Shooting Up: A Short History of Drugs and War
By Łukasz Kamieński

Reviewed by Dr. Robert J. Bunker, Adjunct Research Professor at the Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College

It is rather rare to do a Parameters book review of a military-related work initially written in Polish—in this instance, the new work Shooting Up. In regard to this review, it has turned out to be an extremely fortuitous experience. The original manuscript published in 2014 by Łukasz Kamieński, a Polish academic, has been painstakingly translated into English by the author and two associates for publication by Oxford University Press, a prestigious publishing house.

At more than 400 pages in length, this in-depth chronological study of the subject of “psychopharmacology in warfare” is a unique document. Indeed, very few works so far have attempted to explore the historical impact of drug use in warfare and the co-evolution of the two over time. The book, influenced by an “interpretivist” epistemology, social constructivism, and the concept of war as “an essentially social and cultural phenomenon” (xxv-xxvi) is composed of a preface, an acknowledgments listing, 14 chapters, a conclusion, an epilogue, a notes section, a bibliography, and an index. The chapters are organized into three themes grouped into the premodern through the Second World War, the Cold War, and the contemporary periods. Chapter foci include the Napoleonic era, the Opium Wars, the American Civil War, the Colonial Wars, the First and Second World Wars, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, the Red Army in Afghanistan, our present conflicts with irregular combatants (including intoxicated child soldiers), and contemporary American armed forces. The work is extremely well researched and well referenced with the inclusion of an extensive bibliography.

Given US societal—and military (as a federal agency of that society)—perspectives on illicit (recreational) and licit (medically prescribed) narcotics use, this significant book—exploring the “taboo subject” of psychoactive compounds (xxiv)—can be analyzed on two levels. The first is the detrimental level of addictive substance abuse, including alcohol and harder illicit commodities such as heroin and cocaine, upon military organizations and the societies they represent. Second, is the beneficial level of licit (and at times illicit) alcohol and narcotics use—such as enhanced performance, as a psychological coping mechanism, and as a reward for troops—upon military organizations. Of course, a vast gray area exists between these levels of use, along with the fact a psychoactive compound may have both simultaneous positive and negative effects upon soldiers at the same time. There is an interplay between what may be beneficial for military operations and what would later be detrimental with regard to societal costs, stemming from high addiction levels of veterans returning home—and this is also an underlying theme of the work.
Personally, I found the Second World War section entitled “The Finns: A Special Case” (132-140)—drawing from the seminal work of Mikko Ylikangas—one of the most fascinating elements. It has helped to explain partially the much-higher performance of the greatly outnumbered Finnish commando units in their engagements with invading Soviet forces during the Second World War. As it turns out, Finnish troops had personal medical kits containing heroin, opium, and Pervitin (an early type of crystal meth) that chemically enhanced their stamina and other human performance factors over extended combat mission periods.

For contemporary military officers and strategists, Kamieński’s book provides a very informative historical overview of the use of narcotics in warfare from classical Greece into the early 21st century. Given the United States’ decades-long conflicts with irregular armies, often partially composed of child soldiers, the two chapters on them (12 and 13) should almost be considered mandatory reading—though much of the irregular armies information has been drawn directly from US Army War College professor Paul Rexton Kan’s scholarship. The work also provides a rare glimpse into how and when US military personnel may possibly utilize prescribed narcotics such as “go-pills” and “no-go pills” (263-282) for mission performance requirements. The book does not, however, yield any insights into potential near-peer (e.g. Russian) or peer (e.g. Chinese) competitor military use of such performance-enhancing narcotics and thus must be considered one of its few limitations.

In summation, this exceedingly informative work, especially when combined with Paul Rexton Kan’s seminal Drugs and Contemporary Warfare (Potomac, 2009), would provide an excellent textbook foundation from which to teach a military university course focusing on this still esoteric—yet increasingly important—component of modern military activities. It is easy-to-read, affordable, and a gem of a work produced by a little-known, yet brilliant, academic hailing from the esteemed Jagiellonian University in Kraków, Poland.

**Drones**

The Drone Debate — A Primer on the US Use of Unmanned Aircraft Outside Conventional Battlefields

By Avery Plaw, Matthew S. Fricker, and Carlos R. Colon

Reviewed by Ulrike Esther Franke, Doctoral Candidate at the University of Oxford, Supervised by Sir Hew Strachan

The Drone Debate by Avery Plaw, Matthew S. Fricker, and Carlos R. Colon is a comprehensive book on the debate around the United States’ use of unmanned aircraft outside conventional battlefields. It is particularly suited for teaching as it provides the reader with a broad understanding of the issues surrounding the US drone campaigns.

The three authors work together at the University of Massachusetts Dartmouth; Fricker and Colon are co-founders of the University’s Center for the Study of Targeted Killing. In six chapters, plus an introduction
and conclusion, the authors address the major issues and questions with regard to US drone use outside official battlefields: legality, ethical questions, strategy, and politics, as well as emerging issues such as the proliferation of drones.

*The Drone Debate* is a very comprehensive book. It raises the right issues and quotes the right people—Sarah Kreps, Micah Zenko, Bradley Strawser, Peter W. Singer, and Audrey Cronin among others—and also includes lesser-known but important voices in the debate such as Farha Taj. The book presents and balances opposed views without taking sides; however, at a time when new drone books are flooding the market, a new book must be measured by whether it fills a gap in the literature. While *The Drone Debate* fills a gap in available teaching material, content-wise it does not.

