GEORGE MARSHALL
AND ORLANDO WARD,
1939-1941

by

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"General Marshall got me out of bed at 0350 this morning, more than usual his calm self. [He] directed I notify overseas departments and continental armies of hostilities in Poland, including a statement reference bombing of Warsaw. Done." The quotation is from a diary kept by Lieutenant Colonel Orlando Ward, who, two months earlier, had become the Secretary of the General Staff of the War Department. Ward made the diary entry on the first day of September 1939, as German tanks crossed the Polish border and moved toward Warsaw.

The first of September was also the day that Brigadier General George C. Marshall, the Army's Deputy Chief of Staff, was scheduled to replace General Malin Craig as Chief of Staff and assume the rank and title of that office.

Ward served for the next two years as Marshall's Secretary of the General Staff, a period during which the War Department began serious planning to expand and modernize a military force that had grown accustomed to doing without. At the beginning of that period, the Department controlled an Active Army of less than 200,000 men, and it exercised less control over National Guard and Reserve units. All of these forces suffered from the natural neglect of a Congress that gives grudgingly to its military when no immediate threat exists. Ward's diary during those two years, although often brief and obviously intended only to refresh his memory, includes interesting glimpses of the austere and self-disciplined Marshall, particularly as he coped with pressures applied by the President and his appointees, or by congressional leaders who urged the War Department to adopt policies or programs that incorporated spin-off advantages for their friends or constituents. (The Department's hurried expansion of personnel and procurement programs created abundant opportunities for officials to gain such advantages.)

Brigadier General Marshall had nearly a year's experience in the Chief of Staff's office before moving to the Chief's desk. In October of 1938, Marshall had transferred from his job as Director of the War Plans Division, a position he had occupied for only three months, to fill a vacancy created when Major General Stanley D. Embick gave up the Deputy Chief of Staff job for an assignment in the Third Army area. Long before, General Embick had had a hand in the arrangements to bring Marshall from his troop-duty assignment at Vancouver Barracks, Washington, to take charge of the War Plans Division, with the much-rumored understanding that he would replace Embick and begin on-the-job training for the top Army post. The top layer of military authority at that time suffered from dissension between the Secretary of War, Harry Woodring, and the Under Secretary, Louis Johnson. Unable to agree on basic
principles and unwilling to cooperate, these two men created an atmosphere of indecision and enmity, with the Chief of Staff, General Craig, usually caught in the middle. It was Johnson who favored Marshall as Craig’s eventual replacement and who established a short deadline for the transfer to force the issue when, in the fall of 1938, Craig hesitated about naming Marshall as his new deputy.²

These were the men—Harry Woodring, Louis Johnson, Malin Craig, and George C. Marshall—who made or influenced decisions governing US military policy in the fall of 1938. In Europe, Hitler had just demonstrated Germany’s strength and the comparative weakness and lack of determination of both England and France; at Munich, Prime Minister Chamberlain and Premier Daladier had agreed to German-imposed conditions that startled Americans from a decade of complacency.

Although Marshall’s office in 1938 adjoined that of the Chief of Staff, and although several senior officers, particularly General John J. Pershing, strongly supported Marshall’s advancement to the Army’s top post, Marshall suffered the disadvantage of being a junior general officer in an Army that customarily rewarded its members more for seniority than for excellence. The most prominent barrier to Marshall’s advancement was Lieutenant General Hugh A. Drum, Commanding General of the First Army, with headquarters in New York. Drum had the advantage of seniority, of experience as Pershing’s chief of staff in France, and of having been a contender for the Army Chief of Staff position at the time of Malin Craig’s selection and, before that, when General Douglas MacArthur was named to the post in 1930. In the early months of 1939, while Marshall hoped that his record would recommend him for the job, Drum worked openly to line up a group of active supporters, both those with political and those with military background.³ So confident was Drum that, according to one rumor, he visited Craig to inspect the home reserved for the Chief of Staff on the same Sunday on which President Roosevelt summoned Marshall to the White House to tell him that he would succeed General Craig as the Army’s Chief.⁴

Lieutenant Colonel Orlando Ward joined the office of the Secretary of the General Staff in November 1938. Lieutenant Colonel Harold R. Bull, then serving as the Secretary, had been looking for an able and diplomatic assistant who would fit into the Chief of Staff’s office. Bull expected his own tour of duty there to end within eight months or so, a period his replacement would need to learn the routine of the office. Both Bull and Ward had been members of the US Military Academy Class of 1914; and Ward’s earlier assignments had included tours with cavalry units on the Mexican border and in the Punitive Expedition, service as an artillery officer in France, two staff assignments, and a tour as Chief of Fort Sill’s Guntery Department. He was in charge of the Geographic Branch of G-2 at the War Department when Bull offered him the job in the Secretary’s office, an assignment that promised Ward a measure of responsibility greater than he had previously known.

Although General Craig’s term as Chief of Staff was scheduled to end on the last day of August 1939, he would actually turn over his responsibilities to his successor on 1 July, and keep the title until his terminal leave expired on 1 September.⁵ The late April 1939 announcement of Marshall’s appointment, then, left Ward two months to wonder if Marshall would bring in his own choice to be

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the Secretary of the Staff or keep Ward for the job. During the previous six months the two men had worked well together, but General Marshall usually concealed his thoughts, making it difficult for even close associates to predict what he would do. Marshall maintained a barrier of stiffness that few persons penetrated, and certainly not his military associates. The President himself attempted an informal approach by calling Marshall by his first name when he was Deputy Chief of Staff, but felt the chill of Marshall’s disapproval of what Marshall called “such a misrepresentation of our intimacy.” It was the last time that President Roosevelt called him “George.”

