

# The US Dominican Intervention: Success Story

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Just after 0200 on 30 April 1965, two battalions of paratroopers from the 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division, under the command of Major General Robert York, landed at San Isidro airfield in the Dominican Republic. Ten miles away, the beleaguered capital of Santo Domingo was in the grip of a violent civil war. Six days before, American diplomats and military advisors had been surprised by an unexpected rebellion, observing the resulting bloodshed with shock and horror.<sup>1</sup> Two Dominican army battalions, whose officers supported the return of deposed president Juan Bosch, had entered into open revolt against the government and were joined quickly by several well-organized communist and left-wing political parties. Within 24 hours, the two rebel groups consolidated their power and controlled most of the city. Bosch's supporters adopted the name Constitutionals after the 1963 constitution that was supplanted by the post-Bosch government. The Dominican military and its supporters became known as Loyalists. After considerable delay, the Dominican military decided to fight the rebels under the command of General Elias Wessin y Wessin, a right-wing *caudillo* closely associated with former dictator Rafael Trujillo. Loyalists made two halfhearted attempts to reassert control, but managed to occupy only two small areas in the city.<sup>2</sup>

The American division's arrival in the Dominican Republic displayed President Lyndon Johnson's resolve to prevent another pro-left regime from taking power in the Caribbean. Dark and dormant just hours before, San Isidro airfield was transformed into the center of the third

armed American intervention in the Dominican Republic in the 20th century and the first such expedition undertaken there by the US Army. As the Air Force C-130 transports arrived, soldiers unloaded weapons and equipment and established a hasty security perimeter around the airfield. Within the hour, San Isidro became so overcrowded with aircraft arriving from Fort Bragg that pilots were diverted temporarily to Ramey Air Force Base in nearby Puerto Rico.<sup>3</sup>

Thus began what was to be the largest and most rapidly built-up surgical intervention ever undertaken by US Army forces outside the United States. During the next 14 days, the Air Force devoted all its transport aircraft not involved in Southeast Asia to the Dominican Republic. Landing, on average, one plane every five minutes, the Air Force delivered 14,600 soldiers and nearly 30 million pounds of equipment and emergency supplies to the island in more than 1500 sorties.<sup>4</sup> But the 1965 intervention did more than test American deployment capabilities. The intervention confronted the commander of US forces in the Dominican Republic with new and delicate problems involving carefully orchestrated military support for diplomatic initiatives.

**B**ut I am getting ahead of the story. Three days before the 82d flew to San Isidro, President Johnson detailed his agenda to General Earle Wheeler, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. The President wanted the situation in Santo Domingo brought under control quickly and with no doubt about American intentions to stop the violence. Even while he authorized General Wheeler to use whatever force was needed to stop the fighting, Johnson made it clear that military operations would become secondary to diplomatic considerations once the fighting ceased.<sup>5</sup> From the operation's onset, Johnson envisioned that once the Army brought the civil war under control, its combat mission would be subordinate to State Department initiatives involving the Organization of American States. In this capacity, the military would be used purely to apply the right amount of pressure on the right players at the right time.


Johnson's plan required exceptional flexibility and restraint both from the American military commander and from individual soldiers. The proposition that military actions must always support greater political and diplomatic goals was vintage Clausewitz of course, but in 1965 the situation in the Dominican Republic put this proposition to a severe test.

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A six-vessel Navy task force, commanded by Vice Admiral Kleber S. Masterson, had been ordered to the area from Puerto Rico on 26 April and immediately prepared to perform evacuations. The first evacuation took place the following day, after the naval task force had assumed its station off the island. Following an incident in which rebels fired machine



guns over the heads of Americans gathered at the Embajador Hotel, President Johnson ordered Marines to begin the evacuation. Unarmed Marines from the task force accompanied two ships and several helicopters to the port of Haina, where they received the evacuees. By nightfall, 1176 civilians, most of them Americans, were lifted safely aboard US Navy warships for transport to Puerto Rico.