As I have argued, the current debate on drones suffers from a disproportionate focus on a very specific, albeit by no means typical, use of drones: their use by the US armed forces and intelligence agencies for targeted killings outside official battlefields. As is correctly noted in *The Drone Debate*, of the nearly 11,000 drones in US possession, “only a small number (fewer than 450) are physically capable of carrying armaments in known configurations and among that group a much smaller number actually carry weapons and are operational at any given time. The vast majority of UAVs fielded by the United States are mini (or micro) drones such as the Raven and Wasp which make up 89 percent of the military’s drone inventory (9,765 drones in total)” (282, numbers from Samuel J. Brennan, Ethan Griffin, and Rhys McCormick, *Sustaining the US Lead in Unmanned Systems*, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2014). On the global scale, the numbers are even more skewed towards small, unarmed systems.

Hence, the debate on drones would greatly benefit from more work on non-US drone use, on military drone use for other purposes than targeted killings, on drone use in conventional wars rather than asymmetric ones, and on drone use in official war zones rather than outside of them. The authors of *The Drone Debate* focus on US drone use outside of official warzones. This does not make it a bad book, but somewhat less groundbreaking and original.

*The Drone Debate* is a good tool for teaching as it allows students to get a very comprehensive overview of the current state of the debate. I would recommend assigning this book to students taking a class on drone warfare for the first time, as well as to interested members of the general public. After all, the authors point out, “people cannot be said to consent to a policy of which they are ignorant.” (2) I also recommend combining the reading assignment with other publications that further highlight elements of drone usage such as the Center for a New American Security’s *Global Perspectives, A Drone Saturated Future* (2016); David Hambling’s *Swarm Troopers* (2015); and several papers out of Peter Bergen and Daniel Rothenberg’s *Drone Wars* (2015). This list is by no means comprehensive.

One of the book’s strengths is the discussion of different approaches to measure (civilian) casualties of drone strikes (28ff), which nicely depicts the difficulties researchers face when trying to gather data and to analyze them correctly. On this subject, the authors’ expertise
is particularly strong—Avery Plaw had previously published a highly recommendable paper on this question in Bradley Strawser's *Killing by Remote Control* (2013). I particularly enjoyed the end of the book where the authors start engaging with the issues raised throughout the book and explain how drones have become “the poster child” for targeted killing (333).

All in all, while I would not consider *The Drone Debate* essential reading for those already familiar with the debate, it is useful teaching material and a good primer for the general public—as it was intended by the authors.

**Mercenaries and Private Contractors**

**The Modern Mercenary: Private Armies and What They Mean for World Order**

By Sean McFate

Reviewed by COL Scott L. Efflandt, XO to Commanding General, FORSCOM

Global economic recession, failing states, and a rise in transnational organizations provide ample material for consumers and scholars to synthesize when considering the many changes to the character of war. For most, the ongoing wars in the Middle East have become a constant environmental condition, typically getting little more than a running banner update at the bottom of the news broadcast. With so much ongoing, it is easy to lose sight of the potential second-order effects that may indicate a tectonic shift in civilian-military relations.

Sean McFate breaks this pattern in *The Modern Mercenary* by expertly looking at recent/ongoing wars to explain the increased use of private military companies (PMCs, also referenced in literature as private security companies—PSCs). By outlining the influence of the above factors, he argues this trend will likely affect future wars and indicates an ongoing evolution of the world system. He explains the phenomenon of the contemporary mercenary in three areas. The first part of the book explains why “soldiers for hire” are used. Second, a detailed examination of recent wars scopes the breadth and depth of the current phenomenon. Lastly, the book theorizes as to how this recent and sharp increase in the use of mercenaries will affect who wages war in the future.

Chapters one through five explain the mechanics of modern mercenary activities in contrast to historical norms. By definition, a mercenary is a person who performs coercive military duties for pay without allegiance to a state or sovereign. McFate illustrates such a simple definition, while adequate for understanding the phenomenon from Machiavelli through Forsyth’s novel in 1974, is not sufficient to capture the multi-billion dollar industry that has emerged since 9-11. By building on the contemporary works of Singer and Avant, the author provides a more nuanced and complete understanding using the PMC as the central unit of analysis. These are further divided into two categories—mercenary companies (capable of independent campaigns) and military enterprises (train, advise, and equip armies for command by others). The distinction
proves useful in the author’s application of economic theory in a market economy to explain three factors: a) the conditions that have caused the industry to grow, b) why the industry is dominated by a US military paradigm, and c) why the need for PMCs will continue to grow.

Beyond validating the utility of the above construct, the middle two chapters provide a tour-de-force of the mercenary industry today—with a level of insight and detail unrivaled in any other research in this field. This material is clearly informed by McFate’s previous mercenary experience with DynCorp, which he acknowledges in the foreword. The purists among social scientists might cry foul at the unavoidable bias this induces. Alternately, one could counter this is the price of admission to get such clarity and detail, especially when dealing with such a guarded topic as this. The author’s experience aside, the robust use of references adds depth and credibility to the book. In keeping with the author’s quality of scholarship, even more detailed information on mercenary contracts and operations in Liberia is available in the three annexes.

