STRATEGIC DEFENSE:
NEW TECHNOLOGIES, OLD TACTICS

by

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In his nationally televised "Star Wars" speech, President Reagan called on the scientific community to turn its talent to developing a shield against the threat of ballistic missiles. He also recognized that this would be a formidable technical task that may not be accomplished before the end of this century.

The bold transition of strategic doctrine from offensive dominant to defensive dominant envisioned by the President rests on three major assumptions. One is the success of emerging technologies and our ability to apply them to strategic defense. The second is our ability to deploy a credible system at "reasonable" costs. The third—if reasonable cost criteria are to be met—is our ability to maintain an arms control dialogue with the Soviet Union that leads to predictable ceilings or reductions in Soviet offensive nuclear forces.

Technological success, cost effectiveness, and offensive arms reductions are intimately related in the President's conceptual views of the transition to a defense-dominant world. Soviet offensive countermeasures precipitated by future collapse of the existing Soviet-American arms control regime would create additional technical obstacles for SDI. There may be technical solutions to Soviet countermeasures, but only at increased systems complexity and cost. Open-ended requirements would threaten funding for other important security needs, and, in time, kill political support for expanding strategic defense programs.

The specific coupling of the strategic defense initiative, arms control, and strategic planning was formally approved by the President in his negotiating instructions to Secretary of State Shultz prior to his January meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko in Geneva. The "new strategic concept," reportedly drafted by Paul Nitze, is the philosophical foundation for the three-tiered negotiations in Geneva on strategic weapons, theater nuclear forces, and space. It calls for "radical" reductions in offensive nuclear weapons over the next ten years, and a period of mutual (not necessarily parallel) transition to effective non-nuclear defense forces as technology makes such options available.1

Historically, the evolution from a period of offensive dominance to defensive dominance and back has occurred through technological innovation or tactical adaptation. There are no examples of negotiated transitions. Recognition of the historical shifts from offensive to defensive dominance may be instructive for the current SDI debate. The US objective of freeing Soviet-American relations from the threat of nuclear war is not the first attempt to break out of an offense-dominated world.

The offensive-defensive cycles that have directed the course of warfare throughout history may serve to caution proponents of SDI against undue optimism about technology's potential to create a permanent revolution in strategic capabilities. If history has lessons for us, surely one is that a
transition to strategic defense will not be only a technical problem, but also a posture that will require maintenance and considerable resources over time. SDI could do for the United States what conventional fortifications did for European cities. That is, make a high value target less attractive. But just as the most elaborate fortifications were eventually overcome by the application of greater firepower and assault capabilities, strategic defenses will be vulnerable if there are no limits on Soviet offensive forces.

Even before fortresses were penetrable, the strategic defense of European cities spawned armies that often roamed the field at will, and those who invested their resources in fortresses could not sortie against those armies unless they could also afford to build and maintain an appropriate offensive force. Otherwise, those who lived in surrounding villages (in the case of SDI, Europeans) got little protection once deterrence failed.

Throughout history, military technology has been exploited to penetrate enemy defenses or to blunt his attacks. From medieval castles, armor-clad soldiers, and Maginot lines to mobile artillery, tank offensives, and strategic bombing, the pendulum has swung from offensive advantages to defensive advantages and back again. Military technology has never succeeded in freezing this dynamic relationship. One reason for this should be easy to understand. Technological innovation works with equal force on both sides of the offensive-defensive equation. This can be seen today if we contrast the technological research in the SDI program with our own offensive strategic modernization programs, which include:

- Maneuverable warheads for ICBMs
- "Stealth" technology for bombers and cruise missiles
- Large numbers of sea-launched cruise missiles on submarines and surface ships
- Active and passive penetration aids for missiles and bombers
- ASATs (offensive in their mission against space-based defense systems)

Most of these same programs can be found in some stage of Soviet research and development. Together, they accelerate the development of countermeasures that may put our defensive goals out of reach. In a sense, this is what happened from the late 1960s to the present when Soviet state-of-the-art ABM systems and air defenses contributed to the deployments of US MIRVed missiles, air-launched cruise missiles, and stand-off bombers.

These examples of concurrent research and development in offensive and defensive systems illustrate how the accelerated pace of military technology in the nuclear era has made the lessons of previous periods that were dominated by land warfare less valid for strategic planners. Strategies for land warfare, for example, can still postulate the offensive requirements for defeating an adversary on a particular front (e.g., 3:1 force ratio for an offensive against NATO). No such guidelines have emerged for nuclear weapons. Problems of massive destruction, fratricide, massive preemption versus limited attack options, and hard-target counterforce versus countervalue targeting obscure such facile offensive-defensive ratios. The "fog and friction" of war which Clausewitz described more than a century ago is still relevant to modern warfare. High technology and nuclear weapons open the doors of uncertainty even wider than they were opened for the soldiers and military planners who struggled in Clausewitz's 19th-century wars.

Through their public statements since the "Star Wars" speech, the Soviets have made it

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clear that they are unwilling participants in any future and historically unique diplomatic
transition to a world dominated by strategic
defense. Preventing deployment of weapons
in space is clearly their major objective, and
they have linked progress in offensive arms
negotiations to limits on strategic defense.

The Soviets are obviously concerned
about future programs that may emerge from
SDI, and this could provide leverage for the
United States if we are willing to accept
constraints at reasonably early stages in the
development of ballistic missile defenses. If
negotiations fail and the US proceeds
unilaterally with unconstrained development
and deployment of strategic defenses, there
are many offensive countermeasures available
to Soviet planners. They are likely to
develop the most cost-effective combination
of technological innovations and tactical
adaptations to the task of countering the
politico-military effects of US strategic
defenses. Technological countermeasures
(e.g., fast-burn boosters, spin boosters,
MARVs, ASATs) have been treated exten-
sively elsewhere and will not be examined
here.3 Tactical adaptation, however, has
received far less attention. Thus, the focus
here will be on three possible areas of tactical
adaptation to strategic defense—massing of
ballistic missile forces to penetrate space-
based defenses, circumvention through
bombers and cruise missiles, and con-
ventional superiority in Europe.

