THE EMERGENT ARMY

by

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Few would deny that the US Army is in a period of major organizational flux. Yet the nature and direction of such change are not readily agreed upon and are seemingly often in conflict with each other. The purpose of this article is to present a sociological framework of the emergent Army which can make sense of and order these otherwise contradictory data and tendencies. Most especially, an understanding of the emergent Army requires the commentator to take into account the interplay of pressures emanating from civilian society and those more directly attributable to internal factors within the Army itself. The premise of this analysis holds that the Army is neither completely subject to societal changes over which it has no control, nor is it an autonomous entity operating independently of the forces affecting the larger society of which it is a part.

Any appraisal of the emergent Army must therefore begin with a brief and selective overview of the Army in the context of recent American history. Even in the single generation following the start of World War II, one can observe that the American Army has passed through several distinctive phases. Prior to World War II, Army personnel were
blacks in the total population. Except for some isolated occasions, blacks served primarily in segregated support units. The Army established the Women’s Army Auxiliary Corps in 1942, and a year later redesignated it the Women’s Army Corps (WAC). Although technical specialization proceeded apace during the war, the large majority of ground forces were still assigned to combat and service units. Only about one quarter of personnel were in technical or administrative specialties. But in another way, the Army of World War II, while socially exclusively volunteers, most of whom were making a career of military service. Enlisted men were almost entirely of working-class or rural origins, and officers were disproportionately drawn from Southern, Protestant, middle-class families. The ratio of blacks in the Army, all serving in segregated units, was less than one-third the ratio of blacks in the total population. With respect to Army organization, the vast majority of soldiers were assigned to combat or manual-labor positions. Socially, the pre-World-War-II Army was a self-contained institution with marked separation from civilian society. In its essential qualities the “From-Here-To-Eternity” Army was a garrison force predicated upon military tradition, ceremony, and hierarchy.

World War II was a period of mass mobilization. By 1945, over 8,000,000 persons were in Army uniforms. The members of the World War II force were largely conscripted or draft-induced volunteers. Close to 10 percent of Army personnel were black, a figure slightly under the proportion of representative of American society, was still an institution whose internal organization contrasted sharply with that of civilian structures. Indeed, the findings of the classic sociological study of the World War II serviceman, The American Soldier, revealed that resentment toward the “caste” system of the Army and the differential treatment of officers and enlisted men generated the strongest feelings about Army life.1

Following World War II there was a 16-month period of no conscription at all, but by the time of the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, the draft had already been instituted. The conflict in Korea was a war of partial mobilization; approximately 1,500,000 men served in the Army at the peak of hostilities. Organizationally and sociologically, the ground forces of the Korean War closely resembled those of World War II. But with the implementation of the 1948 desegregation order of President
Truman, blacks were integrated throughout the Army over the course of the Korean War, a process completed by 1955. Also unlike World War II, the war in Korea ended in stalemate, which in turn contributed to adverse accounts of soldiers' behavior—that is, prisoner-of-war collaboration, lack of troop motivation, and deterioration of military discipline.

The Cold War Army after Korea averaged around 900,000 men, again relying in great part on the pressures of the draft for manpower. Especially significant was the fact that technical specialization became a pervasive trend throughout the military during the 1950's and early 1960's. The proportion of men assigned to combat units declined markedly, with a corresponding increase in administrative and technical specialties. This shift was accompanied by an attendant rise in the educational levels of both Army enlisted men and officers. The proportion of blacks averaged around 11-12 percent during the period between the Korean and Vietnam Wars, a figure equivalent to the proportion of blacks in the total population. Following World War II, and especially since Korea, the Cold War Army saw a marked reduction in the proportion of women (from about 2.1 percent to 1.2 percent); and the range of occupational specialties open to WAC's narrowed largely to routine clerical tasks.

Although Cold War policies were generally unquestioned during the 1950's and early 1960's, the military did not escape embroilment in political controversy during this period. Such controversy centered on issues of military leadership and the institutional role of the military. Command policies at the highest levels were subjected to Conservative charges in two major Senate hearings. In both the Army-McCarthy hearings of 1954 and the hearings that followed Major General Edwin Walker's relief from command (for sponsoring troop information programs with extremely conservative content) in 1962, the military establishment found itself on the defensive in countering charges of being soft on communism. During the same period,
disqualified mental levels—categories embracing disproportionate numbers of the lower classes and the black. In 1968 the manpower pool was again enlarged, this time by terminating draft deferments for recent college graduates, who were largely middle-class whites. For the first time since the Korean conflict, the membership of the armed forces again bore some resemblance to the social composition of the larger society.

