breakdown in the old state order leading to a new era of struggles defined by resource competition, pandemics, urbanization, demographic shifts, and state failure. Martin van Creveld argued that a shift away from wars between states to a new era of religious and ethnic conflict challenged many of the philosophical assumptions inherent in western military thought. Former British Army General, Sir Rupert Anthony Smith, proposed that modern war reflects a shift from the paradigm of industrial war to war amongst the people.

The question becomes what forces coalesce to produce a paradigmatic shift in warfare. Borrowing from the Marxist concept of a mode of production, Mary Kaldor hypothesized a new mode of warfare defined by internationalized intrastate identity conflicts, illicit economic networks, and guerilla tactics. As seen in Russian actions in Crimea in 2014, these conflicts can be a hybrid, mixing conventional capabilities and irregular warfare. Similar to Kaldor’s modes of warfare, William Lind and Thomas Hammes suggested distinct, identifiable generations of warfare paralleling larger technological change. Modern war was in the fourth generation, involving the use of all available networks (e.g., social, economic, political) to compel an adversary and avoid costly conflict. Antoine J. Bousquet proposed that the character of war tends to reflect the dominant scientific paradigm of the period. War evolved from a Newtonian mechanistic struggle of Napoleonic armies to the current network-based struggle between complex, self-organizing groups like terrorist movements.

The idea of an emergent, interactive character to war can be contrasted with work on enduring national ways of war. A way of war is a transhistorical approach to the conflict by a political community. Three
examples highlight this point. In Russell Weigley’s original treatment, the American way of war referred to the preferred strategy of attrition and overwhelming force, as seen in Ulysses S. Grant’s emphasis on destroying the Army of Northern Virginia and the application of US firepower in the strategic bombing of Axis cities in World War II. This changed over time, as Max Boot claimed the industrial way of warfare shifted after the introduction of widespread precision targeting. With respect to Germany, Robert Citino argued for a distinctly German way of war organized around offensive solutions to defensive vulnerabilities between the Thirty Years War and the fall of the Third Reich. Liddell Hart claimed there is a distinct British way of war based on economic pressure exercised through sea control, mobility, and surprise.

Assessing the Character of Future War

We propose a trinity-like framework for describing how major trends interact to shape the future operational environment. The combination of the rate of technological change, the composition of the international system, and the strength of state governance shape the emergent character of war and by proxy the motives and circumstances governing how political actors will use force to compel their adversaries.

Our approach assumes even cooperative systems have competition under conditions of information asymmetry and ambiguity (i.e., fog and friction prevail). Therefore, political actors employ strategies to achieve positions of relative advantage to one another that can include acts of force to compel their opponent (war both in the overt act and indirect signaling that occurs through generating forces and posturing). The interaction of the rate of technological change, the structure of the international system, and the governance capacity of the state shapes how actors compete with one another. For instance, the rate of technological innovation—for example, how fast artificial intelligence (AI), quantum computing, or autonomous systems emerge—will likely determine the coercive tools available to state and non-state actors seeking to challenge US interests.

Seen in this light, the character of war tends to define the circumstances in which conflict, as well as preparations for conflict, occur. These circumstances are informed by trends. Trends describe

---


27 Robert Citino, *The German Way of War: From the Thirty Years’ War to the Third Reich* (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 2005).


29 The idea that war is an act of force to compel an adversary comes from Clausewitz, *On War*, 75.
macro-tendencies likely to shape the future. According to the *Oxford English Dictionary*, a trend describes a direction of change. Analysts use frameworks to categorize trends such as social, technology, environmental, economic, and political (STEEP). To speak of trends is to make a bet about the types of driving forces likely to influence the future. Contemporary US Army doctrine uses trends to describe future conflict. Unified Land Operations (ULO) argue that the operational environment, which is “a composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander” is influenced by the following trends: globalization, urbanization, failed/failing states, and the diffusion of information technology.

**Imagining the Future: 1970-2020**

The trinity-like framework we propose synthesizes individual observations made in future studies since the 1970s into a larger analytical framework. After the Vietnam War, most such studies saw a future of fragmentation globally, beginning first with the international system and moving later to the “atom” of that system, the state itself. The 1974 *Astarita Report* commissioned by Chief of Staff of the Army General Creighton Abrams concluded that although the United States would “retain its relative standing as the dominate world power,” its “preeminence” would be inhibited by the rise of Western Europe, Japan, and China. Alongside the United States and the Soviet Union, the report argued these states would be the “primary actors on the world stage.”

The document emphasized the power of states in a competitive system, focusing less on technological change than on relative military and economic power as the primary drivers of strategy. In this, the authors foresaw the world moving from a bipolar configuration to one in which those main actors had to share the stage with others. Other than noting a “shrinking world economy” and the growth of multi-national corporations—a particular type of non-state actor—this was not a world in which the state itself was challenged.

In the 1982 *Airland Battle 2000* commissioned by US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Commanding General Donn Starry, the authors noted trends tend to interact and produce the environment in which militaries apply, design, and generate forces. In the document, the authors list a variety of factors, including increased foreign investment in technology, the proliferation of arms, rising populations in the developing world, growing worldwide urbanization,
political and economic interdependence, and the US transition to an information-based society as trends defining the character of war. The document predicted these trends would interact with the “scarcity of energy and other critical resources and the attendant rise of other potential world powers” and signaled a “shift to a multipolar situation.” In this view of the future, the composition of the international system interacts with technological trends such as the proliferation of arms, technology investments, a transition to an information-based society, and with conditions the authors believed would likely result in challenges to state authority, such as urbanization and rising populations.

Written 12 years later at the behest of Army Chief of Staff Gordon Sullivan, TRADOC’s Force XXI Operations, cited similar trends, as elements of instability defining the strategic environment. The document argued, “The world’s geopolitical framework will continue to undergo dramatic restructuring, accompanied by a wide array of economic, technical, societal, religious, cultural, and physical alterations. History shows that change of this scope, scale, and pace increases global tension and disorder.” The document listed, among other things, shifting power balances at the regional and subnational level, nationalism, rejection of the West, demographics, technological acceleration, information technology, and environmental risks as trends shaping the character of war.

Specifically, this futures document addressed how technology changed the character of war and the stability of the state. Force XXI noted information technology was “expected to make a thousand fold advance over the next 20 years.” This would, the publication argued, “revolutionize—and indeed have begun to revolutionize—how nations, organizations, and people interact” by challenging “the relevance of traditional organizational and management principles.” Thus it saw a future that would be characterized, in part, by growing “rivalries between states and non-state groups for power,” while the “ability of a government to govern effectively is being eroded,” and indeed, the power of information technology itself was “challeng[ing] the authority of long-standing institutions and the meanings of terms such as sovereignty.”

Similar to future studies commissioned by the Army, larger national security foresight initiatives also highlighted the interaction of technology, the international system, and governance. In 1997, the first of the National Intelligence Council’s Global Trends reports saw a continuation of these two trends: growing fragmentation in the international system and a weakening state. Noting that in 1997, “most conflicts are internal, not between states,” the Global Trends 2010 forecasted that an international system “based primarily on relations between states, not developments within them” was “drawing to an end.” Arguing that even stable states “will still find that they are losing control of significant parts of their national agenda due to,” among other things,” the continuing revolution

37 Ibid., 4.
38 TRADOC, Force XXI Operations (Fort Monroe, VA, TRADOC, 1994), 2-1.
39 Force XXI, 1-5.
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid., 2-1 and 2-2 (emphasis original).
in information technology,” the report asserted non-state actors “will not supplant the power of governments,” but “they will weaken them.”

At the dawn of the 21st century, then, the international system was to have moved from its unipolar “moment” to a more multipolar system, and the state itself was to have weakened, but not have been displaced from its place of primacy in that system. After the turn of the century, later futures studies saw the continuation of these two trends. But in those studies, technology—and the accelerating pace of innovation—began to play a more key role in the shaping the future.

To be clear, technology was a consideration—at least an implicit consideration—in each of the studies discussed above, in particular, information technology. Indeed, it would be hard to conclude anything other than that the state of technology—and the rate of invention—play key roles in shaping the future. As a tool or technology, Archimedes’ lever does “move the world.” It is arguable that from that simplistic, albeit metaphorical, lever through the wonders of the Industrial Revolution—all one, two, three, or four of them, depending on who you ask—technology played a significant role in shaping the future.

That said, beginning in the early 2000s, it appears technology began to become a more prominent player in futures studies. For instance, after acknowledging “few predicted the profound influence of information technology”—a cautionary statement about the perils in attempting to predict breakthroughs, if there ever was one—the NIC’s Global Trends 2015 concluded science and technology would be one of the key drivers shaping the future. The report noted “[m]ost experts agree[d] that the information technology revolution represents the most significant global transformation since the Industrial Revolution.” In this report, joining information technology, which was mentioned in earlier studies, were biotechnology—forecasted to “drive medical breakthroughs”—and advanced materials.

Many of today’s futures studies mirror these three larger trends. First, regarding the fragmentation of the international system and governance, the NIC’s Global Trends 2030 sees the “diffusion of power among countries and from countries to informal networks will have a dramatic impact by 2030.” This diffusion of “economic and political power” was catalyzed, according to AT Kearney, a global management consulting firm, by the fact that since the 2008 financial crisis, the United States has “receded from the global stage,” while “rising regional powers...
have increased their political influence in line with growing economic strength.”  

Similarly, like earlier studies, these see an important—and growing—role for non-state actors. The *Global Trends 2030* goes so far as to present a scenario for 2030 it labels the “non-state world.” As the number and influence of non-state actors grow, they will “create pervasive challenges to nation-state power and influence,” and will “complicate decision making.” These complications, in turn, make governing more difficult, which weakens the state.

Despite the prominent appearance of the other two trends, technology continues to play a key—if not the most important—role in these studies. Thus, in many of these studies, the potential of emerging technologies is fully realized, and the consequence of that realization is societies are fundamentally disrupted. For example, “mass production” is seen as “increasingly...replaced with on-demand, custom manufacturing.” “[R]obotics could eliminate the need for human labor entirely in some manufacturing environments,” raising the specter of increased unemployment and unrest. And nanotechnology allows “an ability to create composite or new materials.”

Going forward, the most disruptive of these possible technologies is the potential for artificial intelligence (AI), empowered by quantum computers. It is interesting to note that although information technology has been referred to repeatedly in earlier futures studies, today’s studies show the important and growing role of artificial intelligence. As one study argued, “the first company or country to create and deploy advanced artificial intelligence might acquire a decisive advantage” over its competitors. Since the 1970s, future studies have seen a global environment with more actors who matter, empowered by technology the development of which is increasing at a faster rate. In some ways, these trends are not surprising. No hegemon has ever stayed hegemonic forever. The state itself is not the only principle along which a community could organize itself. Before the Peace of Westphalia, it was not the West’s organizing principle.

These studies demonstrate the importance of considering what has not changed. Despite repeated prognostications of the failed state in these studies, the state remains the most important player on the international stage. More importantly, there is no clear indication of what would replace the state as the government for a geographic area. Similarly, the relative diminishment of the United States is generally caveated with the notation that it is likely to remain the world’s most important state into the foreseeable future.

The forces of continuity are as strong, if not stronger, than the forces of change. Large trends take time to emerge, often eclipsing increasingly short attention spans prone to a historical perspectives. Too often, staffs...
begin the task of describing the future operational environment assuming change as opposed to appreciating continuity. Furthermore, they do not grade their homework by implementing systematic processes that assess whether or not their earlier forecasts came to fruition.

**Conclusion: Integrating Foresight Initiatives into the Army**

The military profession requires an analytical process for describing the future operational environment. If the first act of judgment is to understand the war you are fighting, the second act is to anticipate the next war, knowing full well the inherent uncertainty and contingency involved in the task. To that end, we propose a trinity-like framework based on Clausewitz’s concept of the character of war, arguing that the emergent interaction of technology, the composition of the international system, and governance trends shape the circumstances in which actors engage in strategic competition. Of note, many of these trends appear in earlier future studies. What this article offers is a means of conceptualizing how the interaction of these trends produces an emergent character of war.

Given the importance of futures research to the military, the question becomes how to integrate foresight initiatives designed to describe the future character of war into the institutional Army. While the Army has institutional processes like Exercise Unified Quest nested within larger government exercises like the National Intelligence Council Global Trends and Joint Staff/OSD studies like the Joint Operational Environment, Quadrennial Defense Review, and National Military Strategy, the profession of arms needs a more vibrant and competitive marketplace of ideas that invests uniformed personnel with the responsibility to describe the changing character of war. Many times, existing bureaucratic processes for describing the future—even when guided by thought leaders—suffer from the pitfalls of all routinized staff work. They tend to become non-controversial, consensus documents often bent by existing equities, which reflect the views of a small group of experts true to the original Delphi Method pioneered at RAND in the 1950s. The thinkers become trapped in bureaucracy’s iron cage.

