ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS AND NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

by

FRANCIS X. WINTERS, S.J.

Has recent US foreign policy decision-making given adequate weight to ethical considerations? A review of national security planning reveals an apparent and significant failure in certain areas to include adequate deliberation of ethical issues in formulating foreign policy. Reflection on these apparent failures suggests the need to create a means to provide long-range planning which is essential to embody adequate ethical considerations. In this article, a detailed analysis of three policy areas will suggest the dimensions of the problem and offer an explanation of the failure in foreign policy making to consider adequately the ethical issues. In conclusion, a proposed remedy for these failures will be sketched in brief.

STRATEGIC DOCTRINE

In a press conference at the Overseas Press Club on 10 January 1974, the Secretary of Defense reopened the national debate on strategic doctrine by announcing that the Department of Defense was developing plans for introducing greater discrimination into strategic targeting to provide Presidential options in the dire eventuality of a strategic nuclear exchange between the United States and the Soviet Union.1 Six months later, Secretary of State Kissinger, on his return from the abortive summit in June, summoned the nation to a “great debate” on strategic arms limitations to persuade US military leadership of the urgency of accommodation with the Soviet Union on strategic doctrine and planning.2 Although the personal, bureaucratic, and diplomatic factors influencing these Secretaries will not be known for years, it is clear that their initiatives during the last year had very significant impact on the November agreements between President Ford and Chairman Brezhnev, which may come to be known as the “Vladivostok shock” because of the impetus given to national debate on the future of the arms race. This public debate, carried on within both the bureaucracy and the press, has frequently made explicit reference to ethical considerations. I contend here that the debate and the simultaneous processes of decision making have given insufficient weight to one overriding ethical consideration: the cultural destabilization

Francis X. Winters, S.J., is Director of the Institute for the Study of Ethics and International Affairs, The School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University and an Assistant Professor of Political Ethics in the University. He was educated at Fordham University (A.B., M.A.T., Ph.D.), and Woodstock College (Ph.I and S.T.L.), where he later served as Dean of the Faculty. He is a Director of the Council on Religion and International Affairs, New York City; of Woodstock Theological Center, Washington, D.C.; and of Wheeling College. Since his ordination to the Roman Catholic priesthood in 1964, he has done pastoral work in New York and Connecticut, and has taught at Loyola College, Baltimore; Immaculate Heart College, Hollywood, Calif.; Woodstock College; and Georgetown. He served this year as a Consultant on Ethics and National Security affairs for the “Murphy” Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy; he was also the director of a year-long seminar at Georgetown University for civilian and military policymakers and ethicists on the topic of Ethics and Nuclear Strategy. He has published in America, Worldview, The Modern Schoolman, and Theological Studies. His book, Politics and Ethics appeared in 1975.

threatened by US and USSR strategic doctrine as it is articulated both by defenders and critics of Schlesinger’s counterforce strategy.3

At first sight, it may appear that Secretary Schlesinger and his critics have paid adequate attention to the moral argument in establishing and articulating their positions. For example, the “counterforce” approach to strategic doctrine emphasizes the priority of protecting civilian lives as a constraint on policy and planning. That is, the reported process of retargeting has attempted wherever possible to discriminate among military, industrial, and civilian targets and to build breaks into operational plans for nuclear strategic response to attack, precisely to withhold civilian targeting as a final deterrent threat and bargaining move. Thus, it is hoped that a strategic exchange could be terminated short of the ultimately threatened mutual assured destruction (MAD). It seems, then, that the traditional abhorrence of targeting the defenseless has been given due weight in the public debate and decisionmaking process.

Attentive scrutiny of the Secretary’s statements, however, fails to reveal any willingness to consider either a mutual or a unilateral declaration that such civilian sectors would be immune unconditionally to direct targeting by our forces. In the absence of such a declaration, I believe the ethical critic is bound to observe that the traditional insistence on moral restraints against civilian targeting has been reduced to a chronological or strategic restraint, namely, a postponement of civilian targeting to the last moment in the strategic exchange. It seems that this revision of the tradition of civilian inviolability constitutes a curious reversal, and final abandonment, of the civilized instinct that saved “women and children first” from a sinking ship. Now they will be targeted last. One might ask whether this postponement of their fate does not promise a unique psychological atrocity for these temporary survivors, only to be followed by the counterforce coup de grace—annihilation.