Ward was nevertheless pleased with Marshall’s appointment. When the time came for Harold Bull to give up his job as Secretary of the Staff—it was 1 July 1939, the same day that Marshall replaced Craig and assumed the title of Acting Chief of Staff—Marshall named Ward to the post. It was with a stirring of anxiety that Ward assumed his new duties.

On the eventful first day of September 1939, General Marshall interrupted his work briefly to be sworn in, first as a permanent major general, and immediately afterward as a temporary four-star general and as Chief of Staff of the Army. This done, Marshall and several other top military leaders went to the White House for an urgent meeting with the President.

A newly assigned officer to the Secretariat, one recommended by Ward and approved by Marshall, was Omar N. Bradley. When a second opening occurred, Ward recommended another brilliant and capable officer, Walter Bedell Smith. From the beginning of his tour as Secretary of the Staff, Ward was surrounded by excellence. As Dr. Forrest C. Pogue later wrote:

[General Marshall] relied heavily on his Secretary of the General Staff, Lieutenant Colonel Orlando Ward, a quiet, studious type, who resembled a teacher more than a future armored division commander. Ward and his assistant, Stanley R. Mickelsen, were the first of a remarkable group of officers who served Marshall in the exacting job of handling correspondence, collecting statistical information, and keeping up with the entire flow of business between the Chief of Staff and his various assistants. In the course of the war this staff was to include a number of top officers, destined to become high-ranking generals, such as Omar N. Bradley, Maxwell D. Taylor, J. Lawton Collins, and Walter Bedell Smith.

Although Marshall had previously known some of these officers, it was Ward who searched for talent to fill a vacancy and who recommended them to the Chief. The ability to recognize competence and talent was a trait in which Ward felt a measure of pride; the reputation he gained for maneuvering the right officers into positions of responsibility was Mickelsen’s reason for calling Ward “the kingmaker.”

The major areas of concern with which Marshall had to deal from his first day in office were: how to expand and equip a neglected Army, how to modernize it, and—a source of friction among the top decision-makers—what to do with a developing US Army Air Corps. The leaders of that expanding branch of the Army were grasping for more status and autonomy, suggesting a separation from Army control. Although Ward remained on the fringes of authority, he felt obligated to share his views on important matters with his Chief. Concerning the Air Corps’ struggle for more independence, Ward pointed out to Marshall the advantages of cutting the Air Corps loose from the Army’s budget and manpower restrictions. As part of the Army, the Air Corps had been exploiting its newness and glamor to claim an uneven portion of the military budget. Marshall, however, while serving as Acting Chief of Staff, wanted no drastic changes, preferring to give the Air Corps more representation on the General Staff and to make it “part and parcel of the Army.” Their discussion of the matter convinced Ward that General Marshall was unwilling to make any truly significant
changes during his initial days in authority or especially take a stand that might become a last-minute obstacle to his big move to the Chief of Staff's office. Marshall's stance at this time was something of a source of perplexity to Ward, a feeling that he would experience again in the months ahead.

A related Air Corps problem concerned planes, their production and allocation. President Roosevelt had raised and defined the issue in November 1938, only weeks after Marshall became Deputy Chief of Staff. The President wanted to build 10,000 planes (he proposed 20,000 but doubted that Congress would approve) and to create the production facilities for making 24,000 planes a year, which he claimed would be sufficient to prevent an enemy landing in either North or South America. Marshall opposed the President openly, and during the months of military planning and congressional consideration, Ward kept urging Marshall to hold his ground against political pressure. The fact that Roosevelt was interested in planes more than pilots indicated that he planned to have aircraft available to furnish to US allies if the need arose. Ward and the Deputy Chief were thinking of the Army's need for modern equipment; Ward, in particular, hated to see the Air Corps grab such a large slice of the military budget. As the President continued to scale down his request, Ward wrote in his diary:

"Would it not be a good thing for the Army either to kick out the Air Corps or go off and leave it? When the inevitable retrenchment takes place, the Army will suffer if it still has the Air Corps with it. To date, no one has answered the question in public as to what we are to do with 6,000 planes . . . . The Chief of Staff should see that only the proper proportion of cadets try for the Air Corps. It is a waste of money to educate men at West Point and then make them aviators." Ward, of course, was thinking of other US needs and couldn't match the request for planes with existing demands. By May 1939, as Congress debated the President's proposal, Ward noted:

In the testimony on the 5,500 plane bill, Lindberg gave some fine testimony. I think it will eventually be cut, [adding to] the stinking history of how the President started with 20,000, then 10,000 planes without regard to his military advisors. Think then if we are asked for an opinion we can stick to it. Self-respect is, above all, something that all can have."

The dispute over the number of planes dragged on until the war in Europe gave purpose to production. The exact status of the Air Corps also dragged on without resolution until after the national election in the fall of 1940, when Marshall appointed Major General H. H. Arnold as Deputy Chief of Staff for Air, a choice with which few people would disagree. Ward particularly liked Arnold, whom he considered "a two-fisted man who stands up for what he thinks is correct. He may lose his head but he will go down fighting." Ward nevertheless criticized Arnold for a less-than-straightforward maneuver in which he was involved soon after assuming his new position. The Under Secretary of War, going along with what he interpreted as presidential wishes, proposed a plan to increase aircraft production to 36,000 military planes a year, a proposal with a price tag exceeding $2 billion. Marshall avoided the issue with the explanation that anticipated British orders would create plant capacity; accordingly, the means of financing the expansion was not properly the Army's responsibility. Blocked by Marshall's refusal to agree with the request, the Under Secretary of War revised his letter, persuaded Arnold to okay it for the Chief of Staff, and then sent it to the President, who approved the program. When the letter, with presidential approval, came back to the War Department, Ward realized that both the Under Secretary and Arnold had taken the back-door approach, a slightly deceitful route, to get approval of a program in which both had a personal interest. Ward
talked with the Deputy Chief of Staff, who discussed the matter with Arnold, who promised to explain the entire matter to General Marshall. When three days passed without the explanation, Ward told Marshall what had happened. In his diary Ward wrote:

For Hap Arnold to OK in the name of the Chief of Staff a billion-dollar program without telling the Chief about it is grounds for relief. The principle is wrong. My prediction is that the Chief of Staff will do and say nothing.  