In the closing five chapters, the aforementioned framework and contemporary operations are used to support the argument that the private military industry will perpetuate and, in turn, induce larger societal change because the world is entering the “neomedievalism” period. As such, states will continue to exist but they will play a less significant role in the global system as they increasingly compete with other global actors for political dominance. This fragmentation of global society will lead to the use of mercenaries for war by any actor who can afford it. The author concludes in the future the institutional military will more closely resemble the condottieri of pre-Westphalia (a return to the natural condition) than the national armies dominating modern times. The rationale for the conclusion relied on a European centric analysis of warfare over the last 800 years, without acknowledging the inherent distinct histories of other cultures over longer time frames. Put differently, could one analyze the Peloponnesian War and draw the same conclusion? While the conclusion falls short of being compelling, this is exactly how a good book—such as this one—should end. It leaves the reader with new questions.

In summary, for those who wish to understand the current state-of-play of commercial soldiers or contemporary civilian-military relations The Modern Mercenary is a must-read foundational text. The book is clearly written, well documented, and insightful and stands as a pillar in this field. Through the use of thought-provoking applications of contemporary theory the author lays the foundation for future research in important areas.
Jacob L. Devers: A General’s Life
By James Scott Wheeler

Reviewed by Dr. Conrad C. Crane, Chief of Historical Services, US Army Heritage and Education Center, US Army War College

James Scott Wheeler’s fine new book is the latest in the Association of the US Army American Warriors series. The need for it is made clear by the first sentence of renowned author Rick Atkinson’s introduction, “No senior American general from World War II has been forgotten more quickly or with less justice than Jacob Loucks Devers.” While Dwight Eisenhower and his subordinate Army Group commanders Omar Bradley and Bernard Montgomery still receive voluminous coverage in history books, Devers and the Sixth Army Group are often ignored.

That is surprising, considering his significant list of accomplishments. After a lively childhood in York, Pennsylvania, Devers graduated from the United States Military Academy in 1909, ranking 39 out of 103. A field artilleryman, he filled a number of assignments at frontier posts until being assigned to help establish a field artillery school at Fort Sill to train the American army going to France for World War I. He was selected to command a field artillery regiment there, but the war ended too soon. After the war, he served a second tour of duty teaching mathematics at West Point, attended staff college at Fort Leavenworth, and then went back to teach at Fort Sill. He served with the office of the Chief of Artillery before going to the Army War College, and then commanded an artillery battalion before becoming the graduate manager of athletics at West Point in 1936.

Through connections with one of his former battalion commanders, Leslie J. McNair, during this time at West Point, Devers came to the attention of George Marshall, and his career skyrocketed. First, Devers was sent to Panama to help rejuvenate defenses there. Then he was brought back to Washington to serve as Marshall’s “fireman,” and soon Devers found himself in charge of Fort Bragg and the Ninth Infantry Division. Looking for a balanced officer not tainted by cavalry or infantry prejudices, Marshall and McNair picked Devers as leader of the new Armored Force in spring 1941. He made such an impression there when Lieutenant General (LTG) Frank Andrews, commander of the US Army European Theater of Operations, died in a plane crash in May 1943, Devers was quickly chosen as his replacement. I found the most revealing part of this book the coverage of Devers work building up to Overlord, especially his support of LTG Ira Eaker, who was trying to vindicate precision bombing doctrine while scrambling to build up the Eighth Air Force. Eaker seems another general who deserves better from history.

Devers and Eaker soon headed for the Mediterranean, where Devers became deputy theater commander and was deeply involved in operations there until he brought elements of his Sixth Army Group ashore in France in August for the Anvil-Dragoon assault. He led a
combined force of 12 American and 11 French divisions that drove north, cleared Alsace, eventually cleared the Colmar pocket, crossed the Rhine, and participated in the final campaigns that defeated Germany. Few American officers would have been able to handle the stubborn French as well as he did. He actually reached the Rhine in November 1944, and some historians view Ike’s refusal to allow the Sixth Army Group to jump the river then as one of the great lost opportunities of the war. After the surrender, he commanded the Army Ground Forces until heading off for an uneventful retirement out of the limelight.

It is worth contemplating why someone with such a list of accomplishments has been so quickly relegated to the dustbin of history. Devers did not participate in the invasion of Normandy nor the Battle of the Bulge, the two most iconic American battles in northwest Europe. He was not a self-promoter, and later was accused of having “foot-in-mouth” disease with the press, though he was never involved in any scandals. He did not write a memoir. His relationships with his peers were respectful, but not close, and he never became part of Eisenhower’s inner circle. Wheeler believes the source of Ike’s reticence towards Devers started in North Africa, when George Marshall sent his chief of the Armored Force to check on early operations. Assaulted by many problems, Ike probably saw the senior Devers as a possible replacement, and from then on he viewed Devers more as a rival than a subordinate, though Devers never perceived that.

I once participated in a generalship panel at West Point with noted historians Stephen Ambrose, Martin Blumenson, and Brooks Kleber, and they argued the press usually creates great generals, while historians spend eternity trying to adjust those images. Scott Wheeler has done an admirable job countering a veritable press vacuum with a rich account worthy of being read by anyone interested in World War II. Devers might not have gotten much attention in his day, but he deserves it now.

