promises of economic gain and money for college. The ideology of the market may now dominate the military’s methods but not their recruiting messages nor their members’ motives. Strong beliefs in duty, martial tradition, and a desire to sacrifice are principal reasons many enter the military. While Professor Bailey does not directly suggest that military members are infected with the free-market ideology she finds in the Army’s bureaucracy, one of the book’s major claims is that in the transition to an all-volunteer force, the liberal-market ideology of Friedman and Greenspan muscled out other, almost collectivist notions of duty and citizenship. Those living and working in the armed forces of the United States would not see it that way. And while this is a quibble over emphasis rather than substance, it points the way for future work on how military members view their own culture and American society. Overall, America’s Army is an excellent volume, appropriate for anyone interested in the military and its role in American society.

**Bomb Power: The Modern Presidency and the National Security State**

by Garry Wills

Reviewed by John W. Coffey, retired Foreign Affairs Officer at the US State Department.

Recognizing that the world is a dangerous place, Alexander Hamilton observed, “It is the nature of war to increase the executive at the expense of the legislative authority.” Garry Wills views the evolution of the presidency in more sinister terms. According to Wills, the secret Manhattan Project provided a paradigm for presidential usurpation of power across the spectrum of national security. Wills’s determinism makes one thing explain everything. The bomb knocked the Constitution off the skids. “Executive power,” the author claims, “has basically been, since World War II, Bomb Power.” The “forces” he describes have produced an “American monarch.”

Wills’s overwrought reprise of Arthur Schlesinger’s *The Imperial Presidency* lacks three things: an appreciation of the differences between the executive and legislative authorities; historical context; and recognition of the importance of individuals in history. Let us trace his argument.

After World War II, a “structure of fear” in the executive office drove a quest for atomic supremacy. For Wills, psychology displaces historical context to explain foreign policymaking in response to a perceived Soviet threat. The 1947 Truman Doctrine announcing aid to Greece and Turkey formed a “main pillar” of the national security state. The National Security Act of that year built the institutional structure (an Air Force, Department of Defense, National Security Council, and Central Intelligence Agency). The surreptitious diversion of Marshall Plan funds for covert operations to prevent
a Communist victory in the 1948 Italian elections, NATO’s “militarization” of
the Marshall Plan, publication of NSC 68, and the establishment of the National
Security Agency completed the unconstitutional edifice. Executive prerogative
in secret CIA funding for covert operations fails to pass constitutional muster
for Wills, and the Manhattan Project’s secrecy served as precedent in subse-
quent years for covering up “anything important” and concealing CIA “crimes”
in its foreign interventions.

Despite congressional attempts in the 1970s (e.g., the War Powers
Resolution, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, and congressionally
mandated CIA reforms) to limit executive power, the “imperial presidency”
remained unchecked, with Richard Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld leading a
“counter-revolution” against the congressional coup when they returned to
power in the George W. Bush Administration. The Bush II Administration
launched an “extremist” assault on the War Powers Resolution (unconstitu-
tional in the first place), and in a “crescendo of presidential arrogance” brought
executive usurpation to its climax. Wills might have indicted Richard Nixon,
instead of George W. Bush, as chief usurper. In that case, however, he would
have to concede that our constitutional system worked, having forced the re-
signation of a President under threat of impeachment. Wills also elides the fact
that America does have elections in which citizens have ample knowledge to
judge the propriety and efficacy of a President’s actions.

Wills ruefully concludes that President Obama has brought no real
change we can believe in. The modern President is “a self-entangling giant,”
an ensnared Gulliver, trapped in his insidious imperial power. The author
expresses forlorn hope for a return to “the quaint old Constitution” of congres-
sional supremacy (Madison), though the eighteenth century lies far behind us.

Wills’s thesis about the modern presidency—after the bomb, therefore
because of the bomb—rests on a post hoc ergo propter hoc fallacy. The evo-
lution of a powerful federal government and chief executive (and economic
chief) are due far more to presidential leadership in a Civil War, two World
Wars, and Great Depression than to one thing. Recently, we saw an unelected
executive body, the Federal Reserve Board, take extraordinary steps to avert a
second depression. Wills considers himself a Madisonian; yet the first signifi-
cant expansion of executive power occurred with Jefferson’s extraconstitutional
Louisiana Purchase.

The 1803 Louisiana Purchase enlarged the area of the country about 140
percent, making the United States the second nation in total area and the first
nation in tillable area. Jefferson justified his greatest presidential achievement
by his concept of building an “empire of liberty” based on the law of nature
underlying national security, preservation. Jefferson used executive power to
protect free men from aggression and secure access to Mississippi commerce in
order to preserve and nurture the republic. Hamilton laid the politico-economic
foundations of modern America, but Jefferson acquired the territory making a
large commercial republic possible. Joseph Story, who disliked Jefferson and
all his works, later ironically remarked that the strict-constructionist Jefferson used the “implied powers” of the President championed by John Marshall. Nor does Wills appreciate why the respective responsibility and composition of the executive and legislative authorities favor executive predominance in national security affairs. Hamilton argued that because the common defense is the first object of the Union, the power of defense must be constitutionally unlimited on the principle that the means must be proportionate to the end: “The circumstances that endanger the safety of nations are infinite, and for this reason no constitutional shackles can wisely be imposed on the power to which the care of it is committed.”

