

NATO Strategy and Nuclear Weapons: A Reluctant Embrace

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Western military strategists have paid increased attention in recent years to the possibility of a Soviet attack on NATO Europe that might succeed without using nuclear weapons. Were the Soviet Union able to contemplate a successful war in Europe without nuclear escalation, NATO strategy could be undercut. Thus, military strategists and Pentagon analysts have recommended that the United States improve its capabilities for conventional war in Europe, and so raise the nuclear threshold and provide a more credible deterrent against Soviet aggression.¹

The following discussion revisits the relationship between conventional and nuclear deterrence in Europe, addressing sequentially NATO's deterrence dilemmas, Soviet strategy, conventional deterrence and defense options, and the implications of advanced technology. My conclusion is that the de-nuclearization of NATO deterrence is neither imminent nor necessarily beneficial to American strategy.

Recognition of US-Soviet strategic nuclear parity, completion of the superpower agreement on intermediate-range nuclear force reductions, and a more subtle appreciation of Soviet military doctrine have also contributed to increased interest in NATO conventional defense. That is all to the good, except that NATO does not have a credible conventional defense as such, but rather a sufficient capability to deny the Soviets an easy path to conventional victory—as part of a credible nuclear and conventional

deterrent. What deters war in Europe are not only highly competent conventional defenses, but also the Soviets' expectation that if they defeat those defenses, they are only moving into a newer, and less controllable, war.

Weakening Deterrence

NATO's deterrent strategy has been a mixture of conventional and nuclear options for some time. Since 1967, the conventional emphasis has received more rhetorical attention. But the nuclear genie has never been put back into the bottle since it escaped during the massive retaliation strategy declared in the 1950s. Americans and Europeans have jostled over which side of the equation, conventional or nuclear, should receive more emphasis, but the bottom line has been that America's guarantee of nuclear retaliation against Soviet attackers, if NATO appeared to be losing the conventional war, was presumed solid.

French President Charles de Gaulle questioned the solidity of this guarantee by pulling his country out of the NATO military command structure. However, his action did more than question American nuclear guarantees. It also removed much of the space which NATO could trade for time if it had to fight a conventional war in Europe. As a result, the flexible response strategy was perceived by Europeans as having less flexibility than it appeared to have to Americans. Whereas "flexible" meant to Europeans that the distinction between conventional and nuclear war in Europe was blurred, to Americans it implied a clear threshold between war with and without nuclear exchanges.² And the size of NATO conventional forces was constrained, in practice if not in theory, by large European social welfare budgets and American congressional malaise about burden-sharing.

American and European elites agreed to a marriage of convenience under the flexible response umbrella because they never really expected it to rain. The assumption was that the prospect of nuclear weapons exploding in Europe was so frightening that neither East nor West would attempt conventional war either. In order to deter the Soviets, NATO strategy embedded its conventional defense in a cocoon of nuclear escalation. This approach precluded a limited war in Europe which by excluding American nuclear retaliation would appeal as a possible option to desperate Soviet planners. However, if deterrence failed and war did rapidly escalate into nuclear exchanges, NATO's embedded deterrent would have entrapped

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itself. Under normal peacetime conditions, deterrence seemed more credible if the Soviets had no limited war option. But during a tense crisis in which the possibility of war loomed larger, the promise of rapid escalation to nuclear war might deter NATO more than it would the Soviets.

The arrival of acknowledged US-Soviet strategic nuclear parity in the 1970s further restricted the operational credibility of NATO strategy. With nuclear forces evenly matched, there was no clear advantage to NATO in using nuclear weapons first, unless the first use amounted to a comprehensive first strike at the theater or strategic level. Then the Soviet Union would be disarmed instead of coerced into targeting restraint. Without strategic or theater nuclear forces clearly superior to their Soviet counterparts, NATO offered a loose cannon on the nuclear deck instead of a controlled escalation in the face of conventional defeat. Recognition of this dilemma led experts to propose the alternative of improvements in NATO conventional forces in order to compensate for nuclear forces of lesser credibility. The case for improved NATO conventional forces does exist, but not as a substitute for strategic or theater nuclear forces. NATO does not have a credible option for waging conventional war in Europe in the total absence of a threat to escalate to nukes. The informed debate is about whether NATO has realistic options for raising the nuclear threshold by relying more upon conventional deterrence, and for denial of Soviet objectives by conventional forces should deterrence fail.