MASSING OF
BALLISTIC MISSILE FORCES

The political viability of strategic
defense in the United States will ultimately
depend on costs and cost-exchange ratios
between defenses and offensive coun-
termeasures. The technological and strategic
viability of SDI, as currently defined,
depends on developing reliable boost-phase
intercept capabilities. The dilemma faced by
the scientific community is that costs cannot
be determined or limited through technology
alone. Absent offensive limits or reductions,
the Soviets will determine the costs of US
defenses through their countermeasures
against boost-phase defense.

Space-based defenses against ballistic
missiles in their boost phase must be
dispersed to protect against Soviet deploy-
ments of offensive missiles across the full
breadth of the Soviet Union and at sea. The
number of satellite battle stations required
will be determined by orbital time (90 minutes
for low orbits), time over the target area
during a single orbit, destructive payload,
the range of weapons on board, time required
for target acquisition, dwell time (time required
for destruction of the booster), slew or
retargeting time, dispersal of Soviet ballistic
missiles (i.e. target density), sequence of
launches (mass or phased), warning time,
decision time, and battle management
capabilities. It should not be surprising,
therefore, that no single issue in the strategic
defense debate is more divisive than estimates
for the required number of satellite battle
stations.

Estimates have varied widely from
several hundred to less than one hundred,
depending on often unstated assumptions
about technical performance, Soviet counter-
measures, and the type of weapons being
described. The one feature common to most
estimates is that they are based on current
Soviet ICBM deployments (1400) and ignore
a dispersed SLBM threat. The initial low
estimates that were made by the weapons
laboratories (Livermore estimated 90) also
failed to compute time for retargeting after
each kill. Resolution of satellite numbers or
battle stations is essential to the future of
SDI, since each satellite could cost as much as
an aircraft carrier and would have to be
replaced or serviced more frequently even if
they never fired a beam or projectile in anger.

The methodological battle over the
calculation of these numbers remains intense.
Consensus on methodology, however, will
not close the debate. Satellite numbers must
be responsive to unknown Soviet coun-
termeasures. Here, the offense has a tactical
advantage, since it can disperse its forces at
sea while massing them on land through
additional deployments of silo-based and
mobile ICBMs (both road- and rail-mobile ICBMs are probable) to concentrate attacks in the traditional style of Soviet military doctrine. Absent offensive constraints, current ICBM concentrations could grow and be further reinforced during a crisis by rail-mobile ICBMs to confront defensive planners with costly and complex technical problems in battle management.

Soviet attempts to exhaust defenses by maintaining a superior balance of offensive forces would be costly, and Soviet leaders surely would harbor grave doubts about their adequacy to execute Soviet strategic doctrine. Precursor attacks by orbital ASATs followed by saturation of a portion of the satellite fleet that is over the target area at any given time, however, is more feasible, and would require defensive responses in the form of additional battle stations or technical breakthroughs that would allow quick orbital changes and the corresponding capability to mass defensive forces. The fuel requirements and response time for orbital flexibility make this option unattractive from both cost and battle-management perspectives. Additional battle stations could drive costs closer to the estimates of critics and further weaken political support for strategic defense. These Soviet tactical adaptations could also threaten strategic stability by rewarding the Soviet doctrinal preference for massive, preemptive attacks over the US preference for limited attack options and escalation control.

Before strategic defense can contribute to stability, both sides must be satisfied that their offensive forces are survivable against either style of preemptive attack. A mutually constrained offense is essential to achieving this posture. Defense combined with current trends in offensive weapons creates even greater problems of instability—problems that would not exist if the defenses had not been added to the strategic relationship. Defensive inferiority in an environment of growing offensive, hard-target kill capability will be perceived as threatening by the disadvantaged party. In a crisis, striking first may seem their most rational option, because delay could result in a disarming first strike by the side with defensive superiority. Whichever side goes first gains the damage-limiting advantage, and the side that waits may be destroyed.

It is important to remember that these terms ("damage limitation," "rational") are relative. Prospects for either side will be horrifying, but one option will be less horrifying than another. There is a difference between wartime and peacetime concepts of rationality. Options narrow in war. A rational choice in wartime might be an unacceptable option if considered under peacetime conditions. The most desirable options are generally lost with the outbreak of hostilities. Planners must anticipate wartime rationality based on significantly reduced choices of action if they are to evaluate correctly the credibility of their military forces and strategies.

Crisis rationality is a point often missed by strategists and especially by many SDI enthusiasts who postulate the deterrent value of strategic defense against a Soviet "bolt out of the blue" or strategic temptation, rather than in an escalating crisis. For example, retired General Daniel O. Graham, Director of High Frontier, recently made the following analogy in response to SDI critics:

The system would have to work when needed, but if it failed, it would not fail like an alarm clock but like a minefield, and you don't go running through a minefield simply because you think that one or two of the individual mines might not work. The mere existence of a defensive system would make the results of a missile attack so dubious that it would never be launched, and thus the system would perform its intended function: the prevention of nuclear attack.4

Graham's analogy is based on peacetime rationality. If we apply it to actual wartime conditions or crisis decision-making, it may not accurately reflect how an adversary perceives or evaluates the range of choices available to him. Suppose, for example, that a Soviet military commander on the attack finds General Graham's minefield between his troops and sheltered positions near their objective. If he also learns that he is about to
come under intense artillery attack, then he may see his options quickly narrowed to slowing his attack to clear the minefield and suffering even higher casualties from the artillery attack, or he may choose to continue attacking through the minefield while he is still at full strength. The point is, there are wartime conditions that make poor options appear rational. The same is true if strategic stability is lost to an offensive-defensive arms race and one or both sides believe during a crisis that the other is about to attack. Attacking first under such conditions might make sense regardless of the enemy’s defenses. The choice in both examples is narrowed to attacking the same defense while at full strength or after severe attrition. By contrast, survivable offensive forces maintained through unilateral basing and deployment modes (e.g. mobile ICBMs and additional SSBNs) and formal defensive constraints buy time and options. Therein lies the essence of strategic stability.

