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OPERATIONAL RESERVATIONS:
CONSIDERATIONS FOR A TOTAL ARMY FORCE

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FOREWORD

Drawdowns in Army funding and in the overall numbers of Soldiers have called attention to the “right sizing” of the “three Armies”—the Active Component, the Army Reserve, and the Army National Guard. As senior leaders of all three components weigh the various options and discuss the merits of an Operational Reserve, it is important that they and civilian policymakers consider the necessary reforms that might have impact on implementing the Army Total Force Policy directed by the Secretary of the Army.

The authors examine the tenets of the Army Total Force Policy, the details of what exactly the term “Operational Reserve” means, and the potential obstacles that are currently in place to disrupt successful reform. The monograph includes questions for senior leader policy considerations, examples of potential concerns, and recommendations to help mitigate obstacles in achieving a suitable and workable Total Army end state. The authors note that the significant changes created by the Reserve Components’ eventual integration will demand concomitant significant organizational cultural change by all three components.

The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to publish this timely thought piece discussing the “field” realities of such an endeavor. It is hoped that this monograph will inspire both senior and junior leaders to recognize the necessity of that cultural shift commencing in the near future.

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SUMMARY

As the Army Reserve Components—the Army Reserve and the Army National Guard—assume an “operational” mission as the force drawdowns in overseas contingency operations occur, the Army senior military and civilian leadership should consider the ramifications and realities of such a mission in what is expected to be a relatively peaceful time. This monograph explores some of the considerations regarding the implementation of the Army Total Force Policy, identifies potential obstacles, and makes recommendations to better engage the “three Armies” in a successful and meaningful reform effort. Throughout, the authors call for significant cultural shifts in thinking about how the Reserve Components are used and integrated into a Total Force.
OPERATIONAL RESERVATIONS: CONSIDERATIONS FOR A TOTAL ARMY FORCE

INTRODUCTION

The Battle Update Briefing for the theater-level command post exercise was going well. The Current Operations Officer, an active duty major, was confident that he had all of the information needed by the Deputy Commanding General, an Army Reserve (AR) major general.

"Sir, we have the three detachments of the 999th MP Company located here, here, and here," he said, indicating three different sectors on the map. "Their primary mission is to secure the main supply—."

"Whoa there!" interrupted the general. "I happen to know that unit—Reserves, yes?"

"Yes, sir."

"When was it mobilized? On whose authority?"

"It was mobilized for this exercise, sir. We mobilized it. It worked well, because the company is already located there in the AO [area of operations]."

"Well, there are a couple problems here, Major. One, we can’t simply mobilize a Reserve unit without proper authority. Two, I happen to know this unit and know that one detachment is in Kuwait, one is in Djibouti, and one is in Kyrgyzstan. How can they just show up on your map?"

"But sir, they are assigned to us."

"Then you should know where they are, and it ain’t there," the general said, pointing to the map.

"Well, it is just for the purposes of the exercise, sir."

"Then I suggest you learn the proper way to mobilize and integrate Reserve forces—we need to train as we fight."
“B-b-but, sir, our Reserves are supposed to be operational . . .”

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That incident actually occurred in mid-2012 (although the unit designation and locations have been changed). As illustrated here, there is often a large disconnect between what Active Component (AC) and Reserve Component (RC) leaders believe about what “Operational” Reserve forces can and cannot accomplish, and how they can be used by Active Component forces.

Importantly, this disconnect has manifested itself in a dichotomy between the Department of Defense (DoD) intentions for an Operational Reserve (OR) and the realities experienced by the RC. While there has been tremendous progress in the last 5 years, it is prudent to review the results and challenges of the Army’s effort toward institutionalizing the OR.

Indeed, the very definition of “OR” is not universally understood, a fact uniformly acknowledged by the senior leaders interviewed for this project. This is mainly because its abstract definition lends itself to being defined as whatever one wishes. This monograph will examine the various definitions and expectations related to the OR and explore how the concept came into being. It will also touch briefly on recent arguments that the federal budget can no longer support an OR.

The monograph will look in-depth at the requirements of both the DoD’s directive to manage the RC as an operational force and the Army’s Total Force Policy (ATFP). A number of potential problems with ATFP will be examined, and suggestions will be made
to mitigate those problems. An examination of the Army’s Force Generation (ARFORGEN) model is also included, with recommendations on how to make the model more useful for planning RC operations and training. Finally, we will examine the almighty budget issue and its implications for the future of the RC.

Throughout the monograph there is a discussion of the various mindsets and organizational cultures that permeate the AC, Army National Guard (ARNG), and Army Reserve (USAR). These have a tremendous impact on the components’ ability to interact and will play a pivotal role in determining the success of the Army’s Total Force efforts.

This monograph will raise more questions than it will provide answers. Although the report will end with a list of recommendations, the most essential takeaway is that the Army must engage in robust discussions about the intent, challenges, and viability of maintaining the RC as a permanent operational force. Only then can prudent decisions be made about the fate of the OR.

BACKGROUND: THE SHIFT FROM STRATEGIC TO OPERATIONAL RESERVE (OR)

Dating back to the militias that fought the Revolutionary War, the United States has benefited from the contributions of “citizen soldiers.” Within the last century, Reservists (both USAR and ARNG) were used extensively in World War I, World War II, and the Korean War.² Following those conflicts, the RCs were used less and were considered to be a strategic reserve—units and individuals to be called to duty only for the most extreme national crises. Although some RC units and
individuals were called up for duty in Vietnam, overall RC involvement was limited. The Cold War was conducted almost exclusively with active duty units, with only occasional RC training missions to Europe and Korea.³

The role of the RC began to change in 1990, when both USAR and National Guard (NG) units were called up for Operations DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM. The majority of RC units deployed were combat support and service support, but a number of RC combat units were also mobilized. Despite some concern about units that were not able to deploy due to training issues, those units that did deploy performed well.⁴

After their proven performance in Operations DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM, the RC demobilized and reverted to being a strategic reserve. Overseas training deployments increased somewhat,⁵ but RC units were once again resourced against the assumption that they would not be called upon for service any time soon.

Following the attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11), the nation was galvanized and patriotism flourished. Both civilians and Soldiers asked, “What can I do to help?” Predictably, RC Soldiers and leaders wanted to help with the effort against al-Qaeda, fight for their country, and “get in the game.”

Post-9/11 RC mobilizations began with thousands of RC Soldiers providing security at airports and critical infrastructure in support of Operation NOBLE EAGLE. As AC forces headed to Afghanistan to begin Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF), Reservists were also mobilized to fill training base slots in the United States.

As the United States expanded its operations in Afghanistan, RC forces began joining the AC over-
seas. While the early deployment of RC forces to OEF was somewhat limited, RC deployments steadily increased. RC contributions to Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) were significant from the start. RC units were a part of the initial assault into Iraq in March 2003, and AC/RC deployments rose and fell in proportion throughout OIF. RC units blended with AC forces to provide a strong and balanced American force in Iraq.6

In total, over 800,000 RC Soldiers of all services served in Iraq and Afghanistan. Of those, over 533,000 were ARNG and USAR.7 Of particular note were the contributions of civil affairs, water purification, mail handling, psychological operations, military history, and Enemy Prisoner of War processing units, which came almost exclusively from the RC.8 Because those capabilities were largely absent from the AC, it was assumed that RC units would be included routinely in future operational endeavors.9

As the frequency and scale of RC deployments increased in both Afghanistan and Iraq, military and civilian leaders began viewing the RC with a different lens. The RC was recognized for having well-trained units, critical specialties, and motivated Soldiers who could be used in a variety of missions and roles. Although there was not a formal plan to do so, the RC became an operational force; this meant they were made more readily available for a sustained period of time than had been planned under the strategic reserve construct. By 2005, Army planners began acknowledging that the RC would be used as an operational, rather than just strategic, force.10

Later in 2005, the nation was reminded of its dependence on RC forces to respond to domestic emergencies; over 50,000 of the 72,000 responders to Hurricane Katrina were RC personnel. Much to the RC’s
chagrin, however, the comprehensive NG and USAR response was overshadowed by the AC. Despite the presence of thousands of National Guardsmen in New Orleans, the arrival of Lieutenant General Russel Honore (the AC First Army Commander) and the 82nd Airborne Division created such a media frenzy that many people believed that AC forces were the only ones responding to the crisis. The presence of National Guardsmen and Reservists from multiple states was ignored.¹¹

The press did not seem to realize that the active duty troops, limited by *Posse Comitatus*, were used mainly for presence patrols in relatively secure areas of the city. National Guardsmen, with broader law enforcement authority, provided backup to the beleaguered New Orleans Police Department, evacuated the Superdome, and patrolled the more dangerous areas of the city.¹²

Ironically, the civilian media were not alone in portraying the AC as the main force involved in Katrina. The U.S. Army Military History Institute, in its summary of the Army’s response to the hurricane, published a glowing account of the AC’s contributions in *The Army Response to Hurricane Katrina*. The NG received only three sentences in the entire article; the USAR received none.¹³ Even the Louisiana NG, which continued operations despite its headquarters being flooded, was ignored in the report.¹⁴ There was no mention of the RC Soldiers who responded, despite being victims themselves;¹⁵ the 17,000 rescues done by RC troops;¹⁶ or the Louisiana National Guard’s Joint Task Force Gator, which stayed on duty for 3 1/2 years after the hurricane to provide additional security in New Orleans.¹⁷ The RC, it seemed from the Army’s report, was still considered to be just a backup to the AC.
Despite RC Soldiers’ frustration at having their contributions minimized, it was obvious that RC units were needed for the Army to continue fighting two wars and to keep the homeland safe. Discussions began in-depth to consider the future role of the RC.

In January 2007, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates issued a memorandum entitled *Utilization of the Total Force* to address his concerns about “whether we have the right policies to govern how we utilize members of the Reserve, National Guard, and our Active Components [sic] units.”18 The memorandum limited RC mobilizations to 1 year (with certain exceptions) and directed that involuntary mobilizations should be managed on a unit basis to maintain cohesion and predictability for RC units. The memorandum further instructed the services to strive for a 1:2 Deployed: Dwell ratio for AC and 1:5 year Mobilized: Dwell ratio for RC. Secretary Gates acknowledged the challenges of frequent and multiple deployments but stated, “Just as we are asking the active forces to do more in this time of national need, so we must ask more of our Reserve components.”19

The year 2008 was a watershed for the RC. The year began with a final report from the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves (CNGR)20—a report that strongly recommended recognizing and resourcing the RC as an operational force and finished with the DoD issuing a directive entitled “Managing the Reserve Components as an Operational Force.”21

The CNGR report, *Transforming the National Guard and Reserves into a 21st Century Operational Force*, was based on 3 years of extensive research, analysis, and forecasting to determine the best use of RC forces in the future. The CNGR determined that the Army would be unable to sustain future operations without
extensive involvement by the RC and recommended that the DoD formally create a sustainable and adequately resourced OR.\textsuperscript{22}

The CNGR’s final report gave almost 100 recommendations in six major categories: (1) Creating a Sustainable OR; (2) Enhancing the DoD’s Role in the Homeland; (3) Creating a Continuum of Service; (4) Developing a Ready, Capable, and Available OR; (5) Supporting Service Members, Families, and Employers; and (6) Reforming the Organizations and Institutions that Support an OR.\textsuperscript{23} Although many of the commission’s recommendations have yet to be acted upon, the CNGR report was a critical work in defining what was needed to operate and maintain the RC as an operational force.