**An American Soldier in the Great War: The World War I Diary and Letters of Elmer O. Smith**
Edited by John DellaGiustina

Reviewed by COL Douglas V. Mastriano, PhD, Department of Military Strategy, Plans and Operations, US Army War College

One hundred years ago, Europe was ablaze with fire and death. In February 1916, the German army launched a devastating attack towards the French city of Verdun. As the casualties mounted, and the Battle of Verdun dragged on, the French appealed to their British Allies to launch an attack along the northern portion of the Western Front to relieve the pressure. The British obliged and began the Somme Offensive on July 1, 1916. The attack had the desired effect, and reduced the pressure on the French at Verdun, though at a terrible price in lives and treasure for the United Kingdom. It would be another year before the United States entered the war. Yet, when it did, tens of thousands of young Americans rallied to the flag and volunteered to serve. Among these patriotic volunteers was Elmer O. Smith.

The story begins with Elmer’s early days in the Army. Sadly, the United States did little to prepare for the war, and rapidly expanded its prewar force of 220,000 to more than four million troops in only eighteen months. Although an impressive feat, the ability of these soldiers to fight “modern” war, was in doubt. This was not helped by General John Pershing’s intent to reject the wartime lessons learned by the French and British. Pershing instead believed American soldiers armed with rifles and bayonets would win the day. Such a view triggered the French Prime Minister, Georges Clemenceau, to retort, “If the Americans do not permit the French to teach them, then the Germans will do so.” Soldiers like Elmer Smith would pay the price for America’s lack of preparedness and for Pershing’s ill-advised ideas on how to fight in 1918.

Yet, like other soldiers in the American Expeditionary Forces, Elmer Smith trained hard and looked forward to fighting. Serving in the 32nd Division’s 119th Field Artillery Regiment, Smith participated in four major campaigns, and had more than 60 days in combat. He was wounded by German artillery, endured gas attacks, and, more importantly, provided support to four American divisions (the 79th, 3rd, 89th, and 32th) during the heaviest fighting Americans encountered in the war.

Of Smith’s combat experience, his 37 days in the Meuse Argonne were perhaps the most significant. The Meuse Argonne Campaign remains America’s largest offensive ever, with more than 1.2 million soldiers serving in the line. It was part of four major attacks across the Western Front planned by the first Allied Supreme Commander (Generalissimo), Marshal Ferdinand Foch. This brilliant broad front attack contributed to bringing the war to an end on November 11, 1918. Smith served in all but the last week of this important campaign. His role was important in that he participated in the reduction of the “Kriemhilde Stellung,” the last German defensive line in the region. Once his division penetrated the Kriemhilde, the ability of the German army to blunt the American attack all but came to an end.

*An American Soldier in the Great War* is a timely book about one soldier who did his duty in the face of daunting odds. John DellaGiustina tells a story worth reading, especially during the centennial commemoration of World War I. Through it all, the enduring lessons of having a trained and ready army echo across the generations to us today. Indeed, men like Smith and countless others found themselves in a war their nation was not prepared for. Many paid the ultimate price for the lack of American preparedness. Hopefully, books like this one, will remind the nation of the need for eternal vigilance to maintain the peace and to secure final victory.
Connecticut Unscathed: Victory in the Great Narragansett War
By Jason W. Warren

Reviewed by Dr. Matthew S. Muehlbauer, author of Ways of War: American Military History from the Colonial Era to the Twenty-First Century and Adjunct Professor of Military History, Austin Peay State University

The conflict generally known as King Philips War ravaged southern New England in 1675-76, generating thousands of casualties and refugees. Death, flight, and the subsequent sale of Indian captives into slavery roughly halved the region’s native population. Among the victorious colonies, about a dozen towns in Massachusetts Bay, Plymouth, and Rhode Island were completely destroyed, with more partially damaged. But, as author Jason W. Warren observes, Connecticut remained relatively “unscathed” during the war. Focusing on this colony, he offers a new perspective on the conflict, as prior treatments emphasized those areas where intense hostilities occurred. In doing so, Warren challenges accepted notions about combat during the war, as well as its very name.

Warren first notes how Connecticut and local indigenous peoples had maintained amicable mutual relations since the Pequot War of 1637-38. When King Philips War began, Massachusetts Bay and Plymouth were surprised by the initial Indian attacks and reacted by incarcerating peaceful native groups within their jurisdictions. In contrast, Mohegans, Pequots, and other local peoples provided crucial intelligence to Connecticut authorities and helped protect the colony throughout the war. Moreover, cross-cultural cooperation fostered a unique tactical approach among its field forces.

Standard narratives of King Philips War describe militia forces as hapless in the face of native ambushes and raids. Late in the war, colonists began to work with Indian allies. Some commanders created mixed units of both settlers and Indian warriors who used native tactics: relying upon terrain and stealthy movement, and forgoing closed-order formations typical of European combat. One of these, led by Benjamin Church, hunted down and killed Philip himself, the Wampanoag leader traditionally blamed for launching the war. Warren challenges this interpretation, asserting it relies heavily on Benjamin Church’s memoirs and similar accounts. Among Connecticut’s forces, Warren claims a military “division of labor” existed between the soldiers and native warriors on campaign (13). Whereas the latter functioned as scouts and flankers, troopers provided firepower once targets had been located and fixed by the warriors. (In contrast to other colonies’ infantry, Warren notes most of Connecticut’s were mounted.) Similarly, colonists assaulted fortifications, whereas Indians would form an outer perimeter to prevent enemies from escaping.

