SOVIET USE OF SURROGATES 
TO PROJECT POWER 
INTO THE THIRD WORLD

by

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How the Soviet Union employs various surrogates to promote its policy and influence in the Third World is a subject requiring much more analytic and scholarly examination than has taken place.¹ A comprehensive study of the many ways in which the USSR employs clients in the developing world would constitute a very ambitious undertaking. In order to narrow the scope of this complicated subject, I will address only two important aspects of Soviet policy and strategy in the developing world. The first focuses on whether and to what degree the USSR promotes what is now referred to as low-level or low-intensity violence, primarily insurgency and terrorism. The second examines Soviet assistance to newly established Marxist-Leninist regimes. It has been suggested by some Western specialists that the latter has as its objective the consolidation of power by pro-Moscow elements during the immediate post-revolutionary period. With respect to each of these policies, is there significant primary evidence pointing to Moscow's reliance on surrogate assets to help accomplish these purported foreign policy objectives?

SURROGATES AND STRATEGY

Before examining these two aspects of Soviet policy in the Third World, it is first important to determine what we generally know about surrogates. Of course, throughout history imperial regimes frequently have used others to project power and influence. For instance, in very early times the Romans used clients to fight various enemies. Furthermore, since the time of ancient Greece and Rome, states have employed mercenaries, whether they are individual soldiers of fortune or defeated troops looking for new causes, as instruments of power and influence. In more recent times the British used the Gurkhas and the French the Foreign Legion.

The Soviet Union, however, according to a number of specialists, appears to use surrogates in ways that differ markedly from earlier and even more contemporary times.² Their arguments, when taken together, point to important distinctions. For one, Soviet surrogates appear to be much more specialized in the tasks and missions they undertake. Further, Moscow's control seems to vary and depends on the ideological, political, geographical, and economic nature of the client state itself. And further, these proxies are apparently involved in an array of operations both in peace and in what has been called "twilight wars" or low-intensity conflicts.

How then has the Soviet Union promoted low-intensity violence in the Third World and assisted new Marxist-Leninist regimes? Clues that address these two aspects
of Moscow’s surrogate policy can be found in the literature dealing with Soviet strategy and policy in the developing world. In the case of low-level violence, the literature suggests that Moscow employs both political and paramilitary instruments to promote instability, including guerrilla insurgency and terrorism. These political and paramilitary instruments are subsumed under the term “active measures.” In terms of support for insurgent and terrorist movements, both types of active measures appear important to achieving policy objectives. Political active measures, it is argued, are used to champion the cause and objectives of the insurgent movement in the international arena. The international acceptance both of the just cause of the insurgency and the repressive/immoral character of the incumbent regime can play an important role at each stage of the movement’s development. The major Soviet techniques employed to promote insurgent causes include foreign propaganda, international front organizations, and what might be termed political action within the United Nations and other international or regional organizations. The latter include the Organization of African Unity, the non-aligned movement, and the Socialist International. If political active measures seek to enhance the reputation of the insurgent movement internationally, paramilitary assistance, according to some Western specialists, seeks to improve their politico-military proficiency “on the ground.” Paramilitary assistance includes arms and logistical support, politico-military training, and advisory support. To what degree do Soviet surrogates perform each of these political and paramilitary tasks in support of Moscow’s policy and strategy? Does evidence exist to support the notion that Soviet surrogates have become quite specialized and different proxies are involved in each of these varied tactics?

As noted earlier, a second important aspect of Soviet policy, according to some analysts, is directed toward assisting Leninist factions to consolidate power during the post-revolutionary period. The Kremlin’s objective, it is posited, is to give operational

meaning to the Brezhnev doctrine’s assertion of the irreversibility of the world revolutionary process. The goal is to ensure that regimes that come to power through Leninist means remain forever inviolate. This is achieved through the development of an internal security infrastructure that can quell all internal opposition, mobilize the population, and insulate the leadership cadre. Additionally, to protect against a new form of internal threat that may challenge these newly established Leninist regimes—resistance movements employing insurgent strategies—the Soviet Union provides military and paramilitary advice and support. As with the other aspect of Soviet policy discussed above, we are left with the question of whether and to what degree the Kremlin can call upon its surrogates to assist in these matters.