Following a 9-month review of the CNGR report, the DoD issued Directive 1200.17, Managing the Reserve Component as an Operational Force.\textsuperscript{24} The directive’s stated purpose was “establishing the overarching set of principles and policies to promote and support the management of the RC as an operational force.”\textsuperscript{25} The directive was considered a victory by RC leaders, and established the expectation of new policies, rules, funding mechanisms, and programs to institutionalize the OR.

Unfortunately, the directive did not come with plans or large pots of funding attached. A year after the directive was issued, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) issued two reports to congressional committees that emphasized the need for more planning and funding: GAO-09-720, Army Needs to Re-evaluate Its Approach to Training and Mobilizing Reserve Component Forces,\textsuperscript{26} and GAO-09-898, Army Needs to Finalize an Implementation Plan and Funding Strategy for Sustaining an OR Force.\textsuperscript{27}
Over the next 4 years, some progress was made, but much remains to be done. In 2012, the Army issued an “Army Total Force Policy” (ATFP) directive that called for the AC and RC to be integrated into a “Total Force.” As with the DoD directive, however, implementation has been limited by a lack of plans and funding. Critical issues have yet to be addressed, and practical measures to institutionalize the OR are still lacking.

Most significantly, the question has again arisen of whether it is feasible to maintain a permanent OR. As troops are pulled out of Afghanistan and the DoD’s focus shifts to maintaining stability in the Pacific region, does the country still have the resources to maintain an OR force? Is an OR needed when the United States returns to a relatively peaceful status? While the full answer to these questions lies beyond the scope of this monograph, we will examine some recent indicators of an uncertain future for RCs.

WHAT IS “OPERATIONAL?” — DIFFERING DEFINITIONS AND EXPECTATIONS

As the opening vignette suggests, there is some degree of confusion regarding what is meant by an “OR.” Indeed, as late as March 2013, one senior AC commander remarked, “Nobody knows what that means!”

Joint Publication 1-02 includes the following as the official, albeit unhelpful, definition: “OR—An emergency reserve of men and/or materiel established for the support of a specific operation. (JP 5-0)” The CNGR report cited a working definition (draft) from the Joint Staff, dated October 15, 2007:
The total Reserve component structure which operates across the continuum of military missions performing both strategic and operational roles in peacetime, wartime, contingency, domestic emergencies and homeland defense operations. As such, the Services organize, resource, equip, train, and utilize their Guard and Reserve components to support mission requirements to the same standard as their active components. Each Service’s force generation plan prepares both units and individuals to participate in missions, across the full spectrum of military operations, in a cycle or periodic manner that provides predictability for the combatant commands, the Services, Service members, their families and civilian employers.31

The key aspects of this definition include: “across the continuum of military missions” (available for essentially all types of roles), calls upon the Services to resource their RCs as they would their AC units, and making employment of the RC “predictable.” In other words, this definition calls for the RC to do anything and everything to the same standard as the AC, and calls for the Services to prepare the RC to do anything and everything, and to do it on a specified time schedule.

The CNGR report took issue with the Joint Staff definition, stating:

... does not answer the basic questions policymakers face: What missions will the National Guard and Reserves perform in their strategic and operational roles? How will DoD resource and equip the reserve components for these missions so they will be a ready force capable of operating both overseas and in the homeland? And what can combatant commands, the services, service members and their families, and civilian employers expect in terms of predictable deployments?32
For its part, the CNGR did little to define the term. A definition can be gleaned from the proposed reform objectives, calling for “improving the ability of the NG and Reserves to meet all threats to the nation as a part of a total integrated force” and:

a force that is ready, capable, and available for predictable overseas rotations, responses to emergencies in the homeland, and strategic depth with the ability to surge when required.33

DoD Directive 1200.17, which mandated the OR, included the following definition:

RCs as an operational force. The RCs provide operational capabilities and strategic depth to meet U.S. defense requirements across the full spectrum of conflict. In their operational roles, RCs participate in a full range of missions according to their Services’ force generation plans. Units and individuals participate in missions in an established cyclic or periodic manner that provides predictability for the combatant commands, the Services, Service members, their families, and employers. In their strategic roles, RC units and individuals train or are available for missions in accordance with the national defense strategy. As such, the RCs provide strategic depth and are available to transition to operational roles as needed.34

This “official” definition describes a reserve force that can integrate seamlessly with AC forces to conduct a variety of missions, tempered by predictability for the RC. One wonders if the “predictable” aspect was an afterthought put in to appease those stakeholders (civilian employers, family members, and even the Soldiers themselves) who do not particularly like the
alternative—undefined deployments with undefined time requirements.\textsuperscript{35}

Regardless of DoD’s official definition and goal of predictability, there is still no agreement on what the OR should be or how it should be employed. There appear to be at least two definitions: one each from the AC and RC perspectives. The AC vision of “operational” embodies deployment for combat-related missions, largely in support of AC forces.\textsuperscript{36} The RC definition of being “operational” includes the idea of supporting the AC for overseas combat missions but also encompasses other “real world” missions.

One NG Adjutant General (TAG) described operational forces as performing “any and all missions that have real world projects and impact, including non-traditional missions. Being operational is more than deploying.”\textsuperscript{37} Other RC leaders agreed, saying that participation in humanitarian, peacekeeping, stability, and domestic response operations helps to train their units and maintain their mission-capable edge.

With two fundamentally different views of what the OR should do, it is little wonder that confusion exists regarding what each component expects of the other. Recent initiatives to align forces with regional combatant command theaters may serve to further complicate the notions of what “support of AC forces” actually means.

Is it important to define the term “OR” more clearly? Yes. A clear definition will provide a better sense of what is expected of the RC and allow a common frame of reference for force structure and resourcing discussions. Until all components agree and understand what the “OR” should be, animosity and “turf wars” will continue to plague the Army.
Perhaps the true issue is the fact that there are three “Armies”: the AC, the NG, and the Army Reserve. Each one views issues first from its own parochial perspective, then perhaps acknowledges the views of the other two. Although the Army Total Force Policy provides a start in reconciling this disparity, policy alone cannot eliminate cultural boundaries. More important will be the willingness of senior leaders in all three components to discuss and agree on what the OR should be and do, then actively seek practical methods to integrate the force. One of these methods must include attacking the cultural mindsets manifested by the leaders in each component.

WHY AN OR?

The question of why there should be an OR was never really asked. The Deputy Chief of the Army Reserve stated that operationalizing the RC “was the right thing to do.” That was pretty much all there was to it. In fact, this justification was repeated by senior leaders in numerous venues. There did not seem to be anyone in the higher reaches of leadership who advocated any other point of view or potential thought regarding how this was to be achieved or what this actually meant. (Perhaps that is why few alternative viewpoints were raised).

The CNGR rightly explained that the OR concept sprang out of necessity due to increased frequency of RC use for both overseas contingencies (in Iraq and Afghanistan) as well as for homeland-based emergencies. The CNGR went to say that the future security environment would be difficult to discern, but it would be certain to require RC elements working in close conjunction with AC forces in order for the United States to achieve its strategic objectives.
The RC has always suffered from a “second class citizen” anxiety and has eagerly sought relevance from the nation’s AC senior leadership. Increased usage of the RC for OEF and OIF was greeted with excitement by both USAR and NG leaders. Of course they agreed that operationalizing the RC was “the right thing to do.” Thus, there was little discourse on what the OR concept would mean for the future.

Despite senior AC leaders’ public statements of confidence in the RC, one can still sense that those very leaders look down on the RC. As the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Raymond Odierno, stated during a symposium at the American Enterprise Institute in July 2013:

> You know, the difference between National Guard, Reserve, and active component is the active component can practice every single day. The Guard gets to practice 39-40 days out of the year. So if you want a football team that can do one practice a month and then have two weeks spring training, versus a force that can train every single day, there’s a difference.\(^4^1\)

Yes, it is a reality that some RC forces will never achieve the same training levels as their AC counterparts unless funding and resources are diverted to those forces in amounts comparable to those of the AC. But statements such as General Odierno’s indicate a lack of knowledge about the innumerable hours of extra training and unpaid work that RC Soldiers put into their military jobs. It is a standing joke within the RC that duty will be “1 weekend a month and 2 weeks in the summer,” as the requirements are almost always greater. These extra efforts cannot erase the training gap between the AC and the RC, but AC leaders would be wise to recognize that RC training goes
beyond “1 weekend a month and 2 weeks of spring training.”

Granted, General Odierno followed his statement by saying:

We need the Guard. We need them. We’ve proven that over the last 12 years and the Army Reserve. We’re going to continue to build an Army that is built on the Total Army concept.\textsuperscript{42}

But what will that Army look like? Will it end up having an OR, or will the RC revert to being a strategic reserve?

**FUTURE OF THE OPERATIONAL RESERVE**

At this time, there is no way to accurately predict whether the Army will maintain the RC as an operational force or return them to being solely a strategic backup. Budget cuts will force large changes to the Army’s force structure and determine the destiny of the OR.

As General Odierno stated during the American Enterprise Institute symposium:

So what we should be looking at is what’s best for our future. So for me it’s maintaining the right balance of forces. We’ve already taken 80,000 out of the active component. We’re going to take a significant amount more out of the active component, based on sequestration. And we’re going to have to take a little bit out of the Guard and Reserve. It’ll be a much less percentage. So the overall percentage of our Reserve component will be much higher than—will be higher than the active component, where before, the active component was higher than the Reserve component. I think that’s the right balance. And we’ve got to look at how we’re
going to employ them, not just rhetoric about certain parts of the force [emphasis added].

. . . So I think we’ve been working with them very carefully through all this. We will continue to work with them. And my job is to make sure we develop the best Army possible for the future. And that’s what we’re going to do.43

Regardless of budget issues and limited support from AC leaders, the RC has continued the push for the OR. At the Reserve Officers Association’s (ROA) 2013 National Security Symposium, General Frank Grass, Chief, National Guard Bureau (CNGB), stated:

We need to continue to engage in the operational missions of our services. . . . We have to look like the Army and the Air Force, and we have to have missions that get us into the fight so we can continue to grow leaders that can be ready at a moment’s notice anywhere in the world [emphasis added].44

The last portion of the CNGB’s statement is critical to understanding why the RC wants to remain operational. Without “real world” missions to continue training RC Soldiers and leaders, the experience gained in a decade of war will be lost. The RC leaders’ fight to maintain the OR cannot be viewed simply as wanting to justify their services’ existence. Rather, operational missions are key to maintaining experienced leaders and proficient units.