The ethical consideration given inadequate weight by Secretary Schlesinger, those who agree with him, and the Soviets is this: the mere postponement of civilian targeting not only includes the malice of killing the defenseless, but also heightens the threatened horror by allowing those so “protected” to witness the death of their society and their loved ones, before their own slaughter.

Schlesinger’s critics, including many of the most knowledgeable, experienced, articulate, and sensitive members of the arms control community both within and around the government, have been quick to point out some of the ironies in the counterforce proposals, and have basked in the complacency of a moral superiority that is equally dubious to some ethical observers. Arguing that the development of nuclear weapons has made obsolete the ancient proscription of targeting civilians and persuaded, perhaps, that there are no morally significant differences between civilians and soldiers, these arms control theorists propose as a substitute norm the achievement and maintenance of stable deterrence. According to this criterion, military strategy should be based upon the maintenance of parity in destructive potential between adversaries, which prevents an expansionist move by either superpower and therefore protects international equilibrium. Relinquishing the limit earlier provided by the principle of the inviolability of innocent human life, this school urges a defense posture based on:

1. the mutual vulnerability of the cities of each society to the offensive missiles of the
other—assured through the virtual abandonment of ABM systems since SALT I.
(2) The invulnerability of a retaliatory strategic force—assured by a submarine fleet, armed with Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs).
(3) The improbability of nuclear hostilities—assured through the combination of (1) and (2), above.
By raising the destructive stakes as high as possible through the unimpaired mutual vulnerability of citizens, the stable deterrence school seeks to reduce the statistical probability of nuclear hostilities until it approximates zero. Among these theorists there is an ample spectrum of strategies for retaliation if deterrence should fail, ranging from assured destruction—the assured capacity to destroy the Soviet Union as a viable society—through a twice redundant (ICBM, SLBM, bomber) capacity to destroy 60 million Soviet citizens and one-half of its industrial capacity—down to a retaliatory and delayed obliteration of ten Soviet cities. Such, it seems, is the meaning of stability in the nuclear era.4

A moral critic might argue plausibly that the countervalue school of strategic doctrine, despite appearances to the contrary, also fails to give due weight to moral considerations. Specifically, it seems that this school has inadvisedly consigned the principle of civilian immunity to obsolescence because:
• the attempt to reduce the probability of nuclear hostilities as far as possible (to levels approaching zero) by raising the stakes as high as possible (by threatening deliberate attacks on civilians) ignores the monumental gap between a low probability of hostilities and a zero probability, which is admittedly unattainable because of political necessities, human unpredictability, human error or technological malfunction, or the final spectre of “the irrational actor.”
• the apparent (relative) political and military stability that has been secured by the current strategic doctrine of MAD has been purchased at the price of a much more fundamental stability, namely, that ancient tradition of limiting the use of violence by the political (and later legal) boundary of civilian immunity from intentional attack.
In support of this contention that the countervalue approach to strategic doctrine is no more adequate than counterforce to resolving the moral issue of nuclear warfare, the following question might be addressed to the supporters of MAD: Is it possible that the policy of targeting civilians, at the very time it is serving to stabilize the international political situation through deterrence of nuclear hostilities, is also profoundly destabilizing the international cultural and ethical situation by undermining the primeval instinct to respect human life? The value of political stabilization achieved through policies of mutual assured destruction ought to be weighed very carefully against the loss, with its consequent cultural destabilization, of the last generally accepted and legally recognized boundary on the use of violence. Stabilization or destabilization, in other words, are processes at work both in the political-military and in the broader cultural sphere of ethics and international law. In an article that appeared on the eve of his appointment as Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Fred Iklé raised this question of the long-range impact of national defense policies which have as a starting point an acceptance of genocide:
The jargon of American strategic analysis works like a narcotic. It dulls our sense of moral outrage about the tragic confrontation of nuclear arsenals, primed and constantly perfected to unleash widespread genocide. It fosters the current smug complacency regarding the soundness and stability of mutual deterrence. It blinds us to the fact that our method for preventing nuclear war rests on a form of warfare universally condemned since the Dark Ages—the mass killing of hostages.5

It may be that we are presently purchasing political and military stability at the cost of cultural and symbolic destabilization. If so, the price is too high. Neither of the publicly debated approaches to strategic doctrine,
then, “counterforce” or “countervalue,” gives adequate weight to the ethical considerations proposed in the tradition of absolute prohibition against direct intentional attack on civilians.