A significant research challenge for the colonial period is Indian peoples left no records. English settlers occasionally noted native perspectives, though scholars then need to account for biases in their transcriptions. Warren shares some intriguing documents that speak to Indian views, such as the accounts of hostile warriors Menowalett and Cohas (74-77). These demonstrate the complex nature of Indian
identity: the tribal labels settlers used to designate various native groups (“Niantics,” etc.) did not necessarily reflect native affiliations, which were complicated by kinship networks. Warren notes this challenge made the colonists’ reliance upon trustworthy native allies all the more important, for they could better determine allegiances among New England’s disparate indigenous groups and colonists. He also employs archeological research and terrain analysis to bolster his argument.

The relative lack of Indian perspectives is significant for aspects of Warren’s argument. In particular, he asserts native allies helped to deflect enemy incursions into Connecticut and minimize the damage from those that occurred. Warren also devotes a chapter to fortifications, noting they also helped deter attacks upon the colony. But, without access to Indian points of view and deliberations, we cannot know the relative impact of these factors upon the native leaders who directed attacks against English settlements. Though not a means to solve the problem, more discussion of developments beyond Connecticut might have helped mitigate this issue, or at least provided more context for understanding available alternatives.

As for Warren’s claim the conflict should be known as the Great Narragansett War, other scholarship indicates Philip’s influence over events was limited, and the Narragansetts deserve more attention in the broader history of the region. The fact that the war was half over before the Narragansetts became active belligerents—and only did so after the New England colonies launched a pre-emptive attack against their homeland—should give one pause. Moreover, such a change would deflect attention from the experiences of the other indigenous peoples who fought and suffered during the conflict (similar to the current problem of calling it King Philip’s War)—including those who initiated hostilities.

These concerns, however, should not obscure the value of Warren’s work. Whereas many scholars highlight examples of cultural adaptability, and particularly how colonists adopted native combat techniques, Warren asserts—at least in 1675-76—Connecticut colonists still relied primarily on tactics predominant in Europe, with Mohegan and Pequot allies fulfilling functions for which they were better suited in New England’s wooded terrain. His book is an important contribution to the literature.

**War and Ethics**

**The Ethics of Armed Conflict: A Cosmopolitan Just War Theory**

By John Lango

Reviewed by Dr. Pauline M. Shanks Kaurin, author of *The Warrior, Military Ethics and Contemporary Warfare: Achilles Goes Asymmetric*, and Associate Professor and Chair, Department of Philosophy, Pacific Lutheran University

In *The Ethics of Armed Conflict: A Cosmopolitan Just War Theory*, John Lango brings a cosmopolitan, universal human rights orientation to the discussion of Just War Theory that is accessible to non-specialists.
His thesis is Just War Theory should be understood deontologically and oriented around the following points: 1) a revisionist approach to just war, including all kinds of responsible agents; 2) a focus on the Security Council; 3) a preventative approach, including non-violent tools; 4) a temporalizing approach to present and future conflicts; 5) a coherentist approach, including just war and general moral principles and real-world cases; and 6) a universal human rights approach, including a variety of forms of armed conflict. (ix) There are multiple themes and moving parts in this ambitious book; it covers a great deal of philosophical ground with significant discussion of real-world conflicts, past and present.

As a scholar and teacher of the Just War Tradition and military ethics, I found several points worth highlighting. First, Lango raises the issue of which acts count as military actions as opposed to non-military actions—notably the question of whether threats of military force are types of military actions and count as war. The second is his focus on the Security Council and the locus for cosmopolitan arguments; Lango admits it is flawed, but it is the best we have at present. Third, he wants to expand the class of persons considered under Just War Theory to “all responsible persons,” not just the usual combatant/non-combatant distinctions. Finally, he considers the question of whether one can justify using military threats to prevent mass atrocities; this is a question of keen interest to those considering humanitarian interventions or peacekeeping operations.

While there is much that merits consideration in this book, and I commend the complexity of the issues and theoretical considerations Lango is wrestling with, this volume is still heavy on theory and would be challenging for non-specialists to find accessible and useful. I think that is the nature of these kinds of discussions, and it is a difficult needle to thread. Case studies certainly help in this regard, but there are too many theoretical balls in the air to hold onto the flow of the argument from beginning to end, much less to then reflect upon the implications of the arguments Lango is making for the practice and conduct of war.

In terms of specific arguments and claims, Lango’s use of philosophical action theory is really interesting and potentially useful; however, he needed to develop it in a more accessible and streamlined way so readers could see how it was integrated into the overall argument. Given the preventative arguments and the focus on the status of military threats in the overall discussion, the theory of action section was weak in laying the necessary foundation for those arguments.

