This work is about the infantry, in close combat, the unique burden it has and will continue to bear for our nation, why we are neglecting it, and the cost of this neglect. A compelling narrative packed with piercing insights, *Scales on War: The Future of America’s Military at Risk* is a well-earned tribute to the military personnel who shoulder the weight of victory or defeat on the battlefield and a cogent and persistent argument that future conflict will demand more than ever before in our history from small combat units. Written principally for US policymakers but immensely useful for the wider defense community, *Scales on War* reminds readers those who do most of the dying overseas—the infantry—often also, and ironically, suffer at home from resource neglect and thin advocacy. With urgency, Major General (Ret.) Bob Scales implores national leaders not to be lured by high-tech, clean, quick, and bloodless thinking about victory that distorts the true character and nature of war. Although his book is thinly sourced, he effectively uses his lifetime of combat, senior military leader, and national security experience to make his case.

Galloping through the past 100 years of US military history, Scales adeptly describes the cyclical buildup and breaking of the Army before and after each major war or conflict. As a result of this cycle, the US Army, and especially the infantry, suffered from what he calls “amateurism,” at least until the beginning of the all-volunteer force in the early 1970s. This amateurism has, in part, resulted in higher and needless casualties on the battlefield by those most likely to face close combat and has, again in part, accelerated the pursuit of quick and bloodless victory using high-tech standoff weaponry. To be sure, Scales does not eschew technology in warfare. On the contrary, he embraces the need to leverage technology to ensure dominant small-unit lethality and to better protect the soldier. He asserts, however, that current policymakers and the entrenched defense industrial base continue to steer warfare to a place it will not naturally go—to a clean, quick, strategic victory via technology.

Indeed, Scales spends a considerable amount of time describing current and future threats as those nearly immune from US technological advantages and willing to trade space and lives for time. Using the oft-cited “asymmetric” playbook, future threats do not have to win but merely not lose, run out the clock, and wait for the inevitable US domestic aversion to increased casualties, resulting in gradual withdrawal from the effort. His point here is to leverage resources and technology at the small-unit level to improve lethality, reduce friendly casualties, and achieve victory where the enemy lives and exerts its political power. Simultaneously, Scales sternly rebukes those that claim big-ticket warships and fifth generation jet fighters will claim the inheritance of future victory. To achieve future victory, he calls for an unprecedented investment in human capital, especially in the infantry. The United States
must carefully select, train, and educate these warriors to be more like special operations forces, including using social science as an amplifier. Deep and persistent cultural training and education will greatly improve small-unit effectiveness in complex environments with an enemy sometimes hidden in plain sight.

Lamenting the fact that soldiers and marines are still using nearly obsolete and unreliable small arms, among other paraphernalia, Scales also calls for a diversion of resource investment towards systems that improve small-unit lethality and survivability, such as new semiautomatic rifles, better ammunition of a caliber with more impact, lighter and more-effective body armor, soldier-view cameras, and handheld devices that replace secure radios and track not only the soldier’s location but also his vital signs. Along with the gear, the US Army must also raise its training and retention standards, accepting only personnel mature enough to handle warfare in complex environments.

Furthermore, leader judgment and small-unit resilience are critical. At more senior officer levels, the US Army must identify and groom future strategic thinkers early with rigorous professional military and civilian education. Admittedly, the author recognizes the cost and time required to achieve these standards. He does not offer any easy solutions. Despite his pleas, the author concludes with an ominous forecast: without these needed reforms at the small combat unit level, the US Army will break again within three years.

Overall, Scales on War reminds us victory in modern war may be tough and elusive, but it still resides where sovereignty and political power actually live: on the ground, up close. Although the narrative occasionally makes hard gear-shifts and is redundant in a few instances, the book delivers persuasive arguments for US policymakers and senior military leaders to consider. Interestingly, there is a hint of “fighting the last war” in this book. What if the next enemy is a high-end peer willing to fight symmetrically? In this case, while the book’s prescriptions may still be sound, its critique of our current defense investment may lose some punch. The author, nevertheless, makes a strong case for investing in the aspect of our military perhaps most likely to achieve lasting military and political outcomes—lethal, resilient, mature, and survivable small ground combat units.

Cyberspace in Peace and War
By Martin C. Libicki

Reviewed by Aaron F. Brantly, Assistant Professor, Cyber and International Relations, United States Military Academy

Cyberspace in Peace and War by Martin Libicki is arguably the most ambitious and thorough individual analysis of cyberspace challenges written to date. Libicki places his deliberate and robust analysis into a readable yet exhaustive work. He advances dozens of arguments from the basics of cyberconflict to deterrence, coercion, and strategic and asymmetric conflict—and nearly everything in between. The true value of this volume resides both within its immense breadth, which exposes
readers to the nuances of debates that have been forming within the cyberconflict studies community, and within its depth on each topic. The book should gain immediate prominence within the cyberconflict literature canon and should be included in required readings of serious graduate-level courses on cyberspace conflict.

What separates Libicki’s analysis from the field at large is his willingness to understand deeply the technical, tactical, operational, and strategic implications of a range of decisions. He is not a Pollyanna for cyberspace, making prognostications about the impending doom or the lack thereof in cyberspace, rather he charts a reasoned middle ground that will challenge both pessimists and optimists. His central argument resides in the realization that cyberspace is a complex domain that engages a variety of core attributes across civilian and military government as well as the public, social, and economic sectors. Any attempt to set policy or strategy in this domain requires coming to terms with the domain’s nuance and complexity.

In coming to terms with nuance and complexity, Libicki builds on his previous works on cyberdeterrence, cyberdefense, and cyberconflict in cyberspace which provided more detail on individual topics but did not encompass the full breadth necessary to understand the relationship between the different aspects of peace and conflict in cyberspace. *Cyberspace in Peace and War* remedies the lack of breadth by walking readers through nearly every debate in the field. The downside of this treatment is some of the latter chapters, in particular, lose the depth necessary to fully develop complex arguments. In the scope of a work connecting such a robust variety of concepts, this lack of depth is not a major weakness, but rather the starting point for academic and policy arguments.

