HOW NATION-STATES CRAFT NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY DOCUMENTS

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FOREWORD

In some manner, shape, or form, every nation state in the international system has a national security strategy or strategies. These strategies are intended to guide the state as it makes its way through the labyrinth of challenges that every nation state faces in the 21st century. The strategy could represent the nation’s overall grand strategy or it could be a national security-related strategy for one particular issue, like force structure development for the armed forces. Strategy making is an art; not a science. Sometimes these strategies work and sometimes they do not. Some are effective and efficient as desired and others are less so. The focus for this assessment is how a nation state can craft the most effective and efficient national security-type strategy possible.

To address these key questions, the national security strategy development processes in this monograph were examined and contrasted in five different nation-states to determine the methodologies they employed. For each case study, members of the government who actually worked on the development of the national strategy document in question were interviewed. These individuals—civil servants, career military officers, and senior political appointees—all had a story to tell about the separate approaches to strategy formulation.

In the analysis of the strategy development processes utilized by Australia, Brazil, South Africa, the United Kingdom (UK), and the United States, it became apparent that there were both similarities and differences in the manner that each nation conducted its strategy formulation. But most important, each one of national strategy development processes was
found to contain elements that could have real value for those countries not employing those particular approaches. Australia and the UK were superb in ensuring true whole of government coordination, as well as concurrent application of the government’s budget process and the formal administration of a risk assessment for the given strategy. Australia and South Africa did a superb job in bringing civil society into their document formulation processes. Brazil was exceptional in the creation of detailed ways and means critical for strategy implementation. Finally, the U.S. approach included addressing all elements of national power, as well as the identification of potential strategy modifiers if the national strategy was found not to be working in certain areas.

Given the complexities of the 21st century in the national security arena, the Strategic Studies Institute believes that assessments like the one you are about to read will be crucial to both practitioners and academics alike to gain greater understanding for the most effective and efficient approaches to national strategy making in the 21st century.

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SUMMARY

Recent years have witnessed the emergence of a spectrum of comprehensive national security strategy-related documents that have been created, in part, to institutionalize the existence of national-level direction for a variety of national security issues and to do this at the unclassified level for the public audience of those democratic nations, as well as in some cases, for external audiences. The intent of this monograph is to explore the actual processes that nation states employ to craft their national security strategy-related documents. The focus is specifically oriented on how to perform such analysis for the development of national security strategies (NSS).

For each of the case studies in question, this monograph will address the oversight, strategic context, national interests and domestic political considerations, facts, and assumptions used to frame strategy development, objectives and measures of effectiveness, ways and means, risk assessment, the identification of a formal feedback mechanism, and who within the government had the final approval authority for the document. Five countries and their national strategy documents were selected for assessment: Australia, Brazil, South Africa, the United Kingdom (UK), and the United States. For each case, at least one national strategy document was evaluated per country and more than one department or ministry from the government’s executive branch participated in each nation’s document drafting process.

The Australian approach to national strategy formulation as demonstrated by the developmental processes utilized for the 2008 National Security Statement and the 2009 White Paper (WP) indicates a
clear focus on crafting whole of government coordinated documents. Participating actors would be found to be negligent if they did not coordinate. The formulation process emphasizes inclusion of the managers who control the fiscal means at every step of decision-making for these efforts. In addition, the risk analysis concept is becoming fully institutionalized. Finally, a wide spectrum of Australian civil society was formally solicited for its thinking on the major issues confronting the 2008 WP drafters.

The Brazilian 2008 National Strategy of Defense (NSD) represents the first national strategy of its kind in Latin America. In combination with the 2005 National Defense Policy and the forthcoming WP, Brazil is developing a systematic approach to the crafting of national strategy. Of particular note is the Implementation Measures component of the NSD and the associated degree of fidelity with the strategy’s ways and means. With the publication of the strategy, this approach provides the ministries and agencies responsible for strategy implementation with the planning information necessary to begin detailed execution.

Both the South African White Paper and Defence Review assisted the nation in moving beyond the apartheid era. The documents provided a national-level strategy for the defense establishment on its role in the society writ large, as well as the approach in the form of ways and means to execute that strategy with the nation’s armed forces in the near to midterm. These documents were guided in detail by the state’s legislative body and uniquely supported by the significant inclusion of civil society throughout the course of their development processes.

The evolution of the UK national strategy development process since 2007 has been significant, especially
with the inclusion and alignment of the means (fiscal resources in the budgeting process) and the utilization of the *National Security Risk Assessment* (NSRA) in analysis of risks and related national interests. This is especially true in the linkage between the NSS and the *Strategic Defence and Security Review* (SDSR), along with the connectivity between the ends, ways, and means contained in the two documents. While an excellent tool, one potential drawback of the formalized risk analysis process contained in the NSRA is that the strategy’s ultimate objectives may be framed more than they should be in terms of risks and challenges, rather than opportunities. Thus, the focus could be on problem solving as opposed to “goal seeking,” having the ultimate effect of inhibiting strategic thinking.

The U.S. NSS is the only complete whole of government national security document that the U.S. Government publishes. The NSS is best developed through coordination and collaboration with all government departments and agencies that have responsibility for both foreign and domestic national security concerns. This analysis reviews the development of three different NSSs: 2002, 2006, and 2010. These three were selected because they required the consideration of the many complex issues of the post-September 11, 2001 (9/11) world and because they were developed at the direction of two different Presidents representing two different political parties, and with the detailed support of three different national security advisors and associated National Security Council (NSC) staffs.
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The word “strategy” is used in a variety of contexts. There are business strategies, coaching strategies, financial strategies, and research strategies. . . . An organization develops a strategy based upon its mission or goal, its vision of the future, an understanding of the organization’s place in the future, and an assessment of the alternatives available to it, given scarce resources. . . . Development of a coherent strategy is absolutely essential to national security in times of both war and peace.¹

—Mackubin Thomas Owens

The basic principles of strategy are so simple that a child may understand them. But to determine their proper application to a given situation requires the hardest kind of work.²

—Dwight D. Eisenhower

INTRODUCTION

The need for security and the institutionalization of that security in national strategy and its associated documents is becoming a significant concern for nations in the 21st century international system. This need requires the development of national-level strategies that are designed with objectives that, if attained, can ensure the conditions necessary for security for a given actor in the international system can be met. Nations have always had a variety of strategies that were intended for use at the strategic or na-
tional level of government. That does not mean that they were either “good” or “bad” strategies or that they were in place at the right time for the right event. But they did frequently exist in one form or another. Most of these strategies existed in formal documents that were classified and not open to public scrutiny. More often than not, strategies that were focused on national security related issues like the overall foreign and domestic security strategies for the nation, as well as more specialized strategies like those designed to guide the nation’s military strategy, the development of the structure, roles, and missions for its armed forces, or perhaps a specific strategy designed for counterterrorism, were not set down in one definitive document. Rather, components of these types of national strategies that were in place for nations that functioned as democracies were either classified or, if unclassified, typically found in senior leader speeches, testimony before legislative branches of government, or in interviews or press conferences provided to the media. Recent years have witnessed the emergence of a spectrum of comprehensive national security strategy related documents that have been created, in part, to institutionalize the existence of national-level direction for a variety of national security issues and to do this at the unclassified level for the public audience of those democratic nations, as well as in some cases for external audiences.

There are several purposes for placing these national security strategies within the public domain:

1. They serve as a broad construct for government departments or ministries (as well as legislative and judicial bodies), to ensure that they understand the intent (approach or direction) that the elected senior leadership desires in selected national security areas.
In essence, a national security-related strategy can be “a unifying document for the executive branch (of a democratic government) . . . designed to create an internal consensus on foreign, defense, diplomatic . . . economic, (and homeland security) strategy.”⁴

2. These strategies can function to inform the legislative body within a democracy (e.g., Parliament, Congress) on the resource requirements for the strategy in question, and “thus facilitate the (fiscal) authorization and appropriation processes.”⁵

3. The documents have the ability to be a strategic communications tool for both domestic and foreign audiences. These audiences include the domestic constituents of a democratic state—those that are considered key to the election of a party in power such as lobbying groups or unions. It could also be directed at other actors in the international system, such as other nation-states or entities that are potential threats that are considered to be significant to the state developing the document. All of these audiences may change over time, depending on the issues faced by the crafting state during the course of the writing.⁶

The intent of this monograph is to explore the actual processes that nation-states employ to craft their national security strategy related documents. It is what Alexander George, the famed Stanford academic, calls process theory, the analysis of how to structure and manage the policymaking process.⁷ For the policymaking (or strategy making) process to have its greatest chance for success, George found that it should be able to: 1) Ensure sufficient information is available and analyzed adequately; 2) Facilitate the identification of the policymaking actor’s major values and interests, and ensure that the objectives are guided
by those values and interests; 3) Assure that a wide range of options, along with their inherent risks, are considered prior to determining the ultimate course of action; 4) Provide careful consideration of each course of action option; and 5) Be willing to accept that the policy (strategy) is not succeeding and learn from that experience. In the case of this research, the focus is specifically oriented on how to perform such analysis for the development of national security strategies.

For each case study in question, this monograph will include addressing the oversight (how and why it was determined to create the document), strategic context (identification of strategy stakeholders, legal issues, determination of prior/current policies and strategies), national interests and domestic political considerations (how were national interests determined and what were the domestic political considerations for the assessed document), facts and assumptions used to frame strategy development (what guidance was provided by the national leadership, and determination of any constraints or restraints, such as resource considerations like money or time for the strategy, what threats and opportunities were established for the strategy), objectives and measures of effectiveness (how were the objectives identified and measures of effectiveness for the strategy developed), ways (courses of action) and means (how were the resources required to conduct the courses of action established for the strategy), risk assessment (how was risk assessed, such as political and monetary cost, second and third order effects, along with the identification of potential spoilers to the strategy such as unanticipated actions that an opponent might take or the occurrence of natural events like poor weather, and modifications to the strategy that could be employed
to address these spoilers), the identification of a formal feedback mechanism (created to formally review progress of the strategy’s implementation on a regular basis; intended to determine when and if adjustments had to take place), and whom within the government had the final approval authority for the document.

The content of the questions described above were addressed to support the analysis of each of the identified case studies and originated with the U.S. Army War College’s National Security Policy Program’s (NSPP) Policy Formulation Model. Those questions contained in the Model had been developed, expanded, and updated on an annual basis between 2004-11 by the students and faculty in each succeeding NSPP class. The Model, with applicability for both policy and strategy formulation, identifies a series of variables or directive steps to be addressed in the national security policy or strategy formulation process. In effect, it was designed to serve as a detailed checklist that could be employed for the crafting of any type of national security-related policy or strategy. These questions are intended to represent a comprehensive listing of all questions that those charged with formulating policy and strategy would have to consider in their analysis. Sequencing of the questions, the order that they are engaged, is secondary to the concept that they must be asked. Most important is that all the questions were taken into account by the end of the formulation process. Given the assumption that these are the right questions to consider, then risk would be taken by the actor doing the crafting in every instance that the substance of the questions were either partially or fully not part of the strategy’s analytic process. The risk could be manifested within the strategy by issues such as less support within the government’s
executive body and/or legislative body if the document is not fully coordinated. In turn, this could mean that the resources may not be available to ensure that the strategy can be fully implemented.

The monograph then aligned the questions to individual case studies of nation-states conducting their national strategy document formulation processes. These case studies were selected based upon a determination of two primary factors: 1) The nation-states in question had developed national security strategy documents that involved participation in the drafting process from more than one department or agency from the executive branch of government; and, 2) Individual participants who were involved in the actual drafting process would be willing to respond to the questions delineated above, either in person or by written response. In addition, subject to travel resource availability, an effort was made to have as many different regions of the world as possible represented in the review. Ultimately five countries and their national strategy documents were selected for assessment: Australia, Brazil, South Africa, the United Kingdom (UK), and the United States. For each case, at least one national strategy document was evaluated per country, and more than one department or ministry from the government’s executive branch participated in each nation’s document drafting process.

Once the data were gathered, the author of the monograph compared and contrasted the various processes employed by each nation in its strategy document development. This included the identification of the separate components of the strategy formulation process utilized for each one of the assessed national strategy documents. Using the questions as the common analytic tool, the cases were then evaluated
in contrast to each other. The comparative analysis demonstrated both the positive and negative impact of how the formulation process questions were addressed in each case; or in some cases, not addressed at all.

The last portion of the monograph evaluates the lessons learned from all five cases and identifies specific lessons that could be applicable to strategy document formulation for any future actor engaged in the process. These ranged from how to ensure maximum agreement on the strategy among all relevant national security actors within the whole-of-government framework, the most advantageous way to engage civil society in the national strategy formulation process, and how best to identify national interests and development of a sound risk assessment process, to crafting valuable detail on the strategy’s ways and means that could best be utilized by planners, direct linkage of the national security strategy to a strategic defense review type document, similar to the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) in the United States, and the identification of potential spoilers to the strategy and modifications that could be employed to adjust the strategy accordingly. In the end, the key question addressed was: was the strategy development process as effective and efficient as it could have been? If the crafting process was assessed to be flawed, it is likely that the resulting strategy was also flawed in some manner. The ultimate intent of this monograph is to attempt to determine lessons from these case studies that will contribute to minimizing future national security strategy developmental flaws for any nation undertaking the development of these documents.
WHAT IS NATIONAL SECURITY AND ITS RELATED STRATEGY DOCUMENTS?

The concept of national security is directly related to the notions of both security and nation or state, and their relationship to each other. But writing in 1952, Arnold Wolfers made it clear that the idea of national security “may not mean the same thing to different people.”\(^1\) In 2008, Ann Fitz-Gerald affirmed the same view on differing definitions of national security in the contemporary period when she stated that “national security differs from country to country, and indeed from institution to institution.”\(^2\) The reasons for these varied interpretations are diverse. The two principal explanations for the national differences lie with different perspectives on national interest. These different perspectives are largely inherent in the respective strategic culture of each nation-state.

Security as a separate idea also has broad interpretation. The term itself points to a degree of protection of acquired values, to include the absence of threats to those values and the absence of fear that those values will be attacked. It is a value for which “a nation can have more or less” and “aspire to have in greater or lesser measure.”\(^3\) Walter Lippmann described the measure for the attainment of security as: “A nation is secure to the extent that it does not have to sacrifice its core values, if it wishes to avoid war, and is able, if challenged, to maintain them by victory in such a war.”\(^4\) That may have made sense at the time of Lippmann’s writing in 1943, but for purposes of this analysis, the concept of security will be measured beyond the issue of war and the military instrument of power. Over time, the idea of security within the international system has broadened to reflect varying
degrees of the union of national military and defense related security with that of domestic/homeland security, as well as to ensure the inclusion of the state, civil society, and the individual. In the 21st century, the overall security concept is being looked at to encompass a “country’s society as a whole” and to include addressing transnational threats ranging widely from energy security, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and catastrophic natural disasters to population growth, pandemic disease, climate change, and global poverty.  

David Baldwin identified seven specific questions for the analysis of the security concept: Security for whom? Security for which values? How much security? From what threats? By what means? At what cost? In what time period? In response to these questions, security for a given nation could be characterized with respect to how the nation’s values are to be secured, the specific values being addressed, the degree of the security to be attained, the kinds of threats that the security must direct itself to, the means for coping with such threats, the costs for doing so, and the relevant time period. The characteristics provided by the national answers to these questions will help determine the real extent of a country’s perspective on what security will consist of for the nation in question. These characteristics are likely to be significantly influenced by how the state actors choose to define the concepts of national interest and strategic culture on behalf of the nation; in turn, this will lead to a determination of how the state defines national security for itself.

A national interest is “that which is deemed by a particular state (actor) to be a . . . desirable goal.” The attainment of this goal is something that the identifying actor believes will have a positive impact on itself.
Realization of the interest could enhance the political, economic, security, environmental, and/or moral well-being of a populace and the state (actor) or national enterprise to which that populace belongs. This holds true within the territory of the actor, as well as in any external relations that the actor may undertake outside of the administrative control of that actor. Interests are essential to establishing the objectives or ends that serve as the goals for policy and strategy. They help answer questions concerning why a policy is important. National interests also help to determine the types and amounts of the national power employed as the means to implement a designated policy or strategy.

The concept of interest is not new to the 21st century international system. It has always been a fundamental consideration of every actor in the system. They are what the actor values. These interests could be designed purely for the sake of advancing the power of an actor with the object of attaining greater security for that actor, or they might be guided by values and ethics with the intent of doing some type of good for parts of the international system, or the overall system in general. This might include collaboration and coordination with other actors in the international system. It could also require the interest-crafting actor to subordinate certain interests that only benefit it for the sake of other interests that are of greater value to additional actors in the system. In addition, interests are typically categorized and determined by intensity or prioritization. Terms like survival, vital, critical, major, serious, secondary, extremely important, important, less important, humanitarian, and peripheral have been used to categorize interests in academic writings and official government documents. Some
categorize how significant the interest is in terms of chronological relationship to the actor that determines the interest (near-term versus longer-term impact), while others relate categories to the intensity of the substantive influence that the interest is determined to have on the actor. All of these questions are directly influenced by the strategic culture of the nation actor in question.

Thomas Mahnken explains that strategic culture “is that set of shared beliefs, assumptions, and modes of behavior, derived from common experiences and accepted narratives (both oral and written), that shape collective identity and relationships to other groups, and which determine appropriate ends and means for achieving security objectives.” The concepts of the national interest and national security are framed by the strategic culture associated with each of the five national case studies being assessed in this monograph. Each of the national strategic cultures refers to modes of thought and action with respect to force, derived from perception of the national historical experience, aspiration for self-characterization . . . and from all of the many distinctively (national) experiences (of geography, political philosophy, of civic culture, and ‘way of life’) that characterize a citizen from that nation.

“Geography and resources, history and experience, and society and political structure” represent a nation’s strategic culture. Examples include the UK, which as an island nation has traditionally favored sea power and indirect strategies and avoided the maintenance of large land forces, while “Australia’s minimal geopolitical status, its continental rather than maritime identity, and its formative military experiences have shaped its way of war.”
The combination of national interests with strategic culture, and a country’s understanding of what its security concerns should be, leads to the identification of what the idea of national security will mean for an individual nation-state member of the international system. Some countries view their national security on a global basis, others regionally, and a third group focuses on their immediate borders and internal domestic security issues. Once determined, the next step is the association of the terms “national” and “security” with the concept of strategy.

Strategy, different from policy, which answers the question of what to do about something or why something is to be done, is the response to the question of how to implement or execute the policy—it is “how something is done.” It’s “a plan for deploying capabilities to achieve policy objectives.” The U.S. Department of Defense defines strategy as “a prudent idea or set of ideas for employing (all) the instruments of national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater, national, and/or multinational objectives.” These ideas provide a structure for a direction in the role of a guiding path through the maze of international (and domestic) events, which are, in turn, linked to ultimate objectives. Most importantly, strategy is a calculated or deliberate relationship between ends and means, intentions and capabilities, and power and purpose. It reconciles what the actor crafting the strategy wants (objectives) with the resources available (capabilities) to meet the wants (attain the objectives). For nation-states, a national strategy contributes to the country’s effort to “best cause security for itself.”

These strategies specifically designed to “cause security” come under the heading of national security strategy. A nation’s national security strategy “rep-
resents a nation’s plan for the coordinated use of all the instruments of state power—nonmilitary as well as military—to pursue objectives that defend and advance the national interest.”

The term “national security strategy” describes a “planned, systematic, and rational process . . . shaped by strong leaders, organizational cultures, and governmental structures.”

This process is intended to result in a country’s written “public, authoritative declaration about the manner in which it intends to achieve its security objectives within” both the international system and its own domestic security environment. These are official strategies that are written and published by governments.

In fact, there are a number of different types of formal strategy documents that address national security issues within the international system, each with its own descriptive name. The most well known examples are labeled: national security strategy, white paper, strategic defense review, and national defense strategy. Of these, the most comprehensive one is typically described as the given nation’s “national security strategy.”

A nation’s national security strategy can serve a variety of purposes. Citing a number of different sources, Sharon Caudle indicated that a successful national security strategy could provide the ability to: communicate a detailed strategic vision of the current and future security environment; communicate the nation’s values; present a comprehensive analysis of the range of threats to the homeland; consolidate the government’s various national security related policies and strategies; present prioritized and measurable goals and objectives with timelines; identify the international and domestic factors such as comparative capabilities, issues, and trends that will impact the
attainment of security goals and objectives; develop a whole-of-government approach to national security policy and strategy making that encompasses all relevant departments and agencies; identify the courses of action and resources (ways and means) to be utilized to attain national objectives and provide guidance to governmental departments and agencies for budgeting, planning, and organizing their responsibilities for implementation of the national strategy; and serve as a link between the strategy’s objectives and courses of action designed to attain the objectives as a tool for requesting resources.32

The ultimate value for a publically declared national security strategy is best determined by the true intent of the originators. The key question that frames the purpose for the drafters is whether the strategy is primarily intended to be a realistic strategy that has the ability to attain its ends with the available resources or, rather, is more of a strategic communications tool that will declare the nation’s national security focus for external international consumption as well as justification for domestic governmental resourcing requirements. The first formal American national security strategy (National Security Strategy of the United States), drafted in 1987, was characterized as a useful document that “brings together familiar statements of American foreign and defense policies . . . it also sets out . . . American interests and objectives . . . and lists some of the threats to those interests.” But that NSS was also described by the same commentator as not having “set forth the priorities and choices which are the essence of the strategy.” Such strategic fidelity could only be provided in a classified document.33 The result is that some national security documents may be more useable for the whole-of-government
national security community, depending upon the actual intent for the creation of the document.

