NEW PATTERNS OF STRATEGIC
CONFLICT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

by

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In early August 1979, the "Voice of Democratic Kampuchea," the radio of the deposed government of Cambodian Premier Pol Pot, claimed that in addition to some 200,000 Vietnamese troops on Cambodian soil and 50,000 more in neighboring Laos, there were now some 3000 Vietnamese troops in Angola. The same broadcast hypothesized that if, despite their poverty, the Vietnamese were willing to send their forces to Africa "to serve as military personnel of the Soviet Union," the Hanoi government might well be willing to make an even greater effort in sending its troops into adjacent Southeast Asian countries.1

The veracity of the "Voice of Democratic Kampuchea" broadcasts and the policy pronouncements of the underground Pol Pot regime are as open to question as those of the rival "Voice of the Kampuchean People," the radio of the Vietnamese-backed government of President Heng Samrin, proclaimed on 8 January 1979 and now settled in Phnom Penh. There has been no confirmation from independent sources that the Vietnamese, like the Cubans, have become the Soviet Union's proxies in Africa. Indeed, knowledgeable Southeast Asian leaders with little love for Hanoi, like Singapore's premier Lee Kuan Yew, have dismissed the metaphor of Vietnam as "the Cuba of Asia" out of hand, though they concede that since the Vietnamese invasion and partial occupation of Cambodia at the beginning of 1979, conditions in the Southeast Asian region have "changed in the Soviet Union's favor."2 On the other hand, greater credence has been attached to reports that Soviet and Cuban "military advisers" have been operating with the Vietnamese forces in Cambodia as they seek to mop up the guerrilla resistance of Pol Pot, and Soviet sources themselves reported have confirmed that Russian "advisers" were killed during the fighting in Phnom Penh in January 1979.3

Such ruminations tend to underscore the most important development in Southeast Asia since April 1975, when desperate South Vietnamese fell from the undercarriages of American helicopters fleeing the US Embassy compound in Saigon, even as North Vietnamese forces were capturing the city. That development is the Soviet support and potential strategic exploitation of the consolidation of Vietnamese power throughout Indochina, a process which confronts no meaningful countervailing force at present, despite the PRC's four-week "punitive" invasion of Vietnam in early 1979. How extensively Moscow will exploit her opportunity remains uncertain, but Soviet naval usage of Vietnam's Camranh Bay military facilities is no doubt more a beginning than an end. Within Southeast Asia there is now a new extension of Soviet power, an addition to the Russian abutments of influence in Angola, across Africa into Ethiopia, and thence reaching toward Asia via South Yemen and Afghanistan.

The source of the new strategic Soviet advantage in Southeast Asia springs partly from Vietnam's own historic ambitions and partly from her sharp economic necessity.
Historical perspective shows Moscow to be an early advocate of a single Indochinese political entity. It was at the Comintern’s behest that the original “Vietnam Communist Party,” founded by Ho Chi Minh at a secret meeting in Hong Kong on 3 February 1930, changed its name to the “Indo-Chinese Communist Party,” because, as an official Vietnamese party history later explained, “The Vietnamese, Cambodian, and Laotian proletarian have politically and economically to be closely related, in spite of their differences in language, customs, and race.” The historic development of the communist movements and the eventual founding of distinctive communist parties in Laos and Cambodia have been closely supervised by Vietnamese Communist leaders. In Cambodia, especially, this Vietnamese dominance was deeply resented by a number of French-educated Marxists, like the later Premier Pol Pot. This resentment, fed by centuries-old Vietnam-Cambodian ethnic antagonisms, erupted into border clashes after the Cambodian Communists overthrew the American-supported Lon Nol regime in April 1975 and established themselves as masters of a new “Democratic Kampuchea” in Phnom Penh.

Because of their continuing frontier territorial conflicts with the bloody Pol Pot regime, as well as their old Moscow-supported aspiration to dominate all of Indochina, the Vietnamese resorted to an accelerating invasion of Cambodia in the closing weeks of 1978. By this time Laos had already become a Hanoi satrapy. Though Hanoi continued to disclaim that it wanted to control Laos and Cambodia, a statement issued at the 1970 summit of Indochinese Communist Party leaders asserted that Laos, Cambodia, and North Vietnam, while implementing “socialist state objectives” and even “independent foreign policies,” would do so within the framework of a “confederation approach” among the three states. This statement has never been repudiated by Hanoi. And no explanations were subsequently offered to clarify what a “confederation” concept of the three Indochinese states might entail.