Interestingly, attendees at the ROA symposium discussed the possibility of having a partial OR, with some units being “operational” and others being resourced at lower, less readily deployable levels.45 This idea hearkens back to the mid-1990’s tiered resourcing
when RC units had expectations of their deployability based on pre-assigned categories. Tiers were developed by considering the type of unit and how likely it was to be needed for deployment, how well the unit met its readiness standards, and other factors. In times of budget restrictions, such a tiered system is certainly more achievable than expecting every RC unit to be resourced as an operational asset.

With the wars coming to a close and operational requirements drawing down, however, there is more friction developing between the AC and RC. Struggles for resources, relevancy, and mission assignments color interactions between the components. The AC, seemingly for budget savings and efficiency, has begun to resume missions that were routinely conducted by the RC for the last decade. Many ARNG and USAR units are being off-ramped from future missions for which they had already begun training. The AC has taken back ARNG commitments to the NATO Kosovo Force (KFOR) missions, the Multinational Force and Observers peace-keeping mission in the Sinai, Egypt and in the Pacific, AC forces are replacing RC units that have traditionally conducted certain engagement-focused exercises.

This concerns RC leaders, who fear that without real world missions to perform, the RC will, in the eyes of the AC, once again become irrelevant. As one ARNG general stated, ‘Without operational missions for us [RC forces], a reserve component ‘death spiral’ is likely.”

In reality, budget restrictions will likely determine the extent to which the RC is maintained as an operational force. Tellingly, Congress failed to act on a proposed resolution that would have affirmed congressional support for a permanent OR. Likewise, the 2013 Army Posture Statement never mentioned an
“OR.” In February 2013, General Odierno testified to the Senate Armed Services Committee that “. . . the reduction in overseas deployments which has sustained our reserve readiness over the past 12 years may result in us being unable to maintain our OR.” None of these bode well for proponents of a fully Operational Reserve.

The future of the OR is still a question. Because the answer may involve maintaining at least a portion of the RC as an operational force, the remainder of this monograph will examine the realities of using the OR. First, we will examine the DoD and Army directives that outlined the goals and policies for establishing a permanent OR and Army Total Force. Then we will examine some of the problems and challenges associated with maintaining an operational RC. It is hoped that these discussions will assist policymakers in their decisions about the future of the RC.

**DOD DIRECTIVE 1200.17—MANAGING THE RESERVE COMPONENTS AS AN OPERATIONAL FORCE**

The OR was formally recognized in October 2008 when the DoD issued Directive 1200.17, *Managing the Reserve Components as an Operational Force.* The directive was a straightforward document that established “the overarching set of principles and policies to promote and support the management of the Reserve Components (RCs) as an operational force.” The directive defined DoD policies (essentially end states), then assigned responsibilities and specific program taskings (ways) to the DoD Under Secretaries, Assistant Secretaries, and Secretaries of the Military Departments. Most significantly, the directive stated:
It is DoD policy that:

a. The RCs provide operational capabilities and strategic depth to meet U.S. defense requirements across the full spectrum of conflict. . . .

b. The Active Component (ACs) and RCs are integrated as a Total Force based on the attributes of the particular component and individual competencies.55

Other policies in the directive included:

• Homeland Defense and Defense Support to Civilian Agencies (DSCA) are Total Force missions.
• The RCs provide connection to and commitment of the American public.
• The continuum of service is utilized to enhance and sustain the all-volunteer force with flexible service options. . . .
• Utilization rules enhancing predictability and prudent use of the RCs are implemented to govern frequency and duration of activations, while acknowledging that “expectation management is critical to the success of the management of the operational force.”56
• Voluntary duty (per Titles 10 and 32 U.S. Code) is encouraged to meet mission requirements.
• RCs are resourced to meet readiness requirements, and tracking mechanisms are in place to provide visibility of resourcing efforts.
• Outreach services for RC members, their families, and employers are established and available from pre-activation through reintegration.57

In an enclosure to the directive, DoD assigned specific responsibilities and outlined numerous program
expectations. Importantly, the first tasking was to ensure that “DoD policies support the planning, organization, and utilization of the RCs to provide operational capabilities and strategic depth across the full spectrum of conflict.”

Two significant points were addressed here: The RC was to perform both operational and strategic roles, and the RC was to be used in missions across the full spectrum of conflict. Instead of being considered only as a backup for large-scale combat operations, RC units were also to be used for noncombat and nontraditional missions; peacekeeping, stability operations, etc.

Another significant responsibility assigned to the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness was ensuring that:

total force policies encourage optimum integration of AC and RC personnel to provide the most efficient training opportunities to all personnel, allow for shared use of resources, and provide the most operational benefits and mission capability.

Additionally, the office was charged with ensuring that “total force assignment policies encourage the consideration of RC members to serve in key senior leadership positions throughout DoD.”

The responsibilities delegated to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve and Personnel Affairs included developing “policies for managing the RCs as an operational force, which is a necessity in an era of persistent conflict and global engagement;” “policies that promote use of total force capabilities in support of domestic disaster without interference with core defense missions;” and “sufficient guidance . . . to guide Service implementation of the continuum of service concept.”
Finally, the Secretaries of the Military Departments were directed to “implement the provisions of this Directive” and “manage their respective RCs as an operational force such that the RCs provide operational capabilities while maintaining strategic depth . . . across the full spectrum of conflict.”

The directive’s enclosure detailed five pages of requirements to ensure that DoD provided an RC force “available for missions in accordance with the national defense strategy”—a rather broad goal. The OR force was also to have “capabilities useful for domestic disaster response” and “meet operational readiness requirements as identified by the President and Secretary of Defense [SecDef].” In other words, the SecDef was calling on the RC to conduct “business as usual” with respect to being able to respond to homeland disasters as well as to fight in ongoing wars or conflicts.

The Service Secretaries were ordered to “ensure appropriate level of full-time support personnel . . . to meet readiness requirements of the RCs”; “implement the continuum of service construct”; and “program and execute resources where required to support a ‘train-mobilize-deploy’ construct.” The directive further mandated that “funds for training and equipment must be provided to coincide with the Services force planning cycle . . .” and stipulated that each Service Secretary would ensure “resources are provided” for medical and dental requirements, equipping needs, facilities, training requirements, and even legal assistance to support activation of military personnel. What the directive did not say was what would happen if those funds were unavailable.

In summary, the DoD was directed to integrate the RC and AC to form a seamless organization ready and able to do all things required, and to do them efficient-
ly and effectively. Unfortunately, the directive was issued with the apparent assumption that resources were bountiful. Left unanswered was the question of what to do if resources were limited. Five years later, that question still awaits an answer.\textsuperscript{65}

**ARMY DIRECTIVE 2012-08. ARMY TOTAL FORCE POLICY**

In September 2012, 4 years after the DoD directed the Services to use “total force policies,” the Secretary of the Army issued Army Directive 2012-08, *Army Total Force Policy* (ATFP). The purpose was to integrate the Army’s AC and RC as a “Total Force,” which was “an integrated operational force to provide predictable, recurring and sustainable capabilities . . . to fulfill national military needs.”\textsuperscript{66} The Army Total Force Policy has been hailed as a “significant step in the evolution of the all-volunteer force . . . .”\textsuperscript{67} The authors of this monograph concur that ATFP is a step forward but warn that the ATFP has ramifications that were either overlooked or not understood by its writers. The ATFP directive contains numerous requirements for the RC that are unrealistic and unachievable. Further, there is a seeming lack of recognition that budget constraints will limit execution of a significant portion of ATFP’s goals for both the AC and RC.

Regardless of the challenges, the success or failure of the ATFP will be determined mainly by the expectations and mindset of the leaders who must implement the policy. Are the components willing to educate themselves on the capabilities and limitations of their partners? Are the components willing to set aside parochial attitudes and consider the concerns of
the other components? Are the components willing to alter their operations to meet the requirements of the ATFP? Are they willing to change their organizational cultures to replace component-oriented identities with a vision of the Total Army?

To determine if achieving the goals of ATFP is even possible, this section will examine the most critical and challenging portions of the Total Force policy and suggest ways to mitigate the potential problems.

The ATFP directive opened with several blanket statements that affirmed current methods of operating as policy but added the title “Total Force”:

As one Total Force, the Active Army, Army National Guard, and U.S. Army Reserve provide operating and generating forces to support the National Military Strategy and Army commitments worldwide.68

The Army will ensure that the Total Force is organized, trained, sustained, equipped, and employed to support combatant commander requirements as force packages tailored to achieve anticipated objectives.69

The remaining policy statements were more substantive and will require significant changes to the way the AC and RC interact. Although the analysis raises more questions than it provides answers, it is critical that Army leaders understand these questions and develop answers to ensure the success of the Army Total Force.
POTENTIAL PROBLEMS WITH THE ARMY TOTAL FORCE POLICY

Integration of Tactical-Level Forces.

The ATFP directive stated:

3.c. As appropriate, the Army will integrate AC and RC forces and capabilities at the tactical level (division and below), consistent with the Secretary of Defense’s policies for use of the Total Force. . . . This will include some predeployment collective training of tactical-level organizations, including those organizations that will routinely deploy as multi-component forces (for example, sustainment brigades and other multifunctional support brigades).70

This tasking can be interpreted in several ways. For those who support integration of the three Armies, this is a green light to plan together, train together, and even form standing multicomponent units (vice those that were formed only out of necessity within combat theaters). For those who oppose peacetime activations of the RC, execution could be limited to “some” combined training, only when RC units are slated to deploy. This interpretation would also limit intercomponent activity to those units that are, of necessity, comprised of multiple components (i.e., the type of brigade level units that usually reside in the AR). The goal of this statement, while perhaps well intended, is so broad that it can be interpreted in opposing ways.
Training Integration.

The objectives of the Army Total Force Policy—inTEGRATED Total Force packages—suggest avoiding the “separate but equal” approaches that most of the RC currently uses. In the struggle to provide unit-based capabilities, the RC has been largely separated from the AC, as it trains separately from the units it is intended to support.

