DEFENSE DIALOGUE:

VIEWS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL CHALLENGERS

With our present Administration now having completed over three years in office, its basic approaches to American security are well established and understood. The views of those who would challenge for the presidency in 1980, however, are far less broadly known. Arrayed below in alphabetical order are nonpartisan statements by the presidential challengers which set forth their broad philosophies of national defense as well as specific analyses of several current issues bearing on US security in the 1980's. This feature is presented for two reasons. First, since the presidential challengers are deeply involved in America's public life and closely in touch with the pulsebeat of popular opinion, their sensings will provide important clues as to likely American defense directions in the coming decade. It is important for those readers involved in matters of Western security to remain abreast of the currents of defense sentiment within America's polity. Second, as public authorities in their own right, committed to the preservation of America's welfare and way of life, the presidential aspirants can contribute usefully to the evolving synthesis of national opinion which will ultimately crystallize in US defense policy in the 1980's. Thus, in a spirit of free intellectual inquiry, the statements below are presented as relevant contributions to the continuing dialogue of ideas on how best to preserve America's security in the face of the dangerous challenges that lie ahead.

Senator Pressler and General Haig have withdrawn their candidacies, but their statements are included, with their permission, to reveal the full range of thinking among the original group. Senator Robert J. Dole and Mr. Benjamin S. Fernandez agreed to participate; however, their statements had not been received at press time. Former President Gerald R. Ford declined to participate.

* * *

JOHN B. ANDERSON

The recent Soviet invasion of Afghanistan forces us to reconsider our bilateral relationship with the Soviet Union and all other broad national security and military policies that flow from that and other relationships. While the US and the Soviet Union have recognized the importance of cooperation in the field of strategic nuclear arms control, we in this country have not adequately recognized that in spite of arms control agreements there will continue to be political, economic, and military competition with the Soviet Union.

We must now improve our ability to compete militarily with the Soviet Union to protect interests vital to the US and our allies. We must improve our military capability in a manner that does not neglect our inherent economic and political strengths. We must simultaneously develop new political and military objectives and strategies that are realistic in guiding our relations with other nations in today's pluralistic, diverse world.

While we improve our military capability, we must do so in a prudent, cost-effective manner, bearing in mind that the American people who will make sacrifices have high standards of accountability for the use of tax funds. Our policy should give greater emphasis in the next few years to the near-term improvement of existing forces. We must, however, lay the foundation for future forces required by new objectives and strategies. Finally, we must take vigorous steps to minimize the vulnerability of our economic system to interruptions in the supply of energy and industrial raw materials from unreliable foreign sources of supply.

Near-Term Defense Spending Priorities

As we develop new national objectives and strategies for achieving them, we need to guide defense spending plans by the following priorities:

- Preserve existing military capabilities and the associated industrial base.
- Improve the ability of decisionmakers to
manage the use or threatened use of force, including the ability to communicate with forces deployed throughout the world during peacetime, crisis, or war.

- Retain senior enlisted personnel and middle-grade officers through improved compensation, benefits, and better management of military personnel.

The guidelines above are usefully applied to a consideration of the fiscal year 1981 Defense Department budget request.

**Strategic Weapons Programs.** We should include the following programs in the proposed Defense Department budget:

- Procurement of a stretched FB-111 beginning this fiscal year to help maintain essential strategic equivalence with Soviet strategic forces in the early and mid-1980's.

- Acceleration of the KC-135 re-engining program to improve the survivability of these critically important aircraft and improve their fuel efficiency and flexibility.

- Improvements in the facilities at Strategic Air Command bases to enhance the survivability of aircraft vital to the execution of retaliatory attacks.

- Continuation and augmentation of existing advanced airborne command post (E-4B) and other programs to improve the ability of the President and other national command authorities to command, control, and communicate with our strategic and general purpose forces in peacetime, crises, and in all phases of war.

- Immediate initiation of a research and development program for a missile to follow the Trident I.

The MX program should be carefully reconsidered in light of its high costs. The inability of the missile to provide a relatively secure and invulnerable capability before 1988 or 1989 in its current deployment mode, as well as the absence of SALT constraints on the growth of Soviet forces, suggests that one last review of the contribution of the MX program to our national security is warranted. Other avenues to military capability equivalent to the MX should now be explored if such capability is needed, even as development of the missile itself continues to go forward.

**General Purpose Forces.** Among the programs meriting additional support are the following:

- Procurement of additional naval aircraft.

- Procurement of larger quantities of war reserve stocks of ammunition; ordnance; expendable electronic warfare systems; and spare parts for vehicles, ships, and aircraft.

- Procurement of additional F-100 type engines for the Air Force and additional development support to extend the life of existing engines.

- Restructuring of the Navy shipbuilding program emphasizing the distribution of desired military capability among many low-cost, efficient ships rather than a few high-cost ships.

- Procurement of additional means to exercise command and control over forces deployed and actually engaged in combat.

Our forces should be equipped with the most effective weapons needed. In future conflicts, however, the quantity of weapons available to combatants may be more significant in determining the outcome than the absolute quality of the weapons engaged. We cannot afford to buy the most technologically sophisticated weapons if in doing so we cannot procure sufficient quantities of weapons that permit us to engage in combat and emerge victorious.

**Mobility Forces.** There has been much discussion of the need for a "rapid deployment force" in recent weeks. We already have more than 60,000 Marines and 20,000 Army personnel available for such a force. We lack the ability to move these forces and their equipment to trouble spots around the globe. Before cannibalizing existing units or procuring new rapid deployment forces, we should procure sufficient airlift and sealift to move existing forces and obtain landing rights overseas for using such forces. Specifically, we should:

- Rapidly expand the civil reserve air fleet program.

- Replace aging amphibious assault ships with vessels of similar capability to operate in both friendly and hostile environments.

- Improve maintenance facilities for existing C-5A and C-141 aircraft.

- Improve the ability to mobilize reserve transport aircraft and naval vessels.

- Develop and procure the proposed CX transport.

**Military Personnel.** We can avoid returning to a peacetime draft if we undertake now a program of fair compensation, improved benefits, and better management of military personnel. Our new national strategies should also take into account the high cost of labor in the military and make adjustments in the use of personnel just as the private sector has done when it has encountered high labor costs. Additional incentives to promote
enlistments and retention in the Individual Ready Reserve should be an extremely high-priority item in the defense budget, as should improvements in the existing selective service machinery to register men and women for military service in times of national emergencies.

**Long-Term Defense Spending Priorities**

While changes in American military capabilities are needed to meet the continuing military competition between the US and the Soviet Union, as well as other threats to our security, certain issues on which decisions must be made are already clear.

First, our strategic warning as provided by the analysis of information obtained in the private sector, the government, and the intelligence community must be improved. We must detect changes in the international economic, political, scientific, technical, and military environments and react decisively to those changes.

Second, standardization of military equipment among our allies is essential. While there is much concern in some quarters over such standardization and our implied willingness to buy weapons for our forces from non-US sources, I am confident that standardization will create new commercial opportunities for our industry and create stronger, more cost-effective military capability. I also believe that the new military capability resulting from improved weapons standardization need not be sold indiscriminately throughout the world in order for our defense industries and those of our allies to prosper.

Third, we need to address the need for further improvements in the ability of the US to attack hardened strategic targets in the Soviet Union over and above the capability we will have in our air-launched cruise missiles and other strategic forces. Any further acquisition of such capability should clearly be placed in secure, invulnerable forces subject to the most rigorous command and control we can devise, while relying on new as well as proven technology.

Fourth, we must increase and sustain government support for research and development in both the military and civil sectors of our economy. It is only through R&D that we will develop new concepts, products, materials, and technologies that enable us to meet new military challenges and make our economy less vulnerable to political actions of others aimed at crippling it.

We must convert the findings of the laboratory into products for use in the civil or military sectors much more rapidly.

**Defense Spending—The Bottom Line**

Over the past year there have been many simplistic proposals for a 3, 5, 7, or even 10-percent increase in real terms in defense spending. Such simplistic proposals do a disservice even to advocates of wholesale and unconstrained growth in military spending. What really matters most is what we buy with our defense dollars, not how much we spend.

Our objective is to buy national security. While I support worthwhile programs which increase defense spending, I oppose wasteful expenditures that do not add to our overall military capability.

