Germany, France, and the Future of Western European Security

THOMAS-DURELL YOUNG
and SAMUEL J. NEWLAND

Recent events in central Europe and the Soviet Union have brought to the fore once again the need to address the “German question.” Doing so has become increasingly complex because it now concerns both the issue of German reunification and a trend in Germany to explore building a European defense system in cooperation with France. The specter of a reunified Germany has caused the leaders of some Western democracies, the Soviet Union, and Poland to express deep reservations about the ten-point proposal for unification of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and the German Democratic Republic (GDR), initiated by Chancellor Kohl on 29 November 1989. Indeed, ambassadors from the Four Powers on Berlin met in December 1989 to discuss such questions. Despite expressed concerns, West German political parties and governmental bureaus are already actively cooperating with their East German counterparts. On 18 May of this year, the two Germanys signed a treaty formally dissolving East Germany’s communist system and creating a single free-market economy which took effect on the 2d of July. It is certain that the process will continue, regardless of objections from countries worried about a resurgent Germany. As noted by President Bush, it would hardly be consistent for the Western democracies to support national self-determination in Eastern Europe and then oppose it for one of the strongest supporters of the Western alliance.

From a US perspective, a greater concern is the widespread perception in the FRG that the Soviet Union no longer presents an immediate threat to that country’s security. Adding to this attitudinal change is the uneasiness
among some Germans about the dependability of the US defense commitment to Europe and the subsequent tendency by Bonn to explore defense arrangements outside NATO. The changing political situation in Germany, the growing Franco-German rapprochement, and the implications for the United States form the subject of this article.

**The Changing Face of Europe**

The difficulty before the Western nations is not so much opposing the unification of West and East Germany; if history and current events are any guide, this political force is clearly one that ultimately defies suppression, unless foreign military formations remain in country to oppose any such move. Rather, the challenge for the Western alliance is how best to deal with this politically delicate issue, given the fact that the FRG is a democracy and is active in its support of the Western security alliance and European economic and political integration. It is therefore not surprising that while Western leaders have expressed their anxiety about a unified Germany, they have also stated that such a result is inevitable. The Western democracies are faced with the complication of having to decide both at which point in the ongoing unification process their interests are threatened, and once that particular point has been reached, how they are to deal with it. How can the Western alliance influence the process of reunification so that: European security is preserved; the FRG, kept mindful of the many advantages which accrue to it by remaining in the Western fold, is restrained from acting precipitously; and Western attempts to influence the terms of reunification do not so alienate the FRG that they encourage the very independent actions they seek to avoid. There would appear to be no serious disagreement with the proposition that a neutralized, unified Germany, as suggested by Stalin in 1952, or an FRG pursuing an extreme form of Ostpolitik at the expense of its Western orientation, would not be in the best interests of Western Europe or the United States.⁴

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Dr. Thomas-Dreuli Young is a National Security Affairs Analyst with the Strategic Studies Institute at Carlisle Barracks, Pa. He holds an M.A. in international relations from the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies and a Ph.D. from the University of Geneva, Switzerland. He has published widely on allied defense issues, most recently the article "Problems in Australia's 'Defence Revolution,'" in the December 1989 issue of *Contemporary Southeast Asia.*

Dr. Samuel J. Newland is on the faculty of the Department of Corresponding Studies at the US Army War College, and previously was a Strategic Research Analyst with the Strategic Studies Institute. He holds M.Phil. and Ph.D. degrees in history from the University of Kansas, as well as an M.A. in history from Pittsburg (Kans.) State University. He is a Major in the Pennsylvania Army National Guard, with a military intelligence specialty.
Since a unified Germany would not likely remain neutral, it would also not be in the Soviet interest...

In brief, the last thing the West wants the FRG to do is to reconsider its position in the West. In order to prevent this eventuality, a convincing case must be made to Bonn of the continuing utility of some form of Western security alignment in its defense needs. For instance, while the immediacy of the Soviet threat has diminished, the threat is likely to remain present in some form. Additionally, in spite of the tumultuous positive changes which have taken place in Eastern Europe in the past year, the potential for instability remains high indeed. Considering the politically stabilizing role NATO can play in European security, a NATO structure altered to reflect the changes taking place in Europe may remain relevant to its members. Regrettably, the credibility of the principal member of NATO—the United States—has suffered in recent years in the eyes of many West Germans. Indeed, the US presence is perceived as becoming increasingly irrelevant to Bonn’s security requirements as Gorbachev’s concept of a “common European home” gains currency.

