ABSTRACT: This article examines the impact of the United Kingdom’s departure from the European Union on the longstanding special Anglo-American security and defense partnership.

When US President Donald Trump first met British Prime Minister Theresa May in January 2017, he praised the Anglo-American partnership as “one of the great forces in history for justice and for peace.” Prime Minister May was equally effusive speaking of the “bonds of history, of family, [and] kinship.” This exchange is typical of the rhetoric of the so-called special relationship, but sentiment has usually played a minor role when compared to the hardheaded, common strategic interests that are its foundation. The unusual bilateral partnership, established during World War II and sustained throughout the Cold War, has facilitated close cooperation through the recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan as well as the fight against Salafi-Jihadism. The idea of a special relationship has had supporters and detractors over the years. But its existence as a political phenomenon is widely recognized by academia, policymakers, and media on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean.

The referendum decision in June 2016 for Britain to leave the European Union (EU) shocked and disappointed political elites on both sides of the Atlantic. “Brexit” is arguably the most dramatic change in UK foreign policy since the Second World War. Such a significant, complex, and controversial event is bound to affect relationships with close allies. After the result, Prime Minister David Cameron resigned and the pound fell to a 30-year low against the dollar. Nevertheless, British officials were quick to downplay the impact of Brexit on the United Kingdom’s security commitments. At least publically, American and British officials stressed the Anglo-American bilateral security partnership would not be affected by Brexit.

Many commentators were not so sanguine. A senior member of the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) claimed Brexit would represent


the United Kingdom’s most profound strategic shift since the country withdrew from a global military role in the early 1970s.\(^4\) Strobe Talbott, former president of the Brookings Institution, warned, “Brexit could be the worst news yet for the trans-Atlantic community, particularly for Britain and the United States.”\(^5\) As Talbott recognized, Brexit appeared to undermine Western cohesion at a time when liberal democracies faced the greatest range of challenges to their security since the end of the Cold War. The aim of this article is to assess the potential impact of Brexit on the special Anglo-American security and defense partnership.

### The Relationship in Context

The special relationship has never been a partnership of equals. From the American perspective, the relationship has been one of choice. For the United Kingdom, American support was essential to counter the existential threat from Nazi Germany and later the Soviet Union. A close relationship with the United States also helped alleviate Britain’s decline after World War II. Privileged access to US strategic nuclear weapons and a uniquely close intelligence partnership helped the United Kingdom maintain exceptional influence in security and defense matters.

The benefits were by no means one-sided. The British brought global diplomatic experience, a seat in the United Nations Security Council, highly effective intelligence services, and strategically significant military bases to the relationship. Despite periodic political differences over the decades, the United Kingdom has proved to be America’s most reliable global ally and a champion of US leadership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). British historian, Hew Strachan, has argued “Britain's unspoken strategy has been to service its alliance with the United States and to act as the cement between Washington and NATO.”\(^6\)

The Anglo-American relationship weathered the end of the Cold War, and Britain’s position as America’s most important ally was even strengthened during recent conflicts. The United Kingdom contributed the most effective allied force to Kuwait in 1991 and played the leading role supporting US operations in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq between 1999 and 2003.\(^7\) Prime Minister Tony Blair’s staunch support for America after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and his willingness to commit British forces to the US invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq did much to put the “special” back into the partnership.

The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan proved a bruising experience for both countries. The relationship came under strain after 2003 when the British, in particular, associated the Iraq War with government dishonesty and strategic incompetence. This perception caused some politicians and commentators to question the value of the close security partnership with the United States as never before. The financial crisis of 2008 created fresh challenges as austerity driven defense cuts by the


British government led senior US officials to lament the apparent loss of America’s most militarily capable and politically willing partner.\textsuperscript{8}

In 2013, the British government lost a vote in parliament to support US military strikes against Syria following the Assad regime’s use of chemical weapons. This defeat for a British executive was unprecedented and inevitably led to additional concerns the United Kingdom was finally abdicating its role as principal ally.\textsuperscript{9} An article in \textit{Foreign Affairs} in 2015 further documented Britain’s declining diplomatic and military capabilities at a time when the United States looked to its European allies for greater support in areas like the Sahel and Ukraine following its “pivot” to Asia.\textsuperscript{10}