One of the key features of national security strategies that provides value to subordinate policy and strategy makers is the inclusion in the document of that nation’s grand strategy, sometimes termed strategic vision. Grand strategy “is a conceptual framing that describes how the world is, envisions how it ought to be, and specifies a set of policies that can achieve that ordering.” A grand strategy represents the “grand design” and presents “the overall mosaic into which the pieces of specific policy (and strategy) fit.” It is the “unifying concept” that guides or directs all other national security related policies. National policy can only be established after overarching national security aims and objectives have been identified. It is the grand strategy that determines those aims and objectives. Grand strategy becomes a function of the “national intent” within the strategic environment. In hierarchical terms, grand strategy represents the highest level or type of strategy. In the end, national security strategy and other types of national-level security-related strategies will serve to implement a grand strategy.

Additional types of national security-related strategy documents include what is termed a white paper. A white paper is the title given to an “official government report in any of a number of countries (primarily in the UK-led Commonwealth of Nations), including Great Britain, Australia, New Zealand, and Canada, which sets out the government’s policy on a matter (typically for a single functional vice regional policy issue such as defense or counterterrorism).” Like documents also include strategic defense reviews (known in the United States as the QDR), which are efforts to link national interests and courses of action
(ways) to support those interests with the military resources required (forces, personnel, infrastructure, and material) to ensure that the nation possesses the military capability to ensure its security. It allows the government to identify the strategic security environment that it will have to plan against. “The Review looks at the type of force desired in the future and helps to plan adequate resources to achieve it.” Other titles for these documents include national defense, military, and counterterror strategies.

All of these national security documents in their different shapes and sizes can be grouped into a hierarchy of sorts. There is a relationship amongst the documents at each level of the national strategy formulation process: “the logic at each level is supposed to govern the one below and serve the one above.” In this case, the national security strategy with the inclusion of a nation’s grand strategy would serve as the strategic standard for all subordinate national strategy documents. “The other documents are, or should be, logically related to if not derived from it.” The national interests defined in the NSS would help to orchestrate supporting functional security strategies. Australian and UK strategic defense reviews and white papers are in support of national security strategies, and the U.S. National Military Strategy (NMS) supports the U.S. National Defense Strategy (NDS) and the NSS.

The single most important question to be addressed is whether there is a “best” way to develop these documents. An associated question is the determination of the amount of risk that the nation could be taking by not employing certain approaches to national strategy document development. For example, some argue that the crafting of a national strategy is normally a “multi-disciplinary and multiagency exercise.” If the strategy
development process does not involve the participation of all the required government actors, then the strategy itself is likely to be flawed. Following this line of thinking, no single government department or agency would be capable of mastering the contemporary security environment to the degree necessary to craft national security strategy documents without the active participation of other like government actors. Following this line of thinking, no single government department or agency would be capable of mastering the contemporary security environment to the degree necessary to craft national security strategy documents without the active participation of other like government actors.44

Understanding the risk of crafting these documents in one way or another may help determine the overall ability of the final strategy to attain its objectives. As examples, there is risk in utilizing a whole-of-government approach where every department and agency has a say in the strategy’s development; the strategy could be “watered down” with every agency’s concern being listed and no specific identified focus. In the opposite vein, there is also risk associated in only having a very small group of individuals work on the documents, with only minimal whole-of-government coordination taking place; because such an approach lacks the assurance by the other governmental actors that all the predetermined ways and means will be available to attain the strategy’s objectives. In the end, it is likely that the individuals who actually conducted the national strategy drafting, in conjunction with the government departments and agencies that they represented in the process, will be able to resolve whether the strategy in question will prove its worth. The following pages will help assess whether the effort was worth it.
CASE STUDY: AUSTRALIA

The Australian government has never published a whole-of-government-like national security strategy, but there are a number of national strategy documents that delineate the country’s national strategy. For this evaluation, they are the 2008 National Security Statement (NSS) and the 2009 Defence White Paper: Defending Australia in the Asia-Pacific Century: Force 2030 (WP).\textsuperscript{45} While the focus of the analysis will be on the process utilized to develop the 2009 WP because it provided the most significant whole-of-government detailed strategic approach for an entire strategy development process and because “defence consumes around 90\% of all government funding for national security,”\textsuperscript{46} the NSS document will also be addressed, in part, because it was the first of its kind. The 2009 WP is considered the principal strategic document for the nation because it provides an overall framework that other national strategy documents can draw from for their own foci.\textsuperscript{47} These defense white papers, essentially a combination of the NDS and the QDR, establish “the Government’s long-term strategic direction and commitments for defense as well as future capability requirements.”\textsuperscript{48} Following a tradition of “strategic basis” papers since 1953,\textsuperscript{49} the 2009 WP was the fifth defense white paper to be published, with the first taking place in 1976, and the last one occurring in 2000, with updates in 2003 and 2005.\textsuperscript{50} The shift to a broader whole-of-government perspective began after the events of September 11, 2001 (9/11) and the expanded emphasis on the threats of terrorism, failed states, and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation.\textsuperscript{51} In addition to the actual WP itself, the developmental process “included the commissioning
of eight internal companion reviews, an intelligence capability review . . . a defence procurement review, together with a separate comprehensive audit of the Defence budget.\textsuperscript{52} The process involved the Department of the Prime Minister and the Cabinet, the National Security Committee of Cabinet, the Secretaries Committee on National Security, as well as the primary drafting elements in the Department of Defence (DoD).

The NSS, a first of its kind part of the Australian national security formulation process, is not a strategy but is rather designed to provide “a strategic framework to drive policy development in the various departments . . . with responsibilities for . . . national security.” It was presented to Parliament in December 2008 in the form of a speech, rather than a written document, by Prime Minister Kevin Rudd and was intended to give the “context for the Defence White Paper, which will detail the way forward for . . . defence over the next 20 years.” It also was designed to “inform a regular Foreign Policy Statement to the Parliament . . . shape the Counter-Terrorism White Paper . . . guide the development of the Government’s first National Energy Security Assessment . . . (and) incorporates the recommendation of the Homeland and Border Security Review.” In essence, the NSS would serve to connect the diverse elements of the Australian national security community into a coherent and coordinated “whole.” The NSS also delineated the nation’s enduring national interests and ends, providing specific direction for all national security related strategy documents, one of which was the 2009 WP.\textsuperscript{53}

During the 2007 election, the Labor Party argued that with the dynamic changes that had taken place in the global security environment and the fact that
no WP had been published since 2000, a new one was essential for a new Labor government in office. Examples cited that described those changes included: the events of 9/11 and the terror bombings in Bali, London, Madrid, and Jakarta; wars in Afghanistan and Iraq; the emerging risk of WMD transference to threatening nonstate actors and Iran; and huge shifts in the global distribution of power. Another part of the Labor Party’s justification for the new WP was also directed at their view of a need for greater discipline in the force development equipment acquisition process for the armed forces. Shortly after the November 2007 election, newly elected Prime Minister Rudd directed the production for a new WP. There is no legislative requirement for the crafting of national security strategy related documents in Australia. Thus, the publication of the WP can be viewed as the most politically effective way for a “new government to demonstrate its commitment” to address emerging national security problems for Australia. A Labor Party Policy Document released just prior to the 2007 election indicated that a “new defence white paper will ensure that Australia’s defence capability requirements are achievable and shaped by our long-term strategic priorities, rather than short-term political objectives.” A rigorous analysis of the connections between strategic objectives, force planning, and capability priorities was promised, to include ending a long time disconnect between strategic guidance and force structure planning.

After the 2007 election and owing to the changing and uncertain strategic outlook for Australia and the world, one of the earlier national security commitments made by the Rudd Government was to produce a WP every 5 years. In the year before a new WP is
developed, the government committed itself to produce “a strategic risk assessment, a comprehensive force structure review, and an independent audit of the Defence establishment to confirm the affordability of capability plans and make adjustments, should circumstances dictate.” In essence, the Labor Government intends to institutionalize an overall review of Australia’s national defense strategy on a regular basis.

The Australian cabinet-based system of government has a singular advantage for the coordination of strategy formulation. It is usually able to resolve interagency disagreement at the Deputy Secretary level because all officials in an Australian ministry below the level of the senior official in the ministry (the Minister) are civil servants. There are no other political appointments below the level of that single most senior individual. At the same time, those in the decisionmaking system must be sensitive to the current political climate in order to be able to operate within the senior level of the government’s political framework. The Prime Minister’s expectation is that coordination both within and external to departments is the norm. While not working seamlessly, coordination and collaboration have been institutionalized within the Australian national-security related interagency for at least 30 years. It is a relatively small community and most civil servants know each other “quite well.” If the civil servant does not coordinate, that individual will not be in compliance with government policy and will not be promoted. Success for a civil servant will not be achieved in Canberra by conducting “one upmanship” against another department.

The writing itself was led and conducted by the DoD. The NSC staff concept is not a strong one in
Australia and this motivates the Prime Minister to look to the department responsible for creating the strategy to synchronize the whole-of-government effort. Mr. Michael Pezullo, Deputy Secretary of Defence (counterpart for the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy in the U.S. system) was the leader and lead author for the DoD team that actually drafted the document. He was assisted by two senior officials, Major General John Cantwell and Ms. Maria Fernandez, individually responsible for force structure, information technology, and human resource issues, and the eight internal companion reviews of defense organization. Approximately 100 career military officers and Defence civil servants participated in the WP drafting effort, “of which 30 were in the dedicated core drafting team and the remainder spread across various Defence agencies doing specific work on force structure issues or the companion reviews.” The Minister of Defence appointed his own three-person advisory panel of senior defense experts to act as his own sounding board. During the drafting process, the panel met approximately every 6 weeks to advise the minister.

The National Security Committee of Cabinet (NSC) also met regularly at the ministerial level (equivalent to the U.S. National Security Council [NSC]) in 2008 to address the development of the WP, including a long discussion early in the process on Australia’s strategic outlook. The NSC is the senior level Australian “decisionmaking and coordinating body for national security matters and consists of “the Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Minister, the Treasurer, the Ministers for Foreign Affairs and Defence, and the Attorney-General.” In addition to the formal NSC meetings, individual ministers met over the course of the year to discuss specific elements of the WP. Prime Minister
Rudd, his fellow NSC minister members, and the finance minister, Mr. Lindsay Tanner, were extensively involved with the WP’s development throughout the crafting process. The entire process began in December 2007 and lasted for 20 months until May 2009.\textsuperscript{61} Given the involvement of the senior Labor Party officials at the helm of the government and civil servant leadership participating on the drafting team, the 2009 WP was a combined product of both top down and bottom up approaches to the substance of the document.\textsuperscript{62}

The members of the drafting team actually proposed the specific organizational structure for the WP document. There has been a general core conceptual structure for all prior WPs. This included addressing the environment, relationships with other nations, risks, trends, strategic interests, resulting tasks and roles for the Australian Defence Force (ADF), and capabilities required by the ADF. A primary difference between the five WPs is the emphasis placed on these specific subject areas.\textsuperscript{63} As an example, the threat of terrorism to the Australian homeland received more emphasis in the 2009 WP than in the four previous ones. This was as a result of events like the 9/11 attacks and the bombing of tourist resorts on the island of Bali in 2002 and 2005.

The creation of a dedicated team from DoD to develop the document allowed for a synergy to be developed in the coordination process for the WP. The team was able to obtain whatever support was required from DoD because of the senior rank of Michael Pezullo; the Prime Minister expected him to operate as a national level leader. He held weekly meetings with the Defence Minister and received decisions on a monthly basis from him. Pezullo also met regularly
with the Strategic Policy Coordination Group (SPCG), a U.S. Policy Coordination Committee (PCC) equivalent group consisting of senior level civil servants from a variety of national security-related ministries like Defence, Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), and the Attorney General. The SPCG then provided analysis and recommendations for WP issues to the Secretaries Committee on National Security (SCNS), a U.S. Deputies-level equivalent body at the second tier of government that is “the peak inter-departmental body to advise [the] government on policy and expanded operational matters.” It is chaired by the Secretary of the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, has strong National Security Advisor involvement and, thus, has a great deal of influence. The SCNS had the primary responsibility to ensure two-way feedback for the whole-of-government coordination process between the drafting group and the senior government decisionmaking bodies during the entire course of the development of the WP.

In addition, Pezzullo and his team had access to the highest levels of the Australian Government to receive guidance for the document. He could speak directly to the Chief of the Defence Force (CDF) if necessary because Pezullo reported directly to both the DoD Secretary and to the CDF. The Service Chiefs and the Vice CDF were Pezullo’s peers, and he could deal directly with them. Finally, the Department of Finance (equivalent of the U.S. Office of Management and Budget) was brought in to work with the drafting team from the very beginning of the process.

Different from the WP, the NSS was primarily drafted by one individual, Ms. Sarah Guise from the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, under the guidance of Angus Campbell, First Assistant
Secretary, Office of National Security, and Duncan Lewis, Deputy Secretary. The Statement was also coordinated though the SPCG to ensure maximum whole-of-government coordination; approximately 12 different departments and agencies were involved in the process, to include the budgeting community (Department of Treasury). NSS stakeholders included both foreign and defense as well as homeland, border security, and domestic economic actors, along with the general public, which was more an audience than a stakeholder because it was not consulted on the development of the NSS.\(^67\)

The major stakeholders for the WP document were the armed forces (both as an entity and any capabilities the forces acquire), the separate military services, DFAT, and the Departments of Finance and Treasury (overall money affordability) for the budgetary process.\(^68\) In particular, the two budget-associated departments were very rigorous in their efforts to ensure that the military operated within its fiscal means. Owing to the fact that the global financial crisis took place in the middle of the WP drafting process, there was an increasing need to ensure fiscal responsibility for the WP. As a result, the WP directed the Strategic Reform Program for Defence to save $20 billion from the administrative/support components of DoD over the next 10 years, which could be reinvested into new capabilities.\(^69\) Regardless of whether a Coalition or Labor government is in power, there has traditionally not been any opposition to defense issues from Parliament. In reality, the Australian Parliament is not a major stakeholder in the development of a DoD WP; the government is elected to govern and there has typically been a bipartisan approach to defense. In the Australian political environment at the time, there
was strong political pressure, and an expected electoral price to be paid if the government were unable to fund WP execution. In the end, there was no major parliamentary involvement in the development of the 2009 WP.\textsuperscript{70}

Seeking recommendations, the NSS drafting effort consulted up to as many as 12 different think tanks and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), like the Australian Strategic Policy Institute. The drafters also examined the national security strategy efforts of other nations, to include the United States, UK, Canada, Singapore, and the Netherlands, to determine lessons learned.\textsuperscript{71}

It was determined to formally bring civil society into the WP decisionmaking process at an early stage. This was done to determine how much the Australian people would be willing to spend on defense in the form of fiscal resources because civil society is considered to be a key part of the Australian audience for the WP.\textsuperscript{72} The Government sought the thinking of the population though the White Paper Community Consultation Program. It was “an extensive effort to engage Australians from all walks of life, as well as defence specialists, academics, business and industry representatives from State and Territory governments.” To make this work, the WP Consultation Program panel headed by Mr. Stephen Loosley, former Senator and Parliamentary Chairman of the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, widely disseminated a 52-page paper that identified key questions for civil society groups and individuals to address. The three key questions were: “1. What role should our armed forces play? 2. What kinds of armed forces should we develop? and 3. Can we afford such forces?” People were invited to contribute by attend-
ing meetings that would be announced in their area and/or submitting written input; 30 public meetings and 35 private meetings were held in every state and territory over the course of a 10-week period. Over 600 people attended the public meetings. The WP Consultation Program panel also received 450 written submissions. The Report’s Findings were released in April 2009, in time to be utilized in the drafting of the WP. It provided input from all sides of the spectrum of society that reflected a broad range of the Australian people, both pro and con in terms of the strategy and its fiscal resourcing component.

The foreign audience was also considered very important for the WP document because Australia wanted to convey complete transparency to its regional neighbors. The intended outcome would be that, with the strategy and force development results of the process, the other regional powers would not view Australia as a threat.

Threat analysis was coordinated by the working group director. He could request specific assessments from separate intelligence community agencies, as well as industry, as relevant.

Australian strategic culture has been fairly consistent since the first WPs and strategic assessments were crafted in the mid 1970s. There is continuity between the five identified national interests in the 2000 WP and the four interests in the 2009 document. Security of the homeland remained the principal national interest in all WPs. The primary national interest changes for the 2009 WP relate to a desire to develop and maintain an expeditionary posture for the armed forces as well as a continental posture for the Australian continent. At the same time, the NSS indicated “that Australia’s national security interests are more complex and less
predictable than in the past . . . international and domestic security issues intertwine.”

When determining Australian national interests, both what they were and their levels of importance in relation to each other, those doing the evaluation found that the importance of any national interest for the WP increased in direct proportion to geography, based upon potential identified missions for the nation’s armed forces. There has always been tension for Australia between geography and alliance engagement and between regional priorities and global interests. In describing the detailed analysis of the approach from an Australian perspective to determine how to define the nation’s national interests, three key national security variables were identified that should be included in the determination: geography related to the location of potential threats and opportunities for Australian security, risk involving the significance of what instruments of national power would be employed to address or not address those same threats and opportunities, and policy concerning how and in what quantity the country chooses to contribute to the international system: having Australia doing its share in the lead or as a contributor within the international community, in peace or conflict. This last national security interest related to how Australia viewed itself as a “good citizen” of the world community in relation to its role in the world and its willingness to support “purposes beyond ourselves.”

Australian strategic culture dictates that unless countries in the developed world, like Australia, address what they term “disfunctionality” in the international system, then “bad” things like the spread of terrorism will take place.

In descending order of interest, the closer geographically to a potential area of a required military
operation, the greater the importance of the interest to the nation. Thus, the closer the threat challenge or the opportunity, the greater the importance of the interest. In the Australian case by level of national interest, there was assessed to be more importance for a national interest associated with the defense of the Australian continent than the need to ensure local regional stability in the South Pacific, followed by stability in the Western Pacific and Eastern Indian Ocean area (relations with China could fall into this category). The last and least important national interest considered for security, was what was termed “broader area operations;” where the entire spectrum of force might be applied on a global basis somewhere in the world in support of a multinational operation. For the ends of the strategy, it was agreed to develop a strategically effective course that that could meet the WP’s minimum established needs.

The WP’s detailed ways and operational means were formulated at a classified level and placed in a separate classified document. Much of the ways and means analysis was done through addressing the individual scenarios in a wargaming process designed to evaluate their capacity for actual execution. The intent was to test the military’s capability to perform in each scenario.

At the beginning of the strategy development process, the WP was considered to be resource unconstrained. However, the coming of the 2008 global financial crisis changed that approach, and a decision was made to concurrently address fiscal resource means. For the means of the WP, the 2009 document was crafted for long-term implementation, to include a funding planning horizon out to 2030, 21 years into the future; far longer than its four WP predecessors.
In principle, the government pledged funding for the execution for the ways contained in the WP, extending for the entire 21-year period. No prior Australian Government had prepared detailed financial defense plans beyond a 10-year horizon.\(^{87}\) “The government has committed to sustainable funding arrangements for the defence budget for future years to provide certainty for planning . . . to meet the growing cost of military equipment.”\(^{88}\) The assumption is that the fiscal resources will be in place for WP implementation; the document was written in consonance with the resource planning effort. Development of the NSS was also resource constrained, “consistent with the government’s fiscal strategy and . . . budget rules.”\(^{89}\)

The NSS did include addressing threats to the nation, but there was no identification of the threats or risks of the threats in terms of prioritization (most or least important). One informal analysis was made of the number of citations in the NSS that addressed challenges or threats. It indicated that terrorism and violent extremism were cited 27 times as the most discussed threat or risk, and drugs, arms, and trafficking were only addressed once in the document. In between the two risk subject areas were 18 other related issues, with 9 citations for the highest to 1 for the lowest that could be defined as threat risks to Australia.\(^{90}\) Clearly, the evaluation of risk and its associated threats in the NSS indicated that this part of the assessment remained immature.