The autumn 1986 Reykjavik summit, where the United States seriously considered the Soviet proposal to dismantle their respective intercontinental ballistic missile forces without first consulting its NATO allies, and the 8 December 1987 Treaty on Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (INF) were widely perceived by many officials in the FRG as concrete moves by Washington to abrogate its nuclear guarantee to their country. Complicating this situation, of course, has been the subsequent diminution of the Soviet threat to West Germany. This has had the additional effect of making the US security commitment to the FRG less relevant to the domestic West German security debate than in previous years and increasing Bonn’s already ambiguous security future.

One means by which Bonn’s European Community allies have responded to West Germany’s security disquietude has been through reviving (at France’s insistence) the defense mechanisms of the Western European Union. While it is evident that a more formalized Western European defense community, or the “European Pillar” as it is often called, must overcome numerous political obstacles before it becomes reality, trends point toward greater European defense cooperation outside the NATO framework. The European Pillar may also attain added relevance by the end of 1992, at which time the European Community’s Single Economic Act is scheduled to be implemented. Indeed, while not widely recognized, the Single European Act has provisions for defense cooperation among the European Community Twelve. Moreover, as argued by French President François Mitterrand, “If we succeed in realizing the internal European market by 1992/93... then present conditions will change entirely, including those for the joint defense of Europe. It will then be understood that Europe cannot exist [as a unified body] without ensuring its own defense.”

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Despite the evident potential of the European Pillar to ameliorate Bonn's security anxieties (and those of its allies), as well as to anchor a unified Germany in Western Europe, a short-term solution to the concerns of both Germany and its allies remains continued success in effecting a closer Franco-German defense relationship. While initiated in the early 1960s only to become dormant quickly thereafter, Franco-German defense cooperation experienced a period of revitalization beginning in the early 1980s and continuing throughout the decade.

One can legitimately question how France, which since 1967 has claimed to base its national security on strict adherence to nuclear deterrence and rejection of the NATO strategy of flexible response, would allow itself to become progressively entangled in the defense of the FRG. The simple answer is that given the fundamental import France places on the FRG's remaining aligned to the West, particularly as a bulwark between France and Eastern Europe, Paris has had no other choice than to move to assuage Bonn's anxieties. When assessed in light of the dramatic ongoing transformation of the Warsaw Pact and the move toward the creation of a European Pillar, Franco-German defense cooperation is highly relevant to contemporary Western European security.

In consequence, given the fundamental changes that have transpired in central Europe, the future vitality of the Paris-Bonn security concord has become one of the crucial elements in maintaining Germany's alignment to the West. One should not infer from this that the role of the United States has perforce been depreciated. Yet, if US forward-deployed forces in central Europe are reduced to 195,000, as announced by President Bush in January 1990, and if US strategic forces are significantly reduced through a Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) agreement with the Soviet Union, then France's defense commitment to the FRG becomes more important in relative terms to Bonn. Under such a scenario France might be willing to change its long-standing nuclear policy and publicly commit its nuclear deterrent force to the defense of Germany as part of the European Pillar, particularly if that is the price to be paid for a Western-aligned German nation.

In essence, the objective of the United States and its principal European allies should be to make it increasingly attractive to the FRG to remain within some form of Western alliance. The European Community under the leadership of Jacques Delors, as President of the European Commission, is close to accomplishing this goal economically with the Single European Act. As a result of the sheer size of its economy, the FRG will dominate this grouping of states—not an inconsequential inducement to Bonn. Apropos of security considerations, the key to achieving the same degree of European cooperation through the Western European Union and the creation of a European Pillar is the continued vitality of the Paris-Bonn security connection.
French National Security Objectives