CASE STUDIES

While the concept of surrogates has become the subject of growing commentary, analytic rigor in assessing this aspect of Soviet strategy has been missing. In part, this has been due to a lack of primary documentation. However, in preparing this study I was able to draw upon a body of unique and only recently available primary materials. This material contains firsthand evidence of how the Soviets use surrogates in the Third World. The documents can be

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subdivided into two categories. The first of these is documentation in the form of arrangements and official agreements, either between terrorists or newly established Leninist regimes and the USSR and its various surrogates. These include materials from Grenada, Central America, southern Africa, and the Middle East.\textsuperscript{10} They reveal the international infrastructure that Moscow and its surrogates employ. The second documentary category consists of testimony by former members of the states sponsoring terrorism and insurgency or the actual practitioners who conducted these operations “on the ground.” This testimony is being collected through interviews with the individuals involved. The portion cited in the following pages is a small part of extensive debriefings of these former principals who have now come to live in the West.\textsuperscript{11} What follows are three case studies revealing how Moscow employs surrogates in its Third World policy.

The Caribbean

The documents captured in Grenada during the 1983 intervention by the United States and its eastern Caribbean allies reveal how the Soviets and their surrogates were deeply involved both in assisting the government of Maurice Bishop in consolidating power and in establishing an infrastructure from which terrorism and insurgency could be promoted in the region. In effect, the documents detail the steps taken to establish a surrogate of a Soviet surrogate, that is, a client of Moscow’s own Cuban surrogate. It would appear that a quite similar situation currently exists in Nicaragua.

A number of the documents portray both the quality and quantity of military assistance received by Grenada from Moscow and its Eastern bloc, Cuban, Vietnamese, and North Korean proxies. The objective of this support was to assist the Bishop government in power consolidation. For instance, the transfer of Soviet arms to Grenada is described in two written agreements with the New Jewel Movement.\textsuperscript{12} Signed in the early 1980s, these agreements cover the period 1981-1985 and demonstrate Moscow’s willingness to underwrite Grenada’s military buildup. This aid included outfitting a Grenadian force of 10,000 soldiers, sending Soviet military advisors and security specialists to Grenada, and dispatching Grenadian soldiers to the USSR for training. A secret Cuban-Grenadian agreement signed by Castro provided a contingent of Cuban military specialists for the purpose of training Grenadian soldiers.\textsuperscript{13} Military scholarships also were made available to bring Grenadian personnel to Cuba. Interestingly, the document stressed that all measures should be taken to insure the secrecy of these agreements. Two other documents described an offer by the government of Vietnam to teach Grenadian officials about American battle tactics and weapons.\textsuperscript{14} Hanoi also offered to assist Grenada in its power consolidation by training cadres in the “techniques of dealing with counterrevolutionaries and anti-social elements, especially in the area of re-education and methods of dealing with lumpenproletarian elements.”

Arrangements to transfer arms from North Korea, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany are outlined. The agreement with North Korea, which was secret and signed by Bishop, included provision of coast guard vessels.\textsuperscript{15} The Czechs, using Cuba as a transfer point, provided rifles, bazookas, grenade launchers, rocket warheads, and similar weapons. The agreement also suggested that the Grenadians make a similar arrangement with other Warsaw Pact states, including the Bulgarians.\textsuperscript{16} In other words, one finds a Soviet surrogate directing Grenada to other Warsaw Pact outlets for acquiring military assistance. The agreement with East Germany, which was signed by Grenada’s security chief, specified that the purpose of the equipment and supplies was to strengthen Grenadian security in “the struggle against enemies of the people.” The ultimate goal was “to help strengthen the operative capacity of the security bodies of your country.”\textsuperscript{17} So it seems that the New Jewel Movement was clear on the system of government it intended to establish in Grenada.
In addition to military equipment, the Secretary of Defense and Interior, Hudson Austin, personally requested from Yuri Andropov (at that time head of the KGB) intelligence and counterintelligence training for Grenadian security cadres. He also acknowledged “the tremendous assistance which our armed forces received from your party and government.” Other documents reveal that Grenadians were to receive military training in Soviet and East European bloc schools.