A highly classified risk assessment was conducted for the WP. This was the first one conducted for any WP. For the first time with the 2009 document, the Australian government utilized a coherent and coordinated whole-of-government approach to risk evaluation for a WP.\(^{91}\) Risk analysis for the strategy was found to
still be an art and not a science.\textsuperscript{92} The Australian Government developed a Strategic Risk Assessment (SRA) methodology that assesses potential risks, probability, seriousness, and consequence. It is designed to assess for priorities and differentiate between force structure options. There were four components to the risk management framework: 1) Risk Context (strategic outlook, policy goals and objectives, and an assessment of the Government’s tolerance for risk against the risk being evaluated; 2) Risk Assessment (risk identification, analysis—the likelihood and consequences of the risk, and evaluation); 3) Risk Treatment (identify measures to reduce risk and the consequences of the risk by lessening the likelihood of an event occurring); and 4) Risk Review (addressing residual risk and regularly monitoring and reviewing risk).\textsuperscript{93}

The Australian DoD conducted a formal series of workshops during July 7-18, 2008, that performed a risk analysis focusing on the likelihood (from almost certain to occur once a year or more frequently to very rare/almost incredible to occur only once in 1,000 or 10,000 years) and consequences of risk (ranging from a high of catastrophic to a low of minor) in support of the 2009 WP. Likelihood was based on intelligence assessments. The consequence assessment was based on policy, intelligence, and consequence management input for the “development, maintenance, and management of critical national systems, infrastructure, or capability.” Most critical was the impact of the risk events being evaluated. Based on the outcome of the workshops, modifiers or “risk treatment” for the WP were developed in the August-September 2008 period. They were assessed in terms of implications for force structure, force posture, and international defense relationships.\textsuperscript{94}
The risk assessment evaluated a range of both potential external conventional conflicts, regardless of likelihood, such as between the United States and China, and domestic issues like disaster relief. Risk profiles were created by type of risk and the associated force and its operational posture. Part of the risk analysis involved a review of potential spoilers to the WP strategy. The working group performed the potential spoiler assessment by reviewing possible scenarios such as the impact of Pakistan devolving into a failed state, if the monarchy fell in Saudi Arabia, as well as if there were a lack of fiscal resources or if for some reason the political will of the Australian people had been diminished or changed. Based upon those spoiler scenarios that were reviewed, a series of war games was held to review the scenarios and determine what types of modifying ways and means could be employed to influence the spoilers in relation to the originally proposed WP strategy. These contingent spoilers and modifiers were then set down in the classified risk assessment for the WP.  

At the conclusion of the strategy formulation process and after the government had completed formal coordination and approved the final document, implementation for both the NSS and the WP were reviewed on a quarterly basis each year by the Department of the Prime Minister and the Cabinet. This was accomplished by their analysis of a spreadsheet submission made by the DoD of its evaluation of progress being made towards WP supporting objectives or “targets” contained in each of the document’s chapters; it included the identification of lead and supporting agencies and proposed timelines for strategy implementation. The cabinet implementation unit of the Department of the Prime Minister and the
Cabinet did quarterly reviews to track implementation of key government commitments, to include that of the 2009 WP. The review process for the NSS was a bit different—in instead, some of the major elements were split out and reported on individually, including by the Department of the Prime Minister and the Cabinet. The quarterly review process of government approved national-level policies and strategies had a long time tradition within the Australian government. Each department has been required to submit its assessment of the progress or lack thereof being made of the policies and strategies that it was responsible for, especially in light of how it was doing to meet the electoral commitments made by newly elected governments.  

In addition to the quarterly review process that the Australian government has developed to continuously review the 2009 WP, the DoD also published a document in 2010 that lays out the Australian Government’s approach to the major components of strategy formulation as it relates to individual government strategies, to specifically include the NSS and the WP. Titled The Strategy Framework 2010, it is intended for three audiences: senior DoD decisionmakers, DoD staff that use or prepare the documents that this publication addresses, and any other interested parties in the overall government that want to understand the DoD approach and how it aligns itself within the government for strategic guidance. Replacing the last Strategy Framework edition published in 2006, the 2010 edition lays out the process that the government uses “to synchronize the formulation of strategic guidance, strategic planning for operations, international engagement, preparedness management, and capability development. It aims to guide planners to
create strategic-level documents that are congruent, coherent, and comprehensive."\textsuperscript{97}"

The Australian approach to national strategy formulation as demonstrated by the developmental processes utilized for the 2008 NSS and the 2009 WP indicates a clear focus on crafting whole-of-government coordinated documents. Participating actors would be found to be negligent if they did not coordinate. The government utilizes a well institutionalized approach that ensures consistent participation on the part of all interested departments and agencies of the Australian national security community. The formulation process also emphasizes inclusion of the managers who control the fiscal means at every step of decisionmaking for these efforts. In addition, the risk analysis concept is becoming fully institutionalized.\textsuperscript{98} Finally, a wide spectrum of Australian civil society was formally solicited for its thinking on the major issues confronting the 2008 WP drafters. In the end, the Australian government has crafted a very sophisticated approach to the development of national security strategy documents.

**CASE STUDY: BRAZIL**

Although the armed forces have wanted it since the end of World War II, the 2008 *National Strategy of Defense* (NSD) is the first ever national level national security-related strategy published by the Brazilian government.\textsuperscript{99} This document was intended to serve as the implementing strategy for the *National Defense Policy* published in June 2005. The decision to craft the national defense strategy was catalyzed by two primary factors: the perception that Brazil was having an increasing influence on the world stage, and the gov-
ernment’s belief that that a gap existed in the part of Brazilian legislation that governed the direction of the armed forces. There was also a desire to engage Brazilian society through the NSD to obtain their support for the armed forces and, thus, ensure that they were a part of any defense strategy-related decisions to be made within the democratic process. This promotion of the relationship between the society and the armed forces is intended, in part, to ensure that the composition of the armed forces reflects the makeup of the current Brazilian society, thus making it a reflection of the Brazilian nation as a whole thru mandatory military service.

The actual decision to create a national strategy of defense was codified in a National Decree by President Lula da Silva on September 6, 2007, which established a Ministerial Committee to “design the National Strategy of Defense” for the next 10-15 years. The Ministerial Committee was chaired by Minister of Defense (MOD) Nelson Jobim and coordinated with Minister-in-Chief of the Secretariat for Strategic Affairs (the planning ministry for the entire government) Mangabeira Unger. These two ministers, in conjunction with President Lula da Silva determined the primary contents of the document. The Ministers of the Planning, Budget, and Management Ministry, Finance Ministry, and Science and Technology Ministry were also involved, as were the commanders of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. While the NSD was intended to be inclusive by the government, there was a perception that other Ministries were not so involved in the document’s contents.

For the Ministerial Committee, while the MOD had overall responsibility for the document’s development, Minister Unger and the Strategic Affairs
Ministry were initially responsible for directing the document’s drafting effort and ensuring coordination with all other involved government actors. The Ministerial Committee received little or no guidance for the document at the beginning from any senior leaders. No constraints were imposed on what the finished product should look like.\textsuperscript{103} The Ministry’s Defense Advisory Division, consisting of two active officers from each of the three services, along with one retired Army colonel and a civilian professor, conducted the actual writing of the NSD’s first draft. Work began in the September/October 2007 timeframe and continued until the NSD was approved in December 2008.\textsuperscript{104}

The Ministerial Committee had many meetings with the three services and traveled around the country to visit numerous military bases to meet with each of the seven 4-star general regional commanders of the Brazilian Army, as well as to naval units, defense education facilities, and research and development centers.\textsuperscript{105} In addition, roughly 10-20 academics were consulted on the document. While all were heard, the three services contributed the greatest amount of input, by far, for the document.\textsuperscript{106} The Ministerial Committee also consulted with experts from outside the government, to include “various public and private agencies, as well as knowledgeable citizens in the area of defense.” This included think tanks, retired military officers, and former ministers of the services.\textsuperscript{107} There was discussion about the potential to bring in the general society’s public audience, but it was decided that it would unreasonably lengthen the drafting process and, thus, there was no conscious attempt to engage with that component of civil society as an entity for input for the document. Towards the later part of the document’s development, the Ministerial Committee
also consulted with the Defense Front in Parliament (an informal grouping of parliamentary committees that had an interest in national security), particularly the Permanent Commission on Defense and Foreign Affairs.\textsuperscript{108} In the end, if there was disagreement within the Working Group, the group ultimately reached a consensus in dialogue with the MOD and the nation’s senior leadership.\textsuperscript{109} President Lula da Silva presented the NSD recommendations for approval to the National Security Council (NSC).\textsuperscript{110}

Later in the process, a Working Group was established that consisted of representatives from the Ministry of Defense and the Armed Forces. This Working Group consisted of about eight general officers and 30 officers at the rank of colonel or navy captain. While the other three ministries were not represented on the Working Group, they were able to review and comment on the NSD drafts. The Working Group began its work in the April/May 2008 timeframe after receiving the Ministerial Committee’s first draft, and completed its draft in June 2008. This second draft was then transmitted back to the Ministerial Committee.\textsuperscript{111} Minister Unger had a continuous dialogue with the services, which resulted in numerous adjustments to the various drafts of the document. Some of the changes resulted in change to verbiage, but not necessarily to the ideas that Minister Unger wanted to convey; they remained in the Strategy. This included continuation of the draft as a demonstration that all classes of society would be committed to the security of the nation. Both the Defense and Strategic Affairs Ministers personally worked on the final document. When there was disagreement that would not permit compromise, the MOD position prevailed. Once complete, a last draft was transmitted to the chiefs of the Armed Forces for
formal approval; they were given 24 hours for any last comments since they had been involved through their staffs in the entire drafting process from the very beginning. The draft then went to the President who convened the National Defense Council (NDC) with senior representatives from all involved ministries in attendance. This represented the first meeting of the NDC ever conducted. The NDC issued a decree supporting the document and forwarded it to the Parliament, also known as the National Congress, for final approval. It was actually the 35th draft of the document that was published.\textsuperscript{112}

The NSD is oriented on the development of medium- to long-term actions along three key axes: “reorganization of the armed forces, restructuring of the Brazilian defense industry, and management of personnel in the armed forces.” There are three additionally associated defense sectors that are addressed: cyber, space, and nuclear.\textsuperscript{113} All had to be addressed within the context of the 2005 National Defense Policy. The NSD also had to ensure that there were no contradictions with, and must be in support of, the 2004-2007 Brazil for All Plan.\textsuperscript{114} Approved by the Brazilian Congress in August 2003, it established overarching development objectives for the nation to include social inclusion and reduction of social inequalities, environmentally-sustainable economic growth generating employment and income and reducing regional inequalities, and promotion and expansion of citizen empowerment and strengthening of democracy.\textsuperscript{115} In addition to other Brazilian strategic documents, as part of their preparation, the drafters also reviewed the national strategy documents of other countries, to include U.S., French, and German national strategies.\textsuperscript{116} Historically, the national interests were orient-
ed on the former antagonisms in the south. But it was recognized that in the 21st century, there are other issues of greater import to the Brazilian people. The national interests that were identified for the NSD came directly from the Objectives of National Defense as addressed in the National Defense Policy of 2005. The origin of the 2005 document’s interests came from the 1988 Federal Constitution and its subsequent amendments. These interests represented a combination of internal components for Brazilian society like sovereignty, territorial integrity, and “preservation of the cohesion and national unit” of the Brazilian populace, as well as external interests of regional stability, the contribution for the maintenance of peace and the international system, and a broader insertion of Brazil into international decisionmaking processes. The principle of noninterference with other countries was also to be codified as a guiding interest. None of these were specifically listed as national interests in the NSD, but all those directly involved in the drafting process that were interviewed for this monograph confirmed that the national defense objectives from the 2005 document represented the national interests that guided the 2008 NSD. The intent behind the utilization of those interests was to affirm “the commitment of every Brazilian citizen, both civilian and military, to the . . . virtues of sovereignty, heritage, and territorial and national unit integrity, within a wide framework of democratic fullness and of total respect to our neighbors.” None of the interests were prioritized; all were considered to have had “the same degree of importance for defense.”

For assumptions and facts that were employed by the NSD drafting group, formulation of the NSD was not constrained by any limitation on fiscal resources.
It was intended to be a resource unconstrained strategy. It was felt that the society would be convinced to provide the fiscal resources necessary to implement the NSD after publication.\textsuperscript{122} The identifiable threats were developed under the direction of Minister Unger and ranged from the lack of societal participation in matters of national defense and budget insufficiency to the obsolescence of military equipment and the restrictions on technology transfer placed on Brazil by more advanced countries.\textsuperscript{123}

The ends or objectives for the NSD were derived directly from the national interests (Objectives of National Defense) that were contained in the 2005 national policy document.\textsuperscript{124} In essence, the national interests became the ends for the strategy. It was very important for the drafters to take into account the flexibility and adaptability of Brazilian culture, and a sense of people doing the best for the country, when determining the interests that would establish the objectives for the NSD.\textsuperscript{125} For the NSD, the real origin of these ends began with the 1988 Federal Constitution, which in turn directly influenced the Objectives of National Defense contained in the 2005 National Defense Policy. In addition, other less formal guidance to the drafting group was found in senior level speeches on foreign and defense policy. It was a combination of the data found in the both the formal documents and less formal guidance associated with the speeches that led to the final acceptance of the Objectives of National Defense and the Guidelines chapters in the National Defense Policy document as representing the strategic ends for the NSD. The Guidelines chapter contains 26 national security related focused objectives that could be considered supporting objectives for the ends found in the Objectives of National Defense chapter. There were
no measures of effectiveness developed for any of the strategy’s objectives. In part, this could be because so many of the objectives—like maintenance of the nation’s sovereignty and heritage and sustaining its territorial integrity—are long-term permanent goals with no real end in sight.\textsuperscript{126}

The armed forces do utilize measures of effectiveness for the implementation component of the NSD. These were derived by utilizing the Balanced Scorecard Performance Measurement System developed by Drs. Robert Kaplan and David Norton for the Balanced Scorecard Institute headquartered in the United States (Cary, North Carolina). “Leading and lagging measures are identified, expected targets and thresholds are established, and baseline and benchmarking data is developed.”\textsuperscript{127} This performance measurement system was obtained from the American Armed Forces by Brazilian officers during travel to Washington, DC, in 2005. In the case of this strategy, the focus is on the objectives established for the individual services. One example was the establishment of an office on the Army Staff (Strategic Follow Up Section in the Policy and Strategy Directorate) to orchestrate the measures of effectiveness for Army supporting objectives connected to the designated ways and means in the Implementation Measures portion of the NSD. This office conducts an assessment of the difference between what the Strategy designates as objectives and what can be resourced to attain the objectives.\textsuperscript{128}

The strategy’s ways and means were developed for inclusion into the Implementation Measures section of the NSD. Some of the detailed ways and means came from service military planning documents, some of which were classified. The section included detailed delineation of guidance for the actors (departments
and agencies) that will be required to implement the strategy, such as direction to the three services of the armed forces that they must develop three sets of plans for detailed force structure development, with established goals for the short term (up to 2014), mid-term (from 2015-22), and the long-term (from 2023-30). Additional sections of the Implementation Measures section originated with other ministries, like the Scientific and Technology and Defense Industry sections from the Ministries of Science and Technology, Development, Industry, and Foreign Trade; all in addition to the MOD and the services. Another such example would be the Ministry of Interior for developmental issues. These ministries were brought into the NSD Implementation Measures development process on an as needed basis for their expertise as the executing ministry for a particular course of action (way), and not for every issue.

The detailed ways and means in the Implementation Measures section provided a real degree of fidelity for the ministries charged with implementing the NSD. The content of this section was developed by Minister Mangabeira and the Strategic Affairs Ministry. It was based upon a determination of both vulnerabilities and opportunities that could be employed to address those vulnerabilities. This was exemplified when the MOD insisted on maintaining the comment describing the “obsolescence of most of the equipment of the Armed Forces.” The MOD Working Group proposed eliminating the comment drafted by the Ministerial Committee. Minister Jobim overruled the comment’s elimination because he believed that he could employ it in the final document to justify increases to the defense portion of the national budget. Each executing ministry was identified by the issue it was
responsible for, along with the provision of suspense dates indicating when implementation planning documents in direct support of the NSD were required to be complete.\textsuperscript{132} This section actually provided the planners located in the associated ministries with the information necessary to begin the execution of the tasks established by the NSD. The details made the Implementation Measures section absolutely critical to the success of the Strategy and, in turn, represented a major contribution to national strategy development for the nation.

Some select risk assessment did take place in the development of the NSD. This was the case with the proposal to commit 2.5 percent of the gross national product (GNP) to future defense spending. Such an increased fiscal commitment would greatly speed the modernization of the armed forces. However, it was assessed that the risk to other parts of the economy was simply too great to permit such a redirected outlay of fiscal resources. In the end, the proposal did not go forward to the nation’s senior leadership for consideration because of the risk assessment.\textsuperscript{133}

After the MOD and the Minister of the Secretary of Strategic Affairs came to agreement on the NSD, they forwarded the document to the President for his approval. The President then met with the members of the National Defense Council to obtain their views, which resulted in agreement and formal presidential approval on December 18, 2008.\textsuperscript{134}

While there was no formal feedback mechanism that described the status of the NSD when in an execution status, the drafting committee did develop the Final Provisions annex to the NSD, which determined additional planning documents to be developed based upon the evolving implementation of the strategy.
These were to be complementary to the strategy itself and could require adjustment as the separate plans were executed. As an example, in 2009, the MOD directed the Army Staff to create an NSD implementation strategy for the Army. It was then codified in the Complementary Defence Act No. 136, signed in August 2010, that the NSD must be updated by the MOD and submitted to the Parliament every 4 years. In addition, the legislation further stated that a new White Paper document, to be published in 2012 and intended to complement the NSD, would elaborate in detail on how the NSD would be implemented. Each new presidential regime will be required to publish this document in the second year of its administration.

The Brazilian 2008 NSD represents the first national strategy of its kind in Latin America. In combination with the 2005 National Defense Policy and the forthcoming White Paper, Brazil is developing a systematic approach to the crafting of national strategy. Of particular note is the Implementation Measures component of the NSD and the associated degree of fidelity with the strategy’s ways and means. With the publication of the strategy, this approach provides the ministries and agencies responsible for strategy implementation with the planning information necessary to begin detailed execution.

CASE STUDY: SOUTH AFRICA

The South African national strategy development process was unique with respect to the other four case studies because it primarily originated with the ending of the apartheid regime and the first truly democratic election in the history of the Republic. Conflict
between the former regime and the African National Congress (ANC)-led opposition was decades old by the time that the first truly all inclusive elections were held in April 1994. In effect, the new national strategy and its associated drafting process was a product of revolution. It was a new South Africa and with that came the recognition that all issues associated with defense and the South African armed forces would have to change.\textsuperscript{138}

The Parliament’s Joint Standing Committee of Parliament on Defence (JSCPD) requested a new budget for the armed forces shortly after the new government was installed in mid 1994. In reviewing the budget submission by the South African National Defence Force (SANDF), which still had a senior leadership from the apartheid era, Parliament found the submission oriented on a pre-1994 defense posture and policy; it was a repetition of the past, focusing on defense strategy and force structure and not addressing issues like civil-military relations, democratic control of the armed forces, the racial and gender make up of the force, language, and religious policy.\textsuperscript{139} The JSCPD then informed the Minister of Defence that it would not approve a new budget until a comprehensive defense policy review was conducted; this led to the processes that resulted in the 1996 \textit{White Paper on National Defence for the Republic of South Africa} (White Paper) and the follow on 1998 \textit{South Africa Defence Review} (Defence Review), designed to implement the White Paper’s recommendations for the SANDF.\textsuperscript{140}

While there had never been a comprehensive national security strategy developed for South Africa that employed the strategic model used by the UK, there was a history of white paper strategic documents going back to the 1970s.\textsuperscript{141} The 1996 White Paper contains the government’s grand strategy and defense policies.
It “is concerned with countering military threats; with the orientation, preparation, maintenance, and employment of armed forces; and with the procurement of weaponry and military equipment.”¹⁴² In support of the policy framework (“political guidance”) and strategic direction established by the White Paper, the Defence Review elaborated on the “policy framework through comprehensive long-range planning on such matters as posture, doctrine, force design (there were 4-5 options addressed), force levels, logistic support, armaments, equipment, human resources and funding.”¹⁴³

While the armed forces were focused on the definitions for its roles and missions, along with its force structure and size for the new government, Parliament and the Minister of Defence (MOD) were far more concerned with issues relating to governance and management, with an orientation on civilian oversight over the armed forces. This would include the specific oversight that Parliament would be able to maintain, accountability on the part of the armed forces, transparency in all that they were responsible for, and the creation of a new civilian Defence Secretariat (similar to a civilian staffed component of the U.S. Office of the Secretary of Defense¹⁴⁴). As a result of this orientation, both the White Paper and the Defence Review became products, in part, of these varied demands as opposed to the result of a single requirement to craft a national defense strategy and develop the force structure to execute it. Under the direction of Committee chairs, initially Mr. Tony Yengeni, followed by Ms. Thandi Modise, the Parliament’s JSCPD served in the role of the governing actor that would ensure that all government demands were met by the
documents. The JSCPD was created with an oversight function over the armed forces because there was a high level of mistrust by the new government from the apartheid era for the SANDF in the immediate pre-1994 period. The Committee was given the responsibility “to investigate and make recommendations regarding budget, functioning organizations, armament policy, and state of preparedness of the SADF; and to perform other functions relating to parliamentary supervision of the armed forces as may be prescribed by law.” After receiving what it considered to be an inadequate proposed equipment acquisition strategy for the armed forces from the MOD, the JSCPD also mandated a comprehensive review of national defense requirements, resulting in the creation of the new Defence Review.

