COMBAT COHESION IN SOVIET AND AMERICAN MILITARY UNITS

by

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Whenever comparisons are made between the Soviet and American Armies, the focus inevitably falls upon weapons systems and employment techniques. Arguments abound in which stockpiles of tanks, missiles, aircraft, submarines, and other implements of warfare are assessed for the technological advantages which will carry the day in combat. Even when troops are compared, it is from the perspective of relative numbers: thus, the recurrent theme that Soviet ground forces outnumber American forces by ominous proportions. While there is no doubt that such comparisons are valuable and important, there seems little attention given to the quality of troops which will be called upon to bear the burden of combat. Moreover, there is almost no attention paid to the very different theoretical conceptions which underlie the training doctrines of both armies.

It is often overlooked that the Soviet doctrine which supports training programs designed to produce reliable and effective fighting units is radically different from American doctrine. In short, both armies proceed from starkly different ideas as to what makes men fight and what techniques are required to keep fighting units cohesive and effective in combat. There is, as far as I can discover, no study which has systematically compared Soviet and American models of combat cohesion. This gap in our studies is an important one which needs attention.

This paper deals with the subject of cohesion in military units. No army can be considered effective unless it can rely upon its units to cohere under the terrifying stress of combat. Moreover, no army can expect to develop highly cohesive units unless it first develops theoretical doctrines which support the development and application of specific techniques which are designed to build cohesion. Thus, it may be assumed that as a point of departure, training doctrines in the Soviet and American Armies are reflections of a theoretical notion of what is necessary to keep units together in combat and to assure their effectiveness in performing their missions. What is intriguing is that Soviet and American models of military cohesion are radically different, as are the training techniques which follow from them.

THE SOVIET MODEL

Fundamental to the Soviet model of military cohesion is the proposition that ideology and ideological conviction is the most important factor in motivating soldiers to fight. Ideological conviction is often referred to in Soviet training literature as "the decisive motivational force behind all soldiers' actions and deeds." Moreover, Soviet doctrine posits a central role for ideology in the development of other military skills.  

The seriousness with which the Soviets hold ideology in military training can be gauged by the fact that no less an authority than Marshal Grechko did not hesitate to subordinate the acquisition of military skills to ideological convictions when he said, "The first and foremost requirement of officers is
to be ideologically convinced . . . and active champions of party policy.”13 In the Soviet view, then, there can be no motivation in any military unit that is not firmly rooted in the ideological conviction and consciousness of the soldier.

If ideological conviction is fundamental to the motivation of the soldier, it is also the core element which produces cohesion within the military unit. The effectiveness of military units is repeatedly attributed to ideological conviction and consciousness.4 With regard to units, the Soviets distinguish very clearly between “collectives” and “corporations.” The former are effective military units precisely because the goals of the group are not confined to the group per se but serve a higher “socially significant motive.”” Corporations, on the other hand, have “goals which arise only out of intragroup needs and interests.”” Accordingly, the distinguishing characteristic of an effective, cohesive military group is the presence of its “socially significant motives” or, in other words, ideology and ideological conviction. Without appropriate ideological consciousness, groups become “parochial” and ineffective as military units.

The Soviets affirm that without proper ideological conviction military effectiveness is simply not possible. They imply that with proper ideological conviction and consciousness these factors in themselves will motivate the individual soldier and produce cohesion in the military collective.9 The Soviets are not naive enough to turn their training camps totally into indoctrination centers on these grounds, and Soviet doctrine notes that other elements are needed along with indoctrination.10 But, motivation and cohesion are never purely technical qualities acquired by training. They are primarily “moral-combat” qualities and they result from:

...the ideological component, which defines the orientation and content of the other components. Its foundation is comprised of the political consciousness and communist conviction of the soldier.11

Thus, the techniques of military expertise in themselves will produce neither motivation nor cohesion in military units. Such techniques are tangential to the fundamental element of ideological conviction and consciousness.

