The Long War: A New History of U.S. National Security Policy since World War II. Edited by Andrew J. Bacevich. New York: Columbia University Press, 2007. 608 pages. $75.00. Reviewed by Colonel Robert B. Killebrew, USA Ret., who served in Special Forces, mechanized, air assault, and airborne infantry units, and held a variety of planning and operational assignments during his 30-year Army career.

After a successful career as an Army cavalry officer, Andrew Bacevich turned to academia and is enjoying a distinguished second life as a professor, author, and frequent critic of US foreign policy. This volume, subtitled “A New History of U.S. National Security Policy since World War II,” sets out, as Bacevich says in the Preface, to see the “Long War”—that period from the end of WWII to the present—as it really is. The reader gets the author’s point when he lambasts the United States’ “foreign policy elite” which, he says, is “dedicated to the proposition of excluding democratic influences from the making of national security policy.” What follows is a series of uneven essays generally advocating the theme that the growth of the American national security apparatus since the end of WWII endangers the freedom of the nation it professes to protect.

This claim is not a new idea, of course. The explosive entry of the United States into WWII and America’s leadership in the Cold War justified a huge and costly national security establishment now devoted to fighting new threats from international terrorist movements. There are reasonable arguments, many of them made recently, that the national security establishment has gotten too large, that the nonmilitary organs of foreign policy have grown too weak, and that civil liberties have been imperiled by security measures believed necessary to meet the threat of the moment. The transformation of US foreign policy following the Second World War, our leading role in opposing Soviet expansionism, and the current campaign against the disintegrative forces of international terrorism have long run contrary to the deep and historic strains of American isolationism. Additionally, even committed internationalists have from time to time opposed policies they believed to be overly militaristic or dangerous to fundamental American principles. One of the most famous examples being George Kennan’s opposition to the development of muscular containment policies in the 1950s. This latter group accepts the fact of American leadership in the world but disputes specific policies. The isolationist strains disagree fundamentally with America’s international role and, as presented in this series of essays, attribute the distortion of US policy to an out of touch, and out of control, foreign policy elite.

The volume’s writers fall into both camps. An example of the former is Tami Davis Biddle, a professor at the US Army War College, who produced “Shield and Sword,” an excellent history of the growth of US strategic forces since 1945 and...
the development—some might say overdevelopment—of US nuclear weapons and policy. Likewise, John Prados’s “Intelligence for Empire” is a workmanlike, though incomplete in some respects, history of US intelligence in the Cold War era, primarily focused on the Central Intelligence Agency’s Directorate of Operations. (More could have been said, for example, about the Agency’s successful recruitment of spies behind the Iron Curtain.) The latter camp is best represented by Bacevich himself, who in his essay “Elusive Bargain” portrays the US military establishment as a largely self-aggrandizing institution concerned more with maintaining its perks than with opposing real threats to American security. Writing of the rebuilding of the US military in the 1970s and 1980s, he says:

The officer corps after Vietnam rediscovered a conception of warfare based on the clash of opposing armies, where campaigns and battles directed by military elites (not bothersome civilians) determined the outcome . . . . Lending political plausibility to this initiative was the existence of a ready-made threat—the large, well-equipped legions of the Soviet empire apparently posed to assault the West—and thus serving the US military’s institutional needs.

Bacevich is a strong and persuasive author, and those inclined to find villains in the Washington establishment will find themselves nodding in agreement with his conclusions. Not all the essays, though, are as strong as the ones previously cited. Considering the obvious qualifications of the authors, the scholarship is curiously uneven from chapter to chapter. One writer, whose name will not be mentioned, would have flunked an undergraduate political science course based on faulty grammar alone. Rushing to meet publication deadlines is no excuse for lines such as “. . . . a system designed to reiterate the status quo and make sure there were no rocking boats.” While a capable writing style is not strictly a requirement for an academic career, published essays should not grate the reader’s sensibilities.

“Too early to tell,” said Mao Zedong concerning the French Revolution, thus illustrating the danger of writing the history of current events (particularly ones in which the participants are still living). As a history of America’s post-WWII national security policy, The Long War falls short for two reasons. First, many of the essays are unbalanced; they focus too narrowly on US policy without providing the context of the environment to explain the factors that motivated American decisionmakers, and in so doing the prejudices of the authors are uncomfortably exposed. Polemics are fine in advocacy journalism, but not in straight history. Secondly, even the best essays in The Long War need the buffering of time to provide perspective. In the end, some Cold War decisions may indeed prove to have been historical blunders; some, that today appear to be errors, may look wiser in a century or two. After all, we are still assessing the American Civil War. It is probably no comfort to modern historians to say that the march of American history since the Second World War cannot be fairly judged for another century, but Mao’s maxim applies. The Long War has some bright spots but ultimately does not reach the goal it sets for itself.

James Willbanks, a retired Army officer and military historian, is Director of the Department of Military History at the US Army Command and General Staff College and the author of two previous books on the Vietnam War, one being his timely 2004 volume, Abandoning Vietnam. Detailing persuasive arguments for why Vietnamization failed, Abandoning Vietnam was published at a time in the Iraq conflict when it appeared Washington was hurtling toward another Vietnam-like disaster by contemplating the implementation of a rapid withdrawal. Advocates of this strategy advised that the way out of America’s dilemma in Iraq was to “train and withdraw,” the sooner, the better. This advice to hastily “Iraqify” the war and pull out, journalist Bob Woodward recently contended, came from Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Admiral Michael Mullen and the commander in Iraq at the time, General George Casey, in the wake of growing frustrations with and lack of public support for the apparently never-ending maelstrom of violence in faction-torn Iraq. Professor Willbanks’s account of the Vietnamization debacle indirectly raised the specter of a repeat performance by Washington related to Iraq. Thanks to the “Surge” and a single-minded President who refused to accept less than victory, this strategy was averted.

