When people talk about proliferation of nuclear-armed and other missiles they generally mean ballistic missiles. The same holds true for the plethora of existing conventions and international agreements to regulate various aspects of missile production, sales, deployment, etc., and for missile defenses. Thus, for example, the controversy over missile defenses to be placed by the United States in Poland and the Czech Republic is all about missile defenses for ballistic missiles (either conventional or nuclear) that Iran is believed to be building. Yet even as governments multiply these conventions, agreements, and regulatory regimes, and seek ever-newer means of forestalling the proliferation of ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, against which there is no practical defense and no treaties curtailing their production, sale, and deployment, are growing on a worldwide basis.

This development has proceeded over several years with little fanfare and publicity, but in Dennis Gormley’s expert analysis we can see just how pervasive the trend has become. Indeed, it is worldwide, with every major military power or aspirant to such status from Russia to North Korea manufacturing or selling these missiles to budding military powers. Thus Russia, Iran, China, India, Pakistan, and North Korea are all engaged in both sides of cruise-missile commerce, namely the manufacture of ever-more sophisticated missiles or their transfer to other nations either in part or in whole. In particular the greatest danger comes from land-attack cruise missiles that can, as their name implies, target terrestrial targets with virtual impunity, as there are no defenses against them. Likewise, antiship cruise missiles are also gaining in popularity and ubiquity as the technology and know-how necessary to manufacture them spreads from country to country.

Nor is the concern about cruise missiles an academic issue, something that only experts worry about. As Russia has indicated, if the United States proceeds with European-based missile defenses it will place its Iskander cruise missiles with either conventional or nuclear warheads in Kaliningrad, from where they can target Poland, the Czech Republic, parts of Germany, and the Baltic states. Therefore, measures to regulate or even curtail the development and spread of these weapons should become an urgent policy issue and not only for the United States.

Gormley’s expertise on these missiles, honed over years of research and publishing, is immense, and his knowledge of the subject verges on the encyclopedic. But the value of this book for experts, interested laypersons, and policy-makers does not end there. Missile Contagion is no mere catalogue of who builds or sells what to whom. Beyond those fundamental facts and a description of the various missiles’ capabilities, Gormley also makes substantial policy recommendations for the United States to counter their proliferation and to establish control regimes, like the arms-control efforts that have so painstakingly been accomplished during the last 50 years.
The author likens the spread of these weapons to a kind of contagion, and they certainly are a growing plague to the international system because the technology and ability to manufacture them have steadily diffused from major military powers such as the United States and the Soviet Union to aspiring major powers, including Russia, China, and India. They have also diffused to nations that feel threatened by any of the newly equipped states. This new list would include Pakistan, Iran, and North Korea. We can be reasonably certain, as is the case with nuclear proliferation, that missile technology will spread from them to other countries that feel threatened by these new powers’ acquisition of such lethal capabilities. As a result, the threat posed by such weapons, which as the Iskander example suggests, will soon be available as nuclear cruise missiles, is no less urgent than ballistic missiles and their armament. For all those who want to understand this threat and what can and must be done about it, Gormley’s book is an indispensable guide.


A sociologist and author of more than two dozen books on diverse topics, Amitai Etzioni is a respected and influential public intellectual. Currently a University Professor at George Washington University, one of his most recent books is Security First: For a Muscular, Moral Foreign Policy. Written prior to the 2008 election, Etzioni seemingly intended the book to convince a new presidential administration that it is not only possible to combine realism and idealism in foreign policy, but that doing so is necessary for national and global well-being.

Etzioni criticizes recent US foreign policy attempts to spread democracy internationally. While favoring democracy and its promotion, Etzioni contends America has applied the wrong approach. He believes the United States should adopt a foreign policy that emphasizes basic security first, not democracy. Promoting security, he insists, provides the foundation for democracy, not the other way around. All other rights are dependent on security; however, security itself is not dependent on other rights. Providing basic security, therefore, takes priority over all else.

The United States’ preoccupation with spreading democracy, according to the author, stems from a national “realism deficiency.” Americans are convinced they have achieved the ideal political system. This self-confidence, combined with great economic and military power, deludes them into thinking they can replicate the American system elsewhere. This utter lack of realism, Etzioni continues, peaked among neoconservatives in Washington, D.C., who promoted a global democracy agenda. He states this goal is impossible to realize and “actually undermines the more practical work, of that which could be accomplished.”

Etzioni rejects the “clash of civilization” thesis, coined by Bernard Lewis and popularized by Samuel Huntington. He argues that embracing this thesis leads to overestimating the ranks of those who truly hate America and who are willing to commit or support violence to further their beliefs. He stresses that those in this category are relatively few. Such black-and-white thinking squanders the opportunity to attract the overwhelming numbers in the Muslim world who, though not liberal democrats, none-
theless renounce violent extremism. This “us versus them” mentality is, Etzioni believes, one of America’s greatest failings since 9/11.

Rather than singling out Islam as a violent religion, he notes that all religions, and even some secular movements, contain within them a fundamental division between those who support the use of persuasion (“Preachers”) and those who support the use of violence (“Warriors”). He notes that the term “Preachers” has no religious connotation; they are simply the individuals in these groups who choose persuasion over violence. Similarly, “Warriors” are those who use or condone violence in service of their beliefs, irrespective of whether they are members of the armed forces.

Instead, Etzioni urges the United States to adopt a “realist” foreign policy. He assures readers he is employing the term “in the psychological sense,” not as it is used in international relations (IR) theory. Ironically, he finds IR realism “unrealistic” because “it ignores the increasingly important role played by moral culture and religion within societies and in international relations.” Focusing narrowly on self-interest to the exclusion of everything else, he insists, is morally dubious. It violates the basic change he would like to make to US foreign policy: promoting the principle of the “primacy of life”—in other words, people everywhere matter.

One of the book’s main suggestions is for the United States to work with “illiberal moderates.” These are individuals who might oppose western-style democracy, believe that Islamic law ought to dominate society, yet are unwilling to use or sanction force to advance their beliefs. The author argues that these illiberal moderates constitute a global “swing vote” in this war of ideas and that we dismiss them at our peril.

Etzioni is not always successful in reconciling realism and idealism. There is tension between the two, and he does not bridge them entirely. He suggests that while a nuclear-armed North Korea might have to be tolerated, Iran will likely need to be “forcibly deproliferated.” Overall, Security First tends toward realist and conservative assumptions and policy prescriptions, though the author seems loathe to concede this point. There are additional concerns about the book. Long-winded at times, Etzioni provides multiple examples at length to demonstrate the same point when just a couple would suffice. He also invokes terms important to his argument, such as “neocon,” “liberal,” “realist,” and “neorealist” but fails to define them sufficiently. This shortcoming is curious in a book with a decided philosophical bent and that attempts to resolve ideological divisions by providing a synthesis of at least two competing ideologies. Etzioni also assails neorealism but offers no fair-minded assessment of it. Although authors are, of course, free to criticize whatever they choose, they ought to at least present competing views fairly.

Despite these concerns, this learned and well-written book deserves wide attention. Etzioni amply demonstrates his deep intellectual breadth, confidently walking readers through an examination of major religions, arms-control policy, the law, and economic development. Specialists might quibble, but the job of the public intellectual, as distinct from the specialist, is to provide a philosophic overview of important issues. This book, therefore, offers the most value to politicians, policy-makers, and military officers interested in a clear and reasoned review of global security problems and general suggestions for how to solve them.

In this second edition of his well-received book, Paul Krugman of Princeton University revisits and updates his thinking about a set of issues that he first addressed a decade ago. Given the developments of the past two years, his thoughts are more relevant than ever. They tend to fall into three main categories.

First and foremost, depression economics are not a thing of the past. The United States and other nations are still prone to the difficulties that plagued economies during the 1930s; that is, to circumstances in which the overall demand for goods and services is less than productive capacity, resulting in surplus output and unemployed resources. Professor Krugman finds evidence of insufficient demand in a string of episodes that span the past 30 years. Although his ultimate objective is to explain why things happened, in each instance he develops a narrative that allows him—much like the facilitator of a discussion about a business school case study—to lead the reader to a better understanding of underlying economic theory. As a bonus, his sequential, chapter-by-chapter descriptions also help the reader to appreciate the path of events.

