COUNTERINSURGENCY:
RELEARNING HOW TO THINK

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The U.S. military’s experience with insurgencies spans its history from the American Revolution to its recent experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan. The current geostrategic environment is fertile for global insurgency, primarily the threat of radical Islamic extremists who have learned to leverage 21st century technologies to enhance their strategic power projection capability. This paper will examine the adequacy of current U.S. counterinsurgency strategic policy, operational concepts and doctrine. Through the review of two case studies, the British Army in Malaya 1948-1960 and the United States Army in the Philippines 1898-1902, insights for strategic leaders and planners will be gleaned and proposed for inclusion in future doctrinal updates.
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COUNTERINSURGENCY: RELEARNING HOW TO THINK

The enemies that we face today for the most part do not have large standing forces or, in some cases, even territory to defend. They know they cannot defeat us on the battlefield, so they choose to fight us in less conventional ways—ways that play to their strengths not ours. We owe our forces the utmost sense of urgency in the tough process of transforming to meet the challenges of the 21st century.¹

- Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, 21 DEC 04

The U.S. military’s experience with insurgencies spans its history from the American Revolution to its recent experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan. The current geostrategic environment is fertile for global insurgency, primarily the threat of radical Islamic extremists who have learned to leverage 21st century technologies to enhance their strategic power projection capability. Department of Defense (DoD) has recognized these emerging threats, has labeled them as irregular security challenges, and appears to have prioritized them ahead of traditional conventional challenges.² Dr Stephen Metz and LTC Raymond Millen, analysts at the U.S. Army War College’s Strategic Studies Institute, have described the current period as an “age of insurgency,” similar to the period 1950s to 1980s, and indicate that this period will continue for the several decades.³ To meet these challenges, civilian and military leaders and planners must change the way they think about the complex challenges of prosecuting a counterinsurgency campaign. Strategic policy makers must question the viability of achieving victory over a global insurgency or just managing it to some acceptable level. In the end, leaders and planners must review and, where necessary, refine or adapt their strategy, operational concepts, doctrine, and organizations to address the global insurgency environment.⁴ When doing so, they must lift the right lessons from history and be cautious not to provide prescriptive solutions but principles. DoD transformational efforts only partially address the current gap between strategy and capabilities.

PURPOSE

This paper will examine the adequacy of current U.S. counterinsurgency strategic policy, operational concepts, and doctrine and then through analysis of two case studies, the British Army in Malaya 1948-1960 and the United States Army in the Philippines 1898-1902, provide insights for strategic leaders and planners and proposals for inclusion in future doctrinal updates.

Recent operations have exposed gaps in our current strategic policy. Senior leaders interviewed after the end of major combat operations indicated that the Army and DoD sought to
develop counterinsurgency strategy early in the war, but other elements of government were unprepared. They claimed that no strategic policy guidance was available to the commanders in Iraq so military operations could be coordinated with strategic policy objectives for the country.5

DEFINING INSURGENCY AND COUNTERINSURGENCY

Battles are won through the ability of men to express concrete ideas in clear unmistakable language.6

- BG S. L. A. Marshall

The terms insurgency and counterinsurgency have long been a part of the military lexicon, yet are not well understood by conventional civilian and military leaders and planners because their use has been dormant for three decades. During the early stages of the recent insurgency in Iraq senior leadership struggled with the language of war. DoD news releases avoided the term guerrilla in favor of terrorist.7 Within the spectrum of conflict, counterinsurgency has been subordinated under the heading stability and support operations but can occur across the spectrum of conflict. Joint Pub 1-02 defines insurgency as “an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict.” It defines counterinsurgency as “those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency.”8 These definitions are dated and should be changed to reflect 21st century insurgency and counterinsurgency strategy. A better definition of insurgency has been offered by Dr. Metz: “Insurgency is a strategy in which the weak use various forms of protracted asymmetric violence, psychological conflict, and a radical counter ideology to alter the balance of power in their favor”9

For the purpose of this paper, the terms terrorist and insurgent are interchangeable. JP 1-02 defines terrorism as “the calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological” and a terrorist as “an individual who uses violence, terror, and intimidation to achieve a result.”10

DEFENSE STRATEGY

STRATEGY TO CONCEPT TO CAPABILITIES

The Defense Strategy must change to reflect 21st century global threat capabilities. The National Security Strategy of the United States of America 2002 (NSS), National Military Strategy 2004 (NMS) and the 2003 DoD Transformation Planning Guidance (TPG) are policy
documents that provide overarching strategic guidance for the military. They serve as a method for the President of the United States and Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) to define national security and military objectives and describe ends, ways, and means. These documents make reference to the threat of global terrorism but ignore the use of the terms insurgency and counterinsurgency.