In the world of the 1980’s our national security will be threatened from many quarters. The recent Soviet invasion of Afghanistan heightens our sense of insecurity. While meeting today’s challenges is important, we must not forget that our security depends on the health of our economy, the vitality of our R&D community, and the ability of our diplomats to work in conjunction with other government agencies and the private sector to reduce uncertainties in the international political environment. Increases in defense spending unsupported by increases in tax revenues will weaken the economy through inflation, thereby diminishing our ability to sustain adequate defense programs and provide for our long-term security.

In the coming months and years, we will continue to use many paths to provide for the common defense of our nation. Arms control efforts will continue to play an important although less idealized role in preserving our security. While increasing defense spending is obviously important, other agencies and departments can play a major role in improving overall national security. The US needs leadership capable of developing objectives and a strategy to achieve those objectives. We need leadership able to work with the Congress, orchestrating a balanced approach to national security. We need leadership capable of improving prudently and judiciously the ability of the US to compete militarily with the Soviet Union, thereby recreating the conditions in which greater international cooperation will be possible.
HOWARD H. BAKER JR.

Recent US defense policies have emboldened our adversaries, encouraged their aggression, endangered the fragile balance of power between East and West, and shaken the confidence of our best allies.

I want the US to remain so undoubtedly strong that Russia would never dare to challenge her. That does not necessarily mean a great superiority of arms, nuclear or otherwise, but it does mean strong enough.

We live in dangerous times, and while we would prefer to dwell on more pleasant matters of life, we must be prepared to deal with those matters which threaten the peace of the world and life itself.

In strategic forces, the Soviet Union has, since 1972:

- Deployed four new intercontinental ballistic missile systems.
- Built and deployed more than 100 supersonic intercontinental Backfire bombers with production continuing at a rate of two or three a month.
- Deployed the Delta I and the Delta II ballistic missile submarines, with a new generation of Delta III’s now undergoing sea trials.

There are numerous other examples of Soviet military expansion.

We have limited improvements underway, but as our own military experts concede, “neither current US production capability nor program funding for sophisticated ground force systems is adequate to overcome this serious disadvantage in the near future.”

In the face of all this, what has the US done?

- It has twice delayed development of the MX missile system.
- It has cancelled the B-1 bomber, scheduled to replace the aging supersonic B-52, without asking for or getting a single Soviet concession in return.
- It has endorsed the cruise missile, not as a complement but as a substitute for a new manned strategic bomber, and then has bargained away much of the cruise missile’s original capability.
- It has cut the Navy’s ship-building program in half. A few years ago, the US planned to build 157 new ships by 1983. Now we will build only 70.
- It has postponed production of the neutron warhead or enhanced radiation weapon, again with no Soviet concession.
- While Soviet defense spending increases in real terms by four percent a year, and already represents a 40 percent advantage over the US, our defense budget for fiscal 1979 represents a real increase of less than two percent.

If we have learned nothing else from the carnage of war down the centuries, we must surely have learned by now that it is weakness, not strength, that tempts aggression.

Much as we would prefer the plowshare to the sword, the American defense budget must be determined by the threat that faces us and cannot be arbitrarily subordinated to other areas of public spending.

At the same time, the Department of Defense must not be allowed to hide waste and insufficiency in a cloak of national security.

We need not match the Soviets weapon for weapon. But we must offer a credible deterrence to Soviet aggression at every level of potential conflict. For only in that deterrence can any reasonable hope for peace and security lie.

At the most basic, conventional level, this means having enough troops, enough ships, enough planes, enough ammunition, enough quality, enough pride to project our power effectively and confidently to crisis points around the world.

In none of these requirements is our strength sufficient today.

Across the dread threshold of nuclear warfare, deterrence means having enough missiles, enough bombers, enough warning, enough control, enough protection—for ourselves and our allies—to survive a nuclear attack and strike a devastating blow in return.

By the mid-1980’s that assurance—and thus that deterrence—will be gone. Ratification of the SALT II treaty in its present form will leave the US at a strategic nuclear disadvantage; that in itself is the most destabilizing fact of life in our time.

Rebuilding our conventional armed forces, encouraging our allies to assume a greater responsibility for their own defense, negotiating an arms limitation agreement that will truly limit and perhaps reduce the capacity for violence on this planet: these must be America’s most urgent national security priorities for the 1980’s.

SALT II

In the debate on the strategic arms treaty, or in any other, it is essential that we see the world as it
is, that we remind ourselves whom we are dealing with when we deal with the Soviet Union.

It is the government that has supplied and supported Hanoi in its deadly wars of Asian conquest.

It is the government that has exercised the most provocative military and political influence in the Middle East, in Africa, in the Caribbean.

It is the government that holds the Warsaw Pact together through force and fear.

It is the government of the Gulag Archipelago, the government that will not lift a finger to save two million starving people.

And it is the government engaged in the most massive military buildup the world has seen since Nazi Germany.

Never in history has a totalitarian regime built an arsenal it did not intend to use.

Recognizing this, the US must resolve above all else to defend itself and protect its friends in this world—not simply for our own safety and security, not only to guarantee the peace, but also to insure that civilization itself will survive on this planet.

The Middle East

The State of Israel must remain a secure and independent nation and should never be used as a pawn in the formation of American policy in the Middle East.

The Camp David accords reached by President Sadat of Egypt and Prime Minister Begin of Israel deserve everyone's support; our government is to be commended for its constructive role in that diplomatic breakthrough.

The US should not negotiate with the Palestine Liberation Organization until that organization renounces the use of terrorism and recognizes the right of Israel to exist as a free and sovereign state.

America has played a constructive diplomatic role in building a foundation for peace in the Middle East. It is time we gave serious consideration to leasing air bases in the Sinai and providing a stabilizing military presence in the region.

President Sadat might well agree that an American presence in the Sinai would be additional proof of the increasing firmness of the Egyptian-American relationship.

The economic rewards associated with such an American lease could be of substantial benefit to the Egyptian economy.

If an emergency were to develop in the future, the US would have on hand the capacity to support its friends in keeping the peace.

I believe the oil-producing countries of the Middle East would be well-served by such a manifestation of the American will do what is necessary to sustain both its alliances and its lifeline.

China and Taiwan

Establishment of diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China was inevitable, and one should have no quarrel with this formal recognition. However, the manner in which it was done is to be regretted. The US could have maintained an official relationship with Taiwan and retained an unequivocal agreement that normalization include the continued security of Taiwan.

EDMUND G. BROWN JR.

With respect to foreign policy, we still have the hangover of America as world policeman. A policy shift is required to induce regional groupings of countries to defend their own interests.

Such a foreign policy would derive from a recognition that, while America has played a significant role since the end of World War II, the time has come to demand of our allies and of other nations that they assume greater responsibility for their own defense and vital interests so that we see more cooperation and more regionalized responsibility for the maintenance of peace. Our national leaders must understand that need and explain it to the American people; we must provide a strong US presence in the world based on the partnership approach.

The rationale for the shift in our relationship with other countries is that during the last 25 years 100 new nations have come into the family of nations. Many of them have become strong and productive, and are now able to assume a greater responsibility for the maintenance of peace in their own areas. America should recognize this as a constructive development and work with it; America should apply its greater strength, technology, and military capacity in this
partnership fashion rather than try to continue a 1950’s constabulary approach to the maintenance of order in a good part of the earth.

In other military matters, the US Senate should approve SALT II. The reasons that the Soviets have been spending so much on arms are their own historic momentum, their desire to expand, their desire to project power in the world, their desire to keep their satellites in line, and perhaps their interest in raw materials. There are doubtless a variety of motives that would cover their military involvement.

My response to the Soviet buildup is this: we certainly need a stronger defense for our own country. With respect to Soviet overseas adventurism, I would respond by developing a more effective deployment force. But again, I believe that we require a greater assumption of responsibility by the European nations and by other regional groupings of nations. I would like to see the US pursue this perspective with much greater imagination.

We should control military spending by eliminating the MX. Present US plans to increase the military budget over other programs in the budget are not acceptable. There is waste in the Pentagon, and that waste can be reduced and controlled.

* * *

GEORGE BUSH

The 1980’s will be a difficult, and perhaps perilous, decade for America. For the first time our strategic forces will be vulnerable and our conventional forces inferior to those of the Soviet Union. It is generally agreed that during the first half of the decade the US will be in a period of unprecedented risk to a Soviet first-strike.

During this period, called the “window of peril,” our strategic and conventional forces will face the prospect of defeat unless we move without delay to reverse today’s trends. The need for action is underscored by the fact that the availability of energy and the vitality of our economy are so closely tied to our strength in the foreign and defense areas.

