necessary for adaptation of new science to warfare and a manifestation of the way nations make wealth.

Although chaoplexic warfare may yet seem far off, reading about its possibilities, with the book’s ample references to other texts, may be a fertile launch point for further independent research for both the military-minded and scientific-oriented readers. This was a good place to end the book. Unfortunately, the author regresses by trying to integrate Gell-Mann, John Boyd’s Observe, Orient, Decide, and Act (OODA) loop in great detail, and an emerging “chaoplexic Clausewitz” by stamping it with quotes from the US Marine Corps’ *FMF/M: Warfighting* manual. The real purpose of this last chapter, as this review alluded to earlier, is to denigrate the US adoption of Network Centric Warfare, also known internationally as NATO Network Enabled Capability (NNEC). Some may welcome this, but it really is an unnecessary political discourse and detracts from the otherwise excellent science/war dynamic of the book’s stated intent. The first three metaphors effectively integrate science and warfare as a duality for each of the modern warfare eras. The last era, chaoplexic warfare, has yet to unfold and should have enjoyed greater elaboration in that chapter. If it had, the reader would recognize that each era of warfare was followed by accelerated adoption and societal acceptance of a new science and that chaoplexic warfare may be here faster than currently imagined.

**Global Security Watch: Jordan**

by W. Andrew Terrill

Reviewed by Colonel Robert E. Friedenberg, currently serving as Senior Defense Official and Defense Attaché, US Embassy Damascus, Syria

Jordan is a poor Arab country with few natural resources, no oil, and a small population, yet its strategic importance has outweighed its lack of attributes. How have the Jordanians achieved this? Will Jordan remain strategically relevant to the United States following combat operations in Iraq, Jordan’s neighbor to the East?

Dr. W. Andrew Terrill, a research professor at the US Army War College, attempts to answer these questions in this book. Well researched and clearly written, his book begins with an overview of Jordanian history, effectively combining both older sources and very recent ones. Weaving a narrative from current King Abdullah II’s grandfather, Abdullah I, to his father, Hussein, to the present day, Terrill shows how the earlier monarchs managed threats, balanced competing interests and maintained alliances. Following a chapter on Jordanian political, economic, and military systems, Terrill then goes into detail on Jordanian relations with the Palestinians, the United States, Israel, its Arab neighbors, and Iran. It is here that the author’s strengths as a historian of the region come into focus. Dr Terrill has written in the past on King Hussein’s rivalry with Yasir Arafat and the Palestine Liberation Organization...
(PLO), and his expertise in this area is useful in his interpretation of the March 1968 Battle of Karameh. This was an inconclusive military action fought on Jordanian territory between the Israelis and a combined PLO/Jordanian Army force. Terrill correctly notes, however, that Palestinian propagandists labeled it as a huge defeat for Israel and the battle became a key element in Arafat’s warrior mythology.

Terrill’s knowledge of wider Middle Eastern history also allows him to place Jordan’s current relations with its neighbors into historic context. In the case of Iraq, he covers the earlier close relations that, following Jordan’s refusal to abandon Saddam Hussein in the 1990-91 Gulf War, a move that severely isolated King Hussein. Jordanian-Iraqi relations were much more strained following the 2003 overthrow of Saddam and the rise of a Shia-dominated government in Iraq. But as Terrill points out, relations are always more complicated than at first glance. Jordan is currently assisting Iraqi police and military training, and continues importing Iraqi oil. The historic ties remain, despite some difficulties. The author answers the question of Jordan’s continuing strategic relevance in chapters on Jordan’s relations with its neighbors, the United States, and Israel. Following the 1991 Gulf War, King Hussein knew he had to get back in the good graces of the United States, and so concluded a peace treaty with Israel, thus ensuring US economic and military assistance. Abdullah, taking a page from his father’s playbook, continued to remain vital to the United States by joining the “Global War On Terror” following the 11 September 2001 attacks and assisting the United States in the subsequent invasion of Iraq. Where there may have been some risk to this strategy in terms of Abdullah’s domestic popularity, Terrill shows us that, with the November 2005 bombings of three Western chain hotels in Amman, al Qaeda overplayed its hand and Jordanian public opinion turned decisively against Osama bin Laden and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the Jordanian-born al Qaeda leader. In his chapter on how Jordan deals with terrorism, Terrill includes the “Amman Message,” a sermon delivered in 2004 by the Jordanian Chief Justice that formalized Jordan’s attempt to advance moderate Islam and counter those voices that labeled all Muslims as extremists. He sees the sermon not as a single event, but as part of a larger effort by the government to counter Islamic extremism. Once again, he finds the larger context that eludes many observers of the Middle East.

In a final chapter entitled “Jordan Looks Toward the Future,” the author clearly explains how Jordan must remain relevant to a host of international power brokers—the United States needs Jordan to maintain peace with Israel and set the example for those Arab nations that have yet to conclude agreements with the Jewish State. Jordan’s ability to affect Iraqi stability in ways such as continuing to train Iraqi security forces, is also vital. In the struggle against terrorism and Islamic extremism, Jordan’s position and influence overshadow its limited population and resources. Jordan’s General Intelligence Directorate, though sometimes accused of brutal methods, is critical in cooperating with the United States in the fight against al Qaeda and related organizations. In advancing the Amman Message, Jordanian “soft power” can counter more
extremist and intolerant versions of Islam. In the final chapter, Terrill has advice for US policy makers. A pro-democracy agenda must be tempered with the desire for stability. He states free elections in Jordan will not necessarily produce pro-American, pro-Israeli governments. It is here that perhaps Terrill’s advocacy of the Realpolitik view may be out of step with recent events. The January 2011 riots in Tunis show us that overdependence on autocratic regimes to maintain stability can backfire. The United States will continue to depend on Jordan for stability, but needs to be aware of growing frustration among its overwhelmingly young population facing increasing unemployment and higher costs of living. The Hashemite family has shown an amazing ability to counter threats to its rule—the increasing frustration of the population is just the latest challenge to stability in Jordan. Some reform is inevitable if the Hashemite Kingdom is to survive.

At the end of the book are several useful appendixes including biographies of Jordanian leaders, the full transcript of the Amman Message, and an address by King Abdullah II to a joint session of the US Congress.

This very readable book is strongly recommended for those in uniform and civilians with Middle East-related assignments.

**Battlespace Technologies: Network-Enabled Information Dominance**

by Richard S. Deakin

**Reviewed by Dr. Jeffrey L. Groh**, Professor, Information and Technology in Warfare, US Army War College

It is a challenge to stay current on information systems and communications technologies in 21st century warfare. The understanding of information-age technologies can be intimidating to senior warfighters and their staffs. Trade journals, internet resources, and technical white papers can heighten the angst to gain an appreciation for the available technologies to prosecute information-age warfare. Richard S. Deakin in his book *Battlespace Technologies: Network-Enabled Information Dominance* provides a valuable service putting the most important networking concepts, information systems, and communications equipment in one reference. Deakin argues, early in the book, that information-age technologies have significant implications for command and control within the operational environment. This thesis should grab the attention of senior warfighters and their staffs as a guide to the concepts and tools required to successfully operate in a network-enabled environment.

The central theme advances the concept of Network-Enabled Capability (NEC). The author describes NEC as an “integrated force approach to modern warfare enabled by the cohesion of communications and computer networks, sensors, intelligence-gathering assets, and databases integrated with the