Were NATO to acquire a conventional warfighting option *exclusive* of nuclear escalation, it might weaken its own deterrent against conventional war in Europe in order to reduce the risk of nuclear war. This inescapable trade-off is rooted in the realities of geography and alliance politics. European students of American history know that providing an isolationist option to any US President with regard to war in Europe is self-destructive. The United States might be only too willing to oblige, especially if the Soviet Union seemed not to be the villain in the plot of the moment. Any hint of an American-inspired willingness on NATO's part to reduce its reliance upon prompt nuclear escalation can be interpreted by Europeans as a prelude to American disengagement. Of course, American conventional forces now deployed in Europe are substantial, and less reliance upon

nuclear weapons will not remove them. However, those American forces in Europe cannot defend their assigned corps sectors for long without using tactical nuclear weapons, and commanders will expect to receive appropriate authorization before Soviet forces have overrun their positions.

In addition to these political and military realities, the absence of a wholly conventional-war strategy for NATO lies in geographical boundaries. Soviet conventional forces can move across the inter-German border or against NATO's northern and southern flanks and seize important political and military objectives within hours of a war's outbreak. The United States cannot bring the bulk of its conventional military power to bear until the war has proceeded for weeks or months, especially its maritime power.³ This Soviet geographical advantage means that while a protracted war of attrition probably favors the West, this is precisely the kind of war the Soviets will be unwilling to fight. Soviet planners are not known for their willingness to lose gracefully. So if NATO conventional defense depends upon protracted war, Soviet attackers will choose another option. And knowing that turning an attempted blitzkrieg into a war of attrition is NATO's trump card, the Soviets will not expect to fight a conventional war successfully unless special conditions obtain.

Soviet Strategy

According to the logic of the preceding paragraphs, Soviet planners should expect that a successful campaign in Europe without nuclear escalation is unlikely. To believe otherwise, they must count on one of two improbable events: either they will be able to actively prevent NATO from using nuclear weapons in the face of conventional defeat, or they will deter NATO from nuclear retaliation by the threat of using superior or equivalent Soviet nuclear forces. In other words, Soviet options would be to *disarm* NATO by force, or to *dissuade* NATO from escalation, or both.

Disarming NATO. The first approach, to pull NATO's nuclear teeth without using Soviet nuclear weapons, requires that the Warsaw Pact execute a swift and decisive thrust into NATO's rear, destroying or incapacitating NATO's ability to use its nuclear forces. For this the Soviets might rely on operational maneuver groups derived from their World War II experience.⁴ These would be comparatively self-sufficient, mobile striking forces which would penetrate behind NATO forward echelons, disrupting command, control, and communications and isolating NATO operational reserves from the front. This approach would substitute speed and shock for a grinding down of NATO forces through a war of attrition.

Could this approach prevent NATO nuclear retaliation? Probably not. Unless the Soviets struck as a true bolt from the blue with essentially no strategic warning, NATO would have had some inkling that the outbreak of war was possible.⁵ The United States and its European allies would have

then taken measures to disperse nuclear weapons from their storage sites and would have begun to discuss the possibility of nuclear release to SACEUR. The command, control, and communications system would begin its transition from peacetime status to prewar readiness.⁶ Commanders would be alert to extraordinary Pact troop movements, electronic emissions, and other telltale signs of war footing. In short, the chance that the Soviet Union could catch NATO totally unawares, and thus disarm NATO theater nuclear forces preemptively, is slight unless the Soviets are willing to use nuclear weapons themselves.

Dissuading NATO. If NATO cannot be forcibly disarmed of its nuclear forces based in Europe, could it be dissuaded from using them by superior Soviet strategic or theater nuclear forces? The Soviet Union cannot assume that NATO will be coerced in this fashion because the Soviets must take seriously NATO declaratory strategy, which is to use nuclear weapons as soon as conventional defeat is imminent. Assuming ratification and execution of the INF agreement, NATO will have fewer nuclear weapons of shorter ranges based in Europe. Of course, fewer in this context still leaves some 4600 nuclear weapons at or below the 300-mile range. The dilemma for Soviet planners is that the better they do without using nuclear weapons, the more likely it is that the time and place of nuclear first use will be decided by NATO. And this first use by NATO could, according to Soviet predictions, be decisive in delaying their offensive and denying to them their objectives. So they will by all accounts be unwilling to concede this initiative to NATO if they can help it.