The episodes that prompted the first edition (and are featured once again in the second) include the Latin American debt crisis of the 1980s; Mexico’s so-called tequila crisis of 1994-95; Japan’s decade-long slump of the 1990s; and the global financial crises that spread from Asia to other emerging markets to Wall Street in 1997-98. Those events that prompted the second edition—the emergence of hedge funds as major players in what is today referred to as the shadow banking system; the aggressive monetary policy pursued in the early years of this decade by the Alan Greenspan-led Federal Reserve Bank; and the introduction of financial market innovations such as subprime mortgages and collateralized debt obligations—all contributed to the speculative bubbles in the US equity and real estate markets that surfaced a few years ago, inevitably popped, and initiated the current global crisis.

Second, three decades of reconstruction and growth following World War II, the collapse of communism, the corresponding validation of capitalism, and the revolution in information technology had a fundamental impact on the formation of predominant ideas. That is, by the late 1990s, professional economists had—mistakenly in Professor Krugman’s view—generally concluded that the business cycle had been tamed. They therefore tended to focus their research on supply-side factors that influenced productivity and long-term growth, and to pay far less attention to the causes of and possible remedies for demand-side fluctuations. With the onset of crises, the absence of new thinking about demand management complicated the challenges confronting central bankers, finance ministers, and experts at the International Monetary Fund. While alternative courses of action each appeared to have heavy costs and uncertain benefits, policies that were pursued often led to unintended and sometimes painful outcomes. In retrospect, the world would have benefitted from larger doses of informed and proactive crisis prevention, and smaller amounts of learning-by-doing crisis response. This fact suggests it is time for economists to return to the drawing board.

Third, as was the case in the early 1930s, when excess supply in the markets for goods and services was accompanied by a loss of confidence in financial institu-
tions, an infusion of capital to the financial sector coupled with a Keynesian-style fiscal stimulus (i.e., aggressive spending by the government as a buyer of last resort) constitute the proper pair of short-term policy responses. Why? In the absence of healthy balance sheets and credibility in the eyes of counterparts, banks and other financial entities will not be able to provide the liquidity needed for typical business transactions. In addition, although micro-economic models posit that in circumstances where supply exceeds demand, a decline in prices for labor, capital, and goods and services will restore equilibrium, the reality is that prices in many markets are downwardly “sticky” and do not readily decline. Therefore, the government has to step in to create more demand at existing prices. Taking a longer-term view but once again drawing upon the lessons of the 1930s, in order to avoid future crises the third line of a robust policy response would entail constructing a new regime to regulate the financial sector.

Given his analysis, Professor Krugman offers some caveats but generally endorses the approach to the contemporary crisis being pursued by the current administration. Of course, not all specialists are in agreement. For example, in recent months, the esteemed historian Niall Ferguson, who worries that the massive deficits and mounting debt being generated by the US government will raise long-term interest rates and choke off a sustainable recovery, has challenged Professor Krugman’s emphasis on the causes and remedies for depression economics. Clearly, there is room for debate.

A final observation is in order. Professor Krugman, the 2008 winner of the Nobel Prize in Economics, has secured his place in the history of the profession and is obviously quite capable of assessing high-tech economics. At the same time, he has gained wide name recognition and popularity as a blogger, television commentator, and columnist for The New York Times. The book is written in a voice consistent with those more familiar guises, one that reflects a touch of humor and is capable of wonderful clarity. All parties with an interest in the current crisis will find this book accessible, enjoyable, and worthwhile.


Gary J. Schmitt has assembled an impressive group of strategists in The Rise of China. The contributors have concerns about the uncertainties of how a stronger, more forceful China will affect the global balance of power and America’s role in that balance. With one exception, the contributors have been affiliated with the American Enterprise Institute, the Project for a New American Century, or both; two institutions often identified as ideologically neoconservative.

In their respective chapters, the authors assert that the leaders of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) assess the international scene as a competitive arena. Therefore, China’s rise in regional and global power poses a challenge to the United States. This challenge necessarily requires calibrated responses until the Chinese Communist Party matures in a geopolitical sense and modifies how it interacts in world affairs.

Gary Schmitt believes that even as the United States is occupied with fighting Islamic terrorism and insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan, “America’s greatest chal-
lenge over the next decades will be the rise of China.” He is concerned with how the Communist Party leadership approaches international affairs and the “spending spree” for new weapon systems in China. Schmitt argues that the military buildup is driven by Chinese leaders’ fears about challenges to Communist Party legitimacy, regional stability, and America’s hegemony. He recommends that Washington increase its level of engagement throughout the Asia-Pacific region and implement additional security cooperation with Asian nations if China does not liberalize.

Robert Kagan focuses on China’s ambitions to be a great power. Kagan describes a struggle over power and principles “between China and the United States that will dominate the twenty-first century.” He sees this as a competition regarding justice, morality, legitimacy, order, and liberalism. For PRC leaders, power is a zero-sum game, which means that the United States has to maintain its own strength.

Ashley Tellis examines China’s “grand strategy.” Tellis sees Beijing as trying to leverage economic power to restore the “position of high international influence and status that [China] enjoyed” from roughly the tenth to the sixteenth centuries. He points to the struggle for “comprehensive national power” as a driving force for planning and decision-making in the Chinese Communist Party. While Chinese leaders decide if they will seek to be a positive “pole in the international system,” Tellis advises that Washington “needs subtlety, patience, and strategic flexibility” as it balances a strategy of engaging with and hedging against China.

Daniel Blumenthal argues that Washington must maintain deterrence against Beijing, keeping in mind the military and strategic history that makes China’s government distinct. In using the term deterrence, the author is not addressing only the nuclear component of defense; he uses the term in the broader sense of the last Quadrennial Defense Review—tailored for rogue powers, terrorist networks, and near-peer competitors. Also, Blumenthal warns that Chinese leaders have not always waited for “military superiority or even parity before attacking” adversaries. He advises a “hedging strategy” for the United States, maintaining a strong deterrent.

Michael Auslin describes Japan’s response to a rising China. In the past, either Japan or China has been a regional or world power. Today, however, both are world powers “at the same moment.” Auslin notes that Japanese industry took advantage of cheap labor costs in China even as the Self-Defense Force and leaders in Tokyo feared China’s rising strength. He suggests that the United States and Japan together should continue to “create a regional economic, diplomatic, and strategic environment that induces China to move in positive directions.”

Ellen Bork examines the role of Taiwan in American policy and how it affects relations with China. She discusses how the development of a “Taiwanese identity” is complicating Washington’s “one China policy.” Bork suggests that the one China policy is at odds with reality and that the United States should move toward a “new democratic multilateralism” in Asia.

Nicholas Eberstadt questions the presumption that “the People’s Republic of China will be a rising power for decades to come.” He does not “handicap” the likelihood of obstacles stopping China’s continued economic and military growth. Instead, Eberstadt highlights the challenges presented by infectious disease, an aging population base, deteriorating family structure, internal migration, social problems, and a faulty pension system. Over the long-term, his view is that conditions are unfavorable for the continued rapid rise of China.
Collectively, these authors present a cogent case for maintaining America’s alliance structure in Asia, good diplomacy, and a strong national defense. They are advocates for liberalism and democratic systems, but they are realists who do not want to stop engagement with the People’s Republic of China. They understand the tensions created by the strong differences in values between the two nations.

This collection is a well thought-through book by a group of strategic thinkers who have strong experience in the executive and legislative branches of the US government. There is a strong moral tone to the writing, but it is not a hyperbolic anti-China book. *The Rise of China* is an important “read,” particularly as a new administration is still mapping out its strategy in Asia. It presents a realistic counterpoint to those who argue that China will necessarily collapse or will somehow be the next global hegemon.

Reviewed by Thomas B. Grassey, Senior Fellow, Vice Admiral James B. Stockdale Center for Ethical Leadership, US Naval Academy.

Do not be misled by the title of this book: *Harming Civilians* would be more accurate, though less dramatic. Beginning with a discussion of “the philosophy of limited war” (“the just war tradition,” “the Geneva ideal”) and its alternatives—genocidal conflict, mass slaughter for God or “the cause,” supremacy of military purposes over any other consideration, guerrilla or terrorist warfare in which the near-powerless feel compelled to disregard normal morality, extreme war as a healthy social purgative, war as an inevitable curse on humanity, and at the other end of the spectrum of views about conflict, pacifism (discussed on one page)—Part I acknowledges that “limited war is not the only philosophy of war and never has been. It has certainly never dominated the practice of war . . . . The great majority of contemporary wars, like their historical antecedents, march and kill to different drums.”