Any chapter could constitute a stand-alone book, yet by consolidating arguments and linking chapters together Libicki provides a nearly linear path for readers to follow. The section on the foundations of cyberspace should be required reading for all senior leaders entering the field. The chapters in this section provide a concise, easily understood foundation for nontechnical individuals. Subsequent sections on policies, operations, strategies, and norms provide ample evidence for arguments on topics such as: how deterrence does or rather does not work, how coercion in cyberspace is lacking, and why a nuclear analogy to cyberspace is inaccurate. Senior leaders who read the entire book will understand very well how one of the most-respected scholars in the field rightly or wrongly interprets the challenges addressed—not come away from the arguments presented having a fixed position. Senior leaders who read the book as a debate rather than a fait accompli will be able to apply the arguments and robust sourcing to their work in the operational and policy worlds.

The greatest benefit of *Cyberspace in Peace and War* is that it removes the rose-colored glasses that cyberspace is the final domain of conflict, one which will solve or create problems independent of other domains. Rather conflict in cyberspace, just as conflict in any domain, is part of a larger whole, a whole that if approached studiously can yield a range of benefits. Libicki does not gloss over the challenges presented by conflict in cyberspace, instead he addresses each challenge in a reasoned manner that continues to place him—and his work—at the forefront of the field.
Rajan Menon, who has published extensively on many related topics, provides a realistic approach to the reasons nation-states become involved in humanitarian interventions with military campaigns focused on ending mass atrocities. Mass atrocities may be spurred by a variety of reasons to include ethnic conflict or cleansing, wars of succession or revolutions, and genocide or race hatred. Menon proposes that states primarily become involved in these warlike humanitarian interventions if it is in the state’s national interests. Others, using a more liberalist approach, have articulated that many campaigns were focused on ensuring universal human rights across the globe, which have expanded with the ending of the Cold War and the need for a “Responsibility to Protect (R2P).” There are real tensions between these two approaches with the author exploring these tensions in multiple ways by clearly examining the “why” behind many armed humanitarian interventions of the last four decades. The book’s smooth introduction, followed by eight succinct chapters with appropriate titles, and almost 50 pages of expansive source notes provide well-supported insights.

The book’s first chapter, “The Animating Ideal,” examines tensions between a realist and liberalist approach by exploring the intellectual foundation of humanitarian intervention. Menon discusses the boundaries of sympathy towards the oppressed and duty to help others, as well as how universal human rights and an enlightenment mind-set have gained traction. This mind-set has the potential to cloud the judgment of interventionists, who may not consider challenges or counterarguments to their approach. The second chapter, “Altruism’s Limits,” focuses on challenges and limits to this approach by a reticent public that does not want to spend their nation’s blood and treasure in warlike humanitarian intervention operations. Menon provides many examples of deaths related to a state’s inability to provide foreign aid to address poverty in certain areas and, most importantly, to not addressing or minimizing the response to mass atrocities in Rwanda, Darfur, and Syria.

From this impressive examination of the tensions between these two approaches, Menon grounds readers in a more academic perspective, providing historical examples of issues impacting humanitarian intervention in the third chapter, “Sovereignty, Legitimacy, and Intervention,” followed by “The Legal Debate,” which highlights states’ rights versus human rights, unilateral intervention by states or regional organizations such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the challenges with aligning law and morality. He shows how states have used these concepts to justify to the global community their reasons for engaging in, or conversely, for blocking the involvement of other states in interventions. Examples from both chapters support the author’s insights and include Pakistan and Bengali, Vietnam and Cambodia, Tanzania and Uganda, NATO and Kosovo, and the United States in
Panama and Grenada. Menon concludes with the thought that “power and interest, not law, will prove decisive” when states decide to become involved in humanitarian interventions.

The approaches and tensions on when to intervene are covered in the fifth chapter, “Human Rights and Intervention,” which begins with historical examples from the 1800s. Menon seamlessly transitions to the complicated journey of the United Nation’s (UN’s) R2P debate and the 2005 World Summit to gain a global consensus on humanitarian intervention. Comments from the leaders of many of the nations at the summit illustrate the extent of global divisions as the original R2P proposal was diluted to provide more vague UN guidance for engaging in humanitarian interventions.

The sixth chapter, “The Primacy of Pragmatism,” clearly cements the author’s realistic approach to humanitarian intervention. He states: “When friendly states commit atrocities, the great powers are wont to look away, offer political cover, or even provide materiel assistance.” Examples he provides to support this pragmatic approach include: the West’s support for three decades of the brutal Indonesian dictator Suharto following his take over in a 1965 coup, the United States overlooking Turkey’s war against the Kurds in the 1980s and 1990s, the United States and European nations ignoring Bahrain’s oppression to quash a 2011 popular uprising with Saudi Arabia and other Gulf Cooperation Council states’ assistance, and the way different states have approached the ongoing Syrian conflict. The lack of humanitarian considerations in these and other examples was compared with the UN Resolution and R2P-worthy actions in 2011 by NATO and Arab states; both parties wanted to oust Gadhafi due to his internal Libyan violence.

The book’s seventh chapter, “War and Post War,” smoothly provides a needed historical perspective to a leader’s overconfidence in quickly achieving their objectives when becoming involved with wars and humanitarian campaigns. Many humanitarian campaigns can create even more dire conditions within a region, especially when a dictator is removed. Examples include: the killing and turmoil associated with the former Yugoslavia region and NATO’s Kosovo and Bosnia campaigns, and NATO’s and the Arab nation’s risk aversion strategy in ousting Gadhafi and the anarchy and international rivalries that spilled over in neighboring states. The final chapter, “The International Community,” examines the influence, or better said the lack of effective influence, of global organizations. Starting with an international relations philosophy for how the global community has become more connective, Menon examines international organizations such as the UN High Commission for Refugees, the International Criminal Court, the World Food Program, and the International Court of Justice. He provides examples of how these organizations desire to address humanitarian challenges, but lack the power, resources, and needed support of key nations.

The author’s conclusion succinctly describes how his realistic perspective differs from humanitarian interventionists anchored by normative values, and why his approach is important. He provides final reasons “that I speak of the conceit of human intervention.” The Conceit of Humanitarian Intervention is well worth the read whether you agree or disagree with the author’s perspective, for it provides multiple perspectives from theory and practice on past and ongoing humanitarian
interventions. Perhaps, for future complex and uncertain humanitarian interventions, leaders may want to integrate relevant principles from both realist and liberalist approaches when making decisions if, when, and how to intervene.