So intent are the Soviets in their belief that ideological consciousness is vital to military effectiveness and unit cohesion that they are openly fearful of any attachments within military units that may result from forces other than ideological ones.12 Official Soviet military periodicals note that there is a potential danger in the formation of “microcollectives”—a code name for groups which tend to form around some basis other than ideology. Such groups represent an “incorrect interpretation of comradeship” that “tends toward . . . supporting a narrow circle of people.”13 It is feared that attachments to the microcollective will compete for the loyalty of the troops and erode their ideological convictions. Recalling that Soviet doctrine links effectiveness to conviction, any erosion within a military group of its “socially significant motives” is
logically to be viewed with alarm. Such primary groups are seen as corrosive of the basic element contributing to cohesion and effectiveness, and rigorous efforts are made to break up such groups "as an essential condition for binding collectives on a healthy basis."

If it is assumed that ideology is the basic motivating force for the Soviet soldier and that ideological conviction is the cement holding military units together in combat, and if it is further assumed that ideology has its source in the basic organization of the social order to which the Soviet soldier is exposed both within and outside the military, then what is the function of the military leader in the Soviet model?

Not surprisingly, the first function of the leader in Soviet military doctrine is to be a model of ideological conviction himself and to take steps to instill and strengthen this conviction in his troops. To quote Grechko again, "The first and foremost requirement of officers is to be ideologically convinced . . . and active champions of party policy."

If the premises of the Soviet model concerning the preeminent role of ideology in military cohesion and effectiveness are accepted, then the role of the military leader is quite logical.

Some appreciation for the role of the military leader in Soviet military theory can be obtained from an examination of a revealing article entitled, "The Ways and Means of Instilling High Moral-Combat Traits in Soviet Soldiers." The authors address the tasks upon which a military leader must concentrate to instill cohesion and effectiveness in his unit. But, the article is most revealing for what it omits. There is no discussion or enumeration of guidelines for the officer or noncommissioned officer to follow in order to build attachments to and within the unit which are not based upon ideology.

In short, the role of the military leader is "to construct the indoctrination process and to supervise the activities of subordinates." There are no injunctions, so profuse in American leadership manuals, to take the initiative, assume responsibility, care for the welfare of the troops, bear hardships with the troops, expose oneself to risk, and generally convince the troops that their leader understands their fears and cares about them. Given the Soviet ideological perspective, the sphere of leadership activity for the Soviet military leader is much more limited than that of his American counterpart.

Indeed, it is difficult to escape the impression that leadership in the Soviet model consists of a largely technical task focusing upon the scientific application of those techniques designed to stimulate ideological conviction among the soldiery. The Soviet model admits of few tasks beyond that of ideological stimulation that the military leader can perform that contribute to cohesion and motivation. This reliance upon ideology to motivate the soldier and generate cohesion in battle reduces the role and responsibilities of the small unit leader by a considerable extent.

The reduced role for leadership elements in contributing to military motivation and cohesion, or at least confining that role largely to indoctrination, is consistent with the ideological and totalitarian nature of

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the Soviet social order. Specifically, any motivation generated by attachments formed to informal groups is correctly regarded as potentially corrosive of the regime's control. This is true in the military and in the society at large. Totalitarian regimes are driven by their own dynamics to become "totalist" in their desire to control all aspects of individual life. Moreover, since the raison d'être of the regime is premised upon its possession and pursuit of a sacred ideology, any group which does not reflect the proper ideological motivation is perceived as "parochial" and must be dealt with.

Soviet military doctrine clearly reflects this view when it defines a collective as "an organized group of people who are part of a society and united by common goals and joint socially useful activity." Any group which arises only out of intragroup needs and interests is to be regarded with suspicion precisely because such groups lack the necessary ideological justification in terms of socially significant goals that transcend the specific interest of the group. The notion that men might forge attachments to each other that have no ideological component, especially in military groups, is denounced as "parochial" and "bourgeois."