The NSS describes the need to operate across the full spectrum of conflict with a priority to winning the war on global terrorism. The NSS makes no use of the terms insurgency or counterinsurgency, but instead describes the current threat to the United States as terrorists with global reach. It then describes a strategy to attack this threat:

The struggle against global terrorism is different from any other war in our history. It will be fought on many fronts against a particularly elusive enemy over an extended period of time. Progress will come through the persistent accumulation of successes—some seen, some unseen. “...Our priority will be first to disrupt and destroy terrorist organizations of global reach and attack their leadership; command, control, and communications; material support; and finances. This will have a disabling effect upon the terrorists’ ability to plan and operate.”

The current U.S. strategy to combat the “war on terror” (global insurgency) appears to be a strategy of victory vice containment or management. A strategy of victory envisions total defeat, while management is simply containing or fighting terrorists in places where there are U.S. interests. The strategy of victory is risky, overly ambitious, and most likely unattainable given the breadth of the problem. During an April 2004 Strategy Conference at Carlisle Barracks PA, Dr Metz led a panel discussion on U.S. strategies for combating insurgency and terrorism. Dr Metz indicated that the United States currently has declared a strategy of victory versus management in what we now call the war on terror. He appears to advocate a strategy of management and suggests that a strategy of victory might be too costly and would require greater degree of transformational movement than currently planned.

The NMS provides the military strategy to meet national objectives. The NMS all but ignores the counterinsurgency problem. The NMS, just as the NSS, makes no direct mention of the terms insurgency or counterinsurgency, yet describes a war of terror, irregular challenges, and unconventional methods adopted and employed by non-state and state actors to counter stronger state opponents. The excerpt below from the NMS highlights the military’s role in combating global insurgency and stresses the importance of other agencies, partners and host nations. “More directly, deployed military units will work closely with international partners and other US government agencies to take the battle to the enemy – engaging terrorist forces, terrorist collaborators and those governments harboring terrorists.”
**DOD STRATEGIC GUIDANCE:**

The DoD Strategic Planning Guidance (SPG) provides strategic direction and informs future DoD plans and resourcing. The discussion of the details of the SPG is beyond the scope of this paper, but the construct from which the plan was developed merits review. The 2006-2011 SPG categorized four major security challenges: traditional, irregular, catastrophic and disruptive. Traditional challenges include conventional forces threats that are imposed by well recognized armies, such as North Korea and irregular threats including state and non-state actors using unconventional methods to counter our traditional advantages. The insurgency in Iraq fits into this category. Catastrophic challenges include the concept of terrorist acquisition, possession, and possible employment of Weapons of Mass destruction-like effects against vulnerable, high-profile targets. Finally, disruptive challenges include competitors developing and possessing breakthrough technological capabilities intended to negate U.S. operational advantages. The 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), a DoD analysis of the national defense strategy scheduled to be published in the Fall 2005 is anticipated to acknowledge the changing global security environment shifting focus from traditional to irregular threats. The 2005 QDR provides the opportunity to continue to steer DoD transformation.

The 2002 NSS directed the military of the United States to transform in order to meet 21st century threats. The TPG directed change in three areas: how we fight, how we work, and how we work with other agencies and multinational partners. DoD transformation must occur in areas other than equipment and organizations. Current transformation language reflects a shift from a threat based to capabilities based approach in how the military determines concepts and capabilities necessary to face 21st century challenges.

**JOINT OPERATIONS CONCEPTS**

In order to defeat the capabilities of the 21st century global insurgent, military strategists and planners must reassess current tactical, operational and strategic operational concepts. At the strategic level, Joint Operations Concepts drive changes in doctrine, organization, training, leadership, materiel, personnel, and facilities. Joint Operating Concepts (JOCs) are designed to provide an operational level description of how Joint Force Commander 10-20 years in the future will accomplish a strategic objective through the conduct of operations within a military campaign. The 2003 DOD Transformation Planning Guidance provided four initial JOC categories: Major Combat Operations, Stability Operations, Homeland Security, and Strategic Deterrence. Counterinsurgency operations fall under the Stability Operations JOC, yet can occur as a part of Major Combat Operations, Homeland Security and Strategic Deterrence.
Emerging JOCs must consider the possibility of counterinsurgency operations occurring across the range of operations and spectrum of conflict.  

**DOCTRINE**

JP 1-02 defines doctrine as: “the fundamental principles by which military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. Doctrine is authoritative, but not prescriptive. Doctrine provides a framework for how to think.”  

Joint and service doctrine evolves from joint concepts and must be continually reviewed for relevance. Existing counterinsurgency doctrine is thin and is based on a Maoist model insurgency (an insurgency with clear political objectives, central leadership and a long term strategy). Doctrine must be updated to reflect projected 21st century irregular challenges that include loosely networked insurgenic with global reach.

Current gaps in counterinsurgency doctrine are a direct result of thirty years of neglect and have resulted in training and force structure shortfalls. At the operational and tactical level recent experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan have produced tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) that should be considered when updating current counterinsurgency doctrine. Two of the four services, the Army and Marines, are developing doctrinal publications to address counterinsurgency. The Army and the Marines have clearly taken the lead in doctrinal transformation.