Part II’s two chapters, though fewer than a hundred pages, are nearly unbearable to read, recounting in gruesome generalities and agonizing specifics the history of genocide, massacre, aerial annihilation, torture and “disappearances,” rape and other sexual harm, forced or restricted movement, impoverishment, famine, disease, emotional torment, and post-war suffering. Mixed with the inevitable statistics (“1.5 million,” “10 million,” “34 million”) are wrenching testimonies (“They wiped all my family out. I witnessed their deaths . . . .”), including personal recollections of the author. But Hugo Slim is a reflective scholar as well, so *Killing Civilians* appropriately employs the works of Saint Augustine, Geoffrey Best, Joanna Bourke, Iris Chang, R. J. Rummel, A. C. Grayling, Osama bin Laden, and many others, as well as numerous reports and studies by nongovernmental organizations, all cited in a 13-page Notes section.

Part III examines with both thoroughness and nuance three main topics. Chapter 4, “Anti-Civilian Ideologies,” begins, “People do not kill civilians mindlessly. They have reasons to kill them.” A spectrum of reasons is depicted, from “an extreme, even celebratory genocidal logic,” through “in the middle . . . . a hard sense of political necessity—the fact that there is no other way to win,” to “a regretful sense of tragic inevitability as they reluctantly kill civilians or cause them to suffer.” Among these ideologies are genocidal thinking (Hitler, of course, but so many others); dualistic beliefs (“with us or against us”)—a valuable study is given of Sayyid Qutb and bin Laden’s jihadist views; dominance and subjugation; revenge (a hard-to-dismiss motive in
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the Allied bombing campaigns of World War II); punishment (Israel’s retaliatory policies); asymmetrical “necessity” (the justifications offered by Hezbollah, Hamas, and al Qaeda for 9/11 and suicide bombings); utility (“because it works”); profit (“because it pays”); eliminating future problems (infanticide, particularly against girls, or killing men and boys); recklessness and indifference; and practical problems (caring for wounded, tending refugees, civilians “just in the wrong place at the wrong time”).

Chapter 5, “Civilian Ambiguity,” offers 30 pages exploring the vital question, “What is a civilian?” Although the Geneva Conventions, international law, and the just war tradition that Slim endorses presume that “civilian” is equivalent to “innocent” (and therefore “not to be harmed”), popular thought and actual experience make this far less certain, obvious, or absolute. Slim acknowledges and addresses the issue. Consider a woman who prepares meals for three males, who are relatives but also resistance fighters. What of the 10-year-old who whistles twice to signal insurgents any time he sees a government soldier? Or the Baghdad mullah who gives fiery anti-American sermons, invariably resulting in a sharp rise in ambushes and improvised explosive device attacks? And those who teach hatred in the madrassas? What of the young Palestinian who writes a school essay celebrating the life and “martyr’s death” of her suicide bomber cousin? Or the tech reps who wear no uniforms and carry no weapons but repair helicopter gunships? Are these all equally “innocent civilians,” to be treated identically and in no way harmed or threatened? Chapter 5 may be the most helpful reading that an American officer can find to answer such a question (since the forces he or she lead may well ask it).

Chapter 6, “Doing the Killing,” connects anticivilian ideologies with the psychological and sociological facts that transform theories into practices. Human factors that are usefully acknowledged and examined here include the “80/20 rule” (“Killing civilians is not simply a profession for evil psychopaths and freaks. Instead, . . . most of us can be drawn into organized violence relatively easily . . . . [G]iven certain conditions, 80 percent of us will either collude or directly participate in acts of [improper] violence.”); dehumanizing the enemy; authority, obedience, and conformity; bureaucratic and euphemistic distancing; altered mental states; pleasure, power, and bonding; practice, repetition, and contagion; hurt and hatred; and psychological denial. No one who engages in, seeks to understand, or teaches about armed conflict can afford to be ignorant of these topics. The author presents human motivations for violence realistically, in detail, and without blinking.

Part IV, “Arguing for Limited War,” is a single chapter, “Promoting Civilian Protection,” with a three-page Epilogue. Slim has spent a large portion of his life in conflict zones, working for Save the Children, being a trustee of Oxfam, standing on blood-stained fields and paths, holding the hands of the starving and dying, and more recently being the chief scholar at Geneva’s Center for Humanitarian Dialog (where he wrote this book) and a visiting fellow at Oxford University’s Institute for Ethics, Law, and Armed Conflict. He concludes with suggestions about how to “convince people that there are such things as civilians in war and that deliberately killing and harming them is wrong.” Few readers of this review will need such convincing, but a select few—particularly anyone involved in military training and education, foreign nation assistance and development, leadership of forces in combat or counterinsurgency operations, and senior officers with related policy responsibilities—may benefit from, and be able to implement, some of the ideas presented in this chapter.
Not another book about Stalingrad? Yes, in this case the first in a trilogy. The battle of Stalingrad may not have as much written about it as many World War II battles and campaigns on the Western Front or in the Pacific, but there has been a spate of English-language literature on the subject in recent years. The To the Gates of Stalingrad trilogy does not simply aim to provide an account of the battle for the city and the fate of the German Sixth Army, but to provide a “comprehensive operational history of the entire German 1942 campaign and of the Soviet response . . .,” examining in detail “the complex and arduous fighting that took place on German Sixth Army’s path to the city and . . . on the flanks” that “sapped the German forces’ energy and resources,” before reexamining the battle itself using both German and Soviet sources. This first volume highlights the period up to which German forces reached and started to fight for Stalingrad.

Having initially examined both German and Soviet plans for the summer campaign and the preliminaries to operations on the Stalingrad axis such as the Khar’kov battle of May 1942, the subsequent chapters look initially at operations on the principal axes toward Stalingrad. The chapter prior to the conclusion examines operations on the flanks. From this reviewer’s point of view it was particularly interesting that the authors provide details of the composition of Soviet armored units for the May Khar’kov debacle and subsequent operations, including the use of Lend-Lease vehicles. The considerable biographical material contained within the notes is also worthy of mention.

In the conclusion, Glantz and House highlight a number of “myths” about the campaign that were challenged in the earlier chapters. First, they argue that there is no truth to the myth that from the first weeks of Operation Blau in June that Soviet forces withdrew according to plan and in an effort to avoid the type of encirclements that characterized 1941. The authors make it abundantly clear they were in fact engaged either in stubborn defensive operations or counterattacks, sapping German strength. While there were encirclements, German forces typically lacked the infantry resources needed to complete them. Glantz and House also note that German forces were not halted at Stalingrad by withdrawing forces, but to a considerable extent by recently raised units, further highlighting the extent of the Germans’ underestimation of Soviet mobilization.

The conclusions drawn in this first volume are sustained by a wealth of archival and published sources. While access to Soviet military archives remains highly restricted, particularly to foreigners, following the collapse of the Soviet Union a vast amount of documentary material has been published in Russian—most notably in the Russkii arkhiv series. Glantz and House have drawn on this material, as well as the Soviet and post-Soviet secondary literature (the value of the former is often underestimated), German documents from the US National Archives, and German divisional histories and related works. Perhaps the only omission seems to be recent German-language literature.

The combination of David Glantz’s accrued knowledge of the war on the Eastern Front during World War II and the rich source material in the extensive notes...
makes this book arguably the most authoritative operational study of the initial phases of the Stalingrad campaign ever published in English, or any language for that matter. For those familiar with developments in Russian-language literature or much of Glantz’s other work, the myth-busting claims of this first volume may seem slightly exaggerated, but that in a large extent is testimony to the cumulative impact of his efforts for English-language audiences. Perhaps the most significant way in which this work challenges existing concepts of the Stalingrad campaign is the extent to which the Soviet Union continued to mobilize large numbers of fresh troops during 1942. Hopefully, the authors will provide readers with a little more detail on this capability in the next volume. It is worth noting that this mobilization was certainly not without its costs with regard to the national economy and the long-term war effort.


*Kill Khalid* is a study of the emergence of the Palestinian Islamic resistance organization Hamas in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. While the book pays special attention to Khalid Mishal, the current Hamas leader referenced in the title, it is not a conventional biography. Rather, it is primarily an examination of the emergence of Hamas as one of the leading political forces within the Palestinian territories. Mishal’s activities and a September 1997 Israeli attempt to assassinate him comprise only part of this larger story, although the latter is one of the most dramatic episodes in Hamas’s existence.

