THE ARMY RESERVE
AND VIETNAM

by

JAMES T. CURRIE

The 1968 decision to mobilize units of the Army Reserve came three years after Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara first raised the idea with President Lyndon Johnson. In May and June of 1965, South Vietnamese forces suffered a string of defeats, and in July the Defense Secretary went to Vietnam on a fact-finding mission. McNamara returned with a recommendation that the number of US personnel in Vietnam be raised immediately from 75,000 to 175,000 with an increase to 275,000 early in 1966. A large part of this increased strength in Vietnam would come from the Army’s reserve components, from which McNamara wanted to call up 125,000 men.¹

The question of calling up the reserves was only a part of the much broader debate that went on within the Johnson Administration. Indeed, the critical decision in July 1965 was whether to pull out of Vietnam entirely, to maintain the current level of involvement, or to “give our commanders in the field the men and supplies they need.”²

In examining the various options, wrote Lyndon Johnson in the autobiographical account of his presidency, “I realized what a major undertaking it [McNamara’s proposal] would be. The call-up of a large number of reserves was part of the package. This would require a great deal of money and a huge sacrifice for the American people.”³ Johnson thereupon summoned a group of what he called his “top advisors” to the White House on 21 July 1965, the day after McNamara’s return from Vietnam.⁴ After a series of meetings which included General Earle G. Wheeler, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, President Johnson made his decision.

I had concluded that the last course [expanding the number of men and amount of materiel in Vietnam] was the right one. I had listened to and weighed all the arguments and counterarguments for each of the possible lines of action. I believed that we should do what was necessary to resist aggression but that we would not be provoked into a major war. We would get the required appropriation in the new budget, and we would not boast about what we were doing. We would not make threatening noises to the Chinese or the Russians by calling up reserves in large numbers.⁵

After what amounted to a perfunctory discussion with congressional leaders, Johnson made part of his decision public in a 28 July press conference at the White House. “I had asked the Commanding General, General [William C.] Westmoreland, what more he needs to meet this mounting aggression. He has told me. We will meet his needs,” Johnson went on to say that he was increasing the number of troops in Vietnam from 75,000 to 125,000. “Additional forces will be needed later,” he said, “and they will be sent as requested.” He was raising the monthly draft calls from 17,000 to 35,000 men, stated the President, but he had concluded that it was “not essential to order Reserve units into service now. If that
necessity should later be indicated, I will give the matter most careful consideration and I will give the country . . . an adequate notice before taking such action, but only after full preparations."26

Johnson was doing everything he could to minimize the impact of his decision, even to the extent of not revealing the full measure of it. He said he had rejected the idea of declaring a national emergency—which was a necessary prerequisite to calling up the reserves—because he saw no reason for it. In answer to a question from the press, the President indicated that he did not want to choose between guns and butter, but would have the government do all it could to continue the "unparalleled period of prosperity."27

The press conference included no discussion of why the reserve components were not being called up for Vietnam, and Johnson did not mention the subject in his autobiography. As already noted, General Earle G. Wheeler, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was present for at least one of the White House meetings in late July. Research conducted by the Historical Division of the Joint Chiefs has not, however, discovered any evidence that the topic of reserve mobilization was discussed at the July meeting from the standpoint of military efficacy.4

The best historical judgment of the decision not to employ reserve component units—particularly the Army Reserve and the Army National Guard—in Vietnam is that Johnson had made an almost purely political decision. Lyndon Johnson was gradually involving the United States in a land war in Asia, yet he was disguising his every move. The short-range success with which he accomplished this goal was exemplified by a front-page headline in the next day's New York Times: "Most in Congress Relieved by the President's Course."9 There was "general satisfaction" in the Congress, reported E. W. Kenworthy for the Times, "that the President had decided to increase the draft and postpone a decision on calling up reserve units." The President had become "increasingly sensitive," reported the Times, "to the possible political effects of a reserve call-up." Thirty-three House Democrats confirmed the political repercussions of reserve forces mobilization, saying that they had been getting "'heavy flak' from families that would be affected by a reserve call-up."10