During the course of the formulation process and after the MOD publically published a first draft of the White Paper in June 1995 with an invitation to all South African citizens to comment on it, the JSCPD received over 90 written submissions and held three “consultative conferences” on the contents of the White Paper before approving it. The Defence Review included even more civil society participation than the White Paper, and to ensure that all interested stakeholders in the society were allowed input, three “national consultative conferences” were held between February 1996 and May 1997, and two rounds of regional workshops were held in nine different provinces throughout the country in both July 1996 and May 1997. The conferences and workshops were open to the public, with attendance “by national and provincial parliamentarians, members of political parties and government departments, and a broad cross section of the defense establishment and civil society” (business, labor,
clergy like the Catholic Bishops Conference, NGOs such as Green Peace, and local community leadership\textsuperscript{149}). The Defence Secretariat went to great lengths to ensure that the public participated, including flying large numbers of civil society representatives (e.g., NGO directors and clergy and local community leaders) in aircraft to ensure that they could attend conferences and workshops.\textsuperscript{150} It was the inclusion of civil society with the multiple workshops and conferences over the course of drafting both documents that substantially lengthened the drafting process. But once the JSCPD approved the documents, passage through Parliament and Cabinet was fairly easy.\textsuperscript{151}

At the beginning of the drafting and coordinating process in the 1994-95 time frame, there was no real integrated interagency-type system of governance in the country. This did not come about until 1999. There also was no NSC-type entity in place until 2000.\textsuperscript{152} Thus, for the actual drafting that took place during this period, the Minister and Deputy Minister of Defence had overall responsibility for the development of both documents and “[both were] the manager[s] of the processes leading to [their] formulation.” For the Defence Review, a main Defence Review Working Group appointed by the Minister of Defense and coordinated by the civil servants in the Secretariat for Defence, with sub-working groups or sub-committees, was established and included MOD personnel (serving members of the armed forces), members (civilian) of the new Defence Secretariat, SANDF personnel (a colonel or Navy captain was provided to the main Working Group by each of the uniformed services\textsuperscript{153}), Members of Parliament and, most interestingly, individual members of civil society organizations (CSOs), to include the academic community and NGOs. The
Working Group specialist sub-committees on “defence posture, functions and force design, human resource issues, Part Time Component (reserve force), the arms industry, legal issues, and land and the environment.”  

In some key areas of the documents, the primary work was conducted within “security clusters” with personnel from the MOD, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the intelligence community, and the police. Although up to 40-50 people may have attended the meetings as members of individual working groups, only about eight of these individuals performed the actual written drafting of the separate chapters in each document.

There was a hierarchy of outside involvement. In what the MOD called “stakeholder consultation,” the Defence Secretariat differentiated between “stakeholders” and “interest groups.” Stakeholders had an “immediate material interest in the process and its outcomes, (government departments, trade unions, the military defence industry, parliament)” while interest groups had an interest but not a material stake in the outcome (academics, NGOs, think tanks, and other CSOs). This permitted the Working Group to focus on attaining consensus with stakeholders, but not necessarily with interest groups, although their views were taken into account. While the MOD was technically “in charge” as the responsible department for developing the two strategies, the JSCPD and Parliament as a whole were definitely not going to be “rubber stamps” as they constantly questioned and reviewed the documents, and were responsible for approving the policy substance of the documents along with the budget required to execute them. In fact, the JSCPD was very active throughout the White Paper development process and “insisted on ratifying the
drafts line by line.” With Parliament’s final approval with multi-party support, after the Cabinet had ratified the document, the MOD described the White Paper as representing a national consensus on defense policy.157

A synthesis among all the participants in the drafting process took place over the course of 17 separate drafts of the White Paper. Issues that could not be agreed to between the more traditional SANDF uniformed personnel, all of whom had served in the armed forces before 1994, and the civilians in the new DoD, many of whom had served with or for the ANC in support of majority black rule, were referred to the JSCPD.158

Both approaches were designed to guide the future direction of the nation’s armed forces. But they were also intended to inform neighboring countries and regional organizations like the African Union (AU) and the South Africa Development Community (SADC), as well as the greater international community like the United Nations (UN), on South Africa’s national security orientation. A key component was to be the assurance that South Africa would not intimidate its neighbors. In addition, the documents communicated the changes in the missions of the nation’s armed forces since the end of apartheid to civil society as a whole. This included target audiences throughout the breadth of South African society: the electorate, the media, and separate civil society organizations.159 CSOs consisted of civil institutions like think tanks or academic bodies that address issues such as human rights, democracy, and governance; civil society engagement; small arms and light weapons; peacekeeping and conflict resolution; anti-corruption; and terrorism and organized crime.160 The inclusion of South
African civil society stemmed from an acknowledged lack of expertise within the government in certain related areas, “as well as the perceived need to legitimize the security architecture that (had been previously) associated with repression and apartheid.” This was in the tradition of the “Bush Conference,” which was a gathering of the elders of a tribe. The elders have the responsibility to listen to all members of the tribal family and then bring the information to the attention of the tribal chief. The tribal chief will then make a decision. This was the role of the JCSPD and resulted in the very strong tradition of ensuring that the voice of the people is heard.

The involvement of civil society was an especially important component of the audience for national security at this time in the nation’s history because the concept of national security was changed by the end of apartheid. In essence, (defense) policy was no longer considered to only be the prerogative of the President and MOD. In the post-apartheid South Africa, it had also become the business of Parliament and the relevant CSOs. Their involvement significantly influenced the White Paper strategy to be structured for a “primarily defensive orientation and posture . . . (that was) reactive or strategically defensive.” This was a significant change from the “proactive and strategically offensive strategy of the apartheid era.”

Civil society’s expanded participation in the development processes also compelled the White Paper to emphasize “the importance of ensuring robust and stable civil-military relations in a democracy,” another very important change from what had taken place during apartheid.

Identification of the national interests for the White Paper was directly linked to the Preamble of the new
South African Constitution that was approved in 1996. Domestically, the emphasis for the interests was on the nation’s reconstruction and development program, while externally regional security became the key interest. Taking direction from the Constitution, domestically, the consolidation of the nation’s new democratic political system, achievement of social justice, economic development, and a safe environment to live in were the national interests with the highest priorities. Externally, the highest interests were the defense of the country and regional security. A key external interest was confidence building with neighboring states to demonstrate that South Africa had neither the intent nor desire to intimidate them, and that no preemptive operation against any of them would ever take place. Most importantly, security would no longer be viewed as primarily a military concept. “The security of people and the non-military dimensions of security, (known as human security), have gained prominence.” It would now have “political, social, economic, and environmental dimensions.” The concepts of “democracy, social justice, economic development and environmental protection” were to be considered more important for enduring security than “large arsenals and standing armies.”

The result of the analysis of national interests is that a new security hierarchy had been developed for the post-apartheid South African nation. In effect, defense had become a subset of socio-economic development policy. The nation’s Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) became the highest component of national policy, with defense policy taking a subordinate role. This approach had the added effect of iden-
tifying the need to reallocate fiscal resources for the RDP and curtailing military spending.¹⁷¹

Because of the higher prioritization of the domestic interests, it was clear from the beginning of the drafting process that defense expenditures would have to be reduced, necessitating a strategy that would be resource constrained. The guidance received for the drafting team from both Deputy Minister of Defence Ronnie Kasrils and the JSCPD was that the White Paper approach must be “needs driven but cost constrained” for the guidance that would shape the SANDF’s future force design and structure.¹⁷²

Rather than a traditional orientation on threats to the state, the Defence Review strategy was based upon a risk analysis. “The strategy was driven by defining defence contingencies and their associated risks, and (then) prioritizing (the strategy’s mission capability requirements for the armed forces)” in relation to the greater risks. The four principal resultant ends for the capabilities of the armed forces were developed by the risk analysis: self defense, regional security and peace support operations, international obligations, and internal support to civil authorities. These became the primary missions for the post-apartheid SANDF. Over the course of the strategy crafting process, there were 93 different contingencies developed, with their concepts of operation (the strategy’s “ways”) for addressing the four primary missions. “These were evaluated for effectiveness through war gaming techniques.” Various force structure elements (means) were applied and assessed for each mission via the gaming. The intensive gaming approach permitted the drafters to optimize the Defence Review’s “ways and means to ensure the greatest possible risk reduction within various budgetary envelopes.” This approach allowed final recommendations to be “made with full knowl-
Some believe that while many concepts of operation and force design options were reviewed and war-gamed, the final strategy was based entirely on an assessment of the likely budget, which was then divided up to give each service enough money “to prevent squeals of outrage.” Thus the budget drove the national strategy rather than the strategy mandating the budget. Likely defense missions over the near- to mid-term were not taken into account. As a result, there is a belief in some circles that the final force design was not adequate to meet all identified contingencies, such as peacekeeping operations.

The analysis conducted in support of the Defence Review did identify some potential strategy spoilers. In particular, the determination of the importance of the national interests combined with budgetary restrictions could place further constraints on defense expenditures for the “short to medium-term” period of the Defence Review’s existence. As a modification, the DoD Offices of the Secretary of Defence, the Chief of the SANDF, the chiefs of the Services and their staffs are instructed to make required “short-term adaptations to ensure the maintenance of the required capabilities and expertise within the financial allocation to defence.”

A key weakness of the strategy was the lack of much of the implementation process.

The Treasury simply declined to provide the necessary funding, and the Defence Force simply ignored much of the DR—for instance closing down the Parachute Brigade and its only division-level headquarters (HQ) within a year or so of those being set down as
part of the force design to be maintained, and doing so with no reference at all to Parliament.\textsuperscript{176}

Both the White Paper and Defence Review assisted the nation in moving beyond the apartheid era. These strategic documents allowed South Africa to enter the 20th century with a very different approach to the concept of national security than it had lived with in the recent past. The documents provided a national-level strategy for the defense establishment on its role in the society writ large, as well as the approach in the form of ways and means to execute that strategy with the nation’s armed forces in the near- to mid-term. These documents were guided in detail by the state’s legislative body and uniquely supported by the significant inclusion of civil society throughout the course of their development processes. Both of these contributions to national strategic development have made the South African strategy document process unique and worthy of additional analysis because of their applicability to other states and their associated approach to strategy formulation.

CASE STUDY: UNITED KINGDOM

The first \textit{National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom} was published in March 2008. This publication was initially “stimulated by the U.S. example of national security strategy development (and a wish on the part of some British commentators to see a distinctive UK voice in security strategy)”\textsuperscript{177} and catalyzed by discussions begun in 2006 by the UK think tank known as DEMOS. All sides of the UK political spectrum supported this effort. The Conservative Party’s National and International Security Policy Group also devel-
oped a “national security approach” in the 2005-07 period, key elements of which were the creation of an NSS. During this time, there was also some thought being given within the government about the need for an NSS. Speaking at the annual DEMOS security lecture in December 2006, Sir David Omand, former UK Security and Intelligence Coordinator in the Cabinet Office, described the long-term and uncertain nature of the 21st century threats, such as border security for the sea, air, and space, as well as environmental security issues that the UK would have to confront. These types of challenges had eliminated the division between internal and external national security-related issues and would now have to be addressed in a singular manner. The various governmental actors responsible for these national security issues in the UK would only be able to work together in a mutually supporting manner if they were “guided by (an) understanding of the ‘Grand Strategy’ being followed.” This grand strategy would contain the strategic “aim” and “direction” for the nation, thus permitting the varied state actors to be led towards common objectives in the foreign and domestic spheres of national security. The grand strategy in question would require the development of a national security strategy. It would be the development of such a national strategy that would provide the government with the ability to anticipate rather than simply react to national security challenges and opportunities.

This speech was followed by the publication of a DEMOS report in February 2007 that elaborated on the need for a whole-of-government approach to an NSS. Such a strategy would:

- articulate a vision of the current and future security environment;
• communicate Britain’s values in the 21st century;
• develop a framework for collaboration across government on national security policy and identify policy areas where departments and agencies can be more efficient and effective in working together;
• prioritize national security policies and initiatives and the allocation of resources; and,
• bring together the plethora of departmental white papers on national and international security.\textsuperscript{181}

An additional influence was the work of the Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR), a think tank that created an independent Commission on National Security in the 21st Century. The Commission, chaired by Lord George I. M. Robertson, a former Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and UK Defense Secretary, authored its initial report in October 2007, highlighting significant changes in the security landscape that the authors felt had not been properly addressed by the government. They included a power shift from Europe to Asia and the Pacific, failed and failing states, climate change and resource scarcity, and the rise of complex networked societies.\textsuperscript{182}

Articulation of strategic vision would be designed for both government actors and the public at large. There were already several government national security strategy-like documents in existence, such as MOD Strategic Defense Reviews, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) international priorities, the CONTEST counterterrorism strategy, and numerous Home Office related publications. In fact, these minis-
tries were believed to often have policies and missions that were not integrated or, at least, not necessarily mutually supporting, with the MOD focused on external defense, the FCO on external diplomacy, and the Home Office (HO) oriented internally. The result was frequently poor coordination and an inability to attain policy objectives. The development of an NSS would create the conditions for the promotion of greater synergy between national security related departments and agencies, allowing for improved resource allocation and risk analysis. An NSS would also serve to create public confidence in the government’s approach to national security so that the crafting process would be better understood and transparent. Finally, an NSS would influence the way national security resource allocation is managed, ensuring that that allocation was aligned with risk prioritization.183

In part because the MOD strongly supported the need for an NSS owing to the belief that no one in the government was viewing security from the perspective of an overall whole-of-government approach, partly because of the acceptance of the DEMOS speech and report findings, and partly because the new administration of Labor Party Prime Minister Gordon Brown wanted to signal that he was different from his predecessor, Tony Blair, in reintroducing more formality into government processes, the newly installed Labor government announced in June 2007 that an NSS would be developed.184

What was to become the UK’s first of three whole-of-government NSSs was crafted between June 2007 and February 2008. The second (essentially an update), was published in June 2009, and the third NSS, in conjunction with an updated Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR), was published after the elec-
tion by the incoming Conservative government in October 2010. The National Security Secretariat (akin to the U.S. National Security Staff or what was previously known as the NSC Staff) component of the Cabinet Office under the auspices of the Secretary of the Cabinet had the responsibility for leading the whole-of-government effort to draft these documents. The National Security Secretariat was created, in part, in line with recommendations made in another DEMOS think tank report, this one first published in 2007. Because the 2008 document and ensuing process were completely new, the Cabinet Office-led team had to determine what the contents of the NSS would be. All personnel who worked on the drafting of the documents were either career civil servants or serving military officers. An intergovernmental or interagency whole-of-government committee with senior representatives from all relevant departments was formed. The committee included personnel from the Cabinet Office National Security Secretariat as the lead agent, the MOD, FCO, HO, Department for International Development (DFID) (the department responsible for orchestrating the government’s foreign assistance similar to the U.S. Agency for International Development [USAID]), and the intelligence agencies.

Officials strongly wanted the 2008 document to benefit from cross government coordination. This would be the case with the participation of senior personnel from the major department ministries involved as well as the two major political parties. At the same time, the Prime Minister’s office via Mr. Matt Cavanagh, Special Advisor for Security to Prime Minister (PM) Gordon Brown, became directly engaged with the drafting process. The result was that there were two separate and different approaches to the NSS.
One was embedded in the Cabinet Office with government career civil service bureaucrats and military officers, and the other with the Prime Minister’s special (personal) advisors in 10 Downing Street approaching the topic from a political perspective. Two separate drafts emerged; each originating from one of the two groups. It became the responsibility of the Cabinet Office, under the direction of Mr. William Nye and the National Security Secretariat to merge the two. Within that process, the MOD and FCO crafted their own chapters in the 2008 NSS, with the FCO component addressing foreign policy issues. The departments were concerned that the creation of the NSS could lead to some type of national security related policy prioritization and, as a result, were focused on protecting their existing operational and financial commitments by ensuring that the NSS gave a high priority, or at least mentioned, any activity that they were responsible for. During the course of the development of the 2008 NSS, a political commitment was made by the Labor Party in power, and supported by the Conservative Party opposition to create an NSS update. The Cabinet Office National Security Secretariat would be responsible for ensuring the updates were conducted, as well as monitoring their implementation. This was the origin of the 2009 and 2010 NSS documents.

The 2009 NSS was essentially a reworking of the 2008 document and was designed to demonstrate what had changed since the publication of the first NSS. This was conducted by the same Labor Party government that had drafted the first document. A significant difference between the first two NSSs was that while the respective ministries drafted their related sections for the 2008 NSS, the 2009 NSS was written in its entirety by the Cabinet Office National Security Secretar-
iat and coordinated closely with the ministries. Neither one of the first two strategies was designed to be overly constrained by resources. These were intended to be national strategies that were “resource blind.” In comparison with what was to become the 2010 NSS, the 2008 and 2009 documents did not “force prioritization” of components of the strategy for policy emphasis, such as “the creation of a special relationship with India or protecting the homeland” and there was no clear link to resource allocation for the budget.

Those crafting the 2010 NSS in the Cabinet Office National Security Secretariat on behalf of the new Coalition (Conservative and Liberal Democrat Parties) government were able to take advantage of the drafting experiences associated with the first two strategies. The Conservative Party Board actually approved the NSS concept prior to their election that year. This NSS would be different for two primary reasons: the NSS was written concurrently and intended to link directly with the first SDSR developed by the UK since 1998, and because the drafters employed a sophisticated risk analysis methodology for both the national security strategy and the SDSR. This NSS, published on October 18, 2010, was specifically designed to establish the end state objectives for the SDSR, published on October 19, 2010, which identified the ways and means of achieving these ends. The NSS could be considered an aspiration document (aspiring for objectives). It would set “the context for the SDSR through which all instruments of national power are brought together.” Both overarching documents were intended to be supported by several supporting strategies like the CONTEST counterterrorism, cyber, and counterproliferation strategies. The ministries charged with drafting the supporting strategies col-
laborated during the crafting process\textsuperscript{202} so that they would be mutually supporting.

The 2010 drafting process expanded the whole-of-government collaboration process, especially with the participation from the outset of the ministries and agencies representing the resource ways for the SDSR. It included all of the new NSC government member departments (FCO, Home Office, MOD, Department of Energy and Climate Change [DECC]), and the Cabinet Office, in addition to the critical addition of the Treasury (Her Majesty’s Treasury [HMT]), as well as the DFID,\textsuperscript{203} and Departments of Transport and Communities (regional and local government).\textsuperscript{204} The Coalition Government also had the benefit of the final IPPR Commission on National Security in the 21st Century report which strongly recommended that the “barriers between departmental” stovepipes be broken down with the assistance of a strengthened “strategic center of government.”\textsuperscript{205} Among the responsibilities for the new National Security Secretariat created to support the NSC and new National Security Advisor position, was the requirement to ensure that the departments develop well prepared papers that present options for “collective decision and effective implementation.”\textsuperscript{206} This new formal mechanism would be responsible for bringing “together all the Departments of Government in the pursuit of national objectives . . . (to) align national objectives . . . for strategic decisions about foreign affairs, security, defence, and development.”\textsuperscript{207} Ten personnel from the national security related departments were seconded to the National Security Secretariat to ensure the ability for real cross government coordination during the course of the actual drafting process for both the NSS and the SDSR.\textsuperscript{208}
The 2010 process “did deliver on integration (collaboration may be a more appropriate term at this point because while the process did get different departments and agencies into the same room with each other, these same departments and agencies were providing their own separate submissions to the National Security Secretariat) and outcome because the process enabled conversations to be had, decisions to be made, and realities to be recognized.” As the two documents were developed in parallel, there was a consistency with the identification of the ends, ways, and means. The participating ministries all were able to review the various iterations of each as they were being crafted. The ongoing review process came about through a disciplined series of weekly meetings chaired by the National Security Advisor and with all of the NSC ministerial Permanent Secretaries (U.S. Undersecretary-equivalent) in attendance. These meetings were always conducted a week in advance of ministerial level meetings chaired by the Prime Minister on the same topics. Of note, there were only a handful of cabinet level meetings that addressed the 2008 and 2009 documents. External to all government actors involved in the drafting process, the government also consulted with think tanks and private experts on a variety of issues, such as the dialogue created by the Office of Cyber Security “with a number of nongovernment experts from across industry, universities, and (other) professional institutions to help with the development of (the cyber component of the strategies).”