Explanations were, in fact, unnecessary. Soon after mid-1975, when Vietnamese Communists had consolidated their power in South Vietnam and proclaimed their new unified “Socialist Republic of Vietnam,” they began to consolidate control in the remainder of Indochina. On 18 July 1977, Vietnamese Premier Pham Van Dong, during a visit to Vientiane, signed a 25-year Vietnamese-Laotian treaty of “friendship and cooperation,” which in effect not only legitimized the presence of some 30,000 Vietnamese troops already on Laotian soil, but also provided the means for Hanoi’s direct influence on the Laotian Government and Communist Party. After the brief Chinese invasion of Vietnam in January 1979, amid reports that the Chinese were still maintaining military “road construction” personnel in northern Laos and were seeking to consolidate their influence in the region, Hanoi’s daily Nhan Dan warned that should the Chinese attempt to encroach on Laotian soil in the future, Vietnam, “in keeping with the treaty of friendship and cooperation” it had signed with Laos in 1977, “would carry out its obligation by fighting beside the fraternal Lao armed forces and people.”

Next it was the turn of Pol Pot’s “Democratic Kampuchea,” whose incursions and border “rectifications” into Vietnamese territory, particularly along the border of the “Parrot’s Beak” region of Cambodia’s Svey Rieng Province, had long been a thorn in Hanoi’s side. By 7 January 1979, after a

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Vietnamese invasion in force, Pol Pot had fled Phnom Penh in order to carry on guerrilla resistance in the Cardamom Mountains, and a Hanoi-backed "Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Council" government had been established. On 18 February 1979, this new Kampuchean Government signed a 25-year treaty of "peace, friendship, and cooperation" with Vietnam, generally following the earlier Vietnamese-Laotian friendship treaty format. Thus the Kampuchean-Vietnamese treaty provides that in the interests of "national defense and construction" the two signatories "undertake wholeheartedly to support and assist one another in all domains and in all necessary forms" in order to strengthen each other's defenses. As in the case of Hanoi's treaty with Laos, the treaty stipulates various forms of economic, scientific, and other cultural exchanges and assistance, and it significantly provides for party cadre training by the Vietnamese. The treaty also strikes a note that was heard over and over again in policy statements emanating from Hanoi, Vientiane, and Phnom Penh in the following months—namely, that the parties "attach great importance" to the historic solidarity between Vietnamese, Laotians, and Cambodians, and that they promise "to strengthen this traditional relationship."

To complete the Indochinese alliance triangle, Laotian President Souphanouvong on 22 March 1979, during a Phnom Penh visit, signed a "cooperation agreement" with the new Kampuchean Government, as well as documents providing for cultural exchanges and mutual economic assistance. The substance of the "cooperation agreement" was not made public, but Kampuchean Government sources hailed the "close militant solidarity" between it and Laos. In Hanoi's press, the Lao-Kampuchean accord was greeted as a "momentously significant event," as a result of which "the invincible strength of the Vietnam-Lao-Kampuchea unity bloc" would be enhanced "many times over."

The concept that the three states now constitute a "unity bloc" has been frequently reiterated in official statements. As a spokesman for a Kampuchean Government cadre training seminar in Phnom Penh put it in mid-June 1979, "Each of the countries of Indochina is like one leg of a three-legged stove." The implications of such a view became apparent in the wake of the brief Chinese invasion of Vietnam. Even before Thai and other intelligence sources began reporting in July 1979 that China was organizing a 4000-man military force in northern Laos, backed by Chinese tanks, the Vientiane government, no doubt with Hanoi's concurrence, began urging that a "close military alliance" be formed among Vietnam, Kampuchea, and Laos. The purpose of such an alliance would be to stop Beijing's "extremely dangerous" military venture, including the alleged Chinese intention to annex Laos. A formal, Hanoi-dominated "federation" of Indochina may not exist today. Yet, the network of treaties now existing among Vietnam, Kampuchea, and Laos, the presence of tens of thousands of Vietnamese military in the other two countries, and the extent of Hanoi's political influence and control over the governments and communist parties of its Indochinese neighbors, may well add up to the same thing. Some might go so far as to speak of covert annexation by Hanoi.