The organizing principle in international affairs today is the fundamental competition between the East and the West; between communist, centrally planned economies and democratic market economies. While there is cooperation in some areas between the two very different systems, there is strong competition for the energy and mineral resources of the Third World, for the support of the nonaligned nations, and now for the sympathies of several Western European powers.

The past few years have witnessed a sharp decline in the authority of American leadership. Yet America is and must remain the leader of the free world.

America’s foreign and defense policy for the 1980’s must evolve from a global strategy characterized by coherence, strength, and predictability. Such a strategy must rest upon full acknowledgement of the social, economic, and energy issues that affect our domestic policies, as well as those factors in the international community that affect our interests and security.

Growing Soviet strength and persistence in enlarging its influence in Europe, Southeast Asia, Africa, and the Caribbean, as well as shifting economic patterns among both the developed and less-developed world, have all applied continuing pressure to American interests in every region of the globe.

Today, friend and foe alike have substantial questions about the nature and direction of US policy. As a consequence, there is uncertainty about the strength of our alliance system. America’s foreign policy must provide continuity and renewed leadership in expanding and invigorating our alliances so that both those who are with us and those who are against us know what our objectives are and how we intend to achieve them.

Alliance for the 1980’s

A key element in restoring the primacy of our strategic and conventional forces and in protecting those who share our ideals is the creation of a new global alliance system for the 1980’s and beyond. This alliance would unite the seafaring nations of the world who share our values and interests.

Freedom of the seas would be a hallmark of the alliance. This not only would ensure our access to needed raw materials, strategic resources, and markets, but also would ensure the rapid movement of military units in time of crisis.

Japan, the ASEAN nations, and the NATO members would assume increased responsibility for the tactical defense and security of their
regions. In our hemisphere, an essential mutuality of interests mandates a drawing together of Canada, the US, Mexico, and the larger nations in South America such as Argentina, Brazil, and Venezuela. In this sense, the alliance would rest upon constructive and mutually beneficial policies in the areas of fossil fuels, immigration, technology transfer, marketing agreements, and security matters.

The alliance would build on existing bilateral agreements and security pacts and would be principally defensive in nature. Its emphasis would be on the maintenance and growth of commercial security links.

The alliance would serve to deter the aggression of the Soviets and their allies. Further, it would encourage nations with strong regional influence, such as Japan, to play a broader role in the tactical defense of their areas.

Most importantly, it would focus the aggregate power of the free world upon ensuring open sea lanes and access to oil and other strategic resources and markets.

**Europe**

In Europe, NATO has served to define our security relationship with many of the Continental powers. In other instances, we have bilateral commercial and cultural agreements. Yet, American influence has declined precipitately in the last decade, partly through the growth of Soviet and Warsaw Pact strength, partly through the decline of the dollar, and partly through the inconsistency of US leadership.

Meanwhile, in Eastern Europe the ominous buildup of nuclear and conventional forces continues. Of particular concern to the West are the intermediate range SS-20 missile and Backfire bomber.

In the coming decade, US relationships with the European Economic Community as well as with NATO must be strengthened. Nations like Germany and Britain must be encouraged to assume a broader role in regional defense, and US policy must underscore our commitment to European security and economic stability in a clear and predictable manner.

We should:

- **Encourage European unity.** Greece, Spain, and Portugal should be admitted to the EEC.
- **Help to resolve the dispute between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus.**
- **Join with Europe in the development of new energy sources and technologies.**
- **Join other NATO members in persuading France to rejoin the military part of NATO.**

- **Support the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.**
- **Take strong measures to maintain the value of the dollar so as to minimize economic instability and maximize stability in the financial and export markets.**

But perhaps most of all, we must restore credibility and certainty to our European policies so that we can again be reliable, predictable friends and allies.

**Latin America**

Latin America is as diverse an area as Western Europe, yet the US and Latin America have objectives based on mutual respect and common need.

There is no question but that the major Latin American nations must be more directly involved in the defense of the hemisphere, particularly insofar as Cuba has progressed from the simple support to the export of revolution. In this regard, America must assist in correcting the social and economic ills that form the preconditions for unrest.

**Middle East**

American policy in the Middle East must be rooted in an appreciation of the unique history and diversity of the region. In acknowledging a special relationship with the State of Israel, our objectives must be to obtain a just and lasting peace among Israel, Egypt, and their neighbors; and to ensure continued access to the resources of the area for our allies and ourselves. We must:

- **Build on the Camp David accords to show that negotiation can lead to stability and peace.**
- **Encourage all parties to renounce the use of terror and armed force while seeking lasting solutions.**
- **Ensure that all parties recognize Israel's right to exist within secure and recognized borders.**
- **Improve relations with the moderate Arab states.**
- **Ensure that the Palestinian people have a voice in determining their future.**
- **Clearly define US strategic interests in the area (the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz, the Arabian Sea, the Red Sea, the Strait of Bab el Mandeb, and the Turkish Straits) and signal American intentions to defend these interests.**

**Africa**

Africa has traditionally been the stepchild of US foreign policy. Today Africa is ignored at our
peril. Southern Africa, in the course of the next decade, could well be the focal point of East-West confrontation in the Third World. This prospect poses a broad challenge to US diplomacy. While Africa is a highly diverse and complex continent, there are certain principles that can guide our policy. They are:

- Not to take sides in racial conflicts. We are the only major power which can be open to and helpful to both sides.
- The US, as a free and democratic nation and because of our own history, cannot endorse situations or constitutions which are racist in purpose or effect. Our role is to press for, support, and recognize progress toward the goal of human and racial equality of opportunity—not to expect overnight miracles or to endorse halfway measures.
- To carefully assess the nature of change. We cannot legitimize terrorists by criticizing moderates more committed to Western democratic norms. Democracy and racial equality may have no meaning when championed by Marxist revolutionaries.
- Human rights will be our hallmark, but strategic interests will also count.

US economic involvement in Africa has been beneficial for Africans—black and white—and for Americans. If American interests are to be advanced, we must ensure that tangible assistance—economic, technical, and military—is provided to those African nations who share our goals and values.

In the UN, we must take steps to illustrate our common interest with the nations of Africa and to support those who support us.

East Asia

In East Asia, as well as in other areas, the US must replace the indecisiveness that has characterized our security commitments with clear and predictable policy supported by a strengthened Navy. We learned decades ago the hard way that appeasement does not work. Yet, there has been a tendency to try to atone for US "guilt" in Vietnam by appeasing aggressive forces:

- US ground forces in South Korea were to be withdrawn, but after reflection, that decision has been postponed until 1981, leaving our allies in doubt. North Korea's one goal is to take over South Korea and unify Korea under Kim II Sung's totalitarian control. This must never happen.

- While Vietnam was expelling and killing masses of its own people and preparing to invade Cambodia, the US in 1978 engaged in negotiations to normalize relations with Vietnam. The recent effort to slap Vietnam's wrist on the Cambodian situation is too little too late.

- American secrecy in dismembering security arrangements with Taiwan raised substantial doubts about US credibility with South Korea, Japan, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia, and others.

- US naval power in the Pacific has been drawn down to its lowest point in the face of a continuous Soviet naval buildup. This undermines the confidence of island nations and others in Asia. Even the People's Republic of China, whom we are courting, has expressed concern.

In the 1980's, the US must:

- Rebuild strong ties and security arrangements with nations in the area, showing our resolve and developing joint strategies with island and maritime nations, as well as South Korea, Japan, ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations: Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, and the Philippines), Australia, and New Zealand.

- Isolate disruptive nations—Vietnam and North Korea, for example.

- Recognize clearly and objectively the strategic value of improving relations with the PRC as an added dimension to our primary relationships with the maritime and island nations.

- Encourage long-term improvement of PRC-Taiwan relations, as this would contribute to peace and stability in the region.

- Encourage Japan to assume greater responsibility in regional defense and security matters.

- Give greater support to Thailand in its struggle against Vietnam-directed subversion.

- Increase our air and naval forces in the Pacific area and establish a fleet in the Indian Ocean, not only for defense of the sea lanes vital to oil shipments westward from the Persian Gulf, but eastward as well.

- Exercise leadership in the international community in resettling Indochinese refugees; press Vietnam to ameliorate the internal policies that have generated the refugee flood; and initiate US action to stem the disaster in Cambodia.

- Promote the rapid economic development of the ASEAN nations, providing greater bilateral assistance to bolster our ability to reward our Third World supporters as well as fostering US trade and investment in the ASEAN markets.
A Defense Policy

A first step in restoring the value and credibility of America’s commitments is to rebuild and strengthen our strategic and conventional arms capabilities. Only in this way can we protect our interests and those of our allies and provide a sobering deterrent to the aggression of the Soviet Union and its surrogates.