To offset this effect, the Army could create a more competitive marketplace of ideas for describing future operational environments. Rather than rely solely on large institutional processes, senior leaders could use small, diverse groups of officers, senior leaders hand selected for their professional competency, analytical attributes, and imagination. This cohort could be placed in an incubator. Incubators are “informal subunits established outside of the hierarchy” where military leaders engage in problem-directed searches for new ideas. If you look at many of the Army’s major futures exercises and significant doctrinal developments since the 1970s like The Astarita Report, they relied on these small groups separated from the bureaucracy.

The emergence of incubators reflects the fact that the profession of arms, by necessity, has developed coping mechanisms for the size and rigidity of modern military bureaucracy. Rather than cut non-standard

---


58 Jensen, *Forging the Sword*, 1.
assignments in incubator-like entities in periods of declining budgets and force structure, the leadership should preserve and incentivize them. Any mechanism that helps a military organization describe the future character of war and through it a range of potential warfighting concepts is, as Barry Watts and Williamson Murray highlight in their study of the interwar period, the “sine qua non of successful peacetime military innovation.”

In addition, competing incubators should produce future forecasts that are rigorous, replicable, and testable. The problem with most futures work is forecasts are rarely subject to testing or updating based on the unfolding operational environment as it actually occurs and unforeseen events. Just as the Intelligence Preparation of the Environment (IPOE) process produces named areas of interests (NAIs) to determine whether or not the predicted enemy course of action is coming to pass, futures work should produce clear indications and warnings that allow analysts to determine whether or not the character of warfare is evolving as forecast.

Paul R. Norwood
Paul Norwood is a Colonel in the US Army currently serving as a Fellow in the Office of the Chief of Staff of the Army, Strategic Studies Group.

Benjamin M. Jensen
Benjamin Jensen is a Major in the US Army Reserve currently serving as a Fellow in the Office of the Chief of Staff of the Army, Strategic Studies Group. Outside of the military, he is a Donald L. Bren Chair and Director of the Brute Krulak Center at the Marine Corps University.

Justin Barnes
Justin Barnes is a Major in the US Army currently serving as a Fellow in the Office of the Chief of Staff of the Army, Strategic Studies Group.

Over 100 years ago, the philosopher-strategist Carl von Clausewitz wrote that a trinity of passion, chance, and political purpose drives the vicissitudes of war. In *Carnage & Connectivity*, David Betz supports this view. He offers a concise, witty, insightful argument for the proposition “war itself has not changed,” though changes in technology have complicated its dynamics. He states his case up front and through his review of literature and evolving military doctrines marshals compelling evidence to support his proposition.

As Betz sees it, “quixotically, the major military powers in the West have serially tried and failed to use technology to disconnect from war’s enduring nature.” They chase solutions using high-tech weaponry that increase the speed at which combat is conducted, but do not affect the forces in Clausewitz’s trinity that continue to govern warfare. The consequences can prove costly. They espouse a form of war that largely replaces forces on the ground with force delivered by long-range weapons. “Each time,” he observes, “all they have managed to grasp is a slow, bitter, indecisive war.”

One cannot achieve victory, Betz argues, by replacing chance in war with information systems, including weaponized malware (cyber weapons), and passion with long-range weapons and spin and compensating for failures of policy and strategic vision with tactics that avoid contact with the enemy—and, one might add, casualties. Indeed a criticism skeptics level against current US policy is it too often seeks to wage a “bloodless” war through the use of drone and air strikes, rather than with boots on the ground. How bloodless such a war may be depends greatly on whether you sit on the sending or receiving end.

Betz skillfully examines how emerging new technologies and a globally connected world have altered warfare. He recognizes the benefits of empowering individuals, but cautions about the darker side. Connectivity provides revolutionary new tools for persuasion. These tools can help articulate a strategic narrative that shapes perceptions, beliefs, and ideals of target audiences, changes behavior, and effects a desired end-state. New technology has altered the capacity of parties to forge and execute strategies, operations, and tactics. What it does not do is change the core truths Clausewitz’s trinity embodies. The West may have bigger, more high-tech weapons, but as the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have demonstrated, Betz says, these cannot compensate for the “deficit of passion” that motivates enemies comprised of moderately organized and loosely affiliated non-state groups. For them, while chance may always

Mr. Farwell is a national security expert and specialist in strategic communication who has advised the US Special Operations Command, the US Strategic Command, and the Department of Defense on communication strategy and cyber war. He is the author of *Communication Strategy* (2015); *Persuasion and Power* (2012); and *The Pakistan Cauldron* (2011). He is also a campaign professional.
play a role, intensely motivated, purposeful enemies using low-tech methods can still defeat high-tech opponents.

Betz cites several examples to show how new technology in prior eras misled commanders into believing the nature of war had changed. Cyber tactics can employ social engineering or “phishing” to mislead enemies. The technology is new; the concept is old. During the American Civil War, Confederate cavalry seized Union telegraph communications—then new technology—to send false orders and reshape the information environment. During the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71, clever Germans trained falcons, turning them into weaponized predators to intercept French carrier pigeons delivering messages. In World War II, radar helped destroy German U-boats. None of these examples altered the importance of passion, chance, and purpose in war, although new technology broadened the capacity and ability of actors to wage war.

Connectivity has increased the number and types of actors who can influence outcomes, empowering non-state as well as state actors. It has enabled violent movements to operate in networked, distributive forms that counter conventional military tactics. It increases the capacity for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)—but also makes operations more transparent, complicating efforts to execute tactics through stealth. For liberal democracies, articulating coherent, credible narratives that support military operations is more challenging. Indeed, Betz points out, connectivity renders disrupters more flexible, adaptable, and dangerous. In a prior era, logistics presented problems more easily avoided today. Disrupters can now focus on ideas and move them in digital form rather than allow for logistics.

Technology has rendered modern armies more lethal. Yet that can produce illusionary victories. Betz cites the 1991 and 2003 Iraq Wars as examples. Our technology and the remarkable skill of our forces were so exceptional they overwhelmed enemies who were never really in the fight. Here, Betz returns to Clausewitz for a pivotal insight. Clausewitz observed war consists of “acts of force to compel our enemy to do our will.” Defeating the enemy kinetically in a battlespace does not necessarily equal winning. Winning requires the enemy to recognize it has been defeated and to subject itself to the victor’s will. Saddam’s resurgence after Desert Storm and the long war waged by al-Qaeda and other insurgents after the fall of Baghdad in 2003 attest to the pitfalls that occur when an enemy denies it is defeated.

Betz challenges the view that the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) has altered the character and conduct of conflict. RMA advocates believe advanced technology and the developing “system of systems” give commanders a clearer, more-rapid grasp of complex situations. This technological edge enables forces to operate within an opponent’s decision and action cycles, make the right decisions, and outthink and
outmaneuver an opponent. Betz believes RMA symbolizes a “blind faith in technology” that could prove self-defeating in fighting today’s less-encumbered opponents. As Betz sees it, today’s conflicts demonstrate “the near impossibility of operating within the decision-cycle of any opponents without a high degree of political clarity about the purpose [and] the issue of force in the first place,” something he argues is increasingly difficult to identify. Betz offers a compelling case for his key point, that evolving technology does not replace the Clausewitz trinity in understanding the dynamics determining outcomes in war.

Betz’s points invite competing views. He agrees with C. E. Callwell who argued a winning outcome requires contact with the enemy and defeating it in battle. Still, Betz acknowledges insurgent dominance of the narrative, aided by Al Jazeera’s biased reporting, determined the outcome of the April 2004 battle for Fallujah. But the pivotal role information warfare played there merits stronger recognition. Information is one of many elements that comprise combined arms warfare, and too few people seem to grasp this truth. In November 2004, information warfare was a crucial element that was well integrated into kinetic strategies and operations responsible for winning the second battle for the city. Still, adroit propaganda by insurgents effectively exploited the after-effects of the battle across Iraq in 2005, arguably the most chaotic year of the war.

Betz is skeptical about Army Col. (Ret.) Thomas X. Hammes’ notion of Fourth Generation Warfare. But I think Hammes is astute, especially in showing how the Palestinians leveraged strategic communications rather than weapons to win the political battle—the one that in that context mattered most—during the First Intifada.

None of these questions detracts from Betz’s central argument. He has written an outstanding analysis as to how connectivity has affected warfare, pointing out its potential, as well as its key traps, for warriors, political leaders, and commanders to avoid. I was pleased to see him quote Phillip Bobbitt, who warned non-state actors might produce a catastrophe using a nuclear device, dirty bomb, pathogen, or pandemic in an American city.1 Neither the United States nor any other Western nation would be the same after that, with one potential consequence being the eclipse of civil liberties in the name of security. Betz empathizes with Bobbitt, who believed evolving technology mandates strategies that focus on the sensitive issues raised in protecting against vulnerabilities, not just mounting threat deterrence.

A second contribution to this topic—Strategic Narratives, Public Opinion, and War: Winning Domestic Support for the Afghan War—offers a

---

collection of penetrating essays on how NATO governments employed strategic narratives well (or badly) to mobilize support for their participation in the war in Afghanistan. The first part of the book offers theoretical debates on “narrative” and “strategic narrative.” Case studies on NATO and other partners follow.

Strategy has proven notoriously difficult to define. Lawrence Freedman’s *Strategy* offers superb insights; but most campaign professionals would find novel his definition of strategy as the “art of creating power.” They would puzzle over Fabrizio Coticchia and Carolina De Simone’s concept of framing as “bricks for building” a broader storyline presented in “The Winter of our Consent? Framing Italy’s ‘Peace Mission’ in Afghanistan.” None of the writers in the volume adequately places strategic narrative in the context of a story from which narrative emanates, or the themes and messages that flow from narratives. They tend to conflate story and narrative and omit theme and message. Distinguishing each of these elements is vital in developing strategies. Still, it is interesting to see how others think about these notions and apply them to concrete studies.

The authors also neglect a critical dimension in measuring the impact of narratives: resonance. Reason persuades, but emotion motivates. Narratives shape behavior when they strike a responsive chord rooted in emotion. Allied messaging in World War I and World War II respected that precept, personalizing the enemy and selling the idea the Germans were monsters we had to vanquish. While true for the second war, it was not for the first. Even when fighting the Nazis, stirring up public support to beat Hitler proved challenging.

In his fascinating study of American attitudes and opinions towards entering the war, historian Steven Casey makes the point many Americans, even after Pearl Harbor, were reluctant to fight to exact revenge against Japan. Americans showed surprisingly little interest in fighting the entire German nation. Most Americans had difficulty believing the Germans were collectively guilty of mass atrocities. Too many viewed the Nazis as an aberration whom the “good” German generals would soon topple. Franklin Roosevelt, who towers as both a political leader and a military strategist, understood the existential threat Hitler posed. He had a good message in the “Four Freedoms” about the values America stood for.

But in that era all but devoid of mass communications, how could Roosevelt motivate Americans to oppose Hitler? He realized they might not give credence to claims the Nazis were committing mass murder; however, they might believe reports about smaller-scale barbarities.

Hitler provided Roosevelt the opportunity after British commandos mortally wounded Hitler’s trusted confederate, Reinhard Heydrich, in May 1942. The Gestapo thought the assassins came from Lidice and Lezak to execute, or sent to concentration camps, about 400 people from these towns—a sufficiently small number Americans could get their minds around. Roosevelt spotlighted this atrocity and mobilized celebrities like Albert Einstein to denounce the Nazis and expose them for what they were. The strategy defined the Nazis in emotional and

---

personal terms. It worked. It is a good example of how framing a story, narrative, theme, and message in a way that evokes an emotional response is crucial to influencing attitudes and opinions and shaping behavior.

Arguably, the true reason the United States went to war against Saddam Hussein in 1991 was oil. Andrew Bacevich well summarized what many political insiders felt was the primary reason for American military intervention in the Middle East: “to preserve the American way of life, rooted in a specific understanding of freedom and requiring a cheap abundance of oil.”

President George H. W. Bush and his team of closest advisers—James Baker, Brent Scowcroft, and Dick Cheney—understood mobilizing support for countering Saddam’s seizure of Kuwait and the threat to Saudi Arabia required sparking emotions. Talking about oil or geostrategy was not going to gin that up. They believed American voters liked to put angel’s wings or forked tails on political players. Hence, they conceived and executed a strategy that demonized Saddam while portraying intervention as a bold stroke to preserve democracy for Kuwait. Bush mobilized overwhelming support for the war.