Notwithstanding the existence of a sizable French nuclear force, Gaullist defense policy is based on the condition that the Federal Republic of Germany remain a strong and acquiescing buffer state against the Warsaw Pact. This has required that Bonn continue to host sizable NATO conventional and, until recently, large numbers of nuclear forces in West Germany, in addition to maintaining a large and modern conventional force of its own. France’s religious commitment to the strategy of nuclear deterrence would be seriously challenged if the West German shield were degraded in any way. Hence, Gaullist strategy has been predicated upon NATO’s (read: the United States) maintaining its military presence in the Federal Republic, and on Bonn’s remaining satisfied with this arrangement. Therefore, in addition to the periodic threats from some US quarters that the United States would withdraw or drastically reduce its forces in Europe for financial and political reasons, Paris also has had to monitor attentively the three disquieting German “isms” that could significantly alter Bonn’s status in the Western alliance: neutralism, nationalism, and pacifism. All three of these “isms” are observable, to varying degrees, in the current domestic political debate in the FRG.

France’s concern over the changing security environment in Europe during the latter 1970s and early 1980s induced a number of trends which significantly changed the orientation of French defense policy by the mid-1980s. First, as a result of a perceived diminution of the US commitment to European and, indeed, global security interests, Paris moved to modernize its conventional forces for European and out-of-region contingencies. This was an important development since Paris was loath to give the perception that it would contemplate engaging in a conventional conflict in Europe, a perception which would depreciate the value of its nuclear deterrent strategy. But as poignantly observed by François Heisbourg, “In the era of smart weapons capable of striking in depth and the age of Soviet operational maneuver groups, the notions of ‘first’ and ‘second’ line states lose a good part of their justification.”

Paris was not alone in its assessment of the changing European security environment. Officials in Bonn were also attempting to formulate new strategies to ameliorate their position vis-à-vis the Warsaw Pact, which included urging their French ally to increase its public commitment to the conventional defense of the Federal Republic. In breaking with long-standing Gaullist defense policy, President Mitterrand responded to Bonn’s anxieties in February 1982 at a Franco-German summit meeting by agreeing to intensify bilateral defense cooperation. In the short term, two important changes in French defense policy were effected, with the result of enlarging France’s national sanctuary to all but encompass the FRG.

This formation of 47,000 troops is designed to provide Paris with a capability to deploy a hard-hitting, air-transportable, conventional force 250 kilometers forward along the central front in the FRG as an important supplement to the First French Army, or to project military power into the Third World.³⁹ While overall force improvements involved in the creation of the *Force d’Action Rapide* are modest at best, its creation manifested a significant attitudinal shift in French defense thinking.

The second French response to its increased apprehension over the Soviet threat to Europe during the early to mid-1980s was the modernization of its force of tactical nuclear weapons. One of the most important programs in this modernization is the current move to replace the Pluton short-range ballistic missile force with the Hadès system.³¹ The Hadès was originally configured to have a range of 350 kilometers, but a 1988 French defense white paper announced that the system’s range was being increased to 500 kilometers.³² This adjustment was obviously made out of consideration for German sensitivity to the possible use of tactical nuclear weapons on German soil—East or West. The role of tactical nuclear weapons in French strategy is to provide Paris with the capability to launch a tactical nuclear warning shot to demonstrate to an opponent France’s willingness to move a conflict to the strategic plane.³³ The term for this force—*armes pré-stratégique* (prestrategic weapons)—was adopted in 1984 to emphasize the strong link between a tactical and a strategic nuclear response. Moreover, Mitterrand has stated that the use of prestrategic forces, the *ultime avertissement* (final warning), would not occur on West German soil.³⁴

In essence, these developments in French defense policy under the Socialist government of François Mitterrand were calculated to assuage anxieties in Bonn. In effect, the previous Gaullist policy of defense independence has all but given way to a stronger de facto commitment to defend the FRG.³⁵ As the political landscape of central Europe continues to evolve and the Federal Republic expands its diplomatic overtures to the East, one can predict a continuation of the evolution of French defense policy toward establishing closer links to Germany. However, in the future the rationale for France’s own Ostpolitik across the Rhine will not primarily be to reassure German anxieties in the new European security calculus, but rather to tie the new Germany to Western Europe and thereby continue to provide a shield against the East.