The Army School System (TASS), for example, encompasses myriad AC, NG, and USAR schools. Under TASS, most state NGs operate their own Regional Training Institute; course offerings include officer commissioning programs, the Noncommissioned Officer Education System (NCOES), and Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) qualification courses. The USAR also operates its own schools, with the same type of offerings (minus officer commissioning). While TASS has done well in limiting overlap in MOS courses, there is significant redundancy in officer and Noncommissioned Officer (NCO) professional development courses.71

More significantly for the ATFP, most post-Initial Entry Training is usually conducted through separate AC and RC programs of instructions (POIs). In the past, RC POIs were structured around the RC training model, which provided for a weekend battle assembly each month and a 2-week annual training period per year. The number of slots for RC students was limited in AC schools, particularly when an RC equivalent was available. Likewise, AC participation in RC schools was limited because the POIs were markedly different.72 The Army is developing the One Army School System to address this, but challenges have arisen in developing POIs that are appropriate
for both RC Soldiers (with limited training time) and AC Soldiers (who can train for as long as needed to achieve proficiency).\textsuperscript{73}

Likewise, collective training rarely blends the AC and RC. RC collective training is normally conducted at the unit’s annual training. Few units develop training plans to include the units they are expected to work with when mobilized. It would behoove RC leaders to seek out their AC counterparts and nest their training plans together. The widely different planning time frames from the RC to the AC would need to be addressed (i.e., many RC units lock in their AT training sites and objectives 2 years in advance; few AC units have any idea what they will be doing in 2 years), but surely progress can be made in conducting multicomponent training.

**Multicomponent Units.**

It may be that the only way—or perhaps the only acceptable way—to meet the intent of the DoD Directive is to establish multicomponent units. Indeed, recent pronouncements seem to indicate a fondness for these constructs by the highest levels of Army leadership.\textsuperscript{74}

Multicomponent logistic support brigades were widely and successfully used in OIF. Ironically, when those multicomponent units redeployed and the RC elements demobilized, the components went their various ways. It would benefit the Army to reestablish those unit/component relationships and continue to develop them with peacetime training opportunities.

To achieve the intended goals of integrating training and developing multicomponent units, planners would be well advised to examine the successes and
challenges of multicomponent endeavors in the past.\textsuperscript{75} Planners should also interview the leaders of units who have trained with the other components, as well as those who have trained with other services. Consideration must be given to the vastly different planning timelines and training schedules of the AC and RC, and units must cooperate in altering their plans to accommodate each other’s needs.

The issues facing multicomponent units are numerous and complex. As the Army moves toward regional alignment of its RC forces, more multicomponent units will be formed. For a more detailed discussion of the challenges facing an RC unit that has already been integrated into an AC headquarters (the USAR’s 9th Mission Support Command), an appendix is included: *Integration Experiences of a Reserve Component Unit Assigned to an Army Service Component Command.*

**Uniform Predeployment Readiness and Professional Development Standards.**

The next requirement contained in the ATFP directive was:

4. Army Commands and Army Service Component Commands will ensure that the procedures and processes for validating the predeployment readiness of assigned forces are uniform for AC and RC units and Soldiers. Army commanders will be responsible for certifying personnel readiness and individual training for assigned personnel. Standards for qualification and professional development will be the same for AC and RC personnel.\textsuperscript{76}

Effecting this portion of the ATFP may be the most difficult of all. There are three potential problem
areas: achieving uniform readiness validation processes, determining which commanders/headquarters will certify readiness, and requiring identical professional qualification standards for AC and RC.

First, it is impractical to require that the same procedures and processes be used to validate predeployment readiness. While AC units have at least 250 days per year to train and test their skills, RC units normally have only 39 days per year. RC units are authorized additional training days before deployment, but the number is limited by the DoD “1-year mobilization” policy. It is unlikely that RC units can be validated on the same range of skills as their AC counterparts.

RC brigade and division level headquarters are already challenged by the requirement to validate their highest-level collective skills, rather than testing the skills they are most likely to use in the theater and mission to which they are deploying. While AC units might have the time to validate on multiple sets of skills, RC units do not.

One OEF-bound RC brigade combat team, for example, was tested on leading a brigade-sized attack, despite the fact that brigade-sized attacks were virtually unheard of for U.S. troops in Afghanistan. Because of the time consumed by that task, the unit was unable to train on what it would be doing in theater: synchronizing numerous squad and platoon-sized actions across a large area. As the sending unit’s NG TAG suggested, it would have been worth taking the risk of not training on brigade-sized maneuvers in order to focus on the missions they knew the unit would have to perform.

An additional challenge to implementation of the “uniform validation procedures” mandate is that there is no existing standard procedure for RC valida-
tions. Procedures vary widely from one mobilization station to another, from the USAR to the ARNG, and even from one state’s ARNG to another. For example, some TAGs have aggressively sought to validate their own units, while others leave it up to the mobilization stations. Many times, RC units are validated in a piecemeal fashion, with different headquarters and organizations validating different skills. For example, an ARNG contingent from 35ID that is deploying to Kosovo in January 2014 will be validated at three different training sites: Fort Hood, TX; Salina, KS; and Hohenfels, Germany. Each site’s training team will likely use different procedures and even different standards to determine that the unit is ready to deploy.

This policy measure will also prove to be difficult in that multiple headquarters (i.e., Army Commands or Army Service Component Commands) could claim to have primacy for validating units. In the case of units with multiple headquarters (i.e., regionally aligned RC units), who dictates the standards? For example, the USAR’s 9th Mission Support Command (MSC)—the headquarters for the Pacific Army Reserve at Fort Shafter, HI—is operationally aligned with and assigned to U.S. Army Pacific (USARPAC), the active army’s Army Service Component Command for U.S. Pacific Command. However, resourcing for the 9th MSC comes from U.S. Army Reserve Command (USARC), which definitely has a vote in deciding what training it will buy. This is significant, especially if USARPAC’s validation standards are more expensive than what USARC can afford to provide. While this particular unit may be presently viewed as an “outlier,” this same type of relationship will be duplicated throughout the RC as it aligns and assigns forces to regional combatant commands.
Finally, it is naive to suggest that RC Soldiers can meet identical standards for professional development and qualification. Already, many RC Soldiers are hard pressed to leave their civilian employers for extended Army schooling.\textsuperscript{81} Increasing requirements (i.e., the expectation that “Before the transition to field grade, captains should have achieved at least half of the credits necessary to earn a master’s degree”)\textsuperscript{82} will place a further burden on RC Soldiers, their families, and their civilian employers.

Additionally, resource constraints will make it difficult for the RC to meet the same standards for qualification and professional development. For example, funding restrictions have reduced the number of seats available at Officer Educational System (OES) and NCOES courses. Some schools have, of necessity, prioritized AC Soldiers and limited the numbers of seats available for RC students.\textsuperscript{83} RC students often have to wait longer to obtain a seat and therefore attend professional development courses later in their careers than AC Soldiers. In addition, some RC courses (i.e., Intermediate-Level Education and the U.S. Army War College) may take a significantly longer time to complete, since the instruction can be spread out over years instead of months.\textsuperscript{84} RC leaders, who already get far less time leading their troops than their AC counterparts, are at a distinct disadvantage when resources limit leader development schools.

A common answer to the problem—to use Distributed Learning (dL) computer classes to replace resident schools—requires RC Soldiers to dedicate countless hours of personal, unpaid time to complete the necessary schooling. Soldiers must complete lengthy online Structured Self-Development courses as prerequisites to attending NCOES courses.\textsuperscript{85} Although
strides have been made in compensating Soldiers for dL hours,\textsuperscript{86} the majority of these courses are still completed by RC students on “Love Time” (unpaid hours). Ironically, RC Soldiers can earn retirement points for completing Army e-Learning courses that will enhance their civilian qualifications (i.e., information technology certification courses, business leadership, and project management)\textsuperscript{87} but earn nothing for mandated military courses.

Few will argue that a computer-based course can provide the same depth and training experience that a resident course can. For example, a Soldier who is training to become a nuclear, biological, and chemical NCO can learn technical information online, but a dL course cannot provide the experience of suiting up in protective gear and performing the job in a contaminated environment. Similarly, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command \textit{Pamphlet 525-8-2} states:

\ldots use of dL is not typically as satisfying for leadership courses and does not provide the social benefits or professional relationships as that encountered in resident PME [Professional Military Education].\textsuperscript{88}

While dL fills some training gaps, it cannot solve all of the challenges of achieving identical AC/RC qualification standards.

**Streamlined Procedures for Mobilizing the RC.**

The next portion of ATFP stated:

5. The Army will streamline the voluntary and involuntary call to active duty of RC personnel and units to rapidly expand and sustain Total Army capabilities.
While the intention is clear, the practical methods to effect this policy have not taken shape. Indeed, it appears the same rules regarding 1,095-day limitations and other prohibitive policies remain in effect. The approval authorities for moving from one component to the next remain in effect from previous years. To achieve this goal, planners must examine the myriad after action reports of RC mobilizations over the last decade. They must extract and analyze the success stories, while developing ways to address and correct systemic problems. Finally, the DoD must reconsider its rules and prohibitions regarding mobilization, and determine whether they can be changed to streamline the mobilization process.

Equipment.

ATFP’s equipping guidance was:

6. The Army’s equipping strategy will ensure the procurement and equipping processes enable the Total Force to perform missions of the Department of the Army.

This policy seems to suggest, again, no necessary changes in practice to what is already occurring. The challenge will arise when wartime budget supplements are gone and equipment budgets are slashed.

The Army made tremendous progress over the last decade in equipping RC units with modern equipment that is compatible with what their AC counterparts have. The ARNG generals who were interviewed for this project agreed that the ARNG has more and better equipment than ever before. Their fear is that, with decreased budgets and a potential return to strategic reserve status, RC units will once again be relegated to using obsolete and inadequate equipment.
In the current budget environment, it is unrealistic to think all RC units can be equipped at the same levels they were under the large wartime budgets of the last decade. At a minimum, however, the Army must continue to equip those RC units that are most likely to deploy. This may not be enough to satisfy RC leadership, but the RC must accept that future budgets will not bring all units to 100 percent of requirements.

**Integrated Personnel and Pay Systems; Continuum of Service; Joint Opportunities.**

The last significant policy issue in the ATFP directive was:

7. The Army will employ an integrated personnel management and pay system that contains standardized business processes and authoritative data for military personnel enabling access to secure and reliable data. Personnel policies shall incorporate Total Force values and facilitate continuum of service and opportunities for joint experiences.  

Two critical taskings are included here: Integrating the AC and RC personnel and pay systems, and changing personnel policies.

**Integrating Personnel Systems.**

This is clearly a “pie in the sky” objective for personnel, and pay systems are nowhere close to standardization. Indeed, the AC and RC “systems” comprise a myriad of subsystems and networks that have difficulty communicating with each other, let alone operating in a coherent fashion to support Soldiers from multiple components.
Instead of trying to integrate existing systems, the most feasible method of achieving the ATFP’s objective would be to develop an entirely new personnel and pay system. Of course, integration was already attempted by the DoD when it tried to implement the Defense Integrated Military Human Resources System (DIMHRS). The system, which was supposed to have integrated the various component human resource functions and subsumed over 90 subsystems, was plagued by problems and delays. When the DIMHRS experiment was finally cancelled, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen told the Senate Armed Services Committee, “This program has been a disaster.” DIMHRS’s billion-dollar failure left the Army with its antiquated human resource systems and little hope for integration in the foreseeable future.