I also found myself wondering how Lango thinks about individual responsibility, especially in the context of the conduct of war for responsible agents and for citizens in a cosmopolitan world. He seems more comfortable with arguments that address a more collective view of action and responsibility, presumably out of his concern to expand these arguments to “all responsible agents.” Are there different levels or kinds of accountability for some responsible agents (say those involved in military action) as opposed to others (like citizens, victims of atrocities)? How does the answer to these questions change the way we think about responsibility in war? He indicates he holds some “revisionist” views, and authors in that vein, like Jeff McMahan, are moving towards an individualist account and rejecting collectivist accounts of responsibility in war for combatants.
In short, this book will be most useful to those well versed in Anglo-American moral philosophy and contemporary Just War Theory, especially those interested in thinking about war in a more cosmopolitan way. Those who consider themselves in the realist camp, and/or are interested in strategy, will find much to be challenged by in terms of arguments and perspectives. The book does raise some important questions, and it will spark discussions in those areas amongst scholars who can advance the debate and then make the ideas more generally accessible than they are here.

COUNTERINSURGENCY

The Soul of Armies: Counterinsurgency Doctrine and Military Culture in the US and UK
By Austin Long

Reviewed by Colonel Ian C. Rice, Military Faculty, Defense Analysis Department, Naval Postgraduate School

How did it come to this? Austin Long asked, reflecting on the endless briefings in the over-staffed headquarters where he worked as a policy analyst in both Afghanistan and Iraq. In The Soul of Armies, Dr. Long, now a Columbia University political science professor, explores the question: how does an army’s organizational culture impact how it conducts counter-insurgency?

Long argues an army’s ability to execute a counter-insurgency campaign is rooted in formative experiences during the 19th century. These early experiences shaped organizational cultures that persist to this day, and some organizational cultures are better suited for counter-insurgency than others. Combining social science methods and archival evidence, Long develops two organizational archetypes—the continental army model where formative experiences and professionalization focus on fighting and winning major wars for national survival against strong state enemies and the maritime army model centered on frequent wars of choice designed to support imperial maintenance with smaller numbers of distributed forces.

The author looks at four cases: Vietnam and Kenya, and his first-hand experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq. Long compares the performances of the US Army representing the continental army model, with both the US Marine Corps and the British Army as examples of the maritime army model. His evidence demonstrates continental armies perform differently than their maritime counterparts with the former focused on large-scale operations and an overwhelming use of firepower to achieve results, while maritime armies (typically operating in small numbers) depend on their ability to find, select, and then work effectively with local partners, partners who will do much of the fighting.

Long’s investigation into organizational archetypes is in good company. In a 1964 study, French Revolutionary Warfare from Indochina to Algeria: The Analysis of Political and Military Doctrine, Peter Paret also noted these differences. He contrasted “pure soldiers” who were only useful in
Europe with French colonial troops who were expected to be self-reliant and manage their sectors with a special emphasis on “local conditions.” In a style accessible to both scholarly and professional military readerships, Long’s historical analysis is also a worthy companion to more recent works focused on the doctrinal origins of counter-insurgency, namely Douglas Porch’s *Counterinsurgency: Exposing the Myths of the New Way of War*, David French’s *The British Way of Counter-Insurgency, 1945-1967* and Brian McAllister Linn’s *Echo of Battle: The Army’s Way of War*. Notably, John Nagl’s *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons From Malaya and Vietnam* compares the American and British armies’ ability to learn from experiences, whereas Long stresses the longevity of the founding culture.

Currently, a tiny task force of predominately special operations “counter-insurgents” is training and advising indigenous forces to dislodge the Islamic State from Iraq and Syria. The results of the operation may produce more evidence to bolster Long’s argument. Will the multi-layered headquarters atop the small advise-and-assist force limit itself to supporting Iraq’s military, or will the strong organizational pull of Long’s continental archetype lead to an increase in ground forces and greater US and coalition involvement?

It is unlikely the importance of organizational culture will diminish anytime soon. Policymakers, military professionals, and scholars will all gain insights from this book. Long provides cause for introspection by those who variously formulate policy, conduct operations, and study this “new way of war.” However, there must be something missing in how the United States wages counter-insurgency campaigns. Although Long presents convincing evidence that organizational culture impacts the conduct of counter-insurgency operations, as he points out, the key for successful campaigns must rest beyond organizational culture alone. Perhaps the larger question is not just which, but whether these two land-force archetypes have ever successfully countered ongoing insurgencies in the first place.

### ISIS

**Black Flags: The Rise of ISIS**

By Joby Warrick

Reviewed by Dr. W. Andrew Terrill, a recently retired research professor from the US Army War College

Washington Post reporter Joby Warrick’s study of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) is primarily a history of the emergence and expansion of the organization well before it began using the name ISIS. Approximately, the first two-thirds of the book deals with the activities of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the Jordanian street criminal turned terrorist, who became the leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), a predecessor of ISIS. As a violent street thug, Zarqawi was convinced by his mother to study Islam at a local mosque in the hope he could be straightened out. While he did respond to some Islamic ideas, he filtered these ideas through his own violent outlook and later became further radicalized in Afghanistan.
After returning to Jordan, the incipient jihadist leader was imprisoned by authorities in 1992 for terrorism-related activities. Then, in the harsh conditions of al-Jafr Prison, Zarqawi formed a partnership with a radical Islamist propagandist and spiritual leader, Abu Mohammed al-Maqdisi, eventually becoming the unquestioned leader of the radical Islamist prisoners. Later, Zarqawi was released from prison in 1999 through what Warrick characterizes as a Jordanian bureaucratic mistake concerning who was eligible for a sweeping royal pardon following King Abdullah’s assumption of the throne. Eventually the ex-inmate ended up back in Afghanistan as the leader of a small band of terrorists. While there, Zarqawi hoped to coordinate with Osama bin Laden, but the al-Qaeda leader did not have the time or interest to meet with him and assigned this duty to subordinates.