If the debates concerning the military establishment were generally muted in peacetime, such was not the case once America intervened massively in Indochina. Opposition to the war soon led to negative portrayals of the armed forces. As the antiwar movement gained momentum, it began to generalize into a frontal attack on the military system itself, particularly within elite academic and intellectual circles. The 1967 March on the Pentagon marked the crossing of a symbolic threshold. Not only was the war in Vietnam opposed, but, for a growing number, the basic legitimacy of military service itself was brought into open question. To compound this problem, a host of other factors served to tarnish the image of the American military in general and the Army in particular: revelations of alleged American atrocities in Vietnam; reports of widespread drug abuse among troops; corruption in the operation of post exchanges and service clubs; and military spying on civilian political activists.

Even more telling, there were undeniable signs of disintegration within the military itself. Some men in uniform—white radicals, disgruntled enlisted men, antiwar officers—were increasingly communicating their feelings to other servicemen as well as to groups in the larger society. Moreover, throughout all locales where US servicemen were stationed, racial strife was becoming endemic. The possibility that black troops might owe higher loyalty to the black community than to the US military began to haunt commanders. By 1971, the American Army in Vietnam was plagued by breakdowns in discipline that included murders of officers and noncoms. Although much of the malaise in the ranks was attributed to changes in youth outlooks as manifested in the widespread use of drugs, it was more likely that the military’s disciplinary problems reflected in larger part that general weakening of morale which always seems to afflict an army in the waning stage of a war. Even the brusque use of coercive power on the part of commanders has limitations once the esprit of an armed force has been so sapped.

The contrast in ideological and public evaluations of the American military establishment over three wars is revealing. In World War II, the American military was held in high esteem in a popularly supported war. Conservatives and isolationists alike were quick to fall in line behind a liberal and interventionist national leadership. But in the wake of the Korean War, defamatory images of the American serviceman were propagated by right-wing spokesmen. Liberal commentators, on the other hand, generally defended the qualities of the American fighting man. In the war in Southeast Asia, a still different image emerged. Although initially the product of a liberal administration, the war had come to be defended primarily by political conservatives, while the severest attacks on both the behavior of American soldiers and the military establishment originated from the left. But, beyond Vietnam and factors unique to armed forces and society in the United States, the decline in status of the American military may well be a part of a more pervasive pattern occurring throughout Western parliamentary democracies. Observers
of contemporary armed forces in Western Europe, the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia have all noted the sharp deterioration of the military’s standing in these societies. Indeed, although it seems somewhat speculative, there is the possibility that Vietnam may be only a minor factor in explaining the reduced prestige of the US Army. In other words, the American military along with its counterparts in other Western post-industrialized societies may be experiencing a historical turning point with regard to its societal legitimacy and public acceptance.

THE SOCIAL COMPOSITION OF AN ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE

An early goal of the Nixon Administration was the establishment of an all-volunteer force. Shortly after assuming the presidency, Nixon appointed a commission to study the implementation of the all-volunteer force. This panel—referred to by the name of its chairman, Thomas S. Gates—published its report in February 1970. The unanimous recommendation of the Gates Commission was that an all-volunteer force be established along with a standby draft. In July 1970 legislation was introduced in the US Senate to implement the recommendations of the Gates Commission. The legislation garnered broad support in its sponsorship, including political figures as diverse as Senators Barry Goldwater and George McGovern. Moreover, a bill was passed in 1971 substantially increasing military salaries, especially for servicemen in their first tours. The Department of Defense set 1 July 1973 as the goal for achieving a zerodraft, with the proviso that Congress should retain a two-year extension of induction authority and standby authority thereafter. The draft was suspended in February 1973. Based upon a year's experience with the zerodraft at this writing, the efficacy of voluntary incentives to meet the quantitative and qualitative personnel needs of the Army continues to remain problematic.