Calling up the reserve components, stated one study of this period, would not have been consistent with Johnson's attempts to portray Vietnam as "a limited war of short duration which could be fought with little domestic dislocation and without interfering with his administration's war on poverty."11 Another author described the process somewhat more cynically:

He was using force but using it discreetly, and he was also handling the military. They were moving toward war, but in such imperceptible degrees that neither Congress nor the press could ever show a quantum jump. All the decisions were being cleverly hidden; he was cutting it thin to hold off opposition. If there were no decisions which were crystallized and hard, then they could not leak, and if they could not leak, then the opposition could not point to them. Which was why he was not about to call up the reserves, because the use of the reserves would blow it all. It would be self-evident that we were really going to war, and that we would in fact have to pay a price. Which went against all the Administration planning: this would be a war without a price, a silent, politically invisible war.12

Whether a substantial mobilization of the Army Reserve and Army National Guard in 1965—McNamara had suggested 125,000 men—would have made any difference in Vietnam is certainly open to debate. McNamara's attempt to merge the two components had been squelched by the Congress, but the Army Reserve was still in a state of McNamara-induced turmoil; the Army National Guard was undoubtedly in better condition for mobilization.13 From a purely military point of view, 125,000 men could have been sent to Vietnam much quicker by mobilizing the Army Reserve and the Army National Guard than was possible through
the long, slow process of the draft. No one knows whether this would have made any significant difference in the military outcome in Vietnam, but a reserve forces call-up would almost certainly have precipitated a closer public and congressional scrutiny of the war itself. As Baskir and Strauss put it, "Reservists and guardsmen were better connected, better educated, more affluent, and whiter than their peers in the active forces, and the administration feared that mobilizing them would heighten public opposition to the war."14

The US role in Vietnam grew ever-wider in the two and a half years following the 28 July 1965 announcement. The number of Army troops in Vietnam rose steadily all during this period, but the increase in active-duty strength came almost exclusively from draftees and draft-motivated volunteers. In 1966 and 1967—as in 1965—the Johnson Administration was unwilling to admit publicly that Vietnam was anything other than a limited war of short duration. That it had been going on for years before the United States ever thought of getting involved was not considered relevant by Johnson and his advisors.

In the years from 1965 to 1968 it became even more politically difficult to consider a reserve call-up, because the reserve components had become havens for those who wanted to avoid active military duty and Vietnam. According to Baskir and Strauss, who wrote what is perhaps the most comprehensive book on the draft and its effects during this time, "A 1966 Pentagon study found that 71 percent of all reservists were draft-motivated," and anyone who was associated with any of the reserve components during those years can remember the long lists of men who wanted to join the unit.15

Even as it became more politically difficult to call up the reserves, however, it became legally easier. Under the Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952, a presidential declaration of emergency was required before reserve components could be ordered to active duty. To the Fiscal Year 1967 Department of Defense Appropriation Act, however, Senator Richard B. Russell added the "Russell Amendment," which gave the President the authority, until 30 June 1968, to "order to active duty any unit of the Ready Reserve of an armed force for a period of not to exceed twenty-four months."16 A June 1967 amendment to the Universal Military Training and Service Act gave the President authority to order non-unit members of the Ready Reserve to active duty until they had completed a total of 24 months' service.17

This expanded legal authority for the President did not make the political decision any more palatable, however, so all through 1965, 1966, and 1967, reservists sat at home and draftees went to Vietnam. This was almost the exact opposite of the first year in Korea, when members of the Army Reserve and National Guard had borne the burden with the members of the active components. This is not to imply that reservists were not fighting in Vietnam during these three years, because most of the officers on active duty with the Army held reserve commissions, the product of the Army's ROTC programs. Members of Army Reserve units, however, as well as members of the Individual Ready Reserve, were not sent to Vietnam during these three years.18

The next year, 1968, was to prove different, however, though not as different as it might have been. The year began most