Zarqawi’s rise, from a small-time radical bin Laden could not be bothered with to an internationally known terrorist leader, occurred because of the Iraq war. In late 2001 or early 2002, Zarqawi saw a potential Iraq war as an opportunity to lead his small band of terrorists against the American troops he felt were certain to invade the country. He and his followers correspondingly infiltrated into an area of Kurdish Iraq outside of the control of Iraqi dictator, Saddam Hussein. There he attached himself to Ansar al-Islam, a group of al-Qaeda-affiliated Kurdish insurgents, who were waging war against the regime.

Warrick maintains this move led the Bush administration to give Zarqawi an inadvertent reputational boost by singling him out as a premier al-Qaeda operative during Secretary of State Colin Powell’s February 2003 United Nations speech, made to justify a possible US-led invasion of Iraq. In that speech, Powell strongly implied Zarqawi could not have been in Iraq unless Saddam was providing him with sanctuary. The administration made these assertions despite regular skirmishes between Zarqawi’s forces and the Iraqi army, as well as the terrorist leader’s decision to align with radical Kurds, who viewed Saddam’s policies towards their ethnic group as genocidal. Warrick further describes the CIA’s chief “Zarqawi expert” as mortified by the mistakes in Powell’s presentation. Unfortunately, the speech did have an important, if unforeseen, political impact by helping to make Zarqawi a terrorist celebrity, and thereby increasing his ability to raise money and attract recruits. Warrick also maintains President Bush considered striking the Zarqawi and Ansar al-Islam terrorist base, but stopped short of doing so because destroying Zarqawi’s headquarters and killing a number of terrorists would undermine a key rationale about the need for war.

After the invasion of Iraq, Zarqawi rapidly expanded his suddenly thriving organization, benefiting from Sunni anger over the disbanding of the Iraqi army and the US-sponsored program of de-Ba’athification. Surprisingly, for a semi-educated criminal turned jihadist, Zarqawi emerged as a remarkably insightful and agile strategist. By contrast, the US administration characterized the Iraqi resistance as Ba’athist “dead-enders” who were simply striking out blindly. Armed with such a narrative, many US officials failed to recognize patterns in Zarqawi’s attacks which indicated his strategy for undermining the occupation.

Warrick maintains Zarqawi bombed the Jordanian embassy in Baghdad not simply for revenge against the monarchy, but also to discourage other nations from establishing diplomatic relations with Iraq.
Likewise, the murder of the head of the UN Mission to Iraq, Sergio Vieira de Mello, and a number of other UN personnel in a truck bombing was meant to convey the message NGOs might want to find work elsewhere. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Zarqawi attacked Iraq’s Shi’ites in an effort to poison sectarian relations, incite civil war, and make Iraq ungovernable. Warrick maintains back in the United States, Vice President Cheney and his aides were putting pressure on the CIA to link Zarqawi to Saddam, rather than unraveling the terrorist leader’s strategy for undermining the occupation. Conversely, bin Laden was taking notice of the former nobody from the Jordanian slums and the two eventually negotiated an agreement, whereby Zarqawi became al-Qaeda’s emir (prince and leader) in Iraq.

Warrick characterizes Zarqawi’s orders for the bombing of three Western hotels in Amman, Jordan as a major mistake that unified most of the country against him, despite some previous public sympathy for any organizations resisting US forces in Iraq. While the terrorist leader claimed he was striking at Israeli and American intelligence operatives, the deaths of large numbers of Jordanian civilians, including children, rapidly undermined these claims. The strike also enabled Jordan’s King Abdullah to intensify his struggle against al-Qaeda in Iraq and to improve his already good intelligence cooperation with the United States.

These bonds, which extended to intelligence operations in Iraq, were to be of tremendous help in hunting down the renegade Jordanian. Eventually, in response to a great deal of effort by a number of intelligence officials, Zarqawi was found and then killed in a US airstrike in June 2006. This loss caused his organization to enter a rapid downward spiral due to the lack of any equally charismatic leader. Warrick also maintains “fusion cells” composed of US Special Forces and intelligence units played a major role in defeating the organization, as did the formation of anti-al-Qaeda Sunni militias as a central part of the US-sponsored anti-jihadi Awakening Councils.

The Syrian revolution helped revive AQI after the post-Zarqawi leadership sponsored a jihadi force known as the al-Nusra Front to oppose the brutal and unpopular Bashar Assad government. AQI, which had undergone a number of name changes during its years of operation, became ISIS during this time frame and eventually sent a number of its own directly affiliated fighters into Syria where they sought to seize territory and re-absorb al-Nusra. The al-Nusra leaders had maintained only limited ties to ISIS during the Syrian fighting and did not wish to be integrated directly into that organization. The disagreement between the two groups then expanded to include al-Qaeda’s formal leaders in Pakistan. When al-Qaeda leader Ayman al Zawahiri attempted to force ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi to allow al-Nusra to exist independently, he was simply ignored, and ISIS seized considerable territory from al-Nusra with significant numbers of casualties on both sides.