With The Tet Offensive, Willbanks has once again produced a volume that, while focusing on wartime events occurring some 40 years ago, has particular relevance. The author’s recounting of the offensive and associated issues is brief (122 pages of text), but well-documented (130 pages of appendices, including source notes, a useful Chronology, Glossary, 33 pages of reproduced documents, Bibliography, and Index). For anyone interested in probing and learning from the Tet Offensive but overwhelmed with the plethora of sources, Willbanks’s volume is certainly the most up-to-date and helpful starting point known to this reviewer.

Willbanks organizes his work into two parts. Part I, “Historical Overview,” is a vivid, concise, and eminently readable recounting of the attacks that comprised the Tet Offensive, including battles in Saigon, Khe Sanh, and Hue, as well as the nationwide onslaughts by North Vietnamese and Viet Cong units. Part II is an engaging examination of the “Issues and Interpretations” spawned by the offensive and contains well-written and stimulating discussions of topics such as Hanoi’s motivations and objectives in launching the attacks, analysis of the offensive as an intelligence failure, the controversy regarding mass executions in Hue, Hanoi’s rationale for besieging Khe Sanh (as a diversion or a serious attempt to achieve another Dien Bien Phu?), and the role of the media during and following Hanoi’s election-year gambit. These chapters
effectively synthesize extant writings from both sides, as Willbanks objectively introduces the various controversies, describes how differing points of view have been expressed, and by whom, always allowing readers to form their own conclusions. All in all, Willbanks’s treatment of these issues is comprehensive, well-cast, and compelling. The book is the classic “quick read.”

Readers who are believers in the words of the French novelist Alphonse Karr, “The more things change, the more they stay the same,” will find themselves nodding as they peruse this volume. The intelligence failures of Tet read right out of Pearl Harbor—or Normandy from Germany’s perspective—warnings obtained, passed on, and not heeded, information that arrives after the attack has commenced or tells of events that are dismissed as diversions. Underestimation of the North Vietnamese caused many analysts to ignore the compelling evidence beginning in late 1967 that Hanoi was planning a nationwide offensive. The ambitious plans revealed in captured documents or by weary North Vietnamese defectors and prisoners simply did not comport with the picture Military Assistance Command, Vietnam analysts had of Hanoi’s capabilities (the command position was that the United States was winning the war, after all). When confusion about dates among Communist forces resulted in premature assaults against some targets on 30 January, tipping North Vietnam’s hand, some analysts dismissed these attacks as diversions from the “real” objective, which in General William Westmoreland’s view was Khe Sanh.

Readers may wonder whether there is room for yet another book on the Tet Offensive. When one examines a typical bibliography on the event, hundreds of volumes and articles beckon, to include detailed and lengthy seminal works by Don Oberdorfer and Peter Braestrup. But Willbanks has taken a somewhat different approach in this compact offering. Rather than pretend to introduce yet another exhaustive account of the fierce battles that occurred between January and September 1968, from Khe Sanh near the Demilitarized Zone to the Ca Mau Peninsula in the south, Willbanks has produced what he calls a “guide.” In the author’s words, he has attempted to “examine the Tet Offensive and explore the various issues and interpretations of this controversial event that changed . . . the conduct of the war itself,” a historical happening that “continues to have an impact on the long-standing debate about the war and its meaning for both the United States and Vietnam.” In this task he has succeeded commendably.


Henry Gole’s biography of General William DePuy accomplishes two valuable functions. First, it tells the story of one of the most important American Army leaders of the second half of the twentieth century. Second, Gole uses DePuy’s life as a lens through which to view the history of the US Army from 1941 to 1977. In doing so, the author brilliantly portrays the life of the man who led the effort to reform and revitalize
the Army after the nation’s bitter defeat in Vietnam, making it arguably the best army in the world by 1990.

Gole’s book explains how Bill DePuy became such a successful leader and trainer. DePuy acquired and honed his leadership skills during the first 30 years of his career. Like many Americans of the Depression years, DePuy joined his state’s National Guard “for the money.” DePuy was commissioned as a second lieutenant through the ROTC program at South Dakota State College on 9 June 1941, just in time for the “Good War.” He then served as a platoon leader in the 20th Infantry Regiment where, he noted, “I learned more about just plain soldiering from six months . . . than I learned in the rest of my service.” His battalion commanders were “tough and hazing kinds of men,” and his regimental commander, Frank W. Milburn, later successfully commanded a division and a corps in Europe.

The formative examples of leadership that DePuy experienced in the 20th Infantry served him well the rest of his career, but the tactical doctrine and training of the unit was, as Gole describes it, “guaranteed to produce American cadavers . . . . Tactics consisted of getting on line and advancing in rushes . . . . It was an idea verging on criminal folly, exercised as it was in Bill DePuy’s training in 1942 and 1943 and in close combat in 1944.” In 1942, DePuy was assigned to the 357th Infantry Regiment of the 90th Infantry Division, where he served for the remainder of the Second World War.