**JOINT DOCTRINE**

Of the 112 Joint Publications currently approved or in development, there is no single Joint manual that provides the Joint force commander with guidance and principles for conducting counterinsurgency operations. The four Joint doctrinal publications that address counterinsurgency provide little substance for regional combatant commanders and their staffs. Some military doctrine writers have characterized existing joint publications as confusing, disjointed, and hollow and acknowledged receiving similar comments from planners and operators in the field.

JP 3-07.1 Joint Tactics Techniques and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense (FID) 30 April, 2004 is the most recently published joint manual addressing counterinsurgency. The manual discusses counterinsurgency operations in the context of Foreign Internal Defense, a mission historically performed by Special Operations Forces. JP 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War, 16 June 1995 specifies joint doctrine for Military Operations Other than War and mentions counterinsurgency in the context of spectrum of conflict. It provides little more than a definition of nation assistance/support to counterinsurgency. In an attempt to
provide an example of a historical counterinsurgency operation, the manual uses Operation PROMOTE LIBERTY, in 1990, following Operation JUST CAUSE in Panama. JP 3.08, *Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations*, 8 February 2001 describes the strategic context for coordination between government agencies and identifies the fundamental principles that a joint force commander may employ in gaining interagency cooperation to accomplish a mission.

Finally, JP3-57, *Joint Doctrine for Civil Military Operations*, 8 February, 2001 is helpful in understanding civil military organizations command relationships and planning that are fundamental for counterinsurgency operations. Many of the concepts presented in this manual were born out of success from historical experiences in counterinsurgency operations.

**SERVICE DOCTRINE**

Existing service doctrinal publications are dated and require revision. LTG William A. Wallace, the former V Corps Army commander who led the recent U.S. Iraqi ground invasion, found current counterinsurgency doctrine inadequate. In his new position as commander of the Combined Arms Center, Ft Leavenworth, Kansas he is driving doctrinal changes to reflect the 21st century operational environment. *The U.S. Army Interim Field Manual 3-07.22, Counterinsurgency Operations*, dated October 2004 and the Marine Corps *Small Wars Manual* (Draft) dated January 2004 are examples of efforts to refine doctrine. These publications are currently being staffed across the services and have been released to the field for comment.

*Field Manual Interim (FMI) 3-07.22*, presents TTP and doctrine for military operations in a counterinsurgency environment. The manual incorporates lessons from recent military operations and historical counterinsurgency operations. *FMI 3-07.22* describes counterinsurgency as an offensive operation involving all elements of national power, highlighting that it can take place across the range of operations and spectrum of conflict. It falls short in outlining a single set of principles for the operational or tactical commander.

In January, 2005 the Army formed the Asymmetric Warfare Group (AWG), an organization designed to study 21st century unconventional threats. The AWG is made up of about 300 personnel, headed by a U.S. Army Colonel and is staffed by both Army personnel and civilian contractors. The AWG will take a holistic approach to the threat, by considering information, intelligence, culture, training and technology in developing solutions. Its mission is two-fold, share lessons learned with the field, and inform future doctrine.

The Marine Corps Small Wars Manual originally published in 1940, republished in 1987 and currently in a revised draft provides operational and tactical level leaders and planners with
enduring principles for the planning conduct of counterinsurgency operations. The 2004 draft manual incorporates recent lessons learned in Iraq and Afghanistan as well as principles learned from U.S. and UK historical experiences. The manual recognizes the changing nature of the 21st century insurgent.  

In an effort to hurdle normal bureaucratic procedures for publishing doctrinal manuals and sharing information, the Marine Corps developed a Marine Corps Small Wars Center of Excellence interactive website containing TTP, lessons learned, and professional readings on Small Wars.

PLANNING

In war nothing is achieved except by calculation. Everything that is not soundly planned in its details yields no results.

- Napoleon, 18 September 1806

Counterinsurgency operations are complex and political by nature; therefore, counterinsurgency planning cannot be left to the military alone and must involve all elements of national power. The problem is that historically the military has taken the lead in all aspects of planning. The Beyond Goldwater-Nichols (BG-N) study team, charged by the U.S. government to look at defense reform, acknowledged this problem and commented that across government agencies, there is no planning culture outside the DOD. Interagency planners are key players during counterinsurgency planning and during certain stages may need to take the lead. The BG-N team made particular note of this requirement. The BG-N Phase I report recommended four major initiatives to improve interagency planning. First, that the President establish a Deputy assistant to the President on the National Security Council (NSC) staff as the lead for integrating agency strategies and planning. Second, that the President establish a NSC planning office for stability operations. Third, that key agencies establish planning cells. The team's final recommendation indicated that for each operation the President should hold one senior official accountable for integrating U.S. interagency operations.

The process of planning at the strategic level has been improved. At the Joint Staff and Regional Combatant Command level, the recent modifications of the deliberate planning and crisis action planning directed by DOD have resulted in a planning process that is shorter, adaptive, and is better suited for the volatile and uncertain 21st century environment.