The superpowers have agreed to remove all medium-range (600-3500 miles) and shorter-range (300-600 miles) nuclear missiles not only from Europe but also globally. This zero-zero option has been hailed by the Reagan Administration as the first real reduction of the American and Soviet nuclear arsenals by mutual agreement through arms control. Preceding SALT agreements and the ABM Treaty of 1972 simply capped projected future expansion or limited technological innovation, but they did nothing to diminish existing arsenals. Critics of the Reagan Administration—in this case including former SACEUR General Bernard Rogers, former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, and former President Richard Nixon—have expressed skepticism. These and other less prominent skeptics have alluded to the potential loss in NATO deterrent credibility via the de-nuclearization of the alliance theater warfighting posture.

It seems, however, that neither the Reagan Administration nor its critics have fully considered their arguments. The Administration appeared to contradict itself in having made the initial zero option offer in 1981 and then delaying its acceptance of the Soviet version of the same proposal in 1986. Of course, the United States had offered INF arms control proposals as bargaining chips while proceeding with the NATO-approved modernization of theater nuclear forces, beginning Pershing II and ground-launched

cruise missile deployments in December 1983. The NATO deployments were thus hostage to subsequent Soviet willingness to serve up NATO's own earlier arms control proposals, which the Kremlin in essence did in Reagan's second term.

The Reagan critics also present less than fully compelling arguments. They exaggerate a drawdown of some nuclear forces in Europe into a de-nuclearization of US and allied theater nuclear forces deployed there. The NATO INF deployments were never intended to provide a self-sufficient theater nuclear deterrent, but only to improve coupling between US strategic nuclear forces and NATO theater nuclear and conventional forces. This improved coupling was judged necessary by NATO because of improvements in Soviet theater nuclear *and conventional* forces from the mid-1970s to the present. The NATO fear was that those Soviet theater nuclear and conventional force improvements would decouple the US strategic deterrent from NATO's theater defenses. The 572 Pershing II and cruise missile deployments were designed as a partial, but only partial, answer to this problem. Also on the boards were improvements in NATO conventional defenses, per agreements reached among alliance members during the Carter Administration. However, when most members of the alliance did not fulfill their objectives with regard to real increases in defense spending, the conventional bedrock of theater nuclear force modernization did not materialize.

Without adequate NATO conventional force modernization, the Soviet Union will want to take the nuclear initiative at the theater level after having prepared the way with its conventional forces. In Soviet reckoning, nuclear and conventional forces support one another, not as distant cousins, but as conjoint partners. So the Soviets, if they embark on war at all, will certainly expect to begin using nuclear weapons at the most advantageous time for them, and with maximum advantage to their advancing combined arms forces. This means that those Soviet nuclear uses, if they occur, will be selective, designed to destroy NATO military resistance while preserving intact the social and economic infrastructure which the Soviets would want to incorporate into their postwar domain.⁷

An assertion of Soviet willingness to take the nuclear initiative is not contradicted by an awareness that they would prefer to fight a conventional war if possible. The problem with that preference is that Soviet planners will not expect to see it realized, if they believe NATO strategy allowing for the early first use of nuclear weapons. Contrary to some analyses, a NATO no-first-use declaration would not make this problem more manageable nor deterrence more stable. A NATO no-first-use declaration would not be believed by the Soviet Union unless NATO conventional forces were built up to approximate parity with Pact conventional forces, and in this regard NATO policymakers have fallen short of their own, and more modest, declared goals. Therefore, prudent Soviet planners

will expect the war to go nuclear quickly even if they do not want it to, and this expectation will suggest to them that preemption is their best alternative, faced with the near certainty of eventual NATO nuclear escalation.