In fact, it appears that the SDSR rather than the NSS was the primary focus of the 2010 national strategy-making cycle; thus emphasizing the ways and means for this iteration of national strategy development.
The draft versions of both documents were developed in the June-September 2010 time frame by the National Security Secretariat and featured constant NSC discussion among relevant cabinet ministers on interests and risk.\textsuperscript{216} The government wanted flexibility on how it chose to define interests in terms of “hard vs. soft” interests—the constant struggle for a state between the national interests and the values of the state. In the UK case, human security problems were discussed to determine where they fit in the prioritization for national interests.\textsuperscript{217} There was a greater effort with this NSS to include UK\textsuperscript{218} long-term national interests in consonance with the shorter near-term threats that had evolved since the events of 9/11; thus, energy security issues were identified in the same national interest context as were terror and Afghanistan. To further the discussion, in addition to the National Security Secretariat, the FCO and HCO also drafted papers proposing their view of national interests. With the employment of the new National Security Risk Assessment (NSRA) methodology, prioritized risks actually were used to identify and prioritize national interests—this was case for both external and internally focused national interests.\textsuperscript{219}

The ways and means appeared to be the primary focus of the 2010 strategy developmental process.\textsuperscript{220} With specific reference to the resource means, both the 2008 and 2009 NSSs were considered to be unconstrained by resources. But in 2010, in light of the impact of the global financial crisis,\textsuperscript{221} the Coalition Government made a conscious decision to align both the NSS and the SDSR with the fiscal resources available for strategy implementation. Based on the information contained in the 2010 document, the related ministries were directed to develop their own detailed budget-
ing decisions to support the national strategy. Counterterrorism was prioritized and received lesser cuts than any other programs addressed in the 2010 NSS. The only area that received an increase in budget was cyber security. Future acquisition commitments were reduced in line with the available resources and the aims contained in the NSS. In addition, the government’s Comprehensive Spending Review (CSR) was conducted in 2010 and released the same month that the NSS and SDSR were released. This document, developed by HMT and signed by the department head, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, was intended to be in direct alignment with the SDSR. To that end, it fully funded the UK’s mission in Afghanistan and supported specific national security areas such as cyber defense.

A key addition to the two 2010 documents was the application of the NSRA. The National Security Secretariat, building on an original domestic-focused National Risk Assessment, formally employed the NSRA in conjunction with “subject matter experts, analysts, and intelligence specialists” across the government through a series of workshops to “compare(s), assess(es) and prioritize(s) all major disruptive risks to the UK’s national interest which are of sufficient scale or impact . . . to require action from (the) government and/or have an ideological, international, or political dimension.” Risk assessment is not new to UK strategy formulation. It actually began with the analysis of risk likelihood, vulnerability, and the impact of the risk as described in the 2002 counterterror strategy, as well as the domestic-oriented 2004 National Risk Assessment, which “drew on the “Defence Planning Assumptions” methodology developed in the 1990s.”
The strategy was then focused on how to reduce the likelihood of the risk becoming actualized.230

This 2010 assessment was conducted to address risks over the next 5- and 20-year time periods. All evaluated risks were viewed as potential threats or challenges to the state and were identified in eight broad categories: 1) terrorism, 2) state threats, 3) risk of instability, 4) risk of disruption to flows of people and supplies that were essential to the economy, 5) risk to disruption of the flow of capital or information, 6) risk to the international system, 7) transnational organized crime, and 8) natural hazards. The likelihood and impact of each risk was considered, as was the economic cost, and impact on infrastructure and society, along with the impact of those risks on their ability to increase the likelihood of one or more other risks taking place. The NSRA was considered so valuable to the process that it was decided to formally update it every 2 years.231

Potentially the most significant component of the NSRA methodology was the assessment for the likelihood of these threats or challenges to emerge over the two given time periods. While clearly subjective, the evaluation was made based on four criteria: intent, capability, vulnerability, and historical evidence. These variables were coupled with the will of actors to carry out malicious or violent activity, the capacity of these same actors to conduct these activities, the vulnerability of intended targets in the UK and UK interests in the world, and any related historical data. The assessment then compared the outcomes by impact and likelihood to each other, and developed a scoring system ranging from highly plausible to highly implausible concerning the likelihood of a given threat being
carried out over the course of the next 5- or 20-year periods.\textsuperscript{232}

It was a subjective process that had limitations, and the National Security Secretariat determined that it had to give the Prime Minister, senior Ministers, and other senior officials the opportunity to consider the relative positioning of the risks; to ensure that they were placed in a logical manner from their perspectives. The Secretariat found that it was not possible to prioritize geographically, primarily because most of the risks crossed or straddled geographic boundaries. It proved difficult to differentiate between current activity and the likelihood for risks to mature over time. It was also difficult to weigh one-time events like a single terrorist attack against risks that manifest themselves over time or in several forms, such as the smuggling of drugs into the country.\textsuperscript{233}

The employment of the NSRA and its ensuing findings permitted a structured discussion to take place among UK officials on the risk impact of both domestic and international threats and challenges, leading not only to a determination of risk but to identification and prioritization of the related interests. Most importantly, the methodology presented a means for prioritizing risks that “represent the most pressing security concerns in order to identify the actions and resources needed to deliver . . . responses to those risks” in order to mitigate their impact. The risks were prioritized in three tiers: Tier One: those of highest priority in terms of likelihood and impact (e.g., international terrorism affecting the UK); Tier Two: next highest priority in terms of likelihood and impact (e.g., attack on the UK by another state or proxy using chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons (CBRN); Tier Three: third highest priority in terms of likelihood and im-
pact (e.g., large scale conventional military attack on the UK). \textsuperscript{234}

All risks, regardless of tier ranking, were to be considered important and require government action “to prevent or mitigate the risk.” In some cases, action is taken to prevent a lower tier risk from rising to a higher tier, such as assistance to an area of potential instability before it becomes more unstable. In the end, the prioritization of risks is conducted in order for a strategy to prioritize capabilities needed to prevent or mitigate those risks. The higher the risk, the greater the effort needed for prevention or mitigation. \textsuperscript{235} This effort tied to the risk evaluation is contained in the National Security Tasks (NST) and Planning Guidelines found in the SDSR. The eight tasks and the more detailed planning guidelines are intended to serve as the ways needed to attain the objectives identified in the NSS. They are designed to “drive detailed decisions by departments over the next five years on how to prioritize resource allocation and capability development.” \textsuperscript{236}

For the future, it was determined that the NSRA would be updated every other year and the SDSR would be developed every 5 years, with the next ones scheduled for 2012 and 2015, respectively. \textsuperscript{237} The SDSR is being reviewed every month or two for effectiveness. \textsuperscript{238} The relationship between the two documents is a key advantage to the 2010 UK national strategy development process, as the ends of the NSS are supported by the ways and means contained in the SDSR. The fidelity of the ways, as identified in the SDSR NST and Planning Guidelines, along with the Defense Planning Assumptions (DPA), in their description of the type, number, and intensity of military operations that the MOD has to be prepared to execute will
provide a planner in the MOD the necessary detailed guidance to plan for like missions.\textsuperscript{239}

The evolution of the national strategy development process since 2007 has been significant, especially with the inclusion and alignment of the means (fiscal resources in the budgeting process) and the utilization of the NSRA in analysis of risks and related national interests. This is especially true in the linkage between the NSS and the SDSR, along with the connectivity between the ends, ways, and means contained in the two documents. While an excellent tool, one potential drawback of the formalized risk analysis process contained in the NSRA is that the strategy’s ultimate objectives may be framed more than they should be in terms of risks and challenges, rather than opportunities. Thus, the focus could be on problem solving as opposed to “goal seeking,” having the ultimate effect of inhibiting strategic thinking.\textsuperscript{240}

The system used to orchestrate the strategy development process has also evolved with the creation of the NSC and the National Security Secretariat. At the same time, the desire for a true whole-of-government product is impacted by the cultures of the departments involved in the process as they influence strategy making. “Actors (sometimes) create cultures that get in the way of a more coherent approach.” In the end, virtually all participants continue to believe that politics and institutional culture matter more than the strategy development process. The good news is that the participants also tend to believe that, where necessary, the process can be utilized to change (at least part of) the political culture.\textsuperscript{241} The evidence is clear for the UK that this type of change can occur, as demonstrated by the creation of new institutions under direction to make the final product one that is based on
a true whole-of-government approach, as was the case with both the 2010 NSS and 2010 SDSR.

CASE STUDY: UNITED STATES

The requirement for the United States to craft a national security strategy (NSS) document was first codified in the National Security Act of 1947, and amended by the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. The 1986 amendment requires the President to submit the document on an annual basis to Congress to provide a comprehensive report on U.S. national security strategy. Both pieces of legislation mandate that the strategy include a “comprehensive description and discussion of worldwide interests, goals, and objectives . . . that are vital to the national security of the United States.” It would also address foreign policy, worldwide military commitments, U.S. national defense capabilities, short- and long-term uses of the elements of national power, and the requirement to have the strategy transmitted to Congress in both a classified and unclassified form. A number of national strategies were developed over time prior to the Goldwater-Nichols legislation, to include what many believe was the most significant grand strategy of the era, NSC-68, the key containment strategy against Soviet and Chinese communism. All were crafted during the pre-Goldwater-Nichols Act period at the classified level.

There have been 15 NSSs published by five different administrations since the implementation of the Goldwater-Nichols Act:

• Obama: 1 (2010)

Clearly there are some gaps during the 25-year period (between 1987-2012) for NSS publication, given the understanding that the Goldwater-Nichols Act stipulates that the NSS is to be provided to Congress on an annual basis and that it is to be published during the first 150 days of any new administration. Some observers believe that an annual requirement for an NSS could be too frequent because a nation’s approach to national security is unlikely to completely change every year. In addition, the requirement for a new administration to develop an NSS within its first 150 days, while many important political appointee national security related policy positions are still being made and some are undergoing congressional confirmation, is simply very difficult to execute. None of the previous four administrations have been able to meet that standard.

The NSS is intended to represent the highest level national strategy document in the United States. It establishes the strategic vision or grand strategic direction for the administration in power, provides the “objectives,” and includes all the elements of national power. It also serves as the “umbrella” strategy for guiding a number of other national security related strategy documents, like the Department of Defense’s National Defense Strategy (NDS), National Military Strategy, the QDR, and the national security-related strategies developed by other departments and agencies in the U.S. Government.

The U.S. NSS is designed to have a number of different purposes. The primary one is to convey it to the various departments and agencies of the executive branch, to “provide guidance on foreign and defense
policies.” A second is to provide the President’s national security-related strategic guidance or vision to Congress to substantiate the need for fiscal resources. The third is to communicate the same vision to a number of other audiences, both foreign and domestic so that they understand the administration’s intentions in the national security arena. The fourth is to address specific domestic audiences, frequently political supporters of the administration, that want to see their national security concerns prominently highlighted. Finally, the NSS assists in the establishment of a President’s national security agenda in the public domain. As a strategic communications tool, the publication of the NSS allows the administration an opportunity to “publicly explain and sell its policies.” Much of the information contained in the NSS was extracted from the administration’s policy—often articulated in key presidential speeches—essentially codifying what was already stated.

The NSS is to be considered a “public strategy document; one that can create a list of national interests and “desirable goals,” but will not contain the detailed ways and means needed for an executable strategy. To a great degree, this is because it must be an unclassified document to serve as the strategic communications tool described above. The ways and means specificity is traditionally contained in the classified, and occasionally unclassified, directives (titled National Security Policy Directives [NSPD] in the Bush 43 administration and Presidential Policy Directives [PPD] by the Obama administration) issued by an administration on key national security issues requiring policy and strategy direction. Examples would be NSPD-9 (Defeating the Terrorist Threat to the United States) and PPD-6 (U.S. Global Development Policy).
The NSS is the only complete whole-of-government national security document that the U.S. Government publishes. All other national security related strategies, like the NDS or the National Strategy for Homeland Security (NSHS), are broad in scope, and do cut across various levels and sectors of government, but are still narrower than the NSS in terms of their focus on the needs of the national security problem that the specific strategy is charged with providing guidance for. Coordination for the NDS primarily rests with the defense community, while coordination for the NSHS is with the domestic security-focused federal, state, and local governments. The NSS provides guidance that addresses all these areas and, as such, is best developed through coordination and collaboration with all government departments and agencies that have responsibility for both foreign and domestic national security concerns. This analysis will review the development of three different NSSs (2002, 2006, and 2010), selected because they required the consideration of the many complex issues of the post-9/11 world and because they were developed at the direction of two different Presidents representing two different political parties, and with the detailed support of three different national security advisors and associated NSC staffs.


Based upon the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act, creation of the 2002 NSS was understood and accepted as a statutory requirement by the administration of George W. Bush (Bush 43). In particular, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff pushed hard for the NSS to be developed early in the first Bush 43
administration so as to serve as guidance for the yet to be developed NDS and National Military Strategy (NMS). It was decided early that the 2002 NSS would be a top down-directed document from the White House, similar to the way that the Cold War containment strategy (NSC-68) was drafted in early 1950; by only a small handful of people at the direction of the government’s most senior leadership. This would ensure that the strategy would be framed with a strategic perspective. This approach to the crafting also meant that very few would be involved, both in the writing and in the associated interagency coordination. Presidential National Security Advisor (NSA) Condoleezza Rice in direct consultation with Bush 43 made a determination to keep it very close hold. In fact, in the copies that were distributed for coordination, a note was on the front indicating that it was for the cabinet member’s eyes only.

The NSC staff, under the direction of NSA Rice, solicited views from a variety of sources on what should be included in the document. Of its own volition, the State Department’s Office of Policy Planning headed by Richard Haass crafted a comprehensive global strategy in the summer of 2001 that read, in the eyes of some readers, more like a report card than a national strategy, and was not written in the President’s personal voice. The NSS was an official document and required presidential signature prior to forwarding to Congress. As a result, in the fall/winter of 2001-02, NSA Rice requested Dr. Philip Zelikow, a highly respected academic from the faculty of the University of Virginia, to develop the real first draft of the 2002 NSS.

The issues to be addressed in the draft were discussed during a lunch meeting sometime during that
same period between Dr. Zelikow, NSA Rice, Michael Gerson, the President’s Chief Speechwriter, and Counselor to the President at that time, Karen Hughes. Dr. Zelikow was also guided in his writing by several speeches made by President Bush. Over the course of the period that he worked on his draft, winter 2001-02 thru summer 2002, Zelikow met periodically for additional guidance with NSA Rice and the NSC Staff Executive Secretary (NSC EXSEC), Stephen Biegun, as well as with others like Robert Zoellick, the U.S. Trade Representative, and Elliott Abrams, Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director on the National Security Council for Near East and North African Affairs, for additional comments on various issues. Zelikow crafted several drafts of the NSS. After she had reviewed the initial draft NSS, NSA Rice had NSC EXSEC Biegun and Ms. Anna Perez rephrase some parts of the document into a more colloquial form. In the end, Zelikow had a significant foundational role in the development of the initial draft of the 2002 NSS.

After Zelikow received and inserted inputs from the senior directors on the NSC staff, NSA Rice provided the final Zelikow draft to President Bush in the summer of 2002. The President took it with him to read in detail during a weekend that he spent at the presidential retreat at Camp David, MD. After his return from the Camp David weekend, he informed NSA Rice that the document needed to be rewritten in his own speaking voice. “I thought this document was supposed to be my strategy . . . . It doesn’t sound like me.” NSA Rice then took the Zelikow draft and personally reworked it during July-September 2002. She reworded and shortened it. NSA Rice also consulted with every senior director on the NSC staff during this period on the issues that directly related to them. It was during this time that NSA Rice final-
ized what became very politically sensitive comments on the need for the United States to have the option to actively preempt terrorists who had gained an ability to strike American interests or the American homeland with a weapon of mass destruction (WMD). The material on the preemption of terrorists had originally been developed by Zelikow in one of his early drafts. NSA Rice deleted some of that material and moved it to the document’s WMD section. NSA Rice requested NSC Legal Advisor John Bellinger to review that section in detail and modified it based upon Bellinger’s advice. When complete, the document was a significant revision and modification of the Zelikow draft that represented the personal views of NSA Rice and the President.

The primary audiences for the 2002 NSS were the U.S. Government national security interagency community (e.g., State, Defense, and the intelligence community), as well as the American people, the media, and both external allies and enemies. There was a belief among senior participants in the drafting process that Congress, as the nation’s legislative body, had a larger role to play as part of the audience, and was not engaged to the degree that it should have been by the NSC staff. Using the Scowcroft Model on how the NSC staff should operate, the NSC staff serves the President, not Congress. The departments in the Executive Branch were the components of the federal government meant to work with Congress. As a result, there was virtually no outreach to Congress in advance of the document’s release at the end of September 2002. Some in Congress felt strongly that they and the institution they represented had been slighted. To that end, Senator Robert Byrd, a Democrat from West Virginia, stated that:
the only reference to the Constitution . . . that is made in this document titled ‘The National Security Strategy’ . . . (is) that: ‘The constitution has served us well . . . . That is the alpha and the omega of the reference to the Constitution. . . . And note, too, that the word ‘consti-
tution’ as mentioned in the President’s document is in lower case. . . . This administration doesn’t believe that it merits a capital C even.” 262

From the hindsight perspective of some of the 2002 NSS drafters, not engaging with Congress with its important role was an oversight. 263

The 2002 NSS chapters were structured in order of importance. This ranged from championing aspirations of human dignity and strengthening alliances to defeating global terrorism and preventing attacks against the United States and its friends at the highest end, down to transformation of America’s national security institutions at the lower end. 264 Clearly, the leading placement of human dignity aspirations demonstrated an emphasis on the importance of value-driven national interests for the strategy. During the development of the document, it became clear that in the post-9/11 era the spread of democracy had become embedded as a national interest in the battle of ideals to defeat terrorism. 265 NSA Rice believed it to be key that the 2002 NSS, the first NSS of the post-9/11 world, should delineate the advancement of democracy and democratic institutions as vital U.S. national interests. This thinking originated with the influence of academic specialists on the Middle East like Bernard Lewis and Fouad Ajami, the 2002 Arab Human Development Report, and “multiple conversations” with President Bush. It would be these national interests from which the long-term objectives (end state aims) for the 2002 NSS would be derived. 266
The development of the national interests was not a separate distinct process for the 2002 NSS. Zelikow took the lessons of 9/11 about what to do in the world. He understood that national interests would endure after what had become the post-9/11 world. As noted above, Zelikow also used a number of presidential speeches to guide his national interest formulation. In addition to the June 2002 West Point, NY, address, he also examined the speeches at the Reagan Library and the Citadel. Zelikow added the significance of terror to the national interests in the discussion but did not eliminate any other interests that had been delineated in past strategic documents.

Domestic political considerations were “minimal” and not a major factor for the 2002 NSS drafters. This was to be an articulation of the Bush 43 administration policy regarding the formulation of national security strategy that domestic politics did not have a role in this development. The internal U.S. national debate over whether to attack Iraq was taking place during the final stages of the document’s drafting and coordination process in late summer 2002. NSA Rice wanted the NSS to stand alone to represent the nation’s security strategy to the world writ large and not just for Iraq. She did not want the Iraq debate to be addressed in the document and, as such, “the case for Iraq was not made by the strategy.”

“Events and creative thinking” really determined both the challenges (to include threats) and opportunities (ends) for the strategy. From President Bush’s perspective, “inside every challenge is an opportunity for the country.” Measures of effectiveness were not created for the ends at the time of the drafting process. But in some aspects, they did come later for the democratization and development objectives with the
implementation of the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) program. The MCA began implementation in 2004, and subsequently the State Department utilized those effectiveness measures developed for the MCA program to assess progress towards the democratization and development objectives described in the 2002 NSS. 271

There were no operational objectives contained in the NSS. 272 The 2002 NSS was drafted with the intent that the departments and agencies in the federal government that it was providing strategic guidance for would create implementation plans that delineated the strategy’s ways and means in detail. One such example was the State Department’s Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative created in 2004 to advance democracy and economic development in the region. 273

The 2002 NSS was written to be resource unconstrained. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) was never brought into the formulation process. A key unspoken assumption was that, in part, the finished document was to be provided to the relevant government departments and agencies for them to utilize as strategic justification for their budgets. 274

The concept of risk as a separate entity was only addressed in specific components of the 2002 NSS. The world as an entity, and the associated international system, with its inherent risks was understood by the crafters. For this type of a strategy, some believed that risk cannot be assessed devoid of a separate specific case; it had to have detailed context. 275 A place that risk was directly evaluated concerned the issue of the preemption of terrorists with a WMD capacity. Risk associated questions that were assessed included: would the United States appear too aggressive to
the world community if it delineated a preemptive approach in the document, and should all potential diplomatic options be exhausted before preemptive measures requiring the military element of power be used? Reflecting this risk analysis, the statement “We will always proceed deliberately, weighing the consequences of our actions” was inserted into the text of the document in the section that described the preemptive policy against WMD-equipped terrorists. The section addressing preemption of WMD-equipped terrorists was intentionally written in a very deliberate manner, with caveats as deemed appropriate; the intent was to clarify the strategy’s intent in detail.

Neither strategy spoilers nor modifiers were considered during the drafting, in part because the NSS was designed as a strategy that would unfold over a long-term period. The result was that the drafters wanted to give the strategy the time that it needed to work to minimize the potential of premature adjustment of the strategy. It was also a conscious decision to not identify potential spoilers and modifying ways and means to the strategy because of the possibility such an effort would distract executing departments and agencies from the primary direction of the NSS.