The 90th Infantry Division is a case study of how a poorly trained division paid an incredible price in blood before it became a competent combat force. The 90th Infantry suffered enormous casualties in its first months of combat and saw the relief of two inept division commanders and numerous regimental commanders. By the end of July 1944, Brigadier General Raymond S. McLain had assumed command. He, and the few surviving original officers, turned the division around. DePuy credits McLain “with saving the division . . . . He visited the most forward battalions and was seen by his troops.” Omar Bradley later recognized McLain as one of his best division commanders, and George Patton chose the 90th Infantry Division to receive a Presidential Unit Citation. But the process of retraining the division took months of effort by McLain and officers such as DePuy, who served as the Operations Officer (S3) of the 357th Infantry Regiment. During this process, DePuy learned how to train soldiers to fight effectively and win. This experience enabled him to later remake US Army tactical doctrine and training in the 1970s.

The first formative period of DePuy’s career ended in 1945. He had learned how to teach the nitty gritty skills of combat to soldiers, how to lead in combat, and how to think through the tactical lessons learned by his division. His ability to look objectively at his experiences shaped his approaches to combat, leadership, and training for the rest of his service.

Following graduation from the Armed Forces Staff College in 1952, DePuy served as V Corps’ Assistant G-3 for Training in Germany. In this job he tested and evaluated 20 battalions a year. This service brought him back to the fundamentals of Army combat training. After two years in this billet, DePuy took command of an infantry battalion in the 4th Infantry Division. For the next year, DePuy practiced the
lessons of training that he had learned with the 90th Infantry Division and in his time as a training officer. He found that his new battalion “was as good as any of the battalions over there . . . . At the squad level it was a shambles, just like my battalion had been in World War II. At the platoon level, it was a little better. The company commanders were better. They had good potential. So I decided to spend my time at the bottom.”

Gole correctly observes that “DePuy’s decision to spend his time ‘at the bottom’ specifically addressed what he found in 1954, but he made the same decision in his battle group in 1961, in his division in 1966, and as the US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) commander in 1973. His lifelong conviction was that if you get it right at the squad and platoon levels, the rest would fall into place.” As a battalion commander, DePuy personally tested his infantry squads and platoons until “they got very, very good.” As a division commander in Vietnam, he continued this hands-on approach to leadership and training.

From 1964 to 1969, General Bill DePuy was “totally immersed” in the Vietnam War from three perspectives: theater operations, as J-3, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, 1964-66; tactics, as the commander of the 1st Infantry Division, 1966-67; and national strategy, as Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency and Special Activities, 1967-69. He is best remembered, however, for his command of the Big Red One.

DePuy continued his bottom-up approach to training as he improved the combat effectiveness of the 1st Infantry Division. During his year in command, the division fought large-scale battles against major Viet Cong and North Vietnamese units in its successful effort to protect the approaches to Saigon and to give the Army of the Republic of Vietnam a chance to reorganize and train. DePuy stressed the use of firepower rather than man-to-man combat to destroy Communist forces. He pioneered airmobile operations while also paying close attention to tactical details and training at the squad and platoon levels. He had no patience for ineffectual battalion commanders and earned a reputation for ruthlessness with subordinates and impatience with superiors. Henry Gole covers the debates that surround the DePuy leadership style and results with thoughtful directness and sound judgment.

DePuy, like a number of other Regular Army officers who survived the Vietnam War, realized that the Army was in deep trouble by the 1970s. Many of the junior and mid-grade officers had left the service after repeated tours in Vietnam. The noncommissioned officer corps was exhausted, with many of the best NCOs opting to leave. At the same time, the nation ended the draft, making it harder to fill the ranks with qualified personnel. At this critical juncture in Army history, Bill DePuy was selected to command the newly organized TRADOC and given the mission to revitalize training and solidify tactical doctrine in light of the lessons of recent wars, to include the Arab-Israeli Wars of 1967 and 1973. In the case of DePuy, opportunity and preparation intersected, placing him in a critical job at the right time.

William DePuy ended his Army service as Commanding General of TRADOC in 1977. Henry Gole successfully argues that DePuy was the principal architect of the resurrection of the US Army from the depths of despair it had found itself in by the end of the Vietnam War. DePuy initiated this turnaround by creating a training
system based on national and regional training centers focused on the rigorous testing of soldiers, squads, crews, platoons, companies, and battalions. DePuy’s genius was his ability to teach leaders how to train their units in the essential combat skills needed at the forward edge of the battlefield.

Gole’s account of DePuy’s life is told with warts and all. Bill DePuy was one of those men who evoked either fierce loyalty or intense dislike as he worked aggressively to improve the fighting power of the Army. Gole often shares some of his personal observations on the issues of DePuy’s life, many of which Gole lived through. There could have been no better historian to tell the story of the man who helped save his nation’s army at one of the worst periods in its history. General William E. DePuy: Preparing the Army for Modern War is a superb contribution to our knowledge of the Army’s transformation and provides much food for thought about the forthcoming challenges of regeneration and reorientation the nation faces.


This slim volume is essentially an extended commentary that builds on a controversial op-ed piece the authors published in the Australian newspapers The Age and The Sydney Morning Herald in May 2005. In that piece, the authors, both professors of law in Australia, argued “the belief that torture is always wrong is . . . misguided . . . . It is this type of absolutist and shortsighted rhetoric that lies at the core of many distorted moral judgments . . . .” As the tone and placement of the original article would indicate, this book is more a work of strident advocacy than of cool and dispassionate analysis, although to be sure, it touches on all the relevant legal and philosophical issues that bear on the question.