**West German Angst**

From the perspective of Bonn, its postwar strategy has been dependent on US nuclear deterrence (extended to cover Germany) as a necessary element for its national security. In recent years the importance to the Germans of this close US tie and the value of an extended umbrella of nuclear deterrence has not been fully appreciated by many US policymakers. Equally misunderstood are
German perspectives on the use of nuclear weapons. For the Germans, the extended US umbrella has served as a political weapon. Its value is in deterrence, not its warfighting capabilities. If in its defense doctrine the United States appears to emphasize short-range nuclear weapons or battlefield nuclear devices, the Germans become extremely uneasy (as with the recent dispute between Bonn and Washington over Lance SRBM modernization).  

Consequently, one of the first contemporary disconnects in US-German security policies occurred in the early 1960s when the Kennedy Administration initiated the doctrine of flexible response. To German officials, flexible response did two things. First, it implied a slight decoupling of the United States from its policy of extended nuclear deterrence; second, it appeared to permit Germany to become a potential battleground for a war, conventional and nuclear. Ultimately the FRG accepted this doctrinal change, but the belief has lingered that flexible response implied a full-scale nuclear war, with nuclear weapons thus being valued for warfighting rather than deterrence. Despite the philosophical difference on the actual application of nuclear weapons and the usual irritants that develop within a multilateral alliance, no crisis shook the foundations of West German security policy—NATO and the United States with its umbrella of extended nuclear deterrence—until the last ten years.

Beginning with the Carter era, US administrations began to take positions that threatened Bonn’s external policy interests and aspirations. Since the beginning of détente, the Germans had proceeded to improve relations with the East bloc, and by the late 1970s this initiative had achieved broad consensus, even within the conservative Christian Democratic Union and affiliated Christian Social Union parties. However, the Carter Administration ultimately came to perceive the Soviets as gross violators of human rights and thus conditioned its interest in détente on an improved Soviet record in that area. Nor did the situation improve with the arrival of the Reagan Administration, which further shook German confidence by three initiatives which, in German eyes, weakened a key element of German security. First, in a highly publicized move, President Reagan announced plans for the Strategic Defense Initiative, which was perceived by many Germans either as an attempt by Washington to develop an alternative to extended nuclear deterrence or as an acceleration of the arms race. Second, as noted earlier, at the Reykjavik summit President Reagan seemed willing to dissolve the US ICBM force, which provided the Germans with a large part of their strategic nuclear umbrella. Third, the agreement on intermediate- and shorter-range nuclear forces caused another wave of uncertainty in the Federal Republic because it seemed to be a further attempt by the United States to decouple its strategic nuclear forces from Europe. Thus, the activities of two successive US administrations contributed to significant changes in the foreign policy orientation of the FRG.
A new variable in Bonn’s national security calculus is the growing perception of a reduced threat emanating from the Soviet Union and an increasingly chaotic Warsaw Pact. Underscoring this shift in German attitudes was the FRG’s December 1989 announcement to cut the Bundeswehr by 20 percent (from 495,000 to 400,000) by the mid-1990s. Further, the US security commitment to Bonn will doubtless become less urgent as the Soviet Union disengages itself militarily from central Europe, and as European members of the Warsaw Pact undergo a phase of defense reorganization and even security reorientation in some cases. Thus, the United States faces the prospect of a Germany that doubts the US security commitment, even as this very commitment is seen by Bonn as of diminishing relevance to its security. Still, though the Germans are now less concerned about a Soviet incursion into Western Europe, one can anticipate that the experiences of the last 50 years will lead Germany to seek security guarantees from its allies in the West.

Franco-German Security Initiatives

While postwar Franco-German defense cooperation traces its antecedents to the stillborn Elysée Treaty of 1963, the current phase of intensified Franco-German defense cooperation commenced in February 1982 when French President Mitterrand and German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt agreed to conduct “thorough exchanges of views on security problems.” This decision came in the wake of Schmidt’s dissatisfaction with the security policies and foreign policy priorities of both the Carter and Reagan administrations. Admittedly, the overall German effort has been to draw France into the cooperative defense of Western Europe, rather than to totally supplant the United States. The 1982 agreement between Mitterrand and Schmidt has since been augmented by additional agreements between Mitterrand and Helmut Kohl, including their October 1982 decision to implement the defense clauses of the 1963 Elysée Treaty, especially the provisions that led both countries to reach “Common Conceptions” in defense issues.