Among the superpowers, the USSR has been the principal beneficiary of this development. It seems probable that even before Vietnamese troops moved in force into Cambodia to oust the Pol Pot government, Hanoi had consulted with Moscow regarding such a venture. On 3 November 1978, as Vietnam's clashes with the Chinese-backed Pol Pot government in Cambodia increased in intensity, the Soviets and the Vietnamese signed a 25-year treaty of "friendship and cooperation." Article 6 of the treaty provides that in the event of attack there shall be mutual consultation between the two signatories and "appropriate measures" taken to ensure their security. Additionally, the Soviets agreed to a number of programs of economic and technical
assistance to Hanoi. In subsequent weeks, not only Vietnam but also Laos and the new Kampuchean Government in Phnom Penh witnessed the arrival of Russian aid personnel, as well as planeloads of food and technical equipment provided by various Soviet youth, women’s, and other official organizations.

By August 1979, Moscow was reported to be providing aid to Vietnam at a rate of $2 million a day, with substantial if lesser degrees of support going to Laos and the Kampuchean regime. The extent to which this considerable Soviet aid has military significance is apparent from the fact that under the terms of documents attached to the Soviet-Vietnamese friendship treaty, harbor and port facilities in Vietnam are being improved by Russian technicians in order to accommodate the Soviet Navy. During a visit to Hanoi in late April 1979, UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim was told by Vietnamese officials that the former American naval complex at Camranh Bay would not become a Soviet base. But in October 1978, the Soviet naval buildup in the western Pacific, reportedly amounting to more than 750 vessels and said by Soviet sources to be necessary because of “instability” in the region, had begun to alarm Japanese circles.11

Indochina’s Southeast Asian neighbors are also deeply concerned about Soviet intentions. For example, though the Russian Ambassador to Thailand earlier had assured the Bangkok government that the USSR wished friendly relations with all countries and was not assisting any “liberation” movement in Southeast Asia, after the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia the Thai press reflected a different perspective:

The fact is that Moscow is also very active in promoting its own interests in Africa and the Middle East, as well as in Southeast Asia through Vietnam. It is easy for the [Soviet] envoy to deny that the planes which had been overflying Thai territory transported weapons to Vietnamese forces. It is true that Aeroflot was permitted to fly through Thai airspace three times a week, but the planes which had been making 79 flights over Thailand in the past two months were large Antonov-12, Antonov-22, and Ilyushin-76. What these aircraft could be carrying other than arms and ammunition is a difficult conjecture.12

The advent of Moscow’s new influence has in large measure depended on the economic reverses which the newly unified Vietnamese Government and nation confronted after the communist consolidation of power in South Vietnam in 1975. Alternating floods and drought, as well as admitted mismanagement by Hanoi, combined with the ravages of war to cause serious drops in Vietnamese grain production (e.g. a shortage of about 2 million tons in 1977 alone), damage to arable land, and serious population dislocations. Meanwhile, industrial production lagged as more than a third of the total labor force of 22 million remained unemployed. Because of doctrinaire social and economic reform measures, skilled ethnic Chinese manpower began fleeing Vietnam, and aid to Hanoi from the PRC—estimated to have amounted to more than $12 billion in the previous two decades—dried up.13

During much of 1977-78 the Hanoi government had sought to improve its relations with its Southeast Asian neighbors, as well as with the US, and broaden the base of its international contacts and foreign reconstruction support. But Vietnamese militancy in reacting to the provocations of the Chinese-supported Pol Pot government in Cambodia, together with a restructuring of distributive mechanisms within Vietnam’s trade system which particularly affected the ethnic Chinese population in what had been South Vietnam, aroused Beijing’s wrath. Indeed, these were serious self-inflicted wounds to Hanoi. In light of China’s anger at Vietnam, the Carter Administration judged the time for a normalization of relations with the Vietnamese to be less and less opportune, and toward the close of 1978 this left only an eager Russia as a source of succor. Both the negative reaction of much of the world to Vietnam’s Cambodian campaign and the punitive Chinese invasion of Vietnam in
January 1979 seemed to Vietnamese leaders to confirm the necessity of their dependence on Moscow, at least for the time being.

