REASSESSING TURKEY:
A FAITHFUL ALLY DISILLUSIONED AND IN TROUBLE

by
FRANCIS P. BUTLER

To assess the relationship between Turkey and the United States, one must deal in perceptions. It has been Turkey’s contention since the mid-1960’s that the US has employed a paternalistic and condescending attitude in relations with its NATO ally. To the policymakers in Turkey, this perception further means that American decisionmakers feel that Turkey’s need for close ties is far greater than that of the US. Actions by the US have increasingly been perceived as those of a tolerant master who feels justified in bullying a dependent that reaps most of the benefits of the relationship. These perceptions explain to Turkey’s satisfaction what it views as a series of affronts by the US that it can hardly continue to ignore.

The future is uncertain for these two allies. As correctly and aptly pointed out in recent columns by Evans and Novak, and by T. R. Milton, Turkey is no longer the unquestioning and malleable ally of the US that it once was. Rather, Turkey today is receptive to any nation willing to extend aid to it, even the Soviet Union under proper circumstances.† As these columnists argue, NATO’s southeastern flank is coming under increasing danger owing to the antiquated, US-supplied military equipment which still serves as the backbone of the Turkish armed forces, and especially because of the Turkish reaction to Soviet entreatments to closer and friendlier ties. It has always been Turkey’s contention that it brings at least as much to the NATO alliance as it takes from it. Turkey fully accepts responsibility for its role in the community of nations and regards its membership in any alliance as benefitting fully all parties to the agreement. In fact, Turkey views its contribution to NATO as vital to the alliance and is therefore willing to commit a singularly large number of troops to the NATO effort. A further point it makes is that the US has had no more tenacious partner in containing the Soviet Union than Turkey.

However, Turkey is ready now to question the reasons for its present commitments, a readiness which will force the US to reassess the comfortable old assumptions it has held regarding Turkey. The US has assumed that to counter the traditional Soviet threat Turkey must continue to express an active hostility toward the USSR, must retain membership in a strong anti-Soviet military alliance, and must hold Turkish-Soviet contacts to a minimum in all but the diplomatic arena. The US has assumed that solutions to Turkey’s domestic and foreign problems may be held hostage to US military and economic aid. The US has assumed that its regional interests and those of Turkey continue to coincide. How the US came to hold these assumptions and why they have now become suspect are questions worthy of examination.

Turkey today cannot be understood or discussed without an appreciation of the transformation of life that occurred under the strong leadership of Kemal Ataturk from 1922 until his death in 1938. He was
responsible for the secularization, Westernization, and modernization of Turkey. Reactionary sentiment whenever and wherever it emerges in Turkey is routinely discredited by evoking the memory of Ataturk. Thus far, this tactic has been sufficient to deter all but a very few of the periodic counter-progressive Islamic "reforms." Modernization, however, continues to struggle with economic reality.

It is the matter of Westernization that demands the lion's share of our attention. Ataturk pointed to the West as the model for Turkey. It was the West that represented for Ataturk the way of the future. Ataturk promised that the West, with its democratic political system, separation of church and state, efficient economic system, and affluent way of life, was soon to include Turkey within its broad boundaries. In contrast with that seductive dream, however, Ataturk's legacy is a Turkey today beset with an economic system in shambles, an inert political system destabilized by the ever-present threat of military intervention, and a foreign policy wavering between East and West. It is still the ghost of Ataturk that drives Turkish dreams to seek solutions within the framework of Western-oriented economic and political systems, but a large question mark now follows Ataturk's heretofore unchallenged assertion that Turkey's destiny lies toward the West.

The Turk of today is strongly nationalistic, fiercely patriotic, anti-Greek, and no longer as pro-American as he once was, nor as anti-Russian. In fact, he wants proof of who his friends are in the world. Even as early as
1972, Turkish fears of the communist menace had begun to abate:

... [In 1972, we] talked endlessly about Soviet foreign policy and Communist objectives in general. The subject actually arose one day when we were discussing the author Makal and his book *Bizim Koy*. Makal had been branded a Communist by many in Turkey, and I asked [my friend] if he thought Makal actually was a Communist. [He] smiled at me and said, 'You too, in America, went through your McCarthy era, didn't you?' Though [he] would quickly point out that the primary threat to Turkey is from the Soviet Union, he believes that the Communist threat itself is greatly overstated. He makes a distinction between a threat from the Communists and one from the Soviet Union. The pressure from the Soviet Union is the same geographical threat that has existed for centuries. The threat from the Communists is ideological and therefore not one the military can effectively deal with. . . . Effective democracy at home, a democracy extended to all and therefore benefitting all, is the best counter to the Communist threat. A people already free don't submit themselves to chains willingly . . . . [Communist countries] are not providing for their own people; therefore, these countries cannot accept the added burden of fighting a war for expansionist objectives.³

The Soviet military threat from without is one with which Turkey can live; the communist threat from within is increasingly linked to the alleged abandonment of Turkey by its friends at a time when it desperately needed political and economic support. The issues range from support of Turkey's nationalistic aspirations for territorial sovereignty to support in providing for its people's basic material needs.