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inauspiciously for the United States when the North Koreans seized the USS Pueblo, a Navy spy ship, off the coast of North Korea on 23 January. Two days later President Johnson used the authority given him by the Russell Amendment (Public Law 89-687) to mobilize 28 units of the Air Force Reserve, Air National Guard, and Naval Reserve. This mobilization had nothing directly to do with Vietnam, though some of these men were eventually sent to Southeast Asia.19

Less than a week after the Pueblo incident, the North Vietnamese launched their Tet Offensive. Tet was a military defeat for the North Vietnamese, but it was a psychological defeat for the United States, coming as it did when US officials were proclaiming that the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese were on the verge of military collapse.20

According to General Westmoreland, the US Commander in Vietnam, the Tet Offensive "had at last presented the right opportunity" for calling up the reserves. Westmoreland, who stated in his autobiography that he had earlier opposed a reserve mobilization, now felt that "with additional strength and removal of the old restrictive policy, we could deal telling blows—physically and psychologically—well within the time frame of the reservists' one-year tour. The time had come to prepare and commit the Reserve."21

US forces in Vietnam at the time numbered about 500,000 of the 525,000 approved to that point by the President. General Westmoreland wanted 10,000 more troops sent to Vietnam immediately. In response to a request from Secretary of Defense McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff began to look at various possibilities for reinforcing Westmoreland, including Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps assets in their deliberations. The Army Staff worked feverishly to develop force-structure packages in support of overall JCS goals, but the Army planners were severely handicapped by several factors. First, time pressures were enormous. During the 11-week planning period, the Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development issued some 75 different force packages, generally under such short suspenses that there was often no time to coordinate them with anyone outside the Army Staff.22

The planning was coordinated with the Office of Reserve Components; the Chief, Army Reserve; and the Chief, National Guard Bureau. Because of what was described as "the need to maintain security," however, the Office of Reserve Components was not allowed to contact the Continental United States Armies, US Army Reserve Commanders, or State Adjutants General. Data on which to base the various force packages, then, had to be compiled from information on hand in the Army Staff offices. A further problem, which aggravated the situation at the Department of the Army level, was that the Army's reserve components had begun a major reorganization on 1 December 1967, a reorganization which was not completed until 31 May 1968.23

All of this frenetic activity at the Army Staff level was in turn being driven by political and other decisions being made higher up. The Joint Chiefs of Staff organization, for example, was busily considering three different overall plans for the mobilization, with a total strength mix ranging from 90,000 to 126,000 men.24

The question of mobilizing the reserve components was topmost in the minds of the JCS, because only through such a mobilization could the United States maintain any sort of strategic reserve, if additional active forces were sent to Vietnam. The JCS had long been urging a reserve forces mobilization, and the JCS recommendation, which General Wheeler offered in a 12 February meeting with the President, was that "deployment of emergency reinforcements to Vietnam should not be made without concomitant call up of Reserves sufficient at least to replace those deployed and provide for the increased sustaining base requirements of all services."25

Defense Secretary McNamara, however, had done a turnaround from his 1965 advocacy of a reserve call-up. McNamara had gotten his knuckles rapped for his earlier
position, and he now opposed mobilization of the reserves for Vietnam duty. President Johnson asked McNamara and Wheeler to "study the problem further and to agree on a recommendation." The Secretary of Defense was not prepared to wait for JCS agreement with his position. Instead, he immediately recommended, and President Johnson ordered, the deployment to Vietnam of one brigade of the 82d Airborne Division and a Marine regimental landing team—a total of 10,500 men. The Joint Chiefs thereupon urged on 13 February the call-up of 32,000 Army, 12,000 Marine Corps, and 2300 Navy reserve personnel. The Army personnel were needed, stated the JCS, "to replace the forces deployed from the strategic reserve, to provide support units to meet anticipated requirements in I CTZ and to provide a wider rotation base of requisite ranks and skills."