The next day, 28 April, another 1000 civilians were airlifted to ships from a makeshift heliport at the Polo Grounds adjacent to the Embajador Hotel. At 1800, after being informed by the Embassy that "collective madness" engulfed the city, President Johnson approved a Joint Chiefs' proposal to land three Marine battalions (approximately 1700 men) in Santo Domingo. The Marine landing began at 1900, with an initial complement of 400 men. The armed Marines would be used to reinforce the area surrounding the Embassy, to protect remaining American citizens, to bolster sagging Loyalist morale, and to assure an American military presence on the island should the 82d Airborne Division be introduced into the fray, which it in fact was—31 hours later.<sup>6</sup>

Shortly after arriving on the island in the lead aircraft, General York boarded a Marine helicopter and met offshore with the American Ambassador, W. Tapley Bennett, Jr., and Admiral Masterson. During the pre-dawn hours of 30 April, these three began to formulate a scheme to move the paratroopers into the heart of Santo Domingo. Together they developed a straightforward plan—divide the city by extending a line of American and loyal Dominican army forces from San Isidro airfield across the Duarte Bridge to Marine positions near the Embassy (see map).<sup>7</sup> This would provide a continuous line with paratroopers on the east, Loyalists in the center, and Marines on the west in the diplomatic section of Santo Domingo.

At dawn on 30 April, the 1st Battalion, 508th Infantry, advanced west toward Santo Domingo and secured the Duarte Bridge, the only route out of the city to the east. Meanwhile, the 1st Battalion, 505th Infantry, secured San Isidro as additional troops and equipment arrived from Ft. Bragg. It was during the move to Santo Domingo that the division was confronted with the first of several unanticipated problems—how to tell the difference between the Dominican factions. Since both Dominican forces wore identical uniforms, a way had to be found to identify who was who—which troops were friendly and which weren't. An imaginative young officer suggested that as a temporary measure Loyalists could wear their hats sideways or backwards. As unlikely a solution as this appears, it worked.<sup>8</sup> Daybreak also showed local commanders how fortuitous the eleventh-hour change of plan from airdrop to air landing had been. Reconnaissance patrols reported that the division's planned landing zone was covered with sharp coral outcroppings that would have inflicted heavy casualties to paratroopers. Although the entire operation was based on an approved

contingency plan, no one from the American military advisory group had conducted an on-the-ground survey of this key area.<sup>9</sup>

Once York's men secured the bridge and a small strong-point in Santo Domingo, the operation to divide the city fell apart. Loyalists cheered the paratroopers' arrival, picked up their equipment, and withdrew east across the bridge to San Isidro airfield. This unexpected turn of events presented York with a serious tactical problem—his defensive line lacked a center. The plan had intended to divide rebel forces; instead, the Loyalist retreat left the Americans separated.

Since military necessity required a continuous defensive line, York requested permission from the Joint Chiefs to close the gap. To his surprise, the answer was an emphatic no. Presidential advisors, particularly former Ambassador John B. Martin, feared another overt military move would jeopardize negotiations at the OAS, where anti-American debates had followed the American division's unannounced arrival.<sup>10</sup> York thus experienced the first of many decisions that demonstrated how Johnson intended to use the Army. Although the President wanted the rebellion ended quickly, military initiatives would be subordinated to diplomatic considerations. This point was reinforced again at the height of the buildup on the first day when in response to an Embassy request, General Wheeler ordered humanitarian supplies flown to the island ahead of scheduled combat troops.<sup>11</sup>

It was early recognized that US forces in the Dominican Republic required a buffer headquarters between the tactical troop commander, General York, and the various civilian actors—US, OAS, and Dominican—that operated above him. Such a buffer headquarters would be commanded by an officer of sufficient rank and stature to provide undisputed authority over all US forces on the island and deal appropriately at the diplomatic-political levels. Accordingly, in response to the President's order to get "the best General in the Pentagon" for the position in Santo Domingo, Wheeler named Lieutenant General Bruce Palmer, Jr., as Army ground force commander on 30 April. General Wheeler briefed Palmer on the absolute necessity to work hand-in-hand with Ambassador Bennett, and he promised Palmer additional forces if he needed them to stop the rebellion.<sup>12</sup> After assuming overall command from General York, Palmer immediately