The US has lost critical momentum in the maintenance and strength of its defense capabilities. The US has cancelled or delayed several critical weapon systems which must be approved, developed, and deployed. These include:

- A new manned bomber.
- The long-range cruise missile.
- The neutron weapon.
- A strengthened three-ocean (Atlantic, Pacific, Indian) Navy, including a new nuclear-powered aircraft carrier and improved sealift capabilities.
- Improved air defense capabilities.
- Expanded and improved strategic airlift capabilities.

In addition, we must:

- Expand and improve our conventional weaponry to help restore the balance between NATO and the Warsaw Pact.
- Support the Volunteer Army. However, there is a need for registration—for both men and women—over the coming difficult period.
- Expand our military training program.
- Maintain a strong intelligence service capable of providing accurate information on events abroad that are relevant to the security of the US.
- Ensure adequate funds for military research and development.

All this will cost money. It means a commitment to spend a minimum of about $15 to $20 billion more during the next few years, starting immediately with an increased expenditure of $5 to $6 billion more in 1980. The next three years are the most critical, and we should not wait until 1981 before we start rebuilding our defenses. The Soviet Union is not waiting and is outdistancing us in almost every category.

SALT II

The treaty before the Senate must be amended before ratification to correct seriously defective provisions in it. For example:

- The Soviet Backfire bomber should be counted as a strategic weapon.
- The treaty must be verifiable.
- The size and strength of nuclear warheads and missiles, not merely the number of launchers, must be addressed to make the treaty more equal.
- Obstacles to deploying our MX missiles must be removed.

Since the treaty has very little to do with real arms control, we must look to SALT III. In doing so, we must remember that it has taken several years to negotiate the present SALT II.

There must be no illusion that real arms control under a SALT III will come easily or soon in the 1980’s. We must be ready to stay the course and hold our own, remembering that no treaty is better than a bad treaty. But the concepts of real reduction, real limitation, real verification are worthwhile and should be implemented if at all possible.

"There is a tide in the affairs of men which taken at the flood leads on to fortune." The tide is now and we must not delay in seizing the moment.

* * *

JOHN B. CONNALLY

The decade of the 1980’s will be a time of great danger and decision for America. Not since World War II have we been presented with a greater set of challenges than those that confront us now, at home and abroad.

We are outraged that a group of terrorists could take over the American Embassy in Iran, kidnap our diplomatic personnel, and hold them hostage, violating every diplomatic and ethical standard valued in the course of relations among nations states. We are outraged when the Soviet Union moves with massive military force to subjugate and occupy a weak and neutral Afghanistan.

Yet, we can hardly be surprised by these outrageous actions; they can be viewed as predictable responses to recent manifestations of American weakness. Why did we give up the Panama Canal? Why did we cancel the B-1 bomber program, delay the needed nuclear-powered attack carrier, and refuse to deploy the neutron “enhanced radiation” warhead? Why did we delay the MX missile, Trident, and the cruise
missile systems? Why did we until recently push for a SALT II treaty that would not only codify our declining position in the world, but distract us from true Soviet intentions?

The US is now in a "battle for resources" with an imperialist Soviet Union intent on denying us access to Mideast oil and Third World minerals. The Soviets are now in Afghanistan, separated from the Persian Gulf only by a country on the verge of collapse.

The Middle East has been and continues to be the most volatile and strategically important part of the world. The US has overriding military and economic interests in the region. We should establish a strong military presence in the Middle East, with airfields in the Sinai and with a fleet in the Indian Ocean. The use of American-designed, all-weather airbases such as Elzion in the Sinai has been encouraged by Ezer Weizman, Israel's Defense Minister, to aid in the rapid deployment of a credible US military response to protect legitimate American security interests in the region. We are scrambling now to cover ourselves in the area.

There are a great many things that this nation is going to have to make up its mind to do. No one wants to get into any unnecessary confrontation with the Soviet Union or any other nation. But we all realize that the surest way to prevent a confrontation is to be prepared for one. The Soviet Union has always responded to weakness or appeasement in an aggressive manner. Throughout the last few years, we have been sending out just such signals of weakness to the world, and that largely explains the crises we face today in Afghanistan and Iran.

During the 1950's, the military portion of the federal budget was about 56 percent. Today it is 23 percent. In 1961, we had over 1000 ships on the line. Today we have fewer than 400—fewer even than before World War II. Why? Because the Congress has consistently refused to build a defense establishment worthy of the name. It has consistently been responsible for the deterioration of our military strength, conventional as well as nuclear.

The US needs a drastic change in long-range policy; not a temporary resort to tough-sounding speeches. We need to be more realistic and more aggressive in pursuit of America's interests.

We must say to other nations that if they want to engage in free and unobstructed trade with American merchants, then we will do the same with theirs; but for as long as they continue to condone and encourage unfair trading practices, they simply will not have free access to the American economy.

We must say to the Soviet Union that we know about and understand their plan to establish Marxist governments around the globe in order that Moscow may ultimately control the West's lifelines. We must show them that we will no longer sit idly by. We must be willing to sacrifice a part of this great wealth we have created in America in order to ensure that we remain free, in order to ensure that we can continue to conduct our own lives as we wish.

We must increase our defense budget—by at least $8 to $10 billion annually, and perhaps by as much as $20 or $25 billion. We must provide the Navy with the carriers, the full-sized attack subs, and the fighter aircraft—F-14s and F-16s—that it needs. We must provide the Air Force with the F-16s, the F-15s, and the A-10s that it needs, and we must develop and deploy a penetrating bomber such as the B-1.

We must provide the Army with the tanks and helicopters it needs. We must upgrade the quality of service life and the benefits for Army personnel to ensure that we can attract and retain the highest quality men and women for the most important jobs in America.

We must reduce the crippling effect of congressional oversight on our intelligence activities abroad by eliminating the access of six of the eight committees (with 200 members) who currently have entree to extremely sensitive classified information and knowledge of the methods of its collection.

We must establish a sound basis for emergency mobilization which involves much more than an overdue return to draft registration. We need a greatly improved Selective Service System, an overall plan for civilian industrial mobilization, and a significant improvement in our airlift and sealift capabilities.

We must ensure that our children are not forced into a desperate war unprepared and without the tools necessary to ensure victory. The survival of our way of life can best be assured through a strong national defense and an informed leadership cognizant of its primary function—to defend the interests of the American people at home and abroad.
PHILIP M. CRANE

The first obligation of any American President is to guarantee the security of the nation, to preserve the lives and freedom of the American people, with peace if possible, with war if necessary.

Beyond that, this nation has an obligation to provide global leadership in the next century. No other country could fill the void if we abdicate this responsibility. The US has to play a commanding role in promoting the freedoms of Western civilization. This ideal is superior to that of the people who seek to impose their will by force on weaker nations. Governments based on use of force will not retreat. Therefore, some international confrontations that will require the US to demonstrate strength and credibility are inevitable.

Recently there seems to be a tardy national reawakening to the realization that the Soviet Union espouses and actively promotes at every available opportunity a basic philosophy diametrically opposed to ours. Their advances threaten individual human freedom, our fundamental national value. The combination of US domestic political reaction to involvement in Vietnam, our resultant withdrawal from the international arena, and a more bold and adventurism Soviet foreign policy has induced many in this country to believe that we have caused the Soviets to react as they have. To the contrary, Lenin’s teachings and the Kremlin’s policy on spreading communism are premised on taking the advantage whenever and wherever possible. The only way to check such a strategy is with strength.

To meet this challenge, the US must be militarily superior. We cannot expect to play a role for good in this world, cannot expect to champion and spread the concept of freedom, from a position of military parity with the Soviet Union. A second-rate power is not going to have the necessary influence. A free democratic society that tolerates parity with a centralized totalitarian system is going to be constantly on the offensive. We enter any confrontation with some given disadvantages. Anyone modestly aware of military matters will recognize as obvious the advantage of military initiative over sheer capability. To grant the Soviet Union military equivalence along with military initiative means granting them strategic superiority. Our political ideology requires us to cede military initiative. We must not cede military superiority as well. That is exactly what we are doing. Against communism there can be no second place.

