THROUGH EUROPEAN EYES:
SHOULD NATO STRATEGY BE CHANGED?

by

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Students of European and American security are asking if the current NATO strategy dating from 1967 is out of step with new realities, and American strategic thinkers seem to be most concerned. The "realities" since 1967 can be reduced to two: increased Soviet military capability has probably altered the "correlation of forces" to Soviet advantage, and Western Europe no longer marches to American commands. These two developments influence the way we look at strategy and tell us much about the essential differences between Americans and Europeans as they study the same facts and come to different conclusions.

The European challenge is to keep the Americans in Western Europe in order to keep the Russians out, to do enough to placate the Americans but not enough to enrage the Russians. The American strategic task is to maintain peace and stability in Europe while being prepared for contingencies around the world. Clearly the more the Europeans do, the more likely the success of the American strategy. Differences derive from estimates of what is enough and assessments of the comparative utility of military and nonmilitary means.

NATO Europe emphasizes the nonmilitary elements of strategy and seems to be generally satisfied that the current strategy is successful in its main purpose. America stresses the military aspect of strategy and is clearly dissatisfied with what it chooses to see as European apathy. It would be too simple and incorrect to attribute differences exclusively to transient moods. An effort needs to be made to understand why Europeans...
behave the way they do and how the United States might serve its best interests by meeting Europeans halfway. Too often differences on various issues are addressed without taking into account fundamental differences in world view.

**EUROPEANS ARE DIFFERENT**

The United States, by its very location, starts from a position of relative security simply unattainable for Europe. Broad oceans and weak neighbors, vast space and abundant resources, a large population and—perhaps the key to the European-American difference—a unique point of view distinguish the American world view. That point of view centers on the notion that we can disengage from an ungrateful world and its problems at will. We can fix any problem; if others fail to recognize that, we can simply withdraw to our continent and pout in the security provided by nature.

The European experience has produced a very different point of view. Despite the profound influence of Europe in shaping the world we find around us in the 1980s, Europe is a small, crowded, diverse continent dependent upon raw material imports. It is a collection, in fact, of second-rate powers which, since the devolution of colonial empires, have not yet decided upon their role in the world outside of Europe. Europeans have been bumping into one another for centuries. From time to time various states have made a bid for hegemony: Spain, France, Germany, and, since World War II, Russia. The Habsburgs, Bourbons, Napoleon, and Hitler are gone, but Switzerland, Italy, and the others are still there, alive and well. Denmark was conquered in four hours on a day in April 1940 during the last German bid. Danes lived as well as their conquerors and better than most Europeans during World War II. Copenhagen was hardly damaged. In 1945 the conquerors went away, not as a result of Danish actions but because the Great Powers made it happen. Rotterdam, on the other hand, was the target of terror bombing because the Dutch resisted. There is a lesson in this: the smaller states of Europe are like corks in a heavy sea, subject to winds and tides beyond their control.

Over the centuries the options available to the lesser powers of Europe have been three. The most attractive is to stay out of harm's way, a Swiss solution since Napoleon's time and a solution for Sweden during the world wars in this century. Albania has accomplished a miracle: it is invisible. Geography and immediate circumstances dictate the terms of this arrangement. Those states astride the Great North European Plain, which stretches from the Urals to the French Atlantic Coast, have been unable to hide. The unhappy history of Poland can be understood by noting the absence of natural frontiers in the East and West and the presence of powerful neighbors in those directions. The militaristic history of Prussia can be explained by the determination of that kingdom to survive as a great power despite modest means and a geographical reality that continues to locate the two Germanies of the 1980s between East and West. The lowlands, with some frequency, have served as a convenient doorway for use by the stronger powers. Some nations can avoid confrontation, some cannot.

If it is impossible to stay out of harm's way, it is sometimes possible to band together with others to neutralize the strength of a great power bent on extending its influence or frontiers. Coalitions, alliances, and defensive treaties fill the pages of European history. The weak have had to join forces to bring down the powerful France of Napoleon and the powerful Germany of Hitler. Strength external to the Continent was often required to restore what came to be known as the balance of power. Britain intervened often over the centuries, generally throwing its weight on the side of a coalition resisting the state attempting to rise above the others. The United States has been playing a similar role in our century, first against the Germans and now against the Russians.