The AC, USAR, and ARNG still have largely separate personnel systems. Some computer integration has been done through the use of the Electronic Military Personnel Office (eMILPO), but its capabilities are limited. All DD Form 93 (Record of Emergency Data) and Service-members Group Life Insurance forms are uploaded into the eMILPO system and tracked regardless of component. But that is the full extent of its AC/RC interconnectivity. RC Soldiers’ retirement points, awards, and evaluations cannot be recorded, limiting e-MILPO’s ability to track a “continuum of service.”

Continuum of Service and Joint Opportunities.

Little progress has been made in developing a continuum of service. This concept (also known as “Soldier for Life,”) would allow Soldiers to move more easily between the various Army components (Active, Reserve, and Guard) to meet the individual Soldier’s
personal needs and desires. Continuum of service policies would provide a baseline system of credit so Soldiers would remain competitive for promotion and be eligible for retirement from any component. This goal, while admirable, has not prompted any changes to current policies.

Indeed, the RC also has to contend with the 1,095-day rule, which essentially prohibits active duty service for operational support for greater than 3 years in a 4-year period\textsuperscript{95}—clearly violating any spirit of a continuum of service concept. As with many other aspects of having the OR, one must question whether there is truly a desire to implement the continuum of service. Without major changes to the personnel systems, this concept will remain merely a good idea.

There is also much work to be done in creating joint opportunities for RC Soldiers. While joint opportunities are available for those Reservists who wish to deploy or take a full-time tour, part-time joint billets are scarce. Other than figurehead positions at large headquarters, there are few opportunities available for rank-and-file drilling RC Soldiers to work with the other services. Ironically, the most numerous joint positions seem to lie in the domestic response arena; each state has a multiservice team of Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers (EPLOs) to work with the NG in planning and responding to domestic emergencies.\textsuperscript{96} Thankfully, there is hope that part-time joint billets will increase with the coming regional alignments of RC units to geographic commands. The authors recommend that specific effort be dedicated to identifying and publicizing those billets to increase the joint service experience level of the RC.
**Cultures and Mindsets.**

Perhaps one of the biggest obstacles to becoming a Total Force will come from the cultures and mindsets of the different components—not just the leadership, but also the rank and file.

It is clear the ATFP was written to help combat the traditional perceptions that the RC comprised the “junior varsity” or “the B-Team”—terms that still get used today by even junior and mid-grade officers and NCOs in the AC. These perceptions tend to rankle RC Soldiers, especially if they have come from a wealth of experience in combat operations or from years of AC service (both are very common in the RC). In response, many RC Soldiers have adopted an inflated view of their own capabilities and insist that they are just as proficient as the AC. The RC sometimes fails to acknowledge that is it physically impossible to achieve the same level of expertise with only a fraction of the training time.97

Senior leaders in both components have recognized the strong performance of the RC in the recent wars. But while the overall acceptance and integration of RC units have improved, the reality is that the AC policies and procedures still treat the RC as second-class citizens. We see in the areas of training and personnel readiness, as well as operational integration within commands, a disjointed view of the RC. The situation calls for a mass change in organizational culture—one that may not be effected for decades.

Another cultural change needed is the recognition that each of the three “Armies” within Total Force has valuable, unique contributions to make. The AC would benefit from recognizing RC Soldiers’ civilian skills and domestic emergency response expertise.98
The RC would benefit by more gratefully accepting the AC’s training assistance, rather than chafing against perceived paternalistic attitudes.

To gain acceptance by AC leaders, the RC needs to “remove the chip from its shoulder” and stop taking offense every time a suggestion is made to reduce RC funding or manning. Leaders in all components need to recognize that their force must share in the pain of sequestration and budget cuts. The “our force is more valuable and therefore should not be cut” arguments are often rooted in a defensive “us versus them” mentality and serve no valid purpose in working out problems.

Us versus Them has no place in a Total Force. Leaders and Soldiers in all components need to examine their mindsets and discard parochial attitudes. Until cultures change, the Army will not change.

ATFP—Realistic or Idealistic?

Is the Army Total Force Policy realistic or idealistic? Cynics would say it is yet another instance of senior leader intent not taking into account the practical reality of what can (and cannot) be provided. Optimists and visionaries might respond that the policy represents a viable end state to which all Army efforts should be directed. The true answer probably lies somewhere in between. Regardless, it is clear that the three Armies have much work to do in the areas of integrating training and operations, personnel, resourcing, and—perhaps greatest of all—expectation management and cultural change.
Mobilization of the RC is normally based on “demand signals” from the AC. When the AC anticipates a critical shortage of forces to meet its operational demands, it turns to the RC to fill the gap. When the available AC forces are sufficient to meet the demand, RC involvement is considered unnecessary.

The conflicts of the past decade created a strong demand signal for RC forces, for both current and future operations in the “Long War.” To generate and ensure the flow of necessary forces (both AC and RC), the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) model was created and implemented in 2006. The ARFORGEN model sought to provide a “sustained flow of forces for current commitments and to hedge against unexpected contingencies.”

It was to increase predictability to combatant commanders—Central Command (CENTCOM) in particular—by cycling units through three force pools: RESET, Train/Ready, and Available. This cycling process was to be “the structured progression of unit readiness over time to produce trained, ready, and cohesive units prepared for operational deployment, . . .”

While not perfectly executed, not tied in with personnel policies, and expensive, it is this same essential process the RC seeks to use for continuing its operational support to the AC—even as we enter supposed years of relative peace. Is ARFORGEN’s supply-oriented process needed when demand is lacking? More to the point, is RC support needed when the AC can already meet its operational requirements?

Lacking a demand signal, it appears the RC is hoping to create demand by publicizing its capabilities, aggressively seeking nontraditional real world mis-
sions, and volunteering for a plethora of engagement and training exercises. Under the Army’s move toward regionally aligned forces, the RC is placing full-time RC Soldiers into Army Service Component Command (ASCC) headquarters to continuously remind the AC campaign planners and training personnel that the RC is still in existence and available for duty.

It is unclear that the AC leadership fully embraces the notion of a RC supplement to the ongoing AC missions—to include engagement exercises or civil assistance programs. In the Pacific, the Army has reasserted its AC to indicate to the U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) commander that Army forces are ready and relevant to support the “rebalance to the Pacific Theater.” While this does not necessarily mean a complete ousting of RC participants in theater exercises, it certainly means a large reduction in the demand for such forces.

The looming question is, of course, whether the Army will be able to maintain the funding that is required to keep RC forces in the ARFORGEN’s readiness cycles. Considering that the mobilizations of the last decade have been funded almost exclusively by Overseas Contingency Operations funds, what will happen when those funds are reduced? If funding is required from the AC, what incentive exists to siphon its primary training dollars to RC training, when it is primarily responsible to train AC formations? These are questions that have yet to be adequately answered by the force generation plans currently being used.

If the goal as articulated in the Army Total Force Policy is to “ensure that the procedures and processes for validating the predeployment readiness of assigned forces are uniform for AC and RC units and Solders” and that “standards for qualification and
professional development will be the same for AC and RC personnel,” then the cost to ensure this undoubtedly will have to rise (especially if other factors, such as healthcare, are added into the mix to make the components more equitable). If the supply of available RC units remains at its current level (based on rotations through the ARFORGEN cycle) but the demand for them drops, is it cost-effective to maintain the RC units at readiness levels that are not truly required?

RC leaders would point out the efficiencies gained by using “part-time” forces that can be rapidly trained and assimilated into the war fight. These efficiencies have been cited in numerous venues (mentioned earlier), essentially stating that the RC comprises somewhere around 50 percent of the total Army force but costs only about 16 percent. Opponents would respond that because of the demand to get forces into Iraq and Afghanistan, predeployment training was done to a “good enough” standard—one that obviously worked and allowed quick integration into the two operational areas.

Regardless of how many RC forces are ultimately committed to operational missions, the Army needs to decide whether ARFORGEN is still the right system to use for RC force generation. Proponents emphasize the predictability and levels of readiness that ARFORGEN provides, while others go back to the question of whether a demand-based model is the best to use in peacetime.

The ARFORGEN Model.

It appears the RC wants to continue using the ARFORGEN model to prepare and mobilize its units for operational missions, regardless of demand. The
Chief, National Guard Bureau, General Frank Grass, recently stated, “One of the best things the Army ever did was adopt the ARFORGEN model.” His enthusiasm was apparently based on the model providing predictability and stability for Soldiers. “Everyone is in a cycle,” he said. “People do need a break.”

Ironically, many of the lower-ranking generals who were interviewed for this project were considerably less enthusiastic about ARFORGEN. While all agreed the ARFORGEN model was a reasonable planning tool, they expressed concern that its planning timelines were disregarded more often than they were followed. Numerous examples were given of units that deployed two and even three times in 5 or 6 years—a far cry from the “1 in 5” predicted by the model. If the model is not going to be followed, they asked, why have it?

Soldiers question its use, too. Whereas all of the general officers understood ARFORGEN was just a planning tool, Soldiers in the field tended to view its timelines as a promise. When they had to deploy more frequently than 1 year in 5, some Soldiers viewed it as a betrayal. They were willing to deploy and “get the job done” but were disappointed the Army wasn’t following its own guidelines.

There was also a marked lack of knowledge about the length of ARFORGEN’s planning cycles. Only one interviewee even mentioned the steady-state 6-year cycle that is supposed to be the norm for RC units in peacetime. Instead, everyone spoke of a 5-year cycle: RC units would mobilize for 1 year and spend 4 years of dwell time. Few seemed to know the 5-year cycle was intended only as a surge—“when demand exceeded forces in the Available Force Pool.”
In order for ARFORGEN to be a viable planning tool, it is essential that Soldiers understand its rotational cycles, guidelines, and limitations. For example, they should know the ARFORGEN regulation specifies an exception to the rotational cycles for “specialized units belonging to an ‘intensely managed structure that must maintain a level of readiness that allows them to be called upon for periods of high demand’.”\textsuperscript{108} In other words, certain units (i.e., civil affairs, aviation, and special operations units) are going to mobilize and deploy more often than 1 year in 5.\textsuperscript{109} If Soldiers understood the possibility their unit might be on a compressed rotational cycle, there would likely be fewer complaints about mismanagement of forces.

By and large, the Soldiers interviewed agreed a 5-year cycle was reasonable for RC units (again, most being unaware that the ARFORGEN plan called for a 6-year steady-state cycle).\textsuperscript{110} All expressed concern that the necessary readiness levels might be difficult to achieve if adequate resourcing were not provided in the Train/Ready years.

