Communicating Pacific Pathways

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We have to have more faces, in more places, without more bases.  
—General Vincent K. Brooks

The 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance (DSG) directed the U.S. rebalance to the Asia-Pacific and required the Department of Defense to “whenever possible . . . develop innovative, low-cost, and small-footprint approaches to achieve our security objectives, relying on exercises, rotational presence, and advisory capabilities.” Pacific Pathways 2014 provided an innovative and efficient Army response to the DSG requirement. Because the Army was then struggling to define its post-Iraq and Afghanistan roles, its Pacific Pathways proposal was not well received in the 2013 strategic information environment. The weak economy, record national debt, and public weariness from the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts exacerbated the Army’s attempts to affirm its relevance. According to a Department of the Army (DA) narrative study, the Army has historically struggled to justify its relevance during peacetime. Effectively communicating the Pathways concept within the Army, to the joint and interagency communities, political leaders, and the public proved so difficult that the concept almost failed before it began. Despite challenges, however, United States Army Pacific (USARPAC) was eventually able to effectively communicate the Pathways concept. This essay overviews the 2013 Pacific Pathways strategic information environment, analyzes implementation of the Pathways communication strategy, and offers recommendations for more effective communication of future iterations of Pathways.

Strategic Information Environment

The Army’s Pathways proposal was stymied by its inability to convey a clear narrative explaining its role as the primary element of U.S. Landpower. Historically, the Army has “adopted multiple mottos and slogans for different audiences and purposes,” resulting in inconsistent messaging and muddled brand recognition. This became especially apparent after the DOD published the 2012 Air-Sea Battle (ASB) concept which emphasized Air Force and Navy weapons capabilities with little mention of an Army role in countering emerging Anti-Access / Area Denial capabilities in the Asia-Pacific. As one blogger noted, “there is growing concern inside the Army that the narrative in Washington already is being seized by advocates of naval and air warfare, and that the Army has yet to put forth a coherent vision of how land warfare fits in the picture.”

In 2013, the Army developed the Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF) concept of which Pathways is “an expression.” Under this concept, continental U.S. forces align with overseas Geographic Combatant Commands to support their training, exercises, and deployments. According to the 2013 Army Posture Statement, RAF:
will provide Geographic Combatant Commands with mission-trained and regionally focused forces that are responsive to all requirements, including operational missions, bilateral and multilateral military exercises and theater security cooperation activities.10

The U.S. Marine Corps, unlike the Army, has engaged in more successful “branding and marketing”11 to build a “strong, positive” narrative. The contrasting images of the Army and Marine Corps contributed to a situation in which many objected to the Army’s proposed role in Pathways: “The Army is encroaching on the traditional Marine Corps mission by operating from ships and rebalancing to the Pacific (Pacific Pathways).”12 In 2014, Retired Army Lieutenant General Guy Swan lamented the issues surrounding the Army narrative, stating: “It’s such a difficult story to tell . . . it does not resonate like airplanes and battleships and aircraft carriers,” to which the reporter added, “. . . or ‘A Few Good Men.’”13

**Communicating Pathways**

USARPAC experienced major changes in 2013 that affected its ability to plan, prepare, and execute Pathways effectively. General Vincent K. Brooks assumed command of USARPAC on 2 July, 2013 as its first four-star commander since 1974.14 General Brooks’ assumption of command symbolized “the continued rebalance for the United States in the Asia Pacific region.”15 With General Brooks came significant headquarters reorganization designed to increase the operational focus of the staff. General Brooks created a new Strategic Effects Directorate (FXD) by consolidating all of the “soft power” staff sections into one Directorate.16 Additionally, the USARPAC Public Affairs Officer (PAO) approached retirement, effectively leaving the command without a senior Public Affairs (PA) advisor until June 2014.17

Shortly after arriving, General Brooks saw an opportunity to use exercises more efficiently. He believed properly synchronized exercises could support the USPACOM and USARPAC Theater Security Cooperation Programs in accord with the Army’s RAF concept.18 Further, synchronized exercises would operationalize mission command from USARPAC through I Corps and the 25th Infantry Division to engage units across the Pacific.19 General Brooks, initiated the external coordination process by discussing the nascent “Exercise Pathways”20 concept, as it was originally called, with the U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) Commander, Admiral Locklear, and with the Army Chief of Staff, General Odierno.21

The USARPAC staff’s small initial Pathways planning team then began to outline the formal coordination requirements in a draft Warning Order.22 The finished order would direct the USARPAC staff to coordinate the Pathways concept with Hawaii-based Army and joint organizations for comment and refinement.23 Notably, the draft order did not require coordination with any interagency organizations, specifically the Department of State (DOS), its Ambassadors, or the embassy country teams in the countries identified to host Pathways exercises.24 It also did not address coordination with the political and military leaders of the countries identified to host Pathways exercises. Because the Pathways concept envisioned modifications to how USARPAC participated in existing exercises, and because each exercise already had its own planning cycle involving the host nations, the staff did not identify an early need for formal external coordination.25 The prevailing thought was that Pathways was simply a “different way of doing what they were already doing.”26

As USARPAC refined the Pathways concept and coordinated it within select elements of the joint community, its leaders attended the 2013 AUSA Convention in Washington, DC. During the convention, General Brooks referred obliquely to Pathways, announcing that “We intend to put into motion a pathway of activity (for the Army) into multiple countries for extended periods of time, linking a series of events and exercises on a variety of topics.”27 His comments did not attract mainstream media coverage; only a small number of DOD and defense-related websites covered the story.28 Two reporters requested interviews with
USARPAC after the convention: an *Army Times* reporter and a *Washington Post* reporter. The USARPAC PA staff was still coordinating these potential interviews when initial Pathways planning culminated with a decision brief to General Brooks on 1 November, 2013.