CIRCUMVENTION BY BOMBERS
AND CRUISE MISSILES

The SDIO (Strategic Defense Initiative Organization) has made it clear that its mandate is limited to research of a layered defense against ballistic missiles. If such a defense were deployed today it would deter or defend against an attack by approximately 90 percent of Soviet strategic nuclear forces (ICBMs and SLBMs). If confronted with an expanding American ballistic missile defense system, the Soviets cannot be expected to maintain this same triad mix. Absent arms control constraints, they could be expected to expand their bomber forces with a mix of long range Bear-H and Black Jack bombers armed with cruise missiles. These programs are well advanced and, in some cases, in limited production. Thousands of Soviet air-launched cruise missiles could be deployed years ahead of US ballistic missile defenses.

At sea, the Soviets could begin deploying large numbers of sea-launched cruise missiles on submarines and surface vessels. Expanded sea-based nuclear forces would confront a highly regarded American anti-submarine warfare capability, but risks may be manageable with the modernized Soviet navy ideally configured to protect its submarine fleet. Geographic asymmetries afforded by the long North American coastlines provide Soviet sea-based forces with lucrative targets and short warning time. Combined air- and sea-based threats would drive US air defense requirements higher than at any time since the 1950s and early 1960s. In short, a multibillion-dollar ballistic missile defense system could not only be threatened with direct assault, but also with envelopment by an expanded air-breathing leg of the Soviet strategic triad.

Inevitably, SDI must breed ADI (air defense initiative). Major General John Shaud, Director of Plans for the Air Force, has anticipated these requirements in his comment, “If you are going to fix the roof, you don’t want to leave the windows opened.” Secretary Weinberger and others anticipate closing those “windows,” and have conceded that SDI will require the backup of a restored air defense.

Cost estimates for modernized ground radars, AWACS, and interceptors to counter a growing threat from low-flying Soviet bombers and cruise missiles vary widely. Whatever the costs, the prospect of a vastly expanded and modernized air defense illustrates the inexorable logic of the offensive-defensive relationship—one threat leads to another in the absence of constrained threats.

CONVENTIONAL SUPERIORITY
IN EUROPE

Conventional force postures may also be affected by strategic defense. If defenses succeed in limiting the threat from offensive nuclear forces, what will success look like for NATO? Will the world be safe for conventional warfare, and if so, how might that translate into additional requirements for procurement, personnel, and conventional weapons needed to deter the Soviets' massive capabilities on the ground? How will the US strategy of extended deterrence be affected if NATO's nuclear umbrella disappears in a
defense-dominant world? NATO allies could face the prospect of increased demands on their resources to deter conventional aggression in Europe during a time of growing controversy over burden-sharing. An abrogated ABM treaty could also expose them to rapid Soviet deployments of state-of-the-art ABM systems that would be effective against limited British and French nuclear deterents currently undergoing costly modernization. In a defense-dominant world, the deterrent value of these forces would give way to the conventional balance and battlefield nuclear weapons. Predictably large numbers of short-range, low-yield, tactical nuclear weapons would ensure the continued high cost of fielding and protecting the full spectrum of conventional forces required to fight Europe's air-land battle.

Even Europeans who support SDI research do so in the context of arms control and potential bargaining leverage. There is also a growing economic interest in access to research dollars and contracts for European allies. Serious doubts, however, remain about SDI's potential for boost and mid-course interception capabilities against the shorter flight times of intermediate and short-range missiles which threaten Europe. These systems are more vulnerable to terminal defenses, but the large numbers of interceptors that would be required to meet even current Soviet forces would be costly and politically difficult to deploy in the wake of the Pershing II and GLCM controversies.

The strategic contradictions between the INF and SDI debates will not be lost on Europeans, especially those who oppose deployment of both. During the INF debate it was argued that intermediate-range nuclear weapons must be deployed in Western Europe to establish credible deterrence through linkage to US central strategic weapons. Now, however, the British and French are concerned about the future credibility of their nuclear forces, and the West Germans may grow equally restive about the future of their nuclear deterrent—American Pershing and ground-launched cruise missiles deployed in the Federal Republic.

The potential incompatibility of strategic coupling, strategic defense, and the doctrine of flexible response can be illustrated best through German eyes. The credibility of the US nuclear deterrent in Europe was perceived to be weakened by Soviet-American nuclear parity. West Germans feared that the Soviet Union no longer believed the United States would retaliate in the event of a nuclear attack on Germany. The Soviet threat of escalation against the continental United States weakened the American nuclear umbrella over West Germany. Intermediate-range missiles based on West German soil that could reach Soviet territory, however, would reinforce deterrence by guaranteeing that nuclear war would not be isolated to Europe's central front. Through "coupling" of theater and strategic nuclear forces, the US nuclear umbrella would create a hostage relationship that linked American and German security.

The strategic coupling of American and West German security through intermediate-range missiles in the Federal Republic serves the greater German interest of strengthening deterrence. Strategic defense, on the other hand, raises many of the same concerns Germans previously expressed over American efforts to raise the nuclear threshold through the strategy of flexible response. Flexible response places emphasis on the initial conventional defense of Europe. It has never been popular with West German strategists because defending with conventional weapons increases the likelihood of trading space for time and reinforcements. The use of nuclear weapons is foreseen only if defeat is threatened. By that time the battle will have penetrated deep into the heavily populated West German heartland, where collateral damage from nuclear weapons—theater and tactical—would be highest and credible threats to employ them lowest.

West Germans prefer to think in terms of "forward defense," early use of nuclear weapons, and striking Warsaw Pact forces in their own territory. In short, West Germans understandably emphasize deterrence over warfighting and see deterrence maintained over the long run only if there is a shared American-European community of risk.
At best, strategic defense may result in unattractive conventional options for Europeans. At worst, it could result in a fortress America or, more likely, unilaterality in Soviet-American relations. Either risks the unraveling of the shared community of risk on which the ultimate credibility of the NATO alliance may rest.

Other problems, such as the future of NATO air defenses, will inevitably place additional strains on the alliance during the SDI debate. The air defense component of a future European strategic defense posture would be far more complicated than that facing the United States. Western European air space is directly accessible to Soviet aircraft in Eastern Europe, which together with medium bombers from Soviet territory could mount a nuclear air offensive far larger than could be mounted against North America. This asymmetry of vulnerability could easily be used to fan European sensitivities and fear that SDI will decrease the American commitment to the defense of NATO.