There are vast differences between America and the USSR: differences in cultural history, differences in military and diplomatic philosophy; differences in political ideology, governments, and global goals. That is a reality. We must not delude ourselves that our beliefs or our actions will change their approach toward influencing the rest of the world. If we decide to play their game, by their rules, at our present strength, we will lose. Similarly, if we seek peace without understanding the dynamics of geopolitics—great power politics—we will end up at war. The geopolitical forum is no place for naiveté and inexperience. Success in this arena requires an understanding of global realities, clarity of vision, and steadfastness of purpose.

These qualities have been seriously lacking in American leadership. The path America has been following is simply dangerous. The US has failed to comprehend the geopolitical posture of the US vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. We cut $5 billion from the last administration’s annual defense budget proposal, seriously injuring US naval capabilities. We slashed $57 billion from that administration’s six-year defense spending proposal. We cancelled the B-I bomber. We shelved development and deployment of the enhanced radiation weapon (the neutron warhead). We failed to implement funding for a large aircraft carrier. We delayed the development and deployment of the strategic cruise missile, the Trident SLBM and submarine, and the MX ICBM programs. We closed the Minuteman III production line. Even more damaging than nullifying our technological advantage, our pursuit of SALT II compromised US national security by weakening the will of America to be prepared for inevitable confrontations. Too many people believe that the strategic arms limitation talks and the resultant treaties equal peace. Many national leaders have furthered this misconception.

Given the sum of these developments, is there any wonder why our friends and allies consider us weak? After our failure to respond to the Soviet-armed Cuban Afrika Korps’ adventures in Angola and Ethiopia; our cavalier treatment of the Republic of China on Taiwan; our abandonment
of proven friends of the US in Iran and Nicaragua; and our inaction in the face of Soviet combat troops, advanced nuclear-capable fighter bombers, and improved submarine servicing facilities in Cuba, can we blame them for not counting on our support? We cannot expect other free pro-Western nations to support our ideals and consider them precious if we are unwilling to stand up for them. We cannot foster and champion the spread of basic human freedoms and counter Soviet aggression if we sit idly by and watch Americans taken hostage and sovereign nations overrun by tanks. It is absolutely essential that we change this perception. We must act now to reverse the course of America’s declining credibility.

In 1962 our superiority was clearly recognized by everyone, including the Soviets, and that superiority established John Kennedy’s credibility in the Cuban missile crisis. The superiority is no longer there. The majority of experts and laymen alike agree that the Soviet Union has accumulated more military power than it needs to defend itself against any reasonable threat. Most Sovietologists are convinced that Moscow’s leadership seeks military supremacy and domination throughout the world and that they are willing to employ coercive diplomacy and direct use of force if necessary. To achieve this current military arsenal, analysts agree, the Soviets have undertaken the greatest peacetime buildup in the history of the world. The Department of Defense recently revealed that the Soviets are out-producing us two to one in tanks, five to one in other combat vehicles, two to one in combat aircraft, over two to one in helicopters, and three to one in attack submarines. That they have out-produced us in strategic weapon systems, there is no doubt.

Reinforcing this harsh reality is the fact that the Soviets are closing the technology gap. Their weapon systems have vastly improved. The traditional tie-breaker—our ability to counter larger numbers with superior technology—is slipping away. From 1972 to 1978 Soviet investment in R&D exceeded ours by $40 billion. In that period, while Soviet R&D investments grew 92 percent, those of the US decreased 19 percent.

The Soviet effort is beginning to surface in new hardware. Construction of their first nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, a titanium-hulled attack submarine, more advanced aircraft and helicopters, and nuclear reentry vehicles with increased accuracy is proof of their efforts.

The US has not fielded a major new advanced weapon system in a decade. Unilateral restraints have only exacerbated the situation and placed America at a greater disadvantage.

This is more poignantly reflected in a comparison of spending differentials. Since Leonid Brezhnev’s ascendency in 1964, the Soviet Union has dedicated steadily increasing resources to military programs. No matter how the military growth is measured, in dollars, rubles, or physical change in hardware, both the magnitude and the momentum of their effort is impressive. Using the dollar as a basis for comparison, their annual rate of growth in real terms has been three to five percent despite their less efficient economic system and a gross national product one-half ours. In 1970, Soviet military expenditures exceeded ours for the first time. In less than a decade, the Soviet Union outspent the US by $104 billion. That amount is enough to have purchased all the major weapon systems, except naval ships, requested by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. That spending would have kept us even with the Soviets.

Soviet defense spending has consumed between 11 and 15 percent of their GNP; ours may reach six percent. While their expenditures have expanded, ours have contracted. Even with superior technology, we must now play a catch-up ball game.

To obtain military superiority, we must first set out to achieve it. As John Kennedy said during the Berlin crisis, “I figure if you start out to be number two, then that is how you are going to end up.”

To accomplish the goals set forth at the beginning, we must build our defense based on the Kremlin’s military capabilities, not on speculation as to their intentions. We must regain strategic military superiority. We must build a strong mix of strategic defenses so we can survive a nuclear attack and fight and win the resultant war. Our conventional capabilities must be strengthened to protect our sea lines of communications and project US power whenever and wherever necessary. This will require considerable emphasis on the US Navy. We must revitalize our intelligence-gathering and analysis capabilities, for without eyes a great capability can be rendered useless. And finally, much effort must be assigned to readiness of our active, reserve, and national guard forces. If, when a crisis comes, we are unable to marshal our forces effectively to meet the threat, the world’s finest equipment will be of little value.

We have failed to meet the challenge recently. The situation in the Indian Ocean/Persian Gulf/South Asia region is a case in point. Since the British withdrawal from “East of Suez” in
1970, the US has failed to fill the vacuum. Despite the region's demonstrated strategic value to the US and our allies, it has been sadly neglected. The Soviets appreciate the value of the Persian Gulf and associated sea lines to the West. They have acted aggressively. Yet America has done relatively little to stabilize the area. America needs an active foreign policy and a forward military strategy for the region. America needs a physical presence there, that is, a new fleet with ports, airfields, logistical facilities, communications and intelligence sites, and bases which can receive troops for further deployment.

Such a policy would protect major US interests while manifesting to the world our intention to remain the leader of the free world and champion of freedom. It would be a new beginning. It is time that we face global realities and our responsibilities.

Of course, we would all like to devote our energies to peaceful pursuits. Global peace is an all-consuming goal. But we cannot allow our military posture to be dictated by what we wish the situation were. An old intelligence community axiom warns: "Never believe what you want to believe until you know what you need to know." We would all like to believe we can achieve peace by unilaterally disarming, but we know that such a course would be digging our own grave. In this vein, George Washington admonished, "To be prepared for war is one of the most effectual means of preserving peace."

* * *

ALEXANDER M. HAIG JR.

A meaningful defense policy for the 1980’s must be balanced, synchronized, and harmonized with the overall context of the foreign policy which it will be required to buttress. Simply stated, our defense posture must be responsive to the foreign policy we seek to pursue. Notwithstanding its crucial importance, the military dimension must be understood to constitute only one of a number of tools available for the conduct of foreign policy. The key to a credible and effective US defense posture for the 1980’s lies in achieving a balanced Western military, political, economic, and diplomatic posture to assure the deterrence of war and the protection of vital interests. We must achieve a balanced approach in the following dimensions:

• Balance, in our evaluations of the nature and implications of threats. Clearly, the greatest single military challenge to world stability we will face during the 1980’s will emanate from the same source that has threatened us since World War II, namely, the Soviet Union. Our relationship with the Soviet Union should be a function of a comprehensive, integrated policy based on the various elements of detente measured against corresponding Soviet conduct in the international arena. This linkage, however, cannot and should not be mechanically applied. Furthermore, we must also acknowledge and understand that our differences with the Soviet Union are deep-rooted and extend to a cultural and philosophical dimension. In addition, a threat of a different, but significant magnitude is emerging from problems such as the economic difficulties confronting the West and vulnerability to supply disruptions as well as administered higher prices of critical raw materials.

• Balance, in our concern for and attention to the requirements of deterrence on the one hand, and of pure war-fighting capability on the other. These have been harmful side-effects of the worsening trends in Western military capabilities in contradistinction to the determined, sustained Soviet military buildup across every dimension and category of capability—including nuclear and conventional; including land, sea, and air—which has transformed Soviet military posture increasingly into an offensive character with global reach. This capability has even generated a "window of vulnerability" expected in the early 1980’s when the Soviet Union will be able to neutralize a substantial ratio of the US land-based ICBM force. Probably the most significant of these side-effects are the ever-increasing doubts and uncertainties held by friends and foes alike with respect to US credibility, commitment, and capabilities. A defense policy formula that deals with the number of men, amount of arms, and the allocation of defense resources can address the issue of military capability. Questions with respect to the credibility of a deterrent force rely on the delivery of a signal and a correct reception of the message by one’s opponent, while commitment is largely a matter of will and confidence. Will and confidence are largely a function of leadership in our foreign and defense affairs, in particular, and leadership in our society in general. The American people are yearning for leadership that will not
send out signals of withdrawal and uncertainty to the world. The real depth of feeling evoked by the events in Iran and Afghanistan may well reflect the American people's desire to demonstrate clearly and convincingly to the world that the curtain has closed on the recently passed era in which the US could be challenged with no risk.