Hamas was drawn from the Palestinian branch of the much older Muslim Brotherhood organization and became prominent during the first Palestinian intifada (uprising) in the late 1980s. At that time, Hamas was led by the paraplegic, but still extremely militant, Sheikh Ahmad Yassin, who sought to propel the movement into more direct confrontation with the Israeli occupation authorities. Mishal was a promising Hamas organizer then, but he was not clearly in line to lead the organization in later years. Mishal was viewed as something of an outsider because he spent much of his early life away from the occupied territories as part of the Palestinian community in Kuwait. Nevertheless, he was a brilliant organizer and an excellent fundraiser. If his career had progressed normally, he seemed certain to become important for the organization, although not necessarily its leader.

The event that catapulted Mishal to international notoriety and set him up to become a major contender for Hamas leadership was the assassination attempt in Amman, Jordan. Israeli intelligence (Mossad) agents attempted to kill Mishal using a powerful toxin designed to mimic a heart attack. The effort went wrong when several of the Mossad assassins were captured by Jordanian authorities after a scuffle with Mishal and his driver, while two others fled to the Israeli embassy. Mishal, who initially appeared unscathed, rapidly deteriorated to a point near death. Jordanian King Hussein, while having no love for Hamas, was infuriated by the attack, which threatened to undermine the image of the monarchy throughout the Arab world. A few years earlier, the King had courageously concluded a peace treaty with Israel, in defiance of significant elements of public opinion within Jordan and throughout most other Arab countries. Now, Israel was seeking to assassinate a prominent Palestinian leader in the streets of Amman in apparent cooperation with the Israeli embassy there. Worst of all, the King’s
own uneasy relations with Hamas could be used to suggest Jordanian collaboration with Mossad in this operation.

Israel was forced to pay an exorbitant price to clear up the mess and maintain acceptable relations with Jordan. Benjamin Netanyahu, then serving his first term as Prime Minister, ordered that Jordanian medical personnel be provided with the antidote to the poison. In addition, the Israelis released a number of Palestinian prisoners, including Hamas leader Sheikh Yassin, then serving a life sentence. The Jordanians returned the Mossad agents in their custody to Israel. Mishal recovered, and both he and Hamas emerged from the crisis with a dramatically elevated level of prestige.

McGeough presents the story of the failed assassination as both a key event in the rise of Hamas and illustrative of the counterproductive nature of Israel’s hard-line approach to Hamas and the Palestinians in general. Netanyahu’s clumsy strike was a major factor leading to Mishal’s elevation to Hamas leadership after Yassin died in an Israeli “targeted killing.” Mishal himself is portrayed throughout the book as a brilliant and dedicated revolutionary, propagandist, and planner. He is also presented as a tough hard-liner who is comfortable with the use of terrorism and especially suicide bombing, an approach that eventually caused him to be expelled from Jordan. Conversely, he can also be tactically flexible, as evidenced by his willingness to consider long-term truces with Israel and his support of the Hamas decision to participate in Palestinian elections.

Hamas itself is seen to have benefited beyond its own expectations in elections held in the Palestinian territories due to the rival Fatah organization’s deep and entrenched corruption and its inability to show any tangible results from cooperation with Israel. McGeough is highly critical of the Israeli decision to impose harsh economic punishment on the Palestinian territories after the Hamas electoral victory in 2006 as well as the further economic isolation imposed on the Gaza Strip after Hamas seized power there following a brief civil war with Fatah. He is also unsympathetic toward Fatah and particularly Mohammad Dahlan, the tough security chief, whom he views as arrogant and brutal.

McGeough’s book expresses a higher level of sympathy for Hamas than would be found among most western journalists. He basically assumes that the organization’s use of extremist tactics, including terrorism, is a response to the misery and hopelessness of the Palestinians and the world’s inability to become more serious about a two-state solution. He sees Mishal as a ruthless but pragmatic nationalist and not as a religious fanatic seeking to impose Taliban-style rule on any of the land that his movement might eventually control. McGeough assumes that Hamas is not the worst or most unreasonable organization that may yet emerge from the Palestinian territories. Although many would not agree with his point of view, McGeough’s book may take a particularly important role at this time when the US President is seeking to revitalize the peace process and may, according to various journalistic accounts, be willing to accept Hamas participation if it renounced violence and agreed to a two-state solution.

Champlain’s Dream: The European Founding of North America.

Pulitzer Prize-winning historian and Brandeis University professor David Hackett Fischer has done it again. In his first foray into biography, Fischer has written
the definitive life of the great explorer Samuel de Champlain. His *Historians’ Fallacies* (1970) and *Albion’s Seed* (1989) are required reading in many history departments across the United States. But Fischer is probably most familiar to *Parameters* readers for *Paul Revere’s Ride* (1994) and *Washington’s Crossing* (2004) for which he won the Pulitzer. These books established Fischer as a terrific military historian. *Champlain’s Dream* is still more proof—if any were needed—that Fischer is simply one of the finest historians working today.

Champlain is a challenging subject for a biography. Many aspects of his life are well known, but others have eluded historians for generations. Historians, including such greats as Francis Parkman and Samuel Eliot Morison, have tried to capture Champlain on the page with varying levels of success due to gaps in the sources and the man’s own contradictions. He was an outstanding leader, soldier, cartographer, writer, patriot, explorer, naturalist, and entrepreneur. Champlain made 27 trips across the Atlantic between 1599 and 1635 without losing a single ship and only a few men.

Champlain could not only negotiate the savage ocean, he also proved himself a shrewd navigator of the often treacherous French royal court. When he was not in New France, he was cultivating close personal and professional relationships with Henri IV, Marie de Medici the queen regent, Louis XIII, and Cardinal Richelieu. As Fischer notes, Champlain was also a human being with plenty of shortcomings and weaknesses. He could be rash, cruel, petty, and thin-skinned, and his personal life was a shambles. *Champlain’s Dream* is no hagiography. Fischer paints a beautifully rendered portrait of the man in all of his complexity.

But first and foremost for Fischer, Champlain was a visionary. “This war-weary soldier had a dream of humanity and peace in a world of cruelty and violence. He envisioned a new world as a place where people of different cultures could live together in amity and concord. This became his grand design for North America.” It was this dream that drove Champlain to return again and again to the New World and to overcome the innumerable obstacles that stood in his way. The dream also directed his relationship with the native peoples he encountered, a relationship that was very different from that developed by his English, Spanish, and French counterparts.

Champlain honed his leadership skills as a successful soldier during the French campaigns against the Spanish in Brittany, but like many soldiers he hated war and yearned for peace. His important service to the king led to his appointment to positions of increasing authority and responsibility, which in turn led directly to his career as an explorer who shared with his sovereign a unique vision of America. After securing a personal fortune and service on an expedition to the Spanish West Indies, Champlain became captivated by the long, disastrous history of France’s attempts to establish viable colonies in the New World. Through careful study, he was convinced that poor leadership was primarily responsible for the previous failures, along with other problems such as logistics, organization, and interaction with the Indians.

Champlain applied these lessons on a series of expeditions to what is now Maine, Acadia (now Nova Scotia), and then up the St. Lawrence River deep into the Canadian wilderness. He experienced firsthand several unsuccessful attempts to start a viable settlement, but as always, he learned from his and others’ mistakes. Finally in 1608, Champlain established the French settlement at Quebec. (The release of the book was, in part, timed to coincide with the 400th anniversary of Quebec’s founding.)
It was only due to his force of personality, tough discipline, and superb leadership that Quebec would ultimately survive.

Unlike most of his predecessors (English, Spanish, and French), Champlain treated Native Americans with great respect. As Fischer argues, “This recognition of common humanity in the people of America and Europe—and all the world—lay at the heart of Champlain’s dream.” Befriending local tribes such as the Algonquin, Huron, and Montagnais, he took every opportunity to observe and participate in their customs, and he traveled extensively with them deep into the unexplored countryside. Champlain and his Indian allies were able to successfully deter Iroquois aggression against the French for years to come. Readers will be particularly interested in Fischer’s vivid description of the battles and his analysis of Champlain’s innovative tactics, strong leadership, and the long-term impact of these engagements.

Although Quebec and other colonies in New France would suffer from the mother country’s neglect, poor leadership in Champlain’s absence, and English invasion, they survived due in no small part to Champlain’s efforts. The peopling of New France may be his greatest legacy. Under Champlain’s leadership, Quebec attracted an increasing number of colonists and especially female emigrants, the most important prerequisite for a settlement’s stability and growth.

So did Champlain realize his dream in the end? Not entirely. After all, the delicate peace with the Iroquois would end in 1640, and the British ejected the French from North America in 1759. But as Fischer argues, “from 1603 to 1635 [Champlain’s death], small colonies of Frenchmen and large Indian nations lived close to one another in a spirit of amity and concord. They formed a mutual respect for each other’s vital interests, and built a relationship of trust that endured for many years.”