**WAR & LEGALITY**

Waging War: The Clash between Presidents and Congress, 1776 to ISIS
By David J. Barron

Reviewed by John C. Binkley, Professor of History and Government, University of Maryland University College

On April 6, 2017, President Donald Trump authorized a cruise missile attack on a Syrian airfield in response to the use of poison gas by Bashar al-Assad’s regime. The administration based the legality of the missile attack upon the president’s power as commander-in-chief. While many in Congress welcomed the attack, there was considerable concern over the lack of congressional approval for the action. As any student of American civics understands, the Constitution contains numerous points of contention as institutional checks and balances come into play. While the Constitution clearly gives Congress the authority to declare war, its management of military operations sets the power of Congress against the authority of the president as the commander-in-chief. Two fundamental questions are raised regarding actions such as Trump’s: can Congress interfere in the military’s operational decisions once war has been declared, and to what extent can the president order the military into harm’s way absent a declaration of war? These are the questions David Barron attempts to answer in *Waging War*.

The answers to these questions tend to fall into two contradictory categories. For analysts who believe in the unitary executive, such as a John Yoo, a law professor at the University of California, Berkeley and author of *Crisis and Command: A History of Executive Power from George Washington to George W. Bush* (2009), the power of the executive as the commander-in-chief is effectively almost unlimited, checked only by the budgetary and impeachment authorities of Congress. Even in the absence of a congressional declaration of war, the commander-in-chief has unfettered authority to use military force to sustain America’s interests. Once Congress has declared war, it abdicates operational authority to the president.

Barron, a federal judge on the US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, rejects the unitary executive vision of almost unchecked presidential power. Instead, he argues presidents have been very cognizant of the constitutional prerogatives of Congress and have tried to gain congressional acquiescence to presidential actions. According to Barron, this deference to the legislative branch originated during the American Revolutionary War when George Washington followed the lead of the Continental Congress on a number of issues. This deference,
however, was based on the explicit grant of authority given Congress in the Articles of Confederation to direct military operations. Barron goes on to argue that even with the creation of the executive branch at the constitutional convention in 1787, the founders still believed implicitly that congressional power was to be dominant. While his analysis of the founders’ intentions is well written, interesting, and argued effectively, his conclusions are less sure-footed. For example, Barron does not discuss the important debate over whether to substitute the more operational term “make war” instead of the legislative authority to “declare war.”

The next 25 chapters are a series of historical studies on the use of presidential military power and how commanders-in-chief exercised this power in relation to Congress prior to the Global War on Terror. In most cases, the issue was how the president was going to achieve his desired goals in the face of congressional obstinacy, and in many cases, statutory obstacles. As Barron succinctly describes, the “commanders-in-chief have found themselves mired in statutory restrictions in every phase of American war-making, from the Revolutionary War, to the early wars with France and England, to the Civil War and its aftermath, to the specter of total war culminating in World War II, to the Cold War itself.” In each case, the president had to figure out how to circumvent Congress or co-opt its acquiescence either explicitly or implicitly. Since the last declaration of war in 1941, the solution for both branches of government has been a series of legislative grants of authority to conduct military operations short of a declaration of war. The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution (1964) is one of the more famous of these grants of authority.

The final three chapters address post-9/11 events. Barron delves into the conflict existing between the unitary executive supporters, primarily located in the Office of the Vice President and the Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel, and Congress, which believed it had certain power over post-9/11 military operations. The conflict between the George W. Bush administration and Congress over enhanced interrogation techniques was probably the most contentious.

In assessing the quality of *Waging War*, this reviewer noticed the writing style. While Barron, a former assistant attorney general of the Office of Legal Counsel in the Department of Justice, clearly knows his way around legal opinions and briefs, his writing is clear and uncluttered with legal jargon. In comparison, many books on this topic read as though they have been “cut-and-pasted” from a legal brief. Instead, Barron tells a series of well-written stories supporting his position regarding the presidents’ deference to Congress. While this style is readable for the nonattorney, some of the stories could have used more legal analysis. This is particularly apparent in the discussions of the writing of the Constitution and the crucial Supreme Court decisions relating to the executive/congressional war powers. Also, Barron selected stories supportive of his general proposition, while ignoring those that might have undermined it. For instance, he simply refers to President Thomas Jefferson’s use of the navy against the Barbary pirates in the First Barbary War (1801–5) as “a deft handling of the use of force” even though this decision is an early example of the use of unilateral executive power.

Notwithstanding these minor criticisms, Barron has written an extremely readable and effectively argued counterbalance to the viewpoint of unitary executive theorists. For anyone interested in
the constitutional relationship between the president and Congress regarding war powers, Waging War belongs on your bookshelf.

Court-Martial: How Military Justice Has Shaped America from the Revolution to 9/11 and Beyond

By Chris Bray

Reviewed by C. Anthony Pfaff, Research Professor for Military Profession and Ethic, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College

In Court-Martial: How Military Justice Has Shaped America from the Revolution to 9/11 and Beyond, historian Chris Bray chronicles the evolution not just of the military justice system, but also of our sense of what counts as military justice. Thoroughly researched, Bray writes in an entertaining, narrative style that sheds a fascinating light on a process that shaped both the US military and the society it serves.

Civil-military relations in the early United States were very different than they are today. In those days, every “able-bodied white male citizen,” was a militiaman. This broad imposition, though popular at the time, embedded in the militia an irreconcilable character: it was simultaneously a government organization run by a strict hierarchy and a neighborhood association that relied on mutual consent and a sense of community. So while today our civil-military concerns are driven by fears that the military and society are too far apart, in those days the concern was they were too close together. Bray relates numerous stories where bar fights and business disputes between neighbors ended up in court-martials when one party happened to outrank the other in the militia. Similarly, many units simply evaporated because the commander did not treat subordinates as neighbors and gain their consent before giving orders.

This conflation of civil and military came to a head during the War of 1812, when Andrew Jackson declared martial law in New Orleans, bringing civilians and military alike under military rule. He conscripted soldiers from the local population and banished those who refused to serve. When several militiamen from Tennessee tried to go back home after their enlistments had expired, Jackson had eight of them executed. When a state senator objected to Jackson’s continued imposition of martial law months after his victory over the British, Jackson had the senator, and any who tried to support him, including his lawyer, thrown in jail. While Jackson’s own officers acquitted the senator, it was incidents like these, and Bray chronicles many, that drove the American public to prefer a large standing army rather than constant, if inconsistent, subjugation to military law.

Even after civil and military split, military courts continued to serve as an agent of change on the larger American society. While the role of the military in improving racial equality is well-known, what is less known is the important role of the court in that process. For example, during the Civil War, some African-Americans drafted by the Union army were tried for mutiny for objecting to serve for less than equal pay. A number were executed. But because they were tried in court, their
claims of injustice were aired, which prompted the same commanders who ordered the executions to lobby Washington to provide the necessary funds to right what they too saw as a wrong.