The proponents of these opposing strategic doctrines, however, would be justified in asking their critics: What conceivable strategic doctrine would meet such a test? In the interest of advancing the public debate on strategy, let me propose an alternative strategy alongside those currently being discussed, and suggest that this strategy combines the three requirements of a military posture compatible with a sense of morality, that it:

- protect the legitimate political, military, and economic interests of the United States in the international system.
- not trigger a nuclear holocaust.
- not erode the crucial cultural heritage of respect for human life.

A strategy meeting these requirements might be called a “counter-strategic defense.” It would avoid targeting cities, industry, communication centers, and conventional combat forces such as the Soviet troops on the Chinese border. It would target only such USSR strategic forces as ICBMs, submarines and their support facilities, ABM systems, airfields, air fuel depots, missile depots, railroad lines servicing ICBM fields, and other targets determined to be contributing, or about to contribute, to strategic attack on the United States. These targets appear to constitute the upper level of the minimal force necessary to defend the United States and justifiable according to the principles of discrimination and proportionality. The cultural and specifically the moral stability of the human enterprise requires observance of these limits defined by the principles of discrimination and proportionality.6

Would the adoption of such a radical change in US military strategy be liable to result in a destabilization of the international system and in consequent Soviet gains in areas such as Europe and the Middle East where it presumably has ambitions? Almost certainly it would, if the proposed strategic shift were to be implemented immediately, or even by 1980. But there is, of course, no chance that US policymakers would change their own perceptions with such destabilizing rapidity. Even if such a proposal were to be examined seriously as part of the imminent national debate, no consensus for a counter-strategic defense could be formed before 1985. By then, the domestic debate would have made this remote possibility well known to world leaders. Even if such a radical reversal of strategic doctrine were adopted by 1985, the United States would need another ten years to reorient its defenses to conventional forces before abandoning present and currently projected force structures. Surely by 1995, the international system could have adapted to the proposed change in US defense policies.

CHOICE OF TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS

The implications for weapons choice of adoption of the proposed “counter-strategic defense” posture lie beyond the competence of this author, although I question continued reliance on SLBMs because of their apparently exclusive direction against soft targets. Presumably such choices among available weapons systems, as well as research and development of weapons more appropriate to such a strategy, could be made largely on technical grounds without further recourse to moral criteria.

The choice of tactical nuclear weapons, however, is the focus of a vigorous policy debate both within and around the government.7 This debate also involves moral arguments, some of which are explicitly made by advocates of competing weapons systems, while other moral considerations have so far been either ignored or prematurely discounted. A review of the three most widely held views, along with the accompanying moral argument, will illustrate both the actual and potential impact of ethical considerations on the choice, or rejection, of tactical nuclear weapons.

Several military and political considerations have stimulated the current review of US
policies for the defense of Europe, including the following:

- the disparity between the size and yield of currently deployed tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) and their potential military missions; many of these weapons are too powerful to be used without destroying the defended area, Europe.

- the risk of escalation from tactical to strategic conflict through loss of command and control during hostilities, asymmetry of US and Soviet doctrines about limited tactical nuclear war, and difficulty of distinguishing kiloton from megaton nuclear explosions on a battlefield.

- risk of accident, theft, or capture of TNWs.

- political complications resulting from the admitted (and intended) strategic capabilities of some present NATO “tactical” nuclear forces.

To obviate some of these difficulties, various defense analysts have proposed altering NATO defense postures by:

- reducing the number from 7000 to 2000 or 1000, and restructuring the composition of nuclear weapons deployed in and around Europe, while building up conventional defenses.

- redesigning conventional defenses, and redesigning TNWs to low-yield (subkiloton) forces which would be used promptly against any significant Warsaw Pact threat to seize territory in Western Europe.

- withdrawing all TNWs and relying on conventional forces alone.

A moral critic can argue, I believe, that both reduction of the number and yields of TNWs and of conventional forces are motivated partially by explicit moral considerations which in themselves are valid. If complemented, however, by further moral reconsideration, they might lead to quite a different conclusion—adoption of the proposal for total withdrawal of US nuclear forces from Europe, along with substantial build-up of conventional defenses there.

