AMERICA'S STRATEGIC POSITION

by

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Whatever other purpose it may have served, the 40th anniversary of the close of World War II gave Americans a chance to look back over the last four decades of their history and to think about how their country came to occupy the unique place it now holds in world politics. In many ways the war was like a great and violent tide which, when it receded, left the United States beached or embedded all along the periphery of Eurasia. From Europe to the Middle East to Northeast Asia, America acquired new alliances, commitments, and, in some cases, actual physical outposts. The net effect of the conflict was to leave this country in an unprecedented position of geopolitical extension. Now, after forty years, there is a tendency to see all of this as somehow natural, self-sustaining, and permanent. Problems which in many cases have deep, underlying causes are often treated as discrete, unconnected, and requiring only “fine tuning.” The peculiar character of America’s strategic position and the unusual demands which it imposes are rarely given the attention they deserve.

As an essentially insular, democratic, great (some might even say imperial) power, the United States is an extraordinary if not altogether unique political animal. Our career as such has thus far been relatively brief but it has also, on balance, been highly successful. For reasons which I hope to make clear in this essay, however, the position which this country acquired after the Second World War is (1) difficult, (2) costly, (3) dangerous to maintain, and (4) hard to justify over time to a democratic polity. It may well be (as I in fact believe) that the maintenance of relative peace and the preservation of freedom require that the United States continue to play the part of a world power. That we shall do so, however, cannot simply be assumed.

DIFFICULTIES

In a speech before the House of Commons in 1902 shortly after he became Prime Minister, Arthur Balfour compared the strategic challenges England faced to those of the continental European powers:

The problem which other nations have to solve is in most cases one of extreme simplicity. They have not a great Colonial Empire to defend; they know with absolute precision what are their dangers, from what quarter those dangers come, what is the magnitude of them and by what organization of counter-arrangements these dangers can be met . . . . [W]hile the problems of foreign Governments may be onerous in respect of the amount of financial contribution required, and may be difficult in consequence of the difficulty of providing an adequate force, the intellectual and speculative elements of those problems are incomparably below those of the problems presented by the British Empire.¹

With certain modifications something similar could be said of the United States. As a great power we too have far-flung commitments (although we do not, of course, have an empire as such), but we also have the luxury of choice—we can decide when and
where to become engaged. Like England, we have benefited from the absence of enemies on our frontiers. The difficulty is that such circumstances require a degree of farsightedness. The significance of developments in distant places must be perceived if problems are to be dealt with before they get out of control. Attention and ultimately resources as well must often be juggled among widely separated theaters. Insularity therefore creates difficulties both of planning and of execution.

Looking at a map, it is obvious that most of the places which matter to this country are a long way from its borders. Europe is over 3000 miles away, the Persian Gulf as many as 12,000 by sea, Japan and Korea between 5000 and 6000, and even important parts of Central America are over 1000 miles from the nearest major US port. These sizable numbers are not, in themselves, decisive. Modern transportation technology does make it possible to move across vast distances at relatively high speed and low cost, but it does not annihilate distance altogether. 3

In order to bridge the gaps between itself and the theaters of interest to it, the United States maintains substantial forces for air and sealift. According to official figures these forces now include 304 C-5s and C-141s as well as 26 KC-10 tankers for "inter-theater mobility" and 518 C-130s (mostly for movement over shorter distances). In a crisis, 289 additional civilian passenger and cargo aircraft could be called into service. Because large, heavy loads are still movable only by sea, some 90 cargo ships and 30 tankers are kept in routine service, with a reserve of 202 additional cargo vessels and 120 tankers. 4

The logistical system of which these vehicles are a part is expensive, but its operation poses no insuperable problems in peacetime. During a major war, however, the difficulties would be much more severe. The security of sea and air lines of communication as well as the safety and perhaps even the existence of off-loading points could no longer be guaranteed, and the time lags between embarkation and debarkation of men, equipment, and supplies would assume critical importance. Civilian strategists often talk about so many soldiers fighting in Central Europe under such and such conditions, for example, without saying much about how those men got to the battlefield or how they should be supplied and reinforced. The problems which an insular nation faces in waging war at great distances from its borders are thus frequently understated, if not overlooked entirely.