Regional combatant commanders are responsible for conducting (planning, preparing, executing, and assessing) military operations in their areas of responsibility in support of counterinsurgency. Close coordination with the US
ambassador or diplomatic representative and country team within supported HNs is essential in order to build an effective regional counterinsurgency program.33

IMPERATIVES TO COUNTERINSURGENCY PLANNING:

The following imperatives hold true at all levels of planning. First of all and most important, current U.S. military doctrinal guidance states that the overarching principle for counterinsurgency planners is that responsibility for Internal Defense and Development (IDAD) ultimately should fall within the purview of the host nation. All aspects of planning must support this principle. Counterinsurgency missions are inherently political in nature, thus, require coordination between the military and the Host Nation, interagency and country teams. When developing U.S. assistance programs, planners must consider long term effects. Assistance programs must support the overall campaign and must lead to Host Nation self sufficiency. Finally, planners must develop operational relationships between the military and other players such as non governmental organizations.4

Former Central Command commander General Anthony Zinni, USMC, (RET), described the challenges inherent in operations that involve a high degree of civil military planning and the need to establish formal civil military relationships. "There is a history of relearning the requirement for and the modalities of civil military operations about as often as there is a major change of command or new complex contingency." "The status quo is [ad hoc] every time. So in the next conference, someone will say that they have just discovered NGOs, just discovered that they are different, just discovered that you actually need to coordinate with them.... There needs to be change."5

Regional combat commanders require an increase in staffing, specifically interagency and humanitarian advisors/planners. Existing arrangements between military planners and interagency at the regional combatant command level are insufficient. The current structure provides the Combatant Commander with a Political Advisor and a regional country team. This structure facilitates coordination during planning, but does not provide the depth in interagency and humanitarian functional expertise required to conduct mission planning.6

After the events on September 11, 2001 the DOD realized that there was a great need for improvement in interagency cooperation. The Joint Interagency Coordination Groups (JIACGs) concept came about to bridge the gap between military and civilian planning.7 In 2002, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) approved Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) JIACG prototypes and directed experimentation. JFCOM is currently preparing a fielding plan for SECDEF review. If approved as a permanent Combatant Command staff element, the
JIACG will greatly enhance combatant commander's planning capabilities by providing improved information sharing, adaptive civil military planning and rehearsal planning. Phase II of the BG-N study team is reviewing existing combatant regional command structures and will provide recommendations to improve existing structures.

HISTORICAL CASE STUDIES

History taken in the proper context can help inform the future. Two case studies in counterinsurgency, the British Army in Malaya 1948-1960 and the United States Army in the Philippines 1898-1902, provide leaders and planners unique insights into such warfare. These case studies describe how two armies learned to adapt, change and in the end succeed. Lessons learned are not presented as prescriptive solutions, but are intended to be used as a construct to frame contemporary problems - how to think versus what to do.

BRITISH ARMY IN MALAYA 1948-1960

The British have a wealth of experience and have enjoyed considerable success in counterinsurgency operations. Their counterinsurgency experience spans over fifty years with operations ranging from Palestine, Cyprus and Kenya in the late 1940s and 1950s, to current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. During the post WW II period, 1948-1960, the British found themselves fighting a communist insurgency in Malaya. This was an insurgency that they were not prepared to fight. During the twelve year conflict, the British learned to adapt, that conventional methods would not work against an unconventional threat, and that counterinsurgency strategies must consider civil-military relationships.

Historical Context

British influence in Malaya dates back to the late eighteenth century, when colonial interests included mining and rubber plantations. The British would maintain a small military and civilian presence in Malaya until 1945 when they would return in greater numbers. Following World War II, when most of the British attention and efforts were focused on the reconstruction of their own homeland, Britain became involved in a small war in Malay, often referred to as the Malayan Emergency. This British experience in Malaya provides insights into counterinsurgency operations.

In 1948 Malaya was a pluralist society represented by a 49 percent Malayan, 38 percent Chinese, and 11 percent Indian population. Malaya was facing a growing communist insurgency from the Malayan Peoples Anti-British Army (MPABA), the military arm of the Malayan Communist Party (MCP), but had not realized the magnitude of the problem. To
prosecute the campaign, the Federation army had at their disposal about 4000 soldiers belonging to ten battalions: two British, five Gurka and three Malay. The primary mission of this force was to conduct security operations against the 4000 MPABA insurgents. After about three months into the insurgency, the Federation formed a constabulary force of about 24,000 to perform passive security operations. This freed the Federation army from these duties, allowing it to perform active patrolling. The heart of the Malayan security force was the Malaya Federation Police headed by Colonel W.N. Gray, a British officer and the former inspector general of the Palestinian police. To emphasize that the military was working for a civil authority, all counterinsurgency operations fell under Gray. Military efforts were led by General Boucher, General Officer Commanding of Malaya. By the end of 1948 security forces would reach about 25,000 strong, outnumbering the insurgents five to one. At the top, counterinsurgency efforts were being led by Sir Edward Gent, High Commissioner and retired Lieutenant Colonel Sir Harold Briggs, Director of Operations.