Leading up to the decision brief, General Brooks provided additional guidance that clarified the Pacific Pathways concept. Subsequent planning documents and media articles repeated several of his statements. This decision brief marked the point at which USARPAC considered Pathways “approved,” although USARPAC had not briefed the concept to all joint and interagency stakeholders—most notably the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Policy (OSD-P) and the DOS. In addition, because only a portion of the USARPAC staff conducted the early planning, a fully developed and approved communication strategy to support Pathways did not exist, nor had the newly assigned USARPAC Foreign Policy Advisor (FPA) yet seen the entire Pathways concept. To understand Pathways more fully, the FPA asked for an update, after which she realized there was “going to be a problem in the region because of the host nation notification and coordination requirements.”

The first of a series of Pathways public relations problems occurred in early November 2013, marking the point where communication, in the words of one PA officer, “went sideways.” USARPAC briefed the Sergeant Major of the Army on Pathways during a visit to Hawaii. In a subsequent meeting with soldiers at Schofield Barracks, he responded to a question on the Asia-Pacific rebalance. Beginning with, “I just came out of a great brief on Pacific Pathways,” he then expounded on the Pathways concept. The *Honolulu Star-Advertiser* reported his comments in a 7 November, 2013 article entitled “Army Weighs New Pacific Deployment Strategy.” *Stars and Stripes* repeated the story on 8 November. The articles publicized Pathways before USARPAC had fully coordinated it with the joint, interagency, and multinational communities.

Shortly after the articles were published, the USARPAC staff met with the *Army Times* reporter for a Pathways interview. During the interview, the USARPAC Exercises Director presented the Pathways concept using approved themes, messages, and content. As the interview continued and the discussion included specific countries, exercises, and timelines, the PA representative felt that the details were not appropriate for release because Public Affairs guidance on Pathways had yet to be approved. Consequently, the interim USARPAC PAO requested that the *Army Times* delay publication of the article so that USARPAC could fully coordinate the concept and provide updated information. The interview raised awareness of Pathways across the USARPAC staff, and highlighted the challenge of developing a new concept like Pathways: determining the best time to transition from a small planning team to the entire staff.

The USARPAC staff then informed leadership of a potential Pathways communication crisis due to the pending *Army Times* article, prompting the command group and communication staff to develop and implement a strategy to mitigate potential fallout. The strategy centered on accelerating Pathways coordination to ensure that USARPAC informed all stakeholders before publication of the article. The Security Cooperation Program (SCP) Director socialized the Pathways concept paper with affected country Defense Attachés, Marine Forces Pacific (MARFORPAC), USPACOM, OSD-P, and DOS for official review, comment, and feedback. The USARPAC command group personally briefed key joint and interagency leaders and sent briefing teams to local commands to get ahead of the expected 16 December, 2013 *Army Times* article. Late November also marked the point when the entire PA Staff began to work on proposed Pathways Public Affairs Guidance (PAG) and to expand the existing Pathways communication strategy. The PA staff had no awareness, however, of the OSD-P and DOS implications in the Pathways communication strategy.

By early December OSD-P expressed support for the Pathways concept, but had concerns about its policy implications, budgetary impacts, and sensitivities in the region. OSD-P wanted to see the USARPAC Pathways PAG, and DOS and White House leaders wanted USARPAC to provide briefings before the *Army
The delay, whether due to USARPAC’s request or internal turnover on the “turf war” theme twisted the Pathways narrative. The ensuing controversy added friction to the ongoing SAKURA in Japan. Additionally, the USARPAC PA staff would use to develop the requested PAG (see Figure 1). OSD Public Affairs (OSD-PA) and USPACOM PA officers disagreed with the need for a USARPAC Pathways PAG because Pathways was still a concept. They specifically feared that approval of a PAG could be misconstrued as de facto OSD approval of the overall USARPAC Pathways concept. Both offices recommended that USARPAC proceed instead with a “Respond to Query” (RTQ)-only PAG. The RTQ-only PAG would consist only of a holding statement, questions and answers, and points of contact.45

In the interim, a Washington Post reporter interviewed General Brooks in Hawaii and at Exercise YAMA SAKURA in Japan. Additionally, the Army Times did not publish its Pathways article on 16 December as expected. The delay, whether due to USARPAC’s request or internal turnover on the Army Times staff, actually hurt, rather than helped, Pathways. The Washington Post published its article on 29 December, 2013, and effectively “scooped” the Army Times article. The Post spun Pathways in a “sensational direction,” reaching a much wider audience than the more factual Army Times article would have.48

The Washington Post headline read: “Army’s Pacific Pathways Initiative sets up Turf Battle with Marines.”49 USARPAC expected a general article about the Army and the Pacific rebalance, but the resulting “turf war” theme twisted the Pathways narrative. The ensuing controversy added friction to the ongoing coordination challenges, especially with the DOS. While the article conveyed some facts, it emphasized an

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**Figure 1. USARPAC Pacific Pathways Communication Strategy.**