The US presidential elections in 2016 offer a good example of how emotion can evoke an extraordinary response in target audiences. Consider Donald Trump. Skeptics argue Trump’s narratives lack substance, a problem that may prove fatal in the November general election. But, Trump defeated 16 candidates, many considered political powerhouses, to win the Republican nomination. He did so, almost entirely, by tapping into the deeply held emotional hostility to a sense the US government had left its constituencies behind in favor of wealthy insider elites whose agendas ignored their hopes and dreams.

None of these questions detracts from the book’s high merit, especially in the specific analyses of the dynamics governing each nation’s strategic narrative. Each writer is incisive and illuminating, presenting convincing cases for the conclusions argued. A powerful question raised is how one can forge a viable war-fighting coalition among actors with different political systems, agendas, interests, resources, and scope of flexibility to participate in foreign conflicts. The case studies of country perspectives highlighted next impressively dissect how each nation employed strategic narratives to mobilize public support.

Quoting Johns Hopkins scholar Michael Vlahos, the editors note it is critical to root policies in a foundation of “truths” people can easily accept because they appear to be “self-evident and undeniable.” Or, put in campaign terms, the rationale for expeditionary interventions needs to be credible, defining the stakes and explaining persuasively why and what action is taken, how it will unfold and for what purpose, and how it benefits both foreign and domestic actors.

Netherlands, Italy, and Canada failed to produce coherent, persuasive, consistent narratives, costing their governments vital public support, but not necessarily with the same result. The Dutch government, which operates through consensual politics, collapsed. Italy’s executive traditionally has wide power in security matters, but poor messaging drained

---

public support. Both governments drew down their International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF). In Canada, elite consensus based on a pro-NATO strategic culture enabled it to sustain ISAF’s fourth largest combat presence in Afghanistan. A similar scenario enabled Australia’s government to hold firm in providing its forces.

Adroit leadership in Germany, notably by defense minister Zu Guttenberg, produced security-driven arguments and sustainable elite consensus. These overcame lack of public support. In a system attuned to consensus politics, the Danes articulated a narrative “attuned to shared national values and ideals—such as the promotion of human rights—while still preserving the argument of protecting Danish security...” Germany’s and Denmark’s ability to present “consistent, compelling, and clear” narratives that contained elements of purpose, legitimacy, and success underpinned their engagements.

One striking finding was most governments changed their narratives. Rather than building public support, those actions diminished it, partly because the new narratives embodied new rhetoric not new strategies. This political gamesmanship inspired counter-narratives and undercut scope of action.

Consider France. Traditionally, France accords its executive wide authority on security matters and debates there have tended—as its many interventions in Africa illustrate—to occur among elites. Even during the Algerian civil war, the explosive issue of the use of torture by the armed forces, which threatened to subvert republican values, transpired among elites, not the general public. Elites still matter, but in this era, public opinion that translates into votes at the ballot box counts, too.

This lesson proved costly as President Nicolas Sarkozy saddled himself with an incoherent narrative manifested in a four-page leaflet expressing elusive objectives for French intervention. Sarkozy regularly leveraged his frenetic leadership style to muscle his way through such problems. What the French read in newspapers conflicted with on-the-ground realities. Confronting election defeat, mounting casualties and strong counter-narratives forced Sarkozy to pull back. His party lost the next election. Sarkozy’s rhetorical approach in talking about problems rather than solving them contributed to the loss.

Hungarian voters are less interested in foreign policy although they pay attention to casualties. The Hungarian government managed by sticking to its basic narratives of helping Afghans and allies in Afghanistan without being directly at war, and, crucially, showing support for the NATO alliance. “This is about NATO, not Afghanistan,” Minister of Defense Ferenc Juhász declared. Important was his insistence against taking offensive action or even detaining anti-Afghan government forces. That dismayed ISAF allies. With uncertain public support for sending troops, Hungary never altered the rules of engagement or aimed to win hearts and minds for the provincial reconstruction teams (PRT) it deployed. It consistently characterized its mission as peacekeeping, and its refusal to adopt a more belligerent stance enabled it actually to increase its forces.

Poland stressed the need to be counted as part of an alliance, knowing the same alliance might one day be called upon to defend it against Russia. Combined with a narrative about strengthening Polish
military capabilities, the posture enabled the government to achieve important goals despite vocal opposition.

Sweden—which is not a member of NATO—provided troops. It justified its actions through a catch-all narrative that ranged from fighting terrorism to enhancing Afghan democracy. It consciously declined to specify clear policy goals. This approach reflected domestic imperatives to balance interests among competing target audiences in order to forge consensus. The Swedes questioned whether Afghanistan posed a terrorist threat at home, and the military felt uncertain about the purpose of its mission. The government narrative stressed the need for Afghan and Swedish security. It argued the use of force, but not war, was necessary to attain democracy, political stability, governance, and gender equality. The strategy worked, giving legitimacy to the use of force by appealing to humanitarian needs, Swedish self-interest, and an argument for strengthening collective security organizations like NATO by participating in NATO actions.

The British approach reflected a strategic culture that stresses the US-UK alliance. Like Americans, the British public takes pains to show support for its military—even when it may disagree with government policies. All three UK political parties supported intervention, and a clear narrative emerged that balanced protecting UK security and joining international partners in the fight against terrorism. A global outlook and elite consensus bolstered support for participation in the ISAF. Critically, the campaign reflected a strong belief that protecting security at home required international engagement.

Britain’s steady hand in the face of mounting casualties after troops were deployed to Helmand Province in 2006 suggests fatalities do not necessarily erase popular support in some societies. Curiously, after 2009 the government muddled its narrative by adding humanitarian concerns to national security goals. Was Britain engaged in peacekeeping or war-fighting? Foreign Secretary Jack Straw moved to finesse the issue by stressing the “astonishing success” British forces were achieving. When British forces withdrew, it pegged the withdrawal to progress made on the ground. The Brits declared victory and went home. How that might affect future actions should the current stalemate in Afghanistan continue or should the Taliban seize power poses interesting questions.

The final chapter addresses the United States. It is an interesting analysis centered on *New York Times* stories and how they shaped elite discourse on Afghanistan. Yet, it is somewhat irrelevant to decision-making by Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama. Priding himself as pragmatic and down-to-earth, Bush did not read the *Times* or many newspapers. He relied on his instincts as the “decider” and, at least until 2006, surrounded himself with circles of neoconservatives who pushed their ideological agendas.

An intense intellectual, Obama reads voraciously, but is a self-contained leader who trusts his judgment above all others. Both presidents produced incoherent narratives for Afghanistan. Neither laid out a story, narrative, or themes and messages tied to clear policy goals or that effectively shape an audience’s behavior to achieve a desired end-state. Not surprisingly, most objective observers severely question what US actions have achieved or what price propping up the Ashraf Ghani
administration is worth paying. In a recent *Atlantic* interview, Obama expressed deep skepticism over whether the United States could solve the problems in the Middle East. One infers he feels the same about Afghanistan, whose challenges one can reasonably suggest he understated before taking office. Both of these presidents were strong-willed individuals for whom media reporting has relatively little effect on national security decisions.

Strategic Narratives, Public Opinion, and War ends with a commendable chapter that summarizes conclusions and raises questions for the future. The current political environment in the United States and Europe has elicited a healthy debate about the future of NATO. In the 2016 presidential elections, major differences on the issue have emerged between Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump. This book admirably contributes to that discourse. With clarity it lays out the political dynamics that challenged NATO countries who grappled with joining an American-led coalition in Afghanistan. Have NATO nations done their fair share in shouldering the burden of European security? With varying success and the employment of distinct strategies, NATO political leaders tried to support the US intervention in Afghanistan. Domestic considerations affected the extent and terms of each nation’s engagement there. But as a group, these leaders recognized a strong NATO represents vital hope to deter or defeat potential Russian aggression. Maintaining alliance with the United States mattered to all of them.
Dr. Sullivan’s essay, while well-articulated, urges a specific strategic approach should be undertaken which this commentator argues is not in our nation’s best interests.

Sullivan’s essay focuses on the rise of a new menace—the emergence of radical Sunni-inspired terror states in Iraq, Syria, and Libya linked to ISIL—as well as a reconstitution of Taliban sovereignty over Afghanistan. It paints a very accurate overview of issues stemming from state failure in these four countries as well as themes related to internal sectarian politics, tribalism, external power interference, poorly crafted policies and their unexpected second-order effects, and a host of other political maladies. The author rightfully acknowledges the dismal performance of the United States and its coalition partners in the promotion of state-building—specifically that founded on liberal democratic governance—in these four countries in the recent past as well as the US government’s present recalcitrance to get more deeply involved in civil wars that are seeing raging insurgencies taking place within them.

The author determines the most strategically prudent course of action for the United States is that of “…adhering to a militaristic foreign policy agenda…” to “…combat the rise of new radical-inspired states.” A centerpiece of this agenda would, by necessity, be one focused once again on ‘state-building.’

Sullivan recognizes such a strategic policy is not without its major detractions, including the fact the US government does not currently possess a “workable blueprint” to reconstruct failed states successfully. In addition, as in our successful campaigns, a small US military or coalition garrison would be required indefinitely for stabilization purposes. Still, given the mounting security concerns that now exist, state-building is viewed by the author as our best option when countering ISIL’s terror state in Iraq, Syria, and Libya, and the Taliban’s re-emergence in Afghanistan.

A number of faulty assumptions underpin the author’s strategic policy guidance. One is to suggest the transnational threat represented by an ISIL caliphate spanning Iraq, Syria, and Libya simply does not represent an existential threat to the Westphalian-state form itself. Viewing ISIL as the next generational evolution of the al-Qaeda organization, however, does indeed highlight the fact that this threat now readily
exists outside of the modern state-centric paradigm. If we are willing to accept we are indeed operating “out of paradigm,” then all past international security assumptions we held as valid—including those related to state-building—need to be questioned.

One such presupposition is we can “orchestrate economic recoveries” in these countries in question. Put differently, we can create viable formal—hence legitimate—economies that will supersede the informal and criminal economies that presently exist, such as the poppy-opium-heroin production centered in Afghanistan. What if we were to instead assume the illicit economy is now actually the dominant economy in certain regions of the world, such as in Afghanistan? If this is indeed the new reality, then we may quickly come to the conclusion an integral component to liberal democratic governance simply cannot be accomplished there and, quite possibly, in some of the other countries.

Another presupposition mentioned is that a professionally trained local military force would be required in areas taken back from ISIL, in Syria, for instance. Even if we forget the immediate $500 million Free Syrian Army debacle, the United States and its allies would be required to stand up a new force of Syrian fighters who are not polarized along the ends of the spectrum of Islamic radicals and Assad regime loyalists. Such a recruiting pool no longer exists—the Syrian men who have migrated to Europe in search of a better life for themselves and their families have no intentions of going back, and those men who live in refugee camps in neighboring states with their families realize their cause for democratic freedoms is lost.

Additionally, nothing negates a militaristic foreign policy like that advocated in the article for the United States like a nuclear-armed foreign power. Russian forces are now based in Syria, actively engaged in supporting their allied Assad regime against all opposing factions on the ground in the country. While the United States can operate covertly on the margins in Syria, we simply would not risk—nor should we—the escalation potential vis-à-vis Russia resulting from any overt boots-on-the-ground campaign in the country.

Critiques such as these can also be applied to the situation in Iraq, a country fragmented into Kurdish, Sunni, and Shia zones. The chance to engage in state-building for the benefit of a greater Iraq is long past. Given ongoing American tensions with Iran, and its intimate relations with the Shia population in Iraq, the southern region of the country can only be expected to see waning liberal democratic influence over time. Under such conditions, further US investment in Shia infrastructure and development makes little sense. The middle section of the country is partially controlled by ISIL. Additional Sunni territories have some affinity for ISIL, which is viewed as a partial counterbalance to the threat the Shia militias pose in the area. Only in the Kurdish zone do any type of real US state-building futures exist and then, if implemented, the negative impacts on our alliance with Turkey would certainly have to be considered, which may likely preclude such a course of action.

Brevity prevents a critique of state-building and the requirement for deployed American troops on the ground in Libya. Suffice to say, this does not represent a rational course of action on the part of the United States towards the ISIL threat. Competing governments now exist there,
along with roughly 8,000 ISIL fighters attempting to expand their self-
proclaimed caliphate. This new quagmire is of immense geo-political
significance to Europe and by all rights should fall within its sphere of
regional security interest. Hence, Libya should come under European
Union mandate, and as part of our Atlantic alliance, its domestic secu-
rity needs should fall under a European burden-sharing agreement with
the United States.

While the emergence of ISIL is a component of a changing world
that is exiting the modern state-centric paradigm into something else—
and may even represent an existential threat to the Westphalian-state
model—the United States cannot become mired in multiple countries
with deployed ground forces in support of prohibitively expensive
social-engineering projects as a futile exercise in liberal democratic
expansion. This is even more the case given our past failures in this
regard, and the realization we have no viable strategic state-building
plan. We, unfortunately, tend to incrementally “wing-it” once in country
by literally throwing money at the problem to the benefit of corrupt local
officials and businesses.