It would also appear that the Soviets and their surrogates were preparing Grenada to play a role in the international infrastructure used to promote the cause of “national liberation movements.” For instance, in a Cuban-Grenadian Communist Party agreement, Havana offers to provide propaganda training for New Jewel Movement cadres and arranges to coordinate their strategy in international organizations and events, including the Socialist International. The communication is between Hudson Austin and Manuel Pineiro, the chief of the Americas Department of the Cuban Communist Party. In many respects Pineiro is the equivalent of Boris Ponomarev, the head of the International Department of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). In a related communique Pineiro provides the New Jewel Movement with information on how to contact other communist party organizations across the globe, including illegal parties from Chile, Brazil, and Turkey. These could be reached through Cuban embassies in the Soviet Union, Portugal, and East Germany. A number of these parties were scheduled to take part in the Conference on Solidarity with Grenada which was being organized by Soviet front groups.

The Cubans provided Grenada with a report on how to cultivate and manipulate church clergy. This included clergy in Grenada as well as the promotion of contacts with clergy from Nicaragua and other Latin American countries linked to the theology of liberation and committed to the revolutionary process. This suggests that Grenada was being prepared to play a role in Soviet-Cuban political warfare efforts in the Caribbean region.

In light of the documents described above, it would seem to be no exaggeration to suggest that Grenada was being groomed for a surrogate role. This was, however, a role that they themselves sought. This was made explicit in a number of documents reviewed for this study. For instance, a meeting between Maurice Bishop and Andrei Gromyko discloses not only the high level of interest the KGB leadership had in the New Jewel Movement, but also the degree to which the Grenadian government saw itself as an evolving Soviet client. Bishop emphasized to Gromyko the special geographical position of Grenada and his government’s desire to promote the world communist movement in the Caribbean region. Bishop goes on to state that the airport in Grenada could be used to interdict NATO supply lines.

Accounts of the meetings of the New Jewel Movement’s political bureau delineate their linkage with the Soviet-Cuban regional and international infrastructure for conducting political warfare. For instance, the New Jewel Movement established relations with national liberation movements supported by the USSR, including the PLO and SWAPO. In communiques between the Grenadian government and its embassy representatives in Moscow, the Bishop government declared its desire to fight against imperialism. Other documents included a 1981 letter from Bishop to Hafez Assad of Syria in which Bishop states that Grenada will continue to support the PLO. A letter from a Grenadian official in Moscow recounted his meeting with the PLO, and in which he expressed the New Jewel Movement’s desire to play a client role.

Of particular interest is a series of items which documented the role of Grenada as a Soviet surrogate in the Socialist International (SI). Grenada was one of a number of regional members of a special secret caucus of the SI. What was the purpose of this secret caucus? To influence the SI to oppose more aggressively US policy in Latin America and to support the government of Nicaragua.
and the guerrillas in El Salvador. What is most interesting is that one of the members of this secret regional caucus of the SI was Cuba. However, Cuba is not a member of the Socialist International. What this suggests is an intricate effort by the USSR and Cuba to manipulate this international organization.

Finally, still other documents demonstrate that Grenada was involved with Soviet front groups and took part in the Congress of the World Center for Resistance to Imperialism, Zionism, Racism, and Reaction. Pineiro counseled Grenada on its role in the Congress, and a Grenadian Peace Council was established as the national-level affiliate of a major Soviet front organization, the World Peace Council.

In sum, one finds a number of Soviet surrogates involved both in assisting the New Jewel Movement to consolidate power, and in integrating Grenada into the world revolutionary process.

Central America

An examination of the Central American situation suggests a pattern similar to the Grenadian case. Testimony by former Sandinista officials and captured documents outline Moscow's extensive use of surrogates. Testimony by a former Sandinista counterintelligence officer, Miguel Bolanos Hunter, provides firsthand evidence of the Soviet, Cuban, East German, and Bulgarian roles in both the seizure of power and the consolidation of control.

