Commentaries and Replies

On “The Lure of Strike”

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This commentary is in response to the special commentary, “The Lure of Strike” by Conrad Crane published in the Summer 2013 issue of Parameters (vol. 43, no. 2).

As an admirer of Dr. Conrad Crane, it genuinely saddens me to see his new essay, “The Lure of Strike.” Here we have a distinguished historian becoming, in essence, an “interservice hit man,” and chief spokesperson for the Army’s small but burgeoning neo-Luddite wing. Regrettably, his essay sounds too much like that of a 1930’s cavalryman fulminating against the internal combustion that was altering the way the Army would fight wars.

Dr. Crane starts by expressing the belief that because of what he seems to think is a nefarious Air Force, America suffers from the delusion that technology inevitably produces what he calls “short, tidy wars with limited landpower commitments.” Where he gets this notion isn’t clear. The Air Force, which sandwiched a decade of no-fly zone enforcement marked by hundreds of Iraqi anti-aircraft engagements between years of wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, certainly does not view conflict that way. Nor does the general public, whose rejection of stand-off strikes against Syria is ample evidence that it has no illusions about the potential unintended consequences of any use of force.

Regardless, defending Army force structure is plainly the raison d’être of Crane’s piece. Indeed, “The Lure of Strike” is reducible to a simple syllogism: if technological developments allow for “short, tidy wars with limited landpower commitments” then that will inevitably mean (in his thinking) a smaller Army. To him, a smaller Army is, ipso facto, bad. Ergo, technology is bad. Classic Neo-Ludditism.

Exactly why Dr. Crane is not advocating that the Army develop its own method for conducting “short, tidy wars with limited landpower commitments” is also unclear. After all, such conflicts would limit the risk to America’s most precious resource: her sons and daughters and, particularly, those in Army uniforms. It is especially baffling given that a weary Army is just emerging from exactly the opposite: long, untidy wars with massive manpower commitments that produced results most charitably described by Army Colonel Gian Gentile as “unsatisfying.”

Unfortunately, Dr. Crane does not attempt to bring to bear his formidable skills as a historian to address some of the very questions that have spurred the nation’s search for the technology-based alternatives that he rails against. For example, why is it that the best-trained, best-equipped, and most valorous army in the history of warfare was, nevertheless, unable to fully defeat the largely uneducated and lightly-armed tribesmen it significantly outnumbered and wildly outgunned?

Moreover, why did the Army, as it implemented its manpower-intensive strategies in Iraq and Afghanistan, ignore a fundamental lesson of COIN history, that is, that the most powerful insurgent recruitment

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tool is not, as some narratives would have it, the use of high-technology means (such as stand-off strike), but rather the physical presence of foreign troops? Should not the Army ask itself why its leaders repeatedly characterized its warfighting mission as “protecting the Afghan (or Iraqi) people” when the actual assignment was about protecting the American people as Congress’ Authorization to Use Military Force made crystal clear?

And even among those Soldiers who did grasp the true mission, why did so many think that the way to go about it was to try to turn infantrymen armed with high school degrees into social workers, civil engineers, schoolteachers, and boy scouts as Dr. Crane’s COIN doctrine importuned? And then give them the Sisyphean task to transform hostile, ancient cultures into pacific, Westernized societies? Even if that scheme somehow could work, did they not realize that al Qaeda would easily outflank it by decamping to Pakistan, Yemen, and North Africa—not to mention burrowing into urban areas around the globe?

Instead of grappling with those substantive questions of recent history, Dr. Crane launches a lengthy and startlingly venomous attack on America’s most high-tech force, the United States Air Force. According to Crane, not only does airpower fail at every turn, it is Airmen who are disingenuously and deceptively corrupting the national security dialogue. Of course, these hackneyed myths have been rebutted repeatedly, but picking apart the many flaws and omissions in Dr. Crane’s rendition is actually unnecessary. In fact, his essay amply illustrates the limits of the historian’s art when it comes to the technology of war. It really doesn’t matter, for example, what airpower could or could not do during World War II or, for that matter, yesterday, as the only thing that really counts is what it can do today.