CONCLUSIONS

The viability of each Soviet countermeasure and tactical adaptation is, like SDI technologies, subject to debate and the assumptions of various studies and advocates. Nevertheless, if only a few of the many responses available to the offense are feasible, deployment of defensive systems will have to be very cost-effective at the start to overcome domestic and NATO opposition. SDI may provide the transition to a safer world. The historical trends summarized here suggest, however, that even a successful transition will be only a temporary plateau in the offensive-defensive relationship. Given the many uncertainties, the burden of proof is decidedly on those who advocate proceeding, even in the absence of offensive arms constraints. A balanced military posture must credibly deter or meet all contingencies on the spectrum of threat from low-intensity warfare to nuclear war. These needs compete in programs to deploy a 600-ship Navy, to modernize NATO, to deploy forces under the Central Command, and to meet the growing challenge in Central America. Investing a disproportionate share of resources for the least likely nuclear contingencies runs the risk of "beggaring" conventional and limited war capabilities. This, in turn, could spark conflicts that could otherwise be deterred or met decisively before they escalate to superpower confrontations.

There is a great deal at stake in the strategic defense debate. Scientists and engineers have yet to test questions of systemic feasibility, much less reliability. Military strategists have barely begun to consider the long-range implications of a defense-dominant world for US global military strategy. The Congress and the American public have every right to be cautious and skeptical. Strategic defense is appealing, but it may be an illusion that could block the search for strategic stability, arms control, and a balanced military posture to meet the most probable threats to American security in the 21st century. Science, diplomacy, and strategy must succeed together, or SDI risks becoming America's technological Vietnam.

NOTES


ETHICS AND THE SENIOR OFFICER:
INSTITUTIONAL TENSIONS

by

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Army officers are devoting a lot of
thoughtful consideration to the subject
of ethics. The purpose of this article is
to present a firsthand appreciation of various
ethical tensions that confront senior Army
officers. To accomplish this I will briefly
explore the foundations of our ethical system,
offer some thoughts about how this ethical
system should apply specifically to the
military profession, and finally take an
empirical look at the tensions in the military
society that provide fertile grounds for
ethical abuses.

The term ethics is used to mean the study
of human actions in respect to their being
right or wrong. Whether we like it or not,
ethical reflection has seldom been carried out
in isolation from theology. Ethical values
generally reflect our view of human life as it
is embodied in the teachings of the prevailing
religion, because all human conduct,
especially, takes place in relationship to
other human beings. Therefore, if I believe
that human life, that is, all of human life,
without exception, has equal and infinite
value, then my concept of right and wrong
conduct will reflect this conviction. If I
believe that human life has limited value, let's
say limited by what it can contribute to the
common good, then my concept of right or
wrong conduct will reflect this conviction. If
I believe that some forms of human life have
more worth than others—that, say, males are
more valuable than females, or whites are
more valuable than blacks, or Americans are

more valuable than Cambodians, or the rich
are more valuable than the poor, or Jews are
more valuable than Arabs—then my concept
of right and wrong conduct will reflect
whichever of these convictions I hold.

Our Western value system of right and
wrong is based primarily on what Jesus
taught concerning the origin and value of
human life, augmented by the Old Testament
lawgivers and prophets. This is what we
commonly call the Judeo-Christian tradition.
Although these teachings have been eroded
and in some cases prostituted radically
through the centuries, they still strongly
influence the attitudes of Americans and
other Westerners and form the core of our
ethical concepts. In the Judeo-Christian view,
man was created by God in His image; that is,
with awareness, with purpose, with person-
ality, and with inherent worth. All forms
of human life are equally endowed by God
with worth and dignity. There is no distinc-
tion between male and female, between black
or white, rich or poor, aristocrat or peasant,
Americans or Cambodians, Jews or Arabs,
old or young, born or unborn, smart or
dumb, with regard to inherent worth and
dignity. All are created with equal worth,
with equal dignity, with equal status, and
with equal rights within the human race.

From this basic belief has come the thesis
that whatever protects or enhances human
life is good, and whatever destroys or
degrades human life is evil. Thus, our whole
moral and ethical concept of right and wrong
stems from this thesis—antithesis of good and evil, and I believe that we cannot consider right and wrong within the military profession outside of this framework; that whatever protects and enhances life is good, and whatever destroys and degrades life is evil. The great concepts of justice, mercy, compassion, service, and freedom are immediate derivatives of this central distinction between good and evil as received from our Judeo-Christian heritage.

Before addressing ethics within the military profession, I will deal briefly with the ethical basis for our profession. The moral justification for our profession is embedded in the Constitution—"to provide for the Common Defense." We are that segment of the American society which is set apart to provide for the defense of the remainder of that society. The word defense is key. We are to defend our territory, because that is where our people live, but in an expanded sense, we are defending our value systems, our way of life, our standard of life, our essential institutions, and whatever our government declares to be our national interest. Our Founding Fathers were realists. They knew that most of the rest of the world did not share our view of the value and worth of human life. They recognized that we lived in and would continue to live in a dangerous world, one in which only the strong, or those allied to the strong, can remain free. Only the strong can influence whether peace will be preserved or broken, because strength deters aggression and discourages conflict, and weakness invites aggression and encourages conflict.

Those who provide for the common defense, who protect the lives of our citizens, can best do so by creating a strong, effective deterrent to would-be aggressors. As military people our objective is "not to promote war, but to preserve peace" and to protect life. Even if deterrence fails and we go to war, our final objective is peace. Ours is an honorable profession with an ethical purpose entirely consistent with our basic view that whatever protects and enhances life is good.

I will now turn to ethics as they specifically apply to the military profession. In essence, professional ethics is that body of written or unwritten standards of conduct by which that profession disciplines itself. One writer said, "Professional ethics are designed to assure high standards of competence in a given field." In the general case, then, that conduct which contributes to the attainment of the purpose of that profession is good. The conduct which detracts from the attainment of the purpose of that profession is bad. Various professions have adopted either written or unwritten codes. Doctors, nurses, engineers, journalists, lawyers, businessmen—all have established standards of right and wrong for their respective professions. For instance, the written code of Hippocrates states that the medical profession is dedicated to the preservation of life and should be of service to mankind. Certain practices inimical to that goal are forbidden in the Hippocratic code.

