Checking the Doctrinal Map: 
Can We Get There from Here 
with FM 100-5?

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As lieutenants we encountered the delicate protocol of “checking the map.” Rule #2 was “Thou shalt check the map” . . . because Rule #1 was “Thou shalt not get lost.” At the same time, we soon learned that too much study of the map—particularly if accompanied by anxious muttering—could cause considerable restlessness in the ranks. And few can forget that wonderful flash of insight when the platoon sergeant said: “Please don’t make it obvious you’re carrying the map, Lieutenant—it makes me nervous standing next to you.”

With these concerns in our collective consciousness, some may feel that it is not quite time to scrutinize our primary doctrinal map—FM 100-5. After all, it was only signed out in June of ’93! Give our new doctrine some time! As Colonel (Ret.) Rick Swain once pointed out: “Before a war, doctrine is hypothesis, not subject to proof until applied under hostilities.”

That said, can we possibly assess the 1993 doctrine in this period of peace? We can and we must, for we are already “under hostilities” in a chaotic era of peace, war, and operations other than war, phenomena that the 1993 FM 100-5 resolutely attempts to address. FM 100-5 has been “subject to proof” for over a year—how’s it doing? That’s a tough question, but we are a tough, doctrine-based Army. Furthermore, our doctrine demands high standards. Does it remain “adaptable enough to address diverse and varied situations worldwide?” Has it proved to be “solid enough to weather the winds of turmoil and, at the same time, sufficiently dynamic to capture the relevant aspects of change”? Is this doctrinal map going to guide us through the post-Cold War era? Can we get there from here?

A Quick Glance at the Terrain

Before any map check, a quick glance at the terrain is in order. How would we characterize the Army’s strategic environment since June of 1993?
In places like Somalia, Rwanda, and Haiti we have faced complex, sometimes unprecedented challenges in the "operations other than war" identified by FM 100-5. In Korea, the more familiar, and more dangerous, potential for a high-intensity conflict has driven proportionately high levels of planning and preparation. And our rapid return of forces to Kuwait in 1994 demonstrated the need for— and efficacy of— no-notice, strategic power projection.

Throughout this period, a contentious national debate on foreign policy has increased in volume. The proper role for military force dominates public discussion, to the point that the Secretary of Defense has stated, "When and how to use American military force is one of the most difficult questions facing a president today." The long certitude of the Cold War and the temporary focus of Desert Storm have given way to national confusion on the use of military force.

The future, meanwhile, is two years closer, and to many the future looks increasingly grim. Samuel P. Huntington has postulated that the central aspect of global politics will be a "Clash of Civilizations," a new phase of history in which culture, rather than ideology or economics, will drive human conflict. Robert Kaplan projects no civilization at all, but rather "The Coming Anarchy," in which criminal anarchy will emerge as the dominant strategic danger. Martin van Creveld and Major Ralph Peters envision "The Transformation of War" and "The New Warrior Class," in which warrior societies transpose fighting from a means to an end. These are differing views of the future, to be sure, but with one common, disturbing thread: chaos.

Here at home, the Army—like the rest of the Defense establishment—is on the institutional defense, as budgets shrink and the joint services warily eye each other's roles and missions. Eschewing a passive posture, in the past several months the Army has promulgated a proactive self-vision: a digitized, modern force on the cutting edge of information warfare.

So: information, chaos, confusion, and conflict—does FM 100-5 help us deal with them?

The Doctrinal Map

First, the good news: the new FM 100-5 effectively presents the major post-Cold War terrain features of force projection, coalition operations, and operations other than war. The events of the last year have already proved the
legitimacy of the increased focus on these topics. Furthermore, FM 100-5 reinforces traditional Army doctrinal strengths such as the emphasis on leadership and human factors, the Army’s ties to the citizenry and their values, and a clear commitment to joint teamwork. New doctrinal facets such as battlespace and conflict termination are holding up well under scrutiny. In general, the anticipation, focus, and timely emergence of this doctrine is an extraordinary institutional achievement. We can and should take great satisfaction in getting it about 90-percent right, but our particular interest in this doctrinal map check is in the 10 percent that may require correction.