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requested permission to close the gap in his lines. Like York, Palmer was told that the operation would have to wait a few days while negotiations on an OAS-sponsored peacekeeping force continued in Washington.<sup>13</sup>

**A**t the Pan American Union, debate was not going well for President Johnson. He had seriously underestimated Latin reaction to the unannounced arrival of the Army in the Dominican Republic. OAS delegates were furious and subjected the United States to endless condemnation. Violent anti-American demonstrations erupted in many capitals, and anti-American newspaper articles outnumbered pro-American ten to one.<sup>14</sup> Not only had Johnson violated the non-intervention clause of the OAS charter, he had done so without consulting the OAS. Johnson had been sure the OAS would not endorse his plan, however, and therefore chose to seek its concurrence after the fact. As a result, Latin governments felt slighted. Even those governments that supported the two Marine evacuations and understood Johnson's rationale for the intervention could not accept the manner in which he did it.

Few OAS representatives were convinced when Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker explained that the intervention had been unannounced because there was not enough time for consultation. Even fewer were impressed when President Johnson publicly compared the situation to "another Cuba," or when the American Embassy in Santo Domingo released an ill-prepared list of communist agents within the rebel movement.<sup>15</sup> It was with regard to Johnson's allegations of an imminent communist threat that perceptions differed most in the organization. This is not to say that the members were soft on communism; they were not. Rather, they were more concerned with American military intervention. Despite these feelings, however, delegates saw the real seriousness of the situation and turned their attention to finding a graceful way to reduce US military presence and to end the civil war.

On 2 May, after Ambassador Bunker reported to the President that progress was being made toward a regional peace force, General Palmer received permission from Washington and from an OAS committee in Santo Domingo to close the gap in his lines. At one minute past midnight on the morning of 3 May, three infantry battalions advanced west from the Duarte Bridge and in only one hour and eleven minutes closed on the American Embassy compound without serious incident.<sup>16</sup> The division now secured an east-west corridor enclosing its route of advance that divided the city and isolated nearly 80 percent of the rebel force in the southeast portion of Santo Domingo, Ciudad Nuevo. The corridor, officially named the Line of Communication, united Army and Marine forces and was affectionately called the "All American Highway." The corridor was later extended to embrace the international diplomatic section, the Hotel Embajador, and the

Polo Grounds that lay to the southwest. By separating the two Dominican factions, the Line of Communication enabled Palmer and his forces to adopt a more neutral position. As such, it started the second phase of the intervention—unilateral American peacekeeping.

In Washington, OAS delegates continued to question whether they should sponsor a regional force to assume peacekeeping duties in the Dominican Republic. Although such a plan had been suggested during other conflicts before 1965, national sensitivities about armed intervention had always prevented the organization from establishing one. Influenced by reports from its on-site commissions and Ambassador Bunker's offer to reduce US forces and to provide logistical support for Latin troops sent to replace them, the council approved the formation of an inter-American peace force on 6 May.<sup>17</sup> This regional force would be made up from voluntary member contributions, would be under the control of the Meeting of Foreign Ministers (the organization's highest body), and would be commanded by a Latin general officer. General Palmer, the American force commander, would serve as the commander's deputy.<sup>18</sup>

While the force was being assembled, Palmer strengthened his positions in Santo Domingo and established a cadre headquarters for the OAS force.<sup>19</sup> By doing this he hoped to influence the structure of the peace force and maintain greater autonomy for US forces (then 14,000 men in nine Army and three Marine battalions, and peaking at 21,900 men on 17 May), even though he would be placing them under formal OAS command, a situation he did not like. When he expressed his apprehension on this score to General Wheeler, he was told, "We devised the IAF [Inter-American Force] concept for the purpose of giving an international cover to American military involvement in the Dominican Republic and to legitimize our activities in world opinion by identifying them with the OAS."<sup>20</sup>

As Palmer laid the administrative foundation for the Inter-American Peace Force, he also paved the way for diplomatic negotiations. He accomplished this sensitive task by refining the rules of engagement established for his force. With the Line of Communication separating Loyalists and rebels, Palmer stressed restraint and neutrality. The use of force in response to rebel attacks was limited to individual and light crew-served weapons, with specific permission required before troops could respond with recoilless rifles, bazookas, or artillery. In fact, after American artillery fired eight illumination rounds on the first day of the intervention, it thereafter remained silent for fear of causing excessive damage and hurting the American peacekeeping mission.<sup>21</sup> Despite these restrictions, the division not only prevented armed rebels from leaving their stronghold in Ciudad Nuevo, it also prevented Loyalists from venturing into it.<sup>22</sup> This was a dramatic change from the initial situation when American troops actively supported the Loyalists.