With US national debt now over $19 trillion, the exhaustion of our
armed services—especially our army—from more than a decade of
constant deployments, the rise of an expansionist China and a bellicose
Russian state, and the ongoing gang and cartel problems in the Americas,
strategic prudence suggests we should not go “all in” to Afghanistan,
Iraq, Syria, and Libya. Rather, we should target, degrade, and undermine
ISIL and the Taliban when and where we can in a measured and cost-
effective manner. We must also recognize the Assad regime, supported
by Iranian and Russian forces, has stabilized its position and does not
appear to be in danger of imploding.

If we are entering a new and more dangerous global security era,
logic suggests we marshal our strength as the last remaining super-
power. Sullivan’s state-building policy guidance, in an absolute best-case
scenario, would yield us nothing more than pyrrhic victories. Instead,
we should reposition ourselves for continuing global influence and
dominance rather than myopically becoming mired in a handful of lost
causes for the long-term.

The Author Replies

Charles J. Sullivan

I wish to extend my sincere thanks to Parameters for publishing
my article “State-Building: America’s Foreign Policy Challenge” in its
Spring 2016 issue. I would also like to thank Dr. Robert J. Bunker for
his thoughtful critique of my work. One of the reasons I wrote this
article was the hope of initiating (or perhaps reigniting) a discussion on
US strategy in the Global War on Terror. In reading Bunker’s critique,
I admittedly agree with many of his observations. Indeed, the United
States faces a most daunting situation across the Middle East today.
Furthermore, as I have already noted, there are many risks involved in
the United States adhering to a state-building-oriented strategy. That
said, it is on strategy where Bunker and I differ. He sees state-building as too risky, and he argues America should “reposition” itself so as to maintain “global influence and dominance” in the international system. I appreciate this viewpoint, but I also believe it to be mistaken.

In endorsing a state-building-oriented strategy, I am not thinking in terms of preventing the fall of dominoes across the entirety of the Middle East. Instead, I believe a degradation-oriented approach is an acceptable strategy for the United States to pursue in certain countries where states are either failing or collapsed such as Nigeria, Somalia, and Yemen. I also agree other challenges, particularly those involving Russia and China’s hegemonic aspirations have the potential to undermine the United States’ superiority in the international system. Pivoting away from the armed conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and Syria, in particular, may not be a wise decision. Metaphorically speaking, these four countries, in my opinion, represent the dominoes in the Global War on Terror, and what I am suggesting is America should try to stand them back up, if possible.

Syria and Libya have fallen apart, and Afghanistan and Iraq are wobbling. My preference is for America to focus its efforts primarily on Afghanistan and Iraq, but I do not think the United States can disassociate itself from Libya and Syria altogether. I believe state-building is a very bloody and costly foreign policy agenda to pursue, and Washington does not know how to go about rebuilding failed states. Adhering to a state-building-oriented strategy would involve experiencing future setbacks. Yet, I do not foresee acts of political violence within these four countries and elsewhere (as evidenced by the recent occurrence of deadly attacks in the West) letting up if the United States decides to scale down, abandon, or hand-off its state-building efforts. Europe needs America’s help in Libya, and I do not view Russia’s strategy for Syria, Iran’s strategy for Iraq, or Pakistan’s strategy for Afghanistan as sustainable.

I hope my article, along with Bunker’s critique, prove helpful to America’s future military leaders, in terms of laying out the dangers facing the United States today and the strategic options available to them. In all honesty, I very hesitantly argue on behalf of a state-building-oriented strategy. Nevertheless, I see it as America’s best option. Non-state actors like ISIL seek to transform into states. Their respective interests run counter to America’s interests across the Middle East. They have also shown themselves to be lethal adversaries. I thus believe it is in America’s interest to stifle their rise and gradually eliminate them. “Degrading” is what we are (hopefully) trying to do in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and Syria now.

“Destroying” though entails America assisting in the rebuilding of fractured states or building of new states within these countries. Rest assured, such entities need not evolve into consolidated liberal democracies, but they should aspire to govern in an accountable and inclusive manner. Otherwise, this menace facing us will continue to snipe at our interests. In my article, I have laid out a blueprint for how to rebuild these four war-torn countries. In truth, I do not see a light at the end of this tunnel just yet, but I do feel it is best if America keeps pressing forward.
Despite its efforts, the United States does not know how to effectively rebuild failed states. America’s military has demonstrated they can “clear” a territory of enemy forces and “hold” it, but what the United States has sought to “build” in countries such as Afghanistan and Iraq is apparently not built to last. One of the major limitations of US counter-insurgency policy as it applies to the Global War on Terror lies with the seeming inability of Washington to convince local elites of certain host governments to govern in a more accountable fashion.\footnote{For an analysis of the origins, adoption, implementation, and limitations of the United States military’s counterinsurgency policy, see Fred Kaplan, \textit{The Insurgents: David Petraeus and the Plot to Change the American Way of War}, Reprint Edition (New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 2014).}

That said, the rise of ISIL and the resurgence of the Taliban may have initiated a change in the decision-making calculations of some Afghan, Iraqi, Libyan, and Syrian elites. Watershed events do not happen very often so the United States has to exercise prudent judgment in determining the extent to which America should involve itself in the domestic politics of these four countries. As I stated in my article, dealing with failed states is extremely difficult, for they require a lot of time and effort be devoted to them. Moreover, devoting resources to their betterment may not pay off for the United States in the long run. Still, in spite of these drawbacks, I conclude state-building holds the greatest promise in terms of resolving the intractable conflicts, and of lessening acts of political violence, within these four countries.
I approached the article, “Rethinking America’s Grand Strategy: Insights from the Cold War,” by Hal Brands in the Winter issue of Parameters with great interest. However, after having read it, I found the case for the value of such a retrospective search for lessons learned unconvincing.

The author’s account of lessons learned rests primarily on the propositions that the Cold War period and the early 21st century are similar enough in their basic characteristics as to suggest a similar “Grand Strategy”; and, that there is such a Grand Strategy that finds broad support within the foreign policy establishment. It is worth noting that “every analogy begins with a lie,” that the underlying facts can never be the same, so analogies are fundamentally flawed and should be viewed with some degree of skepticism. That is not to say analogies are without merit. Rather, it is meant to make the point that the less alike the two scenarios being compared, the heavier the dose of skepticism recommended.

One cannot help but cite some significant differences in the bipolar nature of the Cold War environment and that which exists today. The uncapping of many of the pressures the Cold War contained is among the major forces that have led to a new world order. The new order is characterized by the diffusion of power among multiple regional or, as Samuel Huntington has described, civilizational centers. This shift has had a profound effect on the strategic configuration of the planet. As a result, a basis for comparison of the field where geopolitics is played is questionable at best. This suggests an analogy of its own, and one that better captures the realities involved: the comparison of the two environments as being as different as a boxing match and a game of dodgeball.

In fairness to the author, there are certainly lessons to be gleaned from the Cold War period. However, does the unchallenged continuation of past practice constitute a Grand Strategy? And, does the grafting on of new tactics, also largely unchallenged, represent an affirmation of the Grand Strategy or evidence of ‘drift’ in the absence of a strategic rudder?

A fundamental shortcoming of the use of the Cold War experience as a standard to evaluate existing geopolitical strategy is that it places strategic analysis in the context of ‘what was’, not ‘what is’. Any adjustment to strategy must assess the country’s current strengths and
Commentary and Reply

weaknesses and the nature of the threats the new world order presents. This includes challenging assumptions that have been embedded in the policies inherited from the past.

In short, continuation of past policy, regardless of its historical success, is a poor substitute for the crafting of a Grand Strategy that reflects the realities of the present.

The Author Replies

Hal Brands

In his letter to the editor, William Gole offers a critique of my article, “Rethinking America’s Grand Strategy: Insights from the Cold War.” In response to his critique, I would simply like to make three brief points.

First, the core of Gole’s critique—that my argument is flawed because it assumes a fundamental continuity between the Cold War and the post-Cold War era—actually misconstrues the point of my article. Nowhere did I argue there was perfect continuity between the two eras; in fact, I acknowledged the differences between them. What I argued, rather, was the perceived lessons of the Cold War unavoidably loom large for policymakers, many of whom came of age during that conflict. Accordingly, it is important to really scrutinize the history and lessons of the Cold War, to ensure that whenever history is used in policy debates today—as it inevitably will be—is it used well rather than poorly.

Second, although I acknowledge there are crucial differences between past and present (as there always are), I reject the idea that the post-Cold War era is too dissimilar from the Cold War era—in terms of American statecraft—to learn useful lessons from that earlier period. As I pointed out, the United States today is having a fundamental debate about whether to remain globally engaged in the future. The Cold War represents the only period prior to the post-Cold War era in which the United States has pursued a globalist grand strategy, and so it seems quite plausible that interrogating this history can reveal useful insights about the nature, the impact, and the value of that global engagement.

Third, Gole apparently feels I draw the wrong historical lessons from the Cold War. But he never specifies the lessons or insights with which he disagrees. Does he disagree with the idea that the history of the Cold War shows that stability is not an organic condition of the international system, but must be provided by powerful and principled actors? Does he disagree that the history of the Cold War shows that selective and strategic democracy-promotion can benefit American statecraft? He never actually says which, if any, of these insights he deems incorrect. And that is too bad. I would welcome a debate about whether one should interpret the history of the Cold War differently than I do, but that would require drawing the lines of agreement and disagreement more distinctively than Gole’s letter does.
On “Making Sense of the ‘Long Wars’ – Advice to the US Army”

G. T. Burke, COL (USA Ret.)

This commentary is in response to Tami Davis Biddle’s special commentary “Making Sense of the ‘Long Wars’ – Advice to the US Army” published in the Spring 2016 issue of Parameters (vol. 46, no. 1).

Dr. Biddle is correct to recommend Army senior leaders should better educate themselves regarding communication with civilian decision-makers so as to improve results in future operations. While her special commentary inspired many positive thoughts, I also have several critical comments to pass along.

In paragraph 4, when Dr. Biddle recommends asking probing questions can we be so sure Army senior leaders did not ask—or at least considered asking? In such cases, it is useful for subordinates to consider the most likely, and the best-case or worst-case results when questioning political leadership. Responses could range widely—from approval to censure.

As noted by Dr. Biddle, General Petraeus’ communication skills yielded temporary, finite “means” versus “ways.” Army leadership should work more ways-means balances in its dealings with political leadership.

In the final few paragraphs, Dr. Biddle recommends a “more-is-better” strategy in leader development. While it is nearly impossible to win against a “more-is-better” argument, I will try:

- She is correct: there are areas in which we need a greater understanding of strategic leadership, and one’s education at the US Army War College is not the only time to focus on these areas. I suggest concurrent learning must become the norm and recommend more distance-education programs.
- The push for advanced degrees is fine, but I do not believe they are seen generally as a serious diversion from the “warrior path.” I suggest an examination of general-officer biographies will show all have at least a master’s degree and a significant, and acceptable, amount have had useful “unconventional” assignments.
- Mimicking an Air Force program to rotate captains into the Pentagon is a good idea, except we already have internship and broadening opportunity programs.
- Also, general-officer ranks should seek out mentoring to improve civil-military communication skills—again via modern online methods.

Thank you for the opportunity to comment on Dr. Biddle’s important and timely recommendations.
I am pleased to have an opportunity to respond to COL Burke’s comments and recommendations regarding “Making Sense of the ‘Long Wars’ – Advice to the US Army.” I appreciate both his kind words and his thoughtful reading of the essay.

With respect to COL Burke’s first question, pertaining to the Bush administration’s decision for regime change in Iraq in 2003, it is clear from the history of events there were serious gaps in planning for the post-combat phase of the endeavor. This was a result of several different types of problems. In some instances, important questions were not raised by Army senior leaders. (To consider asking such questions, but then to refrain from doing so is not an option when the stakes are high and lives are at risk.) In other instances, important questions were posed, but perhaps not with sufficient tenaciousness. And sometimes, efforts to raise important questions were simply batted away by administration officials who did not welcome them or wish to engage them. All of these problems reflected a troubled civil-military relationship—one that hampered strategic planning and undermined the effective use of military instruments to achieve political ends. When civil-military relations are sound (and I believe they must be sound for strategy to be successful), both sides will feel free to engage in an open and robust conversation about how to use appropriate ways and means to achieve desired ends.