Britain’s National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) in 2015, was intended to mark an end to the perceived decline in Britain’s power and influence.\textsuperscript{11} An emphasis on global reach and engagement was central to the review, which highlighted the nation’s “agile, capable and globally deployable Armed Forces.”\textsuperscript{12} Economic prospects were much brighter than the dire financial circumstances that had driven prior defense cuts. Threat perception had also increased following Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the terrorist attacks inspired by the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). The 2015 review committed the government to maintain a defense budget of at least two percent of the gross domestic product (GDP) and make significant investments in military equipment. The review acknowledged close security cooperation with states in the European Union, especially France, but the special relationship received notably greater emphasis. The United States was described as Britain’s “pre-eminent partner for security, defence, foreign policy and prosperity.”\textsuperscript{13}

\textbf{The Military Partnership}

The military establishments of both countries have had an easy familiarity since WW II, despite doctrinal, cultural, and occasional linguistic differences. The forces frequently hold joint training exercises, and liaison officers work together at headquarters throughout the world.\textsuperscript{14} An analysis on the implications of Brexit outlined the value of the British military’s expeditionary outlook, willingness to deploy and


\textsuperscript{9} Juliet Kaarbo and Daniel Kenealy, “The House of Commons’ Vote on British Intervention in Syria,” \textit{Italian Institute for International Political Studies Analysis} 228 (January 2014): 3. The deployment of the armed forces are covered by royal prerogative and there is no legal requirement for a prime minister to seek permission from parliament.


\textsuperscript{12} Prime Minister, \textit{SDSR}, 11.

\textsuperscript{13} Prime Minister, \textit{SDSR}, 51.

\textsuperscript{14} In a recent conversation with the author, a senior US Air Force officer highlighted the particularly close relationship between US exchange officers and their UK counterparts, which even included occasions of USAF pilots flying RAF planes on operations against ISIS.
sustain forces overseas, and its ability to conduct operations across the spectrum of conflict to support American military efforts.\textsuperscript{15}

The British armed forces maintain a high level of operational readiness. In 2017, 1,350 personnel deployed in operations against ISIS in Iraq and Syria; over 1,000 served as part of NATO’s enhanced forward presence (EFP) in Estonia, Poland, and Romania; and 1,200 contributed to operations in the Mediterranean, Africa, and Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{16} The United Kingdom provided the largest European contingent to the air campaign against ISIS and trained 60,000 members of the Iraqi security forces.\textsuperscript{17} In 2016, the nation’s military began a five-year exercise program with the US Army, which includes testing a UK division under a US corps-level command.\textsuperscript{18} Counterterrorist operations since 9/11 have also created a particularly close partnership between British and American special operations forces (SOF).\textsuperscript{19} Currently Britain is developing a new carrier task force designed to enhance NATO’s strike capability and project maritime power alongside US carrier battlegroups. Finally, the strength of defense industrial cooperation is illustrated by the United Kingdom’s role in the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter development program: the United Kingdom is the only Level 1 project partner and British industry will build 15 percent of each of the projected 3,000 planned aircraft.\textsuperscript{20}

The future of the special relationship may depend, however, on whether Britain’s armed forces continue to play their customary role of capable and dependable military partner after Brexit. Doubts had understandably risen during the last decade as financial austerity drove cuts that significantly weakened British military capabilities. The defense budget decreased 8.5 percent in real terms between 2010 and 2015.\textsuperscript{21} Reductions in front line capabilities included the withdrawal of Harrier attack aircraft and Nimrod reconnaissance aircraft, the early decommissioning of aircraft carriers, and a 30,000-soldier reduction in regular army personnel.

Britain’s failings in Iraq and Afghanistan also suggested its defense establishment could no longer provide effective strategic leadership. The United Kingdom failed to adapt its approach after the levels of violence rose in both theaters after 2006. British forces were inadequately manned, resourced, and supported, and operational mistakes were made due to doctrinal complacency and obsolete structures and tactics.\textsuperscript{22} A revitalized US Army and Marine Corps eventually adapted successfully to the challenges of contemporary small wars, not their British counterparts. The relative failure led one prominent academic

\textsuperscript{18} Ministry of Defence, Annual Report, 42.
\textsuperscript{19} Stanley A. McChrystal, My Share of the Task (New York: Penguin, 2014), 243–44.
to question whether the United Kingdom was still America’s “ally of
first resort.” Hew Strachan viewed the strategic failings as the result
of playing the role of junior partner and relying on the United States to
provide a strategic lead, which he argued was not necessarily always in
Britain’s best interest.