In just three weeks, US forces had changed the complexion of the Dominican civil war. Overwhelming American military presence separated rebels from Loyalists, forced a military stalemate, and stopped the majority of the fighting. The Army had achieved President Johnson's first and primary goal—to prevent the possibility of another Castro-style regime in the Americas. Johnson had also been assured that history would not remember him as the President who lost the Dominican Republic to communism. But in accomplishing this, the President had paid a high price. The unilateral intervention dissolved Latin trust in the postwar US policy of military nonintervention in the hemisphere.<sup>23</sup> With a stable situation brought about by the controlled application of a disciplined, restrained, and well-led force, the President then turned his attention back to Southeast Asia. Concurrently, his advisors concentrated on soothing Latin feelings and finding a permanent, OAS-sponsored peace in Santo Domingo.

**F**or the next four months, while American soldiers guaranteed relative quiet in Santo Domingo and pressured the Dominican factions toward the negotiating table, the OAS and its peace force began to play a more visible role. As military contingents from six Latin American nations joined the Inter-American Peace Force in mid-May, they augmented or replaced American troops along the Line of Communication and along the boundary between the diplomatic section and Ciudad Nuevo.<sup>24</sup> At full complement, the Inter-American Peace Force fielded 1600 Latin soldiers and policemen from Brazil, Honduras, Paraguay, Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Costa Rica. As the Latin soldiers arrived, American strength was gradually reduced until it stabilized at only 6243 men.<sup>25</sup>

In mid-June, a major rebel offensive failed to breach the Line of Communication held jointly by US and OAS troops. Convinced of OAS solidarity and determination, rebel leaders found their only hope for concessions lay in negotiations.<sup>26</sup> Shortly thereafter, both factions entered into serious talks to find an acceptable interim government until general elections could be held.

While diplomats negotiated, American peacekeeping forces divided their time between keeping the combatants separated and providing assistance to Dominican civilians. Across the island US Army doctors treated more than 58,000 Dominicans before the last American soldier left the country in the fall of 1966.<sup>27</sup> Many OAS members that for a variety of reasons had not volunteered military assistance joined the humanitarian effort and provided food, clothing, medical supplies, and doctors.<sup>28</sup>

On 31 August, Constitutionalist and Loyalist representatives signed the OAS-proposed *Act of Reconciliation and Institutional Act*. This agreement established an interim government under Hector Garcia-Godoy pending elections the following June. During the interim period, the Garcia-





Many OAS members contributed humanitarian relief. The inscription on the box carried by the Dominican lady reads: "To the people of the Dominican Republic, from the 82d Airborne Division wives."

Godoy government worked to reunite the Dominican armed forces, restore public utilities and services, and begin economic recovery.<sup>29</sup>

As the provisional government sought to return the island to normalcy, American forces entered a third and final phase of operations. This time, General Palmer shifted emphasis from neutrality to active support for the provisional government. Before the provisional government disbanded after elections in 1966, Garcia-Godoy requested Palmer's help several times to stop outbreaks of violence in Santo Domingo, Santiago, and Barahona.<sup>30</sup> American infantry were also used to stop an attempted coup by General Wessin y Wessin only six days after the provisional government was inaugurated.<sup>31</sup>

In June 1966, American military forces were called upon to support a final diplomatic objective. Augmenting three sets of international observers, the paratroopers monitored the election process. Despite minor irregularities, the elections were generally honest and peaceful.<sup>32</sup> Joaquin Balaguer, representing political moderates, defeated Juan Bosch and won the presidency with more than 57 percent of the vote. Bosch, who according to General Palmer suffered from apparent cowardliness and lack of machismo by remaining in exile during the civil war, captured only 40 percent of the 1.3 million ballots cast.<sup>33</sup>