In the military profession we do not have an all-inclusive code of ethics, although we do have documents which contain broad and compelling standards of professional conduct. Some would say that the West Point motto of "duty, honor, country," is all that we really need. But those values, as good as they are, do not give a conceptual basis for their implementation. What is duty? What is honor? What do we mean by country?

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Lieutenant Calley probably considered that he was doing his duty at My Lai. Our code of conduct for POWs sets forth right and wrong conduct under those limited but extremely trying conditions. Have you ever thought of our Oath of Allegiance as a document of ethics? It is—of sorts. "I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies foreign and domestic." That sounds great. But whose interpretation of the Constitution? The latest Supreme Court decision? And who are those domestic enemies? Anyone who disagrees with our interpretation of the Constitution? And what is the role of the Department of Defense in fighting domestic enemies? I thought that was the role of the FBI. And further, the Oath states, "I will obey the orders of the officers appointed over me." Well, yes, assuming they’re legal, assuming they’re consistent with my moral standards.

But back to my earlier statement: If that conduct which contributes to the attainment of the purpose of the profession is good, and that which detracts from the attainment of the purpose of that profession is bad, then for the military profession, whatever enhances the common defense essentially is good, and whatever diminishes the common defense is essentially bad. But this must be tempered by the larger issue, that whatever protects and enhances human life is good and whatever destroys life or diminishes the quality of life is bad.

This consideration leads, of necessity, to a brief discussion of means and ends. I think it should be an absolute rule among military people that ends do not justify means. Nor that means justify ends. Both ends and means must be consistent with our fundamental values. Honorable ends cannot be achieved by dishonorable means, nor do honorable means justify dishonorable or unethical ends. Although the general welfare of our nation is an honorable and ethical purpose, the selective elimination of nonproductive members of society, although it would contribute to the general welfare, cannot be tolerated. Domestic tranquility, although an honorable purpose, cannot justify police brutality or unlawful detention. Common defense is an honorable purpose, but misrepresentation of an enemy threat before a congressional committee cannot be justified by the belief that it is necessary in order to acquire funding for an important weapon system.

So can we make any general rules for ethical conduct within the military profession? I think so. Essentially, what is right is that which enhances the accomplishment of our basic purpose, the common defense, provided that it is consistent with our overall view of the value and dignity of all human life and that the means to accomplish it are acceptable. Or, ask these questions: Does the action we are about to take or the policy under consideration contribute to the national defense? Is it consistent with the protection and enhancement of life? Are both ends and means consistent with our national values?

Given these thoughts, I will now turn to the empirical aspects of the subject, the tensions within the Army which provide fertile grounds for ethical abuse. All military officers have experienced these tensions, and they will continue to characterize the environment in which senior officers will serve. The higher the position, the more complex and less precise are the issues. The last job I really understood was being a tank platoon leader in combat. As I progressed upward, the ethical environment became more murky, less clear, less subject to specific rules and simple solutions. However, an officer’s usefulness to the nation and overall credibility will be fundamentally affected by his ability to enter an environment where absolutes are hard to find, and still make wise and ethical decisions. These tensions will require of you a bedrock of ethical values.

The one tension that will be most consistently with you involves the ethical use of authority. The authoritarian structure of our profession, even though essential, is the natural breeding ground for the unethical use of authority. The power and influence of a colonel is greater than that of a lieutenant
colonel. The influence of a general officer is truly awesome. This fact requires a clear understanding, first, of the meaning of rank.

Within our hierarchical, authoritarian structure, there are various levels of responsibility. Each level of responsibility is assigned a commensurate degree of authority. Rank is simply a badge of the authority vested in a person to carry out a specific level of responsibility. Company-level responsibility requires company-level authority, and the rank of captain is associated with that level of authority. So lieutenant colonel rank represents the authority necessary to carry out battalion-level responsibilities; colonel, brigade-level responsibilities; major general, division-level responsibilities. When authority is used in the fulfilling of responsibility, it is used legitimately and ethically. When authority is used for purposes not directly associated with carrying out assigned responsibilities, it is being used illegitimately and unethically. Conversely, if I fail to use my authority to carry out my responsibilities, my negligence is itself unethical, and someone who will use that authority should be given my job. The question is: Am I using my authority, my rank, fully but solely for the purpose of carrying out my responsibilities?

As you go up in rank, those of lower grade tend more readily to assume that you are using your authority legitimately and ethically, because of the high regard with which juniors hold very senior officers. Thus, the general who directs his pilot to arrange a flight plan on an authorized TDY visit so as to remain overnight at a city not specifically on the most direct route, so that the general can visit his mother who is in a nursing home, will be assumed by the pilot to be fully authorized to do so. The Pentagon colonel who calls an action officer in from leave because the colonel thinks his general might ask a question which the action officer is best qualified to answer will be assumed to be using his authority ethically. Think about that.

This gets to the guts of the use of authority. In my opinion, one of the most widespread and patently unethical uses of authority is the exploitation and degradation of subordinates, which is a generally accepted institutional practice. It is an encouraged institutional practice, and it is wrong. We have fostered the image of the successful leader as the one who doesn’t get ulcers, but gives ulcers; as the one who is hard, unfeeling, even vicious.

Some may disagree, but I think that is true. Whom do we admire? We admire the man with “guts.” What do we really mean by this? We mean the man who drives his people hard, who has the reputation for firing subordinates, who goes for the jugular, who works his people 14 hours a day, and who takes his objective in spite of heavy and possibly unnecessary casualties. We set these people up and idolize them. Even in industry. We like the kind of guy who moves in as the CEO and fires three-fourths of the vice presidents the first week. He gets things done! He’s got guts! But what about the perceptive, cool-headed leader who takes a group of misfits and molds them into an effective, highly-spirited team? Or the colonel who can see the great potential of a young commander who is performing only marginally and, through coaching and encouraging, turns him into a first-rate performer? Or, the leader in combat who takes his objective with no casualties? Or the brigade commander who has the guts to resist the arbitrary, capricious order of a division commander to fire a faltering battalion commander because the colonel believes that with the proper leadership that battalion commander can be made into a successful one? Or, the Pentagon division chief who defies the norm and refuses to arrive in his office before 0730, or to require his action officers to do so, and who manages the workload of his division so that every man gets a reasonable amount of leave, seldom has to work on weekends, and gets home every evening at a reasonable hour?