There were also RC-specific concerns about the model’s lack of realism in trying to achieve a steady buildup of readiness. For example, the ARFORGEN model posits that changes of command will occur in the RESET year.\textsuperscript{111} That is feasible for AC units that are on a 3-year cycle, but not for RC units with a longer cycle. RC command tours are usually limited to 2 to 3 years, meaning a unit will see multiple commanders and senior enlisted leaders over a 5-year ARFORGEN cycle. This does not bode well for continuity of a 5-year training plan, as each commander will conduct assessments with subjective criteria, regardless of the “aim point guidance,” and place different levels of focus on an ever-changing mission essential task list.
Further, ARFORGEN calls for most individual training and professional development to occur in the RESET year. It is unrealistic to expect that this training will be sandwiched into only 1 year of a 5-year cycle. Many RC Soldiers are constrained by civilian employment and scheduling issues prohibiting them from attending OES and NCOES schools in a given year. Also, new personnel will join the RC unit throughout the training cycle; those joining in the later years will need to be trained, especially if they have not been able to get a RESET year to become individually proficient.

To answer some of the questions about the viability of a 5-year training cycle for RC units, Major General Tim Orr, the Adjutant General of Iowa’s National Guard, proposed adapting the ARFORGEN model to reflect the realities of peacetime training for the RC. Since most RC units are not likely to deploy again in the near future, Orr suggested maintaining ARFORGEN’s timelines but revising the goals and expectations for what should be accomplished in each year of the cycle. This could also take into account the varied probability that units would deploy, laying out more stringent readiness aiming points for those specialized units more likely to be mobilized.

Orr’s ideas for adapting ARFORGEN were practical, realistic, and easy to implement. They go beyond the scope of this monograph, but the authors recommend ARFORGEN program managers and RC leaders examine the ideas further.112

As with many other issues, the successful use of ARFORGEN as a planning tool will be determined in large part by funding available to resource the plan.
BUDGETS AND BARGAINS

In January 2013, Chief of Staff of the Amy (CSA) General Raymond Odierno conducted an awards ceremony and had an informal dinner with leaders and spouses of the 35th Air Defense Artillery Brigade at Osan Air Force Base, Republic of Korea. During the dinner, the CSA spoke frankly about the looming DoD reductions in budget and basically affirmed that with the continuing resolution, the Army was “short about six billion dollars.” He also lamented “sequestration” and signaled that if sequestration were to occur, then it would likely mean a “17 billion dollar shortfall, and if this happens, it will come out of readiness dollars.” Regarding benefits, he further added that there would not likely be an “impact to Soldier benefits for at least several years,” but pointed out that “since 2001, the cost of an individual Soldier had doubled, with much of that cost found in health care.”

One month later, testifying before Congress, Odierno spoke forcefully of the fiscal cuts the Army was already undertaking under the Budget Control Act of 2011: about $170 billion over the next 10 years. He cited the Army’s intent to:

[Reduce] active duty end strength from a wartime high of about 570,000 to 490,000; the Army National Guard from 358,000 to 350,000; the U.S. Army Reserve from 206,000 to 205,000; and the civilian workforce from 272,000 to 255,000 by the end of fiscal year 2017. . . . [By 2017] we will downsize our active component force structure from 45 Brigade Combat Teams to potentially as low as 32 . . . In 2014, however, we will begin significant force reductions. . . .

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Perhaps one of the most thought-provoking details presented by the CSA was the minimal reductions to be allocated to the RC (just 13 percent of all Soldier reductions). What was the rationale behind making broad cuts to the AC and civilian work force rather than the RC? Why not make proportional cuts across the board? In an environment characterized by drastic reductions in budgetary resources, why was the RC spared draconian cuts in end strength?

What Odierno did not say (out loud) was that the RC is more “cost-effective.” This fiscal reality has been proven by numerous studies and is touted by RC leaders as one of the main reasons the RC should be maintained at current (or even increased) strength levels.

Not surprisingly, one of those publicizing the fiscal wisdom of maintaining the RC is Lieutenant General Jeffrey Talley, the current Chief, Army Reserve (CAR). In recent testimony to Congress, he stated that:

> [a]s the Army’s Federal OR force provider, the Army Reserve provides a cost-effective way to mitigate risk to national security, comprising almost 20 percent of the Total Army for only 6 percent of the current budget, and adds that this is an excellent “return on investment.”\(^{115}\) Then Acting Director of the Army National Guard (DARNG), Major General Raymond Carpenter, cited statistics that reflected the ARNG’s 33 percent of the total Army’s force while consuming only 10 percent of the total Army budget.\(^{116}\)

The 2008 CNGR report gave significant attention to discussing the economic and budgetary environment. The CNGR concluded that the RC is a bargain: The National Guard received about 12 percent of the total Army 2008 requested budget, while the Army Reserve received only 6 percent, (compared to 66 percent pro-
vided to the AC, with the remainder going to research, development, testing, and evaluation programs). Despite its small portion of the Army's budget, the RC mobilized and deployed in huge percentages and greater frequencies than originally planned.

The Reserve Forces Policy Board (RFPB) also concluded that the RC provided a bargain for national defense:

[T]he most recent report of the Reserve Forces Policy Board (RFPB) concluded that while Reserve component forces comprise 39% of the total force, they account for 16% of the costs. It calculated that an Active component service member costs taxpayers $384,000 compared to $123,000 for his counterpart in the Reserves, which would translate into about $2.6 billion in savings for every 10,000 positions shifted from full-time to part-time.

Critics of these numbers point out that RC formations require more training time to get ready for deployment than AC troops, and that this train-up period could cost more than a steady-state investment. They also say the numbers do not take into account the economic impact of RC Soldiers being out of the civilian economy and therefore may be costing the nation in ways not altogether measurable.

There is also concern that increased usage of the National Guard in a warfighting role would diminish the NG’s ability to perform its homeland role of DSCA. Indeed, a state may suffer if its NG Soldiers are deployed elsewhere while a natural disaster or terrorist incident occurs in the state. This concern is mitigated in two ways: 1) It is unlikely that a state would ever have to deploy all of its forces at the same time; and, 2) Emergency Management Assistance Compacts
(EMACs) exist between states to provide domestic response capabilities for states in need.\textsuperscript{119}

Perhaps the real issue is that the AC does not \textbf{want} the RC to assume an operational role. Although Senior AC leaders have publicly echoed the “let’s have an OR” mantra, they have also more privately expressed concerns over the concept. Some have mentioned that mobilization of the RC during a crisis and during a shooting war is one thing, but a regular, peacetime mobilization could have drastic effects.

One senior Army commander said in an interview for this project, “. . . with the localization of the Reserve component, large mobilizations could destroy a community, take down an industry—that is where this is fuzzy.”\textsuperscript{120} This could, indeed, be an issue in certain towns and industries (i.e., law enforcement has a heavy percentage of reserve component Soldiers), but one must question whether it is a large enough concern to negate the benefits of having an OR.

The budgeting and resourcing process highlights the reality that we have three Armies: the AC, the ARNG, and the Army Reserve. When it comes to decisions regarding manning, equipping, training, and missions, the three Armies vie for precious dollars to each serve its own needs. While the Army Total Army Force Policy directs that the AC and RC be considered as one,\textsuperscript{121} it is idealistic to think that the parochial fights for resources will abate.

For example, RC general officers have recently become bolder in directly asking Congress for increased funding for specific RC endeavors. Are the RC leaders making an “end run” around the Department of the Army, “asking lawmakers to do what the Pentagon may not want done”?\textsuperscript{122} As one critic noted, “[The RC generals] want to stay part of the operational force in-
stead of the strategic reserve because it means they’ll get much greater resources.” He further surmised that maintaining an operational RC “would also increase pressure for deeper cuts in the active-duty Army.” Are these legitimate concerns, or is this just another example of the three Armies posturing and vying for increasingly scarce resources?

At his Congressional testimony in January 2013, Odierno listed the steps the Army needed to take as a result of the expected budget shortfalls for Fiscal Year (FY) 13 and FY14. He first mentioned furlough planning and cuts to civilian personnel; cancellation of third and fourth quarter depot-level maintenance; cancellation of “all but one of the Brigade maneuver Combat Training Center rotations for nondeploying units”; and “large reductions of institutional training across the Army” (including reduction of aviation training flying hours; courses on DSCA and military intelligence; NCO common core courses; the Captains Career Course; and Intermediate Level Education [ILE]). Odierno also discussed cuts in base sustainment funds, severe reductions in RC pre-mobilization medical readiness accounts, and others.

Odierno ended the long list of budget reduction measures by saying:

Let me emphasize that these readiness issues are not limited to the Active Component. They will hit the Total Army. In fact, the reduction in overseas deployments which has sustained our reserve readiness over the past twelve years may result in us being unable to maintain our OR.

It remains to be seen whether Congress will deem it feasible (or even necessary) to pay for an OR in times of relative peace. As the Center for Strategic and Inter-
national Studies’ (CSIS) Christine Wormuth stated in an analysis of the CNGR recommendations on developing the OR:

[These] recommendations will truly make or break transforming the National Guard and Reserves into a twenty-first century operational force. . . . However, these recommendations come with multi-billion dollar price tags—a fact that raises the barriers to their implementation very significantly. The financial cost of this transformation is high, but so is the cost of failing to make the transformation. Congress and the American public thus must engage in an explicit debate about the need for an operational force and how to prioritize this need against many other competing priorities.¹²⁷

Indeed, that debate is sorely needed. Without it, the fate of the OR could be dependent on the actions of accountants with red pens, slashing items they do not understand from an extremely tight budget. Our Army and its Soldiers deserve better.

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

The numerous challenges surrounding RC integration and an OR suggest the creation of a senior level working group to delve into the issues and develop concrete solutions to problems that have been “kicked down the road” for years. The working group should have representatives from all three components, preferably officers and NCOs who have both AC and RC experience, understand the challenges of the other components, and are willing to engage in robust and honest discussion.

The working group should address the issues outlined in the following text to develop and recommend comprehensive, holistic, and viable courses of action.
for the Army’s senior leadership. Emphasis must be put on setting aside parochial interests and looking at what is best for the Army as a whole. In this manner, an approach can be found that will best serve the long-term interests of all components and achieve a true Army Total Force.

The issues to be tackled by the working group should include:

1. Define with clarity and certainty: what “OR” means; the mission(s) of the AC and RC; and the ultimate “demand signal” of the AC to mobilize reserve elements. Specify what missions can be accomplished solely by the AC, which require RC assistance, and in what time frame. Additionally, which missions are best suited to the RC only?

2. Clarify the mission command of RC units with respect to alignment, allocation, and apportionment to AC and geographical combatant commands. Ensure all elements understand what is meant by these relationships and what the responsibilities are for each unit. Determine which headquarters will: provide mission taskings, issue training guidance and validate mission essential task lists (METLs), approve training plans, provide resources, ensure inclusion with current operational plans and orders, and determine availability schedules.

3. Revisit the 2008 report of the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves. Review the commission’s recommendations and validate which are still needed to integrate the RC as an operational force. Develop courses of action to implement the commission’s recommendations.