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assumed Army conflict with the Marines over missions and roles.\textsuperscript{50} Shortly after the *Washington Post* article, “a” Marine’s position became “the” Marines’ position\textsuperscript{51} when the Brookings Institution online blog *Up Front* published a follow-on article entitled “The Wrong Path in the Pacific.”\textsuperscript{52} This article reinforced the turf war theme, implying that the Army was seeking to establish an amphibious capability in competition with the Marines. The Army does have an amphibious mission,\textsuperscript{53} the Pathways concept, however, envisioned sealift only to move Army units and equipment from exercise to exercise, not to conduct expeditionary amphibious operations. The Brookings author argued that it was “troubling” that the Army advocated that Asia-Pacific challenges had “to be met with an Army solution.”\textsuperscript{54} Misconstruing the efficient movement of Army exercise forces across the Pacific as a replication of a Marine Expeditionary Unit mission, the blog proved more sensational than the *Washington Post* article.\textsuperscript{55}

The following day, the *Marine Times* and *Defense News* both carried an interview with Marine General John Paxton, the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps. Entitled “Marine Corps not Threatened by Army’s Pacific Strategy,” General Paxton’s remarks demonstrated USARPAC’s prior engagement with MARFORPAC.\textsuperscript{56} Although the article again mischaracterized Pathways as amphibious, General Paxton remarked “there is plenty of turf for the Marine Corps and the Army to cover.”\textsuperscript{57} In regard to Pathways, he stated “So do I feel threatened? Absolutely not. Is there a place for all of us? Absolutely.”\textsuperscript{58} On 27 January, 2014, the *Army Times* finally published the article, titling it: “Three-month Pacific Deployments.”\textsuperscript{59} Publication was anticlimactic.\textsuperscript{60}

USARPAC leaders and the communication team spent November and December 2013 and January 2014 making up for the lack of prior formal coordination with OSD-P and DOS. In Washington, USARPAC leaders countered the “turf war” narrative by asserting that “the press loves good inter-service rivalry stories, and that is what they sensed with Pathways.”\textsuperscript{61} Nonetheless, the episode generated friction between USARPAC and the joint and interagency communities. Because of the perception that USARPAC was “out there doing things on its own,” tense emails, phone calls, and VTCs were exchanged between USARPAC, OSD-P and DOS.\textsuperscript{62} While USARPAC leaders focused on joint and interagency coordination, the USARPAC communication team needed a strategy to mitigate the impact of the negative press. According to one OSD-PA officer, “I spent hundreds of hours making phone calls and sending emails in response. We were trying to get a counter-story released to reporters to help recover.”\textsuperscript{63}

USARPAC had three options: (1) it could implement the December “active” communication strategy, although its approach relied on generic messaging to multiple audiences, rather than tailored messages to designated audiences; (2) USARPAC could refine the December strategy and focus on the media and public in an attempt to counter negative press; (3) USARPAC could remain silent and let the negative press subside on its own, risking that it might continue indefinitely. As the former Chief of Army Public Affairs, General Brooks was experienced in dealing with the press.\textsuperscript{64} He chose option three: deciding to “fight the urge to write articles countering the *Washington Post* article . . . answering the noise with more noise would be counter-productive.”\textsuperscript{65} His decision to pursue the recommended “RTQ-only” strategy succeeded. By the end of February 2014, the echoes of the *Washington Post* and Brookings articles had ceased reverberating.

By April 2014, USARPAC felt comfortable enough with the communication situation for General Brooks to respond to questions during the AUSA LANPAC (Landpower in the Pacific) Symposium in Honolulu, Hawaii.\textsuperscript{66} When asked about Pathways, General Brooks replied, “Instead of a series of Army units traveling to an exercise for 10 to 30 days and returning home, the new Pathways model would deploy a smaller unit whose ‘nucleus’ will move from one exercise to the next.”\textsuperscript{67} As Pathways operationally transitioned from planning to preparation, the USARPAC communication team and PA staff refined the communication strategy and PAG. USARPAC did not complete its “Communication Campaign” until 24 July, 2014 (see Figures 2-5,
The campaign briefing notes remarked, “up to this point, we’ve worked at setting the conditions with partners/Allies, PACOM and Army stakeholders. We believe there is no impediment to moving forward . . . to institutionalize the concept and expand it.”

Compared with the previous communication strategy, the communication campaign framework added desired conditions, phases, and a new objective (6, in Figure 2). The communication strategy focused on a campaign to bridge between Pathways 14 and Pathways 15, before Pathways 14 ever started (see Figure 3). The engagement and media plans for the expanded campaign incorporated lessons from the preceding Pathways communication efforts (see Figures 4 and 5).

**Figure 2. Pacific Pathways Communication Campaign, Objectives.**

Communication Objectives:
1. Develop widespread understanding and appreciation for Pathways among all audiences, creating a permissive environment for execution.
2. Increase Ally & partner awareness and understanding of Pacific Pathways and its advantages.
3. Obtain Ally & partner armies commitment to participating in Pacific Cooperation.
4. Inform U.S. and assure regional audiences of USARPAC role and significant contribution to U.S. rebalance to the AOR.
5. Inform US and regional audiences that Pacific Pathways is an efficient, effective model for the employment of Army forces in the Indo-Asia Pacific.
6. Inform internal DOD audiences of this additional flexible, responsive capability for the GCC.