When unable to avoid danger or form a coalition powerful enough to resist the most recent troublemaker, the relatively weak turn to another alternative: accommodation. The
very thought of bowing to another state is odious to Americans, but to Europeans there is often no real alternative. On the crowded Continent there is a sense of déjà vu as the personalities change, but the game continues to be played by rules made permanent due to unchanging geopolitical realities. This appreciation of the need to take the world as it is has settled in the bones of Europeans who, since the dissolution of colonial empires, have few illusions about altering the human condition or remaking the world. Their inclination is to adjust rather than to remake. If Americans wish to toss off this lesson that Europeans take from their history with a derogatory slogan, accusing Europe of a better-red-than-dead defeatism, so be it, but it seems unwise to set aside the centuries-long evolution of a culture with a shrug of the shoulders—if we truly want to understand Europe.

Sometimes a vignette out of one’s personal experience makes a point more effectively than citing any number of books. In the summer of 1973 a young German of modest circumstances showed his new house in a small Bavarian village to his American friend, for whom the house plan had been scratched in the dirt at the actual building site four years earlier. It is a marvelous house—as solid as a bunker, spacious, and up-to-date. The house tour ended in the cellar. The oil tank is twice the size of what one would expect in an American home; the furnace has a mysterious second compartment. When asked about the second compartment, the unsophisticated German explained in a most matter-of-fact manner without change of expression, “That’s a wood furnace for when the bad times come.”

Not if, but when the bad times come. It would be difficult to formulate an expression that more sharply reflects the essentially different points of view of Europeans and Americans. This scene took place before the energy crisis was foreseeable to any but insiders and specialists. There are simply good times and bad times. One muddles through. One has no control over certain forces; one endures.

Perhaps the difference suggested partially explains an anomaly: how Europe, so close to “the threat,” manages to be more dispassionate about it than America, so far from it. Those who live next to the railroad tracks become accustomed to the sound of passing trains; visitors are distracted by the noise. Indignant, even incredulous, American voices have been asking why the United States should be more concerned with European security than Europeans seem to be. The question misses the point on two counts: first, we aren’t—we’re concerned with US security; second, Europeans are concerned but can’t do much more about their security position without risking the transformation of the very nature of their societies. An unkind European might mention that he sleeps about as well in the Soviet shadow as Mexicans and Canadians sleep in the shadow of American power. One accommodates to things that cannot be changed.

All of this bears on how Americans and Europeans think about NATO strategy. Looking at the same words in the NATO documents agreed on by all members, we seem to draw different conclusions, just as one fellow sees the glass half empty and the other sees it half full. Europe sees the glass half full and concludes that the strategy, in this less-than-perfect world, is not all bad.

With the exception of France and the United Kingdom with their still-fresh memories of empire, Western Europe foresees the use of its military force as being limited to the Continent and then only when survival itself is threatened. This general appreciation of military power and its use promises to dominate European thought to the end of this century. It is a purely defensive feeling, an approach suitable to a gentleman in ripe middle age more concerned with the pleasures of life in retirement than with making a great career. It spurns adventure and prefers low risk-taking. It buys locks and pays policemen; it does not take karate lessons or keep loaded pistols near the bed.

This essentially conservative approach to the role of the military in security policy takes into account that there are rascals out there in the world, but it prefers to deal with them primarily by means other than military. It recognizes that a good business deal is not a quick buck realized by establishing one party
as a winner and the other as a loser; two winners is the object of a truly good business deal. Having two winners insure continued business to their mutual benefit and a congenial long-range relationship. The establishment of ties that profit both parties diminishes the attractiveness of any sharp departure from profitable business as usual. Mutual profit does not require affection or even agreement between the parties involved. It tends to relegate to the background anything that might disturb the reason for the relationship: mutual advantage. Further, Europe has also become accustomed to "security on the cheap" by being protected from the outside.  

Europe may prefer the United States, but Western Europe wants and needs the USSR and Eastern Europe—as well as other world regions, including North America—for reasons of economics, politics, and security.  