On 24 June 1966, sixteen months after the start of the rebellion, the OAS Meeting of Foreign Ministers called for the gradual withdrawal of the

peace force. Three months later, on 27 September, the last American soldier left the Dominican Republic and the OAS deactivated its unique peace force.<sup>34</sup> The civil war had been stopped, but at a substantial cost in lives. During the first weeks of the fighting, several thousand Dominicans and 27 American servicemen were killed and another 172 Americans were wounded. No Latin members of the inter-American force were killed during its 16-month deployment, but 17 were wounded.<sup>35</sup>

**A**lthough analysis of any large military operation should consider more than the purely military dimension, the 1965 Dominican intervention demands it. In the political arena it produced widespread and lasting results. President Johnson's decision to reintroduce military intervention to American foreign policy damaged political relationships across the hemisphere. Within the OAS, the unilateral intervention vitiated the gains made by Roosevelt's Good Neighbor Policy and Kennedy's Alliance for Progress. Once again the United States came to be viewed with suspicion and mistrust by Latin neighbors. Within the American government, Johnson's unannounced military action opened deep cleavages between the President and Congress on matters of foreign policy. Ideological debates spawned by the 1965 intervention continued long after the 82d Airborne Division returned to Fort Bragg, and eventually encompassed American involvement in the war in Vietnam.

While largely disregarding Latin sensitivities or even the OAS Charter, Johnson clearly sought Latin participation in negotiating a settlement to the civil war. Immediately after the Army stabilized the situation in Santo Domingo, the President downplayed military action and sought diplomatic assistance from the OAS. To reach his objectives—prevent communist expansion, protect lives, and calm a destabilizing situation in the hemisphere—Johnson employed the Army as a means to support diplomatic initiatives, not as a solution in itself.

At each stage of the intervention, General Palmer was called upon to perform different missions, each tailored to support changing diplomatic initiatives. To accomplish these, Palmer modified his rules of engagement frequently and relied on disciplined and well-led American soldiers to reduce tensions and to promote tranquility. By providing American diplomats with this type of flexible military support, General Palmer and the men of the 82d Airborne Division, ably assisted by US Marines, stopped the bloodshed and helped promote a negotiated settlement in the Dominican Republic. In a speech delivered in the fall of 1966, Palmer summarized the situation: "The solutions of the problems of a nation do not necessarily lie in the defeat of a specific political faction . . . . Thus, our military task in stability or national development operations may often be to control opposing factions and bring about an atmosphere of tranquility and stability."<sup>36</sup>