The beginning of Turkey's alienation may be traced to a decisive event in 1963-64—the Cyprus crisis.⁶ With the outbreak of civil war between the Turkish and Greek Cypriots in late 1963, it was clear to Turkey that the outnumbered Turkish Cypriots were in danger of being overrun. Appealing first to Greece and Great Britain to intervene as guarantor nations under the 1959 London-Zurich accords on Cyprus, Turkey undertook upon their refusal certain military actions to underscore its concern. It overflew the island with aircraft actually assigned to NATO, and it dispatched Turkish naval units from Istanbul to Mersin, a major port close to Cyprus.

The situation did not improve during the next six months despite American attempts to use both NATO and the UN as forums for Greek-Turkish accommodation. Throughout the period, the US counselled caution. Though able to persuade Turkey to accept a UN peacekeeping force on Cyprus, the US was unable to quiet Turkey's periodic public pronouncements of its intention to invade Cyprus unless the Turkish Cypriot position on the island improved. All the while, a Turkish perception that the US had failed to side with Turkey against Greece grew in the public mind. Disappointment and eventual disillusionment were the results.

In June 1964, when Washington concluded that an invasion by Turkey was imminent, President Johnson dispatched a letter to Turkish Prime Minister Inonu. It warned Turkey that, in the absence of consultation with and support of its NATO allies, no promise could be made that NATO would come to Turkey's aid if Turkish actions provoked Soviet intervention in Cyprus.² This letter and subsequent Turkish perceptions of continued US partiality toward the Greek position inflamed Turkey's passions against Washington even more. The situation heated up again in 1967, with rumors in Turkey creating an impression of renewed US pressure to prevent Turkish intervention in Cyprus.

During the 1960's, numerous charges appeared in Turkish newspapers of CIA interference in Turkish internal affairs and CIA responsibility for the establishment of a military regime in Athens. In November 1968, Robert Komer, whose service as a CIA analyst was on the public record, was
appointed US Ambassador to Turkey; in response, leftist elements hatched a variety of conspiracy theories, ranging from accusations that his appointment was an attempt to divide the left to allegations that his experience as chief pacification advisor in Vietnam was to be used to conduct a similar experiment in Turkey. The Turkish left was also busy toward the end of the 1960's with an attempt to gain Turkey's withdrawal from NATO. It charged that the nuclear bases in Turkey invited a Soviet nuclear attack, questioned whether the nations of NATO would in fact defend Turkey in the event of an attack, and pointed out that, under terms of the NATO charter, Turkey might be forced to participate in a war which did not involve its interests.

US negotiations with Turkey over its defense needs, culminating in the 1969 Defense Cooperation Agreement, also ran into problems. To emphasize the mutuality of benefits under the agreement, Turkey insisted that henceforth it must share control of US bases on Turkish soil. The tough give-and-take leading to the agreement resulted in a further erosion of goodwill between the two countries. Issues further exacerbating Turkish feelings were US policy in Vietnam; the activities of Peace Corps volunteers in Turkey; Sixth Fleet port visits; differences concerning the timing, methods, and scope of modernizing the Turkish armed forces; and the gradual reduction of US economic assistance.