Ward was beginning to realize that the matter was more political than military and that the rules of ethics had to be compromised to achieve political goals.

Ward made no allowances for political influence; he opposed the idea of political tampering or interference with the proper procedures for identifying military needs and establishing goals and programs. Marshall was more realistic; although he could resist even presidential influence when he considered the matter important, he reasoned that he had to bend on lesser issues, conserving his clout for questions of substance.

The end of French resistance in June 1940 gave weight to the President's aircraft production schedule and also prompted him to make several changes that affected the Chief of Staff's office. Realizing that he could no longer endure the bitterness and lack of cooperation that existed between his Secretary of War, Harry Woodring, and the Under Secretary, Louis Johnson, the President looked for a solution that would also offer a political advantage. Following the fall of France, Henry L. Stimson—Republican, elder statesman, President Taft's Secretary of War, and President Hoover's Secretary of State—advocated military preparedness, repeal of the Neutrality Act of 1937, compulsory military service, and increased military aid to Great Britain. Roosevelt needed a Republican of Stimson's stature who advocated the very moves that the President favored. The President appointed Stimson to replace Woodring as Secretary of War, gaining in the bargain a bipartisan appearance for aid to Britain and the military expansion program. While he was at it, the President replaced his Secretary of the Navy with another prominent Republican, Frank Knox, the vice-presidential candidate in 1936. And, after some prodding by Stimson, the President turned out Louis Johnson to make a place for the man Stimson had insisted upon as his assistant, Robert P. Patterson, a graduate of Harvard Law School, an infantry officer during the World War, and a federal judge before taking the War Department assignment.

These men of political power introduced changes as well as authority to the corridors of the Munitions Building, the wooden structure built hurriedly during World War I that now housed the War Department. At the age of 72, having established his record and reputation, Stimson adopted an uncompromising attitude that frequently irritated Ward and other War Department officers who dealt closely with Stimson's office. Stimson and Patterson soon began assigning political friends as their assistants, a process Ward watched with growing apprehension and distrust. Although the new Secretary was familiar with military needs and capabilities, his loyalty was to the President, not to the military organization for which he was responsible. Moreover, Ward considered Stimson slow and forgetful:

He is a doddering old man, irascible and very hard to get in to see. He will change the subject and go to another one and is continually thinking in the past. What a move when what we need is youth and vigor.

Stimson later named as his assistant John J. McCloy, another Harvard attorney from New York whose background prompted him to consider political demands rather than those of the military. Soon after taking over his new responsibilities, he made it his business to attempt to oblige all the funds he could to procure arms for Great Britain, thereby responding to an unstated but well-understood presidential wish.
Stimson appointed Julius Amberg as his Special Assistant, a man who impressed Ward at their first meeting because he asked Ward to explain the organization and functions of the General Staff. But when Ward undertook to do that, he learned that Amberg had little interest in the military organization; rather, Amberg wanted to tell about the sacrifice he had made in agreeing to work for Stimson. Ward noted in his diary:

What we will do if we get many more of his ilk, I do not know . . . . If they would let us alone we could do a good job of running the War Department. Perhaps we would not keep the British uppermost in our minds and would look out for the U.S.\textsuperscript{19}

An early source of disagreement between the civilian authorities and the members of General Marshall’s office was the means to be used to expand the officer corps. During the World War, Stimson had had a hand in establishing camps, known then as “Businessmen’s Camps,” for training young college graduates to be military officers, a plan he favored again. Patterson, a graduate of one of those training camps during the war, supported Stimson’s plan with single-minded determination. Stimson’s proposal, founded on the principle that leadership ability was a product of college training, would award the responsibilities of a commission to the young men of wealthier families, men who had little military experience. Marshall wanted ability regardless of social status and preferred to choose officers from men who had proved themselves during basic training or other military experience. To convert these men into officers, Marshall favored difficult and intensive training programs. Besides the difference in the two approaches to selecting and training officers, a fundamental issue at stake was the extent of the Secretary of War’s authority; it was Marshall’s view that the civilian authorities were trying to make his decisions. Ward urged the Chief to hold out against the political appointees. The issue dragged on for about eight months before Stimson insisted upon a decision and action.

Forced into a showdown, Marshall called in his deputy, Major General Richard Curtis Moore, and Ward to help consider courses of action that could be taken if Stimson persisted. Marshall suggested the possibility of resigning to establish a principle and the limits of Stimson’s authority. Ward advised Marshall to call the Secretary of War’s hand.\textsuperscript{20} Later, Ward described the outcome in his diary:

Marshall and Stimson settled the matter of the Businessmen’s Camps for the sons of the rich without their going through the draft. Marshall told him that apparently the New York group had a ‘general staff’ that thought one thing, but the War Department General Staff thought another, and that he could not stay on as Chief of Staff if the Secretary of War took the advice of the New York military group. It evidently was embarrassing to the Secretary of War, but the Chief of Staff came out on top and it should be a red-letter day for the Army. It should seat us a little firmer in the saddle. God knows, we’re nearly out of it enough of the time.\textsuperscript{21}