4. Complete a comprehensive, apples-to-apples cost-benefit analysis to determine the real costs of an OR with respect to the levels of proficiency desired (as
identified in issue 1). Should a high level of proficiency be desired, then provide the necessary resources to make it happen (noting, of course, that the level of desired proficiency will be tied to the willingness of the Pentagon and Congress to spend on such resources).

5. Develop personnel, communications, supply, maintenance, training, and readiness tracking systems that are identical (or at least complementary) for all components. Make service in each component “interchangeable” to facilitate the continuum of service. Although this would initially be quite expensive, over the long term, such efforts would likely pay for themselves through the cost savings of standardization and the reduction of three different support networks administering each component’s own method.

6. Continue strong efforts to educate and involve RC families and employers. Without good relations between the Army and these civilian support providers, there can be no credible RC.

7. Determine if (or when) it is feasible to require identical standards of readiness and professional development as called for by ATFP.

8. Seek to make RC access to health and dental care at the same level as that of the AC, should the determined missions of the RC warrant.

9. Examine the ARFORGEN model to determine its viability as a model for managing RC training and readiness in peacetime. Explore the possibility of maintaining the model but changing the expectations and requirements of each phase in the rotational cycle to better match RC training realities (per Orr’s recommendation). Determine what impact geographical alignments may have on the ability of the ARFORGEN model to provide globally available RC forces.
10. Collaborate with other military services to share experiences and best practices for integrating the RC. Form a Joint Working Group to examine the OR from a multiservice perspective.

11. Develop ways to replace component-oriented cultures with a Total Force culture. Educate leaders on critical thinking, and encourage them to recognize and set aside parochial views that place their component’s well-being above that of the total Army.

CONCLUSION

As the Army confronts drastically reduced budgets and a changing security environment, it is essential to examine the challenges and requirements of having an OR. These recommendations do not encompass all of the issues that must be addressed to maintain the OR or to better integrate the RC into a Total Force, but they do provide a starting point.

Leaders of both the AC and RC must tackle these critical issues. Frank discussion, lessened parochialism, and a willingness to make hard choices are essential. Otherwise, the OR may become a mere footnote in the Army’s history.

ENDNOTES


3. In peer review comments, Colonel Steve Araki mentioned that Cold War Reserve units were used in the CAPSTONE and WARTRACE programs—aligning strategic reserve capabilities to
specific Active Component units. Oftentimes, this translated into individual augmentation fills rather than provision of a mission support capability.


5. This is based on anecdotal evidence only (a perception from some RC Soldiers that their training opportunities increased following Operation DESERT STORM). The authors did not delve into research of the analysis of training data from the 1990s.


7. Coker, p. 301. As of December 28, 2010, 793,567 Reserve Component forces of all services had been activated for Operations ENDURING FREEDOM, IRAQI FREEDOM, NEW DAWN, and NOBLE EAGLE. In the 2 1/2 years since, the number has risen to over 800,000.


9. Reviewer Colonel Steve Araki noted that, while 96 percent of all CA assets remain in USAR, the AC is significantly increasing its CA capability, largely to address any immediate CA requirements for the future.

10. Author Laura Mackenzie recalled first hearing of the RC being used as an operational force in April 2005 at a USAWC Reserve Component National Security Issues Seminar. The idea was met with surprise but was welcomed by the RC field grade officers who were briefed on the concept.


13. Roberta Berthelot, *The Army Response to Hurricane Katrina*, Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army Military History Institute, Army Heritage Education Center (AHEC), September 10, 2010, available from www.army.mil/article/45029/. Five years after Hurricane Katrina, AHEC published an article summarizing the Army’s response to the hurricane disaster. The article is illustrated with an oversized picture of the AC’s First Army Commander, Lieutenant Colonel Russel Honore, while the text describes almost exclusively the actions of AC units. There are only three sentences devoted to the National Guard contribution, and none to the USAR. From reading this article, it would appear that the Army considers only the contributions of its AC units to be worthy of remembrance. The contributions of the RC, which provided the vast majority of the responders to the hurricane, were merely a side note.


22. CNGR.


25. Ibid., p. 1, para 1, Purpose.


31. CNGR, quoting Joint Staff “OR Definition,” draft, p. 7.

32. Ibid.

33. Ibid., p. 4.

35. Interestingly, when the RC was used for strategic purposes during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM, there was no assurance that the conflict would limit boots-on-the-ground time. In 1990, RC personnel deployed without any idea of how long the conflict was likely to endure or how long their services were to be required.

36. The AC and RC definitions used herein were based on interviews with senior leaders in both components. Although none of the interviewees could give a specific definition, each expressed definite ideas about what he or she expected an Operational RC to do.


39. CNGR, p. 54. In describing the need for operationalizing and restructuring the RC, the CNGR cited the 2005 Defense National Strategy, which “outlined our nation’s security requirements as (1) a United States secure from direct attack, (2) ‘strategic access and . . . global freedom of action,’ (3) strong ‘alliances and partnerships,’ and (4) ‘favorable security conditions’.”

40. Ibid., p. 55.


42. Ibid. Odierno’s phrasing in this quote sounds slightly strange, but one must remember that he was responding orally to a question that was just posed to him. He was talking about a complex issue, and his thoughts were clearly running faster than his spoken words.
43. Ibid.

44. “Reserve Chiefs Endorse Staying Operational,” *National Guard*, Vol. 67, No. 9, September 2013, Washington, DC: National Guard Association of the United States (NGAUS), p 18. This article provides quotes from the meeting. The full meeting notes are not yet available from the Reserve Officers Association.

45. Ibid., p 18.

46. 35th Infantry Division Commanding General Major General John Davoren Kansas ARNG, interview with author Laura Mackenzie, February 15, 2013.


48. Observation by author John Ellis, who works as a contractor at USPACOM; he cites three examples of both Army and Air Force Reserve units being replaced in major exercises over the past 12 months. The exercises involved were Keris Strike and Talisman Saber.


50. Senate Concurrent Resolution 48.IS, 112th Congress (2011-2102), “Recognizing 375 years of service of the National Guard and affirming congressional support for a permanent OR as a component of the Armed Forces.” This bill was introduced on June 12, 2012, by Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT). It was referred to the Senate Armed Services Committee, which did not act on it.


52. General Raymond Odierno, Chief of Staff of the Army, Testimony to the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee, Washington, DC, February 12, 2013.

54. Ibid., p. 1, para 1, Purpose.

55. Ibid., p. 1, para 4.a. and 4.b.

56. Ibid., p. 2, para 4.f.

57. Ibid., p. 2.

58. Ibid., p. 3, para 1.a.

59. Ibid., p. 3, para 1.d.

60. Ibid., p. 3, para 1.e.

61. Ibid., p. 3, paras 2.a and 2.b.

62. Ibid., p. 3, para 2.c. The “continuum of service” concept (also known as the “Soldier for Life” concept), championed by Chief of the Army Reserve Lieutenant General Jack C. Stultz, involved allowing Soldiers to move more easily between the various Army components (active, Reserve, and Guard), depending upon the individual Soldier’s personal circumstances and “wants,” while providing him/her a baseline system of credit for promotion and retirement.

63. Ibid., p. 5, para 10.

64. Ibid., pp. 5-7.

65. After initial submission of this monograph, the U.S. Army Forces Command issued guidance (signed by the U.S. Forces Command Commander, the Chief of the Army Reserve, and the Director of the Army National Guard) regarding ATFP, which echoed many of the directives previously issued. It also reinforced the concept of RC and AC units training together in a pre-mobilization effort. Once again, it appeared little thought had been given about how to accomplish this in a resource-constrained environment, for the policy relies on encouraging tactical commanders to train with each other—without any added budget outlays. Headquarters, Forces Command (FORSCOM) Memorandum, SUBJECT: Army Total Force Policy Implementation—FORSCOM Interim Guidance, December 10, 2013.
66. Ibid., p. 1.


68. ATFP, p. 1, para 3.a.

69. Ibid. This statement may be the basis of the move to establish regionally aligned forces (RAF)—forces that are focused upon a certain geographical combatant command and are available for that command’s use during the units’ operational rotation time frame.


72. Authors’ observations are from John Ellis’s Army Reserve duties and reports from the U.S. Army Reserve Command in various venues/command and staff meetings, further informed by conversations with the command and staff of the 4960th Multifunctional Training Brigade; and Laura Mackenzie’s experience as a TASS battalion commander.

73. Colonel Steve Araki, Commander 4960th Multifunctional Training Brigade, in peer review comments to the authors, September 2013.

75. A study of World War II would provide myriad examples of multicomponent units.

76. ATFP, p. 2.


78. Major General Orr interview, March 29, 2013. This story referred to the experiences of 2nd Brigade, 34th Infantry Division, IAARNG.


80. Interview conducted with a company grade 35ID officer at Fort Leavenworth, KS, September 2013.

81. The authors’ experiences and discussions with Soldiers throughout their careers have shown that lengthy professional development schools (both NCOES/OES and MOS qualification) are a hardship for RC Soldiers and their employers. In general, as the Soldiers progress in the military, they also move ahead in their civilian careers. As civilian job responsibilities increase, it becomes more difficult to break away for military schools.


83. The authors’ experiences and conversations with RC Training NCOs and staff at Regional Training Institutes, January 2014.

84. A common format for nonresident ILE is for students to attend classes either on weekends or at night, taking up to 18 months just for the common core. Distance education for USAWC is done individually at home, taking 2 years and 3 months to complete (vice 10 months for the resident school).

86. Some RC units now allow an occasional “Virtual inactive duty training” — a day when Soldiers can complete annual mandatory training courses (equal opportunity, ethics, safety, etc.) online from home in lieu of attending drill. Soldiers are given their full drill pay for completing the courses by the unit’s deadline. Often this is done to meet mandatory training/education requirements where computer resources at the battle assembly/drill site are lacking.


88. TRADOC Pamphlet 525-8-2, p. 52.

89. Author Laura Mackenzie’s interviews with Major General Orr (March 29, 2103), Major General Davoren (February 15, 2013), and the Adjutant General of Kansas, Major General Lee Tafanelli (February 15, 2013).

90. ATFP, para. 7.


94. Observation by author John Ellis, verified by G1 personnel specialists in the 9th MSC.

95. Ronald J. James, Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower and Reserve Affairs), Memorandum, “Policy for Management of Reserve Component Soldiers on Active Duty for

96. Most states’ EPLO teams are comprised of Reservists from the USAR, Air Force Reserve, and Naval Reserve. The EPLOs’ role is to advise the region and state’s NG leaders on what Title 10 resources are available to assist in domestic emergencies and to coordinate use of those resources when needed. Responsibilities for the EPLO program are outlined in DoD Instruction Number 3025.16, September 8, 2011, SUBJECT: Defense Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officer (EPLO) programs.

