Joint Planning for Operation Torch

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Operation Torch, the Allied invasion of North Africa in World War II, set the United States Army firmly on the course it was to follow in the war and decisively ended strategic debates on how the war should be fought. Commencing 8 November 1942, Torch committed the Army to a Mediterranean strategy for at least a year, prejudicing the buildup of forces in the United Kingdom and abrogating any chance of a major attack on Europe across the English Channel in 1943.¹ The strategic issues surrounding President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s highly political decision that American troops had to go into action against the Germans in 1942 have been thoroughly and thoughtfully discussed. Operation Torch also had important consequences at the institutional level, however. The Army entered World War II with established doctrine for command and staff planning of joint operations, procedures the service virtually ignored from the start of the planning for Torch. The object of this article is to consider the reasons for that fact, and its implications.

Doctrine and Procedures on the Eve of War

The missions Army planners foresaw in the late 1930s governed their conceptions of joint operations. As the decade drew to a close, the presumptive ground force mission was still defense of the Western Hemisphere, particularly defense of the continental United States itself.² Before 1942, as a general rule, when American troops had been sent to oversea theaters, they had been able to land on friendly shores and organize for battle with little interference from the enemy. The Navy’s contribution to such tasks was in

Summer 1991

73
escort convoys to the theater of operations and securing the lines of communications to support the Army in the field. The few real amphibious landings had been very limited in scope, usually little more than river crossings or raids.¹ In point of fact, US forces had never conducted a combat amphibious operation prior to 1942.⁴ Hence there had been little requirement for extensive cooperation between the two services for a task in which responsibilities and command relationships were as unambiguous as the operations were simple.

Both the Army and the Navy tended to view amphibious operations within the frame of reference of an expeditionary force used in connection with defense of the Western Hemisphere and American island possessions. The principal question to be resolved was bureaucratic rather than operational—who would control joint operations. The Joint Army-Navy Board eventually codified the services' limited experience in joint operations in the publication Joint Action of the Army and Navy, drafted in 1927 and updated in 1935. Joint Action constituted all of the extant doctrine for joint operations and reflected the limited scope of such operations anticipated in the two decades after World War I.⁵ The provisions of the joint document faithfully mirrored the simplicity with which armed forces officers viewed cooperative actions.

Various sections of Joint Action dealt with what the services thought the major issues to be. The document first defined the roles and missions of the Army and the Navy and paid special attention to those areas of overlap, such as military aviation and coastal defense, that had long been matters of contention. It went into considerable detail on such technical matters as embarkation and transportation of the force, radio policy, and joint radiotelegraph procedures. The 1935 revision of the manual also incorporated as its chapter six the existing doctrine for amphibious training and landings.⁶ The heart of the document, however, and the section that remained a matter of debate through the time of Torch, was the provision relating to command, as formulated in chapter two, "The Coordination of Operations of the Army and the Navy."

This chapter set forth two methods of coordinating joint operations: mutual cooperation and unity of command. Mutual cooperation was the simpler method, depending on simple collaboration between the two services for the accomplishment of their joint mission. The Army and Navy would

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Parameters
work in parallel, each preparing its own plan and conducting its own training, the two efforts to be married at the point of attack. Unity of command, on the other hand, vested responsibility and authority for all aspects of the operation in a commander of one service. That officer had the task of coordinating the operations of participating forces of both services, designating objectives, and exercising control of the developing action.  

Joint Action assumed that operations would normally be conducted through mutual cooperation, but recognized that unity of command might be operative in certain situations. Predictably, neither the Army nor the Navy cared much for that idea, protesting that no officer of another service was competent to exercise command over elements of its own. On 21 March 1938, a little more than a year before Hitler’s armies marched into Poland, Admiral William D. Leahy, Chief of Naval Operations and acting Secretary of the Navy, submitted the following remarkable opinion to Army Chief of Staff Malin Craig concerning those provisions of the document relating to command:

I am of the opinion that these provisions are at variance with long established policy of the Navy Department, have a doubtful basis in law, and would be difficult to execute as it is unlikely that two commanders will agree as to the intention of the enemy.  

In what to today’s generation of joint-minded officers will surely appear as a quaint gesture, Admiral Leahy proposed substitution of Article 178, US Navy Regulations, which stated, “An officer of the Navy cannot assume command of Army forces on shore, nor can an officer of the Army assume command over any ship of the Navy, or over its officers or men afloat.”