When senior Army officers encounter pathologies in this all-important relationship, they must re-double their efforts to communicate effectively while staying within the norms of appropriate civil-military discourse. Sometimes this requires raising hard questions repeatedly and through as many appropriate channels as possible. If the questions officers want to ask are central to the successful implementation of what the civilians desire, and if those questions are central to a stable resolution of the problem at hand, then officers have an obligation not to self-censor; however, they must work through channels that are within bounds, and that will not further exacerbate an already troubled interaction. If tenacious and good faith efforts on the military side will not resolve the problem, then officers must be prepared to do the best they can in the circumstances they face—for this is the nature of a representative system that is (and must be) under civilian control. If civilians refuse to heed the professional military advice being offered to them and if things go awry as a result, then the serving administration will face sanctions at the ballot box.

Clearly the civil-military relationship is a two-way street, and civilians hold half of the responsibility for its health and soundness. Fortunately, it has been rare for civilian leaders to turn a blind eye or a deaf ear to their military partners. In the great majority of circumstances, the historical record indicates civilians will readily seek professional military advice and place a high priority on sound civil-military relations. We are fortunate in the United States that this is usually the case.
The civil-military relationship is a challenging and nuanced one that must receive careful thought and ongoing attention from both sides if it is to work as it should. If it is not healthy, then national strategy will not be either. Military officers who are approaching the highest levels of their profession must understand this relationship thoroughly and study it in detail. Happily, there is excellent literature to aid them in this process. As I said in my original essay, senior officers must pay particular attention to the skill set required to “craft clear-headed and sophisticated military advice,” and to “pose options that convey what is feasible with the resources available, and what is not.”

In his comments, COL Burke suggests the augmentation and broadening of officer education can take place principally through distance education. I would agree only up to a point. When distance learning is done well, it can be both effective and efficient—and quite rigorous as well. There is much important content that can be delivered to students in this format, including the study of detailed and well-structured case studies. Students working in this realm can surely hone their written communication skills if they are overseen by qualified and skilled instructors. I would contend many of the skills needed by those who are going to negotiate the upper reaches of the civil-military relationship are those that require development via face-to-face interaction with civilians—in academic settings, in non-DOD government agencies, and in programs with partner nations or international agencies. In these settings, officers can learn to understand and communicate with those who come from non-military backgrounds and cultures.

I contend being able to reach across this divide is more important now than it ever was. Very few civilian leaders in the United States have military experience; indeed, many have had no contact whatever with the military or its culture. They lack a detailed understanding of the challenges that are wholly unique to war and warfighting. These include not only physics, geography, weather, and the limits of the human body—but also the daunting challenges of logistics and communications. In addition, civilians often fail to comprehend the psychological challenges of operating in environments that are uniquely stressful and predisposed to every kind of friction. The only way officers will equip themselves to articulate these issues and convey these challenges (prior to finding themselves in a high-level inter-agency meeting or across from a row of senators) is if they practice these skills in settings where civilians are present.

While many senior officers do have master’s degrees, and while some have had unconventional assignments, I have encountered many officers who have paid a career price for taking opportunities to broaden their horizons and/or for following slightly atypical career paths. In my original essay I explained the reasons for the Army’s high emphasis on tactical and operational skill so I will not revisit it here. I will argue that the modern, 21st-century Army needs people with diverse, wide-ranging skills and bodies of knowledge. Promotion practices must adjust to this pressing reality. And, I would make a special plea for sending more officers into PhD programs—and doing so early in their careers. Such programs allow students to gain true mastery of knowledge that must be fully available to those serving in the military if they are to serve as genuine partners with civilian leaders. This high-level knowledge is
needed not only in technical/mathematical realms like computing and operations research, but also in realms like political science where scholars have, in recent years, done profoundly important work that is helping us to understand not only insurgency movements and terrorists, but also the internal dynamics that operate within civil wars. If the Army does not avail itself of this knowledge by sending its most capable young people out into the academy to acquire it, then it will not be serving the nation as well as it might.
It is rather rare to do a Parameters book review of a military-related work initially written in Polish—in this instance, the new work Shooting Up. In regard to this review, it has turned out to be an extremely fortuitous experience. The original manuscript published in 2014 by Łukasz Kamieński, a Polish academic, has been painstakingly translated into English by the author and two associates for publication by Oxford University Press, a prestigious publishing house.

At more than 400 pages in length, this in-depth chronological study of the subject of “psychopharmacology in warfare” is a unique document. Indeed, very few works so far have attempted to explore the historical impact of drug use in warfare and the co-evolution of the two over time. The book, influenced by an “interpretivist” epistemology, social constructivism, and the concept of war as “an essentially social and cultural phenomenon” (xxv-xxvi) is composed of a preface, an acknowledgments listing, 14 chapters, a conclusion, an epilogue, a notes section, a bibliography, and an index. The chapters are organized into three themes grouped into the premodern through the Second World War, the Cold War, and the contemporary periods. Chapter foci include the Napoleonic era, the Opium Wars, the American Civil War, the Colonial Wars, the First and Second World Wars, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, the Red Army in Afghanistan, our present conflicts with irregular combatants (including intoxicated child soldiers), and contemporary American armed forces. The work is extremely well researched and well referenced with the inclusion of an extensive bibliography.

Given US societal—and military (as a federal agency of that society)—perspectives on illicit (recreational) and licit (medically prescribed) narcotics use, this significant book—exploring the “taboo subject” of psychoactive compounds (xxiv)—can be analyzed on two levels. The first is the detrimental level of addictive substance abuse, including alcohol and harder illicit commodities such as heroin and cocaine, upon military organizations and the societies they represent. Second, is the beneficial level of licit (and at times illicit) alcohol and narcotics use—such as enhanced performance, as a psychological coping mechanism, and as a reward for troops—upon military organizations. Of course, a vast gray area exists between these levels of use, along with the fact a psychoactive compound may have both simultaneous positive and negative effects upon soldiers at the same time. There is an interplay between what may be beneficial for military operations and what would later be detrimental with regard to societal costs, stemming from high addiction levels of veterans returning home—and this is also an underlying theme of the work.
Personally, I found the Second World War section entitled “The Finns: A Special Case” (132-140)—drawing from the seminal work of Mikko Ylikangas—one of the most fascinating elements. It has helped to explain partially the much-higher performance of the greatly outnumbered Finnish commando units in their engagements with invading Soviet forces during the Second World War. As it turns out, Finnish troops had personal medical kits containing heroin, opium, and Pervitin (an early type of crystal meth) that chemically enhanced their stamina and other human performance factors over extended combat mission periods.

For contemporary military officers and strategists, Kamieński’s book provides a very informative historical overview of the use of narcotics in warfare from classical Greece into the early 21st century. Given the United States’ decades-long conflicts with irregular armies, often partially composed of child soldiers, the two chapters on them (12 and 13) should almost be considered mandatory reading—though much of the irregular armies information has been drawn directly from US Army War College professor Paul Rexton Kan’s scholarship. The work also provides a rare glimpse into how and when US military personnel may possibly utilize prescribed narcotics such as “go-pills” and “no-go pills” (263-282) for mission performance requirements. The book does not, however, yield any insights into potential near-peer (e.g. Russian) or peer (e.g. Chinese) competitor military use of such performance-enhancing narcotics and thus must be considered one of its few limitations.

In summation, this exceedingly informative work, especially when combined with Paul Rexton Kan’s seminal Drugs and Contemporary Warfare (Potomac, 2009), would provide an excellent textbook foundation from which to teach a military university course focusing on this still esoteric—yet increasingly important—component of modern military activities. It is easy-to-read, affordable, and a gem of a work produced by a little-known, yet brilliant, academic hailing from the esteemed Jagiellonian University in Kraków, Poland.

**DRONES**

The Drone Debate — A Primer on the US Use of Unmanned Aircraft Outside Conventional Battlefields

By Avery Plaw, Matthew S. Fricker, and Carlos R. Colon

Reviewed by Ulrike Esther Franke, Doctoral Candidate at the University of Oxford, Supervised by Sir Hew Strachan

The Drone Debate by Avery Plaw, Matthew S. Fricker, and Carlos R. Colon is a comprehensive book on the debate around the United States’ use of unmanned aircraft outside conventional battlefields. It is particularly suited for teaching as it provides the reader with a broad understanding of the issues surrounding the US drone campaigns.

The three authors work together at the University of Massachusetts Dartmouth; Fricker and Colon are co-founders of the University’s Center for the Study of Targeted Killing. In six chapters, plus an introduction
and conclusion, the authors address the major issues and questions with regard to US drone use outside official battlefields: legality, ethical questions, strategy, and politics, as well as emerging issues such as the proliferation of drones.

*The Drone Debate* is a very comprehensive book. It raises the right issues and quotes the right people—Sarah Kreps, Micah Zenko, Bradley Strawser, Peter W. Singer, and Audrey Cronin among others—and also includes lesser-known but important voices in the debate such as Farha Taj. The book presents and balances opposed views without taking sides; however, at a time when new drone books are flooding the market, a new book must be measured by whether it fills a gap in the literature. While *The Drone Debate* fills a gap in available teaching material, content-wise it does not.

As I have argued, the current debate on drones suffers from a disproportionate focus on a very specific, albeit by no means typical, use of drones: their use by the US armed forces and intelligence agencies for targeted killings outside official battlefields. As is correctly noted in *The Drone Debate*, of the nearly 11,000 drones in US possession, “only a small number (fewer than 450) are physically capable of carrying armaments in known configurations and among that group a much smaller number actually carry weapons and are operational at any given time. The vast majority of UAVs fielded by the United States are mini (or micro) drones such as the Raven and Wasp which make up 89 percent of the military’s drone inventory (9,765 drones in total)” (282, numbers from Samuel J. Brennan, Ethan Griffin, and Rhys McCormick, *Sustaining the US Lead in Unmanned Systems*, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2014). On the global scale, the numbers are even more skewed towards small, unarmed systems.

Hence, the debate on drones would greatly benefit from more work on non-US drone use, on military drone use for other purposes than targeted killings, on drone use in conventional wars rather than asymmetric ones, and on drone use in official war zones rather than outside of them. The authors of *The Drone Debate* focus on US drone use outside of official warzones. This does not make it a bad book, but somewhat less groundbreaking and original.

*The Drone Debate* is a good tool for teaching as it allows students to get a very comprehensive overview of the current state of the debate. I would recommend assigning this book to students taking a class on drone warfare for the first time, as well as to interested members of the general public. After all, the authors point out, “people cannot be said to consent to a policy of which they are ignorant.” (2) I also recommend combining the reading assignment with other publications that further highlight elements of drone usage such as the Center for a New American Security’s *Global Perspectives, A Drone Saturated Future* (2016); David Hambling’s *Swarm Troopers* (2015); and several papers out of Peter Bergen and Daniel Rothenberg’s *Drone Wars* (2015). This list is by no means comprehensive.

One of the book’s strengths is the discussion of different approaches to measure (civilian) casualties of drone strikes (28ff), which nicely depicts the difficulties researchers face when trying to gather data and to analyze them correctly. On this subject, the authors’ expertise
is particularly strong—Avery Plaw had previously published a highly recommendable paper on this question in Bradley Strawser’s *Killing by Remote Control* (2013). I particularly enjoyed the end of the book where the authors start engaging with the issues raised throughout the book and explain how drones have become “the poster child” for targeted killing (333).

All in all, while I would not consider *The Drone Debate* essential reading for those already familiar with the debate, it is useful teaching material and a good primer for the general public—as it was intended by the authors.

**MERCENARIES AND PRIVATE CONTRACTORS**

**The Modern Mercenary: Private Armies and What They Mean for World Order**  
By Sean McFate

Reviewed by COL Scott L. Efflandt, XO to Commanding General, FORSCOM

Global economic recession, failing states, and a rise in transnational organizations provide ample material for consumers and scholars to synthesize when considering the many changes to the character of war. For most, the ongoing wars in the Middle East have become a constant environmental condition, typically getting little more than a running banner update at the bottom of the news broadcast. With so much ongoing, it is easy to lose sight of the potential second-order effects that may indicate a tectonic shift in civilian-military relations.

Sean McFate breaks this pattern in *The Modern Mercenary* by expertly looking at recent/ongoing wars to explain the increased use of private military companies (PMCs, also referenced in literature as private security companies—PSCs). By outlining the influence of the above factors, he argues this trend will likely affect future wars and indicates an ongoing evolution of the world system. He explains the phenomenon of the contemporary mercenary in three areas. The first part of the book explains why “soldiers for hire” are used. Second, a detailed examination of recent wars scopes the breadth and depth of the current phenomenon. Lastly, the book theorizes as to how this recent and sharp increase in the use of mercenaries will affect who wages war in the future.