If the Civil War made the military more sensitive to racial inequality, it did not resolve it. While African-Americans struggled for equality under the law in civil society, military courts handed them a few victories. Jackie Robinson, the first African-American to play professional baseball, was also one of the few African-American officers commissioned during World War II. While stationed in Texas in 1944, he found himself on trial for disrespecting a superior officer and disobeying orders. The source of the disrespect and disobedience was Robinson’s refusal to sit in the back of an Army shuttle bus, which, in accordance with Army regulations at the time, had no segregated spaces. The prosecution, realizing Robinson’s cause was just, tried to make the trial about his justifiably angry response to an abusive interrogation by the camp’s provost. The plan backfired, and Robinson was acquitted.

While the military justice system moderated over time—only one person was executed for desertion in World War II—it still delivered wildly inconsistent outcomes, which Bray describes in great detail. These inconsistencies got a public airing in the aftermath of World War II and forced reform. While there had been attempts at reform during the interwar years, those efforts failed because the Army leadership, including its chief lawyer, saw them as undermining command authority. By 1948, however, in the wake of this public accounting, congress enacted the Elston Act, which established the Uniform Code of Military Justice. This legislation enacted many of the reforms sought previously. Notably, enlisted service members would serve on tribunals where the accused was an enlisted soldier. Lawyers, furthermore, would participate in all parts of the legal process, meaning soldiers would no longer be defended, prosecuted, or judged by the officers who commanded them. Perhaps most importantly, the Elston Act prohibited “unlawful command influence,” which meant commanders could no longer tell courts they expected a particular verdict.

*Court-Martial: How Military Justice Has Shaped America from the Revolution to 9/11 and Beyond* makes fascinating reading for military lawyers and historians—and anyone interested in American history. The book will be especially useful to military leaders at all levels who will benefit from this deep, nuanced description of how military justice has evolved in order to better understand where it—and American society—is likely to go.
Thomas Henriksen has written a relatively short, easy-to-read, quasi-historical account of the evolutionary relationship between the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Special Operations Forces (SOF). This book is targeted exclusively to the general public. To that audience, this book will seem tantalizing and sexy, providing a glimpse into a dark and mysterious topic.

The meaning of the title, *Eyes, Ears & Daggers*, is partially alluded to in the book. The “eyes and ears” refers, in general, to the intelligence community, while “eyes” seem to have been synonymous with the CIA. The metaphor of eyes for CIA is not meant to be a literal analogy to imagery intelligence, even though part of the CIA’s roots included ownership and control of such. The term “ears” is not explicitly referred to in the book although the plethora of mentions about the National Security Agency (NSA) and its signals intelligence capability are the obvious metaphor. As Henriksen points out, however, the CIA has a signal intelligence capability, but one dwarfed by NSA. Daggers refers to the military instrument of power, in this case, the author usually means the SOF.

Henriksen’s premise, which he reuses throughout the book, is that the individuals who are soldiers sometimes become spies, and vice versa. Using the analogy of the eighteenth-century American Revolutionary War army officer Nathan Hale who became a spy—and was caught by the British and executed—Henriksen attempts to trace the dynamic interplay between those who do soldiering activities and those who do spying activities. The CIA has done both, as has SOF, according to Henriksen.

I have some serious concerns about the scholarly value of this book. First, the book is a selected summary from secondary sources that are not scholarly. The secondary sources include: books or articles authored by individuals who were formerly employed by the various national security organizations who revealed unauthorized disclosures, information from leaked documents, and information supplied by anonymous sources; and newspaper articles by syndicated authors. If primary research was done, it was not clearly demonstrated.

Second, structured as a historical account from World War II through 2015, the narrative within each historical era goes back and forth in time, moving between different contexts, making it difficult to follow Henriksen’s argumentation. From a scholarly perspective, the
negative effect of this style of writing is the difficulty in identifying and validating arguments of causality within this complex topic.

Third, the book has many factual errors, which leads one to wonder how many additional errors exist beyond what I could glean. For example, the claim is made the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) was created in 1961 to support tactical military operations, when any reading of its creation directive, Department of Defense Directive 5105.21, 01 August 1961, defines its responsibilities primarily at the theater and strategic levels of war. In another example, Henriksen mentions that Michael Flynn, a recent director of DIA, was a four-star general; he was a three-star general. Other errors were noticed as well.

Fourth, the book is highly editorialized emphasizing one view without acknowledging other views, and without evidence. For example, Henriksen mentions Clausewitz and refers to his famous dictum, “war is a continuation of policy,” when we know that this particular dictum was merely his antithesis, necessary to reach his synthesis, and that his real contribution was what Clausewitz called, the remarkable trinity; that was his famous dictum. Henriksen mentions recent personalities in the press and only represents them in the most positive light, yet fails to let readers know the vast extent of differing views also mentioned in the press. For example, Flynn is mentioned as being an outstanding colonel when in Afghanistan, yet Henriksen fails to mention the plethora of reporting that, at that time, he was known for his arrogance and toxic leadership style. In another example, terrorists were almost always referred to as “Islamic terrorists” or “violent Islamists,” without acknowledging or explaining the intentionality and logic of those in Washington, DC to not invoke the name of Islam to name them. One time, however, Henriksen did refer to such as “insurgent-based terrorism” (162).

Fifth, there were two areas Henriksen briefly raised but should have spent more effort to help the general public understand aspects of the relationship between the CIA and SOF. The first was the sense of identity; what does it mean to the individual who serves as a CIA or SOF officer, and then assume opposite roles? Henriksen briefly mentions the 2003 US Army War College Strategic Research Project (SRP) by an Army legal officer, Colonel Kathryn Stone. He used Stone’s SRP to reinforce the idea that CIA and SOF individuals can serve in both functions of intelligence collection and analysis and military operations. But, Stone’s SRP was fundamentally about the legal and identity issues that separate these two actors, focusing on what would happen, for example, if either were a prisoner, different expectations surrounding compliance with US law, and concerns with command and control. Henriksen could have pivoted the discussion to address these concrete issues. Second, the recent use of drones in nonwar zones, such as Yemen and Pakistan, was raised briefly to discuss the conflicts in authorities over drone use, but the logic behind who should be using drones, CIA or SOF, and why, were not sufficiently discussed.

Finally, the recommendations proposed lacked substantive discourse about how they might be implemented, and most have already been proposed by others.