The War Department did not dispute Leahy’s conclusions about command of joint expeditions. Colonel Sherman Miles, evaluating the Admiral’s comments for the Chief of War Plans Division, agreed that the chapter on command was not acceptable to either service. “It is an agreement on which we do not agree,” he argued, suggesting to his chief that the Army should support Admiral Leahy’s idea that “cooperation on an equal status should be the normal basis for joint action between the two services.”

Within that framework of mutual cooperation, normal staff procedures would apply. Given the mission to conduct a joint operation, each service prepared a plan for its forces involved. Under the Army’s normal procedure, officers assigned to the War Plans Division of the War Department General Staff drafted the basic plan. After Chief of Staff approval, WPD delivered it to those units selected to carry it out. The units involved then conducted detailed planning within the compass of the basic WPD document. Joint Action anticipated that differences might arise that would make the Army’s and Navy’s plans incompatible. To resolve them, chapter seven stipulated local joint planning committees reporting jointly to the commanding general and commandant
of the naval district concerned. Facilitating the process, each service had long-standing published orders authorizing the joint committees, orders that predated Joint Action.

In summary, existing doctrine, plans, and procedures for joint action in 1941 consisted of an intentionally vague set of generalizations that preserved the independence of each armed service as much as possible. Ideally, military and naval commanders would cooperate in the conduct of joint overseas operations, developing their own plans on the basis of master plans drafted by the operations staff of each service. The agreed-upon procedures suited a simpler world in which both services envisioned military operations aimed ultimately at security of the Western Hemisphere. The militarily and politically complex war that came in 1941 rapidly overwhelmed such prewar assumptions.

**Forces Driving the Change**

The last months of peace and the first months of war decisively affected Army war planning assumptions and methods. By early 1941, key staff officers perceived that defensive plans predicated on a war for hemispheric defense were outmoded. A different outlook came increasingly to prevail in Washington. Officers in the War Department General Staff, from Chief of Staff George C. Marshall on down, shared the assumption that, if war came, it would be fought in overseas theaters. Indeed, the highly secret "Victory Plan," a logistics estimate drafted in the summer of 1941, presumed the need to mobilize more than 200 divisions to conduct operations aimed at encircling and finally assaulting the German bastion in central Europe.

To come to grips with the complications of fighting on other continents required the Army to reorient its thinking about war and war planning. As soon as the staff contemplated operations outside of the Western Hemisphere, the Army faced obstacles it lacked the resources to surmount. Unlike the Navy, which had always been a strategic force capable of operating worldwide, the Army and its Air Force could perform their operational missions only after they were strategically deployed. The distinction is an important one, for the Army's inability to establish lines of communications and maintain itself in a foreign theater of war underscored its absolute dependence on cooperation with the sister service.

Important as they might be, sea lines of communications were not the only consideration. The situation in 1941-1942 was completely unlike that which had prevailed in 1917, when the existence of friendly French ports made it relatively simple to project the American Expeditionary Force ashore in Europe. Nor did the landings in Cuba during the Spanish-American War, or at Vera Cruz in 1914, compare in scale, complexity, or risk with the problem that loomed ahead for Army planners in 1941. Future battle in Europe would
unquestionably involve one or more large-scale, opposed amphibious landings, in which the Navy would not only escort and sustain the Army, but would also fight a crucial part of the battle itself. That requirement for joint battle, as much as any other factor, forced the Army to consider the problem of joint planning for war, something that had never been particularly important before.

War also brought significant changes to higher staffs, changes that in large part outmoded prewar thinking about how Army and Navy staffs would function. The alliance with Great Britain immediately complicated Army planning procedures. Fighting as part of a coalition meant that all military plans would have the additional complexity of a political dimension not usually encountered when planning operations for American forces alone. That which is obvious in retrospect swiftly became evident to staff officers planning the Army’s war against Germany: combined military operations had to be coordinated by staffs above the national level. The Arcadia Conference in Washington, December 1941 through January 1942, responded to that need by creating the Anglo-American Combined Chiefs of Staff to direct the coalition’s war. The American component of the Combined Chiefs of Staff was organized in February of 1942, when the largely advisory Joint Army-Navy Board was dissolved and the organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff created. Although at first without a formal institutional structure, the JCS swiftly assumed the duty of strategic direction of America’s war. Prewar staff officers, accustomed to no organization superior to the War Department, found in early 1942 that they were now directed both by a superior national staff agency and a superior supra-national staff agency.