Throughout the book, but especially in the concluding chapters, Fischer examines the cultural folkways from Champlain’s time still in evidence in Arcadia and the rest of French Canada. This analysis was clearly informed by Fischer’s earlier work in Albion’s Seed. Those familiar with Fischer’s previous books will once again appreciate the excellent maps, helpful illustrations, and illuminating appendices on such subjects as the conflicting evidence concerning Champlain’s birth date, an explanation of the Indian tribes he encountered, a detailed chronology of his life and expeditions, and the weapons and vessels he used.

This is an important book. As Fischer demonstrates so well, Champlain was one of the most significant military, political, and cultural figures in the history of both Canada and the United States, and he deserves to be studied. This impressive biography will not disappoint.


“The story of Donald Rumsfeld is an exceptional personal drama that has had profound consequences for the United States and the world. It is an instructive tale of what can happen when a man, once considered among the best and brightest of his generation, meets his greatest challenge late in life and ends up being relieved of duty, widely despised, and branded as a failure.” So writes veteran Washington Post reporter Bradley Graham in his massive and remarkably fair-minded biography of Rumsfeld.
Based on multiple interviews with Rumsfeld, Vice President Dick Cheney, key former Pentagon officials, Rumsfeld’s wife, and a mountain of other primary sources, *By His Own Rules* is indispensable to understanding the controversial former Secretary of Defense and his leading role in the advocacy and conduct of a war that should never have been fought.

Eagle Scout, naval aviator, member of the US House of Representatives, assistant to President Richard M. Nixon, US ambassador to NATO, White House chief of staff for President Gerald R. Ford, and twice Secretary of Defense (for Presidents Ford and George W. Bush), Donald Rumsfeld was a Washington player for more than 30 years. Yet he will be remembered most for his disastrous performance as Secretary of Defense from early 2001 to November 2006.

Indeed, Rumsfeld may go down as the worst Pentagon chief ever. Like the late Robert McNamara, who served under Presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson, Rumsfeld was bright, managerial-technocratic, arrogant, abrasive, contemptuous of professional military opinion (unless proffered by picked toadies), and oblivious to the influence of war’s intangibles. Both men mistook efficiency for effectiveness, combat for war, and American military power for irresistible force. Unlike McNamara, however, Rumsfeld could take no credit for a long-overdue managerial and budgeting revolution inside the Pentagon. Nor has Rumsfeld yet admitted error or expressed remorse over his role as leading architect of a calamitous war.

Graham devotes most of *By His Own Rules* to Rumsfeld’s almost six-year tenure as Secretary of Defense. Rumsfeld arrived at the Pentagon determined to reassert civilian control over the military, which he believed the Clinton Administration had abandoned, and even more determined to transform what he believed was a hidebound military, especially the US Army, into a leaner, more lethal force. Rumsfeld and his neoconservative lieutenants at the Pentagon despised the Powell doctrine of overwhelming force, which essentially foreclosed US military action in all but the most favorable political and operational circumstances. He believed that new advances in reconnaissance, precision strike, command and control, and other technologies afforded the United States the opportunity to substitute speed for mass—to win future wars with far less force.

Rumsfeld also believed, as do most Americans, that the purpose of combat was to defeat the enemy’s military; he saw military victory as an end in itself rather than a means to a political end. The result was a Rumsfeld-massaged war plan that doomed any chance, however small, of converting a predictably quick and easy military victory into a meaningful political success. By paring down the size of the invasion force and ignoring the necessity for stability operations in post-Saddam Iraq, Rumsfeld invited the very insurgency and ethno-sectarian violence that subverted President Bush’s declared objective of Iraq’s political reconstruction as a stable democracy.

Rumsfeld’s concept of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) was not about Iraq’s future or even about disarming Saddam Hussein (the invasion plan paid scant attention to seizing and securing the 946 locations the Defense Intelligence Agency had identified as possible weapons of mass destruction storage sites or facilities). Rather, it was about demonstrating the success of transformed US military power definitively enough to defeat transformation’s opponents within the Pentagon. For Rumsfeld, the main enemy was the US Army, not the Republican Guard. A quick and decisive win in Iraq, especially coming on the heels of the swift and seemingly complete defeat of
Together, the Taliban in Afghanistan, would finally discredit the Army diehards who insisted on too many boots on the ground.

Even as OIF morphed from blitzkrieg to quagmire, Rumsfeld refused to acknowledge the presence of an insurgency or the Pentagon’s responsibility for the ocupation of Iraq. He seemed to regard the expanding war in Iraq as little more than an irritating distraction from transformation, yet he could hardly ignore it. His “effort to transform and fight simultaneously was fateful,” however, because “attempting both at the same time threatened to muddle the focus of military leaders and exhaust the energies of the Pentagon.” Worse still, Rumsfeld apparently did not grasp that a pessimistic General George Casey, Jr., the Multi-National Force-Iraq commander, supported by Central Command’s General John Abizaid, was more focused on extricating US forces from Iraq (via the accelerated substitution of unready Iraqi forces) than on defeating the burgeoning insurgency. Indeed, “Rumsfeld was so eager . . . to diminish America’s exposure and involvement in Iraq” that he failed “to appreciate the need for a new strategy.”

By His Own Rules is a must read for those who wish to understand how Donald Rumsfeld and the Administration he served could commit the greatest American strategic blunder since another Texan in the White House stumbled into Vietnam’s strategic morass 45 years earlier.


There is some crackling good history between the covers of Jeffrey Barlow’s From Hot War to Cold. In this survey of American national security policy in the first decade of the post-World War II era, he considers the associated issues through the lens of the US Navy.

Barlow has written a 710-page, meticulously researched book; included are 65 pages of bibliography and 200 pages of endnotes. His choices of what to include and exclude are interesting. He begins the story with the administrative changes wrought by Admiral Ernest King, the wartime Chief of Naval Operations and Commander-in-Chief of the US Fleet. The author then progresses through the post-war period, addressing planning for emerging threats, the unification fight with the US Air Force, evolution of the National Military Establishment into the Department of Defense, developments in China, the lead-up to the Korean War, European defense issues, and the creation and first years of NATO. He concludes with superb coverage of the Eisenhower Administration and the significant shift in defense policy under Ike.

The book does an excellent job of describing the policy discussions among the senior leaders of the Navy and Defense Department. Barlow has plowed some of this ground before in his widely acclaimed Revolt of the Admirals, although in this latest treatment he curiously leaves the reader hanging without bringing the “revolt” to closure. He spends much time explaining developments in the Far East leading up to the conclusion of the Second World War and the rise to power of the Chinese Communist Party; in fact, the level of detail provided in this chapter is almost gratuitous to the book’s overall purpose. Korea comes in for similar geostrategic treatment; substantial detail brings the reader up to the start of the Korean War with the policy discussions...
that led to military intervention by the United States in the immediate aftermath of the North Korean invasion. But again, Barlow leaves the Korean story incomplete with no description of the Navy’s (or anyone else’s) role in the hostilities. He could have used various threads previously developed to good effect (jointness and Chinese policy, for example) to fully relate the Navy’s tale. In the end, how was the policy implemented and what were the effects of those decisions? The reader wonders.

The author invests time in considering the changes to the national security system implemented by President Eisenhower. The beneficiary of recent historical analysis, Ike has been rehabilitated as a chief executive who mastered the processes and personalities of his Administration’s national security apparatus. Barlow gives him his due with superb analysis of the development and introduction of the “New Look” defense policy. The book ends with an analysis of how the Eisenhower Administration handled the French disaster in Indochina and its ignominious ending at Dien Bien Phu. The give and take at the senior levels is thoroughly relayed to the reader and almost by itself serves as an inspired case study of policy-making in crisis.

The standout chapters are at the beginning and end of the book. The rest of the story is uneven, and Barlow comes up short in several aspects. It is impossible to completely tell the story of the Navy’s role in national security policy without explaining the acquisition priorities over time. More significantly, the development of new platforms and systems is not addressed at all. The introduction of jet aircraft and influence of modern naval aviation are omitted. The sea-based missile programs (Loon, Rigel, and Regulus) and the authorization of the USS Nautilus nuclear submarine are not covered. Neither is the extensive program of naval research that led the effort to combat the Soviet submarine threat. These gaps are inexcusable in a volume that purports to tell the story of the US Navy’s role in the immediate post-war national security arena. Similarly, the story of the ascension of Arleigh Burke to Chief of Naval Operations in 1955 (upon the early departure of the incumbent, Robert Carney) is also missed. How Burke was selected over the heads of 87 more senior admirals, completely skipping the rank of vice admiral, is central to Barlow’s subject, yet it is never considered.