One also surmises that ideology serves as the critical bridge in establishing a motivational connection between the military environment and the larger society. There is, then, no such thing in the Soviet view as a unit motivated or held together by forces which are purely internally generated by the unit. As a result, there is no need for the leader to assume the responsibility to generate the kinds of nonideological attachments which produce cohesion. Motivation and cohesion result from elements external to the group, namely ideology and political consciousness.

THE AMERICAN MODEL

The American model of military cohesion is decidedly different from the Soviet model. However, like the Soviet model, it is a reflection of the society which supports it. In the American case, the theoretical supports for military cohesion are most marked by the absence of any concern for ideology as an important factor. In a society rooted heavily in pluralism and economic "free enterprise," this condition is hardly surprising. Lacking the cohesive force of ideology, American military thought has had to rest its case for combat cohesion on other things.

It seems from a study of American leadership manuals that the American military has adopted the work of A. H. Maslow as its theoretical foundation for explaining cohesion and motivation in military units. Individuals, Maslow maintains, are fundamentally motivated by two generic types of needs, physical needs and learned needs. Physical needs include such obvious conditions of survival as food, water, shelter, and the elimination of waste. More important to any notion of what makes men under stress remain together and remain effective is the concept of learned needs. Learned needs include the following: the need to feel safe, the need for social acceptance and belonging, the need for esteem, and the need for self-fulfillment. Learned needs are the result of the individual's total life experiences in a society. What is important is that the individual soldier brings to the military an already developed set of learned needs; these needs are accepted as given when the soldier enters the military environment. In short, the military services must work with the soldier as they find him.

Motivation in a military environment is accomplished by recognizing individual learned needs and assuring that there is an "alignment of personal and unit goals." The basic assumption is, of course, that the individual soldier can be made to see that he can achieve his individual needs by fulfilling unit functions. Once this connection between organizational and individual goals is established for the soldier, motivation will result. If individual motivation results from an identity of group and personal goals, what is the role of the group in stimulating motivation and cohesion? In American military doctrine, the
Group is perceived in mechanistic or instrumental or entrepreneurial terms. Thus, “Group norms vary from individual needs only in that they are a collection of the individuals in the group.” The group can never have an organic or corporative existence, that is, a value apart from its contribution to meeting individual needs. The group is only an instrument for meeting individual needs.

Given that the group is primarily an instrument for the satisfaction of individual needs in terms of stimulating motivation and cohesion, the military uses the analogy of a contract to explain the relationship between the individual soldier and the larger unit of which he is a part:

Under the terms of the informal contract, both the organization and the soldier depend upon each other for the satisfaction of their expectations, and each must meet the terms of the contract according to what the other expects.

The group is viewed in entrepreneurial terms; that is, it is emphasized that the group has no value beyond its instrumental calculations, namely the extent to which the group meets individual needs. Loyalty to the group will result, and motivation and cohesion will be generated, only so long as the group fulfills its part of the informal contract and continues to meet individual needs through group activity.

What are the linkages which exist between the military unit and the larger social order? In the first place, a primary linkage is assumed insofar as the value system of the individual soldier is formed in the society as a result of personal experiences. It must be expected that wider societal values will penetrate the military and will be reflected in the relations between the individual and the military unit. Further, whatever values and attitudes that the individual acquires in the wider social arena are functions of his basic need requirements. Accordingly, the same “need profile” which motivates a person in civilian life is expected to motivate him in military life. In essence, there is no requirement to develop purely military values and attitudes; civilian mechanisms of motivation are simply transposed into the military environment. Finally, a primary linkage with the larger social order is established in the process of motivation, namely dovetailing self-interests to the organization in an entrepreneurial or occupational fashion. The motivational process is the same in civilian life as in military life. There is no expectation that self-interest will be foregone for higher group interests. There is only the imperative that individual interests will be best served by observing group norms. In this sense, the dominant free-enterprise ethic of the larger American society is linked with the anticipated behavior of military groups precisely on the grounds that the process of motivation is the same for both. There is no assumed ideological link, as in the Soviet Union, for the very obvious reason that there is no formal ideological code in American society.