In fact, because the United States cannot simply count on being able to project its power on demand, it has chosen over the years to deploy sizable forces and considerable quantities of supplies in forward positions. To do this and to provide for the possible expansion of its presence overseas, the United States also maintains a large and elaborate system of bases around the world. These facilities are an important token of American commitment and are crucial to our ability to defend friends and allies overseas. But many of them are militarily vulnerable, and almost all are subject to unpredictable political developments which could result in their sudden closure. A change of government in Australia or the Philippines, for example, could result in a loss of facilities which would severely limit the US capacity to function as a Pacific power, yet neither of these eventualities is impossible or even highly unlikely.

The problems involved in preparing to fight in faraway places are nowhere better expressed than in Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger’s Annual Report to the Congress for Fiscal Year 1986. Since 1979 the

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Defense Department has been actively planning for the possibility that American forces might have to be used in the Persian Gulf, either to protect friendly countries there from local enemies or from Soviet aggression. Today, after six years of preparation, the obstacles to effective and timely US action remain immense and, in many cases, essentially unmoved. This is not the fault of any particular administration but rather a reflection of the intrinsic intractability of the problem. The Persian Gulf is far from the centers of American power but relatively close to the Soviet Union. For political reasons the US presence there has been “restricted primarily to sea-based forces.” Yet in the event of war or a crisis, the United States might have to “project substantial ground and land-based tactical air power very rapidly to this distant region and sustain that power over time.” As the Defense Department goes on to point out, meeting these objectives will require:

—Responding promptly to warning signals;
—Developing the capability to deploy forces rapidly over extended air and sea lines of communications and to sustain the forces in combat;
—Gaining approval for, and developing, land-based prepositioning sites;
—Obtaining both overflight rights and enroute access from several additional countries;
—Securing lengthy air and sea lines of communications for considerable periods of time;
—Obtaining access to and improving selected airfields and seaports in the theater;
—Obtaining additional host nation support from countries enroute to and in [Southwest Asia];
—Improving our cargo-handling capabilities to compensate for the lack of local infrastructure and trained personnel; and
—Tailoring support (e.g. water, medical, communications, and transportation) for unique and austere combat operations.⁴

Each of these desiderata taken separately would represent a substantial challenge. Together they make up a very tall order indeed. The point is simple but worth making: while this country can generate enormous power once mobilized, that power has to be transmitted and applied in order to be effective. In large measure because of geography this is not easy, nor should we expect that it ever will be.

**COSTS**

The transport hardware noted above costs money, but it represents only one item in a much more substantial bill. A functional breakdown of all the expenses which the United States incurs in maintaining itself as a world power would have to include the following:

- The components of the Air Force and Navy needed to secure lines of communication, in addition to airlift and sealift vehicles themselves.
- The men and equipment based forward, primarily in Europe and the Far East.
- Those forces located in the United States which are intended for overseas deployment in the event of a crisis.
- The elements of our nuclear forces (theater but also to some extent strategic) needed for purposes of “extending deterrence” to friends and allies as opposed to simply deterring attack on the continental United States.
- The support structure necessary to sustain the entire effort, including facilities for projection located within our borders; command, control, communications, and intelligence links between home and overseas; and bases on foreign soil.

By some counts the United States maintains as many as 359 bases in various parts of the world.⁵ These entail direct costs for construction, maintenance, and security. According to one estimate, in 1984 the Defense Department planned to spend over $4 billion on foreign bases, including $35.6 million in Turkey, $39.6 million in Oman, $92.7 million in Diego Garcia, $143.3 million in Korea, and $210.8 million on “secret basing projects.” Approximately $1.4 billion was to have been spent in Europe for such
things as ground-launched cruise missile sites, tank facilities, fuel storage depots, and family housing.4

In addition to direct expenditures, overseas bases often require the payment of “rent” (usually in the form of military aid) to the host nation. To take 1984 as an example again, it has been estimated that the United States paid $140 million to the government of Portugal for the use of the Azores Islands, a crucial stopping place on the air route to the Middle East, and $900 million to the Philippines for continued access to Clark Air Force Base and Subic Bay Naval Station.7

All of these figures bring to mind the immortal words of the late Senator Everett Dirksen: “A million here and a million there and pretty soon you’re talking real money.” The question here as elsewhere is, how much?