And that is plenty. As the President and others have come to learn from material found in bin Laden’s lair and elsewhere, what America’s most dangerous enemies fear the most is not chai-drinking soldiers, female engagement teams, or even masses of infantrymen lumbering about in Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles, but rather being relentlessly hunted by high-tech surveillance and strike platforms.

Of course, no one believes that stand-off, precision strike is always the answer, but—sometimes—it can be. As Tom Ricks’s book *Fiasco* reports, 1998’s Operation Desert Fox—a few days of air and missile strikes—effectively ended Iraq’s nuclear weapons’ program. David Kay, the former United Nations arms inspector, said that after the strikes the Iraqi weapons programs “withered away, and never got momentum again.”

America is a technological nation, and the Army ought to embrace and celebrate that fact even if it means changes. Yet as a developer of robotic ground vehicles told *The New York Times*, “there is a resistance to new technologies being introduced in and around soldiers.” Although infantrymen are hardly obsolete, their numbers and employment strategy is—and should be—reevaluated because of what technology can now offer.

The Army needs to calm itself. Everyone whose opinions anyone should care about knows America needs a robust and dominant Army. There is, in fact, a powerful case to be made for such an Army, but it
is not one premised on denigrating another service, or—especially—suggesting that technology does not and cannot change the calculus of warfighting. In short, our Army must resist “the lure of Neo-Ludditism.”

The Author Replies

Conrad C. Crane

I assume that MG Dunlap, like myself, was under a time crunch to get his submission into the journal, so I will accept the possibility that he might not have had time to read my article thoroughly. After acknowledging the important role of airpower in the American Way of War, my intent was to ensure policymakers do not expect too much of it. They must retain the full range of capabilities of the joint force to keep all military options open. As has been apparent in recent Congressional testimony by the service chiefs, they are all concerned that precipitous cuts in force structure will threaten capabilities necessary to preserve national security. I am equally concerned about exorbitant claims that cyber capabilities will be able to plug the gaps.

I was rather appalled by MG Dunlap’s assault on the Army’s record in Iraq and Afghanistan. There is not enough space in this issue to allow me to address that in much detail. While that might be a topic worth a full issue of the Quarterly in the future, it will also be debated in a wave of historical works to come. Much of his opinion is rooted in his well-known opposition to FM 3-24, and the counterinsurgency operations it proposed. He makes the common error of attacking the tool of COIN, rather than the strategies and policies it supported. Decisionmakers need to have a full toolbox to address security interests. Sometimes necessary approaches will be highly kinetic, but MG Dunlap’s disdain for nonkinetic solutions is apparent. He remains convinced you can fight these kinds of wars from 20,000 feet. He argues that large land force presence always has a self-defeating backlash, ignoring the fact that the Afghan president’s most vociferous complaints to commanders were about the perceived excesses of airpower, not too many Soldiers or Marines. No topic causes more concern among the international students at the Army War College than the issue of drone strikes, which might be good counterterrorism for us, but are often detrimental to counterinsurgency efforts in targeted countries, and can create more enemies in the long run.

I must agree with MG Dunlap that the widespread reluctance to engage in air attacks against Syria is a positive sign that the limitations of technology are being considered by decision makers, though the full scenario has still to unfold. At the same time the complexity of that situation, and these recognized technological shortcomings, highlight the necessity for a wide range of options to be available for policy makers. Meaningful land force commitments are obviously a last resort, but having that capability reassures allies, gives adversaries pause, and adds to the menu of possible solutions to apply to difficult problem sets, especially as potential allies also reduce their military force structure.
and the world becomes more urbanized. Advanced technology remains an important part of that national security equation, and America has to retain that asymmetric edge. Sometimes a few bombs or a few electrons will be enough to accomplish national objectives. But when they are not, there must be other tools in the military toolkit. Sometimes boots on the ground will be necessary.