with the ease of navigation, tailored results, and constant updates provided on the World Wide Web. For Schreier’s book, this challenge is compounded by an apparent disinterest in scoping the text to target a specific audience. This is demonstrated in his section on “Major Treaties,” which provides a paragraph on each treaty’s implementation requirements. These descriptions assume background knowledge so they are not aimed at the neophyte, but as single paragraphs they cannot provide value added to the professional either. Many of Scheier’s descriptions contain detail that can be easily assimilated and retained, but not enough to be useful to policy-makers tasked with developing specific countermeasures. This begs the question, who is going to read this book?

To address the WMD thread that Scheier so ably identifies, the arms control community needs more than a catalogue of disparate initiatives. It needs a strategy. It needs a theory that proposes how to use the jumbled array of national and international capabilities, authorities, and cooperative mechanisms in concert to achieve specific objectives. Good strategy starts with basic questions: what inputs (e.g., technical knowledge, materials, infrastructure) are needed to create WMD; where are these components located (e.g., universities, mineral deposits, industrial sites); and what is the process (e.g., extraction, transportation, refining, assembly, testing, deployment) by which each weapon is created from its components. Once these questions are answered, it is then possible to identify chokepoints in the process of weapons creation and transfer and consider means of exploiting them. Fitting the alphabet soup of counterproliferation initiatives (PSO [Proliferation Security Initiative], CTR [Cooperative Threat Reduction]) and nonproliferation regimes (NSG [Nuclear Suppliers Group], AG [Australia Group]) into such framework would be an immensely helpful start.

Such a strategy would also recognize that while WMD proliferation is catalyzed by technological and economic developments, it is fundamentally a political phenomenon. Controlling the creation and transfer of strategic material is an imperative as old as human conflict. Today what we call “targeted international sanctions” and “export control regimes” in an earlier age was known as blockades and siege warfare. The threat from WMD may be unprecedented, but the mission of preventing adversaries from acquiring strategic resources is not. This is not a goal like eradicating AIDS or ending global warming that can unite humanity. There will be losers if the spread of WMD can be halted. The strategies for convincing, or compelling, states to accept such a loss require a knowledge of politics and diplomacy, not physics and technicalities.


Continuing from Volume 1 of his Stalingrad trilogy, David Glantz’s Armageddon in Stalingrad is concerned primarily with the fighting for the city itself prior to the start of the Soviet counteroffensive leading up to the encirclement of the German Sixth Army and elements of the Fourth Panzer Army. After an introductory chapter outlining events prior to September 1942 and introducing key personalities, the authors move between the fighting in various parts of the city from the German
arrival in force, up until the start of the Soviet counteroffensive, Operation Uranus, on 19 November 1942. An additional chapter considers the events on the “flanks” of the Stalingrad battle. The author then finishes with a rather brief but sound conclusion.

Those unfamiliar with David Glantz’s work should not be misled by the blurb for this tome; while it is fair to write that Armageddon in Stalingrad “supersedes all previous accounts” in its detail and source base, it is certainly not “written with the narrative force of a great war novel.” What this volume provides is an operational narrative of the fighting that for many will probably serve as a reference work rather than a bedtime perusal.

As with other examples of Glantz’s work, the new book’s strength is in his meticulous reconstruction of events at the operational level. Certainly, the narrative and the operational conclusions drawn in this second volume, as in the first, are sustained by a wealth of Soviet and German primary sources. Additionally, there are some “new” Soviet archival sources, particularly combat journals of Soviet units and organizations. For western scholars in particular, gaining access to materials from the Russian Central Archive of the Ministry of Defense is challenging, and these materials add a significant amount of valuable detail. The author’s work also reflects what can be achieved through the meticulously piecing together of events from the Russian perspective, using the vast array of published Russian-language documents along with Soviet and post-Soviet secondary literature.