Any effort to devise a zero-based budget in which the costs of world power could be compared to those of isolation and homeland defense is complicated by the way official statistics are organized, in that they report the costs of whole services and individual programs but not of aggregated military functions. Despite this difficulty, over the past few years several attempts have been made to estimate at least the expense of the American commitment to NATO. In 1982 the Department of Defense put the cost of US forces in Europe at $105 billion per year.8 Two years later Senator Ted Stevens of the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee suggested that the true figure was closer to $133 billion,9 and the Pentagon estimated the expense of US forces in Europe plus those earmarked for use there in a long war at $177 billion.10

Earl Ravenal has made one of the few attempts to capture the costs of the entire American global role. For 1985 he put the bill for the European commitment at $129 billion. During the same period $47 billion was to be spent on maintaining US power in Asia and $59 billion was to go to rapid deployment forces (of which $47 billion was directed at the Persian Gulf).11 According to Ravenal, $225 billion or roughly 75 percent of the total defense budget was being expended that year on overseas commitments. Even if this figure is considerably overstated (and Ravenal, with his strong preference for a drastic retrenchment from existing US overseas commitments, certainly has no reason to underestimate their cost), it seems unlikely that the correct fraction is less than one half. In fiscal year 1986, therefore, the United States probably spent at least $160 billion to sustain its worldwide position in peacetime.

This figure is impressive, to be sure, but taken alone it has little or no economic meaning. The United States is a wealthy and fast-growing country. Despite recent increases in defense expenditures, we are now laying out a smaller portion of our gross national product than we were twenty or thirty years ago (.6 percent of GNP projected for FY 1987, as compared to 4.7 percent in 1979, 8.2 percent in 1960, and 9.1 percent in 1955).12 There can be no doubt that in some absolute sense we have the capacity to pay our present bills and a good deal more besides. The real question involves the long-term costs of extracting the necessary wealth from our economy through taxation and borrowing. Several years ago, when economic conditions generally were quite bleak, it was common for writers to blame everything, from higher inflation to declining international competitiveness, on overseas military expenditures.13 There is less such talk today, but the real problem of determining the effect over the long term of high defense spending remains. Presumably our ability, in purely economic terms, to support something resembling our present posture will depend both on the perceived growth in the external threat and on the continuing health of our domestic productive mechanism.

Wherever the absolute economic limits may lie, there are also likely to be virtual political constraints on spending for overseas defense, and in determining these, symbols and inappropriate gross measurements may have effects which an economist would not predict. Thus it is not uncommon for public figures to emphasize the sheer magnitude of spending statistics and to point with horror to their growth over time without reference to the growing economy from which the funds

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are drawn. The fact that the budget deficit is roughly the same size as the amount currently devoted to overseas forces has been noted on a number of occasions, and this equation could become politically potent in the future regardless of its economic significance.  

DANGERS

There are, of course, good reasons for all this apparatus and expense: they are necessary if the United States is to continue to uphold its commitments both explicit (in the form of alliances) and implicit (manifested in various kinds of security guarantees) to states around the world and especially along the periphery of the Eurasian landmass. For the most part these ties were formed in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War when the vacuum which the war had created and the danger of Soviet expansion into it were both unmistakably evident. The unique circumstances of the postwar period and the desire to avoid the mistakes of the 1920s and 1930s combined to help the United States overcome fears which had traditionally been uppermost in the minds of its statesmen—in particular, the anxious awareness that overseas commitments are inherently dangerous, that they necessarily increase the risk of being drawn into foreign wars, and that they may at times involve ceding a share of control over the nation’s security to foreign governments.

Although no simple conclusion can be drawn from the fact, these misgivings still are, or ought to be, valid. Certainly nothing has happened to make them less so, and, indeed, there are reasons to believe that the risks which the United States runs in maintaining its postwar commitments have increased over the last forty years and, in particular, over the last fifteen.

Stated crudely, the principal task of American military strategy during the past four decades has been to counter superior Soviet conventional forces close to the sources of their power. The inability or unwillingness of the Western alliance (broadly defined) to match the Russians division for division has led to a heavy reliance on American nuclear weapons. It is well known that the United States threatens to use such weapons to retaliate for Soviet nuclear and, under some circumstances, conventional assault on its friends and allies.

There was a time when this policy made eminently good sense from an American point of view. Until the 1940s the Soviets had no atomic bombs of their own. Through the 1950s and into the 1960s they had little capacity to deliver those weapons they did possess against the continental United States. Until the mid to late 1960s, virtually all of the Soviet Union’s intercontinental-range forces and a good portion of those directed at Europe would have been vulnerable to American preemption. US forces, on the other hand, were far less susceptible to a disarming surprise attack.