Doctrine and National Strategy

The attempt in FM 100-5 to link our doctrine to the National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy is excellent in principle, but problematic in execution. When we invoked the pursuit of national interests throughout FM 100-5, we probably assumed those interests would be enumerated in the National Security Strategy (NSS). Actually, only the sixth, most recent draft of the Clinton Administration’s NSS enumerated national interests. But even during those extended periods when national interests aren’t specified, they still exist, and our doctrine is correct to remind us of our purpose “to preserve, to protect, and to defend the vital interests of the United States.”

The National Military Strategy (NMS), of course, reflects the National Security Strategy. The NMS no longer includes the “four fundamental demands” cited in the June 1993 FM 100-5, nor does it embody the eight “strategic principles to guide the employment of military forces.” In retrospect, then, the concept of linking our keystone doctrine to the national strategy documents is problematic. It will always be so, because in linking doctrinal guidance to institutions outside Army purview, we are not masters of our own future. Such linkage is important, and we should continue to seek it. But we should be sparing in our specificity, refusing to cite certainties that do not exist.

The Theory of Organization

Clearly, we are an Army that treasures adaptability. We chant the mantra of the continuous challenge of change, and we have added versatility as a tenet of Army operations. Paradoxically, we suffer an institutional blind spot in our vision of adaptability. That blind spot is organization—more specifically, reorganization. For all practical purposes, we simply don’t do it.

You doubt this? Have you ever initiated and implemented an MTOE revision in the same unit tour? Have you noticed that, except for the aberration of the Pentomic experiment, we have not substantively reorganized the US Army division since World War II? What about the motorized division? As the “odd duck” it was the first victim of downsizing. What about the light divisions? They are poorly conceived and under no small amount of institutional pressure. We digitize tanks. We slash force structure. We revise our doctrine. But we do not reorganize. Of course we endure plenty of change. But
these changes are driven by incremental resource cuts and equipment modern-
ization, rarely by a fundamental reappraisal and reorganization. Reorganiza-
tion is viewed as a consequence, not a technique. It’s a problem that extends
beyond the Army. In our current concerns to preserve DOD readiness while
undergoing a massive downsizing, we are willing to attack cross-service
effects and the daunting complexities of joint readiness measurement, but
Congress will ultimately drag us to the table of reorganization.

Although we plan to start another brigade experiment in 1995, expec-
tations for widespread organizational change are not high. Any focus on
fundamentally new organizational concepts will compete with the lure of new
gadgetry. We’ll read a lot about real-time information but not much about real
reorganization. TRADOC PAM 525-5 has already concluded that “we must
organize around the division as the major tactical formation.”

Our institutional failure with respect to organization is founded on
document—or a lack thereof. FM 100-5 does not substantively address it. Our
failure to understand this fundamental mechanism of adaptation could cost us.
In their book Military Misfortunes—The Anatomy of Failure in War, for
example, authors Eliot Cohen and John Gooch examined the initial failures of
the American Navy’s World War II campaign against Germany’s U-boats.
There were several contributory causes—the delayed establishment of a
coastal blackout, inadequate anti-submarine weapons, failure to establish a
convoy system, and disputes over land-based aviation assets. But these prob-
lems do not fully explain our dismal initial performance compared with our
British counterparts. According to Cohen and Gooch:

The answer seems to lie in how the United States Navy defined learning,
particularly in the context of preparation for war. In a nutshell, the navy’s
leadership defined its problem as that of acquiring technical information, not
assimilating new forms of organization.

Prewar coordination with our future British allies focused on techni-
cal concerns, not organizational matters. We saw readiness in terms of tech-
nology, overlooking British organizational approaches that ultimately turned
the tide: single proponenty for fused intelligence, unit allocation, and the
development of anti-submarine techniques.

Our new FM 100-5 surveys organization, but the treatment is far from
complete. We talk about balance and the synergistic effects of combined
arms. We address tailoring as a fundamental consideration of force projec-
tion, and we outline various options for organizing theater structure. What’s
missing is a simple treatment of the fundamental principles involved in these
decisions about organization. What are the tradeoffs between the efficiencies
of centralization and the flexibility of decentralization? When do we maintain
unit integrity in lieu of the ad hoc combination of diverse capabilities? Do the
control, training, and support efficiencies of pure MTOE units outweigh the

40 Parameters
advantages of combined arms synergy and balance? We need a few conceptual guideposts for these questions. Every junior officer should not have to discover the answers the hard way.