According to Bolanos, officers from the Cuban intelligence agency (DGI) occupy key administrative positions in the Nicaraguan state security apparatus. In fact, the head of the intelligence directorate is a Cuban who has served as a link between the Sandinista Front for National Liberation (FSLN) and Cuba for a number of years. Following the revolution, FSLN cadres were sent to Cuba for intelligence and counterintelligence training. In addition to Cubans, there were Soviet KGB instructors at the intelligence school in Cuba. Bolanos noted that Grenadians and Angolans also were receiving training. In other words, the Angolans, like the Nicaraguans, were being educated in the art of power consolidation and control. In addition to basic training in counterintelligence, Bolanos received special instruction in how to manipulate and manage the foreign media in Nicaragua. Those Nicaraguan cadres who were considered both politically reliable and capable were selected to attend the five-year course at the higher KGB school in Moscow.

Within the Nicaraguan intelligence organization, Cuban advisors serve in all of the subdivisions of the counterintelligence and intelligence directorates. East Germans provide technical support in the area of electronic surveillance procedures. Soviet surrogates also were involved in other power consolidation measures, most important the development and expansion of the armed forces. In fact, immediately following the seizure of power, senior ranking Soviet military officers arrived in Nicaragua. Cubans also played a role in training officers for senior-level and general staff positions within the Nicaraguan armed forces.

In addition to the Cuban intelligence, the Americas Department of the Cuban Communist Party and the Department of Special Operations have been involved in Nicaragua. Their functions relate more to the promotion of low-level violence than to power consolidation. The Department of Special Operations assists with the training and advising of Salvadoran guerrilla forces. Along with other Soviet surrogates, it monitors and helps direct operations from guerrilla base camps in Nicaragua. According to Bolanos, the FSLN is part of the regional network for promoting low-level violence in the region. He noted that Salvador is the main target, but Honduras and Guatemala also receive attention. In cooperation with other Soviet surrogates the FSLN also provides international propaganda and political assistance to “national liberation movements.” In cooperation with the Cuban Communist Party's Americas Department, the FSLN established a Department of International Relations in order to conduct
political warfare campaigns in the region more effectively. As noted earlier, the objective of these tactics is to assist in legitimizing the cause and actions of the guerrilla movements in the international arena while discrediting US policy. In sum, one finds coordination between the FSLN’s International Relations Department, the Cuban Communist Party’s Americas Department, and the CPSU International Department, indicating important institutional and operational arrangements.

Another former Sandinista official, Eden Pastora, has also provided interesting insights into Soviet surrogate activities. Pastora’s testimony has focused on military assistance. He observed that in the period prior to the seizure of power, the Cubans played an important role in supporting the FSLN forces against the Somoza government. Castro assisted in the unification of the FSLN factions. Prior to this the different guerrilla factions were involved in internecine arguments over the appropriate road to revolution. Would this take place through the proletariat, through the peasants in the countryside, or through a general spontaneous revolt? These arguments were tearing the movement apart, but Castro succeeded in bringing the factions together. Additionally, as the movement achieved success in 1978, arms began to flow in for the final offensive. Cuba set up an operational center for distribution of weapons to the Sandinistas.

With respect to power consolidation, Pastora explained that Soviet surrogate military advisors were in place almost immediately following Somoza’s fall, taking part in the rapid buildup of the Nicaraguan armed forces. He recounts his meeting with former Soviet Minister of Defense Marshal Dmitri Ustinov to arrange for arms shipments to Nicaragua. Finally, with rapidly evolving Soviet-Cuban involvement in Nicaragua, the FSLN, according to Pastora, allowed its territory to become a base for power projection throughout the region.

In addition to these interviews, a number of documents captured in Central America also reveal how Soviet surrogates have been involved in the support of the Salvadoran guerrilla movement. For instance, one item contained the account by Shafik Handal, the General Secretary of the Salvadorean Communist Party, of his 1980 trip to various Soviet surrogate states to arrange for the shipment of arms. His account provides evidence of the network for acquiring and transporting Soviet surrogate assistance to insurgent movements. Handal arranged for arms to be smuggled to Salvador from Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Vietnam, and Ethiopia. The report also discloses the concerted efforts by the USSR and its allies to cover up their role. This was to be achieved in various ways. For instance, US-made weapons were to be transferred from Vietnam and Ethiopia. The Czechs were to provide rebuilt World War II weapons and other Czech weapons that are readily available on the world market. Soviet-produced arms, on the other hand, were not to be made available, at least at that time. Finally, during the trip Handal often met with high-level government officials, including Vietnam’s Le Duan, Ethiopia’s Mengistu, and leading officials from the CPSU’s International Department.