By 1970 at the latest the situation had changed considerably. The proliferation of Soviet ICBMs and SLBMs and the evolving characteristics of the American strategic force meant that the United States could no longer launch an effective counterforce first strike against the Soviet Union. Since the 1950s there had always been a possibility that in executing its pledge to use nuclear weapons to turn back an assault on Europe, the United States would suffer some damage to its homeland. But this danger had remained relatively slight well into the 1960s. Limited Soviet strikes would have called forth a devastating response, and even an all-out attack on the United States would have been met with still more horrific retaliation. There was little or no likelihood of the Russians disabling American strategic forces, but if the United States got in the first blow, there was a good chance that the Soviets would find themselves effectively disarmed. Under these conditions the threat of retaliation or even a first strike as a response to aggression was quite plausible, certainly to the Soviet leadership if not entirely to their American counterparts. This is what “nuclear superiority” meant during the two decades when the United States possessed it.  

The development of a secure Soviet second-strike force deprived the United States of what Herman Kahn called its “not incredible first-strike capability.” Regardless of what it did, the American military no
longer had the capacity to prevent the Soviets from detonating nuclear weapons over US home soil. With the onset of parity (an event which some American analysts and officials had lauded as necessarily benign and stabilizing) came a scramble for options, whether through improved conventional defenses, more flexible war plans to permit limited use of strategic nuclear forces, or more usable and hence more credible theater nuclear weapons, from "enhanced radiation devices" to new intermediate-range ballistic and cruise missiles. All were intended to shore up the credibility of the American nuclear guarantee. Each produced serious difficulties, both at home and abroad. Anyone who doubts the significance of strategic superiority would do well to consider the effects of its loss on American strategy and, through that intervening mechanism, on the relations between the United States and its allies.

To make matters worse, by the close of the 1970s the Soviets had begun to develop their own capability to strike at US strategic forces in a highly disruptive way. The positions of the two superpowers were not reversed, but a Soviet first strike on the United States (perhaps in retaliation for some limited use of American nuclear weapons in Europe), while still risky and extremely unlikely, was now far less implausible than it had ever been before. 17

By the beginning of the 1980s the strategic situation could be summarized as follows: If a Soviet conventional offensive were succeeding in Europe, the United States could not and therefore would not try to launch the sort of large-scale counterforce attack which it had planned for in the 1950s and 1960s. Any decision to make limited use of US-based strategic nuclear forces, especially against targets in the Soviet Union, would have to be based on the assumption of a similar controlled Soviet retaliatory response. This assumption has been a troubling one since the idea of limited strategic options was first widely discussed in the early 1970s, both because of uncertainties regarding Soviet doctrine and because of the danger of unintentional escalation. To these worries would now have to be added the possibility of substantial Soviet retaliation against US strategic forces in response to some limited American attack.

Assuming that American theater nuclear forces had not been destroyed in preemptive attacks (whether conventional or nuclear), they might be used in a desperate attempt to bring advancing Warsaw Pact armored divisions to a halt. Physical destruction of units and the clear warning of greater and possibly less controllable escalation to follow might cause Soviet leaders to call off their attack. But there is at least as good a chance that theater nuclear attacks would provoke them into an equally devastating response. It is impossible to say which side would be worse off after an exchange of theater nuclear weapons, but it is hard to believe that the West, with its densely populated territory and fragile, concentrated logistical system, would benefit from such a catastrophic turn of events.

This last point raises an even more worrisome possibility. Given the changes in the strategic balance already discussed and the increasing survivability and flexibility of their theater-range forces in Europe, the Far East, and possibly Central Asia, there may now be more of a danger of limited Soviet preemptive attacks with theater nuclear weapons. Such strikes would not include targets in the continental United States and they might not even involve nuclear detonations on American soil, but they could severely damage our capability to conduct further operations in areas of great importance to us. In a war over Iran, for example, Soviet SS-20 and Backfire strikes against Oman, Diego Garcia, and American aircraft carriers might leave the United States with few options, most of them probably escalatory (i.e. attacks with strategic forces on the Soviet Union) and none of which would make it easy for us to get back into a theater from which we had been effectively locked out. The inescapable vulnerability of the ports and airfields through which American reinforcements would have to flow in any war in Europe or the Far East might make them similarly attractive targets.
The United States has now lost the strategic edge which permitted it to compensate for its own and its allies’ inadequate preparations for conventional warfare. Under these conditions the doctrine to which we are committed is extraordinarily risky; indeed, one might well ask if we would be willing to make the same promises today, starting fresh, that were made two and three decades ago.