Conventional Deterrence and Defense Options

In estimating whether NATO can rely less upon nuclear weapons for conventional deterrence, it is helpful to isolate the problem of conventional deterrence and study the historical record. John J. Mearsheimer has done this and applied it to a number of present-day situations, including the problem of conventional war in Europe.⁸

As it applies to Europe, according to Mearsheimer, the problem of conventional deterrence for the West is to prevent Soviet war planners from assuming that a blitzkrieg will succeed. If the Soviets doubt that they can win a rapid and decisive victory and fear being bogged down in a protracted war of attrition, then deterrence will hold. This implies that NATO can deter conventional aggression with less than parity in conventional forces, as long as it has enough forces to present Soviet war planners with the prospect of extended war.

This analysis, while valid in its own narrow terms, omits other matters which are important to the question of conventional deterrence. First, it is not clear that a war of attrition favors the West under all conditions. Second, much depends on alliance cohesion, in both Eastern and Western Europe. Third, US maritime forces will have to provide some decisive leverage against the Soviets if any extended war is to be concluded on favorable terms for NATO without nuclear escalation.

On the first point, a war of attrition that lasted years would certainly favor the West, given the superior gross national products and economic productivity of Europe, Japan, and North America, compared to the Soviet Union and its allies. However, this alignment of economic forces will be telling in wartime only if the war lasts long enough, and without nuclear escalation. The United States and its allies must reinforce Europe quickly with rapidly mobilized reserves, while maintaining enough sustainability for a war of attrition. Given the military doctrines of both sides and their prodigious nuclear weapon inventories, the expectation of a protracted conventional war lasting several years seems fanciful. Of course, Soviet writers state that preparedness for protracted conventional war (as for everything else) is in principle a good idea.⁹ But a war of several months' duration is not the same as one several years in length, and it is not at all obvious that the Soviets and their allies would feel the effects of Western economic supremacy within the shorter period.

The issue of alliance cohesion, a second factor difficult to forecast, might also seem to favor NATO. Members of the Warsaw Pact might defect if war threatened to spread to their homelands, especially if the Soviet

homeland were being spared comparable destruction. However, the Western alliance is potentially as centrifugal as its opponent under the duress of crisis or war. NATO's 16 national constituencies march to the drums of their various parliamentary imperatives. Those imperatives, in a crisis, might argue for less rather than more resistance to Soviet threats. A Soviet bolt from the blue against NATO would find all the defenders united, but as noted above, that kind of attack is least likely. An attack that seemed motivated by ambiguous causes, in which both sides cast plausible blame on one another, could divide the Western response even more than the Eastern. And the division in the Western case need not persist for long, just long enough for the first echelons of Pact attackers to seize important operational objectives. It is not inconceivable that a sufficiently rapid and decisive surprise attack into West Germany and the Low Countries could lead to their anticipatory surrender, although they were still capable of fighting. This scenario might materialize if the West Germans, for example, felt isolated as a result of indecisive and slow responses to their plight from Britain, France, and the United States.¹⁰

A third problematic issue is whether the United States can bring its potential maritime supremacy to bear against Soviet vulnerabilities to compensate for NATO deficiencies in ground and tactical air forces. According to the US Navy, its maritime strategy will do just that. US and allied maritime forces would attack the Soviet navy, including its ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), in its home waters in the earliest stages of any conflict. This early foray into harm's way would accomplish two things: it would pin Soviet subs above the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom gap and prevent them from attacking NATO reinforcements flowing from America; and it would produce attrition of the Soviet strategic nuclear reserve force, which would help to coerce the Soviets into war termination.¹¹

According to critics of the US maritime strategy, it will not accomplish either of these missions without risking nuclear escalation. Barry Posen has argued that the forward operations of US attack submarines against Soviet SSBNs might provoke the very escalation that NATO is seeking to deter.¹² And John Mearsheimer suggests that the US maritime strategy, in addition to raising the risk of inadvertent nuclear war, is also irrelevant to the defense of Europe. That defense will stand or fall on the performances of NATO ground and tactical air forces, compared to their Pact counterparts. Additional investment in forces to support the maritime strategy detracts, according to Mearsheimer, from needed investments in those NATO ground and tactical air forces which could prove to be decisive on the Central Front.¹³ However valid this point, it has implications that go beyond the attainment of desired service force structures. The more important issue is the relevance of NATO and US strategy to the actual threat presented by Soviet military power. If the threat is perceived as primarily one of extended conventional war, then the American Navy seems to have a

more decisive role. If the threat is primarily one of a Soviet blitzkrieg, then forces for immediate defense at the Central Front are more important.