The conclusion to be drawn from these observations is that Europe is not interested in high drama and much prefers a predictable world based on diverse ties with both those it likes and those it dislikes. Security is not an object to be grabbed, but rather the by-product of decidedly nonmartial activities, activities so attractive to all concerned that only an actual threat to self-preservation—not a generalized threat based on "capabilities"—would put business as usual at risk.

It would be in the American interest to recognize this European attitude toward security and to consider it when military policy initiatives are contemplated. Men have been known to leave nagging wives, even beautiful nagging wives. NATO—or something like it—will survive the year 2000 unless its utility is put in question, and only three developments are likely to do that: the end of the perception of a threat from the East; the general feeling that unreasonable burdens are being placed upon European NATO by a nagging United States; or a prevailing US belief that Europe must be left to its own devices as America realigns its strategic interests. All are possible, but two of the three are within our control. As we deal with Western Europe, we must understand that over the centuries Europe has regularly faced various bids at hegemony that have resulted in bloody wars. The desire in Europe at the end of the 20th century is to avoid bloody war; to attain security by the establishment of various binding ties, even with political adversaries; to blur differences rather than to highlight them; and to negotiate disarmament. A continual state of heightened tension should not be forced upon NATO Europe by the United States if the alliance is to survive. The European notion that security is based on something other than the accumulation of guns and tanks needs to be taken into account by US policymakers if Western Europe and the United States are to share in the preservation of a security arrangement.

There are two general appraisals of the current state of the North American connection with Western Europe. One says that we've been there before, that crises have come and gone, that the alliance remains healthy despite a transient low-grade fever. The other says that current problems are different, more serious, deeper-rooted, and threatening to a relationship that has served European and American interests well for a long time. Regardless of which appraisal proves to be correct, the alliance doesn't need strains on it that could be avoided. This should mean to America that the attainable good is to be preferred to the unattainable perfect, that a less-than-perfect NATO is better than no NATO.

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NATO STRATEGY

A reading of the North Atlantic Treaty reveals that the signatories wanted to keep the Russians out of the NATO area. They still want that. The strategy since 1967 has been to preserve peace and to provide for the security of the area primarily by credible deterrence. Should deterrence fail, NATO will attempt to preserve or restore the integrity and security of the area.

Instead of leaping to a recitation of military capabilities and counting tanks, guns, and soldiers, let us take a look at some of the nonmilitary considerations in the agreed strategy, those which Europeans stress.

The NATO strategic concept assumes that Soviet policy will continue to be based on economic means, political means, propaganda, subversion, and military power, in the order listed.

Warsaw Pact capabilities range from major aggression, possibly supported by tactical nuclear and chemical weapons, to limited aggression, incursions, infiltrations, harassment or blockade of Berlin, covert actions, and finally to actions outside the NATO area altogether. The more probable actions appear to be those at the lower end of the spectrum, such as creating tension by harassment, blockading Berlin, or engaging in other political bullying on the flanks of Europe. This is clearly an appraisal of Soviet intentions, for Soviet capabilities do not limit options to the lower end of the spectrum. Such an appraisal by Europeans is in part self-serving, since it produces a threat at a level commensurate with European willingness to address it. On the other hand, it also attempts to see NATO through Russian eyes.

If the only Soviet concern were NATO, then NATO would have cause for even more anxiety than one finds in Europe today. A case could be made that given the choice of Soviet or American problems, a reasonable person would prefer the American problems. Despite overwhelming Soviet military superiority on its eastern frontier, Soviet leadership is deeply concerned about China. The fragility of the Warsaw Pact in peace must gnaw at the Soviet military planner as he considers his land lines of communication to the west in time of war. The situation in Afghanistan provides yet another illustration of a great power earning the disapproval of world opinion while it struggles to accomplish a relatively modest political purpose through the use of military force. Ukrainians, Estonians, Muslims, and a host of others are unenthusiastic about central direction from Moscow. Economic problems abound in the very system that regards economics as the first cause in understanding the nature and destiny of man. It must be discouraging to Soviet officials to recognize that despite achievements in space, military preparedness, and great-power status, their system faces an array of problems begging for solution.