All these factors came into play as the Army began to frame plans to implement the President’s directive for Torch. The invasion of North Africa represented a changed strategic requirement, a tactical problem requiring joint battle, and a political situation that intruded new staff echelons into the planning process.

**Torch Triggers Changes in Joint Planning**

After the declaration of war, War Plans Division considered a wide range of possible military operations. As the possibility of a North African invasion emerged, WPD—soon renamed Operations Division (OPD)—began its preliminary planning according to the principle of mutual cooperation, much as Joint Action prescribed. That is, it unilaterally conceptualized an Army plan that was eventually to be coordinated with that of the Navy. In June and July 1942, on the eve of the President’s decision for Torch, OPD conducted a review of the prospects for a Mediterranean strategy, using the existing Gymnast plan for an operation at Casablanca. After first lodging its objections to any such operation, OPD opined that if ordered to conduct a North African invasion, the Operations Division should be responsible for
Army planning until execution was decided upon. At that point, detailed Army planning should be in the hands of the Army commander of the joint expeditionary force.  

This planning scheme, entirely consistent with the 1935 revision of Joint Action, did not last long. Combined Chiefs of Staff Directive 103/1 took the matter entirely out of Army hands, assigning planning responsibility for Torch to the new allied commander. On 14 August 1942, General Dwight D. Eisenhower assumed duties as Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Expeditionary Force. The Combined Chiefs of Staff directive that assigned him to command also set forth the mission of gaining control of North Africa from the Atlantic to the Red Sea, a task for which Eisenhower had been doing preliminary planning in London since July. By September, Eisenhower’s combined planning staff had evolved a concept of Torch as a three-pronged landing extending from Algiers and Oran, where the Royal Navy would land US troops from England, to French Morocco on the Atlantic, where the US Navy would land American troops staging from Norfolk. This prong would be executed by the Western Task Force, under command of Major General George S. Patton, Jr.

Eisenhower’s command arrangements made it virtually impossible to apply the operating provisions of Joint Action of the Army and Navy. He commanded an allied force under the authority of the Combined Chiefs of Staff and accordingly organized his London staff on both a combined and joint basis, incorporating members of all three services of both nations. Lucian Truscott, whom Marshall had sent to London in May 1942 to serve on Admiral Mountbatten’s Combined Operations Headquarters staff, developed an early appreciation for combined staffs, an advantage retained when he was posted as one of Eisenhower’s chief planners and later when he was reassigned to the Western Task Force. To assist Eisenhower, Mountbatten gave him first one, then four, of his own combined planning teams, each of which was experienced in planning amphibious operations. Like staff officers, subordinate
commanders, regardless of nationality, owed their first allegiance to the Allied Force commander, not to their respective service or national authorities. When, for example, General Sir Kenneth A. N. Anderson received his appointment to command British ground forces in Torch, his directive specifically limited his right to appeal to the British War Office to occasions of the gravest emergency, and then only after consulting Eisenhower on his reasons for doing so.

The same principle applied to all the senior force commanders who worked for Eisenhower, and he sought to obtain the same independence of action for himself that he had obliged his subordinates to accept from their own services. Eisenhower wrote to the Chief of Staff, "It is my belief that the British desire to place in the hands of the Commander-in-Chief the maximum degree of exclusive authority and responsibility that is feasible in an operation involving troops of two nationalities. I hope that this trend will be encouraged on both sides of the Atlantic so that real and complete integration may be possible." Marshall confirmed Eisenhower's status as an essentially independent commander in his reply: "Your requests will be fulfilled to the maximum of our capabilities. It is the desire of the War Department that you as Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Forces should have the maximum feasible degree of authority and responsibility, and that you should operate at all times under as broad a directive as possible."

Thus the Allied Expeditionary Force began life as a creature never envisioned by the prewar Army (or Navy, for that matter). As created, the force that would execute Torch was an allied organization that stood in an ill-defined but assuredly independent relationship to the US War Department. As a consequence, the Operations Division could not presume to issue plans and orders binding on Eisenhower's command.

Before World War II, OPD's predecessor, the War Plans Division, had developed a series of contingency plans similar in scope to Torch, and might reasonably have been expected to continue working at that level, outlining the basic operation plans for all Army forces. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, however, who were responsible for organizing the Western Task Force, sanctioned the division of labor outlined in the Combined Chiefs of Staff directive. In October, affirming a process already well under way, the Joint Chiefs directed that all tactical and logistic plans would be prepared by the task force commanders, who were appointed by the Commander-in-Chief, Allied Force, and that the Army would be responsible only for the logistic support of Army forces assigned to Torch. While Torch planners certainly used OPD's Gymnast planning documents in developing their ideas for the Casablanca landing, Marshall's headquarters played little role in writing the operational orders beyond assigning forces to Eisenhower's command and laying plans for the logistical support of those forces.