Before looking at some probable consequences of the all-volunteer force, however, some background data are in order on military procurement and retention rates in the modern era. Over the past two decades, with some variation, about one third of all age-eligible men failed to meet the mental test standards required for military entrance; this group has been disproportionately poor or black. About a quarter of the age-eligible men (mostly upper-middle-class whites) obtained draft deferments (primarily educational), which resulted in de facto exemptions. Also, in the latter years of the Vietnam War, upper-middle-class youth reduced their draft liability by employing liberalized conscientious objector procedures, and obtaining medical documentation of sham physical disabilities. Thus only about 40 percent of age-eligible young men actually served in the military in recent years, a disproportionate number of which were drawn from the working and lower-middle classes.

Between the wars in Korea and Vietnam, about 40-50 percent of all incoming Army personnel were draftees. About 20-30 percent were draft-motivated volunteers, that is, men joining the Army to exercise a choice as to time of entry or branch of service. Therefore, only about a quarter to a third of all entering Army servicemen in peacetime were true volunteers in the sense that they would have joined the Army without the impetus of the draft. During both the Korean and Vietnam wars, the number of draftees and draft-motivated volunteers increased sharply. It was estimated that in 1970 less than 15 percent of incoming Army servicemen were "true" volunteers.

Soldier retention rates vary by manner of service entry. In peacetime years, about 20 percent of volunteers reenlist for a second term; among draftees the proportion going on to a second term averages about 10 percent. In the latter years of the Vietnam War, however, volunteer reenlistments dropped to 10-15 percent and draftee reenlistments were less than 5 percent. Once a soldier has made the transition from first to second term, however, he has usually decided upon a military career. With remarkable consistency, about four out of five second-term servicemen
remain in the military to complete at least 20 years of service (the minimum time required for retirement benefits).

What lessons does the experience of the recent past offer for an understanding of the kind of Army we can expect to emerge from the institution of an all-volunteer force? Will the Army maintain a membership which resembles in basic respects that which existed prior to the Vietnam War, or will the social composition of the military undergo a fundamental transformation? Even the crucial question of the size of the post-Vietnam Army has no ready answer, although a figure in the vicinity of 750,000 is a reasonable estimate at the present time. Unlike prior times, moreover, when national security needs largely dictated the size of the Army, future troop strength may be determined more by how many qualified people the Army can actually recruit and retain.

One of the most telling arguments against the establishment of an all-volunteer force was that such a force would have an enlisted membership overwhelmingly black and poor. Yet the Gates Commission countered: "The frequently heard claim that a volunteer force will be all black or all this or all that simply has no basis in fact. Our research indicates that the composition of the armed forces will not fundamentally change by ending conscription." 12 Another study, however, contracted by the Institute of Defense Analysis, differed on virtually all counts from the findings of the Gates Commission. 3 Based on a detailed comparison of civilian and military employment earning potential, the Defense Analysis report concluded: (1) non-high-school graduates suffer a financial loss if they choose civilian employment over continued military service; (2) military earnings for blacks with a high school education or less will far exceed their earnings in the civilian labor force. In other words, on the assumption that social groups will generally behave in their economic self-interest, an all-volunteer force will be forced to sustain its membership largely from the less-educated and minority groups of American society.

Thus, social science data have been cited in behalf of contrary predictions and conclusions. With such contradictory findings, what is one to conclude as to the probable future social composition of the enlisted ranks? The trend data since early 1973 are not encouraging. It appears that a nonconscripted Army will be less well educated than heretofore and that minority group youth will be disproportionately represented. Although experience with the new system has been too brief to support definitive conclusions, present indications are that over a third of recent Army entrants have not completed high school, and that close to a third are black or other minority Americans. Thus, a provisional conclusion seems warranted that the Gates Commission erred greatly in its optimism. Unless present trends are reversed, the nonconscripted Army will draw excessively from America’s lower classes.

The movement toward an all-volunteer force will also be accompanied by significant changes in the social basis of officer recruitment. The ROTC units from which the bulk of the officer corps is now drawn will certainly decrease in number and narrow in range. Partly as a result of anti-ROTC agitation at prestige colleges and universities, ROTC recruitment will increasingly be found in educational institutions located in regions where the status of the military profession is highest—rural areas and in the South and mountain states. It must be candidly acknowledged that such ROTC units will often be located at colleges and universities with modest academic standards. Within the
larger urban areas themselves, there is a possibility that ROTC units may be removed from campuses and instituted instead on a metropolitan basis. This eventuality would most likely further restrict recruitment of ROTC cadets from upper-middle-class backgrounds.