A due dependence on the people and due responsibility made a vigorous executive compatible with republican government, Hamilton maintained, and “energy in the executive is a leading character in the definition of good government.” Unlike the legislative branch, the Executive can act with “decision, activity, secrecy, and dispatch.” The virtues of the two authorities differ: “In the legislative, promptitude of decision is oftener an evil than a benefit. The differences of opinion, and the jarring of parties . . . promote deliberation and circumspection, and serve to check excesses in the majority.” Dissension enfeebles the executive, whereas “vigor and expedition” are required in the conduct of war where the executive is the “bulwark of national security.” According to constitutional scholar C. Herman Pritchett, judicial precedent upholds the president’s primacy in foreign relations and war based on the grant of executive power, authority as commander-in-chief, and recognized position as “the nation’s organ for foreign affairs.” These powers, Pritchett held, are “so great, in fact, that to a considerable degree they cancel out the most important grant of external authority to Congress, the power to declare war.”

A preoccupation with one thing leads Wills to neglect the importance of individuals in history, statesmen with different characters grappling, in concrete circumstances, with the complexities and uncertainties of policymaking in a perilous world. In Arsenal of Democracy, Julian Zelizer details the fierce partisan politics that shaped policy and party fortunes in the postwar era. Peter Rodman’s fine Presidential Command describes the ebb and flow of executive authority in national security policymaking. Rodman explains why the character of people, above all the commander-in-chief, is the paramount factor in government, and he demonstrates how effective policymaking requires personal presidential engagement.

The Obama Administration has resisted congressional calls for wider notification of covert actions, retained core elements of President Bush’s counterterrorism policy, and dramatically increased drone strikes in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas. Furthermore, a bipartisan foreign-policy consensus on Afghanistan, Iraq, and Iran has emerged between the Administration and Republicans. These steps illustrate the permanence of our interests (and how a party in, not out of, power must protect them) as well as the interests of other nations. Only a strong President can represent the nation’s unity of purpose and provide clarity of action in a world that looks for American
leadership. That, not the bomb, is why we have a strong (not monarchical) President.

**A Fiery Peace in a Cold War: Bernard Schriever and the Ultimate Weapon**

by Neil Sheehan

Reviewed by Colonel Jeffrey L. Caton, USAF, Retired, former Director of Research, Development, and Acquisition Management and Defense Transformation Chair, US Army War College.

A family escapes a horrible war in their home country and starts a new life in America. The father’s death in a tragic industrial accident forces two young brothers to live in an orphanage. Through his mother’s determination, as well as patronage from influential mentors, one of the brothers rises to the military’s highest ranks, where he develops the most devastating weapons ever known.

This is not fiction from Dickens, but rather the true story of General Bernard Schriever told in compelling narrative by Neil Sheehan. An established expert on Vietnam, Sheehan had never heard of Schriever before he started to research a book on the Cold War nuclear arms race. Captivated by the incredible contributions made by this individual, he decided to make “Bennie” the common thread of his work. He chose wisely, crafting a fresh historical account that includes heroes and villains, courage and treachery, triumph and tragedy, most of which occurred in a mere decade between “Mike,” the first thermonuclear test in 1952, and the first operational alert of the “Minuteman” intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) in 1962.

Born 14 September 1910, in Bremen, Germany, Schriever’s first eight years of life indeed included a family move to America, the untimely death of his father, and residence in an orphanage until his mother found employment in San Antonio, Texas. Luck and hard work brought the family back together, and Bernard (“Bennie” for short) excelled in school and sports, eventually earning his degree from Texas A&M. In 1932, he became an Army Air Corps pilot and within a year reported to Lieutenant Colonel Henry “Hap” Arnold’s unit.

In the chapters covering the next 12 years, Sheehan presents professional trends that would become Schriever’s hallmarks as a leader. By 1944, Schriever became a young colonel after winning over the ill-tempered Brigadier General “Ennis the Menace” Whitehead in Australia. After enduring unfair “chew out” sessions from Whitehead, Bennie responded by applying his technical prowess to solve persistent maintenance issues as well as by showing courage as a B-17 bomber copilot. The author highlights the autumn of that year, when Hap Arnold (now a five-star general) called Bennie to the Pentagon and entrusted him to continue innovating the Air Corps as he himself had done before World War II, and especially to aggressively embrace new technologies.