This conception of the group in military life is very important, for it clearly suggests that there is no need for a socialization mechanism to create new values, destroy old ones, or establish and transmit values and goals which are deemed specifically appropriate to military service. In short, the motivational process and values appropriate to civilian life are deemed equally appropriate in the military environment. There is, therefore, nothing in the military experience per se that requires the re-socialization of the individual to it.

Given the foregoing model of cohesion, what is the role of the leader? American doctrine, although not always consistent with its theoretical underpinnings, assumes a vigorous and straightforward role for the leader in generating individual motivation and unit cohesion. Leadership in the American model is seen as situational; the application of leadership techniques depends very much upon the circumstances.
surrounding any decision. It differs in this respect from the Soviet model, in which leadership is considered more a matter of applying scientific principles in a planned manner. Leadership in the American view is not a science so much as it is a judgmental art. Probably most importantly, the American model of leadership places upon the military leader the requirement that he is directly responsible for everything his unit does or fails to do. This, of course, includes the responsibility for motivation and combat cohesion. While there is the recognized need for management, a bow to the more diffuse conditions that may well affect motivation or cohesion, the American model notes that there are few requirements for management at the small unit level. Here leadership is the key element in keeping units effective.

Equally compelling are the American model's injunctions for the individual leader to demonstrate personal courage, dependability, integrity, a sense of justice and fairness in dealing with his men, unselfishness, initiative, and risk, as well as to share equal hardships with his men. The American officer is to do all this conspicuously. Finally, the American leader must "set the example" and always look after the men and their welfare as a sure means to motivating troops and building unit cohesion. Clearly, the role of leadership in the American model is far more comprehensive and judgmental than in the Soviet model.

THE MODELS COMPARED

Several points of convergence and divergence are evident within the models. While both the Soviet and American models posit a link between effectiveness and cohesion of military units and their respective social orders, the nature of that linkage is radically different in each case. For the Soviets, ideological conviction forms the vital military-societal bridge, its operation being essentially the same in both environments. In American military thought, the linkage is provided by an assumed similarity of process, a similarity in the ways in which individual needs are met in both environments. In the military and in the civilian society, individuals obtain personal goals through calculations of self-interest in which groups remain mere instruments. Both models accept the soldiers as they are, as products of their total social experiences in their respective societies. To be sure, the result of such experiences is very different; for the Soviet soldier it is a collectivist attitude, while for the American the result is an individualistic orientation. Importantly, neither model sees any need to provide additional or different mechanisms of motivation in the military environment than are present in the civilian environment.

The models converge in assuming that there is no need for the military unit to establish a socialization mechanism that would serve to establish new values specifically appropriate to military life. Neither sees military life as being sui generis or even sufficiently different from civilian life to require an alteration in the value patterns which produce motivation and cohesion. Both models affirm that prior motivating forces are as applicable to the military tasks of cohesion and motivation as they are to civilian tasks. The role of leadership in generating cohesion and motivation is more consistent in the Soviet model. The Soviets regard leadership and its applications as far less situational and far more a scientific task than the US model. In the end, leadership in the American model is an art acquired through exposure and experience.

The fact that both models demonstrate certain points of similarity and differences does not lend much insight into which model is most likely to produce troops of higher quality. It seems that if we are going to try to assess the theoretical postulates which underlie Soviet and American training doctrines, some external standard of measurement is required. It may be asked what factors have already been identified by social scientists as contributing to unit cohesion under battle stress. If these can be located, then it will be possible to assess each model against this standard with a view toward trying to make some judgments about
the quality and combat effectiveness of the troops produced under the imperatives of each system.