What the author has included is well-written. But when considering the stated purpose of the book, he misses the mark. To this reviewer, it seems Barlow attempted to stitch several research projects together and added a maritime twist, a conclusion to each chapter that attempts to link the pieces into a coherent whole. That said, *From Hot War to Cold* is a valuable addition to the literature of the immediate post-war era. The author’s access to resources and his description of the inner workings of the policy developers should not be missed by those looking for a 360-degree view of early post-war national security policy. This book, however, suffers from false advertising. Someone looking for the comprehensive Navy role in shaping and executing defense policy of the period should look elsewhere.


“In our time,” George Orwell wrote, “it is broadly true that political writing is bad writing.” Orwell faulted such writing’s vagueness, abstraction, pretentious diction, lack of verbs, and refuge in the passive voice. Echoing Orwell, Angelo Codevilla sets forth a primer for Presidents, calling for plain speaking and common sense in conduct-
ing statecraft that was led astray by “mainstream thinking” in the twentieth century. *Advice to War Presidents* proffers a bracing tonic for dealing with the world as it is and how to more effectively match means to ends in foreign policy.

Codevilla maintains that Theodore Roosevelt’s maxim, “Speak softly and carry a big stick,” stated the fundamentals of foreign policy. The author advises Presidents to “keep it simple: to come down from rhetorical highs, to use words according to their ordinary meanings, and sharply to distinguish war from peace, lest they give us violence without end.” This book should be widely read because it compels readers to rethink those fundamentals. Whether its policy implications provide a princely primer or a flight of fancy is for readers to decide.

Twentieth-century American leaders, Codevilla believes, have been beguiled by abstract euphemisms—e.g., “international community,” “equality,” “peacekeeping,” even “allies” and the “nonsense” of “collective security”—that mask the reality of clashing wills and produce chimerical schemes such as the League of Nations and United Nations. They have evaded the simple questions—who is doing what to whom, and what is in it for us?—and accepted the imperative to go it alone to defend US interests and honor. False axioms such as “duty to mankind” and “common interest” have obscured harsh political choices and fostered endless meddling in other nations’ internal affairs.

The Founders, Codevilla states, understood America’s uniqueness and mankind’s diversity; they viewed America’s leadership as one of superior example, not hectoring others. According to the author, America’s unique cause is to live by God’s laws and savor the bounty of human potential. First, therefore, we desire to be left alone in our independence, having as little as possible to do with mankind’s “corrupt lives in quarrels that mostly do not concern us.” Second, we must “force respect,” since foreign powers will honor our peace only through fear of offending us. Americans care little about others’ alien customs. “Enemies are those who trouble our peace by word or deed.”

The Founders, notes Codevilla, created a navy to keep the seas around America free of hostile powers, although he forgets that Roosevelt sent the fleet around the world to demonstrate the stick. In Codevilla’s odd view, a navy works best close to its own shores; consequently, the United States should focus on the Western Hemisphere and eschew “power projection” into the Old World’s troubles, bothering with overseas matters only insofar as they threaten “more important” ones. Alas, those “more important” matters are the rub.

Readers anticipating a minimalist foreign policy from Codevilla may be dismayed by his muscular agenda (albeit without extended sinews) to thwart the many “enemies” of “our peace.” China’s bid for East Asian hegemony makes it such an “enemy.” Russia’s drive for greatness through reasserting control over its former satrapies “is war itself,” not simply real politik. The United States should crush the inspiration for anti-American terrorism by pressuring the Emir of Qatar to close al-Jazeera television by threatening to incite Qatar’s oppressed Shia. Saudi Arabia’s extortionate control of oil and fomenting of Wahabi Islam call for war; freeze Saudi bank accounts, put its oil revenue in escrow, seize Saudi oil fields and loading centers, aid Red Sea tribes beaten by the Saudis in 1921, and blockade the interior tribes until the Wahabis are eliminated. The author declares war on Iran, too; blockade its imports of needed gasoline and crude oil exports until it forks over “our list of malefactors.” The simple strategy Codevilla describes aims to do whatever it takes to eliminate threats: “whatever intimidating, killing, starving, and humiliating it takes to dismay them, eliminate them, discredit them, quickly to accommodate whoever may dream of martyrdom, and be indiscriminate enough so that those around them will turn on them to save themselves.”
The author’s indictment of US intelligence and homeland security efforts illustrates his penchant for villainizing those with whom he disagrees. Central Intelligence Agency mandarins have aggrandized themselves by pretending to be the fount of “government’s official truths,” subverting the democratic process, and enabling politicians to avoid real war against terrorism. The entire edifice of homeland security amounts to a fraudulent charade, reducing the United States to a “banana republic.” Ordinary citizens reading the newspaper know who the real enemy is, Saudi Wahabism, and grasp that in war domestic civil liberties apply only to “friends,” not “enemies.” The statesman’s job is to be a “good steward of the American people’s innate good sense.”

Codevilla’s right-wing populism resembles the angry, left-wing antiestablishment philippic of Andrew Bacevich’s *The Limits of American Power*. Yet while Bacevich advocated a “small,” i.e., nonimperial, foreign policy, Codevilla advances a robust, unilateralist stance. Nevertheless, both writers would replace elite foreign policy-making with the wisdom of the man on the street. Codevilla wants a national discussion of “our peace” and its “enemies.” What would be the venue for this discussion? Talk radio? Will we formulate foreign policy by popular plebiscite?

Codevilla will have no truck with international collaboration, but it is difficult to imagine what the twentieth century would have looked like and how to manage the problems of the twenty-first century without allies and partners. As Winston Churchill observed, the only worse thing than having allies is not having them at all. Churchill, Dwight D. Eisenhower, and George C. Marshall understood this in World War II. After the war a generation of prescient statesmen created the Marshall Plan, NATO, and the Bretton Woods international economic architecture that brought a half century of peace and prosperity to the Atlantic community. America led this grand project, not as a charitable mission, but as an act of enlightened self-interest. Uniquely, America found profit for itself by benefitting others. In the years ahead, nearly every major security threat we face—economic instability, proliferation, disease pandemics, environmental degradation, natural resource shortages, and not least the war on terror—will require working with and through other nations.

This is the messy world that we actually have. Angelo Codevilla’s unilateralist fantasy imprudently fails to deal with the imperfect world or recognize that no conceivable means are available to match his end of going it alone. There is no alternative to continued US leadership in the world in concert with others. Not to see this suggests a lack of common sense.


The editors of this volume set out their objectives right at the beginning, “to question whether China will eventually displace the United States as the predominant power in East Asia.” Some 230 pages later, they conclude that “none of our six case-study nations see China as a viable strategic alternative to the United States; thus, the United States remains the security partner of choice in the region.”

In between, unhappily, is a flawed, uneven study. The authors look at issues in Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Thailand, Singapore, and Australia. They leave
out Taiwan, with which the United States has quietly been expanding military relations; Vietnam, a strategically situated nation where America has slowly effected reconciliation; and Indonesia, the world’s most populous Muslim nation, another locale for renewed US political and military ties. A chapter on India, which as a senior military officer in the Pacific Command has noted, “is out and about,” was also omitted. Granted, India is not in East Asia, but it figures largely in Pacific Command’s immediate and long-term plans.

Then there are shortcomings in editing. The volume lacks an index, seriously degrading its utility. Seven authors are listed, but the reader is not told who was responsible for what chapter. Assertions such as “contrary to media reporting” are sprinkled throughout the book without quotes or identifying which of the 1,400 newspapers in America the writers consulted or which of hundreds of television news programs were watched. Statements without sufficient support dot the book, such as China and Japan “both see themselves as natural leaders in Asia and, at a minimum, are wary about the other taking a dominant role.” Says which Chinese or Japanese?

The chapter on Japan, considered to be America’s foremost ally in Asia, underscores the uneven quality throughout this book. It says, for instance, that Japan “is one of the world’s top three military spenders.” Maybe so, but what one spends on military forces is not nearly so important as what one buys. Japan’s military services are about the world’s 25th in size because Japanese procurement costs are so high and, like the United States, Japan must pay Self-Defense Force volunteers a living wage; most other Asian nations rely on conscription. The chapter says: “Japan’s economic, political, and potential military capabilities also give it the resources to challenge China’s rising influence and power.” Yet, eight pages later the authors state, in this reviewer’s judgment accurately, “Japan’s clearest and most significant response to China’s rise has been a tighter embrace of the United States.”