But these developments also brought what Singapore’s able Foreign Minister Rajaratnam has called the “age of Communist wars” to Asia, and they have brought a growing apprehension of the effect of Soviet strategic power gained through the new Moscow-abetted Indochina alliance. This apprehension has been expressed in several ways, including the solicitation of increased US military assistance. For example, at the Bangkok government’s own insistence, American military aid to Thailand had been reduced from a high of some $95 million in 1972 to about $8 million in 1978; but Thailand obtained new US military help after Vietnamese forces occupied much of Cambodia in early 1979. US military aid to Thailand in 1979 is estimated to have been about $64 million. By mid-1979, the US had repeatedly affirmed that it would maintain its military presence in the western Pacific; that it regarded the 1954 Manila Treaty, the underpinning of the now defunct Southeast Asia Treaty Organization and the main international legal basis for American involvement in Southeast Asian security problems, as still in effect; and that the earlier-announced US troop withdrawal from South Korea would be suspended, at least for the time being. All of these assurances met with open approbation in most Southeast Asian capitals.14

The region’s “communist wars” particularly have had the effect of causing the member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)—comprising the Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, and Thailand—to draw closer together. Founded in 1967, ASEAN is officially conceived of as a cooperative regional economic grouping in the style of Europe’s Common Market. The economic aspect of the organization has made steady if slow progress, to be sure. But ASEAN members also have long held military maneuvers with each other (as well as with British, Australian, New Zealand, and occasionally even US forces), and they have engaged in joint military action against communist insurgents that straddle their common frontiers; consequently, ASEAN has acquired a de facto defense dimension as well. This has occurred even as ASEAN spokesmen continue to insist, as Thai Foreign Minister Pacharinyangkun did on 6 June 1979, that a military alliance among the ASEAN states would be “untimely” and “unnecessary.”

Furthermore, the Indochinese alliance and the Soviet role in it have prompted ASEAN to act still more as a “unity bloc” itself in the international and regional diplomatic sense. For example, on 13 January 1979, a few days after Hanoi’s troops occupied Phnom Penh, ASEAN foreign ministers issued a joint communiqué sharply reminding Vietnam that it had promised repeatedly in recent years to respect the territorial integrity of other states, and calling for the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Cambodian soil. An ASEAN resolution offered in the UN Security Council on 16 March 1979 called on all states to respect the territorial integrity of Southeast Asian countries, to refrain from acts that would widen existing conflicts, and to solve disputes peacefully. The resolution was, as expected, vetoed by the USSR, but the veto only sharpened ASEAN’s collective condemnation of Hanoi in subsequent months. As Singapore’s principal daily, The Straits Times, editorially inquired on 2 June 1979, “What trust can ASEAN place on Vietnamese words when barely a few months after [Vietnamese Premier] Dong told ASEAN leaders of Hanoi’s commitment to a policy of peaceful coexistence and noninterference, Vietnamese troops launched its invasion of Kampuchea?” And in an address on 8 August 1979, Singapore’s national day, Deputy Premier Goh Keng Swee declared that for those living in the island republic the most important event of the past year had been the Vietnamese incursion into Cambodia. The conclusion to be drawn by the Southeast Asian nations from this incursion, he added, was that “we know now, if we did not believe it before,
that Communist armies do not respect international frontiers,” and that because of the Soviets’ support of Vietnam, Moscow has been given “the opportunity to increase her influence in the region.”

We cannot pause long to discuss the tragic plight of the tens of thousands of Vietnamese and other Indo-Chinese refugees, many of them ethnic Chinese, who have severely overtaxed the reception, camp, and rehabilitation facilities in neighboring Southeast Asian countries over the past two years, particularly in Malaysia and Thailand. Yet, it should be mentioned that in some ASEAN circles, notably Singapore, the Hanoi government’s alleged trafficking in and encouragement of the refugee exodus has been viewed as a deliberate “destabilizing” tactic of Vietnam, designed to accentuate anti-Chinese hostility in the ASEAN nations, all of which have sizable ethnic Chinese minorities. According to Singapore’s premier Lee Kuan Yew, the pressures on ASEAN countries resulting from the flood of ethnic Chinese refugees will tend to make the indigenous majority population groups more anti-Chinese, a development likely to benefit Moscow eventually. Other ASEAN observers do not quite share this view, but they do hold Hanoi responsible for the refugee problem and share Singapore’s opposition to the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia. ASEAN continues to recognize the guerrilla movement of premier Pol Pot as a legitimate government, and ASEAN spokesmen reiterated this view at the conference of non-aligned nations in Havana in late August 1979. 13