Nature of the Insurgency

The MCP, originally established in the early 1930’s, was supported by the Chinese and was the root of the Malayan insurgency. During WWII, the MCP’s military arm, the Malayan’s People’s Anti Japanese Army (MPAJA), was trained and supported by the British to fight the Japanese in Malaya. Following the defeat of the Japanese in Malaya in 1945, the MPAJA was officially disbanded, cached their weapons and continued to exist as a shadow organization. The Chinese and the MCP quickly grew disenchanted with British rule and the idea of the Malayan people gaining sovereignty. By 1948, the MPABA, formally known as the MPAJA were involved in a full scale insurgency in Malaya. They chose a strategy of protracted guerilla warfare to defeat the British. On 16 June, 1948 three European workers were killed by MPABA insurgents. This incident, sparked the Emergency, and resulted in the British total commitment to the Malayan effort.

Counterinsurgency Strategy

The British Declaration of Emergency by Gent marginalized the MCP by imposing restrictions just short of martial law. The declaration allowed the British to impose the death penalty on those caught with illegal weapons, detain suspected insurgents, conduct searches without a warrant, and occupy land as they deemed necessary. Having lost the confidence of the British leadership, Gent was replaced by Sir Henry Gurney as High Commissioner in July 1948.
During the first two years of the Emergency, the counterinsurgency failed to produce results. This failure can be attributed to three factors. At the strategic level the counterinsurgency efforts lacked the full backing of British government. At the operational and tactical level the application of conventional maneuver techniques and tactics learned during WWII would not work against an insurgent who practiced asymmetric tactics. Finally the operation lacked cooperation and unity of effort between civil and military officials. Too much energy was focused on defeating the insurgent rather than the political cause.

By 1950 the strategic tide of the counterinsurgency would begin to change. Recognizing that the counterinsurgency efforts lacked true unity of effort, Sir Harold Briggs established the Federal War Council. This organization had subordinate structures at the state and district levels. The council’s single purpose was to coordinate the efforts between police, military and other civilian organizations. Furthermore, Briggs implemented the blueprint for the counterinsurgency operations known as the Briggs plan. The Briggs plan reorganized the government and put it in charge of the counterinsurgency. The plan had three major objectives: security of Malayan citizens through resettlement, clearing out insurgent infrastructure and civil military cooperation. Even with the implementation of these initiatives, it is important to note that under existing arrangements, Briggs had no control over the military.

The turning point in the counterinsurgency came in October 1951 after High Commissioner Sir Henry Gurney was murdered by insurgents. This event caused the British to reassess the Malaya mission. On 23 December, 1951 British senior leaders, Prime Minister Churchill, Field Marshall Montgomery and Colonial Secretary Oliver Lyttelton met to discuss the Malaya conflict. Shortly after this meeting, Field Marshall Montgomery laid out a strategic direction in a short correspondence to Secretary Lyttelton. “Dear Lyttenlen, Malaya, We must have a plan. Secondly we must have a man. When we have a plan and a man, we shall succeed: not otherwise." The British government chose General Sir Harold Templer to be “the man”. General Templer replaced Briggs in 1951 as Director of Operations but also assumed the position of High Commissioner. Unlike Briggs, in this position he had control over both civilian and military. This new relationship facilitated command and control and provided unity of effort.

Soon after assuming his new position, Templer delivered his strategic message to the Malayan people. His simple but powerful message stated that the British had no plan to permanently stay in Malaya. Templer set no time line for British withdrawal, but instead set conditions for withdrawal. His conditions for withdrawal were the establishment of local law, the
creation of a functional judicial system, freedom of movement for all people, and the creation of a national army. Simply put, he wanted to put power in the hands of the people.56

At the strategic level Templer’s plan continued to be carried out by the Federal War Council. This council not only included British representatives but national leaders from Chinese and Malaya communities. This was a true combined civil-military organization.57

After nearly four years of applying conventional methods and selected elements of the Briggs plan, British operational and tactical level commanders learned that the key to success would be the enlistment of services from the indigenous population. The British empowered local police as well as other civic leaders. This arrangement was critical in the gathering of intelligence and the execution of the information campaign.