According to this general estimate of Soviet concerns, NATO appears far less feeble and fractious to Moscow than it might appear in Western capitals. It is one thing to see a project fail or to suffer a setback, and quite another to lose one’s religion. Communist theology promises true believers that abundant internal contradictions will bring about the collapse of the West. Cracks in the capitalist system have been studied in Moscow dating from the German revolution in 1918 through the Great Depression to contemporary Western European anti-nuclear movements. They are scrutinized by communists for signs of the beginning of the end, but we muddle through; the resilience of the West and its ability to manage without central direction probably causes some dismay in the Soviet Union. Despite highly publicized squabbles that are literally routine in the NATO alliance, the alliance holds together, and a new member waits in the wings. These may be viewed as minor achievements in the West, but it is quite likely that concerned Russians attach more importance to them than we do. This interpretation suggests that NATO strategy is adequate in its first purpose: to deter.

The Soviets see five power centers in the world—the USSR, the United States, Western Europe, China, and Japan—and conclude that four of them are anti-Soviet.
Such a conviction—and the need for numerous internal security forces, a need foreign to the American mind—might explain the Soviet sense of being surrounded by enemies and a corresponding defensive requirement for large armed forces. We see those armed forces as an offensive threat directed at Western Europe.

NATO’s current strategic concept and the measures to implement it emphasize the need to demonstrate the cohesion and determination of the alliance. In a strategy designed to defend Europe against possible Russian aggression, military means and instruments are certainly important, but Europeans prefer to stress the nonmilitary thrust of the strategy. This is a reflection of the broader European concept of deterrence, which contrasts sharply with the American inclination to spring immediately to a discussion of military means—means which are, after all, just one instrument in the statesman’s bag of tricks.

Michael Howard, hardly an innocent, says it another way, a way which speaks for many Europeans:

We may accept therefore that there is at present [1979] little in the nature of Soviet society or Soviet political intentions to justify the ringing of alarm bells in the West, the evocation of the militaristic elements in our society, and the conversion of the nations of Western Europe into garrison states. Indeed, to do anything of the kind could easily make the situation more dangerous, rather than less. The Soviet leadership is no more prone than we are ourselves to accept that the military preparations of its neighbors are purely defensive, and to refrain from responding in kind.¹

But it isn’t purely a matter of refusal to transform Western societies into garrison states that affects European strategic thinking. Europeans also see the threat to their well-being differently.

Howard goes on to say:

We [West Europe] are not a prey to be devoured. We are a potential threat which might have to be neutralized, reluctantly and in extremis, in full consciousness of all the social, political, as well as military costs involved, and only if all else fails . . . . The attack would be improbable unless the Soviet military could promise rapid success without nuclear escalation, and the alternative appeared to be the disintegration of the Soviet empire.¹⁰

If Howard is right and if this interpretation of Europe’s reading of the NATO documents is correct, the 1967 strategy applies quite well to NATO’s situation today and into the 1980s.¹¹ We seek to deter war. Failing that, our flexible response promises direct defense, deliberate escalation, and general nuclear response.

These were and are appropriate measures designed to make it impossible for the Soviet military to promise Soviet political authorities rapid success without a risk of nuclear escalation. A mistaken estimate of Western intentions could have such frightening consequences that responsible and inherently conservative Soviet officials can be expected to err on the side of caution. Recollections of US willingness to fight in Korea and Vietnam might give pause to Russians considering the use of force in Europe, particularly since their own military couldn’t deliver even on the small problem of Afghanistan.

This way of devising means to address a threat is essentially European, an approach that can be called a “minimalist strategy.”¹² It emphasizes the appearance of alliance coherence and determination. The United States certainly takes the appearance of alliance coherence and determination into account but prefers to emphasize military capability. That preference underlines the American inclination to leap to military means to solve what American leaders see as a military problem, an engineering solution to a clouded political problem, a craving for a quick fix.

Few soldiers could be happy with NATO’s current strategy, and few American soldiers are happy with the minimalist solution. But military strategy is what soldiers do or plan to do with the means
provided by the societies they serve. NATO strategy is specifically designed to handle an admittedly more powerful adversary; it implies risk. Military means are but one element of the total strategy. With the tools provided by our politicians, current NATO strategy recognizes what Bismarck called the art of the possible. While we might prefer the strategy suitable to the sledgehammer we don't have, NATO strategy suits the more modest military tools we do have. It says to the Russians: you can't expect a cheap victory; you must go all out; you must expect very serious consequences; you cannot be sure of the outcome. We sometimes forget that current strategy is, after all, an American design formulated as we moved from massive retaliation to flexible response.