Summer 1991
Allied Force planners quickly produced an outline plan for Operation Torch, copies of which Eisenhower forwarded to the Combined and Joint Chiefs of Staff, as well as to the subordinate task force commanders, whose staffs prepared the detailed operations plans for the landings. Combined staffs in London wrote the plans for Algiers and Oran, while the plan devised in London for the Western Task Force was completed by Patton’s staff, at that time working in the Munitions Building in Washington, and Rear Admiral H. Kent Hewitt’s staff in Norfolk. Patton’s and Hewitt’s staffs, evidently abiding by the mutual cooperation provisions of Joint Action, worked separately to write their plans for the Western Task Force.

Not only were they physically separated—Patton in Washington and Hewitt in Norfolk—but also there seems to have been relatively little cross-talk between the staffs. And when the Army and Navy officers did talk, they frequently argued. Patton’s extremely vocal objections to the Navy’s attempt, as he put it, “to issue orders to me,” raised the possibility that Eisenhower would have to replace him with someone easier for the Navy to work with. It was here that OPD staffers Colonel John Hull, General Tom Handy, and Colonel Albert Wedemeyer, aided by Captain Charles M. Cooke of Admiral King’s operations staff, played a vital role as peacemakers, restoring “calm if not always amity.”

While it perhaps would have helped preserve a shaky interservice peace, OPD did not direct Patton’s staff. Although located in the same building as the Operations Division of the War Department General Staff, Patton’s officers looked to Eisenhower in London for direction, rather than to OPD. In fact, Patton maintained tight control of his corridor, stationing guards at each end with orders to double-check the identities of every visitor. Letters, messages, and reports flowed back and forth between Washington and London, and Patton visited Eisenhower’s headquarters in August for coordination. It was during that visit that Truscott’s planning group laid out the basic plan for Patton’s task force, and that Patton asked Truscott to come with him to Casablanca. Eisenhower’s agreement to release Truscott to command a sub-task force under Patton may well have been influenced by the desirability of placing an experienced Torch planner in the Western Task Force.

To further assure that planners in London and in Washington were working toward the same goals, General Mark Clark, Eisenhower’s deputy, crossed the Atlantic the other direction in September to visit Patton, as well as to brief General Marshall, Secretary of War Stimson, Admiral Leahy, and Harry Hopkins. General Eisenhower meanwhile kept up an exchange of messages with Washington that kept General Marshall—in his capacities as Army Chief of Staff as well as executive agent for the Combined Chiefs and Joint Chiefs—informed of his developing plan.

To coordinate plans with the Navy, General Patton’s staff met officers from Rear Admiral Hewitt’s Western Naval Task Force staff to iron
out details and conflicts. The composition of this "T-Committee" varied from meeting to meeting, as did the content of the discussions, which ranged from the minutiae of equipping various elements of the force to basic operational decisions. In the latter cases, Admiral Hewitt, General Patton, and other senior officers typically attended; when minor details were on the agenda, most of the representatives were more junior. Although not a direct participant in the planning, Operations Division sent an officer to at least some of the meetings so as to keep OPD informed about events.37

Cut out of operational planning, OPD quickly found other missions and developed its role in strategic plans. Because of General Marshall's dominant voice in the Combined Chiefs of Staff and Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Operations Division very early came to concern itself with questions of grand strategy. Marshall had always desired the War Plans Division and its successor, Operations Division, to act as his command post and planning staff. As he became increasingly involved in fundamental strategic questions about the conduct of the war, the duties of his OPD planners changed correspondingly. Young OPD officers accompanied him to all the major Allied conferences as advisers and briefing officers, as well as preparing papers Marshall used in sessions of the CCS and JCS. By mid-1942, officers in OPD were much more concerned with larger questions of strategy than with operational planning, and were serving as the de facto Army element in the organizations of the Combined and Joint Chiefs of Staff.38

The active JCS role in Torch, once the preliminary directives had been issued, was likewise much reduced. JCS, for example, took a minor part in the planning by suggesting a cover and deception plan to divert enemy attention from the all-American Western Task Force. To camouflage the purpose of its sailing, JCS proposed an operation with the clever name of Sweater to "cover" the departure of the task force from the United States by designating it a maneuver in the West Indies.39