* Balance, in the quantitative and qualitative improvement of our forces, avoiding over-reliance on attractive but typically transient technological advantages. The US has been unable to articulate a conceptual framework for the conduct of either East-West or North-South relations. Consequently, there has been no standard by which to conduct or judge our relations with friends and enemies, resulting in alienation of our allies and needless confusion, let alone irritation, of our foes. Such gyrations in foreign policy have resulted in ad hoc improvisations in our defense posture. The neutron bomb episode is a case in point. Two or three years ago national authorities sought to cut the defense budget, but recent events have at least prompted our leaders to see the world as it is rather than as it perhaps ought to be, and to advocate a real increase of five percent in defense spending and propose the formation of a Rapid Deployment Force at a cost of $10 billion. The question that arises, however, is whether these moves are aimed at securing Senate approval of SALT II and demonstrating motion during a period of apparent American paralysis in the face of Iranian fanaticism or whether these are objectives within an overall design and framework for the conduct of American defense policy for the 1980's.

It is within this context that ratification of SALT II should be held in abeyance pending clarification on the issues of East-West relations, the concept of detente, and the underlying strategy for the conduct of strategic military-nuclear affairs. In addition, we should have a five-percent real increase in defense spending and implementation of the following strategic programs:

- MX in an acceptable variant.
- Manned penetrating bomber.
- Strategic cruise missiles.
- Expedited Trident (missile and boat).
- Essential improvements in command/control/communications for effective response in a modern post-strike environment.

* Balance, in recognizing that the Western world as a whole and the NATO alliance in particular must be considered a single entity to maintain both unity and deterrence as well as balance in sharing security burdens and curtailting dangers of Soviet domination. The key to a credible and effective US defense posture for the 1980's lies in achieving a balanced Western military posture to assure the deterrence of war and the unity of NATO upon which such deterrence hinges. This is the area of our primary strength, and it is an effort we must pursue with fervor. The heart of the West's effort must be the improvement of the conventional land, sea, and air forces—not because nuclear deterrence is less important, but because a stalwart conventional capability is the prerequisite for such deterrence, and because the deficiencies in the West's conventional posture are currently the most grievous. NATO's forces, for example, must improve their overall readiness, and each of NATO's members must share in these responsibilities. Consequently, the current insufficient levels of manpower and equipment must be remedied. We must, for example, improve our efforts to attract high-quality people to serve in the armed forces. If, as it increasingly appears, the Volunteer Army cannot accomplish its task, we should be willing to review the problem and consider alternative arrangements. Initial steps should be launched now. By remedying these present shortcomings, we will also be sending a clear message to our most powerful adversary, the Soviet Union, and bolster the confidence of our allies. In order to assure the defense of Europe, the West must possess a superior theater nuclear capability. If we seek anything less we will be bringing into question the credibility of America and NATO's nuclear umbrella. Neither we nor our allies can afford to have such commitments questioned.

* Balance, in safeguarding our vital national interests and dealing with sovereign states. The questioning of our commitments to our national defense requirements has also eroded our position in such crucial areas as US security as the Middle East. When we have attempted to reassert our commitments, we have done so ineptly. Despite our pledges of support, actions by the US undercut the Shah of Iran, culminating in our standing by as the anti-American Khomeini took control of a country that has been crucial to Western interests for intelligence and the defense of the Persian Gulf. The sending of unarmed F-15s to Saudi Arabia impressed critical Middle East countries with our excessive caution rather than our firm determination. US self-restraint in dealing with the Iranian situation is in danger of the same interpretation. Rather than being perceived as demonstrations of firmness and strength, such actions have suggested US weakness and paralysis to friends and foes alike.

We must be able to differentiate world trouble
spots where the primary cause is direct Soviet intervention or intervention by Cuban proxy from those cases where the impetus for change emanates primarily from local factors. In many cases, however, the Soviet Union has not hesitated to intervene in order to exploit local unrest. This does not mean that we should embark on a policy designed to confront the Soviet Union or any other challenger at every point on the face of the globe. Rather, we should determine our strategic priorities based on our critical national interests. Although we must assure our capability to defend these interests, we must also be judicious in determining the appropriateness, timing, and degree of the utilization or demonstration of force depending on the particular circumstances.

Our adversaries as well as our allies need to understand that we will protect our interests. The Soviet Union cannot and will not go unchallenged in its drive toward control over an area as vital to US interests as the Middle East. Unchallenged Soviet gains in such a strategic area through exploitation of local factors in countries such as Ethiopia, Afghanistan, and the two Yemens, combined with the paralysis in confronting the events in Iran, undermine the confidence of our allies.

In addition to our legitimate concern for such areas as the Middle East, we must also raise the intensity of our thus-far feeble efforts to promote and improve mutually beneficial relations in the Western Hemisphere. Our relations with such countries as Canada, Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela must be solidified and conducted on the basis of mutual respect and equality. The not-so-special relationship with Latin American states must be transformed into a special relationship in order to solidify the Western world’s defense posture.

In summary, the US must develop a strategic defense posture in line with our foreign policy goals for the 1980’s. Reliability, consistency, and appropriateness of demonstrated resolve to advance the national interest must be the hallmarks of our policy. Only then can we assure support for our friends and allies through sharing of responsibilities to neutralize hostile invasions or interventions, guarantee access to critical resources, and protect vital regions in light of our national interest. Although we must develop and mobilize our resources to insure a nuclear and conventional capability second to none, we must also possess the commitment, credibility, reliability, and consistency that demonstrate to all our resolve to act in pursuance of our national interest.

*   *   *   *   *

EDWARD M. KENNEDY

In building a strong national defense—the cornerstone of an effective foreign policy—the essential element is the possession of usable force. Our four armed services, now more than ever, must be ready, reliable, and combat-effective if we are to defend our national interests, whenever and wherever challenged.

The Minuteman tradition reaches deep into the roots of New England. In our successful war against the British, American workers and farmers demonstrated the dividends that come from the exercise of individual resolve, speed, and flexibility. A military lesson of the post-World War II era is that nuclear missiles and ultrasophisticated conventional weapons have tended to make us muscle-bound and less combat ready. That is why, as we look ahead to the decade before us, our emphasis should be not only on strategic deterrence, but on developing and strengthening a general purpose force that is fighting trim, equipped with workable and working weapons, and relevant and ready for the conduct of various regional missions.

The military balance between the US and the Soviet Union is central in discussing national defense. Soviet military forces are now the equal of our own. Approximate military parity is a fact of life. There is no doubt that in this decade the Soviet Union will steadily work to improve its military forces—upgrading the accuracy and lethality of its strategic forces, deploying a new generation of aircraft and armored vehicles, and strengthening its ability to reach foreign lands beyond Afghanistan and other nearby places.

Similarly, the US must modernize and expand its military force, in concert with its Atlantic and Pacific allies, in response to increased turbulence in such vital regions as the Middle East, Persian Gulf, and Southwest Asia, and in relation to the capabilities of the USSR. The crucial question is, How do we accomplish the important task of strengthening our forces, making them usable, so that they are a credible deterrent and capable of defending Western interests?

One certain way not to improve America’s military capability is to engage in an empty debate.
over arbitrary percentages of budget growth. Anyone who is serious about national defense knows that what the nation needs is not a three, five, or seven percent solution in defense spending. National security cannot be purchased merely by spending more money. What we need are defense resources that are effectively directed to actual military requirements and that are allocated so as to provide the following assurances:

• That our nation can rely upon capable and cost-effective military weapons such as the air-launched cruise missile, which provides us with a military advantage at far less than what it costs the Soviet Union to counter it.
• That these weapons are directed by skilled and experienced personnel.
• That our armed forces are headed by committed and confident leadership.

These are the criteria that will guarantee a strong defense and thus the ones I shall apply when analyzing and voting on the FY 1981 defense budget.