COHESION AND DISINTEGRATION: A TRADITIONAL VIEW

Social scientists have always been interested in the problems associated with war, and as a result, a considerable archive of research findings exists. Specifically, several major research efforts have focused on the problem of cohesion in military units subjected to combat stress. Probably the most definitive, if not the earliest work in the area, is the famous Shils and Janowitz study of the German Army. In brief, they found that German units held together under extremely severe combat stress largely because of loyalties generated and sustained by primary groups. German soldiers, their noncommissioned officers, and their officers comprised a supporting web of strongly personal relationships generated by the experiences of combat stress itself. Soldiers came to feel a responsibility to their peers and superiors that was born of mutual risk, hardship, and the feeling that their superiors truly cared for their welfare and were prepared to expose themselves to the same risks faced by the troops. In this process, the primary group—the social unit of strongest attitudinal attachment—was the foremost generator of mutually supporting relationships. The group per se became more than the sum of its parts, and attachment to it was truly corporative in nature. Personal relationships to each other and to the group were rooted in something stronger than mere utility.

Equally interesting was the finding that the German soldier was not motivated by ideological concerns except to a very small degree. This is not to say that some linkages did not exist with the larger society, for clearly they did. However, the findings strongly suggest that the notion that soldiers can be continually motivated by ideology while subject to combat stress is open to serious question. Indeed, one of the findings of all the major works on cohesion in combat is that ideology plays only a minimal role.

The findings of the Shils and Janowitz study had been anticipated by the earlier findings of the famous S. L. A. Marshall in his work, *Men Against Fire.* Samuel Stouffer's more comprehensive study of the American soldier in that same war, *The American Soldier,* produced the same findings. More recently, John Keegan, in his *Face of Battle,* undertook a detailed study of why men remain together in battle despite terrible stress. He finds cohesion to rest in the mutual hardship, risk, and suffering that all involved—officers, noncommissioned officers, and common soldiers—share. The small unit becomes the focus of intensely personal, almost “priestlike” attachments for which the most conspicuous acts of bravery are performed. Alan Lloyd, in *War In The Trenches,* comes to the same conclusion about British forces in World War I. Samuel Roltbant, in *The Israeli Soldier: Profile of an Army,* also finds military cohesion and motivation rooted in small-unit, intensely personal attachments; further, he specifically notes that ideology—the supposed Masada Complex of the Jews—plays almost no part in motivating the Israeli soldier. Yet their fighting ability and courage in battle remain unquestioned by any serious observer.

What past research into cohesion of military units demonstrates is that the force of ideology, primary in the Soviet model, and the force of entrepreneurial utility, central to the American model, simply do not appear to be major motivating forces in developing and maintaining unit cohesion in combat. Further, these findings appear valid cross-culturally in the British, German, American, and Israeli Armies. Also, they appear to hold trans-historically in all kinds of battles regardless of technology and the killing power of weaponry. In the end, the evidence from what we know of the causes of military cohesion suggests that cohesion is a function of strong personal loyalties to small groups developed through and sustained by a feeling that all participants are united by similar hardship, risk, and fear, and by the understanding that their leaders will endure similar conditions. When these conditions are not present, as has been suggested was the
case among American troops in Vietnam, then no amount of technical military expertise or ideological feeling can produce effective, cohesive military units.\textsuperscript{40}

EVALUATING AMERICAN AND SOVIET MODELS OF COHESION

If the traditional model of cohesion is correct in locating factors contributing to the ability of military units to withstand combat stress, then a comparison of Soviet and American models of cohesion raises some serious questions about the ability of both doctrines to produce truly effective units. There are enough divergencies in both models to suggest that training doctrines based upon them may not produce troops that can be expected to demonstrate high levels of cohesion in combat. The military effectiveness of such units is, therefore, subject to some doubt.