According to President Johnson's account, McNamara and Wheeler continued to disagree on the question of a reserve forces call-up. McNamara's tenure ended on 28 February, however, and he was replaced by Clark Clifford, who was believed at the time to be more inclined to mobilize the reserves. At the same time, General Wheeler returned from a trip to Vietnam and presented Westmoreland's request for 206,000 additional troops.

For the next month the President and his advisors considered various levels of reinforcement for Vietnam, and with every change of nuance a new force-structure package had to be developed by the Army Staff. On 31 March, President Johnson announced in a nationwide television address that he would not run for reelection. The last real political obstacle to a reserve forces call-up for Vietnam had now been removed. The final troop list was submitted to the JCS on 2 April and was based on the mobilization of 54,000 men in three increments, a total far short of the number Westmoreland had said he needed. The total of 54,000 men was modest enough in itself, but even this figure would not stand for long. Just two days later, Secretary of Defense Clifford stated that this option was too expensive, and he pared the call-up to only the first increment. A final revised troop list was prepared by 8 April, calling for the mobilization of 76 Army reserve component units with a total of 20,034 personnel, not all of whom would go to Vietnam. It was this list that the Secretary of Defense announced in an 11 April press conference.

The final selection of types of reserve units was based on specific requirements set forth by the US commander in Vietnam, plus units needed to reconstitute the strategic army forces. The threat of civil disturbances was a major factor in the elimination of particular National Guard units from consideration, though it had no bearing at all on the units of the Army Reserve. The Army goal was to select Army Reserve and National Guard units based upon the proportional strengths of the two components, and the final mixture of 31.9 percent Army Reserve to 68.1 percent National Guard compared with actual force percentages of 40 percent to 60 percent. Units were spread geographically as much as possible, the final troop list representing 34 states. Every attempt was made by the Department of the Army to select the most operationally ready units of each type required, but a lack of up-to-date information hindered this effort. Of the 76 Army reserve component units in the final troop list, 59 were current or former constituents of the Selected Reserve Force (SRF); two units had no SRF counterpart. The other 15 units were selected after considering such factors as readiness status, location (for geographic balance), civil disturbance role, command and control requirements, and length of time the unit had been organized.

The irony was that after all the planning and changing and revising and considering of the proper mix of units needed for support of the war in Vietnam, the total of 70 units mobilized was decided in the end by financial considerations. "The major factor governing the final decision on the size of the force in the 1968 Partial Mobilization," concluded the Army's official after-action report, "was . . . the financial support required for such a force and not operational requirements for additional forces to cope with a
worsening world military situation." Lyndon Johnson had apparently concluded that the American people could not continue to have both guns and butter, and he was therefore cutting back on the rate of procuring the guns.

Regardless of the reasons that went into their selection, 42 units of the Army Reserve were mobilized in this relatively small call-up. The types of units are shown below.15

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of USAR Unit</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Authorized Strength</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Infantry Battalion</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>782</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MI Detachments</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AG Units</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Composite Service Units</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1552</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical Units</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>667</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance Unit</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ordnance Units</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>313</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quartermaster Units</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>457</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation Units</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1814</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>5869</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Most of the members of these units first learned of their call to duty through the media, rather than through official Army notification channels. According to the Army's after-action report, the Department of Defense had prohibited the Department of the Army from following the procedures developed and prescribed after the 1961 mobilization. "This action," concluded the report, "caused confusion, embarrassed field commanders and contributed to a general feeling of consternation among many reservists."16

Nevertheless, more than 5000 Army reservists reported to their home stations on 13 May 1968, and within a week they were on their way to active Army mobilization stations. For the next three to seven months they would undergo the training needed to make them of maximum value in Vietnam. There was considerable local publicity given the mobilized units, and in at least one instance there were special ceremonies to mark the mobilization. When the 737th Transportation Company (Medium Truck, Petroleum) left Yakima, Washington, for Fort Lewis on the morning of 14 May, the town of Yakima was ready. The men of the 737th were treated to a special send-off party by the Greater Yakima Chamber of Commerce, attended by "mothers, wives, children, relatives, girl friends, and citizens." Music was provided by the Davis High School Band.17