Ward had a distaste for the devious ways and insincerity of politics, and the election of 1940 only strengthened his aversion to the business of maneuvering public principles and property for personal advantage. Since members of the military traditionally did not vote, Ward’s interest in elections had always been as an interested observer; as a front-row spectator of the 1940 election, he realized how vulnerable the military was to political expediency. Opposed to letting anyone, military or civilian, hold an important government job for more than eight years, Ward at first favored the Republican candidate, Wendell Willkie. As the competition for votes forced the candidates into more reckless positions, however, Ward concluded that Willkie was just another politician. Willkie announced his support for a separate Air Corps. Roosevelt ordered the Army to put on a big air show just before the election and then appointed B. O. Davis as a brigadier general, the first black officer of that rank.
The Republicans gained black support when Joe Louis announced his support for Willkie, and then received another boost when the President's press secretary, Steve Early, kicked a black policeman. "The whole campaign stinks with insincerity," Ward wrote a few days before the election.22

Unlike some leaders who reach the top levels of authority, Marshall didn't stretch his working hours to accommodate the demands of his office. A man of self-imposed discipline, he chose to squeeze his workload into a reasonable span of duty hours that commenced between 0700 and 0800 and ended usually by 1600 or 1700.23 Ward's office hours usually extended a half hour or longer beyond both ends of the Chief's day, but he still managed a morning horseback ride except when unpleasant weather spoiled its pleasure. Throughout his tour in Washington, Ward kept two horses at the Ft. Myer stables, a 15-minute car ride from his home near the Washington side of the Key Bridge. His enthusiasm for horses, scarcely diminished from the days he served as a cavalry lieutenant on the Mexican border, was an interest he shared with his Chief. The two officers sometimes rode together, following riding paths between Ft. Myer and the Potomac, an area later given over to the Pentagon and the highways encircling that building. During the morning rides, Marshall could relax enough to be pleasantly informal, confident that Ward would not try to gain an advantage from an association that ended abruptly when Marshall returned to the office and resumed his role as the Chief of Staff. Marshall wanted no friendship that might overlap into his official hours, a wish Ward recognized and respected.

As Chief of Staff, Marshall encouraged his close assistants to speak their honest opinions on the issues that passed through the office. Added to that, Ward had long held a special disdain for "yes-men," and he considered it his obligation to speak frankly and honestly even when he realized he was going against the weight of authority. In such cases, the conflicts almost always arose because political authorities hoped to force through a program that Ward believed was not in the best interests of the Army, or because they tried to circumvent existing procedures or authority, as had happened with the aircraft production program. The President was a chief offender, usually pressing the Secretary of War to carry out the President's wishes using methods that Ward considered more concerned with "how to avoid the law rather than how to live up to it."24

During 1940 and 1941, no issue handled by the Chief of Staff's office belonged on those outer fringes of legality more than the program to furnish aid to Great Britain. In 1937, when a European war appeared as a remote possibility, Congress had passed the Neutrality Act to forestall US involvement. That act prevented the United States from furnishing aid to a belligerent nation. In the summer of 1939 President Roosevelt asked Congress to remove that restriction. After the September 1939 formal declarations of war, Roosevelt again pressed Congress to amend the law and thereby legalize aid to Britain. Congress made changes two months later, authorizing the United States to furnish "surplus" arms to Great Britain on a strictly "cash-and-carry" basis. Although Congress authorized the sale of arms, however, it made no provision for increasing production either for Great Britain or for the American military, which then lacked sufficient munitions to train the expanding Regular Army as well as National Guard units. Finding it politically inexpedient to urge more changes on a Congress with strong isolationist sentiments, the President chose indirect solutions.25

Eleven days after the outbreak of war in Europe, before Churchill became Great Britain's Prime Minister, President Roosevelt initiated an exchange of letters by which the two men traded ideas and opinions outside of official government channels. Recognizing Roosevelt's sympathy with the British cause, Churchill appealed to the US President through these personal letters. In mid-May 1940, within a few days after Churchill became Prime Minister, he sent Roosevelt a
long list of wants—including destroyers, planes, tanks, small arms, and ammunition.

Stimson, new as Secretary of War, supported the President’s objectives by whatever means were necessary, putting pressure on General Marshall, whose main interest was to equip the US Army before risking its involvement in a war. Marshall had reservations about US participation in a European war, however, reservations shared by many members of his staff who had served in France during World War I. Many of those officers retained impressions from that war that the British had tried to push the Americans around, claiming that the Americans lacked their training and experience in military matters. Marshall was willing to help the British after the United States had met its own critical needs. Ward, too, was willing to see the British receive needed supplies, but he resented the aggressive British manner of demanding them. Particularly, Ward believed that the United States should look after its own interests first, then, if aid could be furnished, follow the established procedures.

The applicable legal procedures required that, before US military equipment could be turned over to the British, the Secretary of the Army, or Navy, had to certify that it was surplus to US needs. Churchill wanted planes, antiaircraft guns, and 50 US destroyers—the very items the United States also needed. The President found two ways to circumvent the law that stood in his way. First, he directed the military to sell equipment to American business firms, which could in turn sell it to the British after Marshall certified the equipment was surplus, a certification that tested Marshall’s conscience and disturbed Ward. In his diary Ward wrote:

General Marshall in a fix today trying to get a certificate that he could sign to give the British five B-17 bombers and some rifles. Secretary of War is talking honorably, not having to defend his stand in Congress. Marshall has his name to protect. It is a basic honor and we must be able to defend his stand legally as well as from the viewpoint of national defense. The whole mess is due to not handling the affair through the staff.

Since it was impossible for the Secretary of the Navy to claim that the United States had 50 destroyers it didn’t need, the President and Churchill devised a scheme whereby the United States would trade the 50 destroyers for two British bases, one in Newfoundland and one in Bermuda, and for long-term leases on base facilities in the Bahamas, St. Lucia, Trinidad, Antigua, Jamaica, and British Guiana. Ward was apprehensive, especially since the British would not cede sovereignty on six of the bases:

I cautioned General Marshall to look at any gifts the British had to offer with suspicion. I listened to a pair of very gentle British generals who were in France during the retreat talk and answer questions. You can’t help but like them, but I don’t trust them and what is more, they are desperate.