This conflict led to ISIS being expelled from al-Qaeda, an event which had no impact on the organization’s soaring fortunes, as it came to dominate the Syrian opposition. The ISIS leadership also cleverly moved to establish improved relations with many of Iraq’s Sunni tribes which Zarqawi had previously alienated. Seething with resentment of the Shi’ite-led government in Baghdad, many tribal leaders were convinced ISIS would not repeat AQI’s brutal mistakes in alienating the
Sunni tribes. This judgment proved to be mistaken tragically when ISIS imposed an administration of harsh, and often arbitrary, brutality on northern Iraq following its successful military offensive in June 2014.

In evaluating ISIS occupation of Syrian and Iraqi territory, Warrick quotes a young Syrian man who describes “a culture of backwardness and terror, [which emerges] after extinguishing the light of the mind.” Warrick also quotes a teenage gunman who views his role as an ISIS fighter as “quite fun” and compares his experience to a 3D video game. Warrick continuously notes Islam under ISIS is anything its leadership says it is, and ISIS ideology and the religion of Islam are two radically different things. While such observations are useful, the ISIS ideology remains a long way from the oblivion it richly deserves, and the group itself continues to show resilience and flexibility, as well as an ability to absorb tough military punishment and still strike hard at the civilized world. One suspects many more high-quality books on ISIS, such as this one, will need to be written in the future as this ugly chapter in human history continues to play out.

**Social Science Goes to War: The Human Terrain System in Iraq and Afghanistan**
By Montgomery McFate and Janice H. Laurence, Eds.

Reviewed by Ryan D. Wadle, Professor of Comparative Military Studies at the Air Command and Staff College

When the Human Terrain System (HTS) appeared at the height of Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom in 2007, it represented an admission on the part of the defense establishment—it lacked enough knowledge of local conditions to wage a population-centric counterinsurgency campaign effectively. The HTS sought to embed individual Human Terrain Teams (HTTs) at the brigade level in order to provide an operationally useful understanding of local culture and conditions and to bridge knowledge gaps as military units rotated in and out of theater. The HTS attracted media attention because it presented a novel solution to a difficult problem and also through issues surrounding the proper execution of its ambitious vision. It continues to spark discussion in defense and academic circles, even as the American contingents in Iraq and Afghanistan are but a fraction of their former size and as the public shows reluctance to support any further long-term counterinsurgency campaigns. As one of the first academic studies of the HTS, the edited volume *Social Science Goes to War* succeeds at its stated goal of illuminating how the HTTs performed in theater and meaningfully contributed to the war effort.

*Social Science Goes to War* includes 11 chapters: three describe the conduct of research by the HTTs, another three detail how the HTTs sought to integrate their research into the military decision-making process in a meaningful way, and two discuss the historical and contemporary ethics issues raised by the employment of the HTS. The
remaining chapters overview the HTS’ establishment, explore the gulf between the military and academic communities, and frankly assess the HTS’ past and future utility to the Department of Defense. Unlike some edited volumes where the quality of the individual chapters varies widely, the contributions to *Social Science Goes to War* are uniformly strong and valuable in providing unique insights into various aspects of the HTS.

A few common themes emerge across the volume. Most notably, there is a defensive tone to nearly every chapter, likely because the contributors—nearly all of whom worked with the HTS in some capacity—felt compelled to counteract negative, and often unfair, perceptions of the program. These views of the HTS stemmed from the outsized negative media coverage of its failings, including disciplinary issues of personnel and the deaths of four HTT members. The HTS also received widespread vitriolic condemnation by members of the American Anthropological Association (AAA) against any cooperation between members of its profession and the military. Carolyn Fluehr-Lobban and George R. Lucas Jr. link the latter’s criticism to anthropology’s historical association with colonialism and unsavory projects such as the Vietnam War’s infamous Operation Phoenix.

Yet, for all of the concerns raised by the AAA, the researchers sought to follow the ethical guidelines issued by the AAA, the American Political Science Association, and other peer bodies. The researchers protected the anonymity of their interview subjects in accordance with the principle of “do no harm,” and out of fear of generating lists of suspected insurgents for host units to act upon. The military units they operated with concurred in this decision because, as James Dorough-Lewis Jr. highlights, identifying key individuals remained the responsibility of military intelligence. In fact, the most notable shortcomings from an academic perspective were more procedural than ethical as security concerns and time constraints often prevented HTTs from conducting the follow-up research necessary to meet academic standards. Rather, the researchers recognized they needed to provide timely “ snapshots” of local conditions to be of use to their host units.

While highlighting the contributions social science research made in the field, the authors all concede the HTS had several shortcomings and limitations. The HTS never fully accomplished its stated goal of easing the transition between old units rotating home and new units taking their places—largely because new units often sought to gain their own perspective on the battlespace rather than rely on their predecessors perspectives. As an experimental program, the HTS was administered through a contract that limited direct oversight by military officials and led to numerous poor personnel decisions in both hiring and management, creating unnecessary friction. Despite these and other problems, however, Janice H. Laurence points out numerous independent evaluations of the HTS concluded it had ultimately proven effective at providing the desired knowledge to host units and reducing their reliance on lethal operations to succeed.

*Social Science Goes to War* is an excellent volume about an often-misunderstood element of the American experience in Iraq and Afghanistan. One hopes the thoughtfulness of the volume will lead to more reasoned debates on the relationship between the military and academic communities—and a search for possible common ground between them.