Those who advocate reducing the number of TNWs and phasing out specific systems, such as QRA (quick reaction alert), include moral arguments among the considerations that support their positions. They argue, for example, that the present size of the arsenal is dangerously and unnecessarily large. Therefore, to eliminate risks, to reduce political tensions, and to free scarce resources for the improvement of conventional force structures, they urge a reduction from 7000 to 2000 or 1000 TNWs. Against those who urge cutting back conventional forces and miniaturizing nuclear weapons, their moral retort is that such a change in force structure unwisely ignores the significance of the “atomic taboo” (Aron), which puts the most significant strategic firebreak between conventional and nuclear weapons of any size, and thus threatens to facilitate the outbreak of nuclear hostilities. Against those on the other side who want to remove all TNWs and rely solely on conventional forces, they insist that such a radical change would be politically destabilizing and therefore an invitation to Soviet aggression and European capitulation—“Finlandization.”

The moral structure of the argument advocating miniaturization of nuclear weapons, along with reduction in conventional forces, is persuasive initially. It reasons that improved capacity of NATO for tactical defense, clearly separated from any potential strategic utility in the remaining NATO nuclear forces, contributes to political stability and superpower accommodation.

What ethical considerations, then, are lacking in the case made for reducing or miniaturizing the TNW force of NATO? Principally, the further considerations which lead to recommending a different course of action—total withdrawal of TNWs from Europe and increased reliance on conventional forces—are these:

- in response to the reduction thesis:
  - the residual risk of escalation from TNWs to strategic conflict remains the overwhelming political/military threat to peace.

- in response to the miniaturization thesis:
the transfer of the firebreak from quality (conventional versus nuclear) to quantitative (superkiloton to subkiloton) radically undermines the "atomic taboo" and thus heightens the possibility of nuclear hostilities.

- economic and technological reasons for preferring nuclear to conventional forces are superficial and cowardly solutions to the political challenge of combined European and US defense of vital interests in Europe.

In the light of these reflections, let me propose "the extreme viewpoint that the United States should not deploy any non-strategic weapons systems." In support of this alternative proposal, one might offer political, military, and moral considerations. Let me stress only the last: that "the long-standing US tradition of trading technology for manpower" is extremely short-sighted since it contains an unacceptable risk of theater or global escalation.

COUNTERINSURGENCY DOCTRINE

Counterinsurgency, like the insurgent movement which it seeks to overcome, is a political-military strategy to consolidate political power. Hence, it may be morally legitimate or even morally obligatory. The participation of allies in a nation’s counterinsurgency is legitimated by the same criteria as the counterinsurgency itself, namely, the political welfare of the population and the costs of bringing about this welfare through violence. Here, “counterinsurgency doctrine” is taken to mean the political-military doctrine governing US participation in the counterinsurgency activities of its allies—alleged either by treaty or otherwise. The example chosen to examine ethical considerations, which may be relevant to US counterinsurgency doctrine, is US involvement in Vietnam from 1963 until the cease fire.

The decisive question in attempting to assess the ethical legitimacy of US participation in the counterinsurgency efforts of successive South Vietnamese governments is this: was US involvement a function of, and thus subordinate to, the local counterinsurgency itself or was it rather part of a US global strategy of containment of communist advances? Evidently, US policymakers were not oblivious of the global context in which the Vietnamese conflict took place. The record of the period documents the decisive impact of the memory of Munich on key decisionmakers. It seems clear, therefore, that global containment of communist forces was one of the factors motivating US involvement. From this fact, of course, no judgment can be made that US participation was morally illegitimate, for it is quite possible that the interests of the United States in containing Communism and the interest of the South Vietnamese government in protecting its own power base coincided. The crucial issue is one of intention: what were US policymakers trying to accomplish?

Short of extensive and necessarily unverifiable interviewing, there is no way to judge the intention of decisionmakers. Yet, a persuasive index of intention can be found in their strategic and tactical decisions. If, for example, the level of US support was disproportionate to the intrinsic importance of the local conflict and if such a level of support achieved profound and lasting damage to the political, economic, and ecological structure of Vietnam itself, then a moral observer might infer plausibly that the actual motivation of US decisionmakers was the prosecution of a global strategy of containment, which happened to be prosecuted in Vietnam, but which could have occurred in a variety of other localities. It may be inferred plausibly, in other words, that the geopolitical configuration of the domino did not finally matter in Washington—what mattered was its standing or falling. If the identity of the domino is not finally significant for US counterinsurgency doctrine, except in its most technical aspects, the doctrine runs a high risk of leading to decisions that are counterproductive to the counterinsurgency itself, by causing:

- excessive US penetration of the indigenous society.
- replacement of local leaders solely on the grounds of flexibility and subservience to US interests.
• high casualty rates.
• economic dislocation.
• ecological destruction.
• violation of territorial integrity of neighboring states.
• violation of international law by bombing cities.
• erosion of recent customary limitations of warfare against interdicting supply routes.
• withdrawal of popular support from the government.
• heightened morale among insurgents.