The improvement of US general purpose forces is our greatest national defense need. If the US is to project American power, we must make significant efforts to strengthen our naval, air, and ground forces. America cannot expect to counter modern Soviet forces with the arsenal of the late 1960’s and early 1970’s. We must begin immediately to improve our readiness; increase the quantity of vital weapon, communication, and logistical systems; and adapt new technologies to our military forces.

First, I believe a high state of readiness is one of the clearest indicators that the US can act in defense of its global interests. Yet, on any given day, one-third to one-half of our general purpose ships and planes are not prepared for battle. More high performance aircraft are lost in exercises each year than are procured. I am concerned that we have placed too little emphasis on such basic necessities as fuel supplies, spare parts, combat training, and ammunition stocks.

We therefore must improve our readiness posture. For example, if we raised our readiness rates by 10 percent we could add over 1400 Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps combat-ready aircraft to our active arsenal. We must also conduct more realistic combat exercises. Tactics need to be tested under simulated battle conditions, not merely by computer simulations. We must also give greater attention than we have in the past to the problems of operations and maintenance if we are to assure that we possess a full-fledged capability to perform our military missions.

Second, increasing the quantity of weapons available to do the job is also essential. There is no question that we need sophisticated weapon systems, but goldplating new ships, planes, and tracked vehicles buys fewer weapons and serves only to decrease our overall capability. In this era of high technology, we must face up to the battlefield reality that sheer numbers of less sophisticated systems are crucial to our military posture. This includes more of the M-60 tank series, artillery, and antitank weapons for the European and Korean theaters; more surface combat ships deployed in the Indian Ocean area; and more heavy armored vehicles appropriate for desert use.

These—as well as other needed improvements—will cost money. But a good deal of funds could be saved if defense contracting were competitive. I am troubled, for example, by the fact that between 75 percent and 85 percent of defense contracts are not let out to competitive bidding. At the same time, we could strengthen our defense industrial base by readying its capability in the event of a prolonged conflict. Defense readiness, then, includes usable forces in being and mobilization capacity. I am concerned with our current deficiency in this vital area.

Third, we must place increased emphasis on one of our greatest national assets: technological innovation. The development of precision-guided munitions was one of the important military technological achievements of the 1970’s. Sensors for artillery and short-range missile systems and the AEGIS radar (which will help to counter the threat to our naval forces posed by the Backfire and other weapons) hold promise in the 1980’s. But we must do more. We must mobilize our superior electronics industry to improve the ease of maintenance and increase the effectiveness of our weapon systems.

Of fundamental importance in improving the capability of our general purpose forces are the military men and women who serve our nation. Our most precious resource is the millions of citizens who are committed to bettering their country. It is their courage, experience, and toughness that ultimately make the difference. Similarly, weapons we design, produce, and deploy are only as good as the people who use them. The personnel problems facing us in the 1980’s are real, and we can no longer afford to avoid this national security issue.

The most important problem of our modern military is not recruitment, but the retention of adequate numbers of men and women with skills, experience, and motivation. More than half our personnel are leaving the armed forces after one
term of enlistment. We must be innovative in attracting and then persuading able men and women to forsake the benefits of private life and to make the military a full career, a life of service and deep satisfaction. We need legislation that will provide a realistic cost-of-living pay-hike for military personnel. We need pay, housing, medical care, education, and other programs necessary to retain our national resource of trained servicemen and women. The contribution and the sacrifice of our career military personnel are to be admired. Our nation should recognize and respect their essential role in assuring that the US possesses a defense second to none in the 1980's.

In conclusion, the prospect of increasing Soviet intervention, growing regional radicalism, and international terrorism makes the need for an effective US defense posture an urgent one. But our need to reexamine and improve our military forces is symbolic of the need to revitalize our international effort as a whole. American foreign policy is out of control—we lack direction and firmness in dealing with other nations, be they across the oceans or merely across the border. As a result, our friends are often confused and our adversaries lose respect. Reasserting America's military prowess can and must be a primary step in the reemergence of American prestige and influence around the globe.

Another primary step to take is the forging of a national consensus that can keep us secure through the turbulent decade ahead. This task requires not only a far-sighted foreign policy and a versatile, highly capable military establishment, but strong leadership as well. Leadership can make our whole system—at home and abroad—work again. The task of leadership is to inspire, to educate, to assert the common interest, to set goals for the nation, to insist on fairness and equity, to call for sacrifice when needed, and, in the process, to build a consensus on what constitutes usable force.

* * *

LARRY PRESSLER

It is encouraging to note the increased support that developed in 1979 for a better prepared and more reasonably funded US defense posture. The realization that improvements are needed in our national defense, as well as the willingness to accept the substantially higher cost, is a welcome change and one which, it is hoped, has not come too late to protect US and world security interests.

While increased funding for national defense is needed, much analysis remains to be done to ensure that the additional investment is put into the most cost-beneficial programs. It is not enough simply to increase funding without careful specification of the improvements to be sought. Some will argue, of course, that so much improvement is needed across the board that projected budgetary increases will barely begin to overcome the shortcomings in our national defense.

Notwithstanding the demonstrated need for higher defense spending during the next several years, there are opportunities for savings in the military establishment, as there are in other branches of government. Reductions in military energy costs can be accomplished without diminishing military readiness. In this connection it is worthwhile to note that the Defense Department intends to conduct large-scale testing of alcohol fuels in a variety of military equipment. Specific cost savings goals should be established for all components of our national defense system so that additional defense spending above the cost of living increase will not be squandered.

Prognosticating possible Soviet military and political intentions must be based on historical and recent Soviet behavior to ascertain the probable degree of the Soviet threat to US and free world interests. The record clearly indicates that the Soviets pursue an interventionist style in the international arena. Further, during the 1970's, Soviet military spending greatly exceeded US spending, both in absolute terms and as a percentage of GNP.

The strength and quality of a nation's military system are essential elements in the overall national power calculus. Efforts to influence the course of international relations in directions favorable to the national interest would be seriously hampered by inadequate military resources. It is in this light that one must regard with great concern the recent trends in US and Soviet military spending.

We should be especially aware of the tremendous military technological gains made by the Soviet Union in recent years. Any reasonable extrapolation from recent trends in this area
suggests that if those trends are allowed to continue, the US will lose its military technology superiority in the near future. This cannot be allowed to occur. National interest dictates the maintenance of a modern, flexible defense which is not locked into Maginot Line thought and action. At the same time, we should be under no illusions that technological recovery can occur overnight on an entirely crash basis. Sustained effort is needed if military technology superiority is to be retained well into the future. The positive spin-off of military R&D into the private economy also cannot be discounted, particularly in high-technology electronics and data processing. This is also true in the "alcofuels" area, where increased use of gasohol or alcofuels in military vehicles will provide a spin-off to the private sector.

Another important consideration in overall US defense thinking is the maximization of national security through verifiable and equitable international agreements to limit strategic nuclear arms. There appears to be general agreement in our society that the goals of nuclear nonproliferation and strategic arms limitation should be actively pursued by the nation's leadership. However, there is a strong element of caution about specific agreements that have been negotiated in recent years.

The national dialogue on SALT II reflects both the desire for meaningful arms control and healthy skepticism over the specific terms of this particular arms control agreement. Political judgment on the merits of SALT II—a judgment which is well-informed by expert yet conflicting assessments of the military consequences of the agreement—must consider the limits of US verification capability, the implications of Protocol language for rapid cruise missile deployment, the import of Soviet domestic and international behavior, as well as other issues. No limitations should be put in the way of the most rapid possible deployment of the cruise missile and the transfer of conventional and strategic weapons as a counterbalance to currently superior Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces in the European theater. SALT II should not be passed in its present form.

The concept of a rapid deployment force is not new. Surprise, flexibility, and maneuverability have always been hallmarks of US military thinking. These elements have been neglected in the recent past, and it is necessary to reestablish them in fact as well as principle at the forefront of our international defense strategy.

It is also important that decisions quickly be reached on the status and future direction of the all-volunteer concept. A return to a peacetime military draft may not be politically feasible, but we must preserve a qualified and ready defense personnel system. Satisfactory contingency arrangements for rapid manpower mobilization in a wartime emergency must be established in the very near future. These arrangements may or may not include an advance registration system, pending the outcome of effectiveness analysis of Selective Service System computer enhancement efforts.

If we ever have a draft again, it should not be like the draft of the Vietnam era. That draft was unfair. The Vietnam war was fought by low-income and poorly educated people. That is not the American tradition. If we do have a draft, it should be on a pure lottery basis and with virtually no exemptions.