Further, for the Russians even a quick victory in Europe would not equate to winning the war. It would only alienate and mobilize their most dreaded foe, who presumably would have just lost a quarter of a million men, had a million American citizens stranded in Europe, and would be aware that all of its nuclear weapons stationed in Europe were in Russian hands—unless they had been fired, an even less attractive prospect for the Soviets, considering the likely target. It would not be the end of the Russian security problem but only the middle, with no obvious or inevitable settlement in their long-run advantage. An angry and unpredictable America would still be out there. An even more suspicious China, if that is possible, would still be there. Japan might decide that the honeymoon is over. A drive to the Channel would start a process, the outcome of which would be no more certain than it had been before the attack. Marginal Soviet military advantages are thus unlikely to induce the Warsaw Pact to charge west. Their problem at the Channel would be more or less what it was at the Elbe.

This is not to suggest that conventional force levels are unimportant. In time of war the size and effectiveness of NATO's conventional forces would certainly influence the timing of a decision to either accept defeat or employ nuclear weapons. More effective conventional forces provide a degree of flexibility that allows political leaders time to consider fully the possible implications of a course of action that could lead to mass destruction. In this connection, force levels and force development bear directly on the efficacy of the strategy, but strategy remains, above all, a political question.

Our current strategy works in its primary purpose, to deter. Its ability to preserve and restore the integrity and security of the NATO area would obviously be improved if its physical military components—conventional, theater nuclear, and strategic forces—were stronger. The much-lamented demise of American ascendancy in the strategic balance, the admitted tactical nuclear edge now enjoyed by the Soviet Union, and the long-standing advantage of the Warsaw Pact over NATO in conventional forces are clearly matters of serious concern to the West, but we have strengths. America and Europe do virtually everything better than the USSR—with the exception of maintaining in-being military power. The central question is whether the recognized deficiencies in all three legs of the military strategy cause the total strategy to unravel. That is what must be thought through in connection with the instruments of military strategy, the what of that strategy. Related, but something different, is the how of the strategy: the concept of flexible response based upon forward defense, reinforcement of the thinly manned forward defense, and the believability of graduated escalation. Simply posed, the question is: do we need a new NATO strategy or should we keep the one we have and implement it better—if only in marginal ways? Need we replace the tool or sharpen it?

What is it in NATO strategy that should be changed? To suggest that one rejects deterrence is to express a preference for war. Certainly deterrence has no enemies within the alliance. Should deterrence fail, NATO has declared its intention to defend itself. It would be defeatist to say otherwise. Flexible response forces the aggressor to anticipate resistance at all levels of combat, and graduated escalation means that the aggressor cannot know where it will all end. Perhaps the most frequent target of NATO strategy is forward defense—for good reason. Professional soldiers shudder at the
thought of an enemy breakthrough piercing the thin forward shell, rolling up the flanks, and putting the forward defenders in a sack before external reinforcement arrives on the battlefield. Defense in depth and more mobile reserves would be the prudent military means to prevent such a catastrophe, but both depth for maneuver and mobile reserves are denied NATO field commanders whose forces are deployed in the Federal Republic of Germany. German insistence upon forward defense is understandable. The prospect of attack from the East; withdrawal from the homeland, leaving families to Soviet mercy; and counterattack from the Rhine, English Channel, or Pyrenees is singularly unattractive to German statesmen and soldiers, whose nation provides the backbone of NATO’s ground forces. Is there an alternative to forward defense?13

At times it appears that we are analyzing two strategies: the one the Europeans emphasize is the strategy in place before a shot is fired in anger; the other, the one Americans emphasize, plays its role after that shot. Neither denies the other, but emphasis does matter. It matters in a way very unhelpful to the alliance. Phony distinctions are made and debated that pose the issue as one of deterrence or defense (war-fighting capability). Somehow a soldier with a rifle becomes a war-fighter, and a strategic weapon system, Polaris, for example, becomes a deterrent. Both can fight wars; both deter. Perhaps, at root, it is the European minimalist approach to NATO strategy that exasperates American leaders and causes them to charge Europe with attempting to get a free ride. Perhaps it is that we wonder why a prosperous Europe cannot provide for its own security 36 years after World War II. Perhaps it is the idea that we are in Europe to protect Europeans from Russians. In any event, these nagging concerns distract us from what is more basic: the European emphasis on the nonmilitary elements of the strategy has never been fully accepted by Americans, and the American emphasis on military means is suspect in a Europe which increasingly regards both Russians and Americans as reckless.