As the German bombers stepped up their attacks during the fall of 1940, Roosevelt and his aides increased pressure on the War Department to furnish immediately everything possible to the British. Although the methods were obviously illegal, the President’s concern was getting help to the British, not hewing to the provisions of a law he didn’t like. When General Marshall insisted that he could not release 15 B-17 bombers to the British as Roosevelt had directed, the President, skilled at getting around such obstructions, told Marshall to furnish the planes for the British to test in combat. It was an evasion of the law; it strained Marshall’s conscience again, but he realized that the President would have his way and that he should yield the point so he could hold his ground another time.

These maneuvers, and others equally deceptive, troubled Ward, who could not accept the Administration’s willingness to avoid its own laws. “The only thing to do is
to change the law," Ward wrote. "Congress is in session."  
Ward's reservations on the base agreement were justified, as events soon illustrated. The British dragged their feet on implementing the agreement, making no objections to the overall plan, but using small details to delay and giving the impression that they didn't really want to yield possession of the bases. Concerned about equipping the US Army, Ward grew to resent the aggressive manner displayed by members of the many British delegations then operating in Washington. Although President Roosevelt had tried to send almost all newly produced US planes to Great Britain, General Marshall had insisted on keeping half the planes. This agreement remained in force, but it was ignored. Ward wrote in his diary:

The 50-50 deal is working with 33 planes for the U.S. and 409 for the foreigners, a 50-50 deal like one horse for them, one rabbit for us. Too bad the public cannot know this . . . We are like a pointer pup. If someone with a red mustache, a swagger stick, and a British accent speaks to us, we lie down on the ground and wiggle. I admire the British clear sighted, national self-interest, of which they never lose sight. We should adopt the same principle. The British Procurement Commission is impossible to pin down. It gives one list of arms to the Treasury, another list to someone else, and at the same time the British are most critical of War Department action. Regarding base agreement, the British are doing everything possible in a little way to obstruct progress. It took them one month to answer a radio [message] asking for authority to send surveying parties to Trinidad; their answer was they couldn't give blanket authority.  

Ward reacted strongly when the British indicated that they expected the United States to pay customs duty on arms and equipment taken to the bases Britain offered to lease to the United States in exchange for the destroyers. Early in January 1941, he wrote:

The base proposition materialized to Great Britain's advantage rather than to ours; we take responsibility for guarding their possessions and the British collect the taxes and eventually get the land back with all improvements. I hope that within the next year or two we can make some arrangement that is much more satisfactory, one that would give full title to the land to the U.S.  

In the end, Marshall sent one of Ward's close friends, Colonel Harry J. Maloney, to explain to the British that an unreasonable approach could wreck the entire agreement. Ward wrote:

It is tragic that we can't shape our course on a long-range, clearly thought-out program. If we only examined history and then shaped our course we would probably avoid the reefs for which we are headed.  

By the end of 1940, with Churchill emphasizing his needs and wants, and with the Roosevelt Administration running out of the materiel that it could furnish without congressional approval, the President sought a means first to legalize the aid program and then to expand it. On 29 December of that year, President Roosevelt hinted at his plan to convert the United States into "the great arsenal of democracy." The Lend-Lease Bill, introduced into Congress two weeks later, spelled out the President's program for furnishing large quantities of aid to Great Britain. To Ward, the proposed bill would legalize aid to England as a congressionally approved program, eliminating the signed certificates that had troubled his conscience. The bill also threatened to hand over to the British larger numbers of US-produced weapons, leaving fewer for the US Army. When serious Senate objections delayed the bill, the Assistant Secretary of War, John J. McCloy, prodded Marshall to add his influence by claiming that the Lend-Lease Program was vital to the defense of the United States. Although the Chief of Staff signed a statement to that effect contained in
a letter to Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, his reluctance to do so put him in a bad humor that lasted the entire following day. Ward’s immediate reaction to the letter was disappointment because Marshall had yielded to political pressure, especially because the letter implied that Marshall’s staff agreed. Ward thought the occasion had given Marshall a great opportunity to speak forthrightly and give his honest opinion to a congressman. After considering Marshall’s position and his signature on the letter, however, Ward concluded that Marshall had been wise to agree to something he certainly could not have prevented. Had Marshall opposed the action, he probably would have been replaced by a less capable person. Marshall, Ward thought, could do the country the most good in his present job “even if it is difficult to stomach some of the actions of our civilian mentors.” Ward wrote that Marshall “played the Administration’s game very skillfully on the Lend-Lease matter. I would have called their hand.”

After the passage of the Lend-Lease Bill on 11 March 1941, Churchill began pressing the United States to take a more active part by threatening intervention or, preferably, by becoming a belligerent power in support of Great Britain. Meanwhile, the German Army was making spectacular gains in North Africa, Greece, Yugoslavia, and on the island of Crete.

Although the congressionally approved Lend-Lease Bill eliminated the requirement for General Marshall to certify that equipment and supplies sent to Britain were surplus to US needs, the law also established what the British and several civilian members of the Secretary of War’s office interpreted as British right to war goods. Consequently, Ward was soon objecting to methods of procurement that were forced upon the Army—arrangements for the United States to buy defense material from Canada to be turned over to Britain, or for Great Britain to receive trucks under Lend-Lease terms, which the British government then sold to municipalities and civilian firms. With the President’s strong support, the British aggressively pushed their shopping list.

“They have contacts everywhere and cite a tentative agreement obtained from any source as a commitment by our government or the Army,” Ward wrote. “They become insulted if we do not carry it out.” By midsummer of 1941, Russian representatives came with their own lists of equipment and supply needs. After meeting them in Major General James H. Burns’s Office of Lend-Lease Administration, Ward wrote in his diary, “What strange bedfellows.” With three nations demanding a share of US production, the US Army frequently got the smallest portion because it lacked spokesmen who could plead urgency.