A captured document from Salvador reveals that Castro also played a unifying role with respect to the Salvadorean guerrilla factions. In a letter dated December 1979, the three major Salvadorean guerrilla factions—the Armed Forces of National Resistance, the Communist Party of El Salvador, and the People’s Liberation Army—announced the signing of a solidarity agreement and thanked Castro for his assistance in forging their unification. It appears that in recent years Castro has demanded unity among guerrilla elements as a precondition for military assistance. In other letters addressed to Manuel Pineiro, one finds the guerrillas providing the Cuban leadership with operational details concerning the situation on the ground in El Salvador. This would appear to underline the close cooperation at the highest levels between Cuba and the Salvadorean revolutionaries. In these particular letters the guerrillas begin by explaining how the Castro-inspired unification
has broadened their rural base, and they thank Pineiro for his advice. They also describe recent personnel assignments, new propaganda slogans, and external political activities.

Expanding international political support for the Salvadoran guerrillas is an important aspect of Soviet strategy. One of the documents, the Manifesto of the World Front for Solidarity with the Salvadoran People, outlines the use of Soviet front groups for this purpose. Among the members of the World Front’s Permanent Bureau was a representative of the US Communist Party, who also was a leading official in the US Peace Council (the national-level affiliate of the World Peace Council), and the director of the Committee in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador. The latter organization has been a major actor in organizing opposition in the United States to Reagan Administration policy in El Salvador.

The importance of building international public opinion in support of the Salvadoran guerrillas is depicted in the report by Farad Handal (the brother of Shafik Handal) on his trip in 1980 to develop and expand the solidarity movement in the United States. It appears that the Salvadoran guerrillas believe that one way to succeed in El Salvador is to influence public opinion in the United States to oppose the Reagan Administration’s involvement in the conflict. The USSR used the World Peace Council to accomplish the same objective in an interesting operation in Western Europe during the Vietnam War. Handal identified himself not as a member of the Salvadoran Communist Party, but as a member of the National Democratic Union (the legal front of the Salvadoran Communist Party). His travel notes establish that the Salvadoran solidarity movement in the United States is a target of the Salvadoran insurgents, and that they hope to penetrate and influence it. Approximately half of the solidarity groups Handal met with were headed by members of either the US Communist Party or the US Peace Council. Also prominent were Salvadoran members of various guerrilla movements who are living in the United States. While in the United States, Handal linked up with the Cubans during his visit to the United Nations. They advised him to work with certain members of the US Congress and also made contacts for Handal in Washington. While in New York City, he met with the leaders of the US Communist Party and members of the previously mentioned World Front, as well as representatives from the Committee in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador. US Communist Party members in Washington made the arrangements for Handal’s meetings with members of the US Congress. Finally, Handal recounts in his notes a meeting with PLO representatives who offered to assist the guerrillas with arms and training.

The Middle East

Over the last two decades the PLO has emerged in the Middle East and on the international scene as a major practitioner of the art of protracted war. Within the network of Soviet-sponsored and Soviet-supported international terrorism, the PLO has been both a recipient of Soviet surrogate assistance and a supplier of this type of assistance to other insurgent and terrorist movements. Documents captured in the Middle East reveal the complex nature of the linkage between the PLO and a number of Soviet surrogates, as well as the PLO connection with the other international terrorist and guerrilla movements supported by Moscow. Since the end of the 1960s, the PLO-Soviet connection has become increasingly intimate, with steady intensification of cooperation clearly demonstrated in captured documents.

The top level at which the policies and actions of the PLO are coordinated with the USSR is demonstrated in the accounts of meetings between Gromyko and Farrouk Kaddoumi (the “Foreign Minister” of the PLO), and between Arafat, Gromyko, and Ponomarev. The session between Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko and the PLO’s Kaddoumi took place in 1983. The minutes disclose deep Soviet involvement with its PLO surrogate. In fact, during the meeting Gromyko advised Kaddoumi on strategy and
tactics and strongly intimated that the PLO should subordinate itself to Syria. The fact that Gromyko felt he could suggest this to Kaddoumi is in itself significant. The meeting between Gromyko, Ponomarev, and Arafat took place in 1979, and it likewise demonstrates the importance the Soviet leadership places on support and guidance of the PLO. The topics for discussion included PLO strategy in the UN; thwarting US policy initiatives in the Middle East; PLO contacts with Cuba, Syria, Polisario, and Iran (during the 1979 US hostage crisis); Soviet political warfare actions in support of the PLO; and PLO contacts with Soviet front groups.