Those most disappointed with NATO are those who expect too much of it, those who feel uncomfortable with anything less than total assurance.14 They are typically American. Those generally satisfied with NATO are the Europeans, to whom the notion of total assurance is foreign, even laughable given the history of Europe. Here is precisely where the difference in point of view matters. Europeans as well as Americans could sleep better if we had, for example, 12 to 15 more NATO divisions in the Central Region, but Europe realizes that such an increase in allied strength is not going to happen and accepts that. The renewed American interest in defense, and a willingness to pay for it, are not matched in Europe, where the preference is for a more relaxed international scene. The mainstream of European public opinion at the beginning of the 1980s can be summarized as follows: we need the United States; we need NATO; the Soviets represent a threat; we prefer not to station nuclear weapons in our homeland; we choose not to pay more for defense. One might add: we are not interested in adventures around the world, and we are interested in living well now and in our old age.15

America does not welcome this report from Europe and does not want to live with it, but we are not discussing a failed strategy.16 We want an improved military capability, while Europe is telling us that the appearance of alliance cohesion and determination makes the current balance acceptable. It would be most useful to the alliance to shift the discussion from doubts about strategy to means of improving capability at acceptable costs. The strategy serves the alliance well.

CONCLUSION

The European minimalist theory of deterrence may be wishful thinking, more a convenient rationale for doing less than an accurate appraisal of the East-West power relationship as seen from Washington, but it seems to be the way Europeans understand NATO and deterrence. If we see things
differently, several courses of action are open to us:

- Continue to press Europe to do more for its security in Europe and for “defense of the West” in selected regions around the globe. This seems to be what the Reagan Administration will do, while beefing up both our military means and our tough-guy vocabulary. It will produce an incessant series of nagging debates between the United States and Western Europe on a case-by-case basis within the context of a generally deteriorating NATO. That is, raising contentious issues will insure the continuance of acrimonious debate. Differences will fill the pages of newspapers and periodicals, enjoy coverage on the nightly TV news, and generally undermine the appearance of cohesion and determination in the alliance, all of this at a time when the US pro-defense mood promises to collide with European anxieties and fear.

- Withdraw to Fortress America seething with resentment directed at those Europeans who refused to be educated by us and rejected US leadership.

- Reduce our presence in Europe, allowing us to address problems outside the NATO area, as European NATO takes up the military slack created by the reduced US presence in Europe. This is an exceedingly dangerous option for it could have the appearance of withdrawal under pressure, seeming evidence that the Soviets are prepared to stay the course while we are not. Unfortunately, this option is attractive to those who see areas outside of Europe as deserving the main US effort in the 1980s. The psychological reaction almost certain to accompany any drawdown in American forces in Europe could cause irreparable damage there and around the world. It could cause Europe to cross that nebulous line that separates minimalist deterrence from accommodation. One fears that the Soviet Union is well equipped to exploit such a course of action by calling desertion that which US planners would call a rational reallocation of assets.17

- Take into account the European minimalist theory as we proceed in a low-key way to improve the West’s security stance. Differences should not become subjects of public debate. Improvements in the NATO area will be marginal, but physical improvements on the military side are less important than influencing the mind of the Soviet planner, who must be convinced that NATO is a coherent and determined force.