The 2015 SDSR sought to reassure the United States and other allies
that the United Kingdom remained a committed and capable military
partner. But the ambitious military plans were predicated on continued
economic growth and included some optimistic assumptions about
defense budget efficiency savings. Much of the anticipated equipment
expenditure was for international purchases, including additional F-35s,
P-8A Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft, and nuclear missiles from
the United States. The fall in exchange rates, largely because of Brexit
uncertainties, meant a 3.5 percent reduction in purchasing power during
2017 alone. Such effects resulted in the costs of new commitments
exceeding the net increase in funding, which posed a significant risk to
the equipment plan’s affordability.

In July 2017, the British government launched the National Security
Capability Review (NSCR) to support the implementation of the SDSR.
The review covered a broad range of emerging security challenges
and acknowledged significant problems in the current procurement
program. The secretive nature of the NSCR process created media
speculation that the United Kingdom was again preparing to reduce the
strength of its armed forces. The prospect of cuts to Britain’s amphibious
capabilities prompted particular alarm, not least at senior levels in the
United States. Lieutenant General Frederick “Ben” Hodges III, former
commander of US Army Europe, warned that Britain’s position as a key
ally would be at risk if its armed forces shrank even further.

The NSCR review was completed in March 2018, and the
government renewed its commitment to sustaining improvements in
defense capabilities, including the £178 billion reequipment program.
At the same time, the government launched a Modernising Defence
Programme (MDP), which somewhat belied its claims that the defense
budget remained secure. The program includes “work streams” that once
again focus on efficiencies and “business modernization” despite earlier
flawed SDSR assumptions that these could provide further savings.

Ultimately, much will depend on the strength of the British economy
as the March 29, 2019, date for formally leaving the European Union
draws near. Most economic analyses of Brexit have been pessimistic,

30 NSCR, 14–15.
although the gloomiest forecasts have so far proved unfounded. A
government report leaked in January 2018, however, suggested Britain’s
economy would grow more slowly outside of the European Union even
if a favorable deal were struck with Brussels.31 A constrained economy
would inevitably impact negatively on Britain’s strategic ambitions, as
might domestic political changes. May’s position is weak and the Brexit
process could easily trigger an early election. In principle, another
Conservative Party government would back a strong defense policy.
But the Labour Party could win the next election, and it is no longer
the centrist party of Tony Blair. The current leader, Jeremy Corbyn,
is opposed to nuclear weapons and the use of force and has a history of
anti-Americanism.32 The destructive impact such an outcome would
have on the Anglo-American defense and security partnership, to say
nothing of Britain’s security, might be hard to exaggerate.

Brexit and the UK-US Intelligence Relationship

During a recent discussion on the special relationship, Heather A.
Conley, a director at the Center for International and Strategic Studies
praised “the incredibly strong bilateral intelligence cooperation, which
remains the key pillar of the relationship.”33 The United Kingdom and
United States have developed unique, durable institutional intelligence
sharing arrangements and habits that are likely to deepen with the for-
mation of the National Cyber Security Centre and US Cyber Command.
Both intelligence communities are intertwined through bureaucracies
and personal connections. Since 9/11, the signals intelligence (SIGINT)
partnership has been especially close, with National Security Agency
(NSA) and Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) teams
being collocated at each other’s facilities. Close wartime collaboration
was followed by the UKUSA Agreement in 1946, which remains the
basis of cooperation between the NSA and GCHQ. A later agreement
including the intelligence agencies of Australia, Canada, and New
Zealand created the Five Eyes alliance.