The origins of what can be characterized by the end of the 1970s as an intimate relationship between the USSR and the PLO were outlined in an interview conducted with Vladimir Sakharov, a former Soviet Foreign Ministry official who worked clandestinely in cooperation with the KGB. He was assigned to the Middle East from 1967 to 1971. Specifically, he detailed the increased Kremlin support for national liberation movements after the 1967 war and how this affected Soviet-PLO linkages. Sakharov described the growing Soviet political and military support through training programs conducted by the KGB and the Soviet military’s General Staff intelligence organization, as well as the use of front groups to promote the cause and legitimacy of the PLO in the international arena. The latter, of course, are under the direction of the International Department.

The growth of paramilitary assistance from the Soviet Union and various surrogates is outlined in PLO documents captured in Lebanon. In 1982, a PLO-East German meeting in Berlin led to an East German offer to provide the PLO with small ships which, presumably, could be used for surface operations against Israel. Also discussed by the PLO representative and the Chief of Staff and Deputy Minister of Defense of East Germany were other kinds of military assistance and training. Other documents depict training of PLO military cadres in the USSR, Hungary, and Bulgaria in paramilitary warfare and conventional platoon-, company-, and battalion-level operations. Military support was also arranged from Vietnam and North Korea, including training in air defense and command procedures. In sum, the Soviets, East Europeans, Cubans, and Vietnamese have trained PLO forces in military tactics at both the low-intensity or paramilitary level and the conventional warfare level. The preparation of the PLO in both types of warfare is likewise reflected in the kinds of arms that were transferred to the Middle East and captured by the Israelis in 1982. They included not only small arms and other kinds of equipment used in paramilitary operations, but tanks, APCs, air defense weapons, military vessels, rocket systems, and so on.

The USSR and its surrogates train PLO cadres at institutions like Patrice Lumumba University. Documents also refer to the Soviet use of fronts to promote the PLO cause. Sakharov described Soviet coordination of various aspects of this international political propaganda campaign, which started in the late 1960s or early 1970s and employed the Afro-Asian People’s Solidarity Organization. Egypt became the center for this activity. In 1979, after a decade of these developments, Ponomarev told Arafat of plans to create a World Solidarity Committee on behalf of the PLO. He noted that Moscow had established a similar committee for the Vietnamese in the 1960s and that it had been highly successful. Finally, the documents showed the PLO playing the role of a surrogate and providing paramilitary assistance to other Soviet-backed terrorist and guerrilla organizations. This took the form of training cadres in camps in Lebanon. For instance, one document captured in Tyre identified the following groups in PLO camps: Salvadorans, Haitians, southern Africans (African National Congress and SWAPO), and Turks. Other documents outline linkages with extremist groups across the ideological spectrum, ranging from the Japanese Red Army to the West German neo-Nazi group headed by Karl Heinz Hoffman. In effect, these documents demonstrate PLO involvement with terrorist and guerrilla groups from almost all continents and ideological perspectives.
CONCLUSION

The purpose of this study has been to examine through primary sources how the Soviet Union employs surrogates in support of two aspects of their Third World policy: promotion of low-level violence and consolidation of power. Captured documents and testimony by former insiders show that in both types of activities the Soviets employ surrogates in functionally specific ways. With respect to low-level violence, it is clear that Moscow integrated surrogates into its dual strategy of promoting the cause of terrorist and insurgent movements in the international arena through the employment of politico-psychological warfare campaigns, as well as in assisting these groups “on the ground” through arms transfers, training, and advisory support.