Few of the Army Reserve units mobilized had 100 percent of their authorized strength, so the Department of the Army had to find filler personnel for them. There had been no national emergency declared in conjunction with the call-up, so there were in reality few options within the Army Reserve system. One primary source of fillers for the mobilized units was to be found among the 4132 Reserve Enlistment Program-1963 (REP-63) personnel in the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR). These men had enlisted for a six-year hitch in the Army Reserve, and after their initial active duty for training, they were obligated to five and a half years of satisfactory unit membership. For one reason or another, however, they had been transferred to the IRR, and they were now fair game for a call-up.18

Of the 4132 REP-63 personnel who were screened for active-duty orders, 1380 were exempted from call-up for reasons ranging from hardship and dependency (371) to inability to locate them (325). Eventually, 1692 IRR personnel were assigned to the mobilized USAR units, and 1060 were given assignments with the active Army. Over 1800 enlisted vacancies in the Army Reserve units were filled with active Army personnel, as were any officer vacancies.19

Army Reserve units—even those in the Selected Reserve Force—had never received all of the equipment required by their Table of Organization and Equipment, and the 42 mobilized units were no exception. By 12 July, however, all mobilized units had received equipment necessary to bring them to a C-1 Readiness Condition. According to the after-action report, "No significant [equipment] problems occurred after that date."20

The standard training week for the mobilized units was 44 hours long. General training guidance was provided by Department of the Army for all units, while the 35 Vietnam-bound units were given additional training, including a minimum of 16 hours...
with the M16 rifle. There were few complaints from Army reservists that they were not being given meaningful training or things to do, in marked contrast to many such complaints from the Air Force and Navy reservists who had been mobilized earlier in the year.

This is not to say, however, that there were no complaints from the Army reservists. When Representative Charles A. Vanik visited the Fort Meade, Maryland, training site of the 1002d Supply and Service Company from Cleveland, Ohio, members of the unit complained to him about "the lack of combat training, pass policies, laxity in the conduct of physical training tests, and low morale." Additional congressional interest in the mobilization came from the Senate delegation from Massachusetts, composed of Edward Kennedy and Edward Brooke. As early as 27 May, barely two weeks after reporting for duty, 88 enlisted members of the Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 513th Maintenance Battalion, signed a letter of complaint to Senator Brooke. These men charged that the 513th was not prepared for active duty, much less for deployment to Vietnam, and should not have been mobilized. The Army response was that "at the time of selection the 513th was the best qualified unit of the six available in the U.S. Army Reserve." Controversy surrounding the 513th recurred, however, when 16 members of the unit filed suit in US District Court in Baltimore charging that they had not received all of their mandatory training. Senator Kennedy asked the Army to postpone the 513th’s deployment after 67 additional unit members corroborated the complaints of the 16 men who had filed the suit. Kennedy asked Secretary of the Army Stanley R. Resor to "conduct a full and prompt investigation" of the claims and to "keep this unit available until an appropriate inquiry is satisfactorily completed." Resor declined Kennedy's request, and a spokesman stated that the Army had investigated "as far as they're going to and as far as they are concerned, it's a closed case."

Both political and legal challenges failed, however, as the US Supreme Court, in an 8-1 decision with Justice William O. Douglas dissenting, turned down the plea from members of the 513th and five other Army Reserve units. A total of 256 plaintiffs had joined in the suit, which had two major claims: that in being called up for 24 months they were not given credit for active-duty time already served, and that they could only be called up after a declaration of national emergency. The plaintiffs were thus challenging the constitutionality of the Russell Amendment.