A second area of cooperation can be seen in the armament industry. As early as the 1950s the two nations showed interest in joint weapon development, and in 1958 the Franco-German Institute of St. Louis was established in Alsace for the purpose of fostering scientific research and weapon development. Indeed, the French have seen defense industrial collaboration as a primary area of security cooperation with the FRG. Despite the interest of both countries, Franco-German projects have met with mixed success. For example, President Giscard d’Estaing and Chancellor Schmidt announced in February 1980 the intent of the two nations to build a Franco-German tank. While both nations had substantial enthusiasm for the project at the onset, by 1982 this project had been virtually abandoned.
A third area of cooperation, and perhaps the best reported, is in conventional force planning. An important reason for developing the French Force d’Action Rapide, whose creation was strongly supported by Mitterrand, was to reassure the West Germans of the French commitment to assist in West Germany’s conventional defense, even though French troops remain outside NATO’s military structure. Ever mindful of maintaining national freedom of action, the French government explained the creation of the Force d’Action Rapide to the French public more as an effort to reassure anxious Germans than as an expression of national concern over French security.

The latest initiative in the conventional arms arena has been the creation of the Franco-German Brigade, which is to be in place by October 1990. First suggested as a symbol of cooperation by Helmut Kohl in June 1987, the concept was enthusiastically received by the French. As structured, the brigade will consist of some 3000 to 4000 soldiers; their first commander is to be a French brigadier, who will in turn be replaced by a German commander on a two-year rotation.

While these efforts in conventional force planning and in armament research and production indicate a Franco-German desire to cooperate in defense planning, cooperative policies remain elusive in one key area: short-range tactical nuclear weapons and the question of whether the French strategic nuclear force will cover Germany automatically in the event of an attack by an aggressor. This problem relates directly to how the citizens of each country perceive nuclear weapons. For the French, the possession of an independent nuclear force outside NATO is a positive factor for Western security. The Germans, however, have a decidedly schizophrenic view of nuclear weapons: they value nuclear weapons for their deterrent value, but do not want them used for warfighting on German soil. Although reduced tensions between the Eastern and Western blocs will depreciate the value of conventional forces to the Federal Republic, the utility of nuclear deterrence likely will remain high as long as Bonn remains aligned with the Western alliance.

Thus, what the Germans have been wanting from the French is some type of guarantee that the French nuclear umbrella will be extended to cover them. However, formal guarantees by France have been elusive. In February 1986, President Mitterrand did publicly commit France to “consult” (circumstances allowing) with the Chancellor of the Federal Republic before employing prestrategic weapons on German territory. He also suggested in December 1987 that France would not use its Pluton missiles, with their 120-kilometer range, against enemy forces on West German territory.

Despite these significant, if carefully worded, statements, the French have been hesitant to share their nuclear prerogatives with the Germans and unwilling publicly to assure nuclear coverage to the Federal Republic. Yet the French have clearly stated their intent to aid their allies in the event of an attack.
Further, Paris is not insensitive to the problems its nuclear forces pose to greater security cooperation with Bonn. Robbin Laird writes that this very issue of security relations with Germany has made President Mitterrand increasingly uncomfortable with the role of French battlefield nuclear weapons and keenly aware of the problems these weapons pose for Franco-German defense cooperation. Given the rapid changes taking place in the East-West military balance in Europe and France's strongly felt objective of cementing Bonn in the Western alliance, it would not be out of character to see a substantial review of the French tactical nuclear modernization program and its declared purpose.