For many reasons, which I have attempted to identify the most important, Eyes, Ears & Daggers is not a scholarly manuscript, nor does
it provide new information or analysis from what has already been published, and, consequently, it does not provide value to senior members within and scholars of the defense or intelligence communities.

**Chasing Ghosts: The Policing of Terrorism**

By John Mueller and Mark G. Stewart

Reviewed by Robert J. Bunker, Adjunct Research Professor, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College

John Mueller and Mark G. Stewart have created a first-class work in *Chasing Ghosts: The Policing of Terrorism* with a hard-to-beat pedigree of highly regarded authors, teams of research assistants supporting the authors, numerous talks and conferences used to sharpen the arguments contained within the book, various elements of the book appearing in leading publications, over 600 references cited within, and the Oxford University Press seal of approval stamped upon it. The book—per the publisher's synopsis—thematized "approaches terrorist-fighting national security measures and spending with a critical questioning from which they have largely been immune... analyzesthe enormous cost of finding domestic terrorists relative to the threat posed... and... questions whether the current amount of resources allocated to find terrorists is necessary and appropriate." Hence, the authors argue that Islamist extremist terrorists threatening the United States are like ghosts that, while existing, are far more uncommon (N=62, post-9/11 through 2015) than conventionally thought (refer to Appendix A, pages 267–74). As a result, their premise is that the post-9/11 national security apparatus established to catch terrorists is overkill and not worth the costs associated with maintaining the present size of the massive programs enacted to implement it.

The book begins with introductory insights into earlier ghost-hunting episodes in Western history—those focused on witch hunting (and burning) from 1480 through 1680 in Europe and communist hunting (and career destroying) during the 1950s through the 1970s in the United States—and how we have entered a radical Islamist terrorist-hunting era post-9/11. Two sections make up the next portion of the book. "The Ghosts" is composed of four chapters on official perceptions, public perceptions, terrorism and the United States, and the foreign adversary and mastermind myth, and "The Chase" is composed of five chapters on counterterrorism enterprise evaluation, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the National Security Agency (NSA), the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and local and airport police. The book ends with a conclusion detailing the consequences of the present ghost chase and three appendices, the latter two which cover the costs inflicted by terrorism (Appendix B) and marginal costs and benefits of FBI counterterrorism expenditures (Appendix C). Derived from the material laid out in the book and the robust cost-benefit analysis related to it, including tables related to risk-reduction calculations, the authors make a very convincing argument that some counterterrorism programs are more efficient than others and that, overall, the domestic security
apparatus put together post-9/11 is very much a “throwing money at the problem” debacle.

Still, the major theoretical and analytical strength of the book derived from its rationalistic methodology that utilizes a cost-benefit approach to public policy decision-making also, counterintuitively, represents its weakness. The methodology utilized is unable to account for noneconomic costs and benefits hence it is, in a sense, haunted by its own ghostly bête noire of the ethereal and unquantifiable quality of national security itself. This point is made abundantly clear related to the passages addressing 9/11 and Pearl Harbor in that “there was a clear lapse in rational decision making—that is, a failure to consider alternative policies—and that lapse was not necessarily predictable beforehand” (75). Such alternative policies, like “shoring up the protection of US territory and to engage in a patient, far less costly Cold War-like harassment of the much under-resourced and over-extended Japanese empire” (75) in response to the Pearl Harbor attack, may make theoretical sense but contextually from a national security perspective, which follows a very different logic than simple cost-benefit analysis—one that includes concepts of grand strategy, deterrence, and the need for an immediate response to a crisis of governmental confidence in the national psyche—ignore the political and military realities of great power politics.

Sometimes a state, even a classical one such as Rome, will need to “go Masada” on an opponent and make a political statement no matter the high economic costs incurred by such a large-scale endeavor. While this may fail the logic metric of simple economic costs and benefits, it affords the state many international and domestic policy benefits. This is not to say Chasing Ghosts is categorically wrong about the overreaction to 9/11—it is not; it provides a valuable analytical assessment of US bureaucratic and policy failures in this regard. Indeed, US counterterrorism policy needs to find the reasonable middle ground between the present inflamed passions and bureaucratic momentums which have us “chasing ghosts” while at the same time recognizing that states and their citizens cannot, and should not, operate like soulless automatons that simply engage in probabilistic risk-based decision-making devoid of any emotive or ideological considerations. While Mueller and Stewart—to their credit—are cognizant of this dichotomy, they tend to downplay some of the real-world policymaking considerations states engage in for the sake of strengthening the rationalistic cost-benefit arguments presented in the book.
Taiwan’s China Dilemma: Contested Identities and Multiple Interests in Taiwan’s Cross-Strait Economic Policy
By Syaru Shirley Lin

Reviewed by Dr. Andrew Scobell, Senior Political Scientist, RAND Corporation

The US national security community is accustomed to seeing the word “Taiwan” paired with the term “crisis.” Yet, in recent years, the Taiwan Strait has been remarkably calm and largely absent from the headlines. It has been replaced by media attention on other Asia-Pacific flash points, notably the Korean peninsula, the East China Sea, and the South China Sea. Syaru Shirley Lin’s book contains significant insights enabling readers to understand why the Taiwan Strait has remained largely crisis free for almost a decade.

Continued calm is not assured. Taiwan remains the most likely location for a full-blown military conflict between the United States and the People’s Republic of China, even if the degree of tension and probability of a conflagration have both declined significantly. The main reason for this decline is not that China has given up on its pursuit of national unification with the island; on the contrary, Beijing remains staunchly committed to political union with Taipei. As Taiwan’s China Dilemma makes clear, political leaders in China have to date exercised considerable patience and exhibited a good measure of pragmatism and flexibility in pursuing this goal. This pragmatism and flexibility have been matched by political leaders in Taiwan. The result—a remarkable expansion of cross-strait economic relations, transportation links, and people-to-people interactions. The island’s China dilemma refers to the reality of Taiwan “relying economically on a partner it does not trust and that poses an existential threat” (206).

Understanding cross-strait dynamics and focusing on Taiwan requires an examination of multiple factors, and Lin’s book brings these together effectively, showing how economic realities and political aspirations interact. Merely focusing on the burgeoning economic ties increasingly binding Taiwan to China leads to a simplistic conclusion: eventual political union is inevitable. Meanwhile, simply focusing on political trends in Taiwan, such as evolving identities, suggests a more troubled and even turbulent future for the island’s relations with the mainland. Lin examines four case studies of Taiwan’s trade policy toward China and shows how “identity forms the basis for defining interests,” leading the island to alternate between restriction and liberalization (12).