The 513th—all 251 members of it—did go to Vietnam, as did the members of 34 other units of the Army Reserve. In December 1982 Lewis C. Brodsky, Chief of Public Affairs for the Office of the Chief, Army Reserve, sent letters to each of these units, asking for their help in compiling the story of the Army Reserve in Vietnam. Many units responded to this request with newspaper clippings, letters of commendation, general orders, unit lineages, after-action reports, and other documents generated during or immediately after their tours of duty in 1968-69. The stories of the Army Reserve units in Vietnam are varied, but they offer a number of common elements. First, the units themselves were not nearly ready for active participation in the Vietnam War when they were mobilized in May 1968. It required months—sometimes six or seven months—of intensive training before the 35 units were ready to go to Vietnam. Many of the Army Reserve units that were chosen for the 1968 mobilization had only recently undergone TOE changes, and some of them had changed from one branch of the Army to another.

The maturity and esprit of the individuals were major factors in making up for the lack of long-term technical expertise. Most of the men and women in the Army Reserve were older than the typical draftee, and the Army reservist—if the fragmentary statistics on discipline, AWOL, and courts-martial are representative—was less likely to become involved in criminal activities than was the draftee. The personnel of the Army
Reserve units were likewise determined to prove to the active Army—and perhaps to themselves as well—that they were as good as anyone in uniform. And they did just that in Vietnam, for Army Reserve units were often lauded and decorated by the men under whom they served.

Members of the 35 USAR units in Vietnam received 277 Certificates of Achievement and the following other awards: one Silver Star, five Legion of Merit awards, 384 Bronze Stars, seven Air Medals, 779 Army Commendation Medals, and 20 Purple Hearts. Additionally, the 231st Transportation Company (Floating Craft), from St. Petersburg, Florida, was selected as the Army’s outstanding transportation unit in Vietnam and received the National Defense Transportation Award. Two Army Reserve units were recommended for the Presidential Unit Citation, 13 for the Meritorious Unit Citation, and one for the Unit Cross of Gallantry (Vietnam).48

There were some problems with Army Reserve units in Vietnam, but they were not problems caused by the units themselves. The biggest gripe from unit personnel was the Army’s policy of “infusion,” i.e. of taking members out of USAR units and replacing them with non-unit personnel. As the French military thinker Ardent Du Picq stated:

Four brave men who do not know each other will not dare to attack a lion. Four less brave, but knowing each other well, sure of their reliability and consequently of mutual aid will attack resolutely. There is the science of the organization of armies in a nutshell.49

One of the primary strengths of the Army Reserve units in Vietnam was that the men and women in the units knew each other well. Indeed, through years of training together they had developed the highest possible level of esprit, and they were not afraid to “attack a lion” once they got to Vietnam. “Fusion,” whatever its merits as a means of distributing the individuals with particular Special Skill Identifiers among units or of preventing hometown tragedies, was a destroyer of the esprit built up among the Army Reservists.

The US Army could have learned a lesson from the British in this regard, for the British Army has long recognized the value of unit integrity and unit identification as a motivator, and even as a means of increasing combat effectiveness. The US Army now seems with its active Army unit identification system to have taken a step in this direction. The Army Reserve’s experiences in Vietnam should serve to confirm and strengthen this trend.

The final question that can be asked about the Army Reserve’s role in Vietnam is whether it made any difference or not. The individuals and the units mobilized did an “outstanding” job, to use that overworn rater’s phrase. Army reservists in Vietnam, however, were only a small fraction—less than five percent—of the total Army force involved there. They did their jobs, and they did them well. But whether they made any real difference in the war is debatable.

At this writing, the United States has just passed through a significant transition period on the subject of Vietnam. The Vietnam Memorial has become one of the must-see places on the Mall in Washington, and Vietnam veterans are getting some belated recognition and attention and help. Although the individual members of the Army Reserve who went to Vietnam may have done their duty in anonymity, the men and women of the units mobilized in 1968 and returned from Vietnam in 1969 generally experienced a reception much more akin to that following World War II, when Johnny came marching home to a hero’s reception.