We seldom hear about those people. We don’t hold them up as examples as we should. The higher we go, the more important it is to be careful that our impact on the lives and careers and families of our subordinates is positive and not negative. I can think of a
division artillery commander in Germany who ruled by fear, who was hated by his subordinates, and who was the proximate cause of a number of serious domestic crises. I can think of a lieutenant general in the Pentagon who purposely intimidated his subordinates and associates in order to get his own way. I can think of a colonel, the executive to a former Chief of Staff, who blossomed like a rose to his superiors, but who was vicious, demeaning, and bullying to his subordinates. I can think of a colonel in the Pentagon who never showed appreciation and voiced only criticism and whose subordinates gradually became discouraged and frustrated and unproductive.

In contrast, I can think of an Army lieutenant general whose modus operandi was to make his subordinates successful in their jobs. He said, “I’ll have no problem with my job if I can make all of my subordinates successful.” I think of a division commander in Germany with whom I was closely associated, who spent countless hours talking with subordinates at every level, coaching them, encouraging them, teaching them. I think of a Pentagon division chief who looked for opportunities to push his action officers into the limelight, who volunteered them for prestigious positions as secretarial-level “horse-holders,” who worked in the background to cross-train his people so that no one would ever have to be called back from leave, who personally took the rap when things went wrong, and who, in my opinion, ran the best division in the Pentagon. It all gets back to how they looked at people, their value, their dignity, their fundamental worth, their potential.

The higher you go, the easier it is to misuse authority. The checks that we were subject to as junior officers become less evident and less compelling. We gradually begin to believe that we really don’t need to seek the counsel of others. We are at first surprised by and then pleased by the freedom of action accorded us.

For instance: “I really have to visit Germany, but should I do so this winter? No, I’ll wait until the weather’s better. Let’s see, where can I go this winter? I really need to visit Panama and Hawaii. Let’s visit Panama or Hawaii this winter.”

We begin to rationalize small personal indiscretions that we would never accept in a subordinate, like having our personal car worked on by a division mechanic during duty hours, or allowing our wife to bully the post engineer into refurbishing the kitchen of our quarters out of cycle. Sometimes we begin to believe that we are somehow above the law—they really didn’t have a person of our status and responsibility in mind when they wrote it, did they?—and we divert funds, appropriated for barracks maintenance, to refurbish the interior of a rod and gun club, or piece several segments of minor construction money together to accomplish some major construction projects that were disallowed in the last appropriation cycle. These examples are taken from my personal knowledge. As a rule, and this is very important I think, general officers do not get relieved for incompetence. They do get fired for indiscretions, which is simply another way of saying that they’ve used their authority unethically.

A former Inspector General of the Army for whom I have great regard and who was, in a sense, the conscience of the Army for the four years that he was the IG, told me that at any one time about ten percent of the general officers in the Army were under investigation of some kind or another. Most of those charges turn out to be either false or simply a matter of perception, i.e. where the general did something which others perceived to be unethical but really was not. As General Abrams once said, “The higher you go on the flag pole, the more your rear-end shows.”

The second great tension involves the ethical use of military force. The higher you go the more you’ll be called on to exercise judgment in this arena, although some with relatively moderate rank in key positions have great influence on such matters. For instance, a US Marine Corps major on the National Security Council staff wrote the point paper that convinced the President to send Marines into Lebanon. The current Weinberger-Shultz debate falls into
the category of this tension regarding the ethical use of military force. When should it be used? Under what circumstances? In what strength? In defense of US territory only? Or in defense of US interests? Or in defense of our allies? What are our interests? Grenada? Lebanon? The Straits of Hormuz? How about Vietnam? Our involvement in Vietnam was purely ethical in the sense that the United States had no really compelling self-interest. We simply wanted to prevent 16 million South Vietnamese from becoming slaves to a totalitarian neighbor. But what about the level of force used? Was it ethical not to saturate-bomb Hanoi in an effort to force the North Vietnamese government to call off the invasion of South Vietnam? How about Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Afghanistan, the Iranian rescue operation? Should force be used only if there is a reasonable chance of effecting a desirable outcome? General Ridgway, then Chief of Staff, went to President Eisenhower in the summer of 1953 and personally talked him out of sending American ground troops to Vietnam after the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu at the hands of the Viet Minh. Was he more ethical or less ethical than the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff who failed to intercede ten years later to prevent combat troops from being sent into South Vietnam? Could failure to use military force in the defense of freedom be unethical? That's a good question. And what of the Bay of Pigs? Was it moral for the President to call off the air strikes at the last minute, thus practically insuring failure? Was it moral for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to agree to the calling off of those air strikes? Did the operation in and of itself have an ethical purpose? And now today, what of the use of military power to accomplish our purposes in Central America? What are our purposes in Central America? Is the use of military force the only way to accomplish these purposes? If so, how much force? In what form?

In addition to these two prime ethical tensions, there are others that every senior officer will confront, although the forms might vary. I will briefly cite several. One ethical tension is that what is just and fair to an individual may conflict with a policy that attempts to correct long-standing injustice. One of the major problems here is that an open and frank discussion is not only discouraged but virtually impossible due to the emotionally explosive nature of the issue. I'm speaking of course about establishing quotas or their look-alikes for minorities and women in various selective processes like promotions, schooling, command, and other visible assignments.

Another ethical tension is loyalty to the organizational position or policy versus adherence to personal conviction when the two are in conflict. In testimony before a congressional staff, how can you present the OSD or Army position if you personally disagree with it? The same ethical dilemma confronts a Chief of Staff who personally disagrees with the President's chosen strategy. Another ethical tension involves the conflict between ambition and selflessness. What is legitimate ambition? We preach selflessness as a sterling quality of character and then we tend to reward ambition. It is ironic that one Chief of Staff who talked a lot about selflessness was, in his rise to that position, one of the most openly ambitious officers I know.