Prepared by USARPAC OCPA
Figure 3. Pacific Pathways Communication Campaign, Concept.71

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time-frame</th>
<th>Objective</th>
<th>Audience</th>
<th>Means</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sep-Oct 14</td>
<td>Base-line understanding of concept</td>
<td>CODELs &amp; Other KL</td>
<td>Theater visits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Assure; demonstrate value</td>
<td>Allies/partner KL</td>
<td>Exercises &amp; KLE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Increase understanding &amp; demonstrate joint value</td>
<td>PACOM &amp; sister services</td>
<td>Exercises; KLE; Inclusion of Pathways data in leader/staff updates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Assurance of U.S. commitment</td>
<td>Host nation/ Regional publics</td>
<td>Joint Info Bureau activities; Embassies promulgate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct (AUSA)</td>
<td>Transparency; base-line understanding of concept; necessity of land forces in Pacific</td>
<td>U.S. public</td>
<td>Embed coverage (anticipate low); select press interviews</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>De-mystify Pacific Pathways; generate more understanding and interest</td>
<td>Beltway; security focused Think Tanks; Army (writ large)</td>
<td>Leverage AUSA venue and GO travel to D.C.; Press Conf; ILW panel; Select Interviews; Congressional Breakfast; Select Engagements Green Book</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb 15</td>
<td>Peak interest for increased coverage/visit to Pathways</td>
<td>KL; media</td>
<td>Extend invitations; leverage visits</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 4. Pacific Pathways Communication Campaign, Engagement Plan.72

- Corps and below concentrate on tactical/operational angle and media in their AO
  - Primary domestic audiences are internal and local area public
  - Tell the Soldiers’ story
  - Lay foundation for strategic message
  - Embed
- Exercises via JIB and Embassies
  - Full spectrum of media and CI ops
  - Primary audiences are host nation and regional publics
  - Work for AP local coverage to support a larger strategic article
- USARPAC
  - Press Conf at AUSA
  - Media coverage of panel at AUSA
  - Selected one-on-one interviews: AP (D.C. bureau); Army Times (both print and Defense News)
  - Center for Strategic Studies “Military Forum”
  - During FY 15, leverage CG AO circulation for one major U.S. broadcast and print as traveling media
Figure 5. Pacific Pathways Communication Campaign, Media Plan.\textsuperscript{73}

The Pathways communication campaign provided a functional model for bridging from Pathways 14 to Pathways 15. The intent was to focus communication efforts during Pathways 14, leading to increased interest in Pathways 15. USARPAC characterized Pathways 14 as a “proof of principle” from which to build.\textsuperscript{74} The “RTQ-only” policy was still in effect, however, which authorized only USARPAC to communicate Pathways. With the Pathways 14 unit preparing to deploy from Fort Lewis, Washington, to Indonesia in less than 30 days, I Corps and its subordinate unit PA teams needed to know what to communicate along with delegated authority to do so.

The USARPAC PAG provided the themes, messages, guidance, and authority for units to communicate Pathways once approved. USARPAC submitted the PAG to OSD-PA for approval after the 24 July 2014 Pathways Communication Plan brief. OSD-PA approved the PAG on 20 August 2014, while I Corps units were deploying to Indonesia for the first Pathways exercise. The PAG contained extensive Pathways background information, statements for public release, themes and messages, an extensive set of questions and answers, and guidance to subordinate PA staffs. In accord with OSD-PA recommendations to garner positive media coverage, public statements focused on Pathways' reliance on planned exercises as an efficient way to train Army units, rather than using Pathways to posture Army forces in the region for “crisis response.”\textsuperscript{75} Nonetheless, the crisis response theme remained embedded in some of the suggested questions and answers, although the public release portions of the PAG did not emphasize it.

I Corps developed and released its own PAG on 26 August 2014. It largely mirrored the USARPAC PAG, although it added links to Facebook sites for the individual Pathways exercises.\textsuperscript{76} Both PAGs emphasized to subordinate PAOs and units that all products had to be cleared through the U.S. Embassy PAO in each country prior to release.\textsuperscript{77} The late publication of the USARPAC PAG prevented USARPAC and subordinate unit leaders and staffs from conducting timely communication on Pathways and contributed to the potential release of information that did not support the USARPAC communication strategy. USARPAC reserved release authority of the public statement in the PAG. Although it intended to initiate a fully active PA campaign with its release on 1 August 2014, release did not occur until 29 August 2014. Entitled “U.S. Army’s Pacific Pathways Begins,” the release offered an improved version of the public statement from the USARPAC PAG, emphasizing the least controversial aspects of Pathways.\textsuperscript{78}

While no reporters volunteered to embed with the Pathways unit, the media, (including local Hawaii and Washington state news organizations), published a series of positive articles and videos from September through November 2014. DOD websites carried stories that closely followed, often verbatim, the USARPAC and I Corps PAGs’ themes and messages. Furthermore, the I Corps and 2/2 Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT) PAOs addressed an additional domestic audience: the soldiers participating in the exercise and their families. More than half of the 700 soldiers participating in the exercises had never been deployed. According to the Brigade Commander, “hundreds of these kids were in high school last year.”\textsuperscript{79} Unit representatives and exercise planners updated Facebook and exercise websites with stories, pictures, and videos from the Pathways exercises—all of which reinforced a positive Pathways narrative.\textsuperscript{80}

The USARPAC Pathways communication campaign launch event occurred on 14 October 2014. General Brooks hosted a panel discussion on the “Asia Pacific Rebalance and Pacific Pathways.”\textsuperscript{81} The panel included Ambassador Scott Marciel, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asia and the Pacific who characterized Pathways as a “Great example of DOD and DOS partnership.”\textsuperscript{82} General Brooks acknowledged, however, that “We did find that we had gotten out in front of our headlights, communication-wise.” For future Pathways, he continued “We have to be very mindful about not identifying the countries of the Pathway too
quickly, not until we finish the coordination. Even though the exercises did exist, the approach is different.”

