leaders stubbornly and/or blindly assumed that the 1915 operations would be brief. He concludes that the greatest Austrian efforts still constituted inadequate preparation, resulting in failure to mass and insufficient reserves. Instead, sustained winter, and mountain operations involved no less than two-thirds of the Austro-Hungarian Army, cost another 800,000 casualties, and seriously damaged its resiliency. The defeat led directly to determined German intervention and decisive victory at Gorlice-Tarnow, but at the price of diminished freedom of action in light of powerful German assistance.

The book has a fairly-easy style, but there are challenges. The author discusses numerous units from field army to division; at times the reader is hard pressed to follow. An order of battle could have mitigated some confusion. The text incorporates nine maps; six are in the preliminary Introduction and Chapter 1. Similar level of map support of the Second and Third Offensives would have been helpful. Finally, Tunstall writes with many superlatives, rightly hammering home the sheer scope of the Carpathian Campaign. The reader must digest these statistics carefully and often; otherwise, they sometimes appear contradictory.

The book is a detailed case study, based on extensive primary-source research, of an attempt to devise a viable strategy to meet drastically-changed, unforeseen conditions with impending crisis—and with an increasingly domineering ally. In that sense it is of interest to senior leaders today. The detailed description of the campaign with its three principal actions may be excessive for the nonmilitary historian.

Warrior’s Rage: The Great Tank Battle of 73 Easting
by Douglas Macgregor

Reviewed by Jim Shufelt, COL (USA Retired), Center for Strategic Leadership, US Army War College

Either loved or hated by his military readers, Douglas Macgregor has never pulled his punches when expressing his ideas about history, military strategy, Army Transformation, or related issues. Warrior’s Rage, his autobiographical account of the Battle of 73 Easting during the First Iraq War, accompanied by his analysis of the long-term strategic impact of the battle, is another Macgregor book that will be either wholeheartedly accepted or rejected by its readers because of its explicit descriptions, sharp analysis, and blunt conclusions. Some Army senior leaders from that conflict may find it uncomfortable, as the author has no problem naming names in his analysis of tactical, operational, and strategic decisions before, during, and after the battle. Regardless, it is an enthralling story of combat and its conclusions will challenge many past and serving strategic leaders.
Told primarily from the turret of Macgregor’s M1A1 ABRAMs tank, *Warrior’s Rage* vividly describes the experiences of Cougar Squadron, the 2nd Squadron of the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment (2/2 ACR), during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, which culminated in a classic armor battle. A battle that unquestionably demonstrated the overwhelming superiority of US tactical unit leadership, tactics, training, and equipment when faced with the most elite units of the Iraqi Army—the Republican Guard. Macgregor, the Cougar Squadron Operations Officer, captures the chaos of tactical combat, the lethality of modern weapons systems, and the complexity of joint fires. His love for American soldiers is clear, as is his personal disdain for the operational and strategic leaders he believes failed to fully exploit the tactical victory of 73 Easting.

Macgregor characterizes this fight as an overwhelming tactical success, which created an operational opportunity for a bold strike that could have destroyed the fleeing elements of the Republican Guard. When this opportunity was not grasped, the stage was set for continued conflict in Iraq—a conflict that is still unresolved almost twenty years later. Macgregor cites many explanations for this failure. Numerous strategic intelligence mistakes, including continued overestimation of enemy force numbers and capabilities, fed the fears of already conservative operational and strategic leaders. Over-stretched lines of communications and unpracticed extended-distance logistics procedures raised further concerns in risk-averse tactical commanders. An Army unpracticed in large-scale maneuver defaulted to a mechanical delineation of the battlefield that discouraged bold maneuver and denied the fluidity of the situation. Coordination among joint forces, coalition partners, and adjacent and passing units was haphazard at best. Commanders at every level were tied to command posts rather than the front lines of battle, and thus failed to quickly identify and leverage tactical and operational opportunities.

There are positive elements in *Warrior’s Rage*, along with numerous indictments. Macgregor’s account identifies skilled and capable junior officers, noncommissioned officers, and enlisted troops who have continued to contribute significantly to the Army and the nation, to include two who are now serving general officers. 2/2 ACR was clearly a strong unit that made the most of its opportunities prior to the battle to train for the challenges of an extended desert war, building on a base of proven doctrine, quality small unit and gunnery training in Europe, and motivated and talented tactical unit leaders. The inherent flexibility and massive combat power of an armored cavalry squadron is vividly demonstrated throughout Cougar Squadron’s attack into Iraq.

More than a few potential readers may decide to not even open this book because of its author. Others may choose to close it half-read, uncomfortable with the blunt criticism of well-respected general officers such as Frederick Franks and Norman Schwarzkopf. Regardless, the overall impact of Macgregor’s book is limited, because his intent is not clear—is it an autobiography, a unit history, or a critical analysis of operational and strategic leadership during the conflict? As an autobiography, it is interesting, but of limited scope. As a history, it provides a good story of a single unit in a critical fight, and there
Stephen J. Cimbala’s *The George W. Bush Defense Program*

Most examinations of the defense policies during the two terms of President George W. Bush tend to begin and end with Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Global War on Terrorism. These issues so overwhelmed all other aspects of the Bush defense program that one tends to forget there was a defense program prior to 9/11 and there were defense issues that continued to be addressed after 9/11 that were not directly related to the war on terrorism. To appreciate the long term impact of the Bush era, it is necessary to understand and consider the interrelationship of those major issues, i.e., Iraq, Afghanistan, and terrorism, with the other policies developed during this administration’s eight years and place them within a theoretical and historical context. This was Professor Stephen Cimbala’s intent as he brought together an impressive collection of experts to opine on various aspects of the administration’s efforts in *The George W. Bush Defense Program: Policy, Strategy & War*.

A collection of essays, no matter the topic, presents certain difficulties for any reviewer. The first difficulty is usually the uneven quality of the essays. This reviewer is happy to write that Professor Cimbala and his ten other authors have produced a scholarly yet quite readable set of essays that generally fall into the following topics: military transformation, the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars, civil-military relations and how it affected the Bush defense program, nuclear weapons and arms control with a special focus on US-Russian relations, and the impact of the Bush defense program on American international relations. A second difficulty is the diversity of the essays. Too often editors do not identify the unifying themes that make a series of disparate essays a cohesive whole. Unfortunately, neither the introduction nor the conclusion pointed the reader to