Taiwan’s China Dilemma underscores that while people on the island increasingly identify as Taiwanese and less as Chinese, they also recognize their economic present and future are intertwined inescapably with China. Psychologically, the islanders are very proud of the democratic system they have created and the economic prosperity they have built through ingenuity and hard work. For Washington, Taipei’s persistent Beijing dilemma demands continued US vigilance.
Afshon Ostovar’s *Vanguard of the Imam* is a study of the political and military role of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) since it was established in early 1979 as a pillar of the country’s new revolutionary regime. Ostovar describes the development of the IRGC from its beginnings as a loose grouping of proregime militias until its emergence as a major force in Iranian politics and security over time. Ostovar notes IRGC units began as a collection of Islamic militias within a postrevolutionary patchwork of anti-monarchist groups that also included powerful armed leftist organizations. Aware of the leftist threat to its authority, the Islamic government quickly appointed an IRGC command headquarters that provided the militia units with official status and began the effort to centralize the force. The IRGC’s official standing also gave it the political cover it needed to engage in actions such as disarming rival militias and detaining suspected counterrevolutionaries before turning them over to the doubtful justice of revolutionary courts. Throughout this period of upheaval, Ayatollah Khomeini, the leader of the new government, stressed the danger of foreign powers attempting to undo the revolution through a campaign of subversion and other hostile acts. With Khomeini’s encouragement, the IRGC leaders correspondingly justified the campaign against potential rivals as a fight against US and Israeli “plots.”

A central turning point for the development of the IRGC was the Iran-Iraq War, which began with Saddam Hussein’s September 1980 invasion of Iran. At the beginning of this struggle, IRGC fighters were poorly armed, undisciplined, badly trained, poorly led, and had only a few units with combat experience (against Kurdish guerrillas). The organization, nevertheless, did everything it could to rise to the occasion. Early in the war, the IRGC leadership attempted to substitute the revolutionary enthusiasm of its members for military expertise. In this environment, IRGC military efforts yielded high Iranian casualties, but over time members’ combat skills improved, and sometimes the force inflicted serious setbacks on the usually less-motivated Iraqi ground troops, especially in urban fighting. As the war continued, the IRGC and its subordinate Basij militia (mostly made up of boys in their early and mid teens) became the chief proponents of mass infantry assaults as well as the primary participants in such operations (often described as “human waves”). These tactics produced horrendous Iranian casualties, but they also helped to break the Iraqi army’s defensive formations in Iran and push the Iraqis back into their home territory. This approach further leveraged Iran’s larger population as a way of countering Iraqi technological superiority and greater access to weapons suppliers.

Flushed with these grisly victories, the IRGC gradually replaced the regular army as Iran’s leading operational force in the conflict. Moreover, so long as the Iranians continued to rely on human-wave tactics, the IRGC/Basij forces could plausibly claim that they should...
be the dominant forces for achieving an Iranian victory. Unfortunately for these organizations, they championed this tactic long after the Iraqis had learned to cope with it through dramatic improvements in their system of defenses. Iranian mass infantry attacks increasingly led to horrendous losses for negligible gains. By 1988, Iran had suffered a number of battlefield defeats and no longer had a viable path to winning the war. Consequently, the regime had no other option except to agree to a United Nations sponsored plan to end the war. The Iran-Iraq War correspondingly ended in August 1988 without any clear Iranian gains. The failure to defeat Iraq served as a significant blow to the prestige of the IRGC with its previous unrelenting calls for more sacrifice as the road to total victory.

Despite these setbacks, the IRGC sought new roles for itself in the post-war era and in an especially significant move established the Qods Force. This elite IRGC force took over the responsibility for exporting Islamic revolution and thereby creating a regional order more open to Iranian power and priorities. The IRGC correspondingly became the main instrument of Iranian meddling throughout the region, replacing the Office of Liberation Movements, and building on previous IRGC involvement in countries such as Lebanon. Ties to Shia overseas clients and militias were a priority, and these groups have often been especially receptive to Iranian influence, although the IRGC has also supported some Sunni groups that share its goals. In contemporary times, the Qods Force has played an important role in supporting the Assad regime in Syria and is a major supporter of the most prominent Shia militias fighting ISIS in Iraq. Qods Force commander Qassem Soleimani has claimed the uprising against the Assad regime in Syria is part of a much larger Western plan to weaken “Iran’s place in the region” (207).

Also in contemporary times, the IRGC continues its intense devotion to Iran’s supreme leader. The IRGC’s role and functions are safeguarded through the dominance of the leader within Iran’s theocratic system and his special relationship with the IRGC. The 2009 elections, which are widely assumed to have been rigged by the government, serve as an example of this relationship. As unrest expanded, angry mass demonstrations against the vote rigging became a serious problem for the regime, especially when demonstrators singled out Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, in chants of “death to the dictator” (185). The IRGC correspondingly unleashed Basij militia forces (which may number over four million) to crush the demonstrators and brutally restore order for the regime.

Despite this and other chilling episodes, Ostovar concludes on what seems like a bit of forced optimism suggesting that the IRGC may yet find itself weakened by the longing of the Iranian population for reform as evidenced by a number of elections where moderate candidates for office did well despite systematic governmental efforts obstruct their success. He also notes that a future supreme leader will almost certainly enter the office weaker than Ayatollah Khamenei, and may need to make concessions on reform to maintain some level of legitimacy for the system. Such developments are certainly possible, but it is also possible that the current system, which has become remarkably resilient, will maintain itself in the same basic form for some time to come.
High Command: British Military Leadership in the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars
By Christopher L. Elliott

Reviewed by Anthony C. King, Chair in War Studies, Department of Politics and International Studies, University of Warwick

The period 2003–9 remains a traumatic one for the British defense establishment. The United Kingdom had committed to a deeply unpopular and possibly illegal war in Iraq in 2003 and, then, already embroiled in a failing and underresourced struggle in Basra, the country launched itself into another major campaign in Helmand. Operating far in excess of defense planning assumptions, the results were predictable. The British forces, led by the army, suffered a humiliating defeat in Basra, while they proved, despite their best efforts, incapable of pacifying Helmand. The implications for the transatlantic relationship were profound.