In addition, General Brooks participated in the RAF panel and authored an AUSA *Greenbook* chapter, “USARPAC, Rebalanced and Beyond,” in which he highlighted USARPAC contributions to the Pacific rebalance, including Pathways.

Pacific Pathways 14 concluded in November and December 2014 with the close of Exercise Orient Shield in Japan, with redeployment of 2/2 SBCT, and with completion of After Action Reviews (AARs). Of the unclassified AAR comments currently available, only two were related to communication. During the I Corps AAR, USARPAC noted “Messaging needs to be developed earlier and better synchronized... at the theater level, we need to be prepared to deal with... and get ahead of counter-narratives.” Also, the 25th Infantry Division recommended “We need more assets to tell the Army story. There were a lot of missed opportunities with the numerous ceremonies through radio, television, publications, etc.”

**Communication Strategy Assessment**

Although the term “strategic communication” is commonly used in the military to refer to all communication efforts at the strategic, operational, and even tactical levels, joint and Army doctrine specifies that strategic communication is a national-level effort “focused upon effectively communicating national strategy.” Consistent with this doctrine, the USARPAC Pathways communication team developed a commander’s communication strategy for Pathways—not a strategic communication plan. The Pathways communication strategy had two major parts: the coordination phase and the communication phase.

**The Pathways Coordination Phase**

During the coordination phase, USARPAC used focused communication within the joint and interagency communities using personal communications, proceeded with no doctrinal method of assessment. Informally, USARPAC assessed the coordination phase effectiveness using the concept of “resistance.” Resistance, or the absence of resistance, attempts to measure the effectiveness of engagements. It does not, however, address the issue of initiating the right engagements. In the case of Pathways, USARPAC failed to initiate the right engagements because the early coordination efforts did not include DOS or host nation leaders.

Initially, USARPAC encountered more resistance at the Action Officer (AO) level than at the General Officer (GO) level. This is not surprising. As the USARPAC Exercises Director explained, “There was AO-level resistance to Pathways because the Marines were afraid the Army was competing with their mission, USPACOM was suspicious of the Army’s motives, the Department of the Army Staff pushed back, and I Corps exercise planners resisted changing how exercises were planned.” Resistance subsided after Admiral Locklear, General Odierno, and other senior leaders acknowledged supporting the Pathways concept: “Once the bosses voiced their support everyone thought it was a marvelous idea.”

In contrast, Major General Pasquarette—the former USARPAC Chief of Staff— noted that he encountered little resistance because General Brooks talked to Admiral Locklear early. Early in the coordination phase, for example, the MARFORPAC Deputy Commander informed General Pasquarette “The Pacific AOR is a big place and there is plenty of work to go around.” General Pasquarette also noted that when he coordinated with the DA staff on Pathways funding, he met no resistance.
The Pathways Communication Phase

During the subsequent communication phase, the PA Soldier Task “Conduct Media Content Analysis” is the standard used to measure the effectiveness of a communication strategy that uses the media. The standard analyzes media content in terms of frequency, context, and tone. Army doctrine defines these specifically as:

- Frequency: “How often was the key message or theme used?”
- Context: were messages or themes “…used as background information, supported the actual intentions or conditions, or directly quoted as the main subject of a media product?”
- Tone: was the media content positive, negative, or neutral?

The two types of context are referred to as “echoes” and “reflections” by most PAOs.

Because contractors have been hired to conduct media assessments over the past decade plus of conflict, few formal assessments have been conducted by military analysts. The Director of the Army Public Affairs Center, citing his own experience in Afghanistan, explained “We actually used contractors to conduct analysis because at the theater level it is quite work intensive.” The Army’s Office of the Chief of Public Affairs likewise employs contractors to conduct assessments of the “media space.” Because of the trend to use contractors for media analysis and the fact that PAO’s and staffs are constantly pro-active and communicating, neither USARPAC nor I Corps conducted formal assessments of their communication strategies. Both decided they had neither the time nor the resources.

A cursory review of articles related to Pathways, suggests that the media repeated sensational headlines and senior leader statements much more frequently than they conveyed PAG themes and messages; in fact, the media never repeated most of the PAG themes and messages. The Brookings Institution headline, “Army on the Wrong Path in the Pacific” exemplifies a repeated sensational headline. Problematic messages such as this appeared frequently in other defense and security blogs after the Brookings publication. The media also repeated memorable statements about Pathways 14 by General Brooks (contextual “reflections”) more frequently than it repeated official themes and messages (contextual “echoes”). Frequently incorporating direct quotes by General Officers in a positive story appears to be the most effective way to promulgate themes and messages in support of a communication strategy. While DOD websites, media outlets, and publications tended to quote themes and messages directly from PAGs and press releases, civilian media more closely attended to General Officer statements.

Recommendations

Based on this research and analysis, six communication-related recommendations for future iterations of Pathways are offered: (1) perform early stakeholder coordination; (2) allow for sufficient overall and communication-specific planning timelines; (3) anticipate and preempt counter-arguments; (4) plan for and resource communication assessments; (5) focus on communicating the essential selling points to the appropriate target audiences; and, (6) coordinate integrated strategic communication instead of conducting only a more limited communication strategy.