The authors, through no fault of their own, have been the victims of bad timing. They wrote in 2008 that domestic politics in Japan have been nudged to the right in recent years. Yet the left-leaning Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) won a thumping electoral victory in August 2009, when the voters threw out the long-ruling Liberal Democratic Party and gave the DPJ 308 seats in the 480-seat lower and more powerful house of the national Diet. The book makes the puzzling claim that “fifteen years of sluggish economic growth have helped usher in the rise of nationalist sentiment.” Discussions with Japanese in Tokyo suggested that people there were more worried about losing their jobs or their small businesses failing.

Another questionable contention in this book holds: “Japan is reaching out to form new political-military relationships more actively than at any time since World War II. Historically, it has promoted itself as a non-Western alternative to US leadership in Asia.” Once again, however, the authors offer little evidence or quotes from Japanese to back up that point. Indeed, it might be fair to say that no Japanese has advocated that sort of alternative since the Japanese Empire and its Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere collapsed 65 years ago with Japan’s defeat in World War II.

In the end, the authors, curiously, get it close to right. They say: “Clearly, Japan has reacted to the rise of China, in some cases dramatically, but the evidence on coherence is more mixed . . . . Different parts of the Japanese bureaucracy, in short, perceive and react to China’s rise very differently, often working at cross purposes . . . . The reaction of economic bureaucrats has been based on the view that China’s rise is primarily an opportunity, while security elites have considered it a potential threat.”
Despite the book’s flaws, the authors reach a reasonably solid conclusion regarding the six Asian nations they have studied. “In many cases, China makes US security commitments even more relevant: Nations feel they can more confidently engage China precisely because US security commitments endure.” On balance, they contend, “US Asian allies and security partners want continued US involvement in the region but sometimes only in certain ways, at certain times, and on particular issues.”

As an Indonesian diplomat said during a conference in Honolulu, “We want the Americans to be on tap but not on top.”


From the title page onward, one wonders what this book is really all about. The story is that of John Anthony Walker, a former naval warrant officer who achieved national and international infamy when he was arrested by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in 1985, the first of several traitors unmasked that year, resulting in the sobriquet “The Year of the Spy.” The book was written by Walker, in the first person, and supposedly is intended as a long letter to his four children. He explains in the Foreword that his reasons for writing are to apologize to his family “for the destruction I wrought upon them,” to “acknowledge his regrets to the nation for the damage to national security that resulted,” and to explain in detail what motivated him to betray his country. Noble goals.

The book, then, begins as a sort of apologia. But as an apologia, it ranks with the works of Robert McNamara and Jane Fonda in its sincerity and credibility. Once Johnny Walker hits his stride, the work becomes a hackneyed combination of presenting his brilliance, albeit not perfect, and his mostly unsophisticated but self-justifying political views, all cloaked in a sometimes truncated, badly edited account of his espionage adventures between 1967 and 1985.

The reader will not learn how the high-school dropout from a broken family joined the Navy after being arrested for burglarizing a service station and breaking into a clothing store. Or how he rolled in money from his espionage and lived the high life, although acknowledged are his sailboat, an airplane, and the lavishing of cash in a manner that should have attracted attention. For this and other insights about the real John Walker, one should read Howard Blum’s excellent I Pledge Allegiance . . . (Simon and Schuster, 1987). The two accounts set the stage for an intriguing comparison—Walker as seen by the FBI and author Blum, and Johnny “Buzz Saw” Walker as viewed by himself.

Former Soviet officers have boasted of their coup in successfully handling Walker for so many years. KGB officer Vitaly Yurchenko declared, “Walker was the greatest case in KGB history. We deciphered millions of your messages. If there had been a war, we would have won it.” Walker’s tone is that of a sophisticated internationalist, lecturing to the naïve American masses about the evils of their government, and why he came to believe that it was his duty to become a player in the Cold War.

Why would he do this? “First,” Walker expounds in one of hundreds of self-serving and unsophisticated assertions, “after exposure to vast amounts of government
secrets, I concluded that the Cold War was a farce. The Soviet Union had neither the will nor the military strength to engage the United States in armed warfare." "Second," he adds, "... President Kennedy’s assassination was a coup d’état by powerful government officials who objected to Kennedy’s domestic and foreign policies. . . . government entities [who] have ruled ever since." "Third, the failure of the government and the US Navy to defend the USS Liberty (AGTR-5) when it was attacked [by Israel] in 1967. That my government would put petty politics before the lives of its servicemen was a stunning realization."

But lest the reader be tempted to accept the widespread belief that Walker’s misdeeds were for crass monetary reasons, Walker, writing from his federal prison cell, explains how he feels history should record the precise motivations for his espionage. They were, in order: 1. To bring about an improvement in US-Soviet relations by showing the Soviets that our doctrine was defensive. 2. His “disgust” with “US government deception” and “the Cold War fraud.” 3. Adventure. 4. Psychological pressures from his bad marriage. 5. Money. In Walker’s world, he was a hero of the Cold War because, by giving away the codes that enabled the Soviets to read top-secret military communications, they came to realize there was little reason to fear the United States.

Other accounts of his espionage show him as incredibly greedy and ambitious. Once Walker retired from the Navy, he needed sources with access to classified information. He attempted to recruit one of his three daughters who had enlisted in the Army (she turned him down but kept silent for years). He did ensnare his brother, Arthur, who went to prison for life; his best friend, Jerry Whitworth, who will likely die in prison; and his youngest child, Michael, who joined the Navy and began to plunder secrets from the installations and ships to which he was assigned. (Michael received a sentence of 25 years, of which he served 15.)

Walker’s espionage was indeed one of the worst cases in American history, but the disjointed recitation of his sexual conquests and the litany of self-justifications contained in this work make for bad reading. To learn the reality of the case, and what lessons the government should have derived from his astonishingly long years of treason, the Blum book, or Family of Spies by Pete Earley, is far more suitable. In Walker’s ramblings, the disgraced spy sees his crimes as having to do with his alcoholic wife and failed marriage; earning enough money to protect his children from his wife’s abuse; ratcheting back the dangers of the Cold War; and getting even with a deceitful and immoral government. His enemies list is topped by his wife, Barbara, who turned him in; his erstwhile co-conspirator Jerry Whitworth, who tried to turn him in; the US government in general; and Ronald Reagan in particular (whose intractable anticommunism frightened Walker’s Soviet masters). The reader senses that Walker has not yet managed to direct his anger and frustration at his real number-one enemy, himself.


Written in broad, sardonic strokes, Norman Stone’s new book is either graduate-level learning for the present generation or whimsy for those well over 40. What makes this brief volume so potentially useful is that the author has addressed most of the major facets of World War I and reduced them to easily readable summations, thus saving the casual student the necessity of reading dozens of volumes of varying quality.
Parameters

and density. Serious students of the war will likely take offense at some of the broader
generalizations, especially if their dissertations or major publications are involved, but
on the whole, Stone has the mix about right—enough detail that the work serves nicely
as a comprehensive review of WWI for people who would not read anything longer
than this anyway, a mere 190 pages of text, augmented by clean, pertinent maps.

This review opened with the word “sardonic” because that is the overall tone
of the work. Stone addresses events that need not necessarily have gone in the direc-
tion they eventually did, explaining the cost in lives and treasure that accompanied the
chosen path. In retrospect, the alternative might have been less costly, and he assesses
for the reader why no thought was given to other options. Once again, serious students
will likely be offended by that tone, but it works well in calling our attention to the
possibility of different results. Stone’s approach certainly serves to catch the reader’s
attention and to establish a point for further discussion, exactly what a good teacher
aspires to do.

As an example, some may find the characterization of the German General
Staff to be overblown—pounding the table for war now and win, or wait until 1917 and
lose. There is little doubt that the maturation of the Russian railroad system mattered a
great deal in German military calculations. That this entire enterprise was fostered and
financed by the French for very good and sufficient French purposes escapes mention,
but that said, Stone pays plentiful attention to the function and efficiency of the rail-
roads as a major sub-theme, giving the reader a solid idea regarding why the German
General Staff could indeed have acted as they did. He also attends to the importance
of artillery and the maturation of that arm while correctly pointing out how its tactical
effect could be neutralized by the strategic use of railroads, thus again highlighting the
importance of this sub-theme.

