security. Governments may choose interdiction or licensing as policy options that do not play into the hands of the insurgents. But the success of these approaches occurred in unique cases in unique times. If the FARC were defeated, it is unclear how the licensing of cocaine production, on such a scale that could be as profitable as it is for farmers now, would not spark a popular uprising that may lead to the generation of another insurgency. A “coca rebellion” might quickly ensue.

The novel use of the political capital model is a valuable contribution, but it becomes strained as the book unfolds. Each case study appears self-contained, although the conflicts themselves are not. Political capital is also gained, much like contemporary financial capital, through substantial transnational linkages. Broader global patterns of drug trafficking and war are increasingly interrelated and dialectic in many cases, including those covered in this book. For example, cocaine produced by the FARC transits a number of unstable West African countries on its way to the burgeoning European market; this trade path demonstrates the multicontinental dimensions of crime and insurgency. Peace in Colombia may well rest with state strength in nations such as Guinea-Bissau and Sierra Leone, while stability in the West African region may depend on successful counterdrug policies in the Andes. None of this substantially detracts from a book that will be of great benefit to scholars, policy-makers, and military officers who routinely confront the paradox of illicit drug trafficking and intrastate conflict.


In Allies Against the Rising Sun, Nicholas Sarantakes fills a major gap in the study of the Pacific theater in World War II with a presentation of British and Commonwealth actions in the war. Most Pacific War studies concentrate on the American or Japanese perspective. Authors tend to forget that British and Commonwealth forces fought in the theater, too. British forces were engaged in Burma, Malaysia, Hong Kong, and Singapore, but not with their American allies in the Southwest and Central Pacific.

Little is written about the period before the end of the war that involved British and Commonwealth actions. By this point in the conflict American military forces had advanced throughout the Pacific in the final effort and were on Japan’s doorstep. They had conducted major actions to defeat Tokyo. By 1945, Britain and the Commonwealth nations had expended their military manpower and wealth through heavy engagements in Europe and the Mediterranean. A question that has challenged historians is why did London agree to participate in an invasion of Japan during the closing days of the war? Was the rationale based on helping an ally, satisfying a previous agreement, or post-war considerations? Britain also pressed Australia, New Zealand, and Canada to consider and eventually agree to play a role in these operations. One needs to remember that all these nations were facing demands at home to demobilize their armed forces and return to peace. Although the United States appeared to have reached its limit on providing additional forces, a number of military and civilian leaders believed that it was not necessary to seek help from Britain in the final push to conquer Japan. Many felt that
American military forces were capable of executing operations to end the war without their British allies.

Sarantakes provides a comprehensive review of the rational arguments, issues, and decisions that incorporated the British and Commonwealth nations in the final phases of the war. These plans include naval forces, bombing of the Japanese mainland, and the invasion of Honshu. The author provides an interesting discussion of the friction between Prime Minister Winston Churchill and his Chiefs of Staff (COS) related to proposed British strategy to end the war. Churchill supported opening a front capable of moving north from Sunatra with the goal of liberating Singapore. His COS recommended integrating British forces with the Americans in an effort to end the conflict faster. The author provides rich insight into the motivations and concerns of each. For example, Churchill’s COS became so frustrated with the Prime Minister’s arguments that he considered resigning in protest.

The Commonwealth nation’s position and outlook also differed from London’s rationale to enter the war’s closing stages. Instead of trying to regain colonies, as Churchill desired, these nations planned individual courses of action based on their physical location in the Pacific. The motivating factor being the belief that any nation not taking part in Japan’s defeat would have a difficult time securing a role in any decisions regarding the post-war settlement of the region. Australia was already supporting efforts in the Southwest Pacific under General Douglas MacArthur. New Zealand was also extremely concerned about its future security in the Pacific even though many Kiwis had served in the Mediterranean, North Africa, and Italy. Canadians also viewed themselves as a Pacific power. Ottawa desired to maintain good relations with its neighbor, the United States.

Presidents Franklin Roosevelt and later Harry Truman were agreeable to British and Commonwealth forces entering into efforts to end the war with Japan. The American Joint Chiefs of Staff, however, were not united in supporting such a plan. Concerns regarding logistics, basing, doctrine, and operational matters influenced any agreement on how to use these forces. Admiral Ernest King, Chief of Naval Operations, continually tried to derail the efforts. His actions make interesting reading with respect to organizational and personal arguments against such a strategy.

Still, the British and Commonwealth forces did participate in the closing months of the Pacific War. The British Fleet participated in the Okinawa campaign and suffered significant causalities from kamikaze attacks. The atomic bomb made the Commonwealth Corps’s planned amphibious invasion of the mainland of Japan obsolete. Similarly, the Royal Air Force and other Commonwealth air forces arrived too late to provide any significant bombing attacks.

Overall, the book is well worth reading. It provides a clear portrait of a little known part of World War II history that is seldom discussed. Sarantakes’s account also illustrates how politics, personal agendas, and alliances can be incorporated in an effort to develop a culminating strategy. This book has many fascinating insights and anecdotes related to key personalities. Numerous lessons from this period are applicable to today’s strategic environments, especially those concerning the development of strategy. Fortunately, through the authors superb recounting of events, these lessons come alive for the reader.