against states that presented possible threats—have been seen in the cold light of the morning after to have been not just incorrect, but deeply harmful to their originators. It was not the attacks themselves, but America’s mistakes in responding to them, that caused the most damage to the well-being of the world’s sole superpower.

Strahan challenges those who labor in these vineyards with the observation that “Strategic theory has still not adequately responded to the absence of ‘general war’, not just since 1990 and the end of the Cold War, but since 1945 and the end of the Second World War.” With this book, many of the world’s best strategic theorists have responded to the challenges of the post-September 11th world and found them not to be particularly new or even especially challenging when examined in the proper historical context. This is a real service to the United States, one for which both Strachan’s collaborators and the Leverhulme Trust deserve genuine American gratitude. Understanding the hard lessons of the past decade will be the work of a generation that has been schooled in war but has not had much time to reflect on what it has seen. The Changing Character of War is a good place to begin contemplating what is new and what is not, but has had to be relearned at such a heavy cost because of our own errors.

**Patton’s Third Army in World War II**

by Michael Green and James D. Brown

Reviewed by James R. Oman, COL (USA Retired), Director, Senior Service College Fellowship Program, Defense Acquisition University

Authors Michael Green and James D. Brown have collaborated to produce a richly illustrated publication that provides a comprehensive battle history of the United States Third Army in World War II. As is the case with most illustrated tomes, this work is loaded with photographs, more than 400. The majority of these photographs are from the National Archives and to a lesser extent from the Patton Museum as well as from other assorted collections. Notably, each of the photographs is accompanied by a detailed caption. The captions provide context and tell the “rest of the story” of the daily life of the soldier, the weapons of war, and the horrors of combat and its aftermath.

Patton’s Third Army in World War II differs from many similar books in that it includes high-quality maps, detailed biographies on key American and British leaders, and excellent excerpts from earlier publications. The excerpts provide snippets into Patton’s views on war, weaponry, the enemy, and the military profession in general. The inclusion of each of these broad topic areas contributes to the overall richness of the text and make for an interesting read.

While the first two chapters provide the strategic setting and address Patton’s role in Operation Overlord and Cobra, the heart of Patton’s Third Army in World War II traces the Third Army’s combat operations from its activation in
France on 1 August 1944 through Victory in Europe (V-E) Day on 8 May 1945. Central to the August 1944 to May 1945 bookends is the richly described, well documented, yet nearly unbelievable feat of arms exhibited by the leaders and soldiers of the Third Army during the Battle of the Bulge in December 1944. Particularly notable was the skillful manner in which the command pivoted 90 degrees, changing their direction of attack from East to North as they led the Allied effort to relieve the beleaguered American forces in Bastogne. These operations occurred during one of the worst winters on record. To place their feat in modern parlance, a paragraph found in the Introduction says it best:

To understand the significance of Third Army’s turn to relieve the Bulge, imagine a morning rush-hour commute in a large city. Add to the problem a severe snowstorm. Now imagine what would happen if everyone in the gridlock received a new job in a different town while on the way to work. Further imagine that all the gas stations and restaurants along the new route are closed, because they didn’t expect the morning traffic. Imagine that everyone in the traffic stream slept in his car the previous night, and most hadn’t slept in a real bed for over three months. Lastly, imagine that everyone had to arrive at his new job in the order in which he started his original destination. You have only scratched the surface of understanding what it takes to move an army in the middle of battle.

Each contributor provides a wealth of knowledge, research, and bona fides to this effort. Green is an accomplished researcher and a prolific writer, having written several books on Patton. Brown served twenty years in the US Army as an armor officer to include a stint as a professor of engineering at the United States Military Academy. Green and Brown have worked together previously and published *War Stories of D-Day* and *War Stories of the Battle of the Bulge*. Their individual backgrounds as well as their earlier collaborations undoubtedly played a significant role in the production of this well-crafted book.

The 13 exceptionally detailed and illustrative color maps are appropriately placed to add value, clarification, and further definition to Third Army’s actions. Each map provides a chronological snapshot of a major operation or campaign. The maps graphically depict Third Army’s relentless eastward push across central Europe, beginning in France, through Belgium, and into Germany sweeping the Wehrmacht and SS units before it.

The nearly one dozen biographies culled from the National Archives are focused on the general officers who either supervised or worked with or for General Patton. They include familiar names such as Eisenhower, Bradley, and Montgomery, and some who are not as well known such as Weyland, Walker, Gaffey, and Gay. Each leader’s biography adds to the overall insight into the individual’s diverse background and, in a number of cases, includes Patton’s perspective on the individual.

The more than two dozen excerpts from *War As I Knew It* by Patton and *The Unknown Patton* by Charles M. Province expand the picture of Patton as a leader. The topics included Patton’s thoughts related to the duties of an officer, military cemeteries, forward observers, fire and movement, and decorations, to name but a few.
At the end of the day, an organization and its commander are evaluated based on their achievements. In this regard, the Third Army led by General George S. Patton, as measured by the US Army’s statistics, was a highly effective organization. The following makes that case:

In 281 days of combat, Third Army saw 21,441 men killed, 99,224 wounded, and 16,200 missing. Non-battle casualties stood at 111,562. Patton’s Third Army managed to seize 81,823 square miles of territory . . . . Estimated casualties among the German forces that faced Third Army in battle accounted for 47,500 killed and 115,700 wounded. In total, Third Army captured 1,280,688 German military personnel between 1 August, 1944 and 13 May 1945.

Patton’s Third Army in World War II is a superb book as well as a great read; it captures the Third Army’s many exploits and General Patton’s accomplishments, as well as graphically depicting the human dimension of leadership and the cost of war.

Enduring Battle: American Soldiers in Three Wars, 1776-1945
by Christopher H. Hamner

Reviewed by Robert Previdi, author of Civilian Control versus Military Rule

The book is an attempt to compare the combat experience of American forces in three wars: the War of Independence, Civil War, and World War II. The author’s primary thesis is to explain the role of fear on the part of soldiers as the technologies of war make it an ever deadlier environment. Hamner, an assistant professor of history at George Mason University, opens with a chapter contrasting the Battle of Cowpens during the War of Independence, the Battle of Shiloh during the Civil War, and the Battle of the Hurtgen Forest during the Second World War from the combat soldier’s viewpoint.

There is a great deal of interesting factology in the book, but its overall comprehension would have been greatly increased if greater attention had been applied to its editing. For example, if the paragraphs were condensed, the readability would have been markedly improved. There is little question the book makes a number of poignant observations; but in terms of supporting the author’s thesis, the book is missing an overarching concept that would link the material together in a cogent manner. The result is a great deal of redundancy of facts and conclusions.

The author explores how the soldiers of the three wars experienced fear and what could be done to alleviate it. Hamner makes the point that for every soldier fear, at some point in combat, causes immobilization. A soldier can only fight so long before fear incapacitates him for combat. The reality associated with fear and overcoming it was understood by America’s military