Because of its endorsement of the legitimacy of the Pol Pot regime, ASEAN finds itself alongside the PRC, which also continues to insist on a Vietnamese withdrawal from Cambodia and which has promised to provide Pol Pot’s forces with further aid. The US, meanwhile, has become more open in its encouragement of ASEAN (as evidenced by Secretary of State Vance’s presence at the Bali conference of ASEAN foreign ministers in early July 1979), particularly with regard to the ASEAN stand against the Soviet-backed Vietnamese presence in Cambodia. In June 1979, Richard C. Holbrooke, US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, in effect blamed Hanoi’s Cambodian invasion and the “implications” of its November 1978 friendship treaty with the Soviets for the halt in normalization of US diplomatic relations with the Vietnamese. According to Mr. Holbrooke, these Vietnamese policy moves “endangered regional peace and stability.” Noting what he termed the Soviets’ current “large scale supply and logistics support” for the Vietnamese, and the use of Vietnamese ports and air bases by Soviet naval vessels and aircraft, Mr. Holbrooke declared that the use of these Vietnamese facilities provided the USSR with “an increased reconnaissance and intelligence collection capability” directed not only against China, “but also against the US and other military forces in the area.” 14 His words seemed but an echo of an editorial warning in Bangkok’s leading daily the preceding February that “we and our ASEAN partners” had better keep a close watch on the “expansion of Soviet and Vietnamese influence in Southeast Asia,” so as to forestall “inroads by the new imperialism through subversion or any other means.” 15

An inexorable strategic polarization thus appears to be taking place in Southeast Asia. The US and China steadily draw closer together, and the ASEAN states, despite their professed aspirations to area neutrality, find themselves aligned with them. In opposition, Hanoi continues its hold on its Indochinese neighbors with the support of the USSR.

An important element of this strategic polarization is not just Beijing’s currently open approval of ASEAN, but also her announced readiness to come to the assistance of at least one “frontline” ASEAN nation—Thailand—should it be attacked by the Vietnamese. On 4 December 1979, PRC Deputy Chief of Staff General Wang Shangrong, speaking for a visiting Chinese military delegation in Bangkok, went even further, declaring that the Beijing
government would stand "side by side" with any ASEAN nation in the event of a "foreign troop invasion.”

Since the early 1970's, following the improvement in Sino-American relations marked by President Nixon's visit to China and the lowered US military profile in Asia, Beijing's concern over Russian intentions in Asia has caused a marked change in Chinese perceptions. Chinese criticism of SEATO and of the remaining US presence in the western Pacific has disappeared. Indeed, a continuing US strategic role as a counterbalance to that of the Russians now appears to be quietly encouraged by Beijing. Official Chinese suspicions of ASEAN have given way to open praise for its mutual economic cooperation and efforts to promote regional neutrality and "collective self-reliance."  

In contrast, Moscow's attitude toward ASEAN in the last two years has tended to become much more ambivalent. On one hand, Soviet media have suggested that the ASEAN countries are ready to develop "neighborly relations" with countries that have "different social systems," despite a recent Pravda description of ASEAN's position as essentially a "raw materials adjunct to the capitalist world." On the other hand, ASEAN has also been perceived by Moscow as a de facto successor to SEATO, and Beijing has been blamed for trying to turn ASEAN into a military alliance against the Soviet Union "and other peaceable states." Since the first half of 1979, ASEAN has continued to oppose Vietnam's presence in Cambodia, and the Soviets have had nothing good to say of ASEAN.