In High Command: British Military Leadership in the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars, Christopher Elliott, a former two-star general in the British Army, seeks to explain how the British armed forces and the defense community could have failed so badly. There has been much criticism of the senior commanders and politicians over the Iraq and Afghan campaigns culminating in the Chilcot Inquiry into the Iraq War. Elliott, however, notes an oversight: “what the witnesses at the Chilcot Inquiry have not revealed is why good, principled, capable public servants took the actions that they did” (1). He, therefore, determines to explain this conundrum.

Understandably, Elliott wants to avoid the polemical and ad hominem criticisms that have been levelled at senior commanders. Explaining the Iraq-Afghan debacle would be easy if senior officers were just stupid, weak, or malign. For him, the debacle over Basra and Helmand is interesting precisely because senior officers were overwhelmingly so honest, hard-working, and professional. In the last section of the book, he discusses each Chief of the Defence of Staff who served from 1998 to 2010, concluding “it is self-evident that officers of high ability achieved the top military post of UK Chief of the Defence Staff in his period.” Similarly, “all the military chiefs who worked with the Secretaries of State [for Defence] of the decade had nothing but admiration for them” (44). Overseen by competent professionals, the British crisis was an anomaly, then, which Elliott wants to unravel.

Elliott proposes two central explanations for the crisis. Firstly, while individual officers at every level were highly capable, the armed forces institutionalized a system of command that was unhelpful in this era. As an imperial power, British forces have long been accustomed to devolving authority to local commanders. The introduction of mission command into British military doctrine from the 1980s has only accentuated this tendency. Consequently, despite the existence of significant command nodes in the United Kingdom, such as the Permanent Joint Headquarters...
(PJHQ) and the Ministry of Defence (MOD) Director of Operations, senior commanders in London consistently referred to commanders on the ground in Iraq and Helmand as “there emerged a culture where there was just too much deference to the commander on the ground” (177). Consequently, focused on the tactical issues of the local commander, normally on a six-month tour, no coherent national strategy was ever developed and “it was inevitable that each successive vision changed substantially on handover, not least because of deference from PJHQ and the MOD to the man on the ground.”

Excessive decentralization was partly a product of the second central reason for the crisis—the politics of the Ministry of Defence and Whitehall, more broadly. Elliott outlines how the different interests and priorities of politicians, civil servants, and military officers sometimes conflicted with each other to prevent coherent strategic decision-making. In addition, the administrative procedures of Whitehall, a monstrous bureaucracy, impeded coherent decision-making and responsibility.

In an opening vignette, Elliott describes the niceties of its “Byzantine processes” with sharp irony. On his first day as director of military operations in the MOD, Elliott was given a series of files on which to make a decision. Finding the staff-work flawless, he confidently signed off on each file without reference to his colleagues. The decisions seemed so obvious no consultation was required. Elliott, however, was soon confronted by his subordinate: “Brigadier, you signed off the files . . . without socializing them?” (4). No matter how obvious a decision, it was the norm in the Ministry of Defence to confer with the Head of Secretariat, Finance, and probably the Foreign Office, too.

Against this viscosity, strategic commanders in London found it easier to short-circuit decisions by simply passing them down to the local commanders and then presenting the Ministry of Defence, Whitehall, and, indeed, the government with a fait accompli. Yet, the consequences of this ad hocery became obvious in Iraq “when the British found themselves up to their necks in a problem very much greater than they had first anticipated, they lacked the political and institutional will to resolve it, either by reinforcing with sufficient combat forces to master the insurgency or by deploying sufficient cross-government capabilities to exploit military success where it appeared” (125). The episode was truly tragic.

Written by an insider, High Command provides a very useful and perceptive insight into the problems which vitiated British strategy in the crucial decade after the September 11 attacks. There is but one irony in the book. Elliott rightly highlights the problems of interservice rivalry in the Ministry of Defence. As an army officer, however, he cannot always resist a subtle dig at the Royal Marines. He notes the apparent anomaly of sending the marines to landlocked Afghanistan in 2002. While the fact that the Chief of the Defence Staff was an admiral was not irrelevant, the United States requested the Royal Marines for their expertise in mountainous terrain—not for their amphibious capabilities. More archly, Elliott records “several have commented in interview that the hugely talented and influential [Royal Marines] Lieutenant General Sir Rob Fry would have approached things differently as Director of Operations in the MOD if he had experienced high field command himself, which through no fault of his own, was denied to him” (179). While the British
Army has two divisions and a corps, the largest formation of the Royal Marines is, of course, a brigade. Tribalism lives on.

MacArthur’s Korean War Generals
By Stephen R. Taaffe

Reviewed by Donald W. Boose Jr., Contract Faculty Instructor, US Army War College; author of US Army Forces in the Korean War 1950–53 (Osprey Publishing, 2005); and coeditor of The Ashgate Research Companion to the Korean War (Routledge, 2014)

In this fascinating book, Stephen R. Taaffe examines the performance of and relationships among senior US ground force commanders during the first year of the Korean War when General Douglas MacArthur served as the unified, multinational commander-in-chief, Far East Command, and commander-in-chief, United Nations Command (UNC). During MacArthur’s tenure, his forces first conducted a delay against attacking North Korean forces, then began a counteroffensive with the amphibious landing at Inchon and subsequent push deep into North Korea. A massive Chinese intervention in the winter of 1950–51 forced the UNC back into South Korea. A renewed UNC counteroffensive and subsequent war of movement in 1951 culminated in a final drive back to a line generally north of the 38th Parallel. At that point, the two sides began negotiations that would, after another 18 months of bloody but static conflict, bring an armistice that remains in effect to this day. For each phase, Taaffe provides clear, tightly written descriptions of the strategic situation, the military operations, and the actions of the senior ground force leaders. He concludes each section with an analysis of the performance of the senior leaders.

Taaffe, an experienced and respected military historian who has published several excellent books on senior American military leaders during the Revolution, the Civil War, and World War II, is well placed to make these assessments. His evaluations are thoughtful, well informed, and persuasive. He deals with the two most controversial Korean War generals, MacArthur and X Corps Commander Edward M. Almond, objectively and unemotionally. He argues some of the qualities that had made MacArthur successful in the Pacific in World War II (giving his subordinates free play, remaining aloof from tactical decisions, and playing senior leaders against each other) were counterproductive in Korea. He also faults MacArthur for his decision to separate Almond’s X Corps from Lieutenant General Walton H. Walker’s Eighth Army, for withdrawing X Corps to conduct an amphibious turning movement into northeastern Korea, and for his hasty, ill-organized push north that left UNC forces vulnerable to the Chinese attack. Almond, he concludes “was certainly an overbearing, arbitrary, and insensitive man who made mistakes, but his innate aggressiveness and single-minded determination to win paid big dividends for the Eighth Army” (172).