Another ethical tension is between people and mission. Does the goal of having combat-ready units justify neglect of families? Conversely, does the proper care and nurture of families excuse having noncombat-ready units? Can we achieve both? Should dependents accompany their sponsors overseas? Does it detract from readiness, or contribute to it? Is it ethical to separate families from their sponsors in peacetime under any circumstances? What are the effects of separating families? We've muddled through this one, perhaps not very successfully.

A final ethical tension involves the difference between honesty and deception. Decisions at every echelon in our structure are made based upon the information available to the decision-makers. If that information is inaccurate or incomplete, the decision may well be faulty. The decision may be faulty even if the information is accurate and
complete, but it is more likely to be faulty if the information is inaccurate and incomplete. Therefore, it is essential that information provided to our superiors, to our subordinates, and to our peers be accurate and complete. The oath of a witness in a trial to tell “the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth” should be the oath of a professional officer.

This was brought home to me as a tank platoon leader in the Korean War. It was nighttime. The tank battalion of which I was a part had been heavily engaged during the day in support of an infantry regiment in a river-crossing operation. Now we were defending against a flank attack by a Chinese force on the near side of the river. There was a lot of mortar and artillery fire, including illumination and white phosphorus; many casualties; and general confusion. The friendly force was withdrawing and I ended up with my tank platoon fighting sort of a rear-guard action in pitch dark along a road. About the time I got my platoon past a certain checkpoint, I got a radio call from my battalion commander asking if I was the last friendly force to cross the checkpoint. Since we were in close contact with the advancing Chinese force, I said yes, we were the last. Shortly thereafter a long and intense American artillery barrage was laid down in the area I had just vacated. The next morning my battalion commander came to me in our assembly area. He told me he had called the artillery into that area because of my statement that I was the last unit out. In fact, I was not. A friendly infantry unit somehow had been intermingled with the Chinese force and had sustained casualties in the artillery barrage. Gently, but clearly, the battalion commander said, “Buck, you made me tell a lie.”

I’ve never forgotten that. I had told him what I perceived to be true, but was not. I should have qualified my answer, explaining that in the dark and confusion I could report only that my tanks had crossed the checkpoint. That was the only thing I knew for sure. The rest was speculation. Many times since then I’ve been tempted to speculate beyond what I knew and was certain to be true and I have sometimes yielded to that temptation.

As DCSOPS of USAEUR during the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, I was reporting to CINCUSAREUR on the situation so far as we knew it. The actual invasion was of less importance to us than the threat to our nuclear weapons in both Greece and Turkey, stemming from intense animosity by both sides toward Americans for failing to take a clear stand with either country on the invasion. I was discussing the threat to our nuclear weapons with CINCUSAREUR and unconsciously began to drift away from known facts into speculation about what might be true. The CINC looked squarely at me and said, “General, stop bugling. I can’t make decisions on speculation. You’re intermingling facts with possibilities.”

In many situations at high levels of command, the issues of honesty and deception are not recognized as such. One of the most common deceptions is the exaggeration of need in order to get what is really needed, knowing that the initial request is certainly going to be reduced. Money is usually the object, at least in the Pentagon environment. In fact, the whole program budget procedure, in my view, is essentially deceptive and unethical. The annual requests for operations and maintenance funds come in from the major commands over four-star signatures claiming that the request is the bare minimum they can live with. The DA action officers in the planning and budgeting arena don’t believe a word of it. They look at what the command got the previous year, do some puts and takes, and come up with their own figures. The whole process at the major command level was a waste of time, energy, and money. Commanders’ statements are given about as much credence as a Dan Rather commentary on the objectivity of the news media. Then the Programming and Budgeting System, in crunching together the Program Objective Memorandum, inflates those requests which are the “pet rocks” of influential Pentagon pachyderms, and submits them to OSD knowing full well that OSD will cut some of these programs back,
knowing they have been inflated by the Army. Of course, OSD may take the money thus "saved" and add it to other programs based on what some assistant secretary of defense perceives to be important, or what is the current wind of opinion regarding what will sell on the Hill and what won't.

Another blatantly unethical practice in the programming and budgeting arena is what I call the "multiple stampede effect." Newly assigned Lieutenant General A or Assistant Secretary A comes along with Project A which has been his obsession for years. It requires major multi-year funding. He forces it into the program, stampeding the appropriation directors to get on the team, and so the program is funded at the expense of other ongoing programs. Lieutenant General A is then promoted and made a MACOM commander where his influence in the central programming and budgeting procedure fades considerably. Now Lieutenant General B arrives on the scene with Project B, his personal pet rock, and he is able to push his project through the Program Budget Committee and into the next year's Program Objective Memorandum. And where does the money come from? From Program A. So Program A and all the other Program A's are cut back to make way for Program B and all the other Program B's sponsored by the powerful new Lieutenant General B's who will be replaced the next year by Lieutenant General C's with their projects. Thus we have programs by the dozens, originally spawned by the stampede effect of strong-willed, powerful proponents, which are distorted from their original purpose and deflated by inadequate funding, and flop around from year to year due to changes of emphasis and priority at DA level. The people assigned to manage these programs in the field never know from year to year what they can expect in the way of support. Over the course of my last 12 years on active duty, I was involved in the programming and budgeting procedure for ten of those years, eight of them at the DA level and two at the MACOM level. I used to leave Program Budget Committee meetings in the Pentagon feeling unclean, polluted, like I needed to go to confession. The whole system is wasteful of the money our citizens have entrusted to us for their common defense. And most of the senior programming and budgeting participants recognize this. Almost every year that I was in the Pentagon, the Director of PA&E or the Director of the Army staff or the DCSOPS or the Vice Chief of Staff vowed to implement reform and instituted new and different procedures—none of which, as of 30 June 1982, when I retired, had fundamentally improved the system in my opinion.

Another aspect of the honesty/deception tension involves readiness reports. First of all, even the most accurate unit readiness report is a deception unless it is considered in the context of the Army's capability to sustain that unit in combat. The tooth-to-tail, combat-support ratio debate is a case in point. Combat divisions in Europe with C-1 ratings give our national leaders a false sense of confidence if these divisions cannot be sustained in combat past the first few weeks. The readiness of the whole force is what is important. If you are in the force structure business you are contributing to a massive deception if you fail to provide adequate combat support and combat service support to our combat divisions. If you are in the programming and budgeting business you are contributing to a massive deception if you fail to program sufficient ammunition or repair parts to sustain our divisions in combat. The readiness reporting system is not and cannot be purely objective. Subjective judgment always enters in, but the intent, the motive, is what is important.