Neither extreme on the spectrum of possible solutions to this unhappy state of affairs appears particularly plausible, at least over the near term. A massive Western conventional buildup of the sort necessary to provide high confidence of successful local defense without resort to nuclear weapons would be extremely expensive. An effort to regain nuclear superiority through some combination of offensive means (more and better counterforce weapons) and defensive means (sole possession of large and effective ballistic missile defenses) appears problematic. In between these two dubious utopias lies a range of uncomfortable middle ground: sufficient preparations to provide some hope of conventional success backed by “the threat that leaves something to chance”—the threat that if things go too far we will take steps which could easily get out of control.

This situation is not satisfying from a military point of view, and it may be difficult to sustain politically as well. In recent years the debate over European defense seems to be experiencing wider and wider gyrations, pushed along by Americans who are justifiably uncomfortable with the existing state of affairs.” No first use,” SDI, and proposals for a conventional retaliatory doctrine are all in some sense (although in very different ways) responses to the strategic conditions which began to emerge most clearly fifteen years ago. Whether, without American nuclear superiority, there now exists some stable resting point where all parties can be reasonably happy remains to be seen.

There is a cruel but surely unintentional irony in the accusation of certain Europeans that the United States is preparing to fight a nuclear war which would be limited to European territory. Virtually the only way in which this country is ever likely to become involved in a nuclear conflict would be in support of one of the overseas commitments which we took on forty years ago. If avoiding nuclear war were the sole objective of our foreign policy, the critical first step would undoubtedly be to withdraw from these responsibilities and to bring our forces home.

It is odd (and perhaps fortunate) that this is a point which does not seem to be made very often by American anti-nuclear activists, who tend to be rather apolitical and to concentrate on the evils of nuclear weapons and nuclear war per se. The connection between our commitments and our exposure to nuclear danger seems not to have been made, or at least it does not seem to have entered the public consciousness in any lasting way. There is, for the moment anyway, nothing which could be labeled “nuclear isolationism” on the American political horizon.

JUSTIFICATIONS

An array of far-flung commitments is difficult, costly, and dangerous to sustain. It should therefore come as no surprise that it can, over time, prove difficult to justify to a democratic polity. In this regard it is worth recalling again that for most of its two hundred years the United States has done what it could to stand aloof from foreign entanglements, that there was strong resistance to getting involved in both world wars, that the United States essentially withdrew from world politics after the first, and that the last forty years of continuous involvement are unique in the nation’s history. Will the period of engagement last? Can it last forever?

An insular democracy like the United States always has the option of dismissing foreigners with the words Neville Chamberlain used to describe the Czechs in 1938 as “far-away... people of whom we know nothing.” For a country like ours to play the role of a world power over time requires the existence and widespread acceptance of some
rationale, some set of ideas, some comprehensible "story" which justifies the effort, expense, and danger of intervention and continuing engagement.

It is possible to imagine a number of different rationales, of which the first and most obvious would be explicitly imperial. A country may seek to expand, to conquer, and to rule because it frankly expects that such activities will bring glory and economic gain to its citizens or because it believes itself to be fulfilling some noble "civilizing mission." Alternatively, action in distant places may be justified in terms of power politics, as necessary to preserve the balance of power or to secure the interests of the state. Finally, the need to play a world role can be rationalized in ideological terms, either negative or positive. A nation may act either to oppose an inimical political creed or to promulgate its own beliefs. This final variant may shade over into a kind of ideological imperialism which, because it would involve "forcing people to be free," can pose special problems for a liberal democracy.

Except for a brief period at the turn of the 20th century the United States has never thought of itself as an imperial power, and even at the peak of imperialist enthusiasm during the war with Spain there was always strong resistance to the idea of dominion and overseas rule. Dragged reluctantly into war in 1917 and 1941, most Americans thought of themselves as fighting for some mix of power political aims (usually of the "if we don't fight them there we'll have to fight them here" variety) and ideological objectives ("making the world safe for democracy" or opposing fascism).