Further consequences of deciding on a level of US participation, which is proportionate to a global contest for power but which is also clearly disproportionate to supporting the counterinsurgent forces, stem from the fact that such levels of violence can be made intelligible to others only by admission that the real motivation is the prosecution of a global strategy of containment. Such an admission, however, is impossible because it would exacerbate international tensions. US leaders, therefore, had to try to persuade their fellow citizens that the level of US participation in the counterinsurgency was determined solely by intrinsic demands of the local situation. To make this case, the leadership was forced to delude the Congress (Gulf of Tonkin resolution), and finished by deceiving itself in a pattern of bureaucratic activity that might be described by a phrase adapted from strategic terminology: “mutual assured deception.”12 The price of this reciprocal deception turned out to be the abandonment of the Presidency by one of its most jealous suitors.

Employing these indices of proportionality to gauge the intention of decisionmakers concerned with Vietnam from 1963 onward, the moral critic is forced to conclude that the effective motivation for US policies in Vietnam during this period was the prosecution of a global strategy of containment, which was counterproductive to the counterinsurgency itself as Diem might have testified, as well as to the political power of the decisionmakers in Washington.

Counterinsurgency doctrine, then, should be simply that, and not a doctrine of containment, except in those few cases where the two doctrines and their respective policies actually converge. The failure to distinguish the two is both a moral and a political mistake of almost inestimable proportions.

In reviewing three broad areas of US defense policymaking—strategic doctrine, tactical weapons choice, and the doctrine of counterinsurgency—the author has come to the following conclusions:

• strategic doctrine has given insufficient attention to the culturally destabilizing effect of targeting civilians.
• weapons choice has failed to give adequate attention to the feasibility and desirability of avoiding the risk of escalation by withdrawing all TNWs from Europe and relying solely for theater defense on conventional NATO forces.
• counterinsurgency doctrine has failed to distinguish sharply enough between genuine and effective counterinsurgency and counterproductive policies of containment.

In these three areas, it is apparent that ethical considerations have been given inadequate weight in the policy process itself and, perhaps to a lesser extent, in the larger policy debate which surrounds the government. There is evidently a need, then, for a renewed examination of the ethical constraints appropriate for US political/military doctrine. Such an examination would include a careful reassessment of the impact of present strategic doctrine on the perennial instinct to preserve civilian life from direct attack; of the economic and political feasibility of a return to conventional defense of Europe as a safeguard of the “atomic taboo,” which may

---

THE FAILURE TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN COUNTERINSURGENCY DOCTRINE AND A GLOBAL STRATEGY OF CONTAINMENT IS BOTH A MORAL AND A POLITICAL MISTAKE OF ALMOST INESTIMABLE PROPORTIONS.
...IT IS APPARENT THAT ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS HAVE BEEN GIVEN INADEQUATE WEIGHT IN THE POLICY PROCESS ITSELF, AND PERHAPS TO A LESSER EXTENT, IN THE LARGER POLICY DEBATE WHICH SURROUNDS THE GOVERNMENT.

be currently imperiled by US defense force structures for NATO; and of the crucial distinction between genuine counterinsurgency and the alien effort to contain communist expansionism.

In addition to this needed renaissance of ethical reflection, it may be that one major institutional innovation is called for if US military doctrine is to regain its ethical validity. The need for such a structural initiative is suggested by the realization that the changes emerging from the proposed ethical reexamination would be so sweeping in their scope that they might have a destabilizing effect on the international system if they originated from the policymaking community itself. For, reflecting on the considerable gap between current policies and those that would be ethically more acceptable, the observer is inclined to say: “You can’t get there from here.” Some of the proposed alternative policies would require such basic changes in force structure and doctrine that policymakers are not likely to enjoy the imaginative or administrative freedom to propose and implement them. Further, if such changes were proposed by government officials themselves, both adversaries and allies would be rightfully thrown into confusion and anxiety about their immediate implications.