**Implications for US Security**

France and Germany have come to a new understanding concerning a growing commonality in their security interests and objectives—of that there can be little doubt. Yet fundamental impediments (e.g. the final outcome of German reunification and German involvement in French nuclear planning) have heretofore prevented the emergence of a solidified Paris-Bonn defense axis. There is good reason to believe that these impediments will be moved aside in the near future. What is more, it will be in Washington's interest to be supportive. A more intimate and expanded Franco-German security condominium, even if it leads (which is likely) to the establishment of an independent European Pillar, will help to ensure that the Federal Republic avoids drifting eastward and into a form of reunification inimical to Western objectives.

In the early 1960s, at the time of the negotiation of the Elysée Treaty, the United States opposed the creation of a Franco-German security axis. Washington and many of its NATO allies saw Germany's association with a growingly independent France as an unwanted form of "particularism." Over time, however, as France reconciled its differences with NATO and created its own modus vivendi with the alliance, Washington came to assess this and other forms of interallied defense cooperation in a favorable light. Indeed, Franco-German defense cooperation and coordination came to be particularly welcomed, because it had the desirable effect of drawing France back into NATO by its expression of a greater military commitment to the Central Front. That such cooperation might inevitably work against American objectives by reducing US influence in the Federal Republic was either not recognized by Washington or, more likely, judged of less importance compared to the aim of drawing France closer to the Western alliance.

Also problematic is the fear, held by many in NATO, that recent events will lead Bonn to leave the Western fold and adopt neutrality if that is the price it must pay for unification with the German Democratic Republic. Fortunately for the Western alliance, many considerations militate against this eventuality, including the dominant economic and political roles Bonn will
play in the European Community after 1992, assuming that act of integration comes to fruition.

While these aspects of European integration will require close watching, the emergence of a strengthened European Pillar to which the Federal Republic is firmly attached is clearly in the West’s interest. The best means of initiating this process, from the perspective of the United States, is to encourage a closer Bonn-Paris security axis, perhaps even including the explicit extension of France’s nuclear umbrella to encompass the Federal Republic. Additional areas of cooperation are also worth pursuing. For example, the idea of a French nuclear deterrent in the form of a force of neutron weapons stationed in the Federal Republic under joint French-German control has been publicly advocated by two former French defense officials, to the obvious dissatisfaction of the Soviet military. With the likely reduction of conventional forces in Europe in the face of a less-threatening Warsaw Pact, the deterrence offered by such a French nuclear option might have considerable attraction to Bonn.

Some American officials have shown uneasiness about the development of French-German defense cooperation, but the overall desirability of this entente should be readily apparent. Indeed, such a course is desirable even if it does result in a relative decline in America’s influence in Western Europe as the security independence of that grouping of states grows. Further, it would not amount to a total reversal in US-French security relations, since contacts between the United States and France have been far more intimate than commonly known, as recently acknowledged by the US government (e.g., cooperation in nuclear research and development).

From the perspective of the Federal Republic, increased security cooperation with France holds ample attractions. Since France is a European power and a country that strongly values nuclear deterrence, it will remain intimately involved in European regional security, even if, diplomatically speaking, from a distance. To refrain from alienating Bonn on nuclear issues, Paris took a less forceful position on alliance nuclear modernization in early 1989 than it otherwise might have, clearly a manifestation of the increasingly important position Germany plays in French external policy. And the French strategy of stressing nuclear (and increasingly conventional) deterrence, as opposed to warfighting, is and will remain highly attractive to officials in Bonn. If we are to believe Georges-Henri Soutou, a growing common understanding regarding nuclear weapons has extended to embrace German suggestions (made in private) that the French should not build the $2.4 billion Hadès SRBM system in its currently planned configuration, but rather as an intermediate-range nuclear missile capable of striking deep into Soviet territory. Moreover, in view of the decreasing perception of a Warsaw Pact threat to the FRG and if a superpower START agreement is reached, the relatively small French nuclear force will then grow in relative stature, thus gaining increased potential for providing declaratory
extended deterrence to the Federal Republic should bilateral cooperation extend that far.