New Technology and NATO Defenses

We have seen that none of the three presumed escapes from reliance on nuclear retaliation as a key component of NATO strategy is compelling. Each depends on the credible threat of nuclear retaliation, coupled to conventional forces whose strength is allowed to slip no further behind that of forces deployed by the Pact. However, the conventional-option school has one additional card to play. The possibility of NATO using enhanced technology to strike deep could provide for a more effective conventional defense and a much higher nuclear threshold. Offensive deep-strike operational concepts and technologies might in the future be complemented by theater ballistic missile defenses. NATO doctrine endorses the Follow-on Forces Attack (FOFA) concept, which includes conventional deep strike.¹⁴ This is quite compatible with, although dissimilar in content to, US Army global AirLand Battle doctrine, which emphasizes maneuver and the bold counteroffensive if the forces are capable of doing it.¹⁵ However, it is important not to exaggerate the effects of these concepts and technologies on the probability of successfully defending Europe without nuclear weapons.

The first reason to be skeptical about the net effect of new technologies favoring the West is that these technologies, sooner or later, can be exploited by the other side. The Soviet version of deep attack, featuring conventionally armed ballistic missiles and a theater-wide strategic air offensive, and with enhanced technology as a force multiplier, might disrupt NATO cohesion and throw the defender's command, control, and communications system into turmoil.¹⁶ Having mastered their own versions of deep strike and theater defense, the Soviets can turn that mastery to their advantage.

A second reason to dampen optimism about the beneficial effects of deep-strike and active-defense technologies is that technologies are not ends in themselves, but only useful as components of an improved strategy. What NATO must do with its conventional forces is defeat the Soviet strategy for conventional war in Europe, whatever it proves to be. With regard to the applicability of deep attack and FOFA to plausible Soviet strategy, for example, Steven Canby suggests that NATO is attempting to solve a secondary instead of a primary problem. The problem, according to Canby, is that NATO must initially contain the early thrusts of the first-echelon forces of the Pact.¹⁷

In order to defeat these first-echelon forces, according to Jeffrey Record, at least four changes in NATO's conventional defense preparedness are required.¹⁸ First, barrier defenses at the inter-German border would

channel the Pact attack, improve target acquisition, and slow the momentum of the offensive, allowing more time for the formation of NATO operational reserves and counterattacks. Second, and related to the first, NATO requires more operational reserves. These additional reserves, added to existing forces, could provide deployment options which are more effective militarily and more efficient economically. Third, NATO must improve its war reserve stocks of ammunition and spare parts; it is defeated by definition if it cannot fire back against an attacker who can still fire. Fourth, SACEUR should have more authority than he now has to take precautionary measures before war actually breaks out, including dispersing nuclear weapons and tactical aircraft, moving ground forces out of garrison to general defense positions, and calling up certain categories of reservists.¹⁹

A third reason for skepticism about the contributions of new technologies to theater defense and deep attack is that not all the Western versions of enhanced technology are ready for near-term deployment. Some will be on the drawing boards or exist only as prototypes until well into the 1990s; others may never be funded through development into production, or, if funded, may fall short of planners' criteria for success (as in the case of the ill-fated division air defense or DIVAD system).²⁰ In addition, these technologies might prove to be mixed blessings to beleaguered commanders under fire, and a bureaucratic tar pit in peacetime. Take for example the new battlefield data-collection systems. A proliferation of information in real time will swamp commanders and their staffs, with the resulting danger that they will be unable to separate the significant messages from the insignificant.²¹ And the critical information networks for transmitting data from improved sensors and fusion centers will be high-priority targets for Soviet planners. If those networks cannot be destroyed, they might be disoriented by electronic countermeasures or by deception, and the introduction of misleading information into NATO networks would be a tactic prototypical of the Soviet approach to war.²² Important improvements have been made to NATO command, control, and communications in recent years and these improvements are continuing, but how well these systems would withstand the test of wartime disruption is anybody's guess.²³