The authors begin by acknowledging the absolute legal prohibition on torture in international law and arguing that this restriction is precisely what should be changed. They argue for carving out a narrow exception that would allow a utilitarian calculus to permit torture in cases where lives are at risk, the potential harm of an attack is immediate, there are no other possible means of obtaining information within the time available, the person to be tortured has committed a significant level of wrongdoing, and there is high likelihood that he or she does possess relevant information that, if obtained, will prevent the loss of life. Bagaric and Clarke note that, despite the prohibitions on torture, it in fact is widely practiced around the world, even by nations that would most stridently condemn it publicly. In light of that reality, the authors argue, it would be better if torture were legalized (in the very narrow range of cases they have in mind). Further, having legalized it, they posit there should be a prior-review legal mechanism for issuing a “torture warrant” as a much preferable alternative to retrospective decisions regarding torture already committed.
The short chapters that follow review the main counterarguments to the legalization proposal. The first is the “slippery slope” objection—allowing practice A, which might be morally acceptable, will eventually lead because of either logic or social acceptance to allowing practice B, which is clearly morally unacceptable. The consequence of a slippery slope argument is that one ought not, therefore, to allow A in the first place. Bagaric and Clarke reject this objection on the grounds that it is inherently speculative.

The second objection is that acceptance of torture will lead to a general dehumanization of the society that practices it. This critique the authors dismiss on the grounds that it focuses too narrowly on one relationship—between torturer and tortured—to the neglect of the larger framework of affected parties that include the innocents to be saved as a result of information extracted through the use of torture. Discussion of this objection posits that torture is ineffective and the information so extracted is inherently unreliable. The authors claim to the contrary that for the very narrowly focused type of torture they have in mind—where the tortured person is believed to a high degree of certainty to possess specific and relevant information about a particular event—it is indeed effective. Here, the argument goes, it is important to recognize how the advocated torture differs from more widespread but less purposeful torture.

Lastly, the book considers the objection that torture is “undemocratic” and undermines the values of democracy, an objection dismissed quite quickly by citing polling data showing that a great deal of the public does indeed approve of torture that meets the outlined purposes and specifications.

Whether one finds the overall argument in favor of directed torture to be persuasive rests on a deeper philosophical issue, however. Underlying the entire argument is an extremely strong commitment to utilitarianism as the only valid normative ethical theory. Indeed, much of Bagaric’s other published work is devoted to attempting to defend this philosophical theory as the only one capable of giving an “objective” basis to ethics and, for that matter, to the law. An informed judgment regarding those foundational claims would necessarily reach beyond the confines of their development in this small volume where normative theory is more assumed than argued (at least carefully argued). There is a small section in which the authors note that the strong normative foundation for the absolutist rejection of torture rests not on their preferred utilitarian framework, but on a nonconsequentialist moral theory of human rights.

That discussion is, unfortunately, philosophically the weakest in the book. It correctly notes that the language of “rights” can and does grow in extremely undisciplined ways in our society, when virtually everything anyone or any group might wish is defended in the rhetoric of their “right” to the thing in question. But the authors use that circumstance to make sweeping claims about the philosophical cogency of all rights claims. They write, “... the concept of nonconsequentialist rights is vacuous at the epistemological level.” Perhaps, but given the foundational character of rights language to much of the progress of the modern world, one might hesitate before rejecting half of modern philosophical ethical theory because there
are theoretical holes in its system—as if utilitarianism did not suffer from similar problems of coherence and adequacy. Indeed, the authors recognize that “. . . there is an ongoing need for moral discourse in the form of rights,” but argue that such discourse needs to be grounded in a consequentialist theoretical frame if it is to have substantive meaning.

In the end, this book boils down to the rather unsurprising conclusion that if one is a utilitarian, one can think of circumstance that justify torture. But one suspects we knew that before we opened *Torture: When the Unthinkable Is Morally Permissible*. Bagaric and Clarke’s book would serve well as one forcefully argued portion of a much more complex discussion requiring additional nuance and development before at least this reviewer would be prepared to endorse the recommended policy.


*Fighting the War on Terror: A Counterinsurgency Strategy* essentially offers a primer for those atypical military professionals who in this late stage of the war against terrorism are not already well-read or well-versed in the theory and practice of counterinsurgency. This book recapitulates the fundamentals of counterinsurgency and reviews several examples of counterinsurgency practices in the twentieth century. The author, an associate professor at the US Army Command and General Staff College in the Department of Joint and Multinational Operations and a retired Army Reserve lieutenant colonel, offers some critical analysis of the US military’s performance during the first years of Operation Iraqi Freedom. While certainly pertinent for current and future counterinsurgencies, this tome is not necessarily timely. Most of the information regarding operations in Iraq and describing US Army counterinsurgency doctrine is dated because the book was written in 2005 and released in 2007. The reader might find it a bit irksome that the author and the publisher did not make an effort to update some obsolete observations before the manuscript went to print.

Although the book lacks an introductory chapter detailing its purpose and a framework for analysis, the reader can find a distilled thesis on the back cover: “To lay out a plan for winning this unavoidable and essential struggle.” Corum sets out on this journey by highlighting the lessons to be learned from the victories and defeats of both sets of combatants during a host of twentieth century insurgencies and the early years in Iraq. This book is well-written and exceedingly readable. Corum amplifies two salient aspects of America’s history with counterinsurgency and reviews their fundamentals. First, he revisits the economical but successful American and Salvadoran counterinsurgency campaign in the 1980s. This section elucidates the contribution of Max Manwaring’s thinking to the successful conclusion of the counterinsurgency in
El Salvador and recapitulates the tenets of “Manwaring’s Paradigm,” which remain relevant today. Second, the author offers an incisive and candid critique of Donald Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz, and Douglas Feith’s roles during the early days of the Iraq War. As one example, Corum observes, “The historical record of the ongoing Iraq War and the costs incurred to date provide a very eloquent commentary on the soundness of Wolfowitz’s strategic thinking.” Finally, throughout the book Corum revisits and emphasizes the enduring fundamentals and truisms of counterinsurgency. He correctly emphasizes the centrality of the indigenous population, the importance of intelligence, the imperative for the integration of interagency efforts, and the necessity of applying minimal credible force.