Moreover, the Army as well as the other services will obtain a growing proportion of their officers from the service academies. Although the system of selection into the service academies is broadly based, there is a strong possibility that military family background will become even more prevalent among academy entrants. Because of the expansion of the armed forces over the past 20 years, the number of such military families and their offspring has increased markedly. Such concentrated selection from military families would result in a separation of the officer corps from civilian society by narrowing the basis of social recruitment. Likewise, any increased reliance on government-sponsored military preparatory schools or even privately sponsored preparatory schools would similarly narrow the social and geographical background of future officers.

Finally, there is the probability that recruitment from the ranks into the officer corps will decline. With greater and greater emphasis on a college degree for officers, there will be an acceleration of the trend to recruit from college graduates rather than to promote from the ranks. Such a decline in the proportion of commissioned officers from the ranks has already been the experience of European all-volunteer forces. A countervailing factor, however, may be a stepping up of military programs which offer college educations to highly motivated enlisted personnel.

DEVELOPMENTAL MODELS OF THE EMERGENT ARMY

What is the likely shape of the Army in the foreseeable future? To provide an answer to this question, we may resort to developmental analysis, which emphasizes as "from here to there" sequence of present and hypothetical events. Initially, two opposing developmental models will be presented, each of which has currency in military sociology. A third model will then be introduced which synthesizes the previous two. All three models may be considered with respect to their location on a spectrum of military organizations ranging from those highly differentiated from civilian society to those military systems highly convergent with civilian structures. In actuality, of course, America's military forces have never experienced either a total separation from or a complete interrelation with civilian society, but the use of models at either end of the spectrum will serve to highlight the ever-shifting degree of proximity of the military to the civil, and will also alert us to emergent trends within the military establishment—trends that appear to augur a fundamental change in the social organization of the Army within the near future.

A convergent-divergent formulation of the relation between the armed forces and society must consider several aspects of the total relation: (1) the way in which the membership of the armed forces is representative of the broader society; (2) the degree to which there are institutional parallels (or discontinuities) in the social organization of military and civilian structures; (3) differences in required skills between military and civilian occupations; and (4) ideological similarities and differences between civilians and the military. Further, internal distinctions within the armed forces cut across each of the preceding variances: differences between officers and enlisted men, differences between branches, differences between echelons.

Needless to say, there are formidable problems in ascertaining meaningful evidence on the degree of convergence or divergence between the armed forces and society. Some of the more important findings of previous researchers, along with certain new materials, are incorporated in the developmental models presented below.

**Model I: The Convergent or Civilianized Army.** A recurrent finding of studies concerning the military establishment between the wars in Korea and Vietnam was
the growing convergence between military and civilian forms of social organization. In large part, this convergence was a consequence of changes induced by sophisticated weapons systems. These new technological advances had impacts on military organization which were particularly manifest in the officer corps. For weapons development gave rise not just to a need for increased technical proficiency, but also for men trained in managerial and modern decision-making skills. That is to say, the broad trend toward technological complexity and organizational bigness throughout American society was also having profound consequences within the military establishment. In the military, as in civilian institutions, such a trend involved changes in the qualifications, sources, and style of leadership.

The most comprehensive study of American military leadership in the Cold War era was by Morris Janowitz. He documented the broadening social origins of officers which came to include a more representative slice of America’s regions and religious groups, and the increased proportion of non-academy graduates at the highest levels of the military establishment. Moreover, the military of that period was seen as increasingly sharing the characteristics typical of any large-scale bureaucracy. Janowitz argued in effect that the military was characterized by a trend away from authority based on “domination” toward a managerial philosophy placing greater stress on persuasion and individual initiative.

The trend toward convergence has in some respects become even more pronounced in the contemporary period of the early 1970’s. Significantly differing from the pre-Vietnam military where convergence was most pronounced at the senior officer level, the more recent changes were focused largely—with the accompaniment of much mass media coverage—on the enlisted ranks. Partly as a result of internal disciplinary problems occurring toward the end of the Vietnam War, partly in anticipation of an all-volunteer force, the military command inaugurated a series of programs designed to accommodate civilian youth values and to make the authority structure more responsive to enlisted needs.

Beginning in late 1969, VOLAR (an acronym for Volunteer Army) programs were instituted on a growing number of Army posts. VOLAR reforms included such changes as greater liberality in hair styles, abolition of reveille, minimal personal inspections, and more privacy in the barracks. Much of the changed Army outlook was captured in its new recruiting slogan “Today’s Army Wants to Join You.” Similarly, the “Z-grams” of Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Zumwalt alerted commissioned and petty officers to concern themselves with enlisted wants and to show more latitude in dealing with the personal life styles of sailors.