The Center of Gravity

How long will the Army play with the center of gravity? Or is it the other way around? Confusing lieutenants with center-of-gravity conversations has become something of an Army tradition. One could in fact make an argument that there is still utility in this Clausewitzian theoretical construct that encourages commanders and staff to identify sources of strength. But we would be well served to remember Jacob Bronowski’s caution on theory:

Every theory, however majestic, has hidden assumptions which are open to challenge and, indeed, in time will make it necessary to replace it . . . Every theory is based in some analogy, and sooner or later the theory fails because the analogy turns out to be false. A theory in its day helps to solve the problems of the day."

What should concern us is that the center of gravity is an analogy of Newtonian physics. We live in an age of quantum mechanics. Although the concept was spawned in an age of Napoleonic warfare characterized by mass and the single decisive battle, we have carried it forward into a period in which the available means of combat have relentlessly expanded in scope, diversity, power, and complexity. In today’s world, the analogy is stretched considerably: we entertain multiple centers of gravity, and mutable centers of gravity. Newton wouldn’t get it.

We may not be able to carry the center of gravity much longer. As we look forward to an age of information warfare, many are declaring the death of mass and a new analogy: the network.20 If war will be characterized by simultaneous operations, redundant processes, extraordinary situational awareness, and a reduced efficacy of hierarchical organizations, then it may be less important to encourage planners to look for “the hub of all power and movement.” The Army’s fascination with the center of gravity is out of balance.

Where We are Lost

Clausewitz wrote that “the first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgement that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish . . . the kind of war on which they are embarking.”21 FM 100-5 set out to address the kinds of war by defining a range of military operations (war and operations other than war) across three diverse strategic environments: war, conflict, and peace (see Figure 2-1 from FM 100-5, replicated on the following page). If it is indeed “the most far-reaching act of judgement” to understand strategic environments, goals, and the range of military operations, then this was a worthy enterprise. But we have lost our bearings.
Strategic Environment

Our mistake was to cling to the paradigm of "strategic environment" as a principal guideline for operations. It served us well, until about 1940. Since the close of World War II, however, the strategic environment has not been a useful criterion to guide operations. FM 100-5’s Figure 2-1 would have us believe otherwise: Got a war on your hands? See Chapters 3 through 12. Is an operation other than war your current problem? Proceed to Chapter 13. In reality, however, strategic goals of “fighting” and “winning” are not restricted to war. And we “deter war” and “resolve conflict” in all strategic environments, from war to peace.

The classification of conflict as a strategic environment distinct from war or peacetime is especially problematic. After the tentative declaration that conflict is “characterized by hostilities to secure strategic objectives,” the caveats can’t come fast enough. The subtext in Figure 2-1 cautions that “the states of peacetime, conflict, and war could all exist at once in the theater commander's strategic environment." That's certainly true, but it also calls into question the utility of this matrix organization of warfare. Worse still are the contradictions. Is conflict really a strategic environment distinct from war or peace? Wasn't World War II a conflict? Is the non-peacetime, non-war

<table>
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<th>STATES OF THE ENVIRONMENT</th>
<th>GOAL</th>
<th>MILITARY OPERATIONS</th>
<th>EXAMPLES</th>
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| WAR                       | Fight and Win | COMBAT | • Large-scale combat operations...
|                           |       | NONCOMBAT          | • Attack
                           |       |                   | • Defend |
| CONFLICT                  | Deter War and Resolve Conflict | OTHER THAN WAR | • Strikes and raids
                           |       |                   | • Peace enforcement
                           |       |                   | • Support to Insurgency
                           |       |                   | • Antiterrorism
                           |       |                   | • Peacekeeping
                           |       |                   | • NEO |
| PEACETIME                 | Promote Peace | OTHER THAN WAR | • Counterdrug
                           |       |                   | • Disaster relief
                           |       |                   | • Civil support
                           |       |                   | • Peace building
                           |       |                   | • Nation assistance |

The states of peacetime, conflict, and war could all exist at once in the theater commander's strategic environment. He can respond to requirements with a wide range of military operations. Noncombat operations might occur during war, just as some operations other than war might require combat.