In addition to detailed information on the use of East European, Cuban, Vietnamese, and North Korean surrogates to support these aspects of Soviet policy, a number of other interesting developments emerge from the evidence. One, the Nicaraguan FSLN was transformed from a recipient of such assistance to the status of a surrogate of Moscow’s Cuban surrogate. In this capacity Nicaragua has emerged as a base from which to promote low-level violence in the Central American region. Two, the documents captured in Grenada suggest that the New Jewel Movement sought to turn Grenada into a base for similar activities in the eastern Caribbean. Soviet and surrogate assistance appears to have been geared, at least at that time, to achieving this objective. Three, in the case of the PLO, we see an example of a recipient which, while continuing to receive Soviet support, became a surrogate involved in the promotion of low-level violence on behalf of the USSR. Finally, the primary source material also discloses the Soviet use of surrogates as part of a policy of assisting newly established Leninist regimes in consolidating internal control. In both Grenada and Nicaragua the Soviet Union and its proxies assisted friendly governments in arming and training their security forces. Although not an official government, the PLO received similar assistance during the latter half of the 1970s and early 1980s. It was at this time that the PLO was, in effect, a de facto government in southern Lebanon. As in the case of promotion of low-level violence, surrogates performed functionally specific roles in this process.

NOTES


4. Richard Shultz and Roy Godson have noted that "active measures" is a Soviet term that came into use in the 1950s to describe covert operations that influence foreign countries. Active measures may entail influencing the policies of another government, undermining confidence in its leaders and institutions, disrupting relations between other nations, and distorting perceptions of reality. Active measures may be conducted over the foreign propaganda channels, diplomatic relations, and cultural activities. Covert political techniques include the use of covert propaganda, oral and written disinformation, agents of influence, clandestine radios, and international front organizations. Although active measures are used in all political contexts, military maneuvers and paramilitary assistance to insurgents and terrorists also may be involved. Taken from Deinstitutin: Active Measures in Soviet Strategy (New York: Persephone, 1984), I have argued elsewhere that with respect to the Third World, the paramilitary aspects of Soviet active measures are as significant as the political tactics. See Richard Shultz, "Soviet Strategy and Organization: Active Measures and Insurgency," in The Red Orchestra, ed. Dennis Bark et al. (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution, forthcoming 1986).


7. With respect to power consolidation, perhaps the best source of information can be found in the literature on Soviet intelligence. See Raymond Roca and John Dziak, Bibliography on Soviet Intelligence and Security Services (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1985).

8. For a discussion of this see Francis Fukuyama, "The New Marxist-Leninist States and Internal Conflict in the Third World," in Ra’anan et al., Third World Marxist-Leninist Regimes.


10. These materials are contained in a study recently published by the faculty of the International Security Studies Program of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. See Ra’anan et al., Hydra of Carnage, pp. 363-69. The two documents were formally titled "AGREEMENT and PROTOCOL between the Government of Grenada and the Government of Soviet Socialist Republic on deliveries from the Union of SSR to Grenada of special and other equipment."
from the Grenadian Embassy in Cuba reporting that the Czechs have agreed to provide weapons, while Document 8 is a bill of lading for shipment of these weapons.

19. "Document 9: East Germany Aids Grenada's Internal Security," ibid., pp. 382-83. Within the network of assistance provided by the USSR and its client states, the East Germans appear to specialize in providing the equipment and training for an effective internal security apparatus.


21. "Document 11: Grenadian Students in the USSR," ibid., pp. 386-87. This report from Grenada's Embassy in Moscow indicates the variety of training support the Soviet Union was providing to Grenada. It outlines the specific military schools, institutes, and academies they were assigned to attend in the USSR.


23. See "Documents 13, 14, and 15: International Support Network," ibid., pp. 391-94. Actually, the Pinoche communique (Document 13) is one of three documents providing this information to the New Jewel Movement. Document 14 is a memo to an Americas Department official from the analysis section of Cuban intelligence (DGI) listing addresses of communist parties in Europe and Asia, while Document 15 is a Cuban memo giving the addresses of communist parties participating in an international conference on solidarity with Grenada.


30. "Document 22: Relations with the Soviet Union," ibid., pp. 415-17. This outlines Grenada's self-proposed "Role in Regional Affairs," "Relations with other Members of the Socialist Community," and the "Linkage of Grenada's International Activities to Relations with the USSR."