Another explosive issue remained to open the decade of the 70's, widening the gap between the two countries even further. The US satisfied itself that 80 percent of the heroin illegally entering the US was the product of opium produced in Turkey. When news that Attorney General Mitchell, in testimony before the House Ways and Means Committee on 20 July 1970, had agreed in principle to the imposition of economic sanctions on countries failing to shut off production of opium, government and public reactions in Turkey were bitter. The resulting opium accord between the two countries in 1971 was depicted by the Turkish press as unfair. According to press accounts, Turkey had been coerced to accept payment to halt the production of poppies. Turkish authorities were subsequently unable to convince the public that Turkey had in any manner served its own interests with the agreement. The life of the agreement was filled with tension between the two governments, and few were surprised when Turkey decided to resume cultivation of poppies in 1974.4

It remained for the 1974 Turkish-Greek war in Cyprus to precipitate the most serious and irreparable damage to relations between Turkey and the US. Turkey realized that by invading Cyprus it would spark a controversy in which it would be difficult to win support for its position; however, it assumed full responsibility for its actions and defended the move as necessary to protect the Turkish Cypriot population. So far as US-Turkish relations are concerned, the justification for the invasion is not as important as the justification given by the US Congress for imposing an arms embargo on Turkey during the aftermath of the crisis. The embargo was publicly justified in terms of Turkey's violation of agreements by which it obtained US arms. The arms used by Turkey were of course US arms—it had nothing else to use.

Major Francis P. Butler is currently attending the Naval Command and Staff Course at the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island. He is a graduate of Middlebury College and holds master's degrees in International Relations and Middle East Studies, Turkish/Arabic from the University of Utah, where he also earned a Ph.D. in Political Science. Major Butler graduated from the Turkish War College in 1973 and the US Army Command and General Staff College in 1977. In addition to a tour as an Aide-de-Camp to General Melvin Zaix, Commander of Land Southeast Forces in Izmir, Turkey, he has served in Germany, the Republic of Vietnam, and Korea. Prior to his current assignment, he was an Assistant Professor in the Social Sciences Department at the US Military Academy.
Initially, the US did not dwell on the invasion itself other than to caution restraint. The US did, however, adopt a firmer tone when Turkey resumed the amassment of Cypriot territory following its initial invasion pause. At that point, Turkey considered US protests to be mere pro forma rhetoric on the part of a NATO ally caught in the middle. It did not yet construe the protests as an official condemnation of a nation felt to be disproportionately in the wrong.

As the weeks passed following the invasion, however, Turkey grew increasingly concerned over the texture of the US response, which it viewed as a circuitous attempt to appease its domestic Greek lobby. Turkey sincerely viewed US objections to the use of American arms as ludicrous. Far less furor occurred over the invasion itself than over the origin of the arms used. Turkey believed that Greece had clearly provoked Turkish action and that Greece had in fact left Turkey no alternative but to invade to protect the Turkish Cypriot population. It further believed that the US was grasping at straws in an effort to punish Turkey and provide leverage to force Turkey into negotiations and perhaps a settlement unfavorable to its interests. To Turkey, such a course was unacceptable. Especially galling was the “hypocritical” US “interference” in Turkish affairs represented by the American focus on the source of the invasion arms rather than on the invasion per se. Turkey believed that if the reason for the invasion was accepted, however tenuous this acceptance was, then the use of the only armaments available could not be questioned. It appeared to Turkey that the US was saying, the invasion, Yes—the use of arms, No! Just as important, in Turkey’s view, any arms embargo imposed on a nation by its sole supplier represented a crippling blow to national security that could not be tolerated. Further, as Turkey pointed out, it was not just Turkey’s warmaking capability against the Greeks that was being crippled, but its ability to defend the southeastern flank of NATO in accord with its alliance responsibilities.

In sum, Turkey perceived itself as hostage to US domestic politics that were basically sympathetic to Greece. It resolved at that point never again to submit its national security and foreign policy to the vagaries of such a narrow dependency. Thus, the special US-Turkish relationship ended with Turkey’s new perception of its precarious position, a position in which it had become enmeshed during almost three decades of total reliance on a government subject to the shifting winds of political pressure. And certainly a special relationship had existed: Turks had looked with respect and admiration to America and to Ataturk’s legacy of Westernization. Whatever the future of Turkish-American relations might be, the special feelings for Americans will probably never be completely rekindled in Turkish hearts.

This is not to conclude, however, that Turkey will not continue to remain a staunch member of NATO. The likelihood is that Turkey will negotiate economic, military, and base agreements with the US that are felt to be in its national interest, and that it will continue to maintain old ties and seek to open new ones in Western Europe, including joint ventures in weapons manufacture as well as financial and military integration into the European Economic Community. But we have to face the fact that in the Turkey of today there is growing sentiment that to look to the West does not preclude looking to the East as well.

During the past decade, Turkish relations with the Soviet Union have improved. There was, for example, a significant economic agreement with Moscow in 1977 providing for a $1.2 billion loan to Turkey from its communist neighbor. More recently, to the chagrin and embarrassment of the US, Turkey reportedly insisted that Moscow be consulted regarding a US request that U-2 flights over Turkey be permitted as part of the verification process of the SALT II agreement. There are numerous other examples of increasing cooperation in the economic, political, and even military spheres.