Once NSA Rice’s final draft was complete, the President read it in detail, only providing minor changes. After the President provided his comments on NSA Rice’s draft, Deputy NSA Steve Hadley forwarded the document to the senior leadership at State, Defense, and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA); requiring a very truncated review and transmission back to the NSC staff. The departments were intentionally not informed that the President had already approved the draft, so that they could feel completely unconstrained to provide feedback comments. State provided a num-
ber of comments, with some being accepted and others not. CIA also returned a number of comments related to their view of the world, but they were narrower in scope than the State comments. The Department of Defense (DoD) comments were primarily critical of the fact that the NSS was being drafted at all, rather than any of the substantive concepts. EXSEC Biegun met with Defense Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USDOP) Doug Feith to address defense concerns about the draft NSS. In a congenial meeting, with the focus on the substance of the document, USDOP Feith was comfortable with the majority of the NSS and only provided some relatively small substantive suggestions that were accepted. There was no significant disagreement from any of the government institutions on either the policy proposals or the premise that the draft was a useful U.S. strategy.280

Once final and signed by the President, there was no formal feedback mechanism in place to evaluate the progress of the strategy once execution had begun.281


After President Bush had been reelected for his second term in November 2004, NSA Rice was named the new Secretary of State, and Deputy NSA Stephen Hadley (NSA Hadley) was appointed the new NSA to the President. After the November 2004 election, NSA Hadley, in consultation with Bush 43, made a determination in early 2005 that it was time for a new NSS. It made sense to craft one every 4 years. While the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols legislation mandates that a national security strategy be transmitted to Congress on an annual basis, Congress never articulated concern that the most recent Bush 43 NSS had been
published in 2002. The nations’ national security situation had changed since September 2002. Some of the 2002 objectives had been attained, like the fall of Saddam Hussein and movement on the President’s Freedom Agenda (support to enable democracies and work with democracies as natural allies) via the color revolutions in Lebanon, Ukraine, and Georgia, while others had not, such as fulfillment of all goals towards Iraq. It would be important to improve on the specific articulation of parts of the 2002 NSS that had been perceived as misunderstood, such as the preemption policy targeting terrorists with a WMD capability, as well as to address some of the adverse changes that had taken place since it was published. One most significant example was that the President felt it was very important “to take the edge off of the preemption statements (from the 2002 NSS) for the 2006 NSS without changing the substance of the policy.”

Like the 2002 document, the 2006 NSS was designed to be a top down-driven strategy, with detailed direction for the strategy’s structure and content to come from the NSA and President. The President was the principal stakeholder for the strategy, and everyone else (both government and nongovernment actors) was the audience. NSA Hadley wanted the NSS to be an update rather than a fundamental new strategy and indicated that the 2006 document should serve as a continuity document from the 2002 NSS, to include the same chapter headings, plus one additional one that addressed globalization. It would represent a similar worldview for the President, with similar threats and similar opportunities, and would also contain the lessons gained from the first Bush 43 administration in the national security realm. There would be a recapitulation of the 2002 NSS and a summary of the
Bush 43 administration’s first 4 years in the national security arena. The new document would also include greater detail on how to implement specific policies and conclude with the nation’s strategic direction for the future, especially for the war on terror.\textsuperscript{284}

One of the first initiatives that NSA Hadley took was to create a new office on the NSC staff, the Office of Strategic Planning and Institutional Reform. Responsible for regional and functional strategic reviews, contingency planning, and other strategic planning duties, this would be the office that would draft the 2006 NSS. Drs. Peter Feaver and William Inboden were recruited from highly respected academic, State Department, and think tank backgrounds to staff this office and draft the new NSS. Dr. Feaver had also served in the first Clinton administration NSC staff where he served as the director-level coordinator for the 1994 NSS.\textsuperscript{285}

In terms of the mechanics of the document’s crafting, NSA Hadley gave very specific guidance that the NSS drafts were not to be shared with anyone else beyond himself, and all writing was to be conducted on a shared computer hard drive. There would be no general distribution for interagency coordination. This was done to ensure complete freedom for a deliberative drafting process without risk of leaks. There were three primary reasons for such a top down, close hold approach to guide the process: 1) to ensure adequate operational security to prevent premature leaks; 2) to achieve desired strategic coherence so that the parts would all fit together, not appearing to be forced together by committee; and 3) to achieve the desire to speak in one presidential voice. As the President’s message to the world, it had to be in his speaking voice. The President actually crossed out and added
individual words. The document was to be short like the 2002 NSS, both to help ensure that it would be “an exercise in intellectual discipline” and so that people would read it. The two drafters split the 10 chapters between themselves for the actual writing, based upon substantive expertise and personal preference. It was a very collaborative process, and they would repeatedly edit each other’s drafts prior to transmittal to NSA Hadley.  

At the beginning of the drafting process in the summer of 2005, Dr. Feaver solicited advice on the substance of the new NSS from a number of respected strategists in and out of government (e.g., Dr. Steven Krasner, Director, Policy Planning, State Department; Dr. John Lewis Gaddis, Professor at Yale University, and Dr. Eliot Cohen, Professor at the Johns Hopkins School for Advanced International Studies, among many others). In early fall 2005, the drafters briefed a limited Principals Committee meeting (with only the key NSC national security oriented cabinet secretaries and the CIA director present) to gain their approval for the organization of the 2006 NSS and for strategic guidance on particularly salient sections. Both drafters also met with the NSC Staff senior directors on an individual basis to obtain their input for the sections of the NSS that concerned them. NSA Hadley and Deputy NSA J. D. Crouch, along with Mike Gerson, the President’s chief speechwriter, would edit the drafts on a line by line basis.  

The actual writing took place during October-December 2005. One of Dr. Feaver’s objectives was to refine some of the language contained in the 2002 NSS that had been critiqued in public fora; in some cases because he felt that it was misunderstood. One example was the use of support for democratization
as a tool against terrorism. Dr. Feaver also developed a group of what he termed “trusted agents for each cabinet secretary” that were resident in counterpart components of the government’s national security related interagency. These were Steve Krasner, Director of Policy Planning, and Philip Zelikow, Counselor to the Secretary, both from the State Department; Eric Edelman, the USDPI from the Office of the Secretary of Defense; Thomas Fingar from the National Intelligence Council; John Hannah, the NSA to the Vice President; Robert Kimmitt, Deputy Secretary of the Treasury; and Lieutenant General Gene Renuart, Director for Strategic Plans and Policy (J5), the Joint Staff. He would dialogue separately with these individuals to gain their views on a variety of issues, to include the format of the document. Examples of valued input included development policy and issues concerning Iraq from the State Department’s Krasner and Zelikow. In addition, Dr. Feaver maintained a close relationship with Barry Pavel, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy, to ensure that the 2006 NSS would be synchronized with the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)-produced NDS and QDR, which were both undergoing development during this same period. Another key process innovation that the drafters employed was the use of a “Red Team” to develop a critique of the 2002 NSS on a line by line basis. They contacted Dr. Joseph Collins on the faculty of the National War College, a former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, to put together a team of highly qualified former practitioner academics that would evaluate the document in detail and provide their critique to the NSC staff drafters. Taking place roughly between July and November 2005, the value added was to ensure that the drafters had addressed
all potential critiques of the substance contained in the 2002 NSS at the beginning of their drafting process.\textsuperscript{289}

In early December 2005, NSA Hadley and both drafters had an extended meeting with the President to receive his comments on the first complete draft. He felt the substance was good and liked the structure, but wanted the language to be more in his voice so that “the average Joe in Lubbock, TX, could understand it.” More importantly, President Bush wanted to make it clear that this was the American people’s national strategy and he wanted them to be able to take ownership for it. There would be no compromise in the substance. His emphasis in the meeting with the drafters was on democracy and human dignity as “an antidote to the jihadists.” He also did not want to minimize the importance of “American Exceptionalism” in the strategy. America still needs to be the world leader and other countries want it to be. “Even if countries gripe about it, they still want America to lead.”\textsuperscript{290}

For the development of the national interests, there were two identified general priorities: the war on terror, to include the ongoing conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, and relations with the other major powers (e.g., Russia, China, India, Japan, Europe, etc.). The drafters were “not working with a blank sheet” but rather were “standing in the shoes” of the prioritization established in the 2002 NSS. The analytical task for the 2006 document lay in identifying where the 2002 strategy was working and where it was not, as well as clarifying where the 2002 strategy was misunderstood and where new realities necessitated new approaches. The second Bush 43 inaugural address, given in January 2005, was also considered an important source for how the President’s approach to America’s role in
the world had evolved since 2002. The concepts of the advancement of democracy and human dignity were considered among the most important interests and, in turn, among the most important chapters in the strategy.\textsuperscript{291}

The most important new development since the 2002 NSS was the unfolding of the war in Iraq. It commanded the lion’s share of strategic resources and attention, and its future trajectory would impinge on all the other strategic aims of the NSS. At the same time, Iraq was not the only strategic priority, and the United States could not afford to suspend all other pursuits until the fate of Iraq—whether the United States left in victory or defeat—was settled. The challenge for the drafters of the 2006 NSS was to capture both sides of this coin: Iraq’s relative importance and the importance of the rest of the national security agenda. Timing was deemed to be key. If things were going well in Iraq, the priority could shift downwards; the reverse would be true if things were not going well: it would push the priority higher. The lesson for the drafters of the 2006 NSS was that, for the most part, the nation’s national interests are enduring and do not change; the exception is when there is one dominant event ongoing during the drafting, like a war; and for that, the impact is on prioritization of the issue (the impact of how resources are allocated) and its timing.\textsuperscript{292}

Both the President and NSA Hadley made it clear that domestic politics should not impact the substance of the drafting of the NSS. In particular, President Bush made it known that the NSS should not be limited to accommodate anti-Iraq policy isolationism, economic trade protectionism, and anti-immigration desires, but rather be drafted to rebut those influences in the court of public opinion.\textsuperscript{293}
The drafters determined that the ways of countering the asymmetric approach of the jihadists was the integrated employment of all the elements of national power. Kinetic action was needed to destroy and degrade the terrorist network while the spread of democratization, the advancement of human dignity, and the expansion of prosperity through economic development were needed to win the war of ideas. In addition, another way to support those aims was the maintenance of constructive relations with the other powers, like China, Japan, India, and Pakistan, as well as Europe.294

Actual resourcing, the means required for implementing the NSS, were not identified in the document. It was to be an unconstrained strategy. The resource intent was that the publication of the NSS “would guide the strategic planning in the government’s departments and agencies for budget justification.” An associated development for this NSS was the crafting of what became known as the “Silver Bullet List.” This document was developed by the NSC after the strategy’s publication with input from the same NSC staff office that drafted the NSS; it identified about 10 specific national security related programs that mandated NSA Hadley’s direct personal coordination with the White House OMB. These 10 or so programs, many of which were addressed either directly or indirectly in the 2006 NSS (e.g., the desire for a civilian reserve corps of development specialists in the State Department Office of the Special Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization) became national security priorities for resourcing. The Silver Bullet list did not consist of the highest dollar items or even the top overall budget priorities in the national security arena. Rather, the list consisted of those priority items that the regular
OMB budget development system might inadvertently downgrade were it not for top level NSC staff intervention.\textsuperscript{295}

While a specific risk assessment was never conducted, the intelligence community was tasked to determine what could go wrong with specific policies and strategies addressed in the NSS. Some policy and strategy spoilers and modifiers were identified (“tried to anticipate things that could go wrong”) such as what would happen if a major country collapsed through internal strife or what would be the connection between democratization and counter terror issues. It was clear that, in addition to elections, democratization was also about the peaceful resolution of disputes and religious tolerance. The drafters also addressed the issue of preemption of terrorists with WMD; there could be the risk of negative consequences if not carried out in consultation with allies. One very important comment about the concept of risk that emerged from this discussion was “there are never enough resources to eliminate risk, only to reduce it.”\textsuperscript{296} There were actually about 65 drafts of the 2006 NSS before approval of the final one. NSA Hadley and Deputy NSA Crouch spent a great deal of time reviewing the key drafts, which numbered somewhere less than 10. Secrecy remained fundamental. Once he felt that the President was comfortable with the document’s direction, NSA Hadley authorized the two drafters to share the contents with the NSC Staff senior directors for their specific areas of focus. It was still maintained in an extremely close hold format. There was no electronic transmission and the senior directors would have to come to the White House Situation Room to read their relevant sections and provide comments; no one else on their staffs was permitted to view the draft.
NSA Hadley also convened senior NSC staff meetings devoted to critiquing draft sections of the NSS. The President then reviewed the near final draft one last time before providing it to the rest of the interagency for final coordination. Bush 43 had to make some final decisions at this point on language impacting delicate issues like Russia, Iran, and North Korea, which he did. A paper copy of the NSS draft was sent by courier to each of the NSC principals (Department Secretaries and Agency Heads) 2-3 weeks before the document’s release in March 2006. Only that senior individual and one other designated person in the same organization would be allowed to review the draft. They had to provide their comments in paper form within 72 hours; again, no electronic transmission. Finally, 5-6 days before the formal release, the 2006 NSS draft was transmitted electronically for the first time for final review by every NSC department and agency. The respective senior leadership could share the draft with whomever they chose to. They had up to 48 hours to return their comments to the NSC staff. At this point, very few changes were proposed; but some were still significant: the State Department wanted a change on China and tougher language for Iran. The document was finally sent to the printer in time for the March 2006 release.297

For the actual roll out of the strategy to the media, the American people, and the world by the same President who had published the nation’s last national security strategy, a crucial question for determination was: should the 2006 NSS be depicted as a new strategy? The answer was no, it was not a new strategy; rather, it was a “refined” one.298

While there was no immediate feedback mechanism to determine levels of success and failure created
specifically for the 2006 NSS, during his tenure, NSA Hadley created a separate management tool, dubbed “Record 2008,” intended to track progress toward specific goals and objectives in the national security arena for the second Bush 43 administration. These desired accomplishments were tied to the objectives for the 2006 NSS (e.g., what was the progress for democratization in Iraq?). There were also tasks associated with each of the identified objectives. Record 2008 was conceived as a management tool to enable NSA Hadley and his senior staff to monitor progress, or the lack thereof, for policies in their areas of responsibility. This analysis took the form of a “stoplight chart,” with color coding for each policy. If the color was green, then the execution of the policy was believed to be on track to attain the established end state aims for it. If the color was orange, it was deemed not on track but not requiring a fundamental reconsideration of the policy and strategy; with a bit more effort, attention, or resources, the policy could get back on track. If the color was red, it would mean that not only was the policy not on track to achieve the desired objectives but also that the policy would require a fundamental revision to attain the aims that had been set. If a policy area received a critical mass of red lights, it was ripe for a thorough interagency review to examine the entire policy and determine changes that would have to be made, as happened with Iraq policy towards the end of 2006. The analysis for the chart was supposed to be conducted on a quarterly basis by the responsible NSC staff directors and provided to NSA Hadley.²⁹⁹

This NSS drew on the Obama administration National Security Priorities Review (NSPR). The NSPR was initiated to create a broad assessment of national security issues that the new administration would face, to focus the senior Obama administration national security leadership team around one coherent set of national security priorities early in the President’s new term, and to provide a broad framework at the global strategic level for the administration’s national security approach. The NSPR came about, in part, because of concern in January 2009 that the Defense-led QDR, along with strategic reviews being developed by other departments, could be conducted in an autonomous manner from the remainder of the other traditional national security documents that are typically drafted (remembering that Secretary of Defense Robert Gates would remain in his position after the Bush 43 administration departed office, and already had his staff working on the QDR), and with no direction yet from the new Obama White House. This new review would be a classified document orchestrated by the Defense Strategy Directorate from the National Security Staff—the new title for what had previously been known as the NSC Staff. Planners from all the departments and agencies with a national-security role were identified to provide the views of their organizations for the review. The NSPR addressed major threats, challenges, and opportunities and tiered them in priority order from the perspective of the President—it was to ultimately represent his national security priorities. The document was designed to describe the environment and framework that would be used to advance the national security agenda for the
new Obama administration leadership team, which approved the final document at a Principals Committee meeting in the March-April 2009 timeframe.  

Having the information from the NSPR, and understanding the congressional requirement for the administration to produce an NSS, General (Retired) James Jones, the first NSA for President Obama, directed the National Security Staff Office of Strategic Planning to work with the President’s chief speechwriter and Deputy NSA Ben Rhodes to develop the administration’s NSS. Rhodes was critical in the Obama administration process because of the personal relationship that he had with the President and the ability that he would have to capture his thinking on national security issues, as well as the President’s voice in the actual writing style. He also had an excellent appreciation of the domestic political aspects that could influence the NSS. In the end, he was the only drafter who consistently worked directly with the President on the document.

The intent of the NSS would be to articulate the President’s key concepts in the national security arena. The document was designed to describe broad concepts. It would provide a general construct and associated ways for a vision of how the Obama administration would approach international and domestic security.

The initial drafters in the Strategic Planning office (Colonel Ron Tuggle, Mr. Tom Greenwood, and Ms. Kate Phillips Charlet), under the supervision of Ambassador Mary Yates, Special Assistant to the President and Special Advisor of Strategic Planning, spoke with the drafters of the 2006 NSS, Drs. Peter Feaver and William Inboden, both of whom were very helpful in their description of the process and the pitfalls
that they encountered during the course of the drafting effort. The Obama administration drafters initially reviewed the 2002 and 2006 NSSs in detail to determine where the differences should be for their document. They used the NSPR, as well as a number of President Obama’s speeches, like the one made in Cairo, Egypt, and the Oslo Peace Prize acceptance speech, along with national strategy documents that had come before, such as previous NSSs and QDRs, to provide the President’s thinking and voice for the writing. President Obama formally met with his NSA, NSS Deputies, and Ambassador Yates twice to review progress and drafts and to provide direct guidance for the drafters, ensuring that they were “on the right path.” The President directed the drafters to emphasize prosperity, both at home and abroad, and the concept that while the United States will continue to play a major leadership role, it would be important to identify ways to have other countries also play leadership roles within the international system. President Obama felt strongly that domestic homeland security and external national security policy and strategy must all be viewed as part of the nation’s national security effort; with the result that homeland security would be included as an equal part of the Obama NSS. The drafters worked on the document for 6-8 months (from the later part of 2009 to May 2010) and coordinated very closely with the other National Security Staff directorates to frame their respective issues (e.g., cyber security, counterterrorism, intelligence, defense, and global development).

After the initial draft of the 2010 NSS was complete, it was transmitted for comment to the counterpart offices in the other national security related departments and agencies by the Strategic Planning
Office (e.g., State, OSD, Joint Staff, DHS, Office of the Director for National Intelligence, Treasury, and Justice). They were given a few days to respond with comments in preparation for a Deputies Committee meeting review of the NSS draft. The same thing occurred in advance of a Principals Committee meeting. Roughly 70 percent of the feedback was incorporated in the document. NSA Jones felt it very important to receive and consider the input from the other departments and agencies.\textsuperscript{307}

Ambassador Yates consulted frequently throughout the document development process with counterparts in other government agencies: State, OSD, and Department of Homeland Security (DHS). In part, these consultations took place to ensure that national security-related strategy documents being developed by these departments during this same time period, like the \textit{Quadrennial Homeland Security Review} (QHSR), were informed and synchronized by the soon to be published NSS. In addition to the solicitation of formal input from various government actors, NSA Jones also solicited the comments of outside senior readers including two that had retired from government service: Colin Powell, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and former Secretary of State, and Thomas Pickering, former Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs. One of the drafts was transmitted to them, and they both provided valuable input to the drafting process.\textsuperscript{308}

For this NSS, a stakeholder was described as an actor who had something to either gain or lose in relation to the document. In this case, the President was the key stakeholder. The audiences consisted of the domestic constituents (not all of them—only the more influential ones like Congress and labor unions) and
certain influential countries in the external political realm.\textsuperscript{309}

Lower level national security documents that addressed national interests were reviewed during the development of the national interests for the 2010 NSS. Previous NSSs were also reviewed but did not influence the drafter’s recommendations concerning which national interests to select and what priority order to place them in. Four enduring interests were decided upon, with the economy given a high priority role based on Obama administration belief that “more influence comes from economic leadership than from military might.” Security of the homeland would always be the highest priority.\textsuperscript{310}

Domestic political considerations did play a role in the development of this document. There was a conscious decision made by NSA Jones to address “homeland security related concerns,” which meant that in addition to the global economy, issues like the domestic economy, human capital, education and support for U.S. businesses would be addressed and supported as part of the core foundation for American national security.\textsuperscript{311} The end state aims were derived from the national interests. There were supporting objectives aligned with each interest. But, in effect, these were objectives that were really designed to be aspirations as opposed to objectives that could be fully attained. This approach permitted real flexibility for the NSS. There were no real measures of effectiveness for the strategy because of the determination to write it as a less specified document.\textsuperscript{312}

The ways to aspire towards the national interest derived end states were delineated in Chapter III (Advancing Our Interests) of the document, with a number of them identified under the headings of Security,
Prosperity, Values, and International Order. Despite the NSS being a document of the highest policy and strategy, the administration did consult with OMB to explore methods of applying fiscal constraints to the NSS; this was found to prove difficult when dealing at the strategic broad concept level. Risks were assessed and discussed as interests were prioritized.