Whether changes such as these are really fundamental, or merely cosmetic, only time will tell. But something more than just “beer-in-the-barracks” innovations does seem to be happening. Human relations councils consisting of black and white servicemen have come to play an increasing role in the Army’s attempt to cope with racial strife. Even more novel are the officially sanctioned councils of junior officers and enlisted men now in existence on a number of posts. The formal purpose of such councils is to serve as communication channels between the ranks and the command structure. But a precedent has been established which could be an omen of a major reordering of the traditional chain-of-command authority structure.

Perhaps the most powerful tool of a civilian labor force in advanced industrialized societies is collective bargaining by workers. Although trade unionism in the military is hardly more than a cloud on the horizon, there are indirect signs that such an eventuality may someday come to pass. The growing labor militancy of heretofore quiescent public employees at municipal, state, and federal levels may be a precursor of like activity within a future military. Already union memberships and military careerism have proved compatible in the military establishments of several Western European countries, notably Germany and Sweden. Even in the United States there is a precedent
of sorts with the assignment of full-time National Guardsmen who are members of state employee unions to Army air defense missile installations.

At the professional level, the trend toward civilianization is even more apparent. Among active-duty doctors and lawyers, there are manifold indications of greater identity with civilian professional standards than with military values. Also notable, at the service academies there has been a long-term trend away from traditional military instruction and toward authentic liberal-arts programs. Additionally, the academies have evolved toward a less authoritarian approach to military discipline, less hazing, and academic professionalization of the teaching staff.

In brief, there is ample evidence to support the model of the Army moving toward convergence with the structures and values of civilian society. This developmental model anticipates an Army which will differ sharply from the traditional ground forces. An all-volunteer membership will be attracted to the services largely on the grounds of more inducements and job selection in the pattern now found in the civilian marketplace. Some form of democratization of the armed forces will occur, and life styles of soldiers will basically be that of like civilian groups. The military mystique will diminish as the Army comes to resemble other large-scale bureaucracies. The model of the convergent Army foresees the culmination of the civilianizing trend that began at least as early as World War II and that was given added impetus by the domestic turbulence of the Vietnam War years.

Model II: The Divergent or Traditional Army. The antithesis of the civilianized model is the construct which emphasizes the increasing differentiation between military and civilian social organization. Although the consequences of the military buildup of the Vietnam years somewhat obscure the issue, persuasive evidence can be presented that the generation-long institutional convergence of the armed forces and American society has begun to reverse itself. In this view, it appears likely that the Army in the post-Vietnam era will markedly diverge from the mainstream of developments in the general society. The emerging isolation of the military will be reflective of society-wide trends as well as conscious efforts toward institutional autonomy on the part of the armed forces. Some of the more significant indicators of this growing divergence are here summarized.

First, recent evidence shows that beginning during the early 1960's, the long-term trend toward recruitment of the officer corps from a representative slice of the American population has been reversed. Three measures of the narrowing social base of the officer corps in the past decade are: (1) the disproportionate number of newly commissioned officers coming from rural and small-town backgrounds; (2) the pronounced increase in the number of cadets at service academies who come from career military families; and (3) the continuing preponderance of military elite positions held by academy graduates.

Second, although the enlisted ranks have always been over-representative of working-class youth, the fact remains that the selective service system, directly or indirectly, brought some privileged youth into the military's rank and file. The institution of an all-volunteer force will serve to reduce significantly the degree of upper- and middle-class participation in the enlisted ranks. Since the end of World War II, moreover, there has been a discernible and growing gulf between the educational levels of officers and enlisted men. Very likely, an all-volunteer enlisted membership coupled with an almost entirely college-educated officer corps will contribute to a more rigid and sharp definition of the caste-like
distinction between officers and enlisted men within the Army of the 1970's.

