intimidation by terrorist organizations. This is an unusual take on the fact that we still lack a commonly agreed upon frame of reference for terrorism.

Her exploration of genocide as “social death” in Chapter 9, and genocide by forced impregnation in Chapter 10, is particularly useful for anyone concerned with prevention. Our existing definition of genocide from the UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide is a departure point for these chapters. She finds that treaty and frame of reference inadequate, as events taken to destroy a group culturally and socially may constitute genocide even if the group is not physically destroyed.

Unfortunately, the book is occasionally afflicted by the need to single out the United States even where the criticism does not fit. To offer several examples, Professor Card suggests that US detention raids in Iraq were “military terrorism.” Whatever their shortcomings in retrospect, this is no more persuasive than a footnote reference offering the prospect of credibility to proponents of what we might call “the United States was behind 911” school of conspiracy theory. Such passages do not enhance the credibility of the book, but there is more than enough solid material to overcome this. More relevant, by contrast, is her treatment of counterterrorism methods in Chapter 5. So, is this a worthwhile book for the military and interagency community?

This reviewer fully concurs with Professor Card’s conclusion that “The question of a genocidal trajectory becomes important politically for those who might be obligated to intervene to stop the process before it is too late. Potential interveners who look only for intent to commit mass murder will miss many attempts to destroy a people.” That perspective informs these two chapters, and they alone are worth the price of the book. This book merits the attention of anyone engaged in national security practice and education if they are willing to overlook occasional dubious and sometimes absurd references to US military history and contemporary practice, such as engaging in periodic reassessment of their intellectual frame of reference, and are willing to commit to a thought provoking but slow, demanding read.

_**Morality and War: Can War Be Just in the Twenty-First Century?**_

 by David Fisher


Now visiting Senior Fellow at King’s College in London, David Fisher wrote this book as his doctoral dissertation at that institution. Fisher argues cogently that “There are no moral free zones” in international relations; relying upon Aristotle and Aquinas, he says that political and military leaders must be virtuous; and, disagreeing
with such scholars as G. E. Moore and John Rawls, he contends that morality is not essentially a private matter.

Unlike Gilbert Harman or Richard Rorty, Fisher is no relativist, and unlike, say, Charles Stevenson, he is no logical positivist. In fact, Fisher sets himself the noble task of revivifying virtue ethics in the realm of just war theory. In a plea for the improved moral education of soldiers, Fisher uses as background the events in such places as Gaza, Kosovo, Basra, Osirak, Rwanda, Srebrenica, and Darfur. His comments about preemptive attacks and about torture—“morally wrong”—are also succinct and thoughtful. He makes a strong case as well for humanitarian intervention. Although he judges the second Gulf War to be unjust, he admits that, when he held a position in the United Kingdom’s Cabinet Office, he believed that Saddam retained chemical and biological weapons. The chief value of this study is that Fisher concisely examines classical just war theory in the context of recent events and concepts such as “three block war,” military operations other than war (MOOTW), and the global war on terrorism (GWOT).

Fisher coins the somewhat pretentious neologism “virtuous consequentialism,” an attempted hybrid of absolutism and utilitarianism, as a label for his approach to ethics. He explores realism from Thucydides and Thrasymachus to Morgenthau and Mearsheimer, suggesting that realism invariably and mistakenly excludes moral considerations from the art of statesmanship.

Fisher is correct that the drama of politics always unfolds on the stage of morality, but his understanding of realism is limited. Disappointingly, there is no mention in this dissertation-turned-book of such scholars as Inis Claude, Louis Halle, Kenneth Thompson, Robert Jervis, E. H. Carr, William O’Brien, or Reinhold Niebuhr, whose insights would have enriched and refined Fisher’s discussion.

Fisher quotes Michael Walzer, who told us that “War is the hardest place [to make sound ethical judgments].” Fisher is entirely correct, then, about the compelling need for sound moral education and training. One searches the pages of this book in vain, however, for suggestions about who will be such educators or what the appropriate curriculum might be. A recent commandant of the Marine Corps proposed similar moral education for Marines at the end of boot camp or for soldiers after basic training. I had the opportunity to ask him who the instructors would be. He replied that drill instructors or drill sergeants would serve as the teachers. This reviewer must respectfully, if reluctantly, disagree with the feasibility of that idea.

It is with reluctance, because Fisher’s point about the need for ethical education is correct, but, as he rather plaintively asks, how are we morally to educate young men and women who come to military service from a society in which, increasingly, there is a lack of consensus about what constitutes virtue and wise moral judgment? “A society that attaches insufficient importance to the moral education . . . of its citizens will not be able to produce and nurture the practically wise and virtuous politicians and military and civilian leaders whom we need if just decisions are to be taken on the crucial choices between peace and war.”
Although Fisher refers to the work of such philosophers as Elizabeth Anscombe, Peter Geach, and Alasdair MacIntyre, his references are perfunctory, suggesting inadequate consideration of the connection between their work and his present effort. For example, Fisher does not understand the unity of virtues—that wisdom, justice, courage, and temperance are mutually nourishing, even though he alludes to MacIntyre’s work, *Whose Justice? Which Rationality?* In that book, MacIntyre points out the need to understand the unity of virtue. Fisher similarly explores the idea of Double Effect, but inexpertly, and the essays in a key book such as *The Doctrine of Double Effect* (edited by P. A. Woodward), discussion of which could have enhanced Fisher’s presentation, are nowhere cited.

Fisher’s work with just war theory adds little to the foundational work of James Turner Johnson, Paul Ramsey, Father John Ford, or to the recent insights of George Weigel or Jean Bethke Elshtain. Moreover, Fisher’s “virtuous consequentialism,” which is an attempt to merge deontology (rules) and teleology (outcomes) in the service of, and regulated by, prudence is similar to what Norman L. Geisler has called “graded absolutism,” which attempts to resolve the moral problems attending the clash of absolutes. Geisler, too, is overlooked.

That, as Anscombe once wrote, there are some moral rules we can never transgress (she called these the “bedrock” of morality”), is at the heart of military ethics. When Lieutenant Calley was tried for murder after My Lai, for example, the point was made that there are some things that men of ordinary sense and understanding must grasp. One wishes Fisher had developed this theme, reminiscent of the natural moral law, more than he did.

At its conclusion, the book lapses into a quixotic appeal for a national political “Office of Moral Assessment,” whose task will be to “furnish independent ethical scrutiny” of any executive decision to go to war. Fisher seems unaware of Plato’s nocturnal council (in *The Laws*) or Jacques Maritain’s council of wise men (in *Man and the State*). Fisher fails to address by whom such councils will be chosen and to whom they will be responsible and for how long. Who will guard those who are themselves the guardians? This is an ancient question to which Fisher offers no contemporary answer.

The book has notes, a bibliography, and an index. It is peculiar, finally, that Fisher seems not to understand the subjunctive mood, and his alternating use of antecedent and pronoun (*he or him* and then *she or her*) may be chichi, but it is also distracting. Except for its study of modern cases, little in Fisher is new ground. It is, however, a useful synthesis of just war thinking and a basic introduction to virtue ethics.