Walker, MacArthur’s ground component commander, tried with his understrength and poorly equipped Eighth Army to stop stronger, better-prepared North Korean forces during the chaotic and desperate first two months of the war. While noting examples of inadequate
leadership by some of Walker’s subordinates, Taaffe praises Walker for his conduct of the delay and subsequent tenacious defense of the Pusan Perimeter. He also notes Walker did not have MacArthur’s full confidence, refused to challenge some of MacArthur’s questionable decisions, and failed to relieve weak subordinates from fear of being relieved himself. Taaffe blames the substandard performance of some of Walker’s subordinates in part on their selection, based not on previous performance, but rather to give them experience at a regimental or divisional command or as a reward prior to retirement.

Walker was killed in a traffic accident in December 1950. His replacement, Lieutenant General Matthew B. Ridgway, had the full confidence of both MacArthur and Army Chief of Staff J. Lawton Collins, which greatly strengthened Ridgway’s position, allowing him to replace most of the early-war division commanders and to take other actions that improved capabilities. Ridgway’s Eighth Army, now experienced in combat and under solid leadership at all levels, stopped the Chinese winter offensive.

Taaffe continues his analysis beyond April 1951, when President Truman relieved MacArthur of command and replaced him with Ridgway. Ridgway in turn was replaced as Eighth Army commander by Lieutenant General James A. Van Fleet, whom Taaffe rates highly. Under Van Fleet, Eighth Army stopped another Chinese offensive and drove north, well past the 38th Parallel. Taaffe argues, despite an uneven performance earlier in the war, Eighth Army fought well enough to win the war militarily. He insists Van Fleet most likely could have continued the offensive further north, and he notes it was a political decision, not the military situation, that stopped Eighth Army.

Readers may argue with some of Taaffe’s judgments, but he has exhaustively examined the documentary evidence and makes a compelling case. MacArthur’s Korean War Generals is particularly relevant to readers of Parameters. What could be more valuable to senior military professionals than a well-informed study of leadership and operational art during a major and challenging war? This is the heart and soul of the military profession, and Taaffe makes a substantial contribution to the grand conversation on the art of war.

The Myth and Reality of German Warfare: Operational Thinking from Moltke the Elder to Heusinger

By Gerhard P. Gross

Reviewed by Richard L. DiNardo, Professor of National Security Affairs, US Marine Corps Command and Staff College

Certainly no foreign military establishment has garnered more attention in the United States than the German army. Historically, the German army of World War II has taken the lion’s share of interest, but consideration of the army of the Kaiserreich has grown with the arrival of the centennial of the Great War. Some scholars, most notably Robert M. Citino, have posited the idea of a “German way of war.”
This volume by Gerhard Gross is a welcome addition to the corpus of literature on this subject.

Gross, is both a colonel and a career officer in the German *Bundeswehr* and a well-published author and researcher. Until recently, he had been the head of the Department of German Military History before 1945 at the Center for Military History and Social Sciences of the *Bundeswehr* (ZMSB) located in Potsdam, Germany. The center is the successor to the former Military History Research Office (MGFA), the organization that had produced the German “semiofficial” history of World War II, translated into English under the title *Germany and the Second World War*.

Gross’s work is very similar to Citino’s *German Way of War*, but with some important and interesting differences. Where they agree is on the basic parameters of the Prusso-German approach to war. Given the geographic circumstances of the Prussian kingdom, the Prussian army and its German successor sought to fight short wars, quickly decided by sharp offensively oriented campaigns culminating in decisive battles. Thus, while Napoleon is often credited with creating this style of warfare, for the great Prussian theorist Carl von Clausewitz, Napoleon was merely the continuator of a process really begun by Frederick William, Elector of Brandenburg.

While Citino began his work with Frederick, the Great Elector of the seventeenth century, Gross begins his book with Helmuth von Moltke, Moltke the Elder, and thus wades into a controversy that still resonates today, especially in the American military. Moltke is credited with creating the operational level of warfare—or at least identifying it. Defining it, however, was another matter. As Gross notes, Moltke contributed to the confusion with the looseness of his language in his writing on the subject.

The greatest danger to the German army’s preferred method of warfare was something over which the army had no control, namely increasing size. The span of Moltke’s career saw the rise of mass armies, first in the American Civil War and later in Europe after the creation of the German Empire in 1871. The growth in the size of armies made the prospect of waging a short, sharp conflict problematic. Although all the European war plans that were developed called for decisive campaigns, other factors almost ensured the plans would miscarry. Primary among these factors was logistics. Gross notes the failure to take logistics into account was one of the constant weaknesses of German military planning throughout the period of both world wars.

Another critical factor for the German way of war was the environment in which war was conducted. The German high command, both during and after the war, pointed to the Battle of Tannenberg as the ideal operation. Gross, however, identifies two important things that run counter to this fixation. First, Tannenberg was a defensive battle, as opposed to the German army’s preferred posture, which was offensive. In addition, the battle was fought on German territory, allowing German commanders Paul von Hindenburg and Erich Ludendorff to make use of the excellent road and rail system.

The German method of waging war was thus best suited to areas of central and western Europe, where road and rail systems could facilitate the conduct of rapid operations. Where these systems were not present,
most notably in the expanses of Russia, the German way of warfare either yielded indecisive (if occasionally spectacular) results or broke down completely.

Where German military thinking really failed was in its focus, which was generally downward. Thus, the focus of thinking, education, and doctrine produced an army that was operationally nimble and tactically adept, but strategically as bereft of ideas as the country’s political leadership.

Gross goes beyond the scope of most works on German military history, including Citino’s, by extending his discussion into the early Cold War period. The thinking of both German armies owed much to its predecessor, although the Soviet army had also developed its operational theory during the war. For the newly created Bundeswehr, the key figure was Adolf Heusinger, a high-level staff officer who was arrested by the Gestapo in 1944 as a suspect in the attempt to kill Adolf Hitler. Ironically, the German approach to conventional warfare worked best when incorporated into a broader alliance system, where a bigger ally really determined the strategy.

In conclusion, Gross has made a major contribution to the literature in this field. *The Myth and Reality of German Warfare: Operational Thinking from Moltke the Elder to Heusinger* is indispensable reading for any student of the topic.