With no accepted system to allocate US production, Ward advocated that the United States take the initiative to establish an organization—a General Staff of the Democracies—to consider problems of mutual concern. As the nation that would furnish most of the war equipment and supplies, the United States, as Ward saw it, would control an organization made up of representatives of the democratic nations that were either involved in the war or threatened by it. The United States could then allocate available equipment among the nations according to greatest need. First, however, Ward urged that the US Army and Navy form a united front to deal with the British. It was Ward’s hope that by exercising better control of all US production, the United States would get an equitable and larger share. Ward found enthusiasm for the idea among Marshall’s subordinates, but Marshall himself remained noncommittal, probably because he realized that Roosevelt would be the first to disrupt such an orderly process.

In the summer of 1939, when Ward became Secretary of the General Staff, the Army could count shortages in almost all categories, but principally in soldiers. It became General Marshall’s responsibility to support a program of expansion, and it became Ward’s responsibility to monitor and coordinate where possible the efforts of other persons willing to advocate an expansion that then lacked favor, giving Marshall in-
formation he could present to a reluctant Congress. It was the President, of course, who should have spoken out to convince Congress and the nation of the need to rebuild its neglected military force, but expanding military strength depended on a draft, which Roosevelt recognized as a politically sensitive issue. Marshall also preferred to let someone else take the lead, although he was ready to support expansion when Congress asked his advice. In the end, a Republican and an old friend of the President, Grenville Clark, championed the Selective Service Bill. Clark was a New York attorney and a friend also of Secretary of War Stimson; he wrote the first version of the bill submitted to Congress and worked to turn Congress in favor of conscription. Ward assembled the facts and helped to organize the case that General Marshall then presented to Congress.  

The President signed a bill in August 1940 authorizing the War Department to call up 18 National Guard divisions and members of the Organized Reserve, a significant change from the thrust of previous non-intervention policy. As Ward recognized, however, this authority lacked meaning without the authority to draft the men to fill the depleted ranks. Congressmen looking for reasons to oppose the Selective Service Act seized briefly on an Army blunder that occurred during the crucial debating period. A current issue of the Army’s Recruiting News contained a commendation from General Marshall for recruiting personnel and their efforts. A young officer in the Adjutant General’s Office noticed the Chief of Staff’s comments in the yet-unassembled bulletin. Fearing that the comments about successful recruiting efforts could undercut the Chief of Staff’s claim that draft authority was needed, the overzealous young officer removed the two pages containing recruiting statistics. The conspicuously missing pages attracted suspicion at once. Several copies fell into the hands of Congressmen, who created a problem that soon ended up on Ward’s desk. This was a foolhardy error, one that could have stirred considerable wrath in the Chief of Staff, a man who had little tolerance for mistakes. Ward explained to Marshall what had happened and pointed out the suspicion that the error had aroused in members of Congress. This time, Marshall wasn’t concerned. After Ward helped him put the complete story together, Marshall again went to Congress to explain the incident and to affirm that even by encouraging recruiters the Army could not attract enough men.  
When Ward pondered the incident later, he concluded that it would have roused Marshall’s sudden anger had it happened a few months earlier. Marshall, however, had gained experience and confidence from the many occasions on which he had testified before congressional committees. Both accurate and straightforward in his testimony, General Marshall had earned the respect of the members of Congress.  

Congress passed the Selective Service Act on 16 September 1940. The bill authorized the Army to draft men for a one-year period, prompting the War Department’s next major effort, that of justifying an extension of military service for conscripts beyond a single year. Since Ward strongly favored equipping and training an expanded US Army, he could support the War Department objectives toward that end with a clear conscience, especially when increasing the strength of the Army would clearly mean that US forces could claim a larger portion of US weapons and supplies. Marshall testified often during the summer of 1941, appearing before Congressmen concerned about the political pitfalls in the legislation. A year after passage of the original Selective Service Act, Congress did remove the one-year limitation, but by a margin of only one vote in the House of Representatives, where the bill passed by a count of 203 to 202 votes.

Ward delighted in his associations with the capable officers who worked in the Chief of Staff’s office or who came there often. During Ward’s period of service there, Brigadier General Lorenzo Gasser, Major General William Bryden, Major General Richard C. Moore, and Major General Hap Arnold served as Deputy Chiefs of Staff. Major General Stanley D. Embick,
Chief of the War Plans Division and former Deputy Chief of Staff, gave frequent advice to General Marshall and earned Ward's special admiration because he outspokenly advocated courses of action that placed US interests first. During his World War I experiences, Embick had lost confidence in the military judgment of allies; he opposed scattering America's resources to strengthen allies at the expense of the United States. He was particularly distrustful of Secretary of War Stimson's program to equip the British and the Russians before US military forces. Embick's position usually conflicted with the policies of the President and the Secretary of War, policies that Marshall had to carry out; nevertheless, General Marshall sought Embick's advice because of his ability and integrity.41

Among the less-senior officers who kept the office functioning smoothly was a group of brilliant colonels and lieutenant colonels, most of whom Ward had recommended to General Marshall. In addition to those mentioned earlier—Omar Bradley and Walter Bedell Smith, the first to arrive, and Maxwell Taylor, J. Lawton Collins, and Stanley Mikielsen—other officers who spent a tour in the Chief of Staff's office before moving on to responsible commands during World War II were Lawrence S. Kuter and William T. Sexton.