The Office of the Director for National Intelligence was tasked to provide analysis of events that could take place that would serve to spoil components of the strategy. They helped to identify potential spoilers (e.g., what would happen if elements in South America responded negatively to the NSS?). The document was also reviewed two to three times by the intelligence community to determine what might have unintended consequences with U.S. allies and others. It was very important to the Obama administration that the NSS was a clear articulation of the policies and priorities but not inadvertently offend other countries, and the intelligence community had the responsibility to craft that analysis for the drafters.

Once NSA Jones approved the final draft of the NSS, it was then approved at a Deputies Committee meeting, a limited (only national security related departments and agencies represented) Principals Committee meeting, and then approved and signed by the President. President Obama was very involved in the content of the NSS and personally drafted the 3-page introductory cover letter.

A COMPARISON

The governments in each of the five case studies set out to accomplish a similar purpose—to develop national security strategy-type documents that will pro-
vide strategic direction for the nation in the national security arena for an established period of time. Their approaches differ to varying degrees. What is clear at the beginning is that there are pluses and minuses to each approach, in part, because each strategy is developed in somewhat different conditions and, at times, for a number of purposes. This section will provide a comparison and contrast the approaches.

Oversight.

Until the last several years, it was only the United States that had developed whole-of-government national security strategy-type documents on a regular basis. The 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act mandates that requirement for the crafting of a national security strategy report for Congress on an annual basis and within the first 150 days of a new presidential administration taking office. In a formalized manner, the creation of such documents on a multiagency-level goes all the way back to the National Security Act of 1947 legislation. The NSS would establish the strategic vision or grand strategic direction for the administration in power. It is intended to be a stand-alone document that will help guide the national security-related documents of other U.S. Government departments and agencies. There have been 15 U.S. NSSs published to date since the implementation of the Goldwater-Nichols Act.

In addition to the U.S. legislation mandating the crafting of national strategy on a regular basis, Brazil codified a requirement in August 2010 to update the NSD every 4 years, as well as requiring the publication of a new White Paper document designed to implement the NSD. Each new presidential regime would
be required to publish an NSD in the second year of its administration. Australia, South Africa, and the UK are all directed to develop their national security strategy-type documents based upon the discretion of the government in power. There is no legislation in place for these countries requiring the creation of a national security strategy-like document. It will be a political decision to craft one.

Australia, Brazil, South Africa, and the UK have all published national security strategy-type documents that involved government actors outside of the respective defense ministries. But it is only the UK that has published a true whole-of-government NSS to date. The Labor Party, followed by the Conservative/Liberal Democrat Party Coalition, all supported the necessity to develop both an NSS and, in the case of the Coalition government, an SDSR that was directly related to the NSS (published in 2010); both following the 2008 and 2009 WPs. The NSS provided the ends and the SDSR provided the detailed ways and means for the nation’s national security establishment. The Australian Labor Party administration directed the publication of the 2008 National Security Statement and the 2009 WP. While neither of these documents meets the definition of a true NSS, they are able to provide the necessary direction to the nation’s armed forces. South Africa did something similar with the South African 1996 White Paper and 1998 Defence Review; both directed by the first post-apartheid government and requiring two related documents to depict the ends in one and the ways and means in the other. One major exception between the Australian and South African documents was that the Australian strategies were whole-of-government crafted, while the South African ones were developed primarily by the MOD
in conjunction with the separate armed services, as well as civil society. Finally, Brazil published its first whole-of-government document in 2008; similar to the Australian, South African, and UK defense reviews, but with a primary emphasis on organization and development of the armed forces.

In addressing the organization of the armed forces, Australia, Brazil, South Africa, and the UK had developed working groups specifically created to work on the actual crafting of the respective documents. For the most part, these individuals had virtually no other duties during their time on these groups other than to work on the document. The drafting effort for each country was a bit different.

For Australia, the 2009 WP crafting effort was led and conducted by the DoD, while the NSS was crafted by the members of the Office of the Prime Minister and the Cabinet. In the case of Brazil, both the MOD and the Strategic Affairs Ministry committed personnel to working groups that prepared the 2008 NSD; with the MOD having overall responsibility. The 1996 South African White Paper was drafted by a MOD working group with the Deputy MOD personally involved in the process. The 1998 Defence Review was organized differently, with participation from a larger number of actors, both state and nonstate. In addition to the MOD lead and other MOD personnel, sub working groups were established that included personnel from the SANDF services, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the intelligence community, police, members of Parliament, and some individual members from civil society (from academia and NGOs).

In the case of the UK, the 2008 NSS was developed by a whole-of-government working group committee that was led and managed by the Cabinet Office Na-
tional Security Secretariat with representation from the MOD, FCO, HO, DFID, and intelligence agencies. The MOD and FCO actually crafted their own chapters. This committee also had to consolidate significant input that was received in the way of a draft document written by some of the Prime Minister’s personal advisors. The National Security Secretariat-led team had to consolidate the two drafts. The same drafting process was utilized for the 2009 and 2010 UK NSSs. In 2010, the UK also produced its SDSR for the first time in 11 years. Written concurrently with the NSS and released 1 day apart, the SDSR drafting group expanded beyond that of the NSS to include the DECC, Departments of Transport and Communities, and the HMT, critical to ensure that the fiscal resource ways for the document would be addressed.

The U.S. NSSs were developed in a somewhat different manner. This was the only case where there was no identified specifically committed working group that involved more than one department or agency. The document was always written in utmost secrecy, with only a handful of senior personnel involved. All three NSSs were written by select personnel on the NSC/NSS staff. Typically, no more than a handful of individuals actually worked on each of the three NSSs that were addressed. They were either assigned to a special strategic planning directorate on the Staff or, as in the case of the 2002 NSS, were individually requested to work on the draft as an outside expert and have the final draft written by the NSA herself. In all three cases, the drafting of the NSS was always an additional task to the other daily duties that all of the involved personnel participated in. The only addition was when the 2006 NSS drafting team reached out to a “Red Team” of academics to review the previous 2002
NSS to suggest where improvements could be made for the new document.

There were three different approaches to document coordination and the determination of which actors would be involved in the process. Australia, Brazil, and the UK have a policy to maximize whole-of-government coordination from the very beginning of the drafting process—including all related ministries/departments and agencies, and doing it often in a formal process during the entire period of the document’s development. The emphasis is clearly on inclusion vice exclusion for any of the national-level national security-oriented institutional actors. The South African approach only involved the MOD and the services, but was influenced to a certain degree by the civil society. The U.S. process involved all respective departments and agencies that had NSC membership, but with the exception that those not on the actual NSC/NSS staff were typically given much less time to review and comment.

**Strategic Context.**

The stakeholders and audiences were essentially the same in all five cases with some select exceptions and with different degrees of importance placed on certain audiences. All primary stakeholders were in the executive branch, with the chief executive (president or prime minister and his office, along with the department or ministry of defense, to include the services of the armed forces). The one exception was the United States—Defense and the services were not considered stakeholders. Additional executive branch national security related ministerial stakeholders included the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade
(DFAT) for Australia and the Brazilian Strategic Affairs ministry. In the case of South Africa, given its very powerful role in the near aftermath of apartheid, the Parliament had to approve both the White Paper and the Defence Review, thus placing itself in the position of a stakeholder. It could also be argued that with the close inclusion of the ministries or offices responsible for fiscal resources in the cases of Australia and the UK, that these actors also became stakeholders in the national strategy development process. In addition, to varied degrees, the fidelity for the ways and means provided in the 2008 Brazilian NSD necessitated the inclusion of all government implementing actors of the strategy as stakeholders early in the process. These included the Ministries of Planning, Budget, and Management; Finance; Science and Technology; Development, Industry, and Foreign Trade; and, the Interior. Finally, for the Australian and UK cases, the political parties in power at the time of document development could also be considered stakeholders because of their role in directing the strategies to be crafted while they were still out of power and vying for elected office.

The audiences for the documents and crafting authorities were also essentially the same with the exception of the civil society. These primary audiences consisted of the other relevant departments and agencies in the executive branch of the government, the legislative branch (parliament and congress), the media, and other countries. Civil society was a unique and intentional audience on the part of the Australian and South African governments. In both cases, there was a conscious decision to reach out to civil society (academia, think tanks, business, industry and, in the case of South Africa, even clergy and NGOs like Green Peace, and leadership at the local community level.
Both countries held parliamentary hearings and formal public meetings to ensure that these voices were heard on their views about national security for the respective nation. Brazil consulted with think tanks, retired military officers, and former ministers of the services. Also, U.S. drafting teams held informal consultations with certain think tank and academic personnel, as well as a number of well known former government leaders.

There were no identified domestic or international legal issues for any of the national strategy making cases, with the exception that it was intended that no known laws be circumvented or ignored. Also, in each case, all prior related policies and strategies were reviewed; especially when similar formal documents had been produced in the past, such as the Australian or UK white papers or SDSRs, or the U.S. NSS.

**National Interests and Domestic Political Considerations.**

For Brazil, South Africa, and the United States, national interests were typically identified from prior national strategy documents, the nation’s constitution, or presidential speeches, as in the case of the United States, and were associated with themes of key importance to each country. The Brazilian interests were derived from the *National Defense Policy* of 2005 and were related to issues like sovereignty, territorial integrity, and regional stability. South African national interests were directly linked to the 1996 Constitution and focused on the nation’s new democratic system, the achievement of social justice, economic development, as well as assuring neighboring countries that South Africa had neither the intent nor the desire to
intimidate them. U.S. interests were normally found in prior speeches that the serving President had made, or originated with key events like the aftermath of the 9/11 attack, the war on terror, and the military campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The Australian approach to identifying national interests also employed previous white papers as a start point, especially the 2000 White Paper for the interests in the 2009 document. At the same time, because the government was willing to accept additional international or external obligations and the fact that domestic security interests had grown because of the events of 9/11 and the Bali bombings, there was a more in-depth examination of what the 2009 interests should be. The crafters of the 2009 White Paper determined that geography would be a key variable for their national interest decisions; with the premise that the closer a threat was to Australian territory, the greater the importance of that interest.

For the UK, the national interests in the 2010 NSS were, in part, a product of a debate between “hard” and “soft” interests, so that issues like energy security interests could be developed in the same context as interests related to terror or the conflict in Afghanistan. In addition, the UK NSRA methodology was also employed to prioritize risks that could then be identified as interests and would be prioritized in accordance with the same risk assessment approach.

The only real domestic political considerations were those involving the commitments made by the political parties with administrations in power in Australia and the UK. These parties had made electoral commitments to produce the White Paper in Australia and the NSS and SDSR in the UK. Therefore, having made campaign promises, it was incumbent on the
newly elected administrations to develop the documents in a timely manner.

**Facts, Assumptions, and Other Factors Framing Strategy Development.**

Each of the drafting teams/individuals received guidance and direction from the senior elected officials in the administrations, either a president or prime minister. In the case of South Africa, the teams also received some guidance from parliament. The guidance came in both the substance as well as, in the case of the United States, in the desire that the document be drafted using the President’s personal voice for a writing style.

The Brazilian NSD, the first two UK NSSs, and the U.S. NSSs were intentionally drafted to be unconstrained by resources. The belief was that if the strategy was sound, the resources would follow. This was not the case for Australia, South Africa, or the 2010 UK documents. In the Australian case, the Departments of Finance and Treasury were brought in at the beginning of the development for the 2009 White Paper to ensure that fiscal considerations were addressed at every step of the formulation process. The South African White Paper and Defence Review were based upon an assessment of the likely budget, with the budget driving the strategy rather than the strategy mandating the budget. For the 2010 UK NSS and SDSR, Her Majesty’s Treasury was brought in at the beginning of the drafting process to advise on fiscal resource issues; the documents were also intended to be in line with the government’s Comprehensive Spending Review (CSR), which was released the same month that the 2010 NSS and SDSR were released.
The threat challenges for the strategy documents were evaluated by the respective Australian, South African, UK, and U.S intelligence communities. All identified threats were also assessed in the formal or semi-formal risk assessment processes that all but the United States utilized. For Brazil, rather than the intelligence community, the Ministry for Strategic Planning developed the threats, ranging from lack of societal participation in matters of national defense and budget insufficiency to the obsolescence of military equipment and restrictions of technology transfer placed on Brazil by more advanced countries.

**Identification of the Strategy’s Objectives and Measures of Effectiveness.**

In some manner, all five countries derived a strategy’s objectives from their national interests. As an example, the Brazilian ends were contained in their 2005 national policy document and directly linked to the 1988 Federal Constitution. But in effect, most objectives were aspirations as opposed to objectives that could be fully attained, thus permitting various degrees of flexibility for portions of the strategies.

The only country that developed a formal approach utilizing measures of effectiveness for a national strategy was Brazil. This was accomplished with the employment of a system developed in the United States (Balanced Scorecard Performance Measurement System) and applied to the supporting objectives contained in the Brazilian NSD, in coordination with the ways and means found in the NSD’s Implementation Measures section.
Ways (Courses of Action) and Means.

As written, only the Brazilian NSD contained detailed ways and means. The ways and means in the four other state strategies were either developed at the classified level and not published in the public documents (Australia and South Africa), or were developed in a fairly generic manner (UK and the United States), with the intent that the relevant departments and agencies responsible for executing the national strategy would draft the detailed ways and means. There was one exception for the United States: after the publication of the 2006 NSS, the U.S. NSC Staff did develop a management tool, the “Silver Bullet List,” to highlight certain national security-related programs that may have been associated with ways required to implement portions of the strategy in order to coordinate their funding with the White House OMB. Most significantly, for the Brazil NSD, the detailed ways and means in the Implementation Measures section were provided with such a degree of fidelity that the implementing ministries could begin their planning processes for execution without further guidance.

Risk Assessment.

Australia and the UK had formal risk assessment processes in place for their national strategy development. Brazil, South Africa, and the United States did address some risk on a much more ad hoc basis, to include potential strategy spoilers and modifiers. Brazil did consider the risk of the impact of providing more funding to defense at the expense of other parts of the national economy. South Africa examined the impact
of budget restrictions on the ability to attain national interest objectives during the development of the 1998 Defence Review. The U.S. drafters for the 2006 NSS tasked the intelligence community to determine what could go wrong with some specific policies and strategies contained in the document, with a number of important spoilers being identified (e.g., Hamas being elected to office). One important analytical point in terms of modifiers that emerged from the U.S. evaluation was that “there are never enough resources to eliminate risk, only to reduce it.”

Both the Australian and UK risk assessment processes were formalized. Australia conducted a highly classified assessment for the 2009 WP. Known as the Strategic Risk Assessment, it addressed risk context, assessment, treatment, and review over the course of time. Based on the outcome of workshops that conducted the analysis of a number of issues, to include potential scenarios, both domestic and international, the document drafters developed modifiers, or “risk treatment” approaches for the WP that were inserted in the Australian strategy. The UK developed the NSRA methodology for the 2010 NSS and SDSR. The NSRA was implemented through a series of workshops, that also included a number of government “subject matter experts,” analysts, and intelligence personnel, to compare, assess, and prioritize all major risks over the next 5 to 20 years that could potentially disrupt components of the national strategy. The likelihood and impact were considered for each risk issue. This process was considered so valuable to the drafting process that it was decided to formally update it every 2 years.
Approval Authority.

The strategies for all five countries required executive branch approval, either by the president or prime minister. These final decisions by the senior executives were made after consultation with executive branch ministers/secretaries at the conclusion of review processes that had taken place. For Brazil, this required a meeting of the National Defense Council, and a Principal’s Committee meeting for the United States. The Australian and UK leaderships approved their documents after extensive whole-of-government drafting efforts that had taken place over a number of months. In the South African case, in addition to the President and Minister of Defence, it was important to obtain the approval of the parliament for the 1996 White Paper and the 1998 Defence Review.

Feedback Mechanism.

Brazil, South Africa, the UK, and for the most part the United States, have no formal feedback mechanism in existence that would tell the government when components of the strategy were successful and when they were not. As it has done with other policy and strategy documents, the Australian Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet reviews the progress of the 2009 White Paper quarterly, based upon submission of information from the DoD. These reviews are a long time tradition in the Australian government and are considered important in light of the need to demonstrate the ability to meet electoral commitments made by a new government. In the case of the United States, while there has not been a feedback mecha-
nism specifically designed for an NSS, the NSC staff administration of NSA Hadley developed a feedback mechanism for policies approved by the NSPD-1 process of deputies and principals committee meetings. “Record 2008” was employed to monitor the evolution of a number of key policies on a quarterly basis. It was designed to assess the policies for success, if they required a bit more effort, attention, or resources, or if they would need a fundamental revision to attain the aims that had been set.

**IS THERE A BEST WAY?**

The analysis of the five case studies demonstrates that there is no one proven way for crafting national security strategy documents. But there are valuable lessons that can be derived from these cases and, when combined, these could serve as a viable start point for a future drafting effort. This section will attempt to provide that start point for future national strategy document development.

**Requirement.**

There are three primary reasons why the development of a national security strategy type document can assist a country in its navigation of national security issues:

1. Resourcing—to better align national security priorities and funding;

2. Coordination—to reduce duplication of effort between government departments and agencies, as well as between different tiers of the government; and

3. Communication—to provide better clarity for both the government and private sector.
As described, these represent benefits to both stakeholders and audiences to ensure the security of the respective state. The complexities of the 21st century feature challenges and associated opportunities that are in a continuous condition of change or modification. The result is the need to institutionalize the requirement to develop a national security strategy-type document on a regular basis, to be done in tandem with other key national strategy documents, like the NDS and QDR for the United States, SDSR for the UK, the Defence Review for South Africa, and the new White Paper for Brazil. This formalization of the requirement will ensure that national security strategy is being consistently reviewed for modification and adjustment.

The U.S. 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act mandates a requirement for the crafting of a national security strategy report for Congress on an annual basis and within the first 150 days of a new presidential administration taking office.\textsuperscript{321} As written, both requirements are infeasible. At the national level of government, it is rare for a nation to have to change its national strategy on an annual basis; such a change would likely only occur in time of the need for a response to a major event (e.g., 9/11, changes in an ongoing war). The two Bush 43 administrations crafted one NSS during every 4 years, and as of this writing, there has only been one Obama administration NSS. Of the 15 U.S. NSSs to date, six of them were written by new administrations (Bush 41, Clinton twice, Bush 43 twice, and Obama) and none of these were published within the established 150-day period; publication usually taking place during the second year of a new administration. The absence of additional NSSs and the fact that
none were published during the first 150 days of an administration have never been missed. An equally important consideration for a new administration is that it needs time to put in place all of its political appointee senior leaders in positions that have a national security agenda; and provide them with a “learning period,” the time necessary to understand the issues they have been appointed to work, which is likely to take months. Typically many of the appointees may not even have been approved by Congress at the 150-day mark.322

Recommendation. It is more appropriate to institutionalize something similar to the 2010 Brazilian legislation requiring production of an NSS-type document (NSD for Brazil) every 4 years and the requirement for a new presidential administration to produce one in the second year of its administration. This must be flexible to be able to accommodate the need for a new strategy to be created in a situation where a major event took place during the life of the administration. The legislation should stipulate that the development of the NSS should be coordinated with the production of other key national security strategy-type documents and stipulate them by name and how often they are to be written.

Organization.

Australia, Brazil, South Africa, and the UK had developed dedicated working groups to conduct the actual writing of the documents. The participants normally had no other responsibilities during the time that they served on the working groups, allowing them total focus on the very complex task at hand. In part, the issue is that the regular positions that the drafters
typically occupy are so busy that those activities will likely take away from the difficult work required for the national strategy document. The composition of three of four of the working groups encompassed all ministries/departments involved in national security; the South African one only involved the MOD and the services.

With the exception of South Africa, all drafting efforts were either led by an organization similar to the U.S. National Security Staff, or as in the case of Brazil, by two ministries working together. For the document in question to be a true whole-of-government product, it warrants leadership for its development from the center of executive branch power, as opposed to a single (South Africa) or two (Brazil) ministries. The United States also established an Office of Strategic Planning during the second Bush 43 administration on the NSC staff. This office had the responsibility to craft the NSS, conduct regional and functional strategic reviews, and perform contingency planning.  

It was a unique office for the NSC staff because its emphasis was on longer term strategic planning responsibilities. An additional component of the U.S. organization for the 2006 NSS was the creation of the “Red Team” from the National Defense University. This group was able to provide in depth analysis of the previous NSS (2002) and its applicability or lack thereof to the conditions faced by the drafters in 2005-2006; an asset in determining where the NSS that was being drafted should differ from the previous one.

Finally, Australia published a document that specifically delineated their government’s strategic planning process in detail, especially their model for the development of a national strategy. It includes addressing government direction, strategic guid-
ance, strategic planning for operations, international engagement, preparedness, capability, and budget planning.\textsuperscript{324}

**Recommendation:** Dedicated working groups should be created and led by the national security staff of the nations’ senior executive (e.g., Office of the Prime Minister and Cabinet for Australia; National Security Secretariat for the UK; and the NSC for the United States).