Concurrently, Turkey has made overtures
to nations of the Middle East and the Third World. Participation in Third World activities and conferences has provided some degree of legitimacy for Ankara's professed interest in nonalignment politics, and the nations of the Middle East are looked to for help in this period of economic crisis in Turkey.

From the American perspective, the US must revise the assumptions that have guided its relations with Turkey since World War II. First, the US must recognize that Turkey no longer perceives the military threat posed by the Soviet Union in terms of its post-World War II immediacy. Today's is not the same world. The Soviet Union is now seen to employ power in the judicious manner of a nation less fearful for its own security. With the exception perhaps of Afghanistan, the Soviet Union has demonstrated confidence in its ability to attain its objectives by means other than aggression. It competes for influence through economic and military assistance, both of which Turkey needs desperately. And the Soviet Union has not attempted to attach political strings unacceptable to Turkey's national interests.

Second, related to the consideration above, Turkey no longer perceives US aid as the only aid available. The appearance of other sources of assistance has coincided with an American aid policy seen to be less generous, less reliable, and increasingly contingent. Turkey thus sees small reason to submit to affronts to national pride in order to receive little in return.

Third, Turkey perceives that the past decade has produced a steady divergence of interests between it and the US. The US pursues interests prejudicial to Turkey's increasing reliance on certain other nations of the world, including the Soviet Union, the Middle Eastern nations, and the Third World nations, but the US cannot be depended upon to make up for lost help from these countries should Turkey ignore their overtures of friendship and instead support US actions unpopular with them. Such costs to Turkey are now deemed by its policymakers as too great.

Two questions need to be resolved at this point. In view of the changed assumptions as discussed above, what will be Turkey's actions and policies in the community of nations in the future? And what can the US do to guide its developing relationship with Turkey into policy as favorable as possible for itself? The order in which these questions are asked does make a difference: No longer may the US ordain general policy and expect Turkish policy to conform. Turkey intends to develop policy independent of US interests, an intention which must necessarily alter the approach the US takes to its ally.

Therefore, we should ascertain Turkey's perceptions of its own interests and then inquire how these perceptions will be reflected in Turkish policy objectives and actions. Turkey will continue to perceive membership in NATO to be advantageous. It will, however, reduce its commitment and seek arms from non-NATO nations. NATO still represents to Turkey an entree to Western Europe and eventual integration into the European Economic Community. Membership in NATO is seen less as a shelter against attack by the Warsaw Pact allies and more as a hedge against Greek integration into the European community before Turkey or even as a hedge against closer Greek-American ties at the expense of Turkey. Turkey is not truly convinced that the member nations of NATO would finally perceive it in their interests to aid Turkey in the event it was threatened by aggression, but Turkey wants to maintain an option to join Europe in defense against a Warsaw Pact attack if it would be in Turkey's interests to do so. Finally, Turkey, though stopping short of signing a nonaggression pact with the Soviet Union in 1978, did agree to friendly relations and cooperation with Moscow. If the climate between Moscow and Turkey continues to improve, Turkey will go as far as it feels the NATO agreement permits in solidifying the Turkish-USSR relationship through a further pact with Moscow.

With the loss to the US of intelligence-gathering stations in Iran, Turkey finds itself
in a decidedly advantageous bargaining position. Since the US arms embargo was lifted, Turkey has permitted intelligence gathering at three bases to be resumed; however, there is little doubt that their continued operation will depend largely on American willingness to provide critically needed financial assistance and military aid. Further, Turkey will likely insist that the economic assistance be bilateral, not multilateral; that it be in the form of grants, not loans; and that the military assistance include offensive weapons, looking toward the Greek problem, rather than defensive weapons oriented solely toward defense of its border with the Soviet Union.

Turkey will continue at its own pace to seek favorable solutions to the Cyprus problem and its collateral disputes with Greece over airspace and seabed rights. It believes that it is militarily superior to Greece and that it has the superior bargaining position at this time. Therefore, Turkey will not be pressured into settlements that it regards as premature or unfavorable. Turkey will continue to expand its role as interested observer, if not active participant, in the dynamics of the nonaligned world. There is little doubt of the high value Turkey attaches to its relations with this world, especially in such forums as the General Assembly of the United Nations. Turkey will seek oil supplies and financial assistance from the Arab and non-Arab Middle Eastern nations. It is absolutely critical that both oil and funds be found to help Turkey out of an economic morass that is strangling all its efforts to strengthen its position in the world.