For his part, Ward considered it his duty to give his honest opinion to the Chief of Staff. Of an associate, Ward wrote in his diary: "I am convinced he is a yes-man. Never gather that type of person if you expect to command well."42 Another time he wrote, "A staff to be effective should feel free to say what it thinks and should not be criticized for giving the commander views contrary to his own."43 Usually Marshall encouraged an opposing view, provided that it was concise and presented logically; Ward soon learned to gauge Marshall's moods and to avoid the stern man when he was troubled or tired.

Working for Marshall required great patience and a measure of understanding, qualities that Marshall rarely exhibited himself. A man of rigid self-discipline, Marshall made no provisions for error, tardiness, or untidiness, not even for Ward's contrary cowlick that seemed to offend Marshall's sense of order. Frequently he interrupted his work to say, "Ward, make that hair lie down." Marshall's associates, those whose work often brought them into the Chief of Staff's office, were well aware of the bad temper restrained behind Marshall's usual calm self-assurance. Although unable to predict the exact limits, they knew that excessive aggravation or office pressure could create a sudden storm when Marshall indulged the satisfaction of letting his temper have its way. On one occasion when Ward was reviewing a staff paper that displeased Marshall, the general hurled his briefcase across his large office, scattering its contents on the carpet. Ward left the papers and the briefcase where they were on the assumption that Marshall wanted them where he had put them. But such bursts of uncontrolled temper were rare. The members of Marshall's staff were mindful of his temper, but they admired his ability to control it. Those officers also knew, mostly by experience, that Marshall could pack almost as much disdain and disapproval into a glance as he could in an outburst of temper.44

It was not Marshall's manner to commend his subordinates or to express appreciation. He demanded much and then accepted the best and strenuous efforts of his subordinates as ordinary work, or even at times with the appearance of disappointment, as if he had expected something better. Although Marshall's methods were not those that Ward had been taught to use toward subordinates, nor the methods that came naturally to Ward, he usually accepted Marshall's aloof and austere ways as a condition of working for a man of Marshall's intellect, ability, and ironclad integrity. Besides, Ward recognized that Marshall treated all subordinates alike. Ward's diary during his three years of service with General Marshall often reflected admiration and approval of the Chief of Staff; only occasionally did it include criticism, such as:

A very hectic day. GCM on the prod to all around him. [He is] much upset and rightly
so because they are behind on general hospital construction... General bad humor to those who are around him more or less chronic. He will give some politician time and courtesy while we are really in need of seeing him on official business. Blames McMorland for article in Time Magazine about the Johnson gun without any basis of fact. I stood up for him, not to my advantage. However, my conscience is clear."

It disturbed Ward that Marshall expected consideration and loyalty from his subordinates but rarely returned those kindnesses. Ward wrote:

I can't see how he or anyone else can really expect loyalty of his subordinates when he displays this kind of non-support. He is a brilliant politician or, for that matter, fine at anything he puts his hand to, but to date he has spent, and is spending, not enough thought on things military. He is exceedingly critical of the General Staff members who have worked so loyally in his behalf. I have kept this information to myself, but I think that the staff feels it."

Another time he wrote:

The general should assemble [the members of] the staff and thank them for their efforts as they feel that he is intolerant of them. Leadership, to be effective, must have in it loyalty from the top down."

Despite a memory that served him well, Marshall maintained a small notebook that contained a record of his impressions of those officers with whom he came in contact, impressions that would affect promotions and assignments. And the common knowledge of the book's existence and of the fact that Marshall provided no margin for error created anxiety among officers who entered Marshall's office knowing that a misinterpreted instruction carried the same penalty as indifferent failure. Trying to carry out General Marshall’s terse instructions occasionally miscarried. On one occasion, Marshall told Ward, "Have Major Dean assigned to this office as your assistant.” That was easy enough. Ward was acquainted with Major William F. Dean, a member of the G-3 Staff, and it was easy to have the Personnel Division arrange for his transfer. Accordingly, several mornings later, after Dean had reported for duty, Ward asked Dean to accompany him when he took papers in to discuss with the Chief; Dean would learn procedures of the office and, at the same time, Marshall would know that his instructions had been carried out. Dean, carrying a tray of papers, stumbled as he entered the imposing office, lurched forward, and scattered the papers across the carpet. Embarrassed, and rattled by the general's stern disapproval of this performance, Dean retrieved the papers as quickly as he could, laid them on Marshall's desk, and retired. Marshall watched silently, but later in the morning, as Ward was about to leave his office, Marshall asked him who the young officer was. Surprised, Ward explained that it was Major Dean, for whom he had asked. "That's not the Dean I wanted,” Marshall said, and then identified his choice more carefully. First impressions were important to Marshall; officers who stumbled didn’t fit well in the tight efficiency of the Chief of Staff's office. A few days later Ward noted in his diary that the "general does not like Dean so I think I will have to make a shift in my office." Dean returned to his former assignment.

Years later, General Jacob L. Devers, who had worked closely with both Marshall and Ward during this period, said:

Pink Ward deserves a lot of credit for being able to work three years for a man as critical and unreasonable as George Marshall and still maintain an effective working relationship."

Ward never indicated that he considered the job an unusual hardship, possibly because he did not think of it as a means of gaining favor with Marshall or as an advantage in maneuvering for position or assignment. With his own integrity a match for that of Marshall’s, Ward felt obliged to deal can-
Secretary of War Stimson overreached his authority a few months later when he told Marshall of his plan to appoint his friend William J. Donovan as the coordinator of all governmental intelligence and as the person who would then pass intelligence to President Roosevelt. Ward immediately suspected that Stimson’s man in such a position would hand the President only the intelligence that the President wanted to see, making it more difficult to oppose his give-away plans. More objectionable—Ward said it was intolerable—was the fact that Donovan’s proposal would eliminate the Army’s Chief of Staff from the Army’s intelligence activities. Marshall considered the proposal an intrusion into his area; he complained to Ward that he was fed up with the Secretary’s failure to consult him on such matters. Moreover, Stimson annoyed Marshall by claiming that he was the only person within the War Department who had influence with the President. Again, Marshall threatened to quit if the Secretary of War went ahead with the scheme. Although reluctant to see a man of Marshall’s competence give up his responsibility, Ward was encouraged to see the Chief of Staff stand up to the Secretary and crowd him back into his own office.  