## NOTES

1. On 24 April 1965, when the rebellion erupted, the American Ambassador had just returned to the United States to visit his mother, and all but two members of the US Military Assistance Advisory Group had gone to Panama for a routine meeting. Herbert G. Schoonmaker, "U.S. Forces in the Dominican Crisis of 1965," doctoral dissertation (Athens, Ga.: Univ. of Georgia, 1977), p. 21.
2. One force from the Armed Forces Training Center at San Isidro secured an area west of the Duarte Bridge, while a battalion from Camp Mella fought its way into western Santo Domingo. Despite these initial gains, the two forces stopped fighting and did not attempt to combine or enlarge their territory. Center for Strategic Studies, *Dominican Action—1965: Intervention or Cooperation* (Washington: Georgetown Univ., July 1966), p. 27; Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Chronology of the Crisis in the Dominican Republic" (Washington: Historical Division, Joint Secretariat, 30 September 1966), p. 14.
3. Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Staff, "Stability Operations Dominican Republic," pt. 2, vol. IV (Washington: Department of the Army, 28 June 1971) p. 93.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 42; "The Dominican Intervention 1965" (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: US Army War College, 1984), p. 9.
5. Bruce Palmer, Jr., address to AUSA meeting in Washington, 11 October 1966, subject: US Stability Operations in the Dominican Republic, in Palmer's private papers collection, US Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pa.
6. Message, State Department to Bennett, AMEMBASSY Santo Domingo, 281313Z Apr 65, NSC History files, Dominican Republic Intervention, LBJ Library, Austin, Texas (hereinafter, "NSC History"); Memo, State Dept., 28 April 1965, in Bennett's personal papers, box 4416 83D358, US State Department historical files, Washington, D.C. (hereinafter, "State Dept. files").
7. R. McC. Tompkins, "Ubique," *USMC Gazette*, 49 (September 1965), 34.
8. Eldredge R. Long, Jr., "The Dominican Crisis 1965: An Experiment in International Peace Keeping," student thesis (Newport, R.I.: US Naval War College, 1967), p. 39.
9. The proposed landing zone was covered with tall grass and, although members of the USMAAG photographed it from a nearby road, they never walked the ground. Department of the Army, "Stability Operations Dominican Republic," pp. 90-91; Palmer address, 11 October 1966; Edward E. Mayer, "The Dominican Crisis—1965," student paper (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: US Army War College, 8 April 1966), p. 32.
10. Yale H. Ferguson, "The Dominican Intervention of 1965: Recent Interpretations," *International Organization*, 27 (Autumn 1973), 530.
11. List of Assignments, US State Dept., 1 May 1965, NSC History, p. 3.
12. Although it was never deployed to the island, the 101st Airborne Division at Ft. Campbell, Kentucky, was placed on alert during the first week of the intervention by the JCS as backup for the 82d Airborne. Oral history, General Bruce Palmer, Jr., Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pa.
13. US Forces, Dominican Republic, "Report of Stability Operations" (Santo Domingo: HQ, USFORDOMREP, 31 August 1965), incl. 4 to ch. 4, p. 9.
14. Duty log, State Dept., 6 May 1965, NSC History.
15. On CIA Director Raborn's order, the embassy released two lists to the press. The lists named 58 communists or communist supporters within the rebel movement. Unfortunately, the lists had been compiled hastily and were filled with errors that the press was quick to publicize. Five names were duplicated and several others were only loosely associated with any communist movement or activity. Working paper, US Embassy Santo Domingo, subject: Communists Identified as Working in Rebel Movement, in Bennett's personal papers, box 4416 83D358, State Dept. files.
16. US Forces, Dominican Republic, "Report of Stability Operations," p. 9.
17. Action Memo, White House for Bundy, 6 May 1965, subject: Committee Meeting, Dominican Republic Task Force, NSC History, p. 2.
18. Resolution, OAS Tenth MFM, subject: Inter-American Force, doc. 39, rev. 2 (Washington: Pan American Union, 6 May 1965), pp. 1-2; Luis Iturralde Chinel, *La O.E.A. y la Revolucion Dominicana* (Washington: Union Panamericana, 1967), p. 59.
19. Oral history, General Bruce Palmer, Jr.
20. Message, CINCLANT to JCS, 271832Z May 65, and Message, JCS 2997 to CINCLANT and USCOMDOMREP, 27 May 65, file: CJCS 091 Dominican Republic, Historical Records Division, Joint Secretariat, Washington.
21. At times this proved frustrating for American soldiers subject to sniper attack. Soon after they entered the city, they discovered that the 57mm Light Anti-Tank Weapon, and both the 90mm and 106mm recoilless rifles were excellent anti-sniper weapons, although they did cause considerable damage in urban areas. One 106mm recoilless rifle crew also found a completely new application for the anti-tank weapon—anti-ship. After receiving permission to return fire on a rebel gun boat that shelled their

position with mortar fire, the 106mm crew sank the offender with a single round. Long, "The Dominican Crisis," p. 41.

22. After the situation became stable, Palmer established more than ten checkpoints through which unarmed civilians and military personnel were allowed to pass. This not only soothed tensions in the city, it demonstrated American control and confidence. Palmer address, 11 October 1965.

23. Lyndon B. Johnson, *The Vantage Point* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971), p. 198.

24. US Forces, Dominican Republic, "Report of Stability Operations," p. 14.

25. Brazil contributed the largest Latin contingent, an entire infantry battalion (1130 men), and was the only Latin nation to provide its own logistic support. The other five Latin nations provided soldiers or police, but most arrived in the Dominican Republic with little else than what they were wearing. Not surprisingly, this placed additional demands on General Palmer, who was not overjoyed at their arrival in this condition. MFM Resolution, "Inter-American Force," p. 26; "Statement and Diplomatic Notes of Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker to Tenth Meeting of Consultation of Foreign Ministers of the American Republics," US State Dept. *Bulletin*, 52 (7 June 1965), 912.