_Fighting the War on Terror_ however, does not really offer anything novel or epiphanic when it comes to counterinsurgency in general, or with respect to a strategy for winning the war on terrorism in particular. This deficiency may be attributable in part to the fact that the substance of the book dates back to 2005. For example, the notion that this war is a global counterinsurgency is not new. That idea emerged as early as 2004 and cultivated many adherents. The book’s analysis of Malaya, Algeria, Vietnam, and even El Salvador is ground that has been previously well and better ploughed. Moreover, the strategy for winning the war that Corum does postulate is already codified in the extant corpus of open-source national security and military strategy documents the US government has published since 2005.

Finally, the obsolete, incorrect, and hyperbolic bits in _Fighting the War on Terror_ are sufficiently vexatious that this reviewer recommends spending your money on something more timely and prescient, such as Philip J. Bobbitt’s 2008 _Terror and Consent_. One example of obsolescence is the reference to the interim 2004 US counterinsurgency manual (FMI 3-07.22) as a new document, given that the new Field Manual 3-24, _Counterinsurgency_, was published in December 2006, at least a few months prior to Corum’s book. As examples of errors, the author lists the date of the attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon as 9 September 2001 and refers to the CPA in Iraq not by its correct name, Coalition Provisional Authority, but as the “Civilian Provisional Authority.” Moreover, there is a paucity of footnoting—only 301 notes for 267 pages—leaving many paragraphs containing historical and quantitative data without citations.


Generations of West Point plebes have memorized General Winfield Scott’s encomium to their Mexican War forbears:

I give it as my fixed opinion, that but for our graduated cadets, the war between the United States and Mexico might, and probably would have, lasted some
four or five years, with, in its first half, more defeats than victories falling to our share; whereas, in less than two campaigns, we conquered a great country and a peace without the loss of a single battle or skirmish.

Martin Dugard’s new book contains no explicit thesis, but Scott’s words serve well to introduce one strand of the two-part argument he wishes to make: The skill, energy, and courage of the US Army’s junior officers—in 1845, 70 percent of them West Pointers—carried the day in this war for Manifest Destiny. The title captures his second major premise, that these lieutenants and captains “were transformed by their experiences under fire,” which “molded them into the great generals and statesmen they would one day become.”

There is little arguing with either Dugard or Scott regarding the initial proposition. As this volume repeatedly illustrates, Captain Robert E. Lee, Lieutenant Sam Grant, Lieutenant Thomas Jackson, and dozens of other Military Academy graduates propelled a heavily outnumbered expeditionary force, operating far from home with tenuous or nonexistent lines of communication, to an implausibly decisive victory. They embodied the Army’s relatively newfound professionalism, an ethos stemming both from reforms at West Point and a nascent educational and training system established in the 1820s with Schools of Practice for Infantry, Artillery, and Cavalry.

Of course, the young officers did not always apply the “school solution.” Dugard recounts how, confronting an imposing fortress at Monterrey, some company-grade officers disassembled an 1,800-pound howitzer, had the components and ammunition humped up a steep hill, reassembled the gun, and used it to reduce the enemy position. This sort of freethinking “initiative inside intent” repeatedly allowed the Americans to surmount unexpected difficulties and exploit sudden opportunities more readily than their frequently brave but inflexible opponents.

To be sure, all was not perfection. Militating against the development of professionalism were the wide dispersion of units at scattered outposts and frequent detached service for officers. Prolonged frontier duty could be intellectually stultifying. As Richard Ewell, another young lion in Mexico and later Confederate general, opined, “Out there an officer learned all there was to know about commanding 40 dragoons but was liable to forget everything else he had been taught.” Still, the army that entered Mexico in 1846 was the first truly professional military the republic had ever sent to war. In the enthusiastic claim of another West Point subaltern who marched with it, “A better little army than this never took the field.”

It is Dugard’s second contention that is problematic. While intuitively it might seem that the Army and its officers would have learned something of use in Mexico, the author never goes beyond assertion and does not present any specific evidence for such an inference. Indeed, there is a case to be made that Mexican War experiences had negligible institutional or personal impact in shaping the armies and their commanders in the Civil War a decade and a half later. There is certainly not much in the relevant memoirs to suggest it. After all, the great sectional conflict was a far different struggle—a war of annihilation, whereas Mexico was one of maneuver and
attrition, to borrow the great scholar Russell Weigley’s formulation. And the US Army won in Mexico; militaries tend to learn more from defeat. Witness the searing impact of Vietnam on the generation of officers who spearheaded the US military renaissance of the 1970s and 1980s. In fact, the superb force that secured the Halls of Montezuma was in substantial ways a product of the reforms that followed the generally dismal performance of American arms in the War of 1812.