Figure 2-1, FM 100-5.

Range of Military Operations in the Theater Strategic Environment.
“conflict” of Chapter 2 the same “conflict” we seek to end in Chapter 6 when we address conflict termination? Our FM 100-5 treatment of conflict is counter-semantic, counter-intuitive, and counter-productive.

Our doctrine has a problem with conflict. Does it matter much? Unfortunately, it matters completely. National confusion about conflict is at the heart of today’s discourse on the role of military force. FM 100-5 contributes little to the debate, even though it aims from the outset to “address the strategic context of the application of force.”

This was new ground for FM 100-5, and we should not judge ourselves too harshly if our first steps faltered. Conflict is a term loosely understood and even more loosely employed. Is conflict war? Is conflict an operation other than war? Is conflict peace? Conflict is all of those, but it is also terrain where military thinkers have posted few conceptual guideposts. There are theories of conflict, to be sure, but most examine narrow slices of the whole: game theory or academic advocacy of non-military solutions as force alternatives, rather than reinforcing means. We need a modern-day Clausewitz to extend On War to On Conflict, to remind us, as in the opening lines of the 19th-century text, that “in conflict more than in any other subject we must begin by looking at the nature of the whole.”

Concepts of Conflict

We need some mental constructs to support our thinking through these situations called conflict. Former CINCPAC Admiral Charles Larson, for example, recently offered three observations on conflict:

• Ideas are the basis of conflict.
• There are two components to conflict resolution, logic and violence.
• These components of conflict resolution are totally interdependent.

As Larson admitted, these are simple observations. But they offer utility—perhaps more utility than a definition of strategic environment—in describing “how to think” about the use of military force in the post-Cold War era. Ideas are the common currency of conflict—from sublime ideas such as “democracy and the rule of law,” to the less inspiring notions such as “General Aideed is the rightful controller of the Port of Mogadishu.” After the exceptional clarity of the great ideological Cold War struggle, our policymakers face regional conflicts where the ideas in contest are correspondingly regional and generally unfamiliar to us. Is Aristide the legitimate ruler of Haiti? Do the Bosnian Serbs rightfully control the town of Brcko? Americans have few clues about these ideas, and—yes—that matters a lot. The American people are motivated by ideas, not by academic notions of realpolitik. They go to war for ideas, not for power. Intuitively, the Army understands this. We swear allegiance to a set of ideas. FM 100-5 explains “The American View of War,” pointing out, “The Army reflects the highest ideals
of the nation it represents”31 and “The Army serves as a repository of its national values . . . [so that] proper subordination to political authority . . . respect for human dignity, and a sense of justice are all part of the Army’s identity.”32 Just as these ideas motivate us, other ideas motivate future opponents. Our doctrine should instruct that a fundamental conflict consideration of the operational planner is to understand the ideas in competition, and the linkage of those ideas to American ideas, values, and interests.

There is further utility in outlining the dual mechanism of logic and violence in conflict resolution, as well as their total interdependence. The most common error of today’s foreign policy debate is to view military violence and actions of logic—such as economic incentives or diplomatic engagement—as independent alternatives, rather than reinforcing actions. Military violence and nonviolent actions of logic are complementary means for influencing ideas. Military force is not relegated to violence alone; it encompasses a synergy produced by logic and violence. If necessary, that synergy is most effective when the certain, overwhelming potential of our military capability imposes an irrefutable logic upon our opponent, whereby he acquiesces to our demands. In operations other than war, where most of our actions are designed to assist, persuade, and influence, the logical component of military force is predominant.

Of all the services, the Army has the greatest stake in a better doctrinal description of conflict. Only the Army has the capacity for the sustained, decisive application of violence. Only the Army has the means for the long-term establishment of conditions whereby a favorable logic can be brought to bear in operations other than war. Only the Army wins on the ground—where ideas compete and conflict is resolved.