By mid-July 1941, Ward had served 27 years on active duty, had attained the rank of colonel, and had just completed the normal three-year tour in the War Department. General Marshall asked if he had a preference for his next assignment. Marshall also indicated that he would see that Ward’s name was on the next promotion list, a comment that surprised Ward and one he decided he would take seriously when it happened. He didn’t have to wait long; a recommended promotion list from colonel to brigadier general appeared on 5 August 1941 and, as Marshall had promised, the list included Ward’s name.

General Marshall’s principal biographer, Forrest C. Pogue, claims that when General Marshall reflected later in his life on his first two years as the Army’s Chief of Staff, he considered them the most difficult of the war years. They were marked by stress and
aggravation, which he shared with his associates, especially with the members of his immediate staff as part of his calculated plan to make "everyone else work like hell." Ward believed that the demands on his own time and energy by the impatient and taciturn Chief of Staff weighed more heavily than any the Army had previously made upon him. He felt, however, that the satisfaction he earned from the job easily balanced the hardships. Although the frustrations of the office persisted, Marshall learned to deal with them and with the men, mostly politicians, who created those frustrations. Prevented by a strong sense of duty from carrying out his threats to resign his responsibilities, he continued to serve his country well, to the end of the war and beyond.

NOTES

1. Ward’s diary for the period 25 March 1938 to 25 August 1941 is set forth on loose-leaf note paper. Ward usually made entries daily; occasionally he covered the events of several days in one entry; and when the pressures of the office interfered, he left gaps in his record. Some pages are handwritten; some are typed. The diary is held by General Ward’s widow, who lives in Denver.


3. Ibid., pp. 325-30.

4. Ward’s diary entry for 7 January 1941 reads:

Interesting gossip at noon today at lunch. At the same time that Gen. Drum was being shown the Chief of Staff’s house by General Craig, General Marshall was talking to the President. Drum left Washington thinking he would be C/S. Since that time he has been trying to supplant Marshall in every way or at least get some kind of a good job.


7. Ward diary, 1 July 1939.


10. Ward diary, 3 February and 8 March 1939, and 12 August 1940.

11. Ward diary, 14 to 24 November 1940; 16 January 1941; 3, 14, and 18 March 1941; and 31 March to 6 April 1941. See also Pogue, Ordeal and Hope, p. 49.


13. Ward diary, 22 May 1939. Charles Lindberg had been one of Ward’s ROTC students at the University of Wisconsin soon after World War I.

14. Ward diary, 9 November 1940 and 11 March 1941.

15. Ward diary, 14 to 24 November 1940.


17. Ward’s diary entry that covers July 1940.

18. Pogue, Ordeal and Hope, p. 43. Ward diary, 26 May 1941.


20. Pogue, Ordeal and Hope, p. 102. Ward diary, 16 August 1940, and 22 and 27 March 1941.


22. Ward diary, 25 August 1940; 2, 24, 25, and 26 October 1940; and 1 November 1940.

23. Pogue, Ordeal and Hope, p. 11.

24. Ward diary, 7 November 1940.

25. Ward diary, 13, 24, and 26 August 1940; 12 and 17 September 1940; 6, 7, 8, and 13 November 1940; 5 December 1940; and 18 January 1941. See also Pogue, Ordeal and Hope, p. 51.

26. Pogue, Ordeal and Hope, pp. 120-22.

27. Ward diary, 26 August and 12 September 1940.

28. Ward diary, 21 August 1940.

29. Ward diary, 8 November 1940.

30. Ward diary, 20 August 1940; 5 November 1940; 5 December 1940; 1, 6, and 15 January 1941; and 20 and 26 February 1941; 2, 4, and 8 March 1941; and 27 April 1941.

31. Ward diary, 2 January 1941.

32. Ward diary, 18 January 1941.

33. Ward diary, 3, 4, 5, and 8 March 1941.

34. Ward diary, 19 March 1941.

35. Ward diary, 31 March to 6 April 1941.

36. Ward diary, 8 July 1941.

37. Ward diary, 28 to 30 April 1941, and 1 May 1941.

38. Pogue, Ordeal and Hope, pp. 56-58.

39. Ibid., p. 61. Ward diary, 22 August 1940.

40. Pogue, Ordeal and Hope, p. 145. Ward diary, 14 to 23 July 1941, and 12 August 1941.

41. Pogue, Ordeal and Hope, pp. 132-34.

42. Ward diary, 8 March 1941.

43. Ward diary, 16 February 1941.

44. Pogue, Ordeal and Hope, p. 14. Ward diary, 27 to 30 April 1941. General Ward told the account of the briefcase to Lieutenant Colonel Roy E. Appleman when both men were with the Office, Chief of Military History.

45. Ward diary, 12 and 13 November 1940.

46. Ward diary, 30 April 1941.

47. Ward diary, 16 February 1941.

48. General Ward told the story of Major Dean’s assignment to the Chief of Staff’s office to Lieutenant Colonel Roy E. Appleman. See Ward diary, 5 to 7 April 1941.


50. Ward diary, 20 to 30 December 1940.

51. Ward diary, 17 February and 27 April 1941.

52. Pogue, Ordeal and Hope, p. 43.

53. Ward diary, 16 February 1941.

54. Ward diary, 17 February 1941.

55. Ward diary, 23 June 1941.

56. Ward diary, 5 August 1941.

57. Pogue, Ordeal and Hope, p. 11.