As things turned out, the issue of actual command, so important in prewar debates about joint operations, received little discussion. The Combined Chiefs of Staff directive specified that Eisenhower, as Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Force, would command all Torch forces under the principle

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of unity of command. Within the Western Task Force, the only purely US force employed in Torch, the same command principle applied. Admiral Hewitt, commanding the Western Naval Task Force, exercised command of the entire Western Task Force until General Patton established his headquarters on shore, at which time all Army elements would pass to his command.\textsuperscript{40} There is no indication that anyone seriously considered conducting Torch according to the venerable principle of mutual cooperation as laid out in prewar doctrine.

The picture that finally emerges from a review of Army staff planning for Torch is one of an organization in transition. Because of changed circumstances, the War Department staff never carried out the role envisioned for it before the war. Instead, Eisenhower’s Allied headquarters did the basic operational planning, while his subordinate commands completed the detail work. Except in the Western Task Force, which was unique in being an all-American organization, and which made the attempt to plan according to the guidelines laid down by \textit{Joint Action}, Torch planning was never so much joint as it was combined. That was certainly true in London, where plans for the Central and Eastern Task Forces were framed by Allied staffs.

The key lesson of Torch for Washington-level planners in both services was an appreciation of the complexity and difficulty of joint overseas operations, particularly when those operations were also conducted in concert with an allied force. The reasons behind the decision largely to ignore the provisions of \textit{Joint Action} are therefore clear. It remains to consider the consequences of that decision.

\textbf{Conclusions}

An appreciation of the joint planning for Operation Torch, at least from the Army’s perspective, reveals that existing doctrine was inadequate and could not be used. Torch pointed out, but did not solve, problems in the joint and combined plans process. Furthermore, Torch was the first step on the long path that led to postwar JCS publications on unified action.

In the war’s first major campaign, the Army began by jettisoning understood joint doctrine. This was a portentous decision, for once the rules had been thrown out for Torch, they were likewise thrown out for all ensuing campaigns of the war. From 1942 onward, the Army conducted its joint and combined planning on an ad hoc basis, suiting procedures to the demands of the situation. This process characterized succeeding amphibious operations in the European Theater—planning was first of all combined, and then joint, because of the nature of the forces employed. By way of contrast, amphibious operations in the Pacific were for the most part a number of small-scale, ship-to-shore landings for which the Marine Corps had developed a coherent doctrine. Few were as hotly contested as the landings on the continent of Europe. The amphibious landings in Europe depended upon the

\textit{Parameters}
success of a few very large-scale landings on hostile shores, for which there was no comprehensive doctrine before World War II. The long-term impact of these developments was that both services had to consider revising their basic doctrinal concepts for joint operations as the war drew to a close.

Sensitive to the need to standardize procedures, Operations Division of the War Department General Staff began to review the question of joint operations shortly after Torch was completed. The Torch experience convinced OPD that many of the principles of *Joint Action of the Army and Navy* (1935) were wholly inadequate, and the staff enthusiastically endorsed unity of command as an operating principle. The OPD paper even speculated that the future would see the commander of a joint force vested with total authority over all of the elements of his command, much as the commander of an Army division had absolute command over all units of the various branches of service in his division.41

Army and Navy staff discussions on these issues in 1944 were inconclusive, however, with the Navy opting for a revision of *Joint Action* while the Army believed an entirely new document was needed to address the many areas of overlap that had become evident during the war. Unable to reach a conclusion satisfactory to both services, Army staff officers finally recommended that the matter be referred to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for resolution.42

The problem of joint actions was not settled during World War II, nor in the years immediately after the war. Basic questions about how to plan for joint actions and who should command joint task forces could not be solved by rewriting an obsolete publication. Eventually, upon creation of the Department of Defense in 1947, they became some of the most acrimonious issues addressed by the Newport and Key West conferences on service roles and missions.43 In the broadest terms, the imprint of Operation Torch on Army planning was in driving home the idea that the future of warfare was joint—not single-service—in nature, and in opening the debate on how best to achieve that ideal.

NOTES

1. Army war planners believed a Mediterranean operation would fritter away precious resources on an object that could not decisively affect the course of the war. For the Army appreciation of Torch and the joint planning problem, see the relevant volumes in the series *United States Army in World War II*.