The Soviet model shows four important points of divergence. Of great importance is the Soviet emphasis on ideology and larger social forces to produce motivation and cohesion. If past research on cohesion demonstrates anything, it is that ideology does not seem to be an important element in generating unit cohesion. Still, Soviet military theory stresses that without ideology unit effectiveness is impossible, and it reserves for ideology the central role in motivation, cohesion, and effectiveness.\textsuperscript{41} The stress on ideology leads to the tendency to view leadership as a largely technical task and to limit the role of the leader proportionately. The assumption is that one leader is as good as another, as long as ideology remains present. There is no role for the leader in stimulating personal attachments or relationships; leadership is impersonal, bordering upon the scientific.

As a logical consequence of the stress on ideology, the Soviets reject the notion that military cohesion can result from loyalties generated within the group as a consequence of group experiences. Accordingly, the major finding of previous research—that the primary group is a generator of attachments among peers and superiors producing cohesion—is viewed in Soviet theory as virtually subversive. No group can possibly have independent value if it does not demonstrate higher "socially significant motives," namely ideology. Finally, Soviet thinkers on the subject of cohesion literally practice what they preach by taking active steps to break down the "negative" loyalties which seem to develop within "microcollectives." If Soviet military journals can be believed, the Soviets make an overt and deliberate effort to erode the kinds of personal attachments to the primary group that previous research has found to be so important in developing and sustaining unit cohesion. Such a practice is perfectly consistent with Soviet theory, but it necessarily raises some serious questions about the effectiveness of an army in which primary group attachments have been systematically weakened, if not destroyed.

The American model demonstrates three points of divergence from previous findings on cohesion. First, American theory does not posit a corporative or organic role for the military group, that is, a role in which group membership and norms come to be valued in and for themselves. Instead, American theory argues that the group is purely an instrument that is never greater than the sum of its parts. Loyalty to it is based upon a mutuality of convergent private interests. There is never any question that the individual should be willing to sacrifice personal needs to the larger needs of the group; there is only the affirmation that individual needs can best be satisfied through the group. The corporative nature of the group and what that implies in terms of a willingness to subordinate individual needs, which emerges as a premise of the traditional model of cohesion, is rejected by American doctrine.

Interestingly, the American model seems to incorporate within it a basic contradiction, at least from the theoretical point of view. Consider the heavy responsibilities placed upon the unit leader, summed up most succinctly in the dictum that "a commander..."
is responsible for everything his unit does or fails to do." The idea that the leader must establish a bond with his men may be good military practice, but it is not one that can be logically deduced from the major theoretical assumptions made by the American model. Indeed, in light of the major theoretical assumptions made by the American model about what keeps a unit together under stress, namely the convergence of individual and organizational goals, the injunctions for officers to be courageous, be honorable, set the example, share the risks, and so forth really make little sense. All that would make sense in these circumstances would be for the leader to manage his resources in the attainment of organizational goals; the troops would become means to that end. In short, the leadership techniques that the American model requires of its combat leaders are designed to establish a type of relationship between leader and men that is far deeper than one based upon mutual functionalism. A bond requiring such things as honor, integrity, courage, and mutual respect is rooted in things that have very little to do with the assumption of meeting individual goals through the mechanism of the group. Such things only make sense if the group itself, one's peers, and one's leaders are valued as something more than instruments. Accordingly, there appears a basic contradiction between the theory's postulates as to why men cohere under stress and the role of the leader, which is to apply techniques that are effective only if the group is seen to have some larger independent meaning. The practice of leadership requires that the group be more than the sum of its parts, while the theory of leadership requires that the group be only a mechanism of individual interests.

Another point of divergence concerns the civilian-military linkage as a motivating force in military units. American doctrine affirms that the forces of motivation in the civilian society are adequate in the military environment. To be sure, such forces are not primarily ideological. They are, however, founded on the assumption that the same process of need satisfaction applicable to civilian life—based upon the attainment of individual needs in an entrepreneurial fashion—will motivate soldiers in the military. Again, the emphasis is upon perceiving the group as an instrument. There is no concept that relationships within the group can be premised on anything other than mutual utility or that the group has any kind of independent value. The logic of this position is, if pressed, that nothing in the nature of military groups or their components is worth dying for, since death is by definition always an "uneconomic" choice.