Third, the transformation of the armed forces from a racially segregated institution into an integrated organization was an impressive achievement in directed social change. Although the Army never found a panacea for race relations, it was remarkably free from racial turmoil from the early 1950's through the middle 1960's. It is true that interracial embroils have become more frequent in recent years and will almost certainly continue as an irritant into the foreseeable future. Nevertheless, whatever the racial turn of events within the military, the largely successful integration of the Army can be viewed as a kind of divergence from a quasi-apartheid society. The Army, albeit with internal strife, will remain into the indefinite future the most racially integrated institution in American society.\(^9\)

Fourth, the well-known trend toward increasing technical specialization within the military has already reached its maximal point. The end of this trend clearly implies a halt in the conversion of military to civilian skills. A careful and detailed analysis of military occupational trends by Harold Wool reveals that the most pronounced shift away from combat and manual labor occupations occurred between 1945 and 1957.\(^10\) Since that time, there has been relative stability in the occupational requirements of the armed

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forces. Furthermore, as Wool points out, it is often the technical jobs that are most likely to be automated, thereby indirectly increasing the proportion of combat personnel.

Fifth, there is an indication of an emerging divergence between family patterns of military personnel and civilians. Before World War II, the Army at the enlisted levels was glaringly indifferent to family needs. In World War II, except for allotment checks, families of servicemen more or less fended for themselves. Beginning with the Cold War, however, the military began to take steps to deal with some of the practical problems faced by married servicemen. An array of on-post privileges (e.g. free medical care, PX and commissary privileges, government quarters for married noncoms) was established or expanded to meet the needs of military families. This greater Army concern for service families became more evident in the late 1960's with such officially sponsored activities as the Army Community Service. At the risk of overstatement, the pre-World-War-II enlisted force might be viewed as an Army of bachelors, while during the post-Vietnam era it has become an Army of family men.

Sixth, although the much heralded liberal reforms of the 1969-71 period have had some limited impact on internal Army organization, it was evident that by 1972-73 countervailing forces were already in operation. New "tightening up" directives were being issued. Renewed emphasis on formal command responsibilities contributed to a reduction in the number and influence of enlisted councils. Officer and noncom resistance to the enlisted reforms, always latent, became more pronounced and vocal. All in all, it seemed probable that the brief era of liberalization in the Army had run its course.

The six factors discussed above compose only a partial list of the indicators pointing to the emergence of a divergent Army. But there are other indicators as well. For instance, charging the armed forces with welfare and job training programs—witness Project 100,000 and Project Transition—can only lead to greater social distance between officers and the ranks. The downgrading of the National Guard and Reserve components weakens the concept of the citizen-soldier. The employment of foreign-national troops under direct American command—for example, the South Korean troops who today constitute one sixth of the "American" Eighth Army—is a paramount indicator of a military force divergent from civilian society.

Perhaps the ultimate indicator of divergence is ideological. There is a widespread mood among career officers and noncoms that the armed forces have been made the convenient scapegoat for the war in Vietnam. The mass media, seaborland intelligentsia, and certain professors of our leading universities are seen as undermining the honor of military service and fostering dissent within the ranks. Although documentation is elusive, the consequence of this process has been a spreading reaction within the military community against the nation's cultural elite.

Suffice it to say, there are convincing indicators that the Army is undergoing a fundamental orientation away from civilian structures and values. With the arrival of an

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all-volunteer force, the Army will find its enlisted membership less representative of civilian society, and the unsettling effects of unreconstructed members—drafted enlisted men and ROTC officers from prestige campuses—will be no more. This reversion to tradition may well be the paradoxical quality of the "new" Army of the 1970's.

**Model III: The Segmented or Plural Army.** The two opposed models of the civilianized versus traditional military can be incorporated into a third formulation—a model of the emergent Army as segmented or plural. Such a pluralist model of the Army accommodates and reconciles the opposing sets of indicators associated with the civilianized and traditional models. Simply put, the plural Army will be both convergent and divergent with civilian society; it will simultaneously display organizational trends which are civilianized and traditional.

The pluralist model, however, does not foresee a homogeneous Army lying somewhere between the civilianized and traditional poles. Rather, the emergent Army will be internally compartmentalized into areas which will be either more convergent or more divergent than present components of the Army's organization. Such contrasts already characterize trends among the services. Thus, while the Air Force continues to move toward civilianization and participative control, the Marine Corps announces that it will uphold traditional training procedures and regimentation of personnel. What will be novel in the emergent Army, however, is that developments toward segmentation will characterize internal Army organization.

Traditional or divergent features in the Army will become most pronounced in combat forces, labor-intensive support units, and other front-echelon units. Those in the traditional Army will continue to cultivate the ideals of soldierly honor and the mystique of the martial arts. A predilection toward noncivilian values will result from the self-recruitment of the junior membership as reinforced by the dominant conservatism of career officers and noncoms. Beyond the first tour of duty, personnel turnover will be low.