Chapters one through five explain the mechanics of modern mercenary activities in contrast to historical norms. By definition, a mercenary is a person who performs coercive military duties for pay without allegiance to a state or sovereign. McFate illustrates such a simple definition, while adequate for understanding the phenomenon from Machiavelli through Forsyth’s novel in 1974, is not sufficient to capture the multi-billion dollar industry that has emerged since 9-11. By building on the contemporary works of Singer and Avant, the author provides a more nuanced and complete understanding using the PMC as the central unit of analysis. These are further divided into two categories—mercenary companies (capable of independent campaigns) and military enterprises (train, advise, and equip armies for command by others). The distinction
proves useful in the author’s application of economic theory in a market economy to explain three factors: a) the conditions that have caused the industry to grow, b) why the industry is dominated by a US military paradigm, and c) why the need for PMCs will continue to grow.

Beyond validating the utility of the above construct, the middle two chapters provide a tour-de-force of the mercenary industry today—with a level of insight and detail unrivaled in any other research in this field. This material is clearly informed by McFate’s previous mercenary experience with DynCorp, which he acknowledges in the foreword. The purists among social scientists might cry foul at the unavoidable bias this induces. Alternately, one could counter this is the price of admission to get such clarity and detail, especially when dealing with such a guarded topic as this. The author’s experience aside, the robust use of references adds depth and credibility to the book. In keeping with the author’s quality of scholarship, even more detailed information on mercenary contracts and operations in Liberia is available in the three annexes.

In the closing five chapters, the aforementioned framework and contemporary operations are used to support the argument that the private military industry will perpetuate and, in turn, induce larger societal change because the world is entering the “neomedievalism” period. As such, states will continue to exist but they will play a less significant role in the global system as they increasingly compete with other global actors for political dominance. This fragmentation of global society will lead to the use of mercenaries for war by any actor who can afford it. The author concludes in the future the institutional military will more closely resemble the condottieri of pre-Westphalia (a return to the natural condition) than the national armies dominating modern times. The rationale for the conclusion relied on a European centric analysis of warfare over the last 800 years, without acknowledging the inherent distinct histories of other cultures over longer time frames. Put differently, could one analyze the Peloponnesian War and draw the same conclusion? While the conclusion falls short of being compelling, this is exactly how a good book—such as this one—should end. It leaves the reader with new questions.

In summary, for those who wish to understand the current state-of-play of commercial soldiers or contemporary civilian-military relations The Modern Mercenary is a must-read foundational text. The book is clearly written, well documented, and insightful and stands as a pillar in this field. Through the use of thought-provoking applications of contemporary theory the author lays the foundation for future research in important areas.
James Scott Wheeler’s fine new book is the latest in the Association of the US Army American Warriors series. The need for it is made clear by the first sentence of renowned author Rick Atkinson’s introduction, “No senior American general from World War II has been forgotten more quickly or with less justice than Jacob Loucks Devers.” While Dwight Eisenhower and his subordinate Army Group commanders Omar Bradley and Bernard Montgomery still receive voluminous coverage in history books, Devers and the Sixth Army Group are often ignored.

That is surprising, considering his significant list of accomplishments. After a lively childhood in York, Pennsylvania, Devers graduated from the United States Military Academy in 1909, ranking 39 out of 103. A field artilleryman, he filled a number of assignments at frontier posts until being assigned to help establish a field artillery school at Fort Sill to train the American army going to France for World War I. He was selected to command a field artillery regiment there, but the war ended too soon. After the war, he served a second tour of duty teaching mathematics at West Point, attended staff college at Fort Leavenworth, and then went back to teach at Fort Sill. He served with the office of the Chief of Artillery before going to the Army War College, and then commanded an artillery battalion before becoming the graduate manager of athletics at West Point in 1936.

Through connections with one of his former battalion commanders, Leslie J. McNair, during this time at West Point, Devers came to the attention of George Marshall, and his career skyrocketed. First, Devers was sent to Panama to help rejuvenate defenses there. Then he was brought back to Washington to serve as Marshall’s “fireman,” and soon Devers found himself in charge of Fort Bragg and the Ninth Infantry Division. Looking for a balanced officer not tainted by cavalry or infantry prejudices, Marshall and McNair picked Devers as leader of the new Armored Force in spring 1941. He made such an impression there when Lieutenant General (LTG) Frank Andrews, commander of the US Army European Theater of Operations, died in a plane crash in May 1943, Devers was quickly chosen as his replacement. I found the most revealing part of this book the coverage of Devers work building up to Overlord, especially his support of LTG Ira Eaker, who was trying to vindicate precision bombing doctrine while scrambling to build up the Eighth Air Force. Eaker seems another general who deserves better from history.

Devers and Eaker soon headed for the Mediterranean, where Devers became deputy theater commander and was deeply involved in operations there until he brought elements of his Sixth Army Group ashore in France in August for the Anvil-Dragoon assault. He led a
combined force of 12 American and 11 French divisions that drove north, cleared Alsace, eventually cleared the Colmar pocket, crossed the Rhine, and participated in the final campaigns that defeated Germany. Few American officers would have been able to handle the stubborn French as well as he did. He actually reached the Rhine in November 1944, and some historians view Ike’s refusal to allow the Sixth Army Group to jump the river then as one of the great lost opportunities of the war. After the surrender, he commanded the Army Ground Forces until heading off for an eventful retirement out of the limelight.

It is worth contemplating why someone with such a list of accomplishments has been so quickly relegated to the dustbin of history. Devers did not participate in the invasion of Normandy nor the Battle of the Bulge, the two most iconic American battles in northwest Europe. He was not a self-promoter, and later was accused of having “foot-in-mouth” disease with the press, though he was never involved in any scandals. He did not write a memoir. His relationships with his peers were respectful, but not close, and he never became part of Eisenhower’s inner circle. Wheeler believes the source of Ike’s reticence towards Devers started in North Africa, when George Marshall sent his chief of the Armored Force to check on early operations. Assaulted by many problems, Ike probably saw the senior Devers as a possible replacement, and from then on he viewed Devers more as a rival than a subordinate, though Devers never perceived that.

I once participated in a generalship panel at West Point with noted historians Stephen Ambrose, Martin Blumenson, and Brooks Kleber, and they argued the press usually creates great generals, while historians spend eternity trying to adjust those images. Scott Wheeler has done an admirable job countering a veritable press vacuum with a rich account worthy of being read by anyone interested in World War II. Devers might not have gotten much attention in his day, but he deserves it now.

An American Soldier in the Great War: The World War I Diary and Letters of Elmer O. Smith
Edited by John DellaGiustina

Reviewed by COL Douglas V. Mastriano, PhD, Department of Military Strategy, Plans and Operations, US Army War College

One hundred years ago, Europe was ablaze with fire and death. In February 1916, the German army launched a devastating attack towards the French city of Verdun. As the casualties mounted, and the Battle of Verdun dragged on, the French appealed to their British Allies to launch an attack along the northern portion of the Western Front to relieve the pressure. The British obliged and began the Somme Offensive on July 1, 1916. The attack had the desired effect, and reduced the pressure on the French at Verdun, though at a terrible price in lives and treasure for the United Kingdom. It would be another year before the United States entered the war. Yet, when it did, tens of thousands of young Americans rallied to the flag and volunteered to serve. Among these patriotic volunteers was Elmer O. Smith.

The story begins with Elmer’s early days in the Army. Sadly, the United States did little to prepare for the war, and rapidly expanded its prewar force of 220,000 to more than four million troops in only eighteen months. Although an impressive feat, the ability of these soldiers to fight “modern” war, was in doubt. This was not helped by General John Pershing’s intent to reject the wartime lessons learned by the French and British. Pershing instead believed American soldiers armed with rifles and bayonets would win the day. Such a view triggered the French Prime Minister, Georges Clemenceau, to retort, “If the Americans do not permit the French to teach them, then the Germans will do so.” Soldiers like Elmer Smith would pay the price for America’s lack of preparedness and for Pershing’s ill-advised ideas on how to fight in 1918.

Yet, like other soldiers in the American Expeditionary Forces, Elmer Smith trained hard and looked forward to fighting. Serving in the 32nd Division’s 119th Field Artillery Regiment, Smith participated in four major campaigns, and had more than 60 days in combat. He was wounded by German artillery, endured gas attacks, and, more importantly, provided support to four American divisions (the 79th, 3rd, 89th, and 32nd) during the heaviest fighting Americans encountered in the war.

Of Smith’s combat experience, his 37 days in the Meuse Argonne were perhaps the most significant. The Meuse Argonne Campaign remains America’s largest offensive ever, with more than 1.2 million soldiers serving in the line. It was part of four major attacks across the Western Front planned by the first Allied Supreme Commander (Generalissimo), Marshal Ferdinand Foch. This brilliant broad front attack contributed to bringing the war to an end on November 11, 1918. Smith served in all but the last week of this important campaign. His role was important in that he participated in the reduction of the “Kriemhilde Stellung,” the last German defensive line in the region. Once his division penetrated the Kriemhilde, the ability of the German army to blunt the American attack all but came to an end.

*An American Soldier in the Great War* is a timely book about one soldier who did his duty in the face of daunting odds. John DellaGiustina tells a story worth reading, especially during the centennial commemoration of World War I. Through it all, the enduring lessons of having a trained and ready army echo across the generations to us today. Indeed, men like Smith and countless others found themselves in a war their nation was not prepared for. Many paid the ultimate price for the lack of American preparedness. Hopefully, books like this one, will remind the nation of the need for eternal vigilance to maintain the peace and to secure final victory.
Connecticut Unscathed: Victory in the Great Narragansett War
By Jason W. Warren

Reviewed by Dr. Matthew S. Muehlbauer, author of Ways of War: American Military History from the Colonial Era to the Twenty-First Century and Adjunct Professor of Military History, Austin Peay State University

The conflict generally known as King Philip’s War ravaged southern New England in 1675-76, generating thousands of casualties and refugees. Death, flight, and the subsequent sale of Indian captives into slavery roughly halved the region’s native population. Among the victorious colonies, about a dozen towns in Massachusetts Bay, Plymouth, and Rhode Island were completely destroyed, with more partially damaged. But, as author Jason W. Warren observes, Connecticut remained relatively “unscathed” during the war. Focusing on this colony, he offers a new perspective on the conflict, as prior treatments emphasized those areas where intense hostilities occurred. In doing so, Warren challenges accepted notions about combat during the war, as well as its very name.

Warren first notes how Connecticut and local indigenous peoples had maintained amicable mutual relations since the Pequot War of 1637-38. When King Philip’s War began, Massachusetts Bay and Plymouth were surprised by the initial Indian attacks and reacted by incarcerating peaceful native groups within their jurisdictions. In contrast, Mohegans, Pequots, and other local peoples provided crucial intelligence to Connecticut authorities and helped protect the colony throughout the war. Moreover, cross-cultural cooperation fostered a unique tactical approach among its field forces.

Standard narratives of King Philip’s War describe militia forces as hapless in the face of native ambushes and raids. Late in the war, colonists began to work with Indian allies. Some commanders created mixed units of both settlers and Indian warriors who used native tactics: relying upon terrain and stealthy movement, and forgoing closed-order formations typical of European combat. One of these, led by Benjamin Church, hunted down and killed Philip himself, the Wampanoag leader traditionally blamed for launching the war. Warren challenges this interpretation, asserting it relies heavily on Benjamin Church’s memoirs and similar accounts. Among Connecticut’s forces, Warren claims a military “division of labor” existed between the soldiers and native warriors on campaign (13). Whereas the latter functioned as scouts and flankers, troopers provided firepower once targets had been located and fixed by the warriors. (In contrast to other colonies’ infantry, Warren notes most of Connecticut’s were mounted.) Similarly, colonists assaulted fortifications, whereas Indians would form an outer perimeter to prevent enemies from escaping.

A significant research challenge for the colonial period is Indian peoples left no records. English settlers occasionally noted native perspectives, though scholars then need to account for biases in their transcriptions. Warren shares some intriguing documents that speak to Indian views, such as the accounts of hostile warriors Menowalett and Cohas (74-77). These demonstrate the complex nature of Indian
identity: the tribal labels settlers used to designate various native groups (“Niantics,” etc.) did not necessarily reflect native affiliations, which were complicated by kinship networks. Warren notes this challenge made the colonists’ reliance upon trustworthy native allies all the more important, for they could better determine allegiances among New England’s disparate indigenous groups and colonists. He also employs archeological research and terrain analysis to bolster his argument.

The relative lack of Indian perspectives is significant for aspects of Warren’s argument. In particular, he asserts native allies helped to deflect enemy incursions into Connecticut and minimize the damage from those that occurred. Warren also devotes a chapter to fortifications, noting they also helped deter attacks upon the colony. But, without access to Indian points of view and deliberations, we cannot know the relative impact of these factors upon the native leaders who directed attacks against English settlements. Though not a means to solve the problem, more discussion of developments beyond Connecticut might have helped mitigate this issue, or at least provided more context for understanding available alternatives.