Finally, American doctrine logically affirms that there is no need for military units to develop mechanisms for socializing new soldiers to the military group. The need for new values in the military environment would presuppose that there was something about military life per se that required new means of motivation. But, as has been noted, the dominating assumption is that the mechanisms of motivation extant in civilian life are equally appropriate to the military environment. Accordingly, there is no need to develop mechanisms for socializing the soldier to the primary group.

Although both the Soviet and American doctrines diverge from the traditional model at important points, it is clear that the American position is somewhat closer to the traditional model. At least this seems to be so in terms of how the doctrine is practiced. American leadership manuals demand responsibilities and practices of leaders that come very close to the kinds of things that are required of the leader in the traditional role. Indeed, one can perceive only marginal differences between the two. This suggests that while the model of cohesion in American military theory is strongly divergent from the traditional model, the actual implementation of the doctrine seems at points to ignore the theory and include many of the practices which only make sense relative to the traditional model. The same cannot be said for the Soviets, who appear convinced of the validity of their approach and appear to
implement it with considerable vigor.41 In the end, it may be that what really counts is training practice, rather than theoretical doctrine.

The reasons why Soviet and American doctrines diverge from the traditional model of military cohesion are clear enough. In the Soviet case, the totalitarian nature of a regime which manifests an ideology that claims to be scientific cannot permit attachments to small groups to develop, for they become potential “islands of resistance” to the regime. Totalitarian regimes are totalitarian and seek to penetrate all aspects of social life, including military life. Moreover, to admit that cohesion may be a function of personal attachments undercuts the ideological claim of the regime to explain all aspects of society and history. It also implies that men may be motivated by things other than the “underlying forces of production and distribution.” Accordingly, Soviet military doctrine regarding cohesion must necessarily diverge from the traditional model.

In the American case, the reasons for divergence are somewhat more complex. Any nation forged in free enterprise; emphasizing the pursuit of individual self-interest as the highest goal; and stressing laissez-faire, social Darwinist, and Madisonian notions of economics, social life, and politics is hard-pressed to evolve any standards upon which all can agree.42 Loyalty which cannot be directed to common ends is directed to a commonality of means, namely the pursuit of individual needs as the highest goal. The process of this pursuit becomes the central value of society. In the military, any doctrine which suggested a higher goal, and which suggested that the individual ought to sacrifice the pursuit of his interests to it, would stand in stark contradiction to major social values. Accordingly, the American military has adopted an instrumental notion of what motivates soldiers and produces unit cohesion. Whatever its faults, this perspective has the singular virtue of being consistent with the values of the larger American society.

CONCLUSIONS

The major conclusion of this paper is that both American and Soviet models of military cohesion diverge significantly from the findings of past research on the problem. Specifically, the degree of divergence in both models is sufficient to raise questions about the effectiveness of the soldiers and military units which are being produced by the training doctrines which draw their support from each model. The problem is, however, more than theoretical; its potential implications for the performance of both Soviet and American units in battle are serious indeed.

In the Soviet case, the heavy reliance upon ideology, the linkages with larger societal forces, the technical role of the leader, the denigration of the primary group, and the overt efforts to break up informal groups within Soviet military units may actually constitute a grave systemic weakness in the Soviet training system that calls into question the quality and potential effectiveness of Soviet units in combat.

The American situation seems less of a problem, because actual training practices seem to diverge from the imperatives of the model. While the theory of cohesion requires an occupational orientation on the part of the soldier and his leaders, in point of fact American practice defines the role of leadership as if it were related to the unit in a vocational manner. As a result, many of the training practices which are appropriate to the traditional model of cohesion are employed by the American Army without regard for the fact that they contradict the actual formal theoretical doctrine of cohesion.