Linked to its economic problem is that of political deterioration. Turkey continues to experience difficulty with its democratic experiment. In the byways of Turkish politics one encounters chronic rumors of a third military intervention in the face of instability and stalemate. Extremism continues on both the left and the right, which has forced the government to impose martial law in many of the provinces. Inflation is intolerably high, and unemployment continues to rise. Governments formed by the Republican People's Party and the Justice Party during the past decade have been plagued by weakness and volatile conditions that have prevented decisive action. No government has been sufficiently strong to impose new directions in the search for firm and practical solutions to seemingly insoluble problems. Each addition to the succession of weak governments has only portended extensions of inadequate solutions to internal problems and almost no movement toward a negotiated settlement over Cyprus.

What role can the US play in Turkey's future? Turkey wants from the US economic grants and modern offensive weapons. But at what domestic cost can the US provide this assistance? Domestic American politics regarding Turkey are doubtless influenced by the presence of a sizable Greek-American ethnic component in America's body politic, and by the strong Hellenic legacy to Western culture. Furthermore, the last several years have witnessed a growing tendency in the US Congress toward the imposition of restraints on grant aid and increasing sensitivity to how offensive weapons might be used by recipient countries. Thus it will be politically difficult for the US to provide the economic and military aid that Turkey is insisting upon. In the absence of constructive efforts to accommodate Turkey in these areas, the US will discover Turkey's ties to Moscow growing. Moscow can be counted upon particularly to exploit the issue of modernizing the Turkish military. If aid is indeed offered by the Soviets in the military arena, Turkey can be further convinced of the diminishing threat from the direction of Moscow. Of course, Turkey may stop short of accepting Soviet military aid, but it will actively seek out and obtain modern weaponry from somewhere, either through direct assistance or through joint arms development and manufacture. It fully accepts the NATO nations as the preferred source; from the US standpoint, if the reality of domestic American politics precludes
direct arms assistance, Turkey must be encouraged to turn instead to Western Europe.

Turkey must have economic help also, and soon, to arrest its high inflation and high unemployment. Though the rest of the world faces the same double-edged problem, Turkey's situation is more critical. It has devalued the lira as much as it can and now seeks financial aid through multinational instrumentalities such as the World Bank. If any Turkish government is going to become sufficiently strong and stable to move Turkey toward solutions to other domestic and foreign problems, it will be the government that succeeds in obtaining the aid necessary to bring under control the problems of runaway prices and declining jobs. Each successive government, short-lived though it may be, will recognize this fact and go to enormous lengths to bring home the essential rescue assistance. It would be to the advantage of the US to be recognized as the government that contributed decisively toward putting Turkey back on a sound financial footing.

Until that day arrives, Turkey will not submit to any pressure to resolve those two problems of acute interest to the US—namely, the Cyprus stalemate and the need for better technical means of SALT II verification. The US is also vitally interested in reestablishing a stable anchor on NATO's southeastern flank. Greece, of course, holds the key. Greece has withdrawn from the military structure of NATO, leaving a huge gap in NATO's perimeter. With Greece now enjoying a period of moderate politics, it might be able to move toward a constructive act of conciliation in its confrontations with Turkey over Cyprus, Greek-Turkish airspace, and the Aegean seabed. However, without reciprocal concessions from Turkey, little progress can be expected. The hitch is that Turkey cannot afford to make concessions until internal economic stability is restored and the government in turn feels sufficiently confident of its position. If it is Moscow to whom Turkey eventually turns for succor, then a rapprochement between Greece and Turkey can hardly be expected, since the US would no longer exercise the necessary leverage. Obviously, too, is the fact that a Soviet rescue would betoken ill for US hopes to expand its SALT II monitoring stations on Turkish soil.

The US must make a decision soon; Turkey cannot wait much longer. It is this author's opinion that Turkey, though it no longer entertains a special feeling toward the US, would prefer the aid to come first from the US, second from Western European nations, third from Middle Eastern nations, and only as a last resort from the Soviet Union. Though even Ataturk cautioned about the necessity of maintaining close relations with the Russians, his heart belonged to the Americans. And though the hearts of Turks no longer belong to Americans, their heads still do.