Deterrence, Compellence, Reassurance

If we are looking for conceptual context for the fundamentals of Army operations, then we could usefully examine Michael Howard’s three functions of military power: deterrence, compellence, and reassurance.33 FM 100-5 is no stranger to deterrence, maintaining that “this doctrine recognizes the primary purpose of the Army is deterrence.”34 Although FM 100-5 does not use the actual term compellence—the use of armed force to make people do things—our meaning is clear when we state that “the Army’s purpose is to win the nation’s wars by fighting as part of a joint force of the United States.”35 Howard’s third function of military power—reassurance—bears the closest scrutiny, because it lends an important dimension to our institutional investment in operations other than war: purpose.

Howard believes that reassurance may exceed either deterrence or compellence in effective preservation of global stability. Reassurance provides a general sense of security that is not specific to threat or scenario. Engagements such as humanitarian and nation-building programs, security and training assistance, and emergency disaster relief continuously and effectively
communicate US ideas, interests, and commitments. Because all nations share an innate need for security, military assistance and contacts provide an excellent starting point for reassurance.

We can recognize reassurance as the purpose of operations other than war, but that purpose is not clearly articulated in Chapter 13 (Operations Other Than War) of FM 100-5. By offering the old paradigm of an “operational environment” and a laundry list of military activities, we were bound to miss something. We missed forward presence—an important claimant on resources and a source of constant concern to the forward CINC’s and our allies. We missed engagement—the principal concept of our draft strategy documents. We missed regional access—a litmus test of progress in reassurance. And we missed military to military contacts and their concomitant reassurance benefits. These are real-life, daily concerns of the United States Army and the Unified CINC’s. They merit a voice in doctrine.

Who Owns This Map?

Having noted some potential improvements to some of the broader concepts in our doctrinal map, it is fair to ask: Is this our job? Why should Army doctrine address a topic of grand strategy? Are we out of our area of expertise? Perhaps, but we will hear no objections from our left or our right. The National Security Council does not write doctrine. Joint doctrine still takes its lead from the Army, the institution that has spearheaded the renaissance of doctrine. We are far ahead of our sister services in institutional understanding and commitment to a keystone doctrinal document. If not us—who? If not FM 100-5—where?

Getting There from Here

Can we get there from here? Only one serious obstacle looms: our doctrinal success to date. The Army has seen so much doctrinal progress that too many of us may truly believe we are already at the “end of history”—at least with respect to doctrine. But we need to do more with our doctrine than be proud of it. Colonel Swain has observed that by the mid-1980s, Army interest in doctrine and theory had peaked, and:

... further doctrinal change would be on the margin and be thoroughly bureaucratized. That notwithstanding, the whole world context would change within five years with the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the possibilities of a military-technical revolution displayed for all to see in the Gulf War of 1990-91.

I have suggested that our doctrine is 90 percent right. But that is not to suggest that only a ten-percent effort will correct the outstanding problems. We have an institutional commitment to continual doctrinal refinement, and we have extraordinary talent in place at Fort Monroe and Fort Leavenworth. We can get there from here. But we will need to revive the vigorous internal
institutional discussions that characterized the efforts of earlier doctrinal development. If we do that, getting there will be half the fun.

NOTES
7. Ibid.
15. Ibid., pp. 79-94.
16. PM 100-5, pp. 2-2, 2-3.
17. Ibid., p. 3-4.
18. Ibid., p. 4-5.
22. PM 100-5, p. 2-0.
23. Ibid., p. 2-1.
24. Another example is the listing of “strikes and raids” as a type of military activity appropriate to the conflict environment in Figure 2-1. But in Chapter 13 we are reminded that raids also occur in war.
25. PM 100-5, p. 6-23.
26. Ibid., p. v.
27. Clausewitz, On War, “I shall proceed from the simple to the complex. But in war more than in any other subject we must begin by looking at the nature of the whole; for here more than elsewhere the part and the whole must always be thought of together” (p. 75).
29. FM 100-5, p. iv.
34. FM 100-5, p. vi.
35. Ibid., p. vi.
36. Chapter 13 of FM 100-5 is another example of where our instincts to first define an operational “environment” led us to overlook opportunities to incorporate purpose in our doctrine.