Early Stakeholder Coordination

Pathways planners did not identify all key senior stakeholders early in the planning process. They also failed to determine when to engage senior stakeholders in the coordination process. Using John Kotter’s Eight-Stage Change Process model from Leading Change, stakeholder identification and coordination are his second stage task designed to “create the guiding coalition.” Kotter emphasizes that:
Major transformations are often associated with one highly visible individual. No one individual...is ever able to develop the right vision, communicate it to large numbers of people, eliminate all the key obstacles, generate short-term wins, lead and manage dozens of change projects, and anchor new approaches deep in an organization’s culture.102

USARPAC only partially identified and coordinated with the required Pathways guiding coalition: USPACOM commander Admiral Locklear and Army Chief of Staff General Odierno. Optimally, USARPAC should have included the appropriate senior level stakeholders at OSD-PA and DOS to gain what Kotter describes as position power, expertise, credibility, and leadership.103 Creating this early guiding coalition of senior stakeholders would have facilitated subsequent coordination with additional stakeholders, including the affected U.S. embassy Country Teams, ambassadors, host nation leaders, and the OSD-P, DOS and DA staffs. For future Pathways activities, USARPAC should identify all joint and interagency stakeholders, especially those who should be part of the “guiding coalition.” USARPAC should brief them early, obtain their buy-in, and involve them in the entire process from concept development through execution.

Planning Timelines

USARPAC conceived, planned, and executed Pathways within one year. USARPAC could have mitigated risk by opting for a longer planning process, delaying the first iteration until 2015. A longer planning process would have allowed full coordination and perhaps prevented media coverage from jeopardizing concept execution by getting ahead of the coordination process. Leaders must, however, balance deliberation with establishing a sense of urgency—the first stage task in Kotter’s Eight-Stage Change Process model.104 By setting a goal of executing Pathways in 2014, General Brooks created a sense of urgency and even crisis among USARPAC and its stakeholders105 that may have been, to use Kotter’s words, “enormously helpful in catching people’s attention and pushing up urgency levels,”106 which happened with Pathways.

Nevertheless, to ensure effective communication and unity of effort, future Pathways planning cycles, regardless of duration, should be more inclusive from the onset. Additionally, USARPAC should tightly control media contacts and advise recipients of pre-decisional briefings of their confidentiality so as to minimize and possibly avoid inappropriate early release of information. Bringing the entire PA staff into the process sooner would facilitate earlier publication of the USARPAC PAG. This, in turn, would allow USARPAC and subordinate units to communicate Pathways proactively and prevent release of information that could (at least partially) foil the communication strategy.

Counter-arguments

USARPAC should anticipate counter-arguments early and include them in the Pathways narrative to prevent confusion and diminish controversy. Wargaming the coordination and communication process from multiple perspectives and frames of reference can help identify counter-arguments. USARPAC, for example, could have identified the Marine Corps “turf war” counter-argument by viewing Pathways from the perspective of the Marines or anticipating the inclination for the media to look for and exploit potential inter-service rivalries. Further, USARPAC could have preempted the false narrative of the “turf war” by communicating that Pathways units were not conducting amphibious operations, but were simply using sealift assets to move Army units to various training locations. Additionally, critics should be clearly and repeatedly informed that DOD Instruction tasks the Army to “conduct airborne and air assault, and amphibious operations.”107
Assessments

USARPAC should require all PA staffs involved in Pathways to conduct assessments of their communication efforts and then to resource them accordingly (including its own PA staff). In accord with joint doctrine, PA assessment includes “identifying, measuring, and evaluating implications within the operational environment that the commander does not control, but can influence through a coherent, comprehensive communications strategy established by early integration in the planning process.” As such, assessments of communication strategy require “monitoring, measuring and analyzing relevant information” such as media coverage and internet content. The Media Content Analysis model provides a useful means for conducting PA assessment. If the USARPAC and subordinate PA staffs cannot internally assess the effectiveness of their Pathways communication strategies, they should contract for assessment support or request augmentation to do so.

Target Audiences

The various characteristics and “selling points” of Pathways confused the multiple audiences receiving the message. Was Pathways a more efficient way of executing exercises? Was it another crisis response force? Was it a budget-saving measure? Was it a humanitarian assistance or disaster relief force? As USARPAC explanations of Pathways’ missions multiplied, the more it appeared the Army was simply reaching for relevance. Using its own “proof of principle” concept, USARPAC should have described the first iteration of Pathways in its simplest and most important terms. Once the “proof of principle” was clearly and effectively communicated, USARPAC could expand future Pathways selling points. In the words of OSD-PA, “let’s just stick with one idea.” An unclassified I Corps briefing on the Pathways concept contained perhaps the best message on Pathways: “Pacific Pathways accomplishes, more efficiently, what we are already doing, within and in support of existing policy, and with prior agreement of our allies and partners.” This effective one-sentence description, or something very similar, should have been the key Pathways message from the beginning. General Brooks encouraged the USARPAC staff to “tell the story in ‘plain speak’ and continue to sell the ‘brand’ of Pathways” during a November 2014 meeting. He also reinforced this position to the USARPAC staff, stating:

Do not overamplify Pacific Pathways…stay on the key points of Pathways…it is an innovation to what we have been doing for years. We are conducting a routine exercise. This is a PACOM directed event that is sanctioned by the U.S. government. Fight inaccuracy with accuracy.

With the basic theme established, USARPAC should specifically tailor themes and messages to each audience. Themes and messages, for example, that may resonate within the joint community—such as placing trained Army forces in theater for an extended period—may not resonate as well with Congress for whom a theme of budgetary savings may be more effective. General Brooks also stressed this to the USARPAC staff: “Tailor the message to the country teams and stakeholders. Where possible go direct to the country. Separate the exercise from the operation. Exercise discussions will go through the country teams, but the Pathways operation allows for direct discourse with the country.”