The practical business of intelligence exchanges relies on bilateral
agreements between states. Therefore, within Europe, they do not
depend on the European Union and are not subject to the jurisdiction
of the European Court of Justice (ECJ). Other European countries
recognize and value the intelligence capability and reach of the United
Kingdom, and Britain could continue to lead intelligence cooperation
in Europe.34 Yet it would be a mistake to suggest Brexit will have no
impact on this role. A number of former heads of agencies in the United
Kingdom have expressed concern publically about potential problems

31 “EU Exit Analysis—Cross Whitehall Briefing,” in The Progress of the UK’s Negotiations on EU
Withdrawal: December 2017 to March 2018 (London: House of Commons, January 2018); James Blitz,
“Can There Be a Global Role for Britain after Brexit?,” Financial Times, November 9, 2017; and Pippa
33 The Indispensable Ally? US, NATO and UK Defence Relations, HC 387, Oral Evidence Taken Before
the Defence Committee of the House of Commons (March 5, 2018) (statement of Dr. Heather A. Conley,
Senior Vice President for Europe, Eurasia, and the Arctic, Center for Strategic and International
Studies), Q 117.
34 Nigel Inkster, “Brexit, Intelligence and Terrorism,” Survival 58, no. 3 (May 2016): 23–30, doi:
10.1080/00396338.2016.1186974; and Bastian Giegerich and Christian Mölling, The United Kingdom’s
Contribution to European Security and Defence (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies
in areas within the European Court’s competence, which include data sharing and aspects of law enforcement cooperation.\textsuperscript{35}

Britain has played a prime role in counterterrorism intelligence policy in Europe and has benefitted from access to EU databases, such as the Europol and Schengen Information Systems, as well as judicial cooperation through Eurojust and the European Arrest Warrant (EAW).\textsuperscript{36} During Brexit, the United Kingdom has to negotiate new arrangements for these agencies, possibly through bilateral sharing agreements such as those that already exist for Australia and the United States in the case of Europol. But there is no precedent for a non-EU country to have the same privileged access to the Europol Information System as a member state, and the legislative framework for the EAW exists under ECJ jurisdiction that the United Kingdom will leave. In February 2018, May called for a new security treaty with the European Union and offered concessions on the jurisdiction of the ECJ, but the EU leaders’ response was “lukewarm.”\textsuperscript{37}

Assessing the effect of these developments on Britain’s special intelligence partnership with the US is hard. At the bilateral level, the impact should be minimal. But Britain’s loss of influence in Europe will probably force the United States to forge closer intelligence relationships with other European allies, such as Germany.\textsuperscript{38}

\section*{Brexit and US Strategic Influence in Europe}

President Barack Obama’s administration lobbied hard for Britain to remain in the European Union. Previous US governments were equally supportive of Britain’s full participation in Europe. From an American perspective, the United Kingdom has represented an Atlanticist voice in the European Union, being an advocate of policies aligned with those of the United States, including free trade, EU enlargement, and cooperation on foreign, security, and defense issues.\textsuperscript{39} The United Kingdom, for example, worked hard to persuade the European Union to adopt sanctions against Iran, Syria, North Korea, and Russia.

Many analysts believe Brexit threatens US influence in Europe and diminishes Britain’s value as a strategic partner.\textsuperscript{40} Ivo H. Daalder, a former US ambassador to NATO, called Brexit a “defining moment for American diplomacy” as the United States would have to work harder


to maintain transatlantic unity.\textsuperscript{41} James M. Goldgeier, a former dean of the American University School of International Service, warned that the United States would have to look for a “new best friend.”\textsuperscript{42} But some conservative voices have supported Brexit. John R. Bolton, Trump’s national security advisor, claimed Britain’s participation in the European Union’s security and defense initiatives threatened to undermine NATO.\textsuperscript{43} Given his opposition to multilateralism, Trump, as a presidential candidate and as president, also expressed support for Brexit.

Bolton’s unease highlights a perennial US security concern. As an EU member, the United Kingdom ensured that European specific defense and security initiatives did not threatened the primacy of NATO. Like the United States, Britain fears EU military integration might divert scarce resources from the alliance, create duplication, and be used as an excuse for further reductions in defense spending. Most recently, at the 2018 Munich Security Conference, the US delegation complained that EU military plans could undermine NATO and potentially shut out American defense firms from the European market.\textsuperscript{44}

Brexit removes the main state barrier to closer EU military integration. Already the European Union has agreed to establish a joint command headquarters for military missions and to increase the European Defence Agency budget, both measures that the United Kingdom opposes. In December 2017, the European Union launched the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) initiative to integrate and strengthen further internal defense cooperation.\textsuperscript{45} Although membership is voluntary, the initiative is clearly a first step towards a European defense union.