It is apparent from the wealth of material presented that during the battle for Stalingrad the Red Army engaged in an urban war of attrition that neutralized superior German operational effectiveness. Published Soviet documents suggest that by late 1941 Soviet military leaders were well aware that fighting in urban areas offered an ideal opportunity to engage German forces in an environment that minimized German strengths in such areas as command and control while offsetting their utilization of mechanized forces. At horrendous cost, the Red Army was able to gradually counter Wehrmacht strength within the city. Red Army operations were so effective that by the time of the Soviet counteroffensive superior German operational effectiveness outside the city could not make up for the losses within.

A broader context for operational detail (for example political, economic, or diplomatic factors) is limited in this volume, perhaps understandably given the depth with which Glantz examines the operational military history. It might have been refreshing, however, to take a step back from the fighting at tactical level and look at the at broader picture beyond the purely military context. This reviewer could not, for example, find mention of the decision on October 9, 1942 to abolish dual command in the index (whether under “Order,” “Commissar,” or “Dual Command”), despite the interesting timing of this decision at a point when the battle for Stalingrad might have been going against the Red Army. While the distinction between the nature of command prior to and following this order should not be exaggerated, nonetheless it was certainly symbolic of Stalin’s increasing trust in the Red Army officer corps.

If there are weaknesses with the actual content of this volume they are when Glantz comments on broader issues without examining them in sufficient depth or indicating where readers might find additional information. One example in the introduction is the claim that the German army was becoming increasingly Nazified as young
replacements filled depleted units, meaning that “at the tactical level many Germans accepted the racial theories of their Fuhrer.” This situation is contrasted with the Red Army, where the average soldier “may have been less influenced by ideology compared to his Nazi counterpart,” motivated more by “loyalty to comrades and defense of the nation than their healthy fear of the oppressive Marxist dictatorship and its minions.” This assertion is made without any reference or collaborating information.

Trawling through the endnotes and noting the research that has gone into this and the previous volume, it is increasingly unlikely that in the short or medium term these works will be surmounted as the epitome of operational history regarding the fight for Stalingrad. This work will stand the test of time, making a significant contribution to the literature.


Reviewed by David L. Perry, Professor of Applied Ethics and Director of the Vann Center for Ethics, Davidson College, and author of Partly Cloudy: Ethics in War, Espionage, Covert Action, and Interrogation.

Michael Gross is a professor of political science at the University of Haifa, Israel, and the author of two previous books: Ethics and Activism: The Theory and Practice of Political Morality and Bioethics and Armed Conflict: Moral Dilemmas of Medicine and War. Recalling my largely positive assessment of the latter work, I held high hopes for Moral Dilemmas of Modern War.

This book addresses several intriguing and potentially fruitful ethical topics in contemporary armed conflicts, including challenges to traditional principles of noncombatant immunity and the moral equality of combatants, as well as issues surrounding targeted killing, torture, and humanitarian intervention. There are a number of interesting details about Israel’s recent wars in Lebanon and Gaza, and about debates within Israel about the ethics of its military tactics. This reviewer also found the author’s examination of legally prohibited and “nonlethal” weapons in chapters three and four to be informative. The sources cited in the book’s endnotes are rich and varied.

Unfortunately, significant portions of Moral Dilemmas of Modern War contain rambling and repetitive arguments, along with confusing statements. Gross frequently exhibits a lack of care in defining and applying key terms and concepts, and makes claims that are misleading or overly ambiguous in an ethical and legal sense.

Although the author notes on pages 13-14 that the term “asymmetric war” can have distinctly different connotations (he mentions material, legal, and moral), he uses that term in the remainder of the book without ever indicating which meaning is intended.

Gross also tends to categorize conventional wars as symmetric, and humanitarian military interventions as asymmetric, but neither assumption is necessarily true or historically accurate. For example, some conventional wars have been materially and morally asymmetric, while humanitarian interventions can be materially symmetric. Too often in this book (as in far too many recent military books and articles) the