HENCE, it seems useful to propose the establishment of a new public institution which would be charged with the specific responsibility to scrutinize military policies from the perspective of political objective values, including ethical values. In the light of these considerations, I propose the establishment of a public and official, but non-governmental, National Academy of Defense and Diplomacy, composed of about fifteen senior and retired statesmen, military officers, academicians, university presidents, corporate executives, Congresspersons, journalists, artists, and religious leaders who would be elected to serve as an extra-bureaucratic board of advisors on US foreign policy. Figures of national prominence who come to mind as appropriate candidates to serve on such a panel include: George Kennan, William Fulbright, Maxwell Taylor, Kingman Brewster, Robert McNamara, and Sam Ervin.

This proposed National Academy would be federally supported and its members would serve until seventy-five years of age. Their responsibilities, which would exclude other remunerative work and subsequent elective or appointive office, would be to reflect, write, and advise on the long-range goals and strategic policies required for foreign policy. They would have no power beyond that of persuasion. They would have the support of an able staff of specialists in foreign affairs, and might be associated with an institution such as the Smithsonian Institution. They would have access to, and be accessible to, government officials, including the Congress.

The purpose of establishing such an Academy of distinguished foreign affairs advisors would be to overcome the bureaucratic constraints on foreign policy formulation, including the following limitations:

- the necessity to plan in one, or four, or eight year spans.
- the difficulty of proposing creative alternatives for consideration and debate without unsettling domestic and foreign audiences about the short run implications of such alternative policies—the destabilizing nature of creative alternatives.
- uncertainty and ambition on the part of policymakers about future status and economic security.

Is this a utopian proposal? Perhaps it is.
But, from the creation of such an academy we might expect informed deliberation and debate about US goals and strategy to ensure a more peaceful and just international system by the end of this century. The mandate of the academy would be simple: to exercise political foresight. With the benefit of such vision, perhaps the nation will continue to flourish as a moral leader in the international community.

NOTES


3. The ethical consideration in question here is an indisputable element of the Western political and legal tradition: the inviolability of innocent human life, or the absolute prohibition against the intentional targeting of non-combatants during war. The incorporation of this traditional limit on violence into the body of international law is detailed by H. Morgenthau in Politics Among Nations (New York: Knopf, 1966), ch. 16, “International Morality.” Morgenthau draws attention (p. 229) to the affirmation of this prohibition in the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, and in the Geneva Convention of 1949. Another readily available catalogue of international legal restrictions on the targeting of civilians is a Survey (A/9215, Vol. I, 7 Nov 1973) prepared by the Secretariat of the General Assembly of the United Nations, Twenty-Eighth Session, Agenda Item Number 96, entitled: “Respect for Human Rights in Armed Conflicts: Part I” 17-20. According to these moral and legal principles, the intentional targeting of civilians is forbidden.

I contend here that the official policy of threatening non-combatants, even apart from the execution of the threat, likewise violates this moral prohibition, if not the precept of international law itself. The effect of a national policy of deterrence based on such threats is to undermine the cultural (moral) conviction on which the legal principle is based. Thomas Schelling, the strategist, has suggested (The Strategy of Conflict, New York: Oxford, 1960, p. 73) that such traditional taboos function as tacit coordinators which permit bargaining between adversaries about the level of violence which they are willing to use to attain political objectives. Maintaining the integrity of these traditional taboos is thus a stabilizing factor in the international system, and their erosion through continued threats to civilian life is a culturally destabilizing policy and, therefore, immoral.

4. Cf., for example, H. Scozelle’s response to Schlesinger’s proposals in “Flexible MADness?” Foreign Policy, 14 (Spring 1974), 164-77.


6. The case for this strategy is made in greater detail and with more explicit reference to the just war tradition in my recent article, “Morality in the War Room,” America, 132 (15 February 1975), 106-10.


In the confusion, subtle peace-time distinctions between lower level tactical nuclear war and higher level tactical nuclear war, and all-out spasm nuclear war would vanish. Once the threshold is crossed from conventional warfare to nuclear warfare, the clear ‘firebreak’ on the path to complete nuclear holocaust will have been crossed. (p. 3)

10. Record, p. 56.
11. Ibid., p. 9.