Despite British and American fears, there is little prospect that EU defense integration poses a threat to NATO primacy in the medium term. The European Union insists PESCO is complimentary to the alliance, and NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg has welcomed the initiative as a means to strengthen its European pillar.\textsuperscript{46} At the moment, PESCO is an aspiration, and its development will depend on the European Union’s leading powers—France and Germany—which do not share a common strategic goal. Unlike France, Germany views defense integration as a political rather than a military project.\textsuperscript{47}

A continued close military relationship will be mutually beneficial for the United Kingdom and the European Union after Brexit.\textsuperscript{48} Nevertheless, the United Kingdom will cease to be a member of

\textsuperscript{42} “Brexit Vote Looms: What Will It Mean for the EU and US?,” Wilson Center, June 21, 2016.
\textsuperscript{47} Daniel Keohane, “Constrained Leadership: Germany’s New Defense Policy,” \textit{CSS Analyses in Security Policy} 201 (December 2016).
the institutions that formulate and implement external EU actions, including the Political and Security Committee, and Britain will have limited influence on EU defense missions and mandates. The Berlin Plus arrangements allow EU military missions access to common NATO assets, including a headquarters detached from NATO’s military structure commanded by the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (DSACEUR). This leadership position has traditionally been a British appointment, but the EU may be unwilling to accept continued British command of European troops for non-NATO operations. Thus, reduced British influence could potentially lead to EU operations that do not align with America’s interests.49

Britain’s most important bilateral defense relationship in Europe is with France. Brexit does not weaken the case for continuing this close cooperation. Since the Lancaster House Agreement in 2010, both powers have increased nuclear research and testing cooperation, developed a combined joint expeditionary force, and collaborated on equipment projects. Nevertheless, a recent RUSI study, argued the partners may drift apart following Brexit because of France’s longstanding ambition to create “European military autonomy” through a common EU intervention force, defense budget, and doctrine, all of which might create future headaches for NATO planners.50

The United States has often differed with France on European security issues, but some commentators have suggested that President Emmanuel Macron may seek to capitalize on France’s EU membership and military capabilities to become the new “trans-Atlantic bridge” and the leading American ally in Europe if Britain can no longer play this role.51 Deepening US involvement in the Sahel region has already increased France’s importance as a strategic partner.

Brexit and Nuclear Weapons

Anglo-American nuclear collaboration began during WW II, and since the 1950s, Britain has had privileged access to US nuclear weapons technology. Strategic nuclear missiles, including the current Trident system, have been leased from the United States. One of the three US Ballistic Missile Early Warning Systems (BMEWS) is based in England, and British nuclear scientists work with their American counterparts on a range of nuclear research projects. The United States remains a strong supporter of Britain’s nuclear deterrent, not least because it shares the nuclear burden in NATO.52 In 2016, the British parliament voted to renew the Trident system and approved four British-built Dreadnought-class replacement nuclear submarines to be completed by the early 2030s.

Britain’s Trident nuclear deterrent is based at Faslane, Scotland, and the missile warheads are stored nearby at Coulport. The Scottish National Party (SNP) opposes nuclear weapons and would likely seek

52 Indispensable Ally, Q 118, Q 119.
their removal in the event of independence. Likewise, a significant majority of Scots voted to remain in the European Union. These factors give the SNP an incentive to call for a second independence referendum, even though current opinion polls suggest that the SNP would still lose.\(^{53}\) Since a significant minority of Scots still supports independence, the number could grow if Brexit creates major economic problems. Such a vote for independence would create a crisis in the United Kingdom, and more broadly Western defense and security policy. Former NATO Secretary General George Robertson described the impact of Scottish independence as “cataclysmic.”\(^{54}\)

Trident submarines and warheads could be relocated to Devonport and Falmouth in England, but this would add significant costs to Britain’s nuclear program.\(^{55}\) Unbudgeted costs are by no means the only problem. The United Kingdom might be unable to maintain a continuous maritime deterrent if it is forced to move from Scottish bases as alternatives to the current bases were described as “highly problematic, very expensive, and fraught with political difficulties.”\(^{56}\)