Since 1945 the problem has been markedly different. Instead of justifying temporary intervention in distant wars, American statesmen have had to explain why they felt it necessary for their country to take a permanent part in world affairs. For most of the last forty years the answer has come once again in the form of a mixed rationale, with power politics usually subordinated to ideology and, in particular, to anti-communism. This mix was perhaps best exemplified in the domino theory, which combined the fear of ideological contagion with more traditional balance-of-power and geopolitical notions. In a sense the rise and fall of the domino theory is symbolic of the recent collapse of consensus regarding the appropriate explanation for America's world role.

Although the discussion today is less heated than during the Vietnam War years, the fundamental question of the proper US world role is still unsettled; indeed, among elites, there may be more fragmentation now than at any time since the beginning of the Cold War. At a practical level this division reflects itself in a widespread questioning of America's overseas commitments, not just in the Third World where there has always been controversy, but at the very heart of the postwar system in Europe and Japan.

Putting aside specifics, it is remarkable the range of commentators who have questioned the US commitment to NATO over the past five years. People as diverse as Irving Kristol, Eliot Cohen, Senator Sam Nunn, Henry Kissinger, Laurence Radway, and Ronald Steel have all urged a reduction or, in some cases, an actual termination of the American military presence in Europe. Whether out of a general frustration with the Europeans, or out of a desire to free American military resources for use elsewhere, to shift a greater portion of the burden of their own defense onto the allies, to resuscitate the alliance, to allow it to devolve naturally, or to dismantle it—the recommendations have been strikingly similar. Nor is this sort of discussion limited to members of the foreign policy elite writing in obscure journals. Recently the theme has been picked up by editorialists and opinion-makers whose formulations reach a broader audience.

There would seem to be the possibility of major, far-reaching public debate (and perhaps of some rather odd political coalitions) latent in what is really much more than the usual grumbling about alliance relations. A fiscal crisis or a presidential election campaign could bring the debate to the fore. Heightened anti-Americanism in Europe or Asia might have similar effects, as could a destructive terrorist campaign aimed at US
military personnel stationed around the world. Alternatively, a military confrontation with the Soviet Union might reveal the risks of extended deterrence under strategic conditions far less favorable than those prevailing at the time of the various Berlin crises or during the 1956, 1967, and 1973 Arab-Israeli wars.

How could the case for continuing US engagement best be made? This is a question which I will not seek to answer here but which those interested in preserving America's place as a world power would do well to consider in advance. Presumably the truest, and one hopes therefore the most persuasive, argument will involve again a blending of ideology (both positive and negative) and power politics. Perhaps it will also have to include an appeal from necessity, which has a somewhat unfamiliar ring to American ears. However difficult the course on which we embarked forty years ago and however distant its end, the alternatives to it are all likely to be far worse. Here one is reminded of the astonishing candor with which the Greek statesman Pericles rallied the people of democratic Athens to defend themselves against Sparta:

You cannot continue to enjoy the privileges unless you also shoulder the burdens of empire . . . . Nor is it any longer possible for you to give up this empire, though there may be some people who in a mood of sudden panic and in a spirit of political apathy actually think that this would be a fine and noble thing to do. Your empire is now like a tyranny: it may have been wrong to take it; it is certainly dangerous to let it go.21

NOTES

2. For an optimistic but overly economic view of the strategic effect of technological progress, see Albert Wohlstetter, "Illusions of Distance," Foreign Affairs, 46 (January 1968), 242-55.
4. Ibid., p. 232.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
14. See Ravelin, p. 1, and Radway, p. 232. A comparison can be drawn to the British situation in the wake of the Boer War, when the sheer size of spending figures helped to convince politicians that despite substantial increases in national wealth, defense outlays and strategic realignments were necessary. See the first chapter of George Monier, The End of Isolation: British Foreign Policy 1900-1907 (London: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1963).
18. For an argument that this is the best that can be hoped for, see Richard Betts, "Conventional Deterrence: Predictive Uncertainty and Policy Confidence," World Politics, 36 (January 1985), 153-79.
20. Editorials published on successive days in The New York Times make this point nicely. On 27 February 1985 Archibald Gillies, president of the World Policy Institute and an opponent of high defense spending asked, "Why must we spend more than $130 billion annually for European defense...? Why, in any case, after 40 years of peace and nearly two decades of East-West detente, is it necessary for us to deploy more than 300,000 troops and 6,000 tactical nuclear weapons in Europe?" On 28 February William Safire, the conservative columnist, posed a similar question: "What are we getting in return for our nuclear umbrella protecting Japan? Why are a third of a million U.S. troops stationed in Europe, 40 years after the war?"