This book has good balance between Western and Eastern operations with ap-
propriate nods to peripheral theaters. Stone’s treatment of the Eastern Theater reflects
a solid understanding of the time-distance factors that so dilute density in that theater
and serve to limit the possible, an appreciation that is often lost on those who do not
take the time to study the map and thus violate one of C. Northcote Parkinson’s Other
Laws, “Read the Map.”

Further illustrative of the author’s style is this passage relating to the Allied
response to the 1918 German Spring Offensives:

The British infantry were at last well-served by their commander, who now did
what he should have done before, accepted a French commander, who would have
charge of the reserves. On 26 March, at Doullens, he put himself under Foch, who,
unlike so many other generals, learned instead of just repeating himself.

Describing the second German attack:

On 9 April, two German armies attacked, again with the methods of 21 March,
and again with the luck of very favorable weather. On the southern side, they
struck at two divisions of Portuguese. They, like the Italians, were being made to
run so as to learn to walk or even toddle.

There is, of course, much more to the book, but these summaries demonstrate
why it is such an engaging read. Then there is the incorporation of newly discovered
materials that add significantly to this work and lend credence to some of the newer
conclusions. Then there had to be something reflecting the author’s long residence in
Turkey. On the last page, having evaluated the consequences of all the peacemaking
that had gone on and had gone awry, he notes that “One clause of the treaty (never ratified) was that the sale of dirty postcards would be suppressed.”

The first and final chapters of this book, as with the war, are the most interesting.

The Making of Peace: Rulers, States, and the Aftermath of War.

The Making of Peace is a collection of 13 essays dealing generally with setting the terms for peace following a period of open warfare. The conflicts examined range from the Archidamian War (431-421 B.C.) to the end of the Cold War. Three essays do not quite fit that rubric. James M. McPherson, in an excellent chapter on the post-US Civil War South, deals with the conditions for peace, more so than the terms. Jim Lacey writes about the establishment of economic order after the Second World War, and Frederick W. Kagan reviews the end of the Cold War, which can be argued to be genetically different than the other wars considered. Nevertheless, despite the historical scope and the number of accomplished authors, the collection directly supports the book’s overall theme. The opening chapter by Williamson Murray and the concluding chapter by Richard Sinnreich serve well to tie the individual essays together.

The book opens with a preface by Sir Michael Howard. Howard raises an important philosophical issue; namely, what is peace? He chooses to answer the question by citing three theories drawn from Thomas Hobbes, St. Augustine, and Immanuel Kant. To Hobbes, peace is the absence of war. To Augustine, peace is a “just order,” and to Kant, it is something that has to be established and maintained by man. The essays in The Making of Peace, save one, all seem to take Kant’s position; namely, that peace must be created by men who in turn set the terms and define the succeeding international order. Whether reading Derek Croxton and Geoffrey Parker’s essay on the Congress of Westphalia or Frederick Kagan’s assessment of the end of the Cold War, the conflict’s settlement is generally judged by the period of history that follows, and the absence or presence of peace is attributed to the quality of the settlement. The one essay that does not take this position is Paul Rahe’s discussion of the Peace of Nicea, 421 B.C. It seems the ancient Greeks believed war was the natural condition of man, and peace was a temporary interruption. The reader will do well to keep these views of peace in mind while reading the various essays, because in the long run the settlement of all of these wars, whether judged to have been done well or poorly, endures.

The larger purpose of the book can be inferred from Professor Williamson Murray’s opening essay. The general public is largely dissatisfied by the outcome of America’s recent wars, and some scholars now question the value of studying military history. The Making of Peace seems intended to respond in part to that criticism. Professor Murray acknowledges early that most military histories have described “in great detail the course of military events while leaving the making of peace largely unexamined.” He grudgingly acknowledges in a footnote that political scientists have shown some interest in peacemaking but adds they have done so without engaging in a discussion of the nature of war and its impact on the peacemakers’ deliberations. Murray also acknowledges that history offers no comfortable or easy answers. He concludes, nonetheless, that history reveals two crucial points about making peace. “The first is that war is . . . an uncertain and
unpredictable affair. The second is . . . that there are cases in which there is no solution, no appeasement, except absolute surrender.” This answer may not satisfy readers.

Fortunately, readers are not required to trouble themselves with the book’s larger concern. The various accounts of peacemaking associated with a well-chosen group of western wars are well worth reading. By focusing on peacemaking alone, these essays provide considerable insight into the contemporary details of each war’s conclusion and the problems the participants confronted. The chapters show the advances in warfare and the corresponding changes in the mode of diplomacy. Each author offers his own conclusions about the case he explores, and any amateur or professional student of military history is likely to view the pursuit of victory in a new light. Regrettably, those who hold closely to Clausewitz’s dictum that no one starts a war without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve will be disappointed. The historical record shows that war is not, in fact, wedded to Clausewitz’s logic.

**National Security Dilemmas: Challenges and Opportunities.**

Colin Gray’s latest book, *National Security Dilemmas,* is a collection of essays dealing with a range of issues too broad to simply and succinctly recount. How, indeed, is one to adequately express the sweeping breadth of a book that has such range? It will have to be enough to merely convey a general sense of the volume.

It feels a tad unseemly to review Colin Gray’s latest work within the pages of the Army War College’s top-level publication. After all, the original versions of six of the book’s eight chapters appeared first as independent monographs on different, though related, topics published by the Army War College’s Strategic Studies Institute. From a strictly academic point of view, this approach borders on the intellectual equivalent of dating your second cousin. Exacerbating this reviewer’s discomfort is the fact that this is a damned fine book, a worthy and useful addition to the bookshelf of any strategist—academic, practitioner, or theorist.

Indeed, the most difficult thing about reviewing many of Colin Gray’s books is not finding things to say about them but deciding when to cut things off lest you appear sycophantic. Thankfully, here at least this reviewer is not alone. Normally the brief endorsements on the back of a book jacket are something of a throwaway. Known among writers as “blurbs,” they are standard fare and usually easily overlooked. When, however, the names attached to the glowing recommendations are Antulio Echevarria, Steven Metz, Frank Hoffman, Wick Murray, and Mackubin Owens, one cannot readily set them aside. These are men with their own weighty reputations for strategic thought, and more importantly, they are willing to be critical in their writing. So when Murray writes, “Once again Colin Gray has proved that he is the world’s leading thinker on strategy . . . . In every respect this is a major work that every informed student of national security strategy needs to read and absorb . . . .” one may take his words to heart.

To be sure, in any book one may find some small issues with which to quibble. For example, Gray acknowledges that national cultures matter, and that they often drive strategic choices. At the very outset of the text he notes, “Americans are, by inclination, problem solvers.” Yet just a few pages later he offers a prescription that is fundamentally impossible. Gray writes, “Americans must approach the foreign-sourced
prods to behavior, the principal reasons for US national security dilemmas, as conditions to be endured and survived, not as problems that can be solved.”

The problem here is that Gray is violating his own observations from earlier in the text. He notes that national cultures and their constituent narratives are near impossible to move in any politically or strategically relevant period of time, and he has already observed that Americans are culturally inclined to be problem solvers. So how can he direct that we essentially change our national character and forgo the problem-solving part of who we are? Advice that the author knows cannot be followed (at least in any timely way) is not useful.

A little further on in the book Gray credits Victor Davis Hanson for noting, as Gray puts it, that “culturally asymmetric belligerents are apt to disagree on the definition, feasibility, and consequences of so-called ‘decisive victory.’” When reading more deeply, and recalling that for various social and cultural reasons the US general population still wants such a thing to exist, we stumble into another conundrum. Gray makes some very concrete recommendations about what US strategic definitions and goals should be, and he believes these should be much more limited. But really what this suggests is that the general American definitions of war and how it should end are incompatible with those definitions Gray contends are necessary in order to survive into the future. Again, it is essentially the same problem. Nations are not children who may be forced to take their medicine to quench their fevers, so holding up the medicine and saying, “Here, take this” does not work.

Regardless of these hiccups, Gray presents a magnificent series of essays regarding practical issues facing the United States, and in particular the ground forces, as we think about the future and the nature of the strategic environment in which we operate. His chapters range from a well-thought discussion on the nature of “Decisive” victories, to the concept of Deterrence as it may mutate in the future, to Revolutions in Military Affairs, Irregular Enemies, and the concept of Ethical Realism, among others. His writing is clear, strong, and admirably lacking in the high-sounding mucky buzzwords-of-the-day that often grip so many writers working at the strategic level. Each chapter is a standalone feast for the mind. At a listed retail cost of $48, National Security Dilemmas is not an easy pill to swallow in its hardback form, but it is the essence of a professional one.