The actual national security staff participation should come from a permanent directorate/office on these staffs that are designed to focus on long-term strategic planning. Responsibility for the actual drafting of the national strategy document should be given to this strategic planning office to ensure it has a coherent top-down focus directly from the chief executive. This allows for direct access to the office of the chief executive for guidance and direction. It would provide the detailed direction for the wider working group and collate the writing effort. The national security staff office will have to be staffed with a sufficient number of personnel to allow members the opportunity to solely work on projects and have no other responsibilities for extended periods of time. Associated working groups would assess and coordinate review of the strategy document. Ideally the members of the wider working group should also have no other responsibilities during the time of the drafting effort and have direct access to the senior leadership of all departments and agencies in the government that have a stake in the document. As in the Australian and UK cases, consideration should be given to having representation from the departments and agencies with a major stake in the document on the full time drafting team (e.g., DoD/MOD, MFA/State Dept, Joint Staff/General Staff).
Recommend the creation of a “red team” to review the previous document and challenge its assertions for continued applicability and inclusion in the new one being drafted.

Also recommend publication of a document that delineates the strategic planning process for the government in sufficient detail that any mid-senior level participant in the whole-of-government process would understand the national strategy formulation process approach to be taken.

**Coordination.**

The whole-of-government coordination that was conducted in Australia, Brazil, and the UK appeared to facilitate the inclusion of the departments/ministries and agencies representing all the elements of national power in the respective governments. The United States orchestrates this process in a very close hold manner with direction coming from the top (directly from the chief executive) down to the few on the NSS staff drafting the document. There is potential disadvantage that mid levels of the interagency that are knowledgeable in implementation requirements will not be able to provide input. There is also risk that stakeholders in other departments/ministries and agencies that had minimal opportunity to coordinate will not be comfortable enough with the strategy to ensure buy-in from their organization after the drafting process is complete. At the same time, there is also risk that the inclusion of so many actors will lead to a document of compromise that addresses every conceivable issue, with none of them being given priority. The result would be a document reflecting bureaucratic consensus with no real focus.
This emphasis on inclusion rather than exclusion of actors that would have responsibility for executing the national strategy would likely lead to greater acceptance of the strategy’s objectives even before the required planning for implementation took place. It would also have the added advantage of ensuring that concerns from the related departments/ministries with strategy proposals could be evaluated prior to the document being forwarded for senior leader review. Finally, when distributed for highest-level approval, adequate time should be provided for the departments/ministries and agencies to ensure proper internal review.

**Recommendation:** A regularized coordination process be established for the national strategy formulation process that ensures all departments/ministries and agencies that have a stake in the document are permitted time to properly address document issues of relevance to those actors, to include the entire document when necessary. They should be given adequate time for review and comment as required. But in the end, the senior executive leadership must make the final decisions for the strategy document. To be a true successful national strategy, it must be one that ensures prioritization of national objectives and focuses on the key issues vice every issue facing the nation during that period in time. This means that, for focus, the process must be driven from the top and the document cannot be founded on consensus because it is the chief executive’s vision that is at stake.

**Stakeholders.**

As noted earlier, the stakeholders are key because the document is written to attain objectives that they are accountable for to their public and their political
party. In addition to the chief executive of the state and to a somewhat lesser degree, the departments/ministries and agencies that have national security responsibility and are charged with implementing the national strategy must also be considered to be stakeholders. This inclusion becomes important for the complete acceptance and support for the document from within the whole-of-government devoted to national security issues; especially because these other stakeholders will have to work to attain fiscal resources for their execution responsibilities.

Recommendation: Government departments/ministries and agencies with national security authorities should be formally identified as stakeholders in the national security strategy formulation process. It must be understood that for purposes of a national security strategy type document, the chief executive is the primary stakeholder and the NSS needs to reflect his/her views and style of expression.

Audience.

The importance of the domestic audience is significant for obtaining support for the resources necessary to implement the national strategy. Key audiences would be the Congress or Parliament, as well as the media, and other countries. It becomes especially important for legislation that requires the drafting of the national security strategy specifically for legislative body review. The involvement of civil society (academia, think tanks, business, industry and, in the case of South Africa, even clergy and NGOs like Green Peace, and leadership at the local community level) is becoming more important in a time of fiscal austerity. Both Australia and Brazil have been successful in
including civil society and receiving their thinking on national security issues through parliamentary hearings and formal public meetings.

**Recommendation:** To the degree possible, in addition to the legislative body of government and the media, consider civil society to be an important audience and hold congressional/parliamentary hearings that solicit their input. During the time of the drafting coordination process, strongly suggest that select committees be briefed on the substantive content discussion of the strategy in order to obtain their input. Immediately upon document release, would recommend specific presentations be provided to the entire legislative body either as a whole, or by relevant committee (e.g., at a minimum in the United States, it would be for congressional committees on foreign relations, armed services, homeland security, intelligence, and appropriations).

**National Interests and Domestic Political Considerations.**

Four of the five cases used prior national strategy documents, the nation’s constitution, or presidential speeches to help identify national interests. The UK also employed its NSRA methodology to help determine and prioritize interests. For a democracy, most important is to ensure that both the executive and legislative branches of government believe the national interests that are identified are the right ones for the nation at that point in time, and in priority order. The national security environment of the 21st century mandates that a national strategy encompass both domestic and external national interests.
To the national security document drafters, the issue of domestic political considerations can be a two-edged sword. It can influence the strategy in such a way that emphasizes some issues at the expense of others, potentially forcing a political subjectively-based prioritization for the strategy’s objectives. On the other hand, an understanding of the political factors that permit the drafters to know what the American people will and will not support can ultimately impact the development of the NSS and what it says. These factors cannot simply be ignored in a democracy and in the end, domestic political considerations can impose constraints which may be avoidable.

Recommendation: Continue to employ prior national strategy documents, the nation’s constitution, or presidential/prime minister’ speeches to help identify and prioritize national interests. The ability to link interest development to risk evaluation can have the added benefit of providing greater detail to the description of the national interest. Balance the necessity of taking domestic political considerations into account with the requirement to ensure, to the greatest degree possible, that the strategy’s end state aims and prioritization are unimpeded by political constraints.

Constrained or Unconstrained?

There are two major components of constraints that can impact the national strategy development process: domestic politics and resources (means). The issue of domestic politics was addressed in the paragraph above. Constraints of resource means in the national security arena typically relate to money, personnel, equipment, or technology. Australia and the UK found it to their advantage to form national strat-
egy documents that were based on the fiscal resources that their related treasury departments and ministries could make available. Other nontreasury related departments/ministries were already participating in the formulation process and could address potential personnel, equipment, and technology constraints. It could be argued that details for a strategy are more important in a time of resource (fiscal) austerity, thus creating an argument for potential fiscal issues to be understood early on in the strategy development process.

Recommendation: While the ideal is a strategy that can be developed in completely unconstrained conditions, it is especially important during a time of austerity to understand potential limitations all throughout the strategy drafting process. The departments/ministries/agencies that control or manage the fiscal resources should be invited to participate in the national security strategy drafting process from the start. They would be there to advise, not enforce limitations. The national strategy document drafting process should always begin with an unconstrained approach; the resource tradeoffs would then follow.

Identification of the Strategy’s Objectives and Measures of Effectiveness.

There is no real difference between how the five nations developed their strategy’s objectives; they were related to the national interests. Most objectives were aspirational in nature, thus allowing for flexibility on the part of the strategy.

Brazil was the only country that utilized a formal approach utilizing measures of effectiveness for a national strategy. The Balanced Scorecard Performance
Measurement System was applied to supporting objectives contained in the Brazilian NSD in coordination with the ways and means found in the NSD’s Implementation Measures section. Such an approach can assist a strategy maker to determine when the strategy is succeeding and when it is not. This is especially valid for a program designed to monitor the strategy’s progress after the strategy has gone into effect.

Recommendation: Continue to establish objectives for the strategy that are directly related to identified national interests. Formalize a program to develop measures of effectiveness for the strategy as it is being implemented; to serve as an analytic tool to determine how successful components of the strategy have been towards the outcome of attainment of the strategy’s objectives and when those components require adjustment. The measures of effectiveness should be used to evaluate the ability of the ways (courses of action) to approach attainment of the strategy’s objectives. All of the above could be contained in a separate annex to the strategy that focuses on measures of effectiveness.

Ways (Courses of Action) and Means.

Only the Brazilian NSD contained detailed ways and means. Their presence in the Implementation Measures portion of the Brazilian NSD, with a real degree of fidelity, provided sufficient detail to the planners in the ministries responsible for implementing the NSD to begin planning how their respective ministries would execute the strategy. None of the other national security related strategies could do that. In particular, this has been a problem with NSSs in the United States. “The 1998, 2000, (2002), and 2006 national security strategies . . . list goals without going
into much detail as to how they might be achieved in a practical sense.” \textsuperscript{326} The advantage to greater fidelity in the ways and means is that the rest of the government that has a stake in the strategy can immediately begin working on implementation planning, to include requests for fiscal resources.

Recommendation: Provide as much detail as possible in the strategy’s ways and means. This should be designed to specify the guidance necessary for the implementing government departments/ministries and agencies to use to begin detailed planning for execution. The departments/ministries and agencies with responsibility to execute individual ways should be identified and directed to be responsible for their component of that part of the strategy.

Risk Assessment.

The Australian and UK risk assessment processes for national strategy development have become formalized in the last several years. As such, both countries have models that can be used to assess strategic risk context, assessment, treatment, and review over the course of time. Coupled with workshops that utilize the models on specific scenarios related to the strategy being developed, the document drafters are able to identify potential strategy spoilers as well as modifiers to address the spoilers.

Recommendation: Include and formalize risk assessment analysis for all national security-type strategies. Review the risk assessment models being utilized by Australia and the UK for potential utilization for other national strategies. Mandate that a risk assessment annex that would include identification of potential spoilers and associated modifiers be developed for
the strategy. In the United States, something similar is already being done at the classified level by the Joint Staff on an annual basis for the National Military Strategy.

**Approval Authority.**

The strategies for all five countries require final executive branch approval, either by the president or prime minister. This is logical since the chief executive is ultimately responsible for the nation’s national security.

*Recommendation:* Retain the chief executive as the final approving authority for the national security strategy.

**Feedback Mechanism.**

Only Australia has created a formal system to regularly review (quarterly) the national strategy documents for success, failure, and potential modification. This process is based upon submission of information from the Australian DoD. Also, the United States developed a feedback mechanism for policies approved by senior level meetings. Although not specifically developed to support the NSS crafting effort, “Record 2008” was employed to monitor the evolution of a number of key policies on a quarterly basis; if they required a bit more effort, attention, or resources, or if they would need a fundamental revision to attain the aims that had been set. The complexities of the 21st century require some sort of a formal monitoring effort to determine when a national strategy is succeeding and when it is not.
**Recommendation:** Any nation crafting a national security strategy-type document should have a formal process to continuously review that strategy for success, failure, and potential modification. It will require formal guidance from the office of the nation’s chief executive that directs the other department/ministry and agency stakeholders in the strategy to provide detailed information describing the progress of the strategy on a regular basis. The review process should be led by the actor in the executive branch that had responsibility for the document’s development. A public document should be produced every 2 years, or 2 years after the publication of the last national strategy, that provides a review of the progress of the strategy, as appropriate in terms of success, failure, and modification.

**ENDNOTES**


20. Mahnken, p. 3.


29. Doyle, p. 624.


35. Foster, p. 14, as quoted in Deibel, p. 12.


43. See Doyle, p. 625; Deibel, p. 9; and Murdock, p. 9.


47. Michael L’Estrange (former Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, and current Director, National Security College, Australian National University), in discussion with the author, September 29, 2011.


49. David Connery (Deputy Director, National Security College, Australian National University) email to the author, May 12, 2012.

50. Michael Pezullo (former Head of the 2009 White Paper drafting team and current Chief Operating Officer for the Customs and Border Protection Service), in discussion with the author, September 28, 2011.


55. Greg Raymond (Director, Strategic Policy Guidance, Department of Defence) and Bryden Spurling (Deputy Director, Strategic Policy Guidance, Department of Defence), in discussion with the author, September 27, 2011.
56. Ibid.


58. Walters, p. 6.


63. Ibid.


65. Raymond and Spurling in discussion with the author, September 27, 2011.

66. Pezullo, in discussion with the author, September 28, 2011; and Marc Ablong (former Chief of Staff for the 2009 White Paper drafting team and current Assistant Secretary for Strategic Issues Management, Ministerial Support and Public Affairs Division, Department of Defence), in discussion with the author, September 27, 2011.

67. Sarah Guise (primary drafter of the 2008 National Security Statement and current Senior Advisor for Counter Terrorism and
Border Security, Homeland and Border Security Division, Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet), in discussion with the author, September 29, 2011.

68. Graham Eveille (Assistant Secretary, Defence Policy and Operations Branch, Defence Intelligence and Research Coordination Division, Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet), in discussion with the author, September 28, 2011.


72. Ibid.


74. Raymond and Spurling in discussion with the author, September 27, 2011.

75. Ibid.

76. Stephen McFarlane (Assistant Secretary, Intelligence Policy Branch, Defence Intelligence and Research Coordination Division, Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet), in discussion with the author, September 28, 2011 and in email received May 8, 2012.

77. Raymond and Spurling in discussion with the author, September 27, 2011.

Barton, Australia: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, December 10, 2008, p. 2.

79. L’Estrange, in discussion with the author, September 29, 2011.


81. Raymond and Spurling in discussion with the author, September 27, 2011.

82. Ibid.

83. Ablong, in discussion with the author, September 27, 2011.

84. Ibid.

85. Raymond and Spurling in discussion with the author, September 27, 2011.

86. Ablong, in discussion with the author, September 27, 2011.

87. Walters, pp. 7, 10.


89. Guise, in discussion with the author, September 29, 2011.


91. L’Estrange, in discussion with the author, September 29, 2011.

92. Raymond and Spurling, in discussion with the author, September 27, 2011.

94. Ibid.

95. Ablong, in discussion with the author, September 27, 2011.


100. Colonel (Retired) Marcos Antonio (former Coordinator for the MOD Working Group on the NSD and current Manager, Strategic Defense Section, Joint Staff of the Armed Forces) and Captain Rafael Santos (former Strategy and Policy Advisor, Secretariat of Policy, Strategy, and International Affairs, MOD, for the NSD, and current Advisor, Policy and Strategic Planning Division, Navy Staff), in discussion with the author, August 9, 2011.


102. Colonel Edson Diehl Ripoli (seconded to the Ministry of Strategic Affairs Working Group that wrote the first draft of the NSD and currently on the personal staff of the Army Commander), in discussion with the author, August 7, 2011; and “Brazil’s Pursuit of a Nuclear Submarine Raises Proliferation Concerns,” WMD Insights, March 5, 2008.

103. General Brigade (2 star) Luiz Linhares (seconded to the Ministry of Strategic Affairs Working Group that wrote the first draft of the NSD and currently the Deputy Chief of Personnel, Army Staff), in discussion with the author, August 8, 2011.

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105. Linhares; and Captain (Retired) Ruiz Campos (seconded to the Ministry of Strategic Affairs Working Group that
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106. Ripoli, in discussion with the author, August 7, 2011.

107. Lula da Silva, p. 5.

108. Linhares; and Campos, in discussion with the author, August 8, 2011.


111. Santos, in discussion with the author, August 9, 2011.

112. Linhares; and Campos, in discussion with the author, August 8, 2011; and Antonio, in discussion with the author, August 9, 2011.

113. Santos, in discussion with the author, August 9, 2011.

114. Ripoli, in discussion with the author, August 7, 2011.


117. Ibid.


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121. Antonio and Santos, in discussion with the author, August 9, 2011.

122. Linhares, in discussion with the author, August 8, 2011.

123. Ibid.

124. Santos, in discussion with the author, August 9, 2011.

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128. Colonel Pinheiro Evandro (Chief, Strategic Follow-On Section, Policy and Strategy Directorate, Army Staff), in discussion with the author, August 9, 2011.

129. Lula da Silva, pp. 49-50.

130. Ripoli, in discussion with the author, August 7, 2011.

131. Antonio, in discussion with the author, August 9, 2011; and Lula da Silva, p. 42.


133. Santos, in discussion with the author, August 9, 2011.

134. Ibid.


136. Mattos, in discussion with the author, August 8, 2011.


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197. Samuel Selvadurai (Strategy Officer, Foreign Commonwealth Office [FCO] Policy Unit), in discussion with the author, June 27, 2011.


202. Ibid.

203. Ibid; and McDonald, in discussion with the author, June 27, 2011.

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222. A senior UK government official, in discussion with the author, June 28, 2011.


228. Selvadurai, in discussion with the author, June 27, 2011.


232. Ibid, pp. 6-7.


235. Ibid, p. 28.


238. McDonald, in discussion with the author, June 27, 2011.


244. Ibid., p. 3.


250. Tuggle, email to the author, May 31, 2012; and Ambassador Mary C. Yates (Special Assistant to the President and Special Advisor of Strategic Planning, National Security Staff), email to the author, June 4, 2012.


253. “Combating Terrorism: Evaluation of Selected Characteristics in National Strategies Related to Terrorism,” GAO-04-
254. Stephen J. Hadley (former Deputy National Security Advisor to the President in the first Bush 43 administration and the National Security Advisor to the President in the second Bush 43 administration), in discussion with the author, December 20, 2011; and Condoleezza Rice (National Security Advisor to the President during the First Administration of Bush 43), in discussion with the author, April 30, 2012. NSC-68 was drafted by a small group of personnel from the Departments of State and Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff under the leadership of Paul Nitze from the State Department Policy Planning Staff, and all at the direction of the Secretaries of State and Defense. See Steven L. Rearden, “Paul H. Nitze and NSC 68: ‘Militarizing’ the Cold War,” in The Policy Makers: Shaping American Foreign Policy from 1947 to the Present, Anna Kasten Nelson, ed., Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2009, pp. 5-28.

255. Zelikow, in discussion with the author, November 11, 2011.

256. Biegun, in discussion with the author, December 8, 2011.

257. Biegun, in discussion with the author, December 8, 2011; Rice, in discussion with the author, April 30, 2012; Zelikow, in discussion with the author, November 11, 2011; and Hadley, in discussion with the author, December 20, 2011.


259. Ibid.; and Zelikow, in discussion with the author, November 11, 2011.


263. Biegun, in discussion with the author, December 8, 2011.


266. Rice, in discussion with the author, April 30, 2012.


269. Ibid.

270. As quoted by Hadley, in discussion with the author, December 20, 2011.


273. Rice, in discussion with the author, April 30, 2012; and Department of State, “Broader Middle East and North Africa
274. Biegun, in discussion with the author, December 8, 2011.


278. Ibid.


281. Ibid.

282. Peter Feaver (Special Advisor for Strategic Planning and Institutional Reform, NSC Staff, from 2005-07, and current Professor of Political Science and Public Policy, Duke University, Durham, NC), in discussion with the author, November 9, 2011; and Hadley, in discussion with the author, February 16, 2012.


284. William C. Inboden (Senior Director for Strategic Planning, NSC Staff, during the 2d Bush 43 Administration, and current Assistant Professor of Public Affairs, University of Texas, Austin, Texas), in discussion with the author, September 6, 2011; Peter Feaver, in discussion with the author, November 9, 2011; and Hadley, in discussion with the author, February 16, 2012.


286. Inboden, in discussion with the author, September 6, 2011.

288. Feaver, in discussion with the author, November 9, 2011.


290. Inboden, in discussion with the author, September 6, 2011.


292. Feaver, in discussion with the author, November 9, 2011; and Hadley, in discussion with the author, February 16, 2012.


294. Inboden, in discussion with the author, September 6, 2011.

295. Feaver, in discussion with the author, November 9, 2011; and Hadley, in discussion with the author, February 16, 2012.

296. Inboden, in discussion with the author, September 6, 2011; Feaver, in discussion with the author, November 9, 2011; and Hadley, in discussion with the author, February 16, 2012.

297. Inboden, in discussion with the author, September 6, 2011; and Feaver, in discussion with the author, November 9, 2011.

298. Feaver, in discussion with the author, November 9, 2011.


300. Barry Pavel (Senior Director for Defense Strategy from 2008-2010, NSS Staff, and current director of the International

301. Tuggle, in discussion with the author, September 14, 2011; and Thomas Greenwood (Director for Strategic Planning, NSS Staff, from 2009-2011, and current Director for Pakistan, Office of the Deputy Secretary of Defense for South and Central Asia, OSD), in discussion with the author, May 2, 2012.

302. Tuggle, in discussion with the author, September 14, 2011.

303. Ambassador Mary C. Yates (Special Assistant to the President and Special Advisor of Strategic Planning, National Security Staff during crafting of the 2010 NSS), in discussion with the author, June 1, 2012.


305. Yates, in discussion with the author, June 1, 2012.

306. Tuggle, in discussion with the author, September 14, 2011.

307. Ibid.

308. Yates, in discussion with the author, June 1, 2012.

309. Tuggle, in discussion with the author, September 14, 2011.

311. Tuggle, in discussion with the author, September 14, 2011; and Pavel, in discussion with the author, June 7, 2012.

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315. Ibid.


322. Hadley, in discussion with the author, December 20, 2011.

323. Duke Sanford School of Public Policy, “Peter D. Feaver,” available from fds.duke.edu/db/Sanford/pfeaver.

325. Inboden, in discussion with the author, September 6, 2011.