4. This was the judgment of the Joint Landing Force Board in its report "Study on the Conduct of Training of Landing Forces For Joint Amphibious Operations During World War II, to Include that Conducted in the Several Theatres of Operations, with the Objective of Determining the Nature, Organization and Scale of Effort Required" (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1946), ch. 2.
and the Identification of the Major Problems Encountered” (Marine Barracks, Camp Lejeune, N.C., Formal Project No. 13-52, May, 1953), p. A-21 (copy at US Army Center of Military History). Although the Army and Navy carried out joint operations to land troops during the Civil War, as well as in the Spanish-American War, none of those landings resemble, either in scope or in immediate enemy opposition, the amphibious operations of World War II. It is in this sense that the phrase “combat amphibious operation” must be read.


6. “Joint Overseas Expeditions—Tentative,” a Joint Army-Navy Board publication dated 14 November 1929, was originally intended to be a chapter in the 1927 edition of Joint Action of the Army and Navy, but grew too large for inclusion. See Joint Board Serial 450/350, Records of the Joint Army and Navy Boards and Committees, National Archives RG 225. A new edition was published in 1933 as Joint Overseas Expeditions, a Joint Board document. This publication was incorporated as chap. 6 in Joint Action.

7. JAAN 1935, ch. 2.


9. Memorandum, Miles for the Assistant Chief of Staff, WPD, Subject: Admiral Leahy’s Letter to General Craig, 4 April 1938. File 062.2 Joint Action, Section 1-A, War Department Plans and Operations Division ABC Decimal File 1942-1948, Box 70, National Archives RG 165.

10. AR10-15, 18 August 1936, sec. I, p. 12. Memo, Colonel Ward, SGS, for the Assistant Secretary of War, 8 November 1940, copy with WPD Memo, 24 October 1936, Subject: Duties of WPD of the War Department General Staff in War. File WPD 1199-211, National Archives RG 165.

11. JAAN 1925, ch. VII, sec. E.

12. War Department General Order 19, 1923; Navy Department General Order 103, 1923.


14. The Army owned and operated troop transports, but could provide neither armed escorts for its transports nor the merchant tonnage necessary to sustain operations overseas.


17. Ibid., para. 5.1(b).


19. CCS 381. Boxes 178-180 for meetings of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, and Boxes 201-204 for meetings of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in National Archives RG 218. The undated and untiilted JCS draft directive bears the inked presidential approval “OK FDR,” and is appended as section 1 of CCS 381 (24 July 1942). In the minutes of the JCS meeting for 11 August 1942, Admiral Leahy confirmed Roosevelt’s approval of the draft. The CCS approved the “Directive for Commander in Chief, Allied Expeditionary Force” at their 38th meeting on 13 August 1942.


21. Ibid., p. 58.


23. Ibid.


26. Lucian Truscott, an early Torch planner on Eisenhower’s staff, referred to using the Gymnast plans as a point of departure. See Truscott, Command Missions, p. 57.

Parameters


33. Truscott, Command Missions, pp. 59-62. Patton and Truscott were old friends, and Patton's invitation, as reported by Truscott, was characteristic: "Damn it, Lucian, you don't want to stay on any staff job in London with a war going on. Why don't you come with me? I will give you a command."

34. Clark, Calculated Risk, p. 58.

35. OPD Executive Office Files, OPD Exec. #1, Items 7 and 9 (TORCH messages), and Exec. #10, Item 39 (Messages on TORCH), National Archives RG 165.


37. Minutes of Meetings, Army and Navy Representatives, T-Committee. Partial minutes are held in the Strategic Plans Division Records, Atlantic Section. TORCH, Dispatches, Memos, etc., Box 220, Operational Archives, Naval Historical Center.

38. The strategic focus of OPD efforts is evident in many OPD documents. The role for the OPD is also evident in the memoirs and interviews of key members of the WDGS. See, for example, Albert C. Wedemeyer, Wedemeyer Reports! (New York: Henry Holt, 1958); Conversations Between General Thomas T. Handy and Lieutenant Colonel Edward M. Knoff, Jr. (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: US Army Military History Research Collection [now US Army Military History Institute], Senior Officer Debriefing Program, 1976); and Conversations Between General John E. Hull and Lieutenant Colonel James M. Wurm (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: US Army Military History Research Collection Senior Officer Debriefing Program, 1973).


42. There is an extensive discussion of this issue in the Joint Action of the Army and Navy files of the OPD Strategy and Policy Group files (OPD ABC), National Archives RG 165.