Overall, this book is long on narrative and short on analysis, an unsurprising result given the author’s background. Dugard declares frankly that his work “is not a history of the Mexican War,” and he is not a historian. Rather, he is a successful journalist who has been bylined in *Sports Illustrated* and *Gentlemen’s Quarterly* and produced a book on bicyclist Lance Armstrong. Like most popular writers, he tends to use occasional hyperbole and ingenuousness. Were Grant and Jefferson Davis truly “great statesmen?” They are more like classic examples of the “Peter principle,” where capable people rise above their level of competence. Dugard also badly overrates Zachary Taylor, one of the senior commanders in Mexico. “Old Rough and Ready” was a fearless and inspirational leader but hopeless as a strategist and administrator. To remedy this deficiency, General-in-Chief “Old Fuss and Feathers” Scott had to dispatch another West Point prodigy, Captain William “Perfect” Bliss, to act as Taylor’s chief of staff. (One thing is beyond dispute: The Old Army had the best officer nicknames, hands down).

Still, despite its shortcomings, *The Training Ground* furnishes a vivid account of the Mexican War. While it is questionable whether the Texas-Mexico border is truly “no country for old men”—Scott and Taylor were commissioned in 1807 and 1808, respectively, and were merely the most senior officers in the Army’s superannuated upper ranks—Dugard clearly demonstrates how combat manifestly is a young man’s game.


Taking a prominent line from General Dwight D. Eisenhower’s 6 June 1944 D-Day message to the soldiers, sailors, and airmen of the Allied Expeditionary Force for its title, *Nothing Less Than Full Victory* by Edward G. Miller represents a substantial departure from the author’s previous award-winning book, *A Dark and Bloody Ground: The Hurtgen Forest and Roer River Dams, 1944-1945*. The most significant difference is that rather than examining one large operation such as the Hurtgen campaign, Miller studies and reports on selected engagements fought by the US Army from D-Day through the seizure of the Ludendorff Bridge at Remagen and the ensuing operations in the spring of 1945 leading to Germany’s unconditional surrender. His expansive approach is extensively researched, thoughtful, and an interesting story.
Miller, a retired Army officer, adroitly uses the skills he acquired and honed as a logistician and Department of the Army historian to explore the infrequently considered arenas of logistics, organization, training, and deployment. He establishes the parameters for the book early on; the Preface states, “This book is about development and change, or ‘transformation,’ of an Army at war.” Miller’s thesis is quite simply that the bedrock elements of the US Army—its units and the American soldier—outperformed the Germans. The Army succeed in Europe because it skillfully managed its components and outfought the enemy through the “perseverance of both organizations and individuals” until victory was attained.

The author uses the first three chapters to build a solid foundation to support his thesis. These chapters provide an apt description of how the Army transformed itself, including growing from 136,000 soldiers in 1926 to a force of more than eight million during World War II, evolving from a third-rate constabulary force into a global power capable of fighting on multiple fronts and in varying environments. With myriad examples, the author portrays the initially poor state of the US Army, a force that was largely neglected in the interwar years of 1919-39; describes the scope of transformation undertaken in the 1940-42 period on the home front; and closes with an examination of the indoctrination or maturation and inculcation within the Army of lessons acquired by fighting the Germans in North Africa, Sicily, and Italy in 1942 and 1943.

Next, Miller examines the Army’s competence in action; in his words, “...the triumph of American ground troops over great odds to defeat what was arguably one of the most proficient armies in history...” The author’s goal is to examine the combat record of American soldiers as well as their collective performance in the European Theater of Operations (ETO). He sets out to correct the widely held and, as he persuasively demonstrates, inaccurate view that the US Army’s success in WWII was largely a result of the prodigious numbers of weapons produced and utilized to overwhelm the German forces. In the heart of the book, a dozen chapters dedicated to combat operations within the ETO, Miller not only reinforces the transformation theme but more importantly “makes his case” to support the book’s premise regarding the Army’s superior performance.

The author’s extensive endnotes combined with 11 well-placed, detailed maps greatly add to the reader’s understanding of the wide-ranging European operations. The one minor weakness in this book is the occasional misspelling or omission of words. Miller’s citation of a quote from General William E. DePuy on the final page of the book succinctly sums up the nearly miraculous and Herculean transformation that occurred within the Army. General DePuy, commenting more than 30 years following the end of WWII, from his perspective as a youthful combat leader who fought in the ETO as both a battalion commander and division G-3, said, “It is hard to overstate how ineffective [we were] in the beginning and how very effective [we were] at the end.” While much has been written related to the Second World War, Miller’s Nothing Less Than Full Victory: Americans at War in Europe, 1944-1945 provides fresh insights and once again illustrates the high cost of being militarily unprepared.

A book on this subject would have been improbable pre-11 September. The essays in this collection examine recent tensions between federal authorities charged with counterterrorism responsibilities and state and local officials. In the past, disputes among these groups probably would not have been a subject of immediate professional concern to most observers. The advent of US Northern Command and prospects of asymmetric warfare waged on American soil, however, compel a closer examination of the subjects considered in this book.

While the book’s utility for lawyers is evident, its value for other readers deserves consideration. Eight legal scholars contribute essays exploring tensions in federal-state relations generated by federal counterterrorism initiatives since 9/11. The essays examine disputes related to the “commandeering” of state and local government agencies to support national security missions, federal preemption of state law, and the legal and political dynamics that shape the ongoing debate.

Several of the essays out of necessity examine recent US Supreme Court decisions impacting federal-state relations in fields other than national security law. (Important legal insight on homeland security issues can be derived from judicial decisions concerning other types of issues.) Lawyers who are new to homeland security issues will find this exploration valuable and the book well worth pursuing for this reason alone. More experienced readers may chafe at the familiar material. Other issues covered in the book, however, go well beyond those cases that impact litigation or legislative and regulatory drafting.