Finally, leaving aside such other important defense policy issues as Cuban adventurism and the Middle East military situation, reference should be made to the comparative defense efforts by the US and its major allies in Europe and Japan. The defense expenditures of the leading NATO nations and Japan must be substantially increased. We must share fully in the maintenance costs of a worldwide defense system. The US will increase its defense spending, but our prosperous allies, some with higher GNP per capita than the US, will need to do the same. The US must press these stable partners to increase their defense spending dramatically in the years ahead. Our allies cannot afford the long-term consequences of their failure to bear a proportionate share of the military burden.

* * *

RONALD REAGAN

During the Cuban missile crisis, the US enjoyed an enormous strategic advantage over the Soviet Union—about eight to one in our favor. That clear-cut superiority, coupled with our determination to remove Soviet intermediate-range missiles from our doorstep, enabled us to achieve a satisfactory outcome.

Since that time, the Soviet Union, vowing never again to be caught in a position of such inferiority, embarked upon a no-holds-barred effort to catch
up with us. By systematically outspending us in absolute terms, and by steady development and deployment of an awesome array of weapon systems aimed at us, at Europe, and at Asia, the Soviets have largely achieved their objectives.

Today, the US no longer enjoys clear strategic military superiority. As leader of the free world, however, it is critically important that the US should never become number two in comparison with the Soviet Union.

Yet, dramatic Russian improvements are evident in every leg of the strategic triad. Russia embarked on a heavy production program for the Backfire, an intercontinental bomber, while the US unilaterally canceled its B-1 bomber. The Backfire is capable of striking US targets, but requires refueling to return from such a mission. In terms of manned bombers, our aging B-52s—some planes older than the pilots who fly them—give us a quantitative advantage (348 to 150), but qualitatively we are lagging. Within a brief time span, Moscow could match us in bomber numbers with its Backfiers. Furthermore, the Kremlin is developing at least three additional advanced bomber and fighter aircraft.

The land-based leg of the triad was hobbed when the US slowed down the MX program. Meanwhile, Russia kept working on developing bigger and more accurate missiles for possible use against the US. Today, Moscow deploys more land-based ICBMs than the US (1400 to 1054).

At sea, after 1981, we will produce an average of about one new Trident II submarine annually while the Russians will continue to produce strategic submarines at a much more rapid rate. The USSR also has more submarine missile launching tubes (950 to 656).

Overall, we do have some important qualitative advantages in highly sensitive areas, such as antisubmarine warfare and cruise missiles. Yet, without real budget increases in future years, we could lose those advantages.

Our quantitative advantage in areas such as strategic nuclear warheads (9200 to 5000) will disappear within the next few years. This is, even while it lasts, a limited advantage; the most important factor is possessing delivery vehicles that can effectively penetrate targets and that can survive a surprise attack.

If we are to meet the Russian challenge and prevent their domination over us—and we must—then it is essential that the US develop a realistic strategic plan for the future.

This brings us to a discussion of SALT II. It is my conclusion that the treaty must be withdrawn. We should first take the time to rebuild our military strategy and then map out an arms control policy that reinforces that strategy. The US has not yet put forward a defense program that would keep the overall gap in armaments from widening. Upon the basis of what our government has so far proposed, the Russians will keep pulling ahead of us. And, even though our government promises significant results from the follow-on SALT negotiations, it has only the vaguest ideas of what these results should be. It has no idea how we might obtain these results in SALT III or beyond. So why rush ahead with SALT II now?

Still more important is the need to conduct a searching examination of the basic premises and assumptions underlying our foreign and national security policies. It is these policies that have brought us to the present situation, and we must scrutinize them carefully to determine whether they are adequate for the 1980's. This process must precede any further action on arms control because we must first know and understand our goals and requirements before we can understand how an arms control program would assist in achieving them.

In other critical areas, the US must reestablish its credibility among friends and foes alike. We must again convince our friends that they will not be sacrificed as pawns in superpower politics. We must make our adversaries more cognizant that this country will no longer sit idly by while the Soviet Union and its surrogates try to enslave the populations of other nations, either by installing or supporting the harsh rule of puppet governments.

Nowhere is deterrence more crucial than in Western Europe. Clearly, NATO weapons modernization is necessary, particularly in light of the Russian deployment of new SS-20 surface-to-surface missiles and Backfire bombers. Consequently, the recent decision to upgrade and modernize our tactical nuclear forces in NATO is eminently sound. It is unfortunate, however, that the US earlier decided not to deploy the neutron bomb in the face of a major Soviet campaign to dissuade NATO countries from deploying the weapon. One can understand the reason behind the Kremlin's effort. Neutron bombs would largely counter any Warsaw Pact forces attempting an invasion of Western Europe.

Elsewhere, the beefing up of our conventional military power is essential to US national security. For instance, we must reestablish our capability to protect world shipping lanes. Our country is more dependent than ever before upon the rest of the world. Foreign trade amounts to tens of billions of dollars. Millions of American jobs are dependent upon exports and imports. Yet, our Navy has been
declining in relative power and presently has only a slim margin of superiority over the Soviets, even though some 99 percent of our foreign trade is carried by ship.

Likewise, we must be prepared to provide the best possible equipment and in sufficient amounts for our air and ground forces. Specifically, immediate action is necessary to improve our strategic airlift so as to be prepared for a variety of contingencies.

It is also critically important that proper attention be devoted to the all-important area of research and development. The US can never afford to lose its relative advantage in this arena.

* * * * *

MELDRIM THOMSON JR.

We cannot tolerate a Soviet outpost in Cuba, where Russian military and support personnel number almost 50,000. A Cuba armed with 18 or more MIGs capable of carrying nuclear weapons, 40 or more high-speed Russian naval vessels which could be armed with missiles, and a fluctuating number of missile-launching submarines, could cut our oil lines from Venezuela and from refineries in the Caribbean.

For our future safety in a world rapidly growing communist, we must reject the proposed SALT II treaty; reinstitute a uniform and fair national draft; build the B-1 bomber, the cruise and MX missiles, and the neutron bomb; and substantially increase our appropriations for national security.

The events of recent weeks have served to display not only to our own countrymen, but to the world, the precarious position that this nation finds itself in as a result of our appeasement and naivete. The specter of the international crises in Iran and Afghanistan, grave as they are, should not be allowed to overshadow the continuing and acute problem existing barely off our shores in Cuba and the Caribbean.

Thirty-nine years ago our nation was protected by time and the seas. Not since our earliest days had foreign soldiers marched across our homeland to bring war to our doorstep. And so it was with a sense of security that Franklin Roosevelt announced on 29 December 1940 that America would serve as the Arsenal of Democracy for our allies. During the ensuing four years of war, a flow of ships, planes, and war armaments of every description poured from our factories. But never again will it be possible for any nation in time of war to prepare for war. Any nation that is not instantly prepared to retaliate in kind to nuclear attack, and then survive to fight again, will be annihilated or lose its independence, or both. How does a nation prepare for nuclear war with only 30 minutes to spare and no effective means of defense except to launch its own missiles?

* * * * *

Obviously it doesn't—it must be pre-prepared, and it has become increasingly evident that America isn't.

In the 1950's, we held quantitative and qualitative superiority over the Soviets and all other nations of the world in nuclear strike ability. Now, however, the Soviets are known to have in excess of 1400 missiles compared to our total of 1054 missiles. The Soviet Air Force is quantitatively twice that of ours, and they continue to build as we scrap the B-1 bomber program. We have 41 ballistic missile submarines to their 91 and only 82 attack subs to their 260. Every major city of America is vulnerable to obliteration by Soviet missile submarines lurking off our coast or, in the case of their Delta submarines, from as far off as 4000 miles. Yet we falter as the Soviets continue to add to their massive war machine. The hour is late. In today's nuclear age we never again will be protected by time and sea while we build a new arsenal to counter the thrust of a major adversary.

For once in this generation we should go all out for America. If we are too busy to care about our freedom, no one else will preserve it for us.

First, let us return to compulsory military training at once.

Second, we must make whatever sacrifices are necessary to rebuild our Navy, expand our missile arsenal, and vastly improve our Air Force.

Third, we must at once build a national energy policy that works.

Fourth, we must quit bleeding ourselves with no-win wars and with inflationary spending.

Fifth, we should stop feeding the communist world with food, technological know-how, and strategic goods of invaluable worth.

America can survive and grow great again only if those of us who love it work harder to preserve it than the enemy within and without works to destroy it.

* * * * *

Parameters, Journal of the US Army War College