By the mid-1970s, some important Soviet leaders had noticed the potential for exploiting enhanced technology to allow them additional options below the nuclear threshold. An exhaustive study of the writings of former Chief of the Soviet General Staff Marshal N. V. Ogarkov from 1971 to 1985 noted his repeated emphasis on the altered utility of nuclear weapons and the new capabilities of conventional ones.²⁴ According to Ogarkov, work on new conventional weapons "cannot fail to change established notions of the methods and forms of armed struggle and even of the military might of the state."²⁵ Ogarkov's views may have caused his removal to another position in 1984, but they undoubtedly reflected strong

sentiments within the Soviet military hierarchy that insufficient exploitation of new conventional technologies needed to be remedied. According to Pentagon analysts, this Soviet rethinking also coincided with a greater Soviet awareness of the destructive secondary effects of nuclear exchanges on their ground and tactical air forces.²⁶ Overall, it seems fair to say that enhanced technology may provide options that NATO should explore, but it provides no guarantee of permanent advantage relative to the Pact. Nor does it substitute for well-conceived strategy.

To Conclude

The conventional defense of Europe depends on NATO victory-denial capabilities and deterrent suasion. Conventional denial capabilities can be improved and the nuclear threshold raised somewhat. However, raising the nuclear threshold in Europe calls for sensitivity to Soviet strategy, alliance politics, geopolitical realities, and the limits of technology as applied to conventional war in Europe.

The results of the US-Soviet INF agreement might seem like the denuclearization of Europe to Reagan critics. But the post-agreement trauma is as unnecessary as the pre-negotiation euphoria was. Removal of super-power intermediate nuclear forces will have little effect on the overall stability of deterrence in Europe. To contemplate a successful European campaign, by their standards, the Soviets would have to somehow prevent NATO from nuclear escalation and from turning the war into an extended contest of attrition. Even then, a best-case Soviet scenario still leaves US strategic retaliatory forces intact, and escalation to homeland-to-homeland exchanges possible.

Deterrence stability in Europe should not be overestimated, however. The causes of war may not be predictable, and they may grow out of implausible scenarios for which rehearsals have not been provided. The Soviets may be improvising their attack plan in the face of perceived threats from the West, despite Western disinclination to see ourselves as the aggressor. Under such ambiguous conditions, political cohesion may be more the problem for NATO than adequate conventional or nuclear forces.

NOTES

1. Expert arguments for improving NATO conventional defenses are provided by Donald R. Cotter and Phillip A. Karber. See Cotter, "The Need for a Serious Conventional Defense Initiative," *Signal*, 42 (October 1987), 73-81, and his chapter in *Strengthening Conventional Deterrence in Europe: Proposals for the 1980s*, Report of the European Security Study (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983); and Karber, "In Defense of Forward Defense," *Armed Forces Journal International*, 121 (May 1984), 27-50.

2. An excellent overview of this issue is provided in David N. Schwartz, *NATO's Nuclear Dilemmas* (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1983).

3. Colin S. Gray, *Maritime Strategy, Geopolitics and the Defense of the West* (New York: National Strategy Information Center, 1986), pp. 55-76.