Consider a new division commander in Europe who has been in command about a month. His predecessor, a young, ambitious major general, is the new USAREUR Chief of Staff. The new division commander makes his assessment and gives his division a C-3 in training, a drop from C-2. As USAREUR DCSOPS, I review the reports. All the other divisions report C-2. I discuss the reports with the Chief of Staff. He takes strong exception to the C-3 rating of his old division, recognizing that if the report is accurate, his own leadership, judgment, and candor are in
question. The Chief of Staff challenges the judgment of the new division commander, indicating to him that he's using an unrealistic standard to measure the training status of the division. The new division CG holds his ground. The Chief of Staff then questions the motive of the division commander, saying that he obviously wants to show a lower rating on his first report so he can show improvement later on. The division commander holds his ground. The Chief of Staff then begins a subtle campaign to discredit the division commander in the eyes of the CINC. Time passes. The Chief of Staff moves rapidly on to a three-star job and is promoted to lieutenant general. The division commander, who is highly respected both by his peers and by his subordinates, completes his tour and transfers to a job in the Pentagon, and eventually retires as a two-star with 35 years of service. In retrospect, the division commander's subjective judgment on the training status of his division may have been too severe, although I do not in any way question his motive. As DCSOPS, I would have judged all divisions essentially the same in training. Maybe they all should have been C-3. Who was right?

The officer efficiency report system is even more complex. Here the ethical principle of fairness conflicts directly with the ethical principle of honesty. Am I being fair to my people to rate them honestly in accordance with the intent of the OER regulation when I know that across the Army my contemporaries are inflating the reports of their people? Am I justified in waging a one-man campaign for strict honesty when it comes at the expense of my people?

Another aspect of honesty involves what you show your boss when he comes to visit. Conversely, what you should be looking for when you visit your subordinates may be inferred.

The scene is Fort Hood. I am Chief of Staff of the 2nd Armored Division. The Army Chief of Staff is coming to visit the post and wants to see tank gunnery training in progress. Recently the division has received a large number of infantrymen rotating back from Vietnam combat duty. Department of the Army has directed us to convert these infantrymen quickly into tankers, and to integrate them into our tank battalions. Most of these Vietnam veterans have only a few months to go before leaving the Army. They are not at all interested in becoming tankers, and as a matter of fact, they're not really interested in anything but getting out of the Army. We have developed a strenuous, four-week TBT (to be tankers) program, which includes familiarization firing on ranges 1 through 5 of the tank gunnery course. The TBTs will be firing Table 4 main gun when the Chief of Staff visits. All indications are that they will be doing poorly, considering the extreme brevity of their preliminary gunnery training, their record on the subcaliber ranges, their general lack of technical aptitude, and their negative attitude.

A senior adviser suggests to the division commander that we should take our best NCO gunners and have them firing when the Army Chief of Staff visits the range. The point is made that an Army Chief of Staff usually visits any given division only once during the tenure in command of a division commander. Our division is a fine division. It has a good reputation. We have some great battalions. Field training has been going well. Maintenance is up. To show the Chief of Staff what we know would be subpar marksmanship will give him a distorted view of the overall standards of the division and will be a disservice to the Chief of Staff. An alternative is put forth. Why not simply change and reprint the training schedule with attendant back-dating, bringing one of our better-trained tank battalions off of maintenance cycle and putting them on the range on the day the Chief visits.

As division chief of staff, I opposed these proposals, stating that the Army Chief of Staff needs to know the trauma we are undergoing resulting from a DA decision to convert short-term Vietnam infantrymen into qualified tankers in four weeks. After all, I argued, the Chief of Staff is an experienced commander with a reputation for fairness and will understand our situation, and anyway, it would be deceptive to alter the training schedule and substitute training in
which he might be more pleased. We owe it to him to tell it like it is, to show him what he needs to see, not just what he may want to see.

The division commander sides with me, and we make no special arrangements to change the schedule. The Chief of Staff visits the range. The outward appearance of the range—that is, the police, the ammunition stacks, the communications, the flags, the condition of the tanks, the saluting, the uniforms—is superb. But the gunnery is atrocious. Few rounds hit the targets. Although the CG had carefully briefed him on the whole situation en route to the range, the Army Chief of Staff is incensed. He calls the firing to a halt, dismounts the TBTs, the NCOs, the officers, and gathers everyone around him. He berates everyone for such a rotten example of gunnery, for the waste of ammo, for the poor NCO instruction, for inadequate officer supervision. Then he takes the CG aside, mercifully out of hearing of the troops, but in their full view, and proceeds to tear the division commander apart; he thereafter leaves the range without a single word of appreciation for anyone. The division commander is philosophical. “The Chief of Staff is in a foul mood today,” he says, “Nothing would have pleased him. He is exhausted from a killing schedule. He has been under severe attack by the press in recent weeks. He will calm down and the whole episode will pass away.”

The Army Chief of Staff never visited the division again during the CG’s tenure of duty. And the CG, until then considered to be a rising star, eventually moved on to another major general’s position, well out of the mainstream of the Army, from which he retired.

Before I left the division, the CG gave me a superb efficiency report, and I was selected for brigadier general just a year later. Was I right or wrong in recommending that we not change the schedule or substitute experienced gunners for the TBTs? Did my decision contribute to the common defense? Was it consistent with our basic value systems? It certainly ruined a great division commander’s career, and the influence of his character and competence was lost to the Army. On the other hand, I got away unscathed, except for a deep sense of continuing sadness at what I had done to my boss.

In conclusion, I can give no easy answers regarding these ethical tensions. I can, however, from my experience, conclude that an officer’s ethical framework for addressing each of them needs to address the three fundamental questions: Does the action contribute to the national defense? Is it consistent with the protection and enhancement of life? Are the means to accomplish it acceptable? Standing firm ethically can exact a cost, perhaps a steep one. As professionals we must be willing to pay it.