It is likely that we will continue to press Europe to do more while entertaining plans to reduce US forces in Europe. The preferred course of action is to take Europe’s minimalist approach into account, avoiding the kind of public haggling with our allies that would undermine the appearance of cohesion and determination in the alliance while, at the same time, working toward modest increases in readiness and sustainability. Thorough appreciation of the other fellow’s domestic pressures is essential. We should follow a strict policy of no surprises by insuring that US initiatives are thoroughly discussed with allies in private, stressing fundamental shared interests served by the initiatives. Differences will certainly arise, but trade-offs are possible at the highest levels before interest groups on both sides of the Atlantic become involved and complicate already sensitive issues. Finally, we must plan for the mid-term future in order to remove issues from the passions of today.

NOTES

1. Karl Kaiser et al., Western Security: What Has Changed? What Should Be Done? (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1981), simultaneously published in France by the Institut Francais Des Relations Internationales under the title La Scurit de L’Occident: Bilan Et Orientations, in Germany by the Forschungsinstitut Der Deutschen Gesellschaft Fur Auswartige Politik under the title Die Sicherheit Des Westens: Neue Dimensionen Und Aufgaben, and in England by the Royal Institute of International Affairs. “To be sure, tensions or even disagreements are scarcely new in the Western Alliance . . . Nonetheless, the current transatlantic crisis cannot be considered as just one of a series of short-term episodes. It is more far-reaching . . . .” (pp. 8-9).

Indeed, the authors call the current differences in the alliance “formidable” because “a key characteristic of the current international situation is precisely that the West is undergoing a phase of strain and disillusion at the very time when it also has to deal with a crisis in the East, crisis in the Third World, and a prolonged economic and energy crisis on a global scale,” (p. 8). See also Josef Joffe, “European-American Relations: The Enduring Crisis,” Foreign Affairs, 59 (Spring 1981), 635-51. Joffe contends that the situation in 1981 “turns the many disputes of the past into minor family squabbles” (p. 835).

2. Alexander Haig, while Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, addressed NATO’s strategic doctrine in a speech on 13 October 1976 to the Association of the United States Army.
(See Survival, 19 [January-February 1977], 33-35 for excerpts from the text.) He welcomed the desire for a review of NATO strategy but generally cautioned against precipitous change in strategy. Part of the misunderstanding might be the word "strategy" itself. It might be that Americans generally infer "military" strategy from the word, while Europeans normally mean "national" or "total" strategy. In any event, Haig seemed to sense the mood of American impatience with Europe in 1976.


4. Richard Petrow, The Bitter Years (New York: William Morrow, 1974). Petrow reported that the Danish Army suffered 13 dead and 23 wounded; 20 Germans were killed or wounded (p. 49).

5. George Ott, "The Case Against NATO," The Washington Monthly, 12 (December 1980), 34-36. Other voices could be cited, but this one is so shrill that it makes the point in very clear terms.


7. The interruption of normal relations among the states of Central Europe since World War II is often considered a rather permanent fact of political life by Americans. Not so in Europe. See Helmut Schmidt, "A Policy of Reliable Partnership," Foreign Affairs, 59 (Spring 1981), 746, 753-55, for a recent utterance about East-West relations within the context of the Western partnership. See also Keiser et al., p. 23:

Detente policy in general is seen in Europe as having had positive results; while it literally affected millions of Europeans—Germans in particular—detente did not affect the average American and has therefore been generally perceived as a failure.

8. As of the writing of this article, Spain was still in the wings.


10. Ibid., p. 29.

11. Bernard P. Kiernan, "The Myth of Peace Through Strength," The Virginia Quarterly Review, 57 (Spring 1981), 193-209. An impassioned plea for restraint from a different place on the philosophical spectrum, one suspects, is cited below. The general thrust of the current Administration's security policies would seem to be the cause of this response.

Faith in peace through strength requires a kind of magical thinking, a tunnel perspective in which our own power deters everyone else, but no one tries to use their power to deter us (p. 208).


There is no doubt that the integrity of the alliance as we have known it has more to fear from the political puritanism and maximalist expectations of some of its supporters than from any Warsaw Pact blustering . . . . Despite its problems, NATO can be regarded as not falling far short of an optimum alliance posture after a long period during which the conditions in which it was created have markedly evolved.


For the Federal Republic of Germany there can be no alternative to forward defence: in view of her geostrategic situation, her population density near the border to the Warsaw Pact, and the structure of her economy, any conceptual model of defence involving the surrender of territory is unacceptable.

14. Booth, p. 3.