It is difficult to escape the impression that both American and Soviet military theorists have come to believe that the nature of modern military conflict is so qualitatively different from past conflicts that a greater reliance must be placed upon either ideology, in the Soviet case, or upon systems management, in the American case. The belief seems prevalent that the
acquisition of military skills—and technological expertise—when welded to a larger system of supply, mobilization, and economic production designed to place new technology at the service of the soldier—will combine to produce effective, cohesive, and ultimately victorious units on the battlefield of the future. This may indeed prove to be the case. However, if the lessons of past wars are any guide, neither technology nor military expertise in themselves appear to have had much effect on the level of cohesion demonstrated by military units in combat. From this perspective, then, there is serious reason to question whether either the Soviet or American theories of cohesion will produce highly motivated soldiers bonded together in strongly cohesive combat units. The perverse hypothesis of this paper is that there is at least some evidence that they will not.

NOTES

2. Ibid.
4. For a good treatment of the stated relationship between ideology and combat effectiveness in Soviet thought, see Herbert Goldhamer, *The Soviet Soldier* (New York: Crane, Russak, 1975), pp. 206-08. An article in *Komunist Vooruzhennykh Sil* (July 1972), pp. 36-42, stated that "the training process in our army is inseparably linked to the indoctrination process."
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid., p. 283.
8. Ibid., p. 280.
10. Danchenko and Vydrin, pp. 278-83.
11. Ibid., p. 280.
14. Ibid.
15. Grechko speech.
17. Ibid., p. 288.
18. For the case against Western doctrine, see "Contemporary Bourgeois Military Pedagogy and Its Reactionary Essence," in Danchenko and Vydrin, pp. 348-62.
19. Perhaps more than any other military establishment in the world, the Soviet Army constantly undertakes research efforts and attempts to apply their findings. This orientation seems to result from the ideological bent of Soviet theorists to demonstrate the "scientific" character of Marxism.
24. Ibid., pp. 7-1 to 8-6.
25. Ibid.
26. Ibid., p. 7-4.
29. Ibid., pp. 6-1, 6-2. This view permeates chapters 6 and 7. In addition, it might well be pointed out that the argument that the Army could not produce good soldiers in the Vietnam conflict because of the penetration of anti-authority values attendant to the larger social order is a common one. For a critique of this view, see Richard A. Gabriel and Paul L. Savage, "Cohesion and Distinction in the American Army: An Alternative Perspective," *Armed Forces and Society*, 2 (May 1976), 340-76.
30. Field Manual 22-100, p. 1-2. The notion that military leadership requires a good deal of judgment and experience is a premise constantly reaffirmed in military manuals of the American Army.
32. Field Manual 22-100 stresses that a good leader gives his subordinates the opportunity to take the initiative and to exercise responsibility as the only way young leaders can gain the experience necessary to good leadership. Indeed, the failure to provide such opportunities is considered a failure of leadership. Field Manual 22-100, pp. 2-10, 2-11.
33. Edward A. Shils and Morris Janowitz, "Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wehrmacht in World War II," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 12 (Summer 1948), 280-315. This work remains the seminal and definitive study to this day.
39. Ibid., pp. 235-42.
40. This argument is made extensively in Gabriel and Savage, *Crisis in Command: Mismanagement in the Army*. In effect, a technologically and technically superior American force in Vietnam was fought to a draw by an army far less equipped. The authors suggest that the lack of American unit cohesion and leadership was a major factor in this situation.
41. Danchenko and Vdron, p. 282.
42. Field Manual 22-100, Chapter 2, pp. 2-1 to 2-13.
43. For an analysis of the Soviet Army with regard to its morale and discipline and how these are undermined by Soviet efforts to erode personal attachments to military groups, see Richard A. Gabriel, “The Morale of the Soviet Army: Implications for Combat Effectiveness,” *Military Review*, 58 (October 1978), 27-39.
44. This argument can be found in complete form in Richard A. Gabriel and Paul L. Savage, “Law in America: A Profession in Search of Direction,” *The Catholic Lawyer*, 22 (Spring 1976), 87-100.