32. "Document 24: Testimony of Miguel Bolanos Hunter," ibid., pp. 399-20. Bolanos is a former counterintelligence officer in the counterespionage section of the Sandinista state security apparatus, the DGSE. He was responsible for overseeing Western embassies and members of the Western press when he served in the DGSE. These excerpts are part of a much larger transcript of remarks contained in his interview for the Oral History Project, International Security Studies Program, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy.

33. "Document 25: Testimony of Eden Pastora Gomez," ibid., pp. 321-32. Pastora first became involved in the opposition to the Somoza government in 1959. He gained international prominence when on 22 August 1978 he led a group of 25 Sandinista commandos in the seizure of the National Palace, taking 2000 hostages. During the Sandinista final offensive he commanded the southern front, which was the scene of the bitterest fighting of the war. After the Sandinista victory, he was appointed Vice-Minister of the Interior and was responsible for overseeing the Sandinista Popular Militias. He resigned in 1981 and on 15 April 1982 officially broke with the Sandinistas and established the guerrilla group ARDE to challenge them. His testimony here is part of a much larger oral history interview compiled by the ISSP, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy.

34. "Document 26: Testimony of Vladimir Sakharov," ibid., pp. 514-18. During the period 1967-1971, Sakharov (a pseudonym) served in North Yemen, Egypt, and Kuwait and was personally involved in a variety of Soviet operations. The excerpt here draws on his extensive operational experience in the Middle East to bear witness to the early years of Soviet-PLO relations. This is only part of a much larger interview transcript compiled under the auspices of the Oral History Project of the ISSP, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy.

35. "Document 27: Testimony of Fidel Castro," ibid., pp. 544-47. These four documents are selected from numerous captured certificates and letters dealing with PLO training courses and programs organized by the USSR, Hungary, and East Germany.

36. "Document 28: Testimony of Fidel Castro," ibid., pp. 555-58. The latter document lists courses that PLO officers attended in order to receive instruction in how to command a tank battalion, tank company, infantry company, reconnaissance company, infantry platoon, antitank platoon, Sagger missile platoon, and antiaircraft platoon. Almost every PLO faction was represented in these courses.

37. "Document 29: Testimony of Arafat and Pomarah," ibid., pp. 559-62. The latter document lists courses that PLO officers attended in order to receive instruction in how to command a tank battalion, tank company, infantry company, reconnaissance company, infantry platoon, antitank platoon, Sagger missile platoon, and antiaircraft platoon. Almost every PLO faction was represented in these courses.

38. "Document 30: Testimony of Vladmir Sakharov," ibid., pp. 561-68. The latter document lists courses that PLO officers attended in order to receive instruction in how to command a tank battalion, tank company, infantry company, reconnaissance company, infantry platoon, antitank platoon, Sagger missile platoon, and antiaircraft platoon. Almost every PLO faction was represented in these courses.

39. "Document 31: Testimony of Arafat and Pomarah," ibid., pp. 571-72. The latter document lists courses that PLO officers attended in order to receive instruction in how to command a tank battalion, tank company, infantry company, reconnaissance company, infantry platoon, antitank platoon, Sagger missile platoon, and antiaircraft platoon. Almost every PLO faction was represented in these courses.

40. "Document 32: Testimony of Fidel Castro," ibid., pp. 573-74. The latter document lists courses that PLO officers attended in order to receive instruction in how to command a tank battalion, tank company, infantry company, reconnaissance company, infantry platoon, antitank platoon, Sagger missile platoon, and antiaircraft platoon. Almost every PLO faction was represented in these courses.

41. "Document 33: Testimony of Arafat and Pomarah," ibid., pp. 575-76. The latter document lists courses that PLO officers attended in order to receive instruction in how to command a tank battalion, tank company, infantry company, reconnaissance company, infantry platoon, antitank platoon, Sagger missile platoon, and antiaircraft platoon. Almost every PLO faction was represented in these courses.

42. "Document 34: Testimony of Fidel Castro," ibid., pp. 577-78. The latter document lists courses that PLO officers attended in order to receive instruction in how to command a tank battalion, tank company, infantry company, reconnaissance company, infantry platoon, antitank platoon, Sagger missile platoon, and antiaircraft platoon. Almost every PLO faction was represented in these courses.