97. The RC’s refusal to admit that it cannot achieve the same proficiency standards was clear in the recent arguments over CSA Odierno’s comments that AC and RC capabilities are not interchangeable. Odierno stated:

The capabilities are not interchangeable . . . there’s a reason why the active component is more expensive. It brings you a higher level of readiness, because they’re full time. They are trained and ready to do things at a higher level because they spend every day focused on that. Our National Guard, [which has] done an incredible job in the last 10 years, trains 39 days a year.

Both the Chief, National Guard Bureau, and President of the NGAUS disagreed with Odierno’s remarks. The CNGB stated “the idea of doing 39 days a year, to me, doesn’t exist anymore” (an idea that many RC Soldiers would echo). The NGAUS president, however, went so far as to state that Odierno’s remarks were “disrespectful and simply not true.” How so? They are factual, common-sense statements. It is beyond this author’s understanding how RC leaders can believe that training part-time can achieve the same proficiency as training full-time. Paul McLeary, “Trouble Brewing Between US Army’s Active Duty and Guard Forces,” Defense News, January 13, 2014.

98. The greater civilian expertise and advanced education of many Reservists are among the arguments against increasing civil affairs capability in the AC. Many AC Soldiers have only military experience; without complementary civilian experience, they
might be lacking in the requisite background needed by successful civil affairs specialists.


100. Ibid.


102. ATFP, p. 2, para 3.d.

103. Ibid., p. 2.


105. Tafanelli, Davoren, and Orr interviews.

106. This is based on the authors’ discussions with numerous RC Soldiers.


108. AR 525-29, p 4, para 1-10.b. (3). The quotation within the cited paragraph (“... intensely managed structure that must maintain a level of readiness that allows them to be called upon for periods of high demand.”) has no reference within the AR to indicate its origin.

109. Major General Davoren interview.

110. Davoren, Tafanelli, and Orr interviews.

111. Army Regulation 525-29, p. 3, para. 1-10.a.(1).

112. One means for exploring Orr’s ideas for adapting AR-FORGEN for peacetime use would be for the Strategic Studies Institute to commission a study.
113. Colonel Stacey Yamada, Commander of the 658th Regional Support Group, from notes he took while in attendance at the dinner, January 11, 2013.


117. CNGR, p. 65.


119. The Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) is an agreement signed by all 50 states and four territories that “offers assistance during governor-declared states of emergency through a responsive, straightforward system that allows states to send personnel, equipment, and commodities to help disaster relief efforts in other states.” The EMAC website offers further information at www.emacweb.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=80&Itemid=256.

120. Wiercinski interview.

121. ATFP.


123. Ibid. Thompson was quoting Lawrence Korb, former Pentagon top civilian during the Reagan administration and currently at the Center for American Progress.

124. Ibid.

126. Ibid.

127. Wormuth, p. 2.
APPENDIX

INTEGRATION EXPERIENCES OF A
RESERVE COMPONENT UNIT ASSIGNED TO
AN ARMY SERVICE COMPONENT COMMAND

This case study is based on the personal experiences of this monograph’s lead author, John Ellis. He is a USAR colonel who is assigned as the Deputy Commander, 9th MSC.

To understand some of the less obvious challenges facing Reserve Component (RC) assigned to an Active Component (AC) headquarters, a case study of the 9th Mission Support Command (MSC) is presented. The issues discussed herein are not intended as criticisms of either the AC or RC. Rather, they are presented as points of discussion to assist planners and decision-makers when considering the future integration of active and reserve units as well as the restructuring of the units into multicomponent formations.

BACKGROUND

The 9th Mission Support Command is a 3,500-member U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) unit assigned directly to U.S. Army Pacific (USARPAC), an Army Service Component Command (ASCC) headquarters. The 9th MSC receives its operational mission taskings from USARPAC in an operational control mission command relationship, but nearly all of its resources come from its RC headquarters, the U.S. Army Reserve Command (USARC), which retains “shared administrative control” over the unit. The 9th MSC leaders answer to at least two different bosses, and there is some-
times confusion in determining which headquarters’ taskings and policies will take precedence. In such a situation, the unit’s standard operating procedure is to implement the more stringent, but nonetheless, adherence to two different requirements can be difficult.

While the 9th MSC can be considered as an “outlier” because of its unique geographic and command situation, its experiences are illustrative of what other RC units will face as regional alignment takes place. Following are some of the less obvious areas that present challenges for this operationally assigned unit.

**Inclusion of RC leaders in the Planning/Operations Processes.**

USARPAC does a very good job of including its Reserve components into theater campaign planning and execution. Its primary RC unit, the 9th MSC, is invited to all battle rhythm events, to include the highest-level command and staff conferences, battle update briefings, coordinating and special staff endeavors, and installation-oriented meetings. Part of the challenge comes because the majority of these meetings are held Monday through Friday, when the 9th MSC leaders are working at their civilian, not USAR, jobs. Although there is a general understanding and acceptance when full-time civilian and authorized government representative (AGR) personnel have to attend in the stead of the commander and his deputy, the lower-ranking AGR personnel cannot necessarily commit the command to certain requests. Information and time are lost in the transmittal to the MSC commander, and the RC leaders’ input often comes after the AC staff has pressed on and gained a decision. However, we hasten to add that over the past 5 years,
the integration of 9th MSC into USARPAC headquarters’ initiatives and efforts has increased markedly at the senior and even the action officer levels. Most of the challenges come from administrative and communications systems that tend to not address USAR abilities to participate more fully.

Constant Education Process Regarding Usage and Mobilization of RC Units.

As this monograph’s opening vignette illustrated, there is sometimes a lack of understanding about how RC units can be tasked and mobilized. RC personnel must be diligent in training their AC headquarters on mobilization procedures, time limitations, and RC-specific policies. They must also be honest in reporting readiness levels. Although the RC’s widespread cross-leveling of the Operation IRAQI FREEDOM/Operation ENDURING FREEDOM mobilizations worked, it would not be a viable practice for the long term.

Another area for education is the different timelines upon which AC and RC units must operate. Every area of administration and operations has myriad examples of different timelines: completion of personnel evaluations, disciplinary actions, supply transfers, line of duty investigations, mandatory training requirements, etc. The components must educate each other on their timelines and make accommodation where necessary to meet differing requirements.

The USARC is currently addressing this near-constant educational challenge with deployments of teams of AGR officers to assist the ASCC staff in the planning and integration of Reserve forces into AC operations in theater. These efforts are embryonic, and it remains to be seen how effective they can be with
the ASCC leadership. The first of these teams (known as Army Reserve Engagement Cells) stood up in August 2013.

**Mission Command.**

A question that often arises is, “Which headquarters is in charge? The operational headquarters (USARPAC) or the administrative headquarters (USARC)?” Rather than being a turf war, this is a question that has wide-ranging implications.

In the case of validating readiness, for example, who will determine the readiness standards and compliance? The common-sense answer might be the operational headquarters, since they will be the ones employing the 9th MSC. However, resourcing comes from USARC, which definitely has a “vote” in what training it can and will pay for. This can be a problem, particularly if the USARPAC’s standards are more “expensive” than what USARC can afford to provide.

Further, which headquarters should provide the necessary predeployment guidance and standards? From which headquarters will regionally aligned forces (RAF) get their marching orders? Which headquarters will approve their mission analyses, training METLs, and annual training plans?

**Information Assurance Measures.**

Many of USARPAC’s communications systems and information security requirements hinder RC inclusion. For example, the USARPAC LandWarNet communications system will automatically delete e-mail accounts for Soldiers who have not logged into the computers at least once every 30 days. This
happens routinely for some troop program unit (TPU) drilling Soldiers, as battle assemblies may occur more than 30 days apart. Soldiers who are conducting training at a different location might also miss the time frame. When this occurs, the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) is currently requiring a redefinition of the Soldier’s requirement to possess an e-mail account, making the process cumbersome.

Additionally, the USARPAC servers can only be accessed from computers in and around the Fort Shafter area or from 9th MSC unit locations in Guam, Saipan, American Samoa, or Alaska. They cannot be accessed from civilian or even other Department of Defense (DoD) computers. This severely limits the RC Soldier’s ability to keep up with USARPAC message traffic. A Reserve officer who has a civilian job working at USPACOM could not, for example, access USARPAC SharePoint pages and/or webmail via his government computer during his lunch or after duty hours. The 30-day log-on requirement has therefore posed a real challenge to RC Soldiers who do not live close to the unit.

Ironically, USARPAC’s LandWarNet is operated by a multicomponent unit (although the e-mail system is, as mentioned, operated by DISA).

**Healthcare.**

Another example of limited integration is found in the availability of healthcare services for 9th MSC Soldiers. Great strides have been made in the past decade regarding RC Soldiers’ access to a viable and workable healthcare system. Nevertheless, the RC healthcare system does not match or compare to that of the
AC. This impacts readiness levels when 9th MSC units are compared to AC units, and the methods to achieve higher medical and dental readiness require a much greater deal of time, effort, and money to effect than the AC requires.

In many cases, while 9th MSC’s RC Soldiers can get (and pay for) Tricare insurance, they may live or be posted in a place where there are no Tricare providers available (like American Samoa or Saipan). Additionally, the RC Soldiers cannot receive medical or dental screening or treatment at AC clinics unless they are on orders lasting 30 days or more. This can be problematic for RC Soldiers living in Korea, Japan, Alaska, and Guam, where U.S. medical facilities exist but are not required to provide any care for these Soldiers.¹

In those cases where medical or dental care is provided, RC Soldiers have a much lower priority. Granted, healthcare for the RC is one of the easiest areas to justify cutting during austere times. Considering that RC Soldiers want assurance that their post-deployment medical needs will be met (and preferably not just by an already overburdened Veterans Administration); however, decisionmakers may want to find ways to increase RC access to existing AC facilities.

SUMMARY

These examples are not cited to point fingers at USARPAC’s systems or the mindset of its senior officers, for indeed, this command is arguably the most integrated command of all the ASCCs. USARPAC and the 9th MSC have made tremendous progress in integrating their AC and RC units. The concern is that even with such forward-leaning leadership, the RC integration for the rest of the Army will have to deal
with similar situations. Aligning and integrating the rest of the RC with the AC units they support will take considerable planning and procedural changes.

Most importantly, the organizational cultures will have to change to better adapt to the mix of AC and RC operations. The AC must accept the strangeness of the RC and its idiosyncratic procedures, at least until the Army Total Force Policy takes practical and implementable effect. Likewise, the RC must understand that it must truly adapt to the needs of the AC units it supports—instead of often guessing what is required. Until that happens, the “talk” of integrating the RC is not matching the “walk” the RC faces each day.

ENDNOTES - APPENDIX

1. There has been progress in this regard, and RC Soldiers in these areas now enjoy a small degree of access (for screening and some smaller-scale treatment). This access has been the result of “workarounds” and memorandums of agreement with the Pacific Regional Medical Command leadership. Clinic commanders can abruptly end the policy if it appears these facilities cannot meet the demand of the AC and their dependents.