A few of the chapters provide interesting long-term perspectives on local, state, and federal friction influencing the homeland security debate. These particular studies can be used to support contesting philosophies on federal-state cooperation in the national security sphere. One essay, by Jason Mazzone of the Brooklyn Law School, argues that national security was the driving force in the organization of the United States following the American Revolution. “Over and over in the Constitution, security is thus taken up specifically or is never far from mind. Our modern characterization of the Constitution as one of government structures and individual rights pays insufficient attention to the Constitution as a document designed to prevent and respond to war and rebellion. The Protection Clause, rather than a peripheral provision that deserves to be forgotten, in an important sense is the Constitution’s key.” Another related essay, surprisingly, offers a case study on the Fugitive Slave Laws of 1793 and 1850, and local opposition to those laws, to provide insight on current state-federal disputes. Paul
Finkelman of the Albany Law School writes, “My point here is not to praise the fugitive slave laws as models of civil liberties. Rather, the point is to show that the history of this law illustrates the problem of expecting the states to implement federal law.”

Other essays focus on potential and existing operational friction. One analyzes the political and legal dimensions shaping law enforcement task forces, and another examines colliding state and federal laws and policies on incarceration. After reading several of the other essays in the book, those who resent local opposition to federal initiatives on these issues may come to appreciate such dissent as a form of constitutional dialogue and problemsolving.

The book’s primary flaw is one of omission. There could have been wider examination of US historical experience—national and state cooperation was a frustrating, sometimes politically volatile issue in the War of 1812 and on both sides during the Civil War. None of the essays comes to grip with modern asymmetric warfare. As a homeland threat is the problem military or law enforcement in character, or some new hybrid; and what are the legal implications of these scenarios?

The essays do break new ground. Operational law now encompasses national security relationships that were previously confined to the realm of theory until 9/11. Readers with federal responsibilities will gain greater appreciation for the constitutional role, responsibilities, and concerns of state and local officials, along with those of private citizens. Readers critical of the federal role may also come away with renewed understanding of the challenges inherent when these responsibilities are constitutionally weighed and exercised at the federal level.


This compact book is written by someone with impeccable credentials; the author served from 2000 to 2003 as the head of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission’s (UNMOVIC) search for nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons programs in Iraq, and then until 2006 as the chair of the United Nations Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission. The book echoes (and includes as an appendix) the major recommendations of the latter’s unanimous report.

Hans Blix highlights a multitude of reasons for his current pessimism regarding arms control, including the slow pace of superpower nuclear disarmament (the reduction of 23,000 warheads already accomplished leaves some 27,000 warheads in place, despite the commitment to nuclear disarmament contained in Article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty), and as the most recent treaty review conference, in 2005, came to an acrimonious end. Pessimism is now often expressed about the prospects for survival of the nonproliferation regime, given Iran and North Korea’s apparent intentions to acquire such weapons. But Blix convincingly argues that because nuclear proliferation needs to be restrained, it is much too early to give up on the treaty.
The book directs substantial criticism at the Bush Administration’s seeming lack of respect for international law and arms control. The invasion of Iraq, carried out despite the lack of a United Nations Security Council endorsement and even though UNMOVIC reported that Iraq’s nuclear capability had indeed been dismantled, is the author’s primary example of such disdain. Blix also criticizes the termination of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and the Administration’s assertion of a prerogative for “preemption” that may indeed amount to “preventive war.”

One might well agree with such criticisms of the conduct of American foreign policy beginning in 2001, but the more difficult questions, which this book addresses only briefly in the conclusion, may concern whether total or substantial nuclear disarmament is really possible, given the tensions and difficulties of verification that would emerge in a world rife with rumors of cheating. We thus need to know whether the halting of horizontal nuclear proliferation is really so impossible if Moscow and Washington feel that they have to retain substantial nuclear arsenals.

There are persuasive arguments that nuclear disarmament of the existing superpowers would actually spur nuclear weapons programs in Iran or Brazil, rather than holding them back by the power of “good example.” This eloquent book, barely the length of a long journal article, regrettably does not address such arguments.


This lavishly illustrated and attractive book is a collection of case studies of amphibious assaults spanning the disastrous Gallipoli landing of 1915 to operations in Iraq in 2003. Originally published by the Royal Navy, the volume was intended for a professional military audience; specifically, “to enhance Royal Marines’ core knowledge of amphibious warfare.”

The contributors include well-known military historians, some of them veterans of the campaigns and operations of which they write, as well as American and British senior service college instructors. In his Foreword, distinguished historian Corelli Barnett reminds readers that all of “the wars fought by the English-speaking peoples in the twentieth century (and after) have been expeditionary wars nourished by seapower.” In the Mediterranean, at Normandy, and across the Central and Southwest Pacific in World War II, amphibious assault was the “cutting edge of strategy,” the key to “planning and decision at the operational level,” and dependent upon tactical decisions for success or bloody failure. Noting that the underlying theme is maneuver warfare, Barnett cautions against an uncritical return to the beguiling concept of the indirect approach, the “enticing vision of success won at small cost in casualties [that]
neglects a historical truth that conflicts between opponents roughly equal in combat
effectiveness are decided by sheer attrition.”

Tristan Lovering, the volume’s editor, a Royal Navy officer with extensive
amphibious operational and teaching experience, sets the stage by discussing current
British doctrinal thinking on maneuver warfare. He also later presents a superbly
systematic and smoothly written account of the Sicily operation that probably had
its beginning in lecture notes and makes the reader wish to be among Lovering’s
students. William Lind expands on the concept of maneuver and its value to a military
professional in an aptly named contribution, “The Influence of History upon Sea Power.”