As a former intelligence director, Templer realized the value of intelligence. Templer built upon Brigg’s intelligence initiatives and created a Directorate of Intelligence. The mission of the Intelligence Directorate was to coordinate and synchronize all intelligence activities with the overall plan. Intelligence successes were due to the good relationships between the formal intelligence services and the local police. Local police had a good handle on the pulse of the people and frequently passed valuable actionable intelligence.58 Another success story was the employment of psychological operations against the insurgents and the civilian population. The British used psychological operations in an effort to persuade the insurgents to surrender and to win the “hearts and minds” of uncommitted civilians. The psychological operations campaign fell under the direction of the British Information Service and included the use of leaflets, loud speaker teams, government films and the press.59

By 1953, Templer had created “White Areas,” zones where civilians achieved a greater independence; they were curfew free and enjoyed freedom of movement. The creation of these areas had a positive effect on the people bringing an increased level of support to the insurgency. When Templer left Malaya in 1954, major conflict was winding down and the insurgency was losing its effect. The Malayans gained their independence on 31 August 1957, but the insurgency would drag on for the following three years.60

In the end, the British success’s can be attributed to the execution of a balanced civil-military approach to the insurgency. Over the twelve year period, they recognized the need for a change in strategy as well as tactics techniques and procedures. The British adapted as an organization developing enduring principles and doctrine for counterinsurgency.

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Lessons

Sir Robert Thompson, Permanent Secretary of Defense for Malaya during the Emergency, developed important principles for counterinsurgency operations. These principles provide a solid framework for addressing lessons learned in Malaya. Principle 1, establish a political aim and ensure that the public, civil authorities, and the military know what it is. The British did this well with Brigg’s and Templer’s declarations. Principle 2, the military plan must be subordinate to the political plan. The British accomplished this by designing an organization and plan where the military was subordinate to the political. Principle 3, parties must be familiar with and conduct themselves in accordance with the law. This started with the declaration of the Emergency, a plan that imposed a set of rules that were well understood by military and civilian leaders as well as the civilian local and insurgent population. Principle 4, there can only be one plan and this plan must incorporate information and human intelligence. The British combined the efforts of the British Intelligence and Information services with information provided by local civilians, police and captured insurgents to produce actionable intelligence. Principle 5 is security. The British plan accounted for the protection of civilians, military and key infrastructure to include military bases. Principle 6 emphasizes attacking the insurgent indirectly. The British attacked the insurgents indirectly by targeting the insurgent’s economic base of support, logistical support, and legitimacy.

UNITED STATES ARMY IN THE PHILIPPINES 1898-1902

The U.S. experience in the Philippine War from 1898-1902 provides civilian and military leaders and planners with tactical, operational, and strategic lessons in counterinsurgency operations. During the Philippine conflict, the U.S. relearned old lessons and discovered new ones. While entering the conflict without formal counterinsurgency doctrine, victory came chiefly because of ability of leaders at the tactical level to adapt. Poor strategic guidance from Washington and broad operational level guidance from commanders who were often out of touch with the situation on the ground resulted in a tough slog, but in the end a victory for the U.S.

Historical Context

In 1896, a rebellion broke out between the Katipunans, a secret Philippine society and their Spanish occupiers over Spanish rule. The revolution would continue to grow during U.S. occupation in 1898 and would become the root cause of the Philippine insurgency. As part of the Spanish American War, on January 1898, the acting Secretary of the Navy Theodore Roosevelt provided orders to his commanders to prepare to execute existing war
plans against the Spanish in Cuba and the Pacific. These plans included a naval attack in the
Pacific to destroy the Spanish fleet and occupation of Manila in the Philippines. Destruction of
the Spanish fleet in the Pacific would serve to cut off Spanish revenues from the Philippines. In
May 1898 President McKinley approved the naval expedition led by Commodore George Dewey
to carry out the naval war plans in the Pacific. Dewey attacked and easily defeated the Spanish
fleet in Manila Bay. Dewey found that his orders to occupy Manila would be difficult, because
he did not have sufficient ground forces. For this reason, Dewey requested that army forces be
sent to the theater.\textsuperscript{64}

On 12 May 1898, President McKinley appointed Major General Wesley Merritt military
governor and commander of U.S. Forces Philippines.\textsuperscript{65} From the very outset of the war, the
President failed to grasp the complexities of the conflict and provided his senior military leaders
with only general guidance. His failure upfront to define political objectives caused confusion for
military commanders and only served to draw out the initial stages of the conflict. For example,
in early correspondence with the President, General Merritt requested specific mission intent for
the expedition. Merritt asked McKinley whether the objective of the mission was to seize the
capital Manila or all of the islands. McKinley failed to provide Merritt with an answer. It is
unclear whether McKinley was trying to keep his options open or was just indecisive. On 19 May
1898 McKinley directed Major General Merritt to accomplish two tasks, complete the reduction
of Spanish power and provide security for the Philippine Islands. The first task would be
accomplished in short order, but the second task was not possible given the vast size of the
Philippine Islands. McKinley’s direction to Merritt to secure the islands demonstrated his lack of
understanding of Merritt’s capabilities and the operational environment.\textsuperscript{66}

