Normandy hedgerows suggest that war, not just irregular war, requires all armies to adapt to their enemy and surroundings. Finally, Moyar’s thinly veiled backing of an aggressively interventionist foreign policy smacks of hubris. Throughout this work, third-world leaders fighting insurgencies are portrayed as inept and diffident administrators who only need American tutelage to be successful counterinsurgents. Moyar concedes at the end, though, that such “advice rarely sank in.”

*A Question of Command* is intended to assist counterinsurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan and, on the whole, it should be read, but with a careful eye. Moyar is surely correct that multifaceted wars require flexibility and creativity from military and civilian leaders. If readers can navigate through this work’s more specious supporting arguments, there is much to consider in developing leaders comfortable with the complexities of modern war.

**America’s Army: Making the All-Volunteer Force**

by Beth L. Bailey

Reviewed by Dr. Aaron O’Connell, Assistant Professor of History, US Naval Academy.

Beth Bailey has written a marvelous book about an important topic. Her exploration of the Army’s transition from selective service to an all-volunteer force is well-researched, persuasively argued, and clearly written in an easy style that is too often missing from both military and cultural history. From the draft protests of the 1960s to the current wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, America’s Army narrates how the nation’s largest armed service survived the tumultuous 1970s, rebounded in the 1980s, and fashioned a winning formula for public acceptance and support. While scholars have already given some treatment to how the Army moved to an all-volunteer force, this book situates the transition in the broader social context, using the debates over the Army’s future as a lens into American race relations, gender relations, and the role of social science research and the ideology of the market in military affairs.

Bailey begins in the Vietnam-soaked political landscape of the 1968 presidential campaign when candidate Richard Nixon first proposed abolishing the draft. Nixon’s promise was pure political opportunism, but the actual work of designing an all-volunteer force, which fell to a White House commission of economists, soldiers, and business leaders, involved a deeper ideological struggle. Should providing for the national defense be understood as an obligation of citizenship or a labor market issue of supply and demand? Prominent free-market economists Milton Friedman and Alan Greenspan believed the latter and argued forcefully that the key was improved pay and benefits to sustain the required enlistments. Other members of the commission, including
retired Generals Alfred Gruenther and Lauris Norstad, had greater reservations about the intrusion of market principles into military life. Despite the conflicts, the free-marketers seized the initiative, and when President Nixon reported the commission’s findings to Congress, he did so in decidedly Greenspanian language. That ideology of the market, Bailey claims, has undergirded the Army’s all-volunteer force ever since, and has led it to use marketing methods with increasing sophistication: social-science data to identify target audiences, marketing consultants to interpret that data, and Madison Avenue ad agencies to sell the Army as everything from a path to college to a journey toward personal fulfillment. While Bailey lauds the Army’s transition as a “tale of progress and achievement,” she notes in the book’s last sentence that “there is something lost when individual liberty is valued over all and the rights and benefits of citizenship become less closely linked to its duties and obligations.”

The most enjoyable part of the chapters on the 1970s is the narration of the Army’s dramatic branding failures. From its earliest, disastrous slogan, “Today’s Army Wants to Join You,” to “Join the People Who’ve Joined the Army,” and, on a recruiting postcard, “Nothing’s perfect, but this is pretty good,” Bailey shows that the Army’s efforts to cater to “youth values” simply did not work.

What saved the Army from its low point in the late 1970s was a new, no-nonsense commanding general for recruiting and a new slogan. General Maxwell R. “Mad Max” Thurman believed in more social-science data and better use of it, and it was under him that the Army recruiting system finally adopted modern corporate management. The nerdy and demanding Thurman (Bailey describes him as “pencil-necked”) also spearheaded a change in the corporate culture of the Army recruiting system, a shift to viewing the Army as a “gigantic business” and recruiting as a “stock-control function” (Thurman’s words). But the real hero of the Army’s rehabilitation was five little words that Bailey argues changed the image of the Army in the 1980s: “Be All You Can Be.” When the campaign began in 1980, only 54 percent of recruits had graduated from high school, and more than half were Category IVs, the lowest mental category for enlistees. Seven years later, 91 percent were high school graduates and only four percent were the dreaded “Cat IVs.” Later slogans, “Freedom Isn’t Free,” “An Army of One,” and the current slogan, “Army Strong,” had different emphases and varying degrees of success, but the Army’s path to an all-volunteer force only became smoother in the 1990s and particularly after 11 September 2001.

Military historians have only recently begun considering military public relations and recruiting history as windows into America’s civil-military relations, so there is little to criticize in this path-breaking account. But this reviewer cannot help but take issue with the conclusions Bailey draws on the Army’s “turn to the market,” the increasing reliance on slick advertising, and modern corporate management principles to keep its ranks filled. For as ads such as “Army Strong,” “Creed,” and indeed, almost every Marine Corps recruiting slogan since the 1950s show, young Americans do not respond only to
promises of economic gain and money for college. The ideology of the market may now dominate the military’s methods but not their recruiting messages nor their members’ motives. Strong beliefs in duty, martial tradition, and a desire to sacrifice are principal reasons many enter the military. While Professor Bailey does not directly suggest that military members are infected with the free-market ideology she finds in the Army’s bureaucracy, one of the book’s major claims is that in the transition to an all-volunteer force, the liberal-market ideology of Friedman and Greenspan muscled out other, almost collectivist notions of duty and citizenship. Those living and working in the armed forces of the United States would not see it that way. And while this is a quibble over emphasis rather than substance, it points the way for future work on how military members view their own culture and American society. Overall, America’s Army is an excellent volume, appropriate for anyone interested in the military and its role in American society.

**Bomb Power: The Modern Presidency and the National Security State**  
by Garry Wills  
Reviewed by John W. Coffey, retired Foreign Affairs Officer at the US State Department.

Recognizing that the world is a dangerous place, Alexander Hamilton observed, “It is the nature of war to increase the executive at the expense of the legislative authority.” Garry Wills views the evolution of the presidency in more sinister terms. According to Wills, the secret Manhattan Project provided a paradigm for presidential usurpation of power across the spectrum of national security. Wills’s determinism makes one thing explain everything. The bomb knocked the Constitution off the skids. “Executive power,” the author claims, “has basically been, since World War II, Bomb Power.” The “forces” he describes have produced an “American monarch.”

Wills’s overwrought reprise of Arthur Schlesinger’s *The Imperial Presidency* lacks three things: an appreciation of the differences between the executive and legislative authorities; historical context; and recognition of the importance of individuals in history. Let us trace his argument.

After World War II, a “structure of fear” in the executive office drove a quest for atomic supremacy. For Wills, psychology displaces historical context to explain foreign policymaking in response to a perceived Soviet threat. The 1947 Truman Doctrine announcing aid to Greece and Turkey formed a “main pillar” of the national security state. The National Security Act of that year built the institutional structure (an Air Force, Department of Defense, National Security Council, and Central Intelligence Agency). The surreptitious diversion of Marshall Plan funds for covert operations to prevent