4. Christopher N. Donnelly, "Soviet Operational Concepts in the 1990s," in *Strengthening Conventional Deterrence in Europe*, pp. 105-36, esp. pp. 125ff.
5. A scenario for a possibly successful Soviet surprise attack against NATO is presented in P. H. Vigor, *Soviet Blitzkrieg Theory* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983), pp. 183-205.
6. Bruce G. Blair, "Alerting in Crisis and Conventional War," in *Managing Nuclear Operations*, ed. Ashton B. Carter, John D. Steinbruner, and Charles A. Zraket (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1987), pp. 75-120.
7. While the Soviets value economy of force and would not want to waste weapons on unnecessary targets, their operational style emphasizes early use of a large proportion of their forces against necessary ones. See Nathan Leites, "The Soviet Style of War," in *Soviet Military Thinking*, ed. Derek Leebaert (London: Allen and Unwin, 1981), pp. 186-89.
8. John J. Mearsheimer, *Conventional Deterrence* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univ. Press, 1983), pp. 165-88.
9. James M. McConnell, "Shifts in Soviet Views on the Proper Focus of Military Development," *World Politics*, 37 (April 1985), 317-43.
10. James A. Stegenga, "U.S. Forces in Europe: Stay, Leave, or Punt?" letter to the editor, *Parameters*, 17 (December 1987), 99-100.
11. James D. Watkins, "The Maritime Strategy," *Proceedings*, 112 (January 1986), 2-15.
12. Barry R. Posen, "Inadvertent Nuclear War? Escalation and NATO's Northern Flank," *International Security*, 7 (Fall 1982), 28-54, rpt. in Steven E. Miller, ed., *Strategy and Nuclear Deterrence* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1984), pp. 85-111.
13. John J. Mearsheimer, "A Strategic Misstep: The Maritime Strategy and Deterrence in Europe," *International Security*, 11 (Fall 1986), 3-57. The same issue carries a "rejoinder" by Linton R. Brooks, "Naval Power and National Security: The Case for the Maritime Strategy," pp. 58-88.
14. Bernard W. Rogers, "Follow-on Forces Attack (FOFA): Myths and Realities," *NATO Review*, 32 (December 1984), 1-9. (Rpt. *Parameters*, 15 [Summer 1985], pp. 75-79.)
15. US Department of the Army, *Operations*, Field Manual 100-5 (Washington: GPO, August 1962), ch. 7.
16. See Dennis M. Gormley, "The Impact of NATO Doctrinal Choices on the Policies and Strategic Choices of Warsaw Pact States: Part II," *Adelphi Papers*, No. 206 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, Spring 1986), pp. 20-34, esp. pp. 26-32.
17. Steven Canby, "New Conventional Force Technology and the NATO-Warsaw Pact Balance: Part I," in *New Technology and Western Security Policy*, ed. Robert O'Neill (New York: Archon Books, 1985), pp. 66-83.
18. Jeffrey Record, "Europe's Conventional Defense," in *Challenges to Deterrence: Resources, Technology and Policy*, ed. Stephen J. Cimbala (New York: Praeger, 1987), pp. 193-206, esp. pp. 203-05.
19. *Ibid.*, p. 205.
20. On expectations for the emergence of enhanced technology as contributory to NATO strategy, see Richard D. DeLauer, "Emerging Technologies and their Impact on the Conventional Deterrent," in *The Conventional Defense of Europe: New Technologies and New Strategies*, ed. Andrew J. Pierre (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1986), pp. 40-70.
21. For exemplary evidence, see Martin van Creveld, *Command in War* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1985), ch. 7.
22. See the collection of essays in Brian D. Dailey and Patrick J. Parker, eds., *Soviet Strategic Deception* (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1987). For a discussion of Soviet *maskirovka* in theory and practice, see Roger Beaumont, "On the Analytical Challenges of *Maskirovka*," in *Intelligence and Intelligence Policy in a Democratic Society*, ed. Stephen J. Cimbala (Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Transnational, 1987), pp. 197-222.
23. The importance of theater command, control, and communications is attested by an authoritative source in German General Leopold Chalupa "Controlling Tactical Air and Ground Forces Within the Central European Command," *Signal*, 42 (October 1987), 35-40.
24. Mary Fitzgerald, "Marshal Ogarkov on Modern War: 1971-1985," Center for Naval Analyses, Hudson Institute, working paper, 27 September 1985. See also James M. McConnell, "The Soviet Shift in Emphasis from Nuclear to Conventional: The Mid-term Perspective," Center for Naval Analyses, June 1983, CRC 490-Vol. II.
25. Voy J. Nicholson and Charles T. Robertson, Jr., "Soviet Military Policy: Subject of Political-Military Infighting?" in *Essays on Strategy III* (Washington: National Defense Univ. Press, 1986), p. 56. Cited from *Krasnaya Zvezda*, 9 May 1984.
26. See John G. Hines, Phillip A. Petersen, and Notra Trulock III, "Soviet Military Theory from 1945-2000: Implications for NATO," *Washington Quarterly*, 9 (Fall 1986), 117-37. These authors show scrupulous awareness that one must be careful to note what the Soviets are *doing* as well as what they are saying, and to whom they are saying it.