The social isolation of such a traditional Army will be compounded by its composition, which will be over-representative of rural and Southern regions, men coming from the more deprived groups of American society, and sons of military fathers.

On the other hand, the civilianized or convergent compartments in the military system will be accelerated where functions deal with clerical administration, education, medical care, logistics, transportation, construction, and other technical tasks. Those with specialized education or training will be attracted to the service in a civilianized rather than a military capacity and will gauge military employment in terms of marketplace standards. Terms of employment will increasingly correspond to those of strictly civilian enterprises. Lateral entry into the military system, already the case for professionals, will gradually extend to skilled workers and even menial laborers. There will be a concomitant relaxation of Army discharge procedures. The social composition of such a civilianized Army will resemble that of those job groups performing equivalent roles in the larger economy. Men in older age
groups may well be recruited for such tasks. It is also probable that the use of civilians in support roles will increase, either through direct-hire or contract arrangements. It is also likely that the proportion of women in the Army, presently less than two percent, will increase to around four or five percent. At the same time, the range of occupational openings for women in the Army will expand dramatically. Indeed, by the end of 1973, eligible enlisted women could train for 434 of the Army’s 482 MOS’s (in effect all but combat specialties).

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The segmented or plural Army will of course require new organizational forms. The range of such alternative forms can only be sketched here. But, as a minimal requirement, there must be a structure sufficiently flexible to embrace varying personnel policies, diverse systems of military justice and discipline, and differing work ethos. Although the impact of the new personnel management system (OPMS) on Army officer careers is still problematic, the thrust behind the new policy can be interpreted as further legitimation for career advancement outside the traditional command route, i.e. towards a more segmented Army. Indeed, the contradictions between the civilianized and traditional conceptions of the Army may be so great as to prohibit a conventional Army organization. There may develop “two Armies,” each organized upon different premises. Another possible alternative may follow the Canadian pattern, where armed forces’ unification has resulted in a complete separation of support and administrative functions from the combat arms.

Our task here, however, is not to forecast the precise shape of the plural Army, but rather merely to describe those broad, predictable features likely to characterize the emergent Army’s organization. Most likely, the Army of the United States will keep its present overall framework, but divide internally along civilianized and traditional lines. The traditional sector will stress customary modes of military organization. This could entail greater autonomy for tactical units, more regionalization in recruitment patterns, and perhaps even a revival of some form of the old regimental system. At the same time there will be a civilianized sector which will operate on principles common to civil administrative and corporate structures. A long-standing precedent for such organization in the Army is found in the Corps of Engineers.

THE EMERGENT ARMY AND AMERICAN SOCIETY

Developmental analysis serves to steer the researcher between the Scylla of unordered data and the Charybdis of unsubstantiated
conjecture as to future social reality. It was with this purpose that three alternative developmental models of the Army were presented—civilianized, traditional, and plural. And it was the plural model which seemed to correspond most closely to contemporary trends in emergent Army organization.

Ultimately, each of these models must be assessed in terms of its implications for civil polity and the internal viability of the Army. A predominantly civilianized Army could easily lose that élan so necessary for the functioning of a military organization. A military force uniformly moving toward more recognition of individual rights and less rigidity in social control would in all likelihood seriously disaffect career personnel (not to mention its adverse effect upon discipline), while making military service only marginally more palatable to its resistant members. A predominantly traditional Army, on the other hand, would most likely be incapable of either maintaining the organization at its required complexity or attracting the kind of members necessary for effective performance. More ominous, a traditional Army in a rapidly changing society could develop anti-civilian values, thus threatening the basic fabric of democratic ideology.

It is the plural model of the Army—with its compartmentalized segments—which seems to offer the best promise of an armed force which will maintain organizational effectiveness while remaining consonant in the main with civilian values. The American Army is moving toward a future which is committed neither to the rigidities of the old order, nor to the rampant libertarianism of the new. Such an emergent Army will demonstrate, however, an adaptability to modern social conditions while continuing to act upon the older verities of military organization.

NOTES
8. Among sociologists of the military, the view stressing the divergence of the emergent military from civilian society has perhaps been most forcefully argued in my own previous writings. See C. C. Moskos, Jr., The American Enlisted Man (New York: Sage, 1970), pp. 166-82. As is apparent in the conclusions of this article, I have now come to abandon my previous position.