NOTES

3. It is generally agreed among scholars that secularism in Turkey has prevailed. Though Ataturk purged the language, education, and social behavior of all traditional references to Islam, certain aspects of the religion have returned since his death to these areas of Turkish culture. References to Allah in greetings and pleasantries are numerous today; Islamic schools and religious classes are now permitted; and many traditional forms of social behavior have returned to life in Turkey. As I wrote in 1972:

Sufficient time is behind us to judge...the effect Turkish nationalism has had on Islam. What backsliding was going to occur took place, and Islam resurfaced as the religion of the people. Its effect on the Turkish people was healthy; its effect on the Turkish nation was imperceptible. The people, their leaders, and their nation had matured sufficiently to regard religion in terms of their consciences and no longer considered the Islamic religion a panacea for their social, political, and economic ills. Turkey is their nation and Islam is their religion, and in that order.


4. The military has intervened twice in the political process in Turkey, in 1961 and 1971. In both instances every effort was made to return the government to civilian control as expeditiously as possible.

5. Excerpted from the author's Memorandum for Record (10 March 1973) while a student at the Turkish War College in Istanbul. I spent many hours out of class talking to my Turkish classmates on every subject imaginable. Bisim Koy (Our
Village) was a book that had been banned and the author Makal imprisoned as a communist sympathizer. The book questioned certain political practices that seemingly disrupted traditional life in the Turkish villages.


9. Turkey charged that the Greek military junta in Athens ordered the Greek National Guard and a battalion of regular Greek soldiers to remove President Makarios. It further charged that American weapons were present and used on Cyprus by the Greeks during the Cyprus war. Finally Turkey felt it could not accept the leadership of Nicholas G. Sampson, the rebel leader who was a former guerrilla gunman and ardent supporter of Enosis. The newspapers in Turkey called him a monster and a barbarian.

10. Included within this group of cooperative ventures between Turkey and the USSR are 11 major projects, most of a “co-production” nature undertaken with Soviet aid; examples are an iron and steel mill at Izakenderan, an oil refinery at Izmir, and a major aluminum plant at Seydhishe. With respect to U-2 overflights of Turkish soil, see “Turks Deny Consulting Soviets,” *Christian Science Monitor*, 13 September 1979, p. 2. “Contrary to published reports,” it is there stated, “Turkey is talking only to the US and not to the Soviet Union about the US wish to use Turkish airspace for spy flights to verify the SALT II treaty.”

11. Specifically, Turkey is seeking to strengthen its ties with Iraq and Libya, from whom it imports 40 percent of its oil. Turkey desires also to strengthen relations with Pakistan and Iran, though the recent political and religious unrest in both countries does not appear to be a factor.

12. Examples are Turkey’s reluctance to incur the Soviet Union’s displeasure by permitting U-2 surveillance flights over Turkish territory directed against the Soviet Union, and its reluctance to permit use of bases on Turkish territory by US aircraft aiding Israel in 1973.

13. There is some recent evidence of Soviet involvement in political violence in Turkey. It appears that Marxist elements in Turkey are receiving smuggled Soviet weapons and encouragement for violence from a Moscow-supported radio station. There also exists some evidence that Soviet-supported Kurdish separatists may not confine their activities to Iran, but may eventually expand their arena to include Turkey.

14. These are Sinop, Diyarbakir, and Belbasi.

15. The US has increasingly preferred to have economic assistance channeled through multilateral organizations such as the International Monetary Fund. This method is not Turkey’s preference.

16. It is important to stress how complex the issues are that divide Greece and Turkey and how deep is Turkish-Greek enmity. Many Turks are brought up believing that Greece is their primary enemy. The Soviet Union provides the primary threat, but Greece is still the primary enemy.

17. The complicated geography of the Aegean Sea, with numerous Greek islands located close to the Turkish coastline, attaches to these two problems complexities that are only made worse by the Cyprus problem.

18. Inflation is running at about 100 percent a year and rising, while the unemployment rate is about 24 percent.

19. Fortunately, recent US-Turkish negotiations appear to constitute a modest first-step toward resolution of Turkey’s problems. The two governments have initiated four preliminary agreements, with the first establishing a broad conceptual framework for improved bilateral relations and the other three dealing specifically with military grants and credits, US help toward improving Turkey’s logistical and arms-manufacturing capacity, and American use of Turkish bases for intelligence-gathering and military operations. Negotiations are continuing at press time, with final details yet to be announced. See Richard Halloran, “U.S. Puts New Stress on Close Military Ties to Turkey,” *The New York Times*, 21 January 1980, p. 8.