The strategic alignment in Southeast Asia today thus seems to offer no prospects of a lessening of tensions. Indeed, by the end of August 1979, the region's most respected regional newsweekly warned that the USSR, through its support of the "destabilizing policies" of Vietnam and through its own confrontation with China, had become "the greatest single threat to Asia today," possibly dragging it "into a third world war." The brutal Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 served only to underscore such apprehensions. Still, one might suggest, without undue sanguinity, that some significant countervailing factors to these disturbing trends remain. For one thing, both in Laos and among the Vietnamese-installed Kampuchean Government, there is a growing weariness with the large Vietnamese power structure present in these countries, and nationalistic reactions to them are rising. In Kampuchean circles the presence of so many Vietnamese "advisors" is being described as "burdensome," while in Laos defectors assert that there is widespread, if for the time being powerless, opposition to prevailing Soviet and Vietnamese control. In other words, the Hanoi-forged, Soviet-backed Indochina alliance system is not as solid as it would appear, quite apart from such opposition as Pol Pot's 50,000-man guerrilla army in Cambodia and the dissidents in northern Laos reportedly backed by China.

It would be folly to assume that the USSR is unaware of the weaknesses of the Indochinese alliance system and is unconcerned as to whether bolstering it would be worth the cost of possibly provoking new Chinese pressures and attacks on Vietnam or its allies. Certainly the November 1978 Vietnamese-Soviet friendship treaty proved no occasion for the Russians to bring significant new pressure to bear on Beijing after the brief Chinese invasion of Vietnam. Moscow is anxious to reap strategic benefits from the Indochinese alliance, but apart from rhetoric and economic and military aid, the USSR has not thus far indicated that it is ready to go further.

There also remains little doubt that Hanoi is still interested in improving relations with her ASEAN neighbors and is seemingly anxious to establish diplomatic ties with the US as well. According to most observers, the appointment of Deputy Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach (affiliated with the onetime influential pro-China faction in the Vietnamese Communist Party leadership) as Vietnam's Minister of State in May 1979 underscored Hanoi's efforts to break the polarization deadlock in which Vietnam now finds itself, and to seek a new rapprochement with both Washington and Beijing.

Interestingly enough, US-Vietnamese
diplomatic normalization is also favored in some ASEAN circles. In mid-August 1979, Indonesia’s Foreign Minister, Moctar Kusumaatmadja, declared that his government approved efforts to “normalize” Vietnamese-American relations, saying that this would aid in improving the situation in Indochina. Indonesian spokesmen also continue to favor a negotiated solution to the Cambodian problem. Hanoi has remained remarkably restrained in reacting to repeated announcements by the ASEAN foreign ministers that the latter still recognize the legitimacy of the Pol Pot government in Cambodia, but Minister Thach has sharply rejected the idea of a Vietnamese withdrawal from Cambodia as a condition for US-Vietnamese diplomatic normalization. Still, even in Singapore, usually the most hawkish of the ASEAN group on Indochinese questions, the leading semi-official daily editorialized that ASEAN members should not overreact to developments in Indochina, not least because Vietnam’s economic difficulties would severely inhibit any expansionist designs she might have (and perhaps would promote the rise of a truly neutral government as an alternative to both the Pol Pot and the Heng Samrin regimes). In early June 1979, Thach announced that Vietnam would shortly begin sending high-level “peace” missions to Southeast Asian capitals; meanwhile, in Beijing, PRC Vice Premier Chen Mu-hua warned a visiting Thai delegation that both Thailand and Malaysia should expect a Vietnamese invasion in the near future.\(^2^3\)

As a result of the United States’ growing cordiality with Beijing’s present leadership, an effort to scale down such Chinese rhetoric seems to belong near the top of the US foreign policy agenda in the coming months. Equally needed is a careful assessment of how the US might use its leverage (including possible ties with Hanoi) with the USSR and the PRC to initiate a lessening of the polarization now under way in Southeast Asia. Instead of a pattern of superpower proxy confrontations (e.g. a Washington-Beijing-backed ASEAN versus a Moscow-supported Indochinese alliance), a looser, more fluid arrangement of national interests in the region, affording kaleidoscopic turns as new political options diminish strategic tensions, would seem to be more in the interests of all concerned. In various Southeast Asian circles one finds a conviction that the US is well situated to undertake initiatives similar to those taken in the Middle East to break the present confrontation deadlock in the region. One must hope that such initiatives will not be too long delayed.

**NOTES**