As for Warren’s claim the conflict should be known as the Great Narragansett War, other scholarship indicates Philip’s influence over events was limited, and the Narragansetts deserve more attention in the broader history of the region. The fact that the war was half over before the Narragansetts became active belligerents—and only did so after the New England colonies launched a pre-emptive attack against their homeland—should give one pause. Moreover, such a change would deflect attention from the experiences of the other indigenous peoples who fought and suffered during the conflict (similar to the current problem of calling it King Philip’s War)—including those who initiated hostilities.

These concerns, however, should not obscure the value of Warren’s work. Whereas many scholars highlight examples of cultural adaptability, and particularly how colonists adopted native combat techniques, Warren asserts—at least in 1675-76—Connecticut colonists still relied primarily on tactics predominant in Europe, with Mohegan and Pequot allies fulfilling functions for which they were better suited in New England’s wooded terrain. His book is an important contribution to the literature.

**WAR AND ETHICS**

**The Ethics of Armed Conflict: A Cosmopolitan Just War Theory**

By John W. Lango

Reviewed by Dr. Pauline M. Shanks Kaurin, author of *The Warrior, Military Ethics and Contemporary Warfare: Achilles Goes Asymmetric*, and Associate Professor and Chair, Department of Philosophy, Pacific Lutheran University

In *The Ethics of Armed Conflict: A Cosmopolitan Just War Theory*, John Lango brings a cosmopolitan, universal human rights orientation to the discussion of Just War Theory that is accessible to non-specialists.
His thesis is that Just War Theory should be understood deontologically and oriented around the following points: 1) a revisionist approach to just war, including all kinds of responsible agents; 2) a focus on the Security Council; 3) a preventative approach, including non-violent tools; 4) a temporalizing approach to present and future conflicts; 5) a coherentist approach, including just war and general moral principles and real-world cases; and 6) a universal human rights approach, including a variety of forms of armed conflict. (ix) There are multiple themes and moving parts in this ambitious book; it covers a great deal of philosophical ground with significant discussion of real-world conflicts, past and present.

As a scholar and teacher of the Just War Tradition and military ethics, I found several points worth highlighting. First, Lango raises the issue of which acts count as military actions as opposed to non-military actions—notably the question of whether threats of military force are types of military actions and count as war. The second is his focus on the Security Council and the locus for cosmopolitan arguments; Lango admits it is flawed, but it is the best we have at present. Third, he wants to expand the class of persons considered under Just War Theory to “all responsible persons,” not just the usual combatant/non-combatant distinctions. Finally, he considers the question of whether one can justify using military threats to prevent mass atrocities; this is a question of keen interest to those considering humanitarian interventions or peacekeeping operations.

While there is much that merits consideration in this book, and I commend the complexity of the issues and theoretical considerations Lango is wrestling with, this volume is still heavy on theory and would be challenging for non-specialists to find accessible and useful. I think that is the nature of these kinds of discussions, and it is a difficult needle to thread. Case studies certainly help in this regard, but there are too many theoretical balls in the air to hold onto the flow of the argument from beginning to end, much less to then reflect upon the implications of the arguments Lango is making for the practice and conduct of war.

In terms of specific arguments and claims, Lango’s use of philosophical action theory is really interesting and potentially useful; however, he needed to develop it in a more accessible and streamlined way so readers could see how it was integrated into the overall argument. Given the preventative arguments and the focus on the status of military threats in the overall discussion, the theory of action section was weak in laying the necessary foundation for those arguments.

I also found myself wondering how Lango thinks about individual responsibility, especially in the context of the conduct of war for responsible agents and for citizens in a cosmopolitan world. He seems more comfortable with arguments that address a more collective view of action and responsibility, presumably out of his concern to expand these arguments to “all responsible agents.” Are there different levels or kinds of accountability for some responsible agents (say those involved in military action) as opposed to others (like citizens, victims of atrocities)? How does the answer to these questions change the way we think about responsibility in war? He indicates he holds some “revisionist” views, and authors in that vein, like Jeff McMahan, are moving towards an individualist account and rejecting collectivist accounts of responsibility in war for combatants.
In short, this book will be most useful to those well versed in Anglo-American moral philosophy and contemporary Just War Theory, especially those interested in thinking about war in a more cosmopolitan way. Those who consider themselves in the realist camp, and/or are interested in strategy, will find much to be challenged by in terms of arguments and perspectives. The book does raise some important questions, and it will spark discussions in those areas amongst scholars who can advance the debate and then make the ideas more generally accessible than they are here.

**COUNTERINSURGENCY**

**The Soul of Armies: Counterinsurgency Doctrine and Military Culture in the US and UK**

*By Austin Long*

Reviewed by Colonel Ian C. Rice, Military Faculty, Defense Analysis Department, Naval Postgraduate School

How did it come to this? Austin Long asked, reflecting on the endless briefings in the over-staffed headquarters where he worked as a policy analyst in both Afghanistan and Iraq. In *The Soul of Armies*, Dr. Long, now a Columbia University political science professor, explores the question: how does an army’s organizational culture impact how it conducts counter-insurgency?

Long argues an army’s ability to execute a counter-insurgency campaign is rooted in formative experiences during the 19th century. These early experiences shaped organizational cultures that persist to this day, and some organizational cultures are better suited for counter-insurgency than others. Combining social science methods and archival evidence, Long develops two organizational archetypes—the continental army model where formative experiences and professionalization focus on fighting and winning major wars for national survival against strong state enemies and the maritime army model centered on frequent wars of choice designed to support imperial maintenance with smaller numbers of distributed forces.

The author looks at four cases: Vietnam and Kenya, and his first-hand experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq. Long compares the performances of the US Army representing the continental army model, with both the US Marine Corps and the British Army as examples of the maritime army model. His evidence demonstrates continental armies perform differently than their maritime counterparts with the former focused on large-scale operations and an overwhelming use of firepower to achieve results, while maritime armies (typically operating in small numbers) depend on their ability to find, select, and then work effectively with local partners, partners who will do much of the fighting.

Long’s investigation into organizational archetypes is in good company. In a 1964 study, *French Revolutionary Warfare from Indochina to Algeria: The Analysis of Political and Military Doctrine*, Peter Paret also noted these differences. He contrasted “pure soldiers” who were only useful in
Europe with French colonial troops who were expected to be self-reliant and manage their sectors with a special emphasis on “local conditions.” In a style accessible to both scholarly and professional military readerships, Long’s historical analysis is also a worthy companion to more recent works focused on the doctrinal origins of counter-insurgency, namely Douglas Porch’s *Counterinsurgency: Exposing the Myths of the New Way of War*, David French’s *The British Way of Counter-Insurgency, 1945-1967* and Brian McAllister Linn’s *Echo of Battle: The Army’s Way of War*. Notably, John Nagl’s *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons From Malaya and Vietnam* compares the American and British armies’ ability to learn from experiences, whereas Long stresses the longevity of the founding culture.

Currently, a tiny task force of predominately special operations “counter-insurgents” is training and advising indigenous forces to dislodge the Islamic State from Iraq and Syria. The results of the operation may produce more evidence to bolster Long’s argument. Will the multi-layered headquarters atop the small advise-and-assist force limit itself to supporting Iraq’s military, or will the strong organizational pull of Long’s continental archetype lead to an increase in ground forces and greater US and coalition involvement?

It is unlikely the importance of organizational culture will diminish anytime soon. Policymakers, military professionals, and scholars will all gain insights from this book. Long provides cause for introspection by those who variously formulate policy, conduct operations, and study this “new way of war.” However, there must be something missing in how the United States wages counter-insurgency campaigns. Although Long presents convincing evidence that organizational culture impacts the conduct of counter-insurgency operations, as he points out, the key for successful campaigns must rest beyond organizational culture alone. Perhaps the larger question is not just which, but whether these two land-force archetypes have ever successfully countered ongoing insurgencies in the first place.

**ISIS**

*Black Flags: The Rise of ISIS*

**By Joby Warrick**

Reviewed by Dr. W. Andrew Terrill, a recently retired research professor from the US Army War College

*Washington Post* reporter Joby Warrick’s study of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) is primarily a history of the emergence and expansion of the organization well before it began using the name ISIS. Approximately, the first two-thirds of the book deal with the activities of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the Jordanian street criminal turned terrorist, who became the leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), a predecessor of ISIS. As a violent street thug, Zarqawi was convinced by his mother to study Islam at a local mosque in the hope he could be straightened out. While he did respond to some Islamic ideas, he filtered these ideas through his own violent outlook and later became further radicalized in Afghanistan.
After returning to Jordan, the incipient jihadist leader was imprisoned by authorities in 1992 for terrorism-related activities. Then, in the harsh conditions of al-Jafr Prison, Zarqawi formed a partnership with a radical Islamist propagandist and spiritual leader, Abu Mohammed al-Maqdisi, eventually becoming the unquestioned leader of the radical Islamist prisoners. Later, Zarqawi was released from prison in 1999 through what Warrick characterizes as a Jordanian bureaucratic mistake concerning who was eligible for a sweeping royal pardon following King Abdullah’s assumption of the throne. Eventually the ex-inmate ended up back in Afghanistan as the leader of a small band of terrorists. While there, Zarqawi hoped to coordinate with Osama bin Laden, but the al-Qaeda leader did not have the time or interest to meet with him and assigned this duty to subordinates.

Zarqawi’s rise, from a small-time radical bin Laden could not be bothered with to an internationally known terrorist leader, occurred because of the Iraq war. In late 2001 or early 2002, Zarqawi saw a potential Iraq war as an opportunity to lead his small band of terrorists against the American troops he felt were certain to invade the country. He and his followers correspondingly infiltrated into an area of Kurdish Iraq outside of the control of Iraqi dictator, Saddam Hussein. There he attached himself to Ansar al-Islam, a group of al-Qaeda-affiliated Kurdish insurgents, who were waging war against the regime.

Warrick maintains this move led the Bush administration to give Zarqawi an inadvertent reputational boost by singling him out as a premier al-Qaeda operative during Secretary of State Colin Powell’s February 2003 United Nations speech, made to justify a possible US-led invasion of Iraq. In that speech, Powell strongly implied Zarqawi could not have been in Iraq unless Saddam was providing him with sanctuary. The administration made these assertions despite regular skirmishes between Zarqawi’s forces and the Iraqi army, as well as the terrorist leader’s decision to align with radical Kurds, who viewed Saddam’s policies towards their ethnic group as genocidal. Warrick further describes the CIA’s chief “Zarqawi expert” as mortified by the mistakes in Powell’s presentation. Unfortunately, the speech did have an important, if unforeseen, political impact by helping to make Zarqawi a terrorist celebrity, and thereby increasing his ability to raise money and attract recruits. Warrick also maintains President Bush considered striking the Zarqawi and Ansar al-Islam terrorist base, but stopped short of doing so because destroying Zarqawi’s headquarters and killing a number of terrorists would undermine a key rationale about the need for war.

After the invasion of Iraq, Zarqawi rapidly expanded his suddenly thriving organization, benefiting from Sunni anger over the disbanding of the Iraqi army and the US-sponsored program of de-Ba’athification. Surprisingly, for a semi-educated criminal turned jihadist, Zarqawi emerged as a remarkably insightful and agile strategist. By contrast, the US administration characterized the Iraqi resistance as Ba’athist “dead-enders” who were simply striking out blindly. Armed with such a narrative, many US officials failed to recognize patterns in Zarqawi’s attacks which indicated his strategy for undermining the occupation.

Warrick maintains Zarqawi bombed the Jordanian embassy in Baghdad not simply for revenge against the monarchy, but also to discourage other nations from establishing diplomatic relations with Iraq.
Likewise, the murder of the head of the UN Mission to Iraq, Sergio Vieira de Mello, and a number of other UN personnel in a truck bombing was meant to convey the message NGOs might want to find work elsewhere. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Zarqawi attacked Iraq’s Shi’ites in an effort to poison sectarian relations, incite civil war, and make Iraq ungovernable. Warrick maintains back in the United States, Vice President Cheney and his aides were putting pressure on the CIA to link Zarqawi to Saddam, rather than unraveling the terrorist leader’s strategy for undermining the occupation. Conversely, bin Laden was taking notice of the former nobody from the Jordanian slums and the two eventually negotiated an agreement, whereby Zarqawi became al-Qaeda’s emir (prince and leader) in Iraq.

Warrick characterizes Zarqawi’s orders for the bombing of three Western hotels in Amman, Jordan as a major mistake that unified most of the country against him, despite some previous public sympathy for any organizations resisting US forces in Iraq. While the terrorist leader claimed he was striking at Israeli and American intelligence operatives, the deaths of large numbers of Jordanian civilians, including children, rapidly undermined these claims. The strike also enabled Jordan’s King Abdullah to intensify his struggle against al-Qaeda in Iraq and to improve his already good intelligence cooperation with the United States.

