for a discussion of specific changes needed. The chapter is thin on specifics, however, beyond suggesting that the State Department is inadequate for the task of governance and the Army should be made to train and organize for the task.

Instead of detailing how the US Army could improve its performance, the author devotes much space to characterizing offensive war and distinguishing it from defensive war. According to Melton, offensive wars have an end-state different from defensive war, with the first goal to create a permanent ally, then provide for popular government, and then to reform the society along American lines. While developing precise terminology can be a useful exercise, in this case the author undermines his effort by making inconsistent assertions that virtually shift his thesis later in the book. Thus, while the first six chapters seem to recognize the need for offensive war and military occupation which requires the previously noted changes in the US Army, later chapters highlight why such wars are not feasible. For example, Melton devotes a chapter to a discussion of why some obvious rivals to the United States, such as Iran, are not feasible candidates for offensive war and occupation. He also spends one chapter explaining why offensive wars of occupation run against the grain of US tradition and political culture. Finally, he makes statements about offensive wars that are inconsistent and incompatible. After establishing the need for offensive war and postwar military governance Melton then observes, “Rather, it is our offensive military doctrine that has failed us. We simply cannot, as we once could, manage to impose new governance on nations far weaker than us.”

A second problem with the book is that the author was too ambitious in his attempt to cover so many subjects and so much material that both he and the reader lose the thread of his initial thesis. In fact, his over ambition to include everything may also account for the fact that his thesis seems to shift throughout the book. Related to this problem is the fact that he uses empirical support from cases that do not provide evidence to support his thesis. For example, in Chapter Three, which carries as its title “American Military Legacy through World War II: Case Studies in Successful Offensive War,” Melton includes a discussion of England’s offensive failure in the American Revolution and goes on to note that from the standpoint of the United States the war was defensive. Given the chapter title, the reader is left wondering why the case was included at all. Similarly, an entire chapter is devoted to the Balkan Wars without clearly linking that case to the book’s initial thesis. The reader comes away thinking that empirical support is added more to demonstrate the author’s knowledge of cases than to provide evidence to support any thesis.

Finally, because the book is deeply flawed, it reads more as a series of independent essays rather than a coherent whole. The shifting thesis and problematic use of cases are part of the problem. It seems as though the author started out with his idea about the inadequacy of the Army as indicated by events in Iraq and Afghanistan, then as he proceeded to write came to the conclusion that such missions are not feasible to begin with. At one point Melton actually says that efforts to govern Afghanistan are foolhardy. In short, the book reads as a harsh critique of the Army, yet given all the disconnects in Melton’s analysis, one wonders why the US Army would seriously consider reform of its doctrine, force structure, or training to prepare for missions that the author asserts to be undoable.
caricature, but none to Major General Orvil Anderson, who as Commandant of the Air War College in these years had regularly been giving and sponsoring lectures on the option of a preventive war. One also finds no reference to Winston Churchill’s several speeches suggesting such action while the monopoly was in place. On a not-so-trivial factual point, the author states that the Soviet nuclear detonation detected in 1949 used up the only Soviet atomic bomb, but this claim contradicts some other accounts of the process, which state that Stalin felt he needed to have at least one other bomb in reserve, in case he were confronted with an American ultimatum following the test.

To repeat, the historical and factual account of the Soviet nuclear program in this book is very rich in interesting detail and well presented, as is the American effort to assay this program, and the steps taken to detect any progress it was making. The book offers evidence for both sides of the debate on whether the surprisingly rapid Soviet acquisition of the bomb was due to Russian ingenuity or espionage. The Smyth Report, which many today would characterize as having told the world a bit too much about the way American nuclear weapons had been produced, is interestingly discussed, along with the debates at the time regarding the likely availability around the globe of uranium, the crucial ingredient for such weapons.

For anyone advocating a move to “global zero” in nuclear weapons today, the account of mutual suspicion and conflicting national ambitions presented in *Red Cloud at Dawn* would indeed be a very cautionary tale.


Stephen L. Melton in *The Clausewitz Delusion* offers a useful reminder that although knowledge of history is essential for military professionals, that knowledge must be broad and comprehensive rather than selective. Thus, Mr. Melton argues that the US Army failed in Iraq and Afghanistan because it drew from its Cold War experience a defensive mentality while forgetting its World War II experience concerning the character of offensive wars and the need for military governance in their aftermath. As a consequence of its narrowly historical focus, the Army did not have the doctrine, force structure, or training programs necessary to execute an offensive war with its associated mission of military governance. From this promising starting point the remainder of the book is disappointing for several reasons.

First, from the introduction the reader expects that because the author has identified critical shortcomings of the Army in terms of doctrine, force structure, and training, the rest of the book will provide an elaboration of what these elements should look like to prosecute an offensive war successfully. Yet nowhere in the book is such a blueprint provided. Rather, the author makes general criticisms suggesting, for instance, that the Army is too tradition bound and backward looking. Contradictorily, he also chastises the Army for abandoning the pragmatism and engineering approaches that characterized it during the Progressive Era and World War II. How can an institution simultaneously be backward looking and abandon earlier approaches? To be sure, Chapter 10, “Organizing for Military Governance,” seems to be an appropriate place