Although Public Affairs Guidance is not a script, PAO’s should be prepared to incorporate General Officer “quotable statements” into a “PAG by transcript” to “repeat and promulgate those things that have resonance” and increase the likelihood of positive media coverage. An Army Times reporter, for example, instantly tweeted General Brooks’ “We have to have more faces, in more places, without more bases” statement during the 2014 AUSA Convention. The reporter than recommended it as the “unofficial slogan for AUSA 2014.” Media sources subsequently used it in several articles.
Integration

USARPAC did not conduct early interagency coordination. This omission constrained USARPAC and its subordinate commands to use a communication strategy, rather than integrating PA activities as a component of a larger strategic communication effort in support of Pathways. USARPAC should use the interagency process to coordinate future Pathways and similar concepts to allow a unified and integrated communication effort using strategic communication (interagency), public diplomacy (DOS),117 and supporting communication strategies (USARPAC and subordinate commands). Raising communication efforts to the level of strategic communication would also make additional military and interagency communication assets (e.g., Combat Camera) available to support Pathways, along with the radio, television, and other outlets recommended in the I Corps AAR.118

Conclusion

USARPAC conceived Pacific Pathways as an innovative and efficient approach to exercise deployments in the Asia-Pacific region. USARPAC developed Pathways at a time when the Army as a whole struggled to tell its story, convey its relevance, and explain its importance—issues the Army continues to struggle with today. By building on the success of Pathways 2014 and incorporating these basic changes, USARPAC will be able to more effectively support the strategic rebalance to the Asia-Pacific. As part of the larger plan for Regionally Aligned Forces, Pacific Pathways can provide innovative, efficient, and regionally-focused training to rotating forward-deployed Army and joint forces while maintaining/building relationships with key partners across the region. In the words of Sydney Freedburg, USARPAC is “Reinventing the Army via ‘Pacific Pathways.’”119

Endnotes

5 Jeffrey Pool, Office of the Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (OSD-PA), telephone interview by author, December 5, 2014.
that we needed time for a convergence of our perspectives to happen." Robinson, email to author, March 15, 2015.

and signaled their support. . . . It was my assessment the State Department received different signals from their country contacts and

build C-1 units and then put them on a shelf to be used only in the event of war.”

are employed in the Pacific; Pacific Pathways will visibly display the adaptive nature of the Army;” and, “We can no longer afford to

Affairs (PA), Civil-Military Operations, Security Cooperation Program (SCP), Cyber, etc., into one Directorate.

Carlisle Barracks, PA, November 13, 2014.

FORSCOM (U.S. Army Forces Command), PACOM (U.S. Pacific Command), MARFORPAC (Marine Forces Pacific), SOCPAC


http://www.army.mil/article/113539/Army_seeking_in_depth_engagements_in_Asia_Pacific_theater

1. Organizations identified for coordination: “DA,

2. The initial planning team consisted of the Exercises and SCP Directors and their support staffs, until it was later expanded to the “communication team” (see note 18). James Robinson, former USARPAC SCP Director, email to author, March 6, 2015.


James Robinson, former USARPAC SCP Director, email to author, March 6, 2015.

USARPAC Deputy Commanding General – South, telephone interview by author, December 29, 2014.


13 Nielsen-Green, email to author, December 12, 2014.

14 Mathew F. Bunch, email to author, November 14, 2014; Samuel Membrere, USARPAC G7 Civilian, interview by author, Carlisle Barracks, PA, November 13, 2014.


17 Nielsen-Green, email to author, December 12, 2014.

18 Mathew F. Bunch, email to author, November 14, 2014; Samuel Membrere, USARPAC G7 Civilian, interview by author, Carlisle Barracks, PA, November 13, 2014.


22 The initial planning team consisted of the Exercises and SCP Directors and their support staffs, until it was later expanded to the “communication team” (see note 18). James Robinson, former USARPAC SCP Director, email to author, March 6, 2015.

23 U.S. Army Pacific, Draft Warning Order for USARPAC Exercise Pathways, 1. Organizations identified for coordination: “DA, FORSCOM (U.S. Army Forces Command), PACOM (U.S. Pacific Command), MARFORPAC (Marine Forces Pacific), SOCPAC (Special Operations Command Pacific), MSCs (USARPAC Major Subordinate Commands) and TECs (USARPAC Theater Enabling Commands).”

24 Despite the fact that, in the words of the SCP Director, “General Brooks clearly understood that patience and interagency coordination were the main requirements, and that anything outside of the process would distract from the real work at hand.”

25 “General Brooks and USARPAC had unfettered access to decision makers...for these exercises in Indonesia, Malaysia and Japan. General Brooks, in the course of normal engagement in Jul and Aug of 2014, built relationships with the Defense Ministers from Japan and Malaysia. Concerning Indonesia, the TNI (Indonesia National Defense Force) agreed to move a major exercise, Garuda Shield, from June to October 2014 to facilitate the aviation engagement. In short, these countries were aware of this concept and signaled their support. . . . It was my assessment the State Department received different signals from their country contacts and that we needed time for a convergence of our perspectives to happen.” Robinson, email to author, March 15, 2015.

26 Carle, telephone interview by author, December 11, 2014.


29 Samuel Membrere, USARPAC G7, “B4 Guidance,” email message to author, November 23, 2014. Some of the most notable statements by General Brooks that he would repeat and that the media would cover: “We are working to change the way Army forces are employed in the Pacific; Pacific Pathways will visibly display the adaptive nature of the Army;” and, “We can no longer afford to build C-1 units and then put them on a shelf to be used only in the event of war.”