These bonds, which extended to intelligence operations in Iraq, were to be of tremendous help in hunting down the renegade Jordanian. Eventually, in response to a great deal of effort by a number of intelligence officials, Zarqawi was found and then killed in a US airstrike in June 2006. This loss caused his organization to enter a rapid downward spiral due to the lack of any equally charismatic leader. Warrick also maintains “fusion cells” composed of US Special Forces and intelligence units played a major role in defeating the organization, as did the formation of anti-al-Qaeda Sunni militias as a central part of the US-sponsored anti-jihadi Awakening Councils.

The Syrian revolution helped revive AQI after the post-Zarqawi leadership sponsored a jihadi force known as the al-Nusra Front to oppose the brutal and unpopular Bashar Assad government. AQI, which had undergone a number of name changes during its years of operation, became ISIS during this time frame and eventually sent a number of its own directly affiliated fighters into Syria where they sought to seize territory and re-absorb al-Nusra. The al-Nusra leaders had maintained only limited ties to ISIS during the Syrian fighting and did not wish to be integrated directly into that organization. The disagreement between the two groups then expanded to include al-Qaeda’s formal leaders in Pakistan. When al-Qaeda leader Ayman al Zawahiri attempted to force ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi to allow al-Nusra to exist independently, he was simply ignored, and ISIS seized considerable territory from al-Nusra with significant numbers of casualties on both sides.

This conflict led to ISIS being expelled from al-Qaeda, an event which had no impact on the organization’s soaring fortunes, as it came to dominate the Syrian opposition. The ISIS leadership also cleverly moved to establish improved relations with many of Iraq’s Sunni tribes which Zarqawi had previously alienated. Seething with resentment of the Shi’ite-led government in Baghdad, many tribal leaders were convinced ISIS would not repeat AQI’s brutal mistakes in alienating the
Sunni tribes. This judgment proved to be mistaken tragically when ISIS imposed an administration of harsh, and often arbitrary, brutality on northern Iraq following its successful military offensive in June 2014.

In evaluating ISIS occupation of Syrian and Iraqi territory, Warrick quotes a young Syrian man who describes “a culture of backwardness and terror, [which emerges] after extinguishing the light of the mind.” Warrick also quotes a teenage gunman who views his role as an ISIS fighter as “quite fun” and compares his experience to a 3D video game. Warrick continuously notes Islam under ISIS is anything its leadership says it is, and ISIS ideology and the religion of Islam are two radically different things. While such observations are useful, the ISIS ideology remains a long way from the oblivion it richly deserves, and the group itself continues to show resilience and flexibility, as well as an ability to absorb tough military punishment and still strike hard at the civilized world. One suspects many more high-quality books on ISIS, such as this one, will need to be written in the future as this ugly chapter in human history continues to play out.

Social Science Goes to War: The Human Terrain System in Iraq and Afghanistan
By Montgomery McFate and Janice H. Laurence, Eds.
Reviewed by Ryan D. Wadle, Professor of Comparative Military Studies at the Air Command and Staff College

When the Human Terrain System (HTS) appeared at the height of Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom in 2007, it represented an admission on the part of the defense establishment—it lacked enough knowledge of local conditions to wage a population-centric counterinsurgency campaign effectively. The HTS sought to embed individual Human Terrain Teams (HTTs) at the brigade level in order to provide an operationally useful understanding of local culture and conditions and to bridge knowledge gaps as military units rotated in and out of theater. The HTS attracted media attention because it presented a novel solution to a difficult problem and also through issues surrounding the proper execution of its ambitious vision. It continues to spark discussion in defense and academic circles, even as the American contingents in Iraq and Afghanistan are but a fraction of their former size and as the public shows reluctance to support any further long-term counterinsurgency campaigns. As one of the first academic studies of the HTS, the edited volume Social Science Goes to War succeeds at its stated goal of illuminating how the HTTs performed in theater and meaningfully contributed to the war effort.

Social Science Goes to War includes 11 chapters: three describe the conduct of research by the HTTs, another three detail how the HTTs sought to integrate their research into the military decision-making process in a meaningful way, and two discuss the historical and contemporary ethics issues raised by the employment of the HTS. The
remaining chapters overview the HTS’ establishment, explore the gulf between the military and academic communities, and frankly assess the HTS’ past and future utility to the Department of Defense. Unlike some edited volumes where the quality of the individual chapters varies widely, the contributions to *Social Science Goes to War* are uniformly strong and valuable in providing unique insights into various aspects of the HTS.

A few common themes emerge across the volume. Most notably, there is a defensive tone to nearly every chapter, likely because the contributors—nearly all of whom worked with the HTS in some capacity—felt compelled to counteract negative, and often unfair, perceptions of the program. These views of the HTS stemmed from the outsized negative media coverage of its failings, including disciplinary issues of personnel and the deaths of four HTT members. The HTS also received widespread vitriolic condemnation by members of the American Anthropological Association (AAA) against any cooperation between members of its profession and the military. Carolyn Fluehr-Lobban and George R. Lucas Jr. link the latter’s criticism to anthropology’s historical association with colonialism and unsavory projects such as the Vietnam War’s infamous Operation Phoenix.

Yet, for all of the concerns raised by the AAA, the researchers sought to follow the ethical guidelines issued by the AAA, the American Political Science Association, and other peer bodies. The researchers protected the anonymity of their interview subjects in accordance with the principle of “do no harm,” and out of fear of generating lists of suspected insurgents for host units to act upon. The military units they operated with concurred in this decision because, as James Dorough-Lewis Jr. highlights, identifying key individuals remained the responsibility of military intelligence. In fact, the most notable shortcomings from an academic perspective were more procedural than ethical as security concerns and time constraints often prevented HTTs from conducting the follow-up research necessary to meet academic standards. Rather, the researchers recognized they needed to provide timely “snapshots” of local conditions to be of use to their host units.

While highlighting the contributions social science research made in the field, the authors all concede the HTS had several shortcomings and limitations. The HTS never fully accomplished its stated goal of easing the transition between old units rotating home and new units taking their places—largely because new units often sought to gain their own perspective on the battlespace rather than rely on their predecessors perspectives. As an experimental program, the HTS was administered through a contract that limited direct oversight by military officials and led to numerous poor personnel decisions in both hiring and management, creating unnecessary friction. Despite these and other problems, however, Janice H. Laurence points out numerous independent evaluations of the HTS concluded it had ultimately proven effective at providing the desired knowledge to host units and reducing their reliance on lethal operations to succeed.

*Social Science Goes to War* is an excellent volume about an often-misunderstood element of the American experience in Iraq and Afghanistan. One hopes this thoughtfulness will lead to more reasoned debates on the relationship between the military and academic communities and a search for possible common ground between them.
Contributor's Guidelines

Article Submissions

The editor welcomes unsolicited works that adhere to the following criteria:

**Content Requirements**

**Scope:** The manuscript addresses strategic issues regarding US defense policy or the theory and practice of land warfare. Visit our website (www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/) to gain a better understanding of our current editorial scope.

**Audience:** US Army War College graduates and other senior military officers as well as members of government and academia concerned with national security affairs.

**Clearance:** If you are a member of the US military or a civilian employee of the Department of Defense or one of its service departments, your manuscript may require official clearance (see AR 360-1, ch. 6). Contact your local Public Affairs Office for assistance.

**Concurrent Submissions:** The manuscript is not under consideration with other publishers and has not been published elsewhere, including on the Internet.

**Formatting Requirements**

**Length:** 5,000 words or less.

**File Type and Layout:** MS Word Document (.doc) or Rich Text Format (.rtf) file; Times New Roman, 12-point font; double-spaced; 1-inch margins.

**Visual Aids:** Only include charts, graphs, and photographs when they are essential to clarify or amplify the text. Images must be grayscale, a minimum of 640 x 480 pixels, and submitted in their original file format (.tiff or .jpg). It is not sufficient to submit images embedded in a .doc or .rtf file.

**Citations:** Document sources as footnotes. Indicate all quoted material by quotation marks or indentation. Reduce the number of footnotes to the minimum consistent with honest acknowledgement of indebtedness, consolidating notes where possible. Lengthy explanatory footnotes are discouraged and will be edited. The Quarterly generally uses the conventions prescribed in the Chicago Manual of Style.

**Submission Requirements**

**Submit to:** usarmy.carlisle.awc.mbx.parameters@mail.mil

**Include:**

- Each author’s full name, mailing address, phone number, e-mail address, and curriculum vitae or biographical sketch. When there are multiple authors, please identify the primary point of contact.
- All original files (.doc or .rtf, and any .tiff or .jpg files, if applicable) as attachments.
- An abstract.

**Lead Times:** If you would like your manuscript considered for a specific issue, submit it by the following dates:

- 1 December – Spring
- 1 March – Summer
- 1 June – Autumn
- 1 September – Winter

*Note: Lead times only ensure the editor will consider a manuscript for publication in a specific issue; however, the editor reserves the right to recommend a manuscript for publication in any upcoming issue to meet space or topic requirements.*

**Review Process:** Upon receipt, we will send you a confirmation e-mail. The review process can take four to six weeks from date of receipt.
Book Review Submissions

Parameters publishes reviews of books on history, political science, military strategy, grand strategy, and defense studies. The editor welcomes inquiries for potential book reviews.

Send inquiries about a book or requests to review a copy for a specific title to usarmy.carlisle.awc.mbx.parameters@mail.mil. In the e-mail, please provide:

- The book's title and the name of the author(s) or editor(s).
- Your qualifications, full name, e-mail address, phone number, and mailing address.
US Army War College Quarterly

Parameters
47 Ashburn Drive | Carlisle PA 17013-5010
717-245-4943
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters
e-mail: usarmy.carlisle.awc.mbx.parameters@mail.mil

The US Army War College Quarterly, Parameters, is a refereed forum for contemporary strategy and landpower issues. It furthers the education and professional development of senior military officers, and members of government and academia concerned with national security affairs. Parameters is indexed in, inter alia, Air University Library Index to Military Periodicals, US Government Periodicals Index, LexisNexis Government Periodicals Index, Worldwide Political Science Abstracts, Lancaster Index to Define & International Security Literature (UK), and PAIS Bulletin. Book reviews are indexed in Gale Group’s Book Review Index. Parameters is also available through ProQuest and UMI.

Periodicals postage is paid at Carlisle, Pennsylvania, and additional entry offices. ISSN 0031-1723 | USPS 413530 | Library of Congress Catalog Card No. 70-612062.

Subscriptions: US Army War College graduates who are actively employed by the government as well as select organizations may receive a gratis subscription. For eligibility requirements, visit the website listed above.

Non-graduates, retired graduates, and the general public may subscribe through the Government Printing Office.

Address Changes: Submit address changes for unpaid subscriptions to the Parameters office by e-mail or phone.

For paid subscriptions, submit address changes to the GPO (bookstore.gpo.gov).

Reprint Requests: For permission to reprint articles, contact the Parameters editorial office by phone or e-mail. Be prepared to provide the article’s title, author’s name, publication date, intended use, quantity, and means of distribution.

Commentaries and Replies: We invite reader commentaries on articles appearing in Parameters. Not all commentaries can be published. For those that are, the author of the article will be invited to provide a reply. For additional information, visit the website listed above.

The US Army War College

The US Army War College educates and develops leaders for service at the strategic level while advancing knowledge in the global application of landpower.

The purpose of the US Army War College at this time in our nation’s history is to produce graduates who are skilled critical thinkers and complex problem solvers in the global application of landpower. Concurrently, it is our duty to the Army to also act as a “think factory” for commanders and civilian leaders at the strategic level worldwide and routinely engage in discourse and debate on ground forces’ role in achieving national security objectives.

The Strategic Studies Institute publishes national security and strategic research and analysis to influence policy debate and bridge the gap between military and academia.

The Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute provides subject matter expertise, technical review, and writing expertise to agencies that develop stability operations concepts and doctrines.

The School of Strategic Landpower develops strategic leaders by providing a strong foundation of wisdom grounded in mastery of the profession of arms, and by serving as a crucible for educating future leaders in the analysis, evaluation, and refinement of professional expertise in war, strategy, operations, national security, resource management, and responsible command.

The Center for Strategic Leadership develops senior leaders and supports the strategic needs of the Army by educating senior military and civilian leaders on landpower at the operational and strategic levels, developing expert knowledge and solutions for the operating and generating force, and conducting research activities, strategic exercises, and strategic communication.

The US Army Heritage and Education Center acquires, conserves, and exhibits historical materials for use to support the US Army, educate an international audience, and honor soldiers—past and present.