If some Army reservists were subjected to scorn and hostility, most received welcomes like those in Yakima, Washington, or Provo, Utah. Their communities greeted their return as American towns and cities have long greeted returning veterans, with bands and flags and parades. If the public had turned against the war in Vietnam by 1969, the communities of the Army Reserve units had not turned against their men and women in uniform just because the war was an unpopular one. It had been a long time in happening, but the Army Reserve unit had

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become an integral part of the community in much of small-town America, and these true citizen-soldiers were very much in the mainstream of community life and consciousness.

Indeed, the growing involvement of the Army Reserve could well have been the key to what might have been a different course for the Vietnam War. In retrospect, one can suggest that if President Johnson had decided in 1965 to fight the Vietnam War with reserve component forces, rather than draftees, he would have been forced to ask for explicit congressional authorization. The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, which provided the legal basis for Johnson’s actions on Vietnam, would not have given him sufficient authority to call up the reserve components without declaring a national emergency. The whole question of our involvement in Vietnam might have been subjected to the sort of public and congressional debate that never really occurred. Such a debate might well have revealed the painfully learned truth that there was not a deep and enduring national resolve on the question of Vietnam, and it might have shortened the US involvement in the war. It would not have been as easy to call up the reserves as it was to increase the draft calls, and in the history of the Vietnam War, the decision not to mobilize the Army’s reserve components in 1965 may have been Lyndon Johnson’s key decision. Indeed, the Army Reserve ought not to be too easy to mobilize, lest it be used before the crisis has been properly considered. Once a national consensus is reached, however, and the Congress and the President agree on US objectives, the Army Reserve should be ready and able to do its part. Vietnam proved both the truth and the tragedy in this thesis.

NOTES

2. Ibid., p. 16.
4. Ibid., p. 147.
5. Ibid., p. 149.
7. Ibid., p. 800.
10. Ibid., pp. 1, 11.
15. Ibid., p. 51.
18. In a unique exception to the usual pattern, 13 second lieutenants with USAR commissions were called to active duty in 1966 from the 4th Bn, 1981st Artillery (AW) (SP), Delaware National Guard. These individuals had incurred an active duty obligation as a result of their ROTC commissioning, and they were called up as individual Army reservists, despite their being in the National Guard.
20. Odegard, p. 44.
24. Ibid., p. 1-5.
35. *Annual Historical Summary, RCS-CSHIS-6 (RZ), Office of the Chief, Army Reserve, 1 July 1967 to 30 June 1968*, Part I, p. 3. A complete listing of these units, with their home stations, is at Appendix C. The figure of 45 USAR units mobilized is sometimes seen. This figure refers to “company/detachment” size units and as such counts the 100th Bn, 442nd Inf as four units (HHC and three line companies).
37. “737th Mobilizes at Center” and “737th Earns Proud Sendoff from Yakima,” both in *Yakima Herald-Republic*, 14 and 15 May 1968.
39. Ibid., pp. 3-11, 3-3, 4-7.
40. Ibid., p. 3-4.
41. Ibid., p. 3-6.
42. Ibid., p. 3-16.
43. DF, CAR to CORC, 12 June 1968. Subject: “Mobilization of the 513 CS Bn,” with enclosures, found in Records of the Chief, Army Reserve, Washington National Records Center, Suitland, Maryland, Accession No. 71A-3109, 402-05, “Congressional Correspondence, 68, A-G.”
46. “Dissidents in Uniform: Supreme Court Rejects Challenge,” *Boston Herald Traveler*, 8 October 1968, p. 1; other units which had members who joined the suit were the 1002d Sup and Svc Co. (Cleveland, Ohio), 448th Army Postal Unit (New York), 1018th Sup and Svc Co. (Schenectady, New York), 74th Field Hospital (New York), and the 173d Petr Co (Greenwood, Mississippi). These cases were styled Morse et al. v. Boswell et al.; Berke et al. v. MacLaughlin; Felberbaum et al. v. MacLaughlin; and Looney et al. v. MacLaughlin (393 U.S. 802) (1969).
47. Letter, Lewis C. Brodsky, Chief, Public Affairs Office, to 35 addressees, 10 December 1982, Subject: “Request for Historical Information,” copies in OCAR Historical Files.