30 In the words of the former SCP Director, “We began staffing the Pacific Pathways draft concept as soon as we had something to offer (23 November 2013). There were known risks in moving before the concept and supporting requirements were fully developed but we knew the earlier discussion on Pathways began, the higher probability of success.” Robinson, email to author, March 15, 2015.

31 The FPA reported to USARPAC in September 2013. Lisa Carle, email to author, March 9, 2015.
32 Ibid.
33 Pool, telephone interview by author, December 5, 2014.
34 Nielsen-Green, email message to author, December 12, 2014.
35 Ibid.
37 Matthew Kelley, former USARPAC G7, email to author, March 10, 2015.
38 Nielsen-Green, email to author, December 12, 2014.
39 Ibid.
40 Pasquarette, telephone interview by author, December 29, 2014.
41 In the words of the SCP Director, “This task took more than email. We worked the phones, leveraged senior leader engagement and held multiple meetings.” Robinson, email to author, January 7, 2015; Robinson, email to author, March 6, 2015.
42 Membrere, interview by author, November 13, 2014.
43 Nielsen-Green, email to author, December 12, 2014.
45 Ibid.
47 Interview with confidential source, December 9, 2014.
48 Nielsen-Green, email to author, December 12, 2014, Nielsen-Green, email message to author, November 20, 2014.
50 Ibid.
51 Nielsen-Green, email to author, November 20, 2014.
54 Marx, “The Wrong Path in the Pacific.”
55 Ibid.
56 Pasquarette, telephone interview by author, December 29, 2014.
58 Ibid.
60 Pasquarette, telephone interview by author, December 29, 2014.
61 Pool, telephone interview by author, December 5, 2014.
62 Ibid.
63 Ibid.
64 Nielsen-Green, email to author, February 23, 2015.
65 Brooks also believed that “Airing out differences in the press would exacerbate institutional barriers to communications,” and that “It was critical that those with equities had their say and that it was incumbent upon USARPAC to listen and fully consider their perspectives and concerns.” Robinson, email to author, November 26, 2014; Robinson, email to author, March 2, 2015.
69 Ibid., slide 2 speaker notes.  
70 Ibid., slide 2.  
71 Ibid., slide 3.  
72 Ibid., slide 6.  
73 Ibid., slide 7.  
74 Ibid., slide 2.  
75 Pool, email to author, December 5, 2014.  
76 I Corps, Pacific Pathways Public Affairs Guidance (Fort Lewis, WA: U.S. Department of the Army, August 26, 2014), 1.  
81 Brooks, “Pacific Pathways.”  
83 Brooks, “Pacific Pathways.”  
84 Brooks, “U.S. Army Pacific: Rebalanced and Beyond,” 110.  
85 Kristofer Hopkins, Executive Summary, Pacific Pathways 14 I Corps AAR (Fort Lewis, WA: U.S. Department of the Army, December 1, 2014), 5.  
86 Ibid.  
88 U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Information Operations, Joint Publication 3-13 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, November 20, 2014), II-5. “Strategic Communication: The Strategic Communication (SC) process consists of focused United States Government (USG) efforts to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable for the advancement of national interests, policies, and objectives by understanding and engaging key audiences through the use of coordinated programs, plans, themes, messages, and products synchronized with the actions of all instruments of national power. SC is a whole-of-government approach, driven by interagency processes and integration that are focused upon effectively communicating national strategy.”  
89 The “communication team” eventually consisted of the Foreign Policy Advisor (FPA), Security Cooperation Program (SCP) Director, Information Operations (IO) Director, Exercises Director, the interim Public Affairs Officer (PAO) and their support staffs. Robinson, email to author, March 6, 2015.  
90 Nielsen-Green, telephone interview by author, November 14, 2014. “Communication Strategy is a commander’s strategy for coordinating and synchronizing themes, messages, images, and actions to support strategic communication-related objectives and ensure the integrity and consistency of themes and messages to the lowest tactical level through the integration and synchronization of all relevant communications activities.” U.S. Department of the Army, Inform and Influence Activities, Field Manual 3-13 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, January 25, 2013), 2-4.  
91 Nielsen-Green, telephone interview by author, November 20, 2014.  
92 Kelley, email to author, January 7, 2015.  
93 Ibid.  
94 Pasquarette, telephone interview by author, December 29, 2014.  
96 Ibid., 3-118.  


100 Alayne Conway, Office of the Chief of Public Affairs, email to author, February 24, 2015.

101 Johnson, telephone interview by author, November 17, 2014.


103 Ibid., 57.

104 Ibid., 35-6.

105 “B4 (General Brooks) knew that if he allowed Pathways to run the normal gauntlet of interagency staffing and DOD budget processes it would never see the light of day. It is a fair criticism to say that there were mistakes, missteps and miscalculations but the bottom line is that when you do something as ‘radical’ as Pathways was at the time, you are going to break some China.” Kelley, email to author, March 9, 2015.

106 Kotter, Leading Change, 45.


109 Ibid., III-29.

110 Pool, telephone interview by author, December 5, 2014.

111 I Corps, FY 14 Pathways White Paper Concept Slides (Fort Lewis, WA: U.S. Department of the Army, July 30, 2014).


113 Ibid.

114 Ibid.

115 Nielsen-Green, email to author, February 23, 2015.

116 Army Times, Twitter post, October 12, 2014 (6:20 pm).


118 Kristopher Hopkins, Executive Summary, Pacific Pathways 14 I Corps AAR, 5.