An independent Scottish government might allow Britain to continue using nuclear facilities on a temporary basis. But Scottish independence would create a multitude of additional security problems. Relocating and reconstructing nuclear capabilities could take up to 20 years. In the meantime, Britain’s nuclear deterrent would be based in a newly independent foreign country. The associated political and strategic complications might force a future British government to abandon its commitment to retain nuclear weapons. Complex and lengthy negotiations would be required to divide Britain’s fully integrated military defense—military bases, infrastructure, equipment, personnel, and training.\(^{57}\) This process would cause an extended period of strategic paralysis until new defense and security arrangements with Scotland could be decided and implemented.

The SNP has claimed that an independent Scotland would be “a non-nuclear member of NATO . . . contributing excellent conventional capabilities.”\(^{58}\) But there is no guarantee that Scotland—as a new, small state with significant economic challenges—would be prepared to commit adequate resources to its own defense. Scotland represents less than five percent of Britain’s population but over one third of its territory and occupies a strategic location on NATO’s northern flank. An independent Scotland that did not play its full part in collective defense would pose additional difficulties for Britain’s armed forces and for NATO as a whole. For this reason, Scottish independence would pose a

\(^{53}\) “How Would You Vote in a Scottish Independence Referendum if Held Now? (Asked after the EU Referendum),” What Scotland Thinks, accessed May 21, 2018. The first independence referendum was held in September 2014.


greater risk to the UK-US special defense and security relationship than Britain’s exit from the European Union.

Brexit has also exacerbated tensions in Northern Ireland. A clear majority of Irish nationalists, who tend to identify with the republic of Ireland, voted to remain in the European Union. The current open border between the two parts of Ireland is threatened by Brexit as it could become a “hard” boundary if Britain leaves the EU customs union and single market.\(^5^9\) Although low-level attacks by nationalist splinter groups have continued since the peace agreement in 2007, there is currently no mainstream support for a return to violence.\(^6^0\) Unfortunately, the reestablishment of border installations and controls could provide dissident republican paramilitaries with both renewed support and a focus for attacks. Northern Ireland may, once again, divert UK security assets from international challenges to domestic counterterrorism. As the United States played a valuable mediation role during Britain’s peace process with Ireland, a Brexit inspired return to violence would almost certainly create friction in Anglo-American relations.

Conclusions

At a time when the international liberal order is under pressure from autocratic regimes, a strong Anglo-American partnership remains an essential element of Western collective defense and security. Shared history and values, a common language, liberal democracy, legal systems, and commercial networks will ensure continuing close ties between the two countries. Strategic pragmatism, however, is at the heart of the idea of a special relationship, and Brexit could create the biggest challenge to this partnership to date.

The United Kingdom will remain a close security partner of the European Union after the final separation in 2021. But Britain will no longer have a direct influence on the Union’s policies or be able to act as America’s interlocutor. It remains to be seen whether the rhetoric of “Global Britain” is matched by the reality. Even in a benign post-Brexit environment, it is hard to imagine that the United Kingdom could be more than a nominal global security partner for the United States, as the main threats to British interests will remain in the European theater. At best, Brexit will continue to be a distraction from broader international security challenges.

The Brexit process currently dominates Britain’s political and policy agenda and is likely to remain a priority for several years. The current British government seems determined to maintain the special security and defense partnership with the United States. If Brexit is an economic success, or at least not harmful, there is a good prospect that the United Kingdom could remain America’s preferred military partner. But further reductions in Britain’s military capabilities, following an economically damaging Brexit, would fatally weaken that prospect.

In the worst case, Brexit is a perfect storm of economic, political, and security challenges involving a financial crisis, the breakup of the

\(^5^9\) “Twenty Years after a Peace Deal the Mood is Sour in Northern Ireland,” *Economist*, March 31, 2018.

United Kingdom, and a radical left-wing Labour Party government. The military impact alone would include abandoning the nuclear deterrent and cutting conventional forces to the point of military irrelevance. As a result of these factors and pressing domestic challenges in Scotland and Northern Ireland, Britain could experience a long period of strategic introspection during which it would play only a limited role in addressing common Western security threats. In these circumstances, far from being a valued partner, the United Kingdom would become a source of strategic vexation for the United States.