The key, however, to making expanded Franco-German defense cooperation a success and ensuring the continuation of stability in central Europe during this period of post-cold war adjustment lies in an independent European Pillar. To the United States, the issue is not only the satisfactory resolution of German reunification, but also the perceived necessity to influence, in a positive sense, the evolution of the new security balance emerging in central Europe. Thus, the Franco-German security concord is but a part, albeit an important one, of the means to a new security calculus now governing the European continent. Moreover, given the historical animosities among even Western European countries, which continue to plague European diplomacy, European regional security problems can be adequately addressed only within a multilateral body, such as the Western European Union. Security cooperation within the WEU would provide a solution to the nettlesome problem raised by the existence of Article 24 of the Federal Republic’s Basic Law, which stipulates that the command and control over Bundewehr units can be exercised only by a multinational organization. This would preclude the impulse to create a unified German high command and the consequent fears such a body would produce in Europe. In view of the WEU’s continued insistence that its security objectives are complementary to those of NATO, one can scarcely conclude that a WEU-sponsored higher command authority would be inimical to US interests.

At the same time, an independent European Pillar would not be cost-free to the United States. As the principal security guarantor to Western Europe during the postwar era, the United States has been able to command considerable diplomatic influence and prestige in a region that continues to be judged as essential to US defense and political interests. The question Washington now faces is how to maintain its influence and prestige in a Western Europe adapting to the new security environment. At the same time, Washington needs to adopt a forward-thinking vision for European security which will fulfill both its own and its allies’ vital interests. Such interests certainly include continued stability in Europe, the peaceful reunification of Germany on terms acceptable to the members of the Western alliance, and a reduction in the Soviet Union’s diplomatic influence in the region. Given these objectives and constraints, US options would appear to be few indeed.

In the era of “Gorbymania,” the growing democratization of most of the European members of the Warsaw Pact and serious discussions concerning confederation or reunification of Germany all point to the evident “victory” of the West over Soviet-inspired communism. However, with the opportunities of the new decade have come also substantial challenges for the Western alliance. A more intimate Franco-German security relationship can
assuage any lingering West German anxieties over an Eastern threat, as well as European fears of a resurgent unified Germany. It will not in itself provide the major solution to Western Europe’s emerging security problems. But if the traditional Western alliance is to survive the new phase of peace following its “victory” in the Cold War against the Soviet bloc, the Paris-Bonn axis, notwithstanding its limitations, will be at the heart of a successful Western concept establishing a new security balance in Europe.

NOTES

5. For extensive documentation of this subject see Survival, 29 (March-April 1987), 166-88.
25. Grant, p. 16.

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28. An excellent discussion of the effect of the Carter years is contained in Alex Vardaman, "German-American Military Measures," Foreign Policy, 34 (Spring 1979), 86-89.
29. Both the Carter and Reagan administrations sought to use embargoes or sanctions against the Soviets without adequately considering European interests. It was the Reagan policies, however, that so polarized the Social Democratic Party. See Ron Asman, "West Germany Faces Nuclear Modernization," Survival, 30 (November-December 1988), 500-03.
32. The deployment of intermediate-range nuclear weapons in Germany was a highly contentious issue which cost Helmut Schmidt, among others, dearly. Note especially Howard, pp. 480-82.
40. Ibid.
42. Markham, p. 6.
44. Current German thought is against nuclear weapons and chemical weapons for warfighting in that both would devastate one or both Gemanies. Thus the French have had to be extremely cautious because of their multi-delivery capacity for all types of nuclear weapons. Any introduction of new short-range delivery systems has been opposed by sizable elements in the Federal Republic, and some elements of NATO strategy have not been well accepted in Germany. See Eckhard Loebelmeier, "Akzeptanzprobleme Der NATO-Strategie," Kurzgespräche (Bonn: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, November 1988).
49. Gamble, p. 47.
52. See the article by Lieutenant Colonel V. Nikitarenko in Krasnaya Zvezda (Moscow), 24 September 1987.
57. Western European military defense cooperation is not without its critics in the Soviet Union and the European political far left. See the article by Colonel S. Leonidou concerning the threat posed to the Warsaw Pact by the Force d'Action Rapide and other Western rapid deployment forces in Krinsiaya Zveda (Moscow), Second Edition, 19 May 1988; and the French Communist Party's view on European defense integration by Yves Cholière, "Europe: Military Integration or Cooperation in Disarmament?" World Marxist Review, 33 (November 1989), 34-36.