The initial contingent of U.S. forces arrived in the Philippines in late June 1898 under the
command of BG Thomas Anderson. In an attempt to assess the mood of the Filipino people, BG
Anderson met with Emilio Aguinaldo the recently returned and self declared Philippine leader.
After initial dialogue, Anderson realized that Aguinaldo would settle for nothing short of an
independent Philippines under his control. BG Anderson refused to recognize Aguinaldo’s
authority. Anderson’s failure to acknowledge Aguinaldo as a legitimate leader was the spark
that ignited the insurgency.\textsuperscript{67}

On 13 August 1898 Merritt’s ground forces captured Manila, liberating the Philippines from
the Spanish. Soon after the U.S. occupation, Merritt declared to the Philippine people that the
U.S. had no intention of waging war against the Filipino people and that the U.S. would ensure
their personal and religious rights. On 29 August 1898 Major General Elwell S. Otis, Merritt’s
second in command took over operations in the Philippines.\textsuperscript{68}
The Treaty of Paris signed 10 December 1898 transferred sovereignty of the Philippines from Spain to the U.S. and provided a strategically significant permanent U.S. base in the Pacific. President McKinley declared that the U.S. policy in the Philippines was to: protect Philippine civilians, preserve property and individual rights, open ports to commerce, and collect taxes. In the conduct of administrative duties, McKinley stressed the importance of winning the confidence of the Philippine people.68

Nature of the Insurgency

Tensions continued to grow between those Filipinos loyal to Aguinaldo and the U.S. due to the U.S. declaration of sovereignty, and the refusal to recognize Aguinaldo’s government or military. On 4 February 1899, a U.S. patrol fired on and killed a Filipino patrol. This act officially marked the beginning of the insurgency.70

Counterinsurgency Strategy

During the early years of the campaign, commanders attempted to win the “hearts and minds" of the Filipino people through a strategy of benevolent assimilation. In 1899 the U.S. military in conjunction with civil authorities created municipal governments. General Otis issued instructions for establishment of municipal governments utilizing General Orders 43 (1899) and 40 (1900). These two orders provided commanders instruction for the development and administration of municipal governments. Each municipality or district consisted of a mayor, town council and police. The U.S. quickly learned that the empowered leaders of the municipalities were critical in understanding and controlling the Filipino people. To facilitate oversight over the municipalities the Army reorganized their brigades, broke them down to company level and garrisoned them near cities in order to coordinate civic and military matters and provide security.71 By the close of 1900, the U.S. Army had established over four hundred garrisons in the Philippines.72

During the first year of the campaign, the 26,000 U.S. military out fought the insurgents in a series of conventional military battles but had over extended themselves.73 By May 1900, the Filipino national army was defeated, but Aguinaldo’s irregular guerrilla forces had retreated from the cities to the mountains and jungles to regroup. Otis, feeling success, failed to recognize Aguinaldo’s shift to guerilla warfare and the growing insurgency that would ensue.74 Like the U.S., Aguinaldo’s guerrillas operated relatively autonomously and were organized by region. An additional challenge faced by the U.S. forces was clandestine civil military organizations that operated in the cities.75
The period 1900 to 1902 marked the height of the insurgency. In May 1900, Otis was replaced by General Arthur MacArthur who quickly recognized the brewing insurgency. The senior civilian leader at this time was William Howard Taft, chief of the Philippine commission. The commission had the responsibility of governing pacified regions. Recognizing the heightened level of insurgency and sensing that the majority of Filipinos were siding with the insurgents, MacArthur adopted a more stringent pacification policy. As a strategy to enforce his policies, MacArthur used General Order 100, an order originally issued during the Civil War to govern the actions of soldiers when dealing with civilians and combatants. General Order 100, for all intents and purposes, was the Army’s law of warfare. It was used to protect Filipino civilian’s civil rights but at the same time justified harsher treatment of insurgents or traitors. Macarthur’s commanders utilized the provisions of General Order 100 to isolate the insurgents from the local population. Executed through a variety of methods ranging from civilian relocation to destruction of enemy sanctuaries, tactical commanders separated the insurgents from the population. MacArthur’s commanders clearly understood that the success of the counterinsurgency lay in the hands of the Filipino people. The insurgents understood the same and resorted to a combination of intimidation and propaganda to influence the Filipino people.

Intelligence operations proved key during the counterinsurgency. Although national and regional intelligence organizations were created, most operations were decentralized and executed at the tactical level. Tactical commanders used a combination of informants, native scouts, and spies to gather intelligence. Aguinaldo’s capture in April 1901 illustrates the U.S. superior intelligence system. U.S. soldiers acting on information from a local commander captured documents from Aguinaldo’s headquarters. With this information, U.S. soldiers and Filipino scouts executed a raid and captured Aguinaldo without incident. Shortly after his capture, on 19 April 1901 Aguinaldo issued a proclamation to the Filipino people recognizing U.S. sovereignty, this would signal the downfall but not the end of the insurgency.