26. Although there had been several small and unorganized rebel attempts to force their way out of Ciudad Nuevo, the mid-June attempt was well orchestrated and a deliberate rebel military operation. Message, AMEMBASSY Santo Domingo to SECSTATE 2422, 15 Jun 65, 2:15 P.M., in Bennett's personal papers, box 4417 83D358, State Dept. files; Chronology, US Department of State, NSC History.

27. The last American to leave the Dominican Republic was Brigadier General Robert R. Linvill who replaced General Palmer as commander of American forces and IAFP's deputy commander in January 1966. Memo, Palmer to Bunker, 27 November 1965, subject: Support for Provisional Government, in personal papers of Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker, box 14384 67D291, State Dept. files; Letter, Garcia-Godoy to Comision de la OEA, 7 January 1966, in Bunker's personal papers, box 14383 67D291, State Dept. files.

28. Message, Acting Director of OAS Secretariat Services in the Dominican Republic to Secretary General of the Organization, 18 September 1965, file OEA, ser. F/II.10, doc. 270-463, at OAS Columbus Memorial Library; OAS Tenth MFM, "Second Report of the Special Committee of the Tenth Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs," doc. 81 (Washington: Pan American Union, 2 June 1965), pp. 17-20.

29. OAS Tenth MFM, "Act of Dominican Reconciliation and Institutional Act," doc. 363 (Washington: Pan American Union, 7 September 1965), in OAS Columbus Memorial Library, file OEA, ser. F/II.10, doc. 270-463.

30. In both Santiago and Barahona, American forces inserted themselves between Loyalist and rebel factions and stopped the fighting through a show of strength and resolve. Palmer address, 11 October 1966; XVIII Airborne Corps, "Stability Operations Report," p. I-1.

31. Following the attempted coup, General Wessin y Wessin was removed from the Dominican army, named the Dominican Counsel General to the United States, and forcibly placed aboard a plane to Miami by two armed US officers. At approximately the same time, the Constitutionalist military leader, Colonel Francisco Caamano was named the Dominican Military Attaché to England and flown to London. In 1973, Colonel Caamano was killed while attempting to return to the island secretly with a small band of conspirators from Cuba. Palmer, oral history, p. 181; Memo of Daily Notes, Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker, 21 August 1965, in Bunker personal papers, State Dept. files; Message, AMEMBASSY London to State, 5 April 1967, subject: Col. Caamano, in Bennett's personal papers; Letter, Chief of Dominican National Police to Representatives of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 15 February 1966, in OAS Columbus Memorial Library, file OEA, ser. F/II.10, doc. 270-463; Bracey, *Resolution of the Dominican Crisis*, p. 33.

32. OAS, "Report Presented by the Mission of Observers to the President of the Organization" (Washington: Pan American Union, 2 June 1966), in OAS Columbus Memorial Library, file OEA, ser. F/II.10, doc. 270-463; Memo, Bunker, 21 June 1966, subject: members of Thomas Group, in Bunker personal papers, box 14383 67D291, State Dept. files.

33. Palmer, oral history; Melvin H. Johnsrud, "In the Dominican Crisis, Was Peace Victorious?" student thesis, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas, USACGSC, 1968.

34. OAS, "Resolution on the Withdrawal of the IAFP from the Territory of the Dominican Republic," doc. 461 (Washington: Pan American Union, 27 June 1966), and OAS Ad Hoc Committee, "Special Report of the Ad Hoc Committee of the Tenth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Organization of American States," 15 September 1966, both in Bunker's personal papers, box 14383 and 14384 67D291, State Dept. files.

35. Washington Center of Foreign Political Research, *National Support of International Peacekeeping and Peace Observation Operations* (Washington: Johns Hopkins Univ., February 1970), pp. 289-313.

36. Bruce Palmer, Jr., address to AUSA meeting in Washington, 26 October 1966, subject: US Stability Operations in the Dominican Republic, in Palmer's private papers collection, US Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pa.