hegemonic decline. The United States should slowly withdraw its international commitments and allow other states to fulfill their fair share of the international provision of public goods. This will not lead to internecine state conflict; rather, it will further US power abroad.

While Preble rightly questions the merits of utilizing US military force abroad, readers must also carefully plumb Preble’s myriad assumptions. Will other states peacefully and cooperatively rebuild their militaries to fill the US power vacuum? Will US allies forgo nuclear proliferation as Belarus and Ukraine did or accelerate their development like Iran and North Korea? Will states continue to promote economic openness due to complex interdependence, or will states succumb to regional security dilemmas? Does the world truly admire US culture and economic practices as much as Preble suggests? Preble’s critique of American military adventurism is sound, but US policy makers should carefully consider the unintended consequences of reduced American military activity abroad.

The author’s The Power Problem is an important work which all foreign policy practitioners should carefully examine. As we are witnessing in Iraq, Afghanistan, Iran, and North Korea, the use of military force has its limitations. A tragedy of hegemonic foreign policy is that in the pursuit of national security, hegemons often pursue a grand strategy which catalyzes their decline. As previous scholars have clearly demonstrated, military interventions do not always increase state security. The use of force, while reliant on power, may often erode a state’s power in the long run. The strength of any state resides in a robust, resilient, and regenerative economy. Foreign policy decisionmakers should be mindful of bureaucratic groupthink and wary of military solutions as a panacea for international problems. As Preble rightly argues, in many cases the construction of 171 elementary schools instead of one B-2 bomber would go much further in advancing our national security.

The Diffusion of Military Power: Causes and Consequences for International Politics
by Michael C. Horowitz

Reviewed by Stephen J. Blank, Research Professor of National Security Affairs, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College

It is a truism of military studies that technological innovations do not stay confined to the state which first makes or presents them. But it also is equally true that states do not follow each other in mechanical lockstep. Some innovations are improved upon, others are ignored, and often attempts to emulate an innovation fail to realize the original intent. Horowitz’s book represents an effort to impart a theoretical basis to the question of how and why nations emulate leaders
in military innovation. Accordingly, the author advances a theory that he calls adoption-capacity theory to explain the dynamics of emulation and innovation.

According to his theory, to the extent that the financial costs of emulating a competitor’s innovations are too high, other alternatives, e.g., alliances, will be found. By the same token, if the emulation in question requires major organizational transformations in recruiting, training, and war-fighting doctrine, those innovations will not be made and fewer actors will emulate it. For instance, a contemporary example involves the revolution in military affairs (RMA). Soviet experts understood the new technologies that were coming on stream in the 1970s and grasped their potential for revolutionizing military operations. Yet the financial, doctrinal, and organizational transformations required of the USSR to emulate Western technological innovations was so far beyond Soviet capabilities that the effort was either not made or, when attempted, crashed, helping to bring down the whole system.

Horowitz tests the theory for four relatively recent innovations in warfare: nuclear weapons, battle fleet warfare, carrier warfare, and suicide bombing. And in each case the theory holds up. To be fair, there may be somewhat less innovation in his thinking than he presents for we have always intuitively, if not systematically, known that if states lack the resources to emulate their competitors’ innovations they either fall by the wayside or have to find surrogates for that kind of innovation. As Dominic Lieven has recently and brilliantly demonstrated, Imperial Russia could not emulate the Napoleonic levée en masse and Bonaparte’s tactics nor could it hope to win at the beginning of the 1812 campaign by fighting Napoleon’s preferred major pitched battle. Instead, it had to introduce its own reforms and fight a different kind of war that magnified its advantages and reduced Bonaparte’s.

Nonetheless, the theory is analytically important for it serves to underline just what it takes for states to compete in world politics and in warfare and points us in the direction of seeing which states can adapt and survive in an environment of ceaseless innovations, both minor and major. Russia, for example has yet to adapt to the RMA and the task may be beyond it. Yet China seems to be making a relatively smooth adjustment by utilizing its resources to build a formidable irregular warfare, missile, and naval capability in service of an anti-access strategy aimed against the United States. Moscow instead is required to find substitutes, which it has done up until now by emphasizing its nuclear capabilities and asymmetric responses. This requirement to find substitutes demonstrates its lack of both financial and organizational resources, and its inadaptability or inflexibility in military affairs.

If we might rephrase a celebrated quote of Karl Marx here, states do innovate but they are not free to innovate as they wish. Instead, they operate under constraints at all times. But some constraints are more permissive or productive than others. Indeed, the fundamental test of any state’s ability to remain in the military running is, as Horowitz suggests, closely tied to its economic-financial and organizational-doctrinal capabilities. The current crisis’s impact on Europe is graphic evidence of the extent to which successful
military competition depends upon the possession of those capabilities and how the lack of them forces a search for innovative alternatives, e.g., Anglo-French discussions about combining forces. So to the extent that states possess the requisite capabilities to emulate innovators, they and the innovators can remain major powers. But the converse is equally true as the Anglo-French example cited above suggests. Thus, this theory is also a useful means of analyzing the rise and fall of major powers in the international system. That aspect of the theory’s utility adds to the value of this valuable and useful analysis.

**Drugs and Contemporary Warfare**

by Paul Rexton Kan

Reviewed by James J. Carafano, Deputy Director of The Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, and Director of the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies

Here is an important book on an important subject. *Drugs and Contemporary Warfare* examines how drug use and trafficking complicate the conduct of modern conflict. With US forces battling poppy growers in Afghanistan; with the Mexican military trying to take back territory from peso-rich and better-armed cartels; and with many parts of the world seeing both trafficking in drugs and the dangers of failed states on the rise—there are few books that would be more helpful in a contemporary soldier’s intellectual rucksack.

Paul Kan, an Associate Professor of National Security Studies at the US Army War College, has written a well-organized and comprehensive guide to understanding a complex phenomenon that cuts across social, political, economic, cultural, public health and safety, as well as military fields of competition. The problem is inherently “inter-disciplinary.” In response, that is just the approach Kan takes in his analysis and not surprisingly he finds that a multi-faceted response is most effective in dealing with the challenge. Kan writes, “a multilayered effort from international organizations, major powers, and non-state actors is required to fully address the effects of the drug trade on warfare in today’s world.” It is refreshing to see an analysis of an international security challenge which eschews the “easy button.” Rather than argue for some simple-minded, silver-bullet solution, *Drugs and Contemporary Warfare* admits that this is just a damn difficult problem.

The real utility of *Drugs and Contemporary Warfare* is its fact-filled pages packed with useful insight. There is, for example, a long and useful explanation of the stages of production and distribution for different kinds of drugs, marking the unique qualities of manufacturing and marketing from products like heroin, cocaine, and marijuana to synthetic drugs like amphetamine-type stimulants. The author presents a grim account of how warring groups use drugs for recruiting and retention of child soldiers. Kan details a sobering