During the next 15 months, efforts to stem the insurgency would continue under the leadership of MacArthur’s replacement, General Adna R. Chaffee. General Chaffee continued many of the policies of his predecessor and at the same time he greatly increased the pressure on both the insurgents and civilians. His efforts resulted in convincing the Filipino people to side with the U.S., destruction of the insurgents and brought about an end to the war by 4 July, 1902.
Lessons

Ultimately, the successful counterinsurgency can be credited to innovative and adaptive commanders at tactical level who operated in a decentralized manner, were in direct contact with the population and understood the culture. These leaders often located in remote garrisons far from their superiors, carried out the civil-military policies provided by their strategic and operational commanders. Tactical commanders were able to translate vague strategic guidance, broad operational guidance and achieve tactical successes. At the strategic and operational level there was friction between the U.S. military and the U.S. civil administration over ultimate authority. The concept developed by McKinley was that once an area was pacified by the military, it fell under the authority of the civil government, in this case William Howard Taft, the appointed governor general. Military leaders who saw the Philippines as one campaign objected to this relationship because it hampered unity of command and often blurred the lines of authority.

The U.S. used a balance of direct and indirect approaches to defeat the insurgents. They earned the trust and confidence of the Filipinos by executing measures upfront to improve the standard of living for the common Filipino. As the insurgency grew, the U.S. became heavy handed, adopting stricter methods for dealing with the civilians and insurgents. The concept of separating the insurgents from the population by resettlement and denying insurgents sanctuary by infrastructure destruction were particularly effective. At the tactical level, methods developed by commanders to interact with locals and civilian police enabled them to develop actionable intelligence. The insurgency failed because combined civil-military counterinsurgency actions prevented Aquinaldo and his successors from rallying the Filipino people against the U.S.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The current U.S. security apparatus must adapt to meet the challenges of the 21st century. In doing so, leaders and planners must consider historical experiences as well as the future capabilities of our enemies. When they examine history, they should not simply look for prescriptive solutions, but instead should study the principles of insurgency and counterinsurgency. When they study the enemy, they must realize that the 21st century insurgent is a hybrid of his ancestors. Finally, as they look for solutions, they must look at all elements of national power. Existing capability gaps are not simply a result of materiel shortfalls in major weapon systems or military formations, but are the result of shortfalls in strategy, organizational structures, training, education, and doctrine. Given these shortfalls, the following recommendations are presented:
The Defense Strategy, as it addresses the global insurgency, requires modification. First, the strategy must change to acknowledge the new security environment. The current NSS and NMS all but ignore the problem of insurgency, the strategy is vague and the language is soft. Second, in developing a strategy to combat global insurgency, the U.S. should adopt a strategy of management versus victory. The U.S. does not have the resources or the political will to achieve total victory. For this reason, future strategies should include the participation of U.S. allies and partners whose capabilities can complement U.S. capabilities.

Current interagency relationships are not satisfactory. In an effort to enhance unity of effort, policy coordination and planning, the President should contract an independent agency to review how to better align the civilian agencies within the Unified Command structure. Under the current construct, one agency may be required to coordinate with more than one regional Combatant Command. Additionally, Regional Combatant Command staffs require a permanently assigned Interagency staff to facilitate coordination and planning. Current arrangements across the Combatant Commands are ad hoc at best. Joint Forces Command JICAG prototypes, currently under review, would serve this purpose.

The 21st century security environment demands leaders at all levels that are intellectually sound, culturally savvy and skilled in a language other than English. The DoD should develop and resource a comprehensive strategy to train leaders in language and regional expertise outside of the Foreign Area Officer (FAO) program. This training should based on regional hotspots, occur through every step of the military professional education model and continue at the unit level. The intent is not to provide FAO level expertise for all leaders, (this is impractical), but to provide all leaders with a base line knowledge.

Intelligence from the strategic to tactical level is key to successful counterinsurgency campaign. Even with advanced technology, the value of Human Intelligence Collection is as important today as it was during the U.S. counterinsurgency in the Philippines in 1902. The DoD should develop a strategy to grow and maintain Human Intelligence capabilities by focusing its efforts on projected regional hotspots.

Joint and service counterinsurgency doctrine requires updating. At a minimum, doctrine should be developed to provide the Joint commander with a framework, a set of guiding principles and imperatives. It currently does not. This problem is further complicated because existing counterinsurgency doctrine is spread across multiple Joint Publications. Joint counterinsurgency doctrine should be consolidated into a single manual. Finally, the military should review the Joint development doctrinal process for efficiency. The current process is mired in bureaucracy, resulting in timely delays in doctrine and TTP. The review should focus
on procedures in order to provide concept to doctrine and the sharing of TTP to the field in a timely manner.

CONCLUSION

The U.S. must transform its security structure to address the asymmetric capabilities of the 21st century global insurgent. Ongoing transformational efforts across government, military, and non governmental organizations indicate that our nation’s senior leaders have recognized the changing security environment and are adapting to meet the challenges of the future. The question remains, will these changes be enough? Pending the release of strategic guidance and recommendations outlined in documents such as the BG-N report, and the 2005 QDR, both due out in the fall 2005, the jury is still out.

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