Among the subsequent chapters, some stand out. Robert Foley deftly describes
the 1917 invasion and capture of the Baltic Islands off the Gulf of Riga in which
a German Army with no experience in amphibious warfare carried out an effective
operation. The keys to success seem to have been well-trained forces with adequate,
if brief, amphibious training and planners who asked themselves at every potential
branch and sequel, “What could happen next and how do we deal with it?”

Two very well-informed essays by Mark Grove and Merrill Bartlett describe
the Japanese and US Marine Corps development of amphibious doctrine and tactics,
techniques, and procedures between the First and Second World Wars. Tim Benbow
provides a thorough analysis of the British invasion of Madagascar that provided a
valuable test of amphibious techniques early in WWII. Donald Stoker illuminates the
hundreds of Soviet amphibious operations in the Black Sea. The Russians had a well-
developed amphibious doctrine but almost no specialized ships and equipment. The
North Koreans would later make use of the Soviet approach in their early operations
in the Korean War.

All of the World War II chapters are well-written and enlightening. Some
are notable for the quality of the writing; others for the clarity and thoroughness
of the explanation of the strategic setting, description of the operation, and use of
tactical examples; and others for the innovative approach or fresh insights they
provide. Michael West uses the landings on Saipan, Tinian, and Guam to illustrate the
complexities of operational fires. Michael Jones, without belaboring the point, relates
General Douglas MacArthur’s decisions during the reconquest of the Philippines to
the precepts of Sun Tzu, Carl von Clausewitz, and Sir Julian Corbett. Robin Neillands
begins with a persuasive mini-essay on the value of military history and then provides
a lively account of two very different commando operations at Bardia, North Africa,
in 1941 and Burma in 1945.

Joseph Alexander’s chapter on Peleliu is superbly written. In one page
he describes the global strategic setting, personalities of key leaders, nature of the
operation, and organization of the forces with the skill of a novelist. He then assesses
a controversial decision by Admiral Chester Nimitz to reject advice from a senior
commander and unleash a costly battle that has since been criticized as unnecessary.
The reader comes away with greater understanding of the challenges of command and
sympathy for Admiral Nimitz’s decision.
Most of the articles are set at the strategic and operational levels with some essential tactical detail. A few chapters provide insight into relatively small but consequential tactical operations, including a commando raid to seize key terrain at Normandy and the Walcheren landing to clear a German-occupied island blocking access to the port of Antwerp.

For the post-WWII period, in addition to a chapter on Korea, Ian Speller traces the development of the British seaborne and airborne doctrinal concept through the 1956 Suez amphibious operation that demonstrated that mere maneuver is not the same as maneuver warfare, and then the 1961 reinforcement of Kuwait to forestall an Iraqi invasion. Thomas Hayden describes Marine amphibious and Army riverine operations in Vietnam. Major General Julian Thompson recapitulates the Falklands campaign, and the final chapters deal with amphibious demonstrations and other actions in Operations Desert Shield, Desert Storm, and Iraqi Freedom.

*Amphibious Assault* is an excellent work, and its flaws are minor. It is beautiful and a delight to read, but also large, heavy, and unwieldy. The case studies all contain useful information, and many are exceptionally well-written. The maps usefully supplement the text, and many are taken from the operational plans and orders of the actions they illustrate. Some, like a hand-drawn chart used by Royal Marine gunners during the Gallipoli action, are works of art.

A small number of chapters do not rise to the level of the majority. Regrettably, one of these is the article on the 1950 Inchon landing, written by an accomplished military historian who is a Korean War veteran and retired senior officer. He writes engagingly and presents an account that is accurate overall, but incorrect in a few instances of varying significance.

These cavils aside, this book is an important contribution to the literature on amphibious operations with application to the study of strategy and joint operations generally. Each of the essays, including the Inchon chapter, will expand any military professional’s knowledge of warfare. Senior members of the defense community, especially those grappling with the complexities of joint doctrine, and readers interested in history and good writing will profit by partaking of this outstanding compilation.


The Department of Defense defines strategic communication as “focused United States Government processes and efforts to understand and engage key audiences in order to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable to advance national interests and objectives through the use of coordinated information, themes, plans, programs, and actions synchronized with other elements of national power.” Parsing that definition to its essential parts, strategic communication consists of orchestrated
words, images, and actions that persuade and influence in order to change behavior. The modern strategic communication practitioner, however, should not be fooled by the title of Jonathan Reed Winkler’s new book. The tome’s focus is not on the message, but on the physical means required to transmit it, specifically the global submarine cable system and emerging transoceanic radio networks of World War I. As such, the book presents significant parallels to the modern world of cyberspace as a domain offering both threats and opportunities. It also points to a strategic vulnerability in that the United States had little or no control of this critical means of communication, an eerily familiar concern as America increasingly relies on the Internet for fast and reliable business dealings and personal communications.

Winkler begins his work by relating the fascinating story of the surreptitious destruction of German submarine telegraph cables on the same day Great Britain entered the war in 1914. He describes how the cable ship Alert moved unescorted into the English Channel, found and raised five German cables, and “hacked” (yes, hacked) them with hatchets. The United States, with virtually no oceanic cable system of its own, found itself at the mercy of the British, who now controlled existing cables, cable manufacturing, and access to the scarce raw materials used in the manufacturing process.

Themes of national security priorities emerge in subsequent chapters. The United States’ use of cables was primarily a matter of commercial interest prior to our entry into the war. The British, having cut the German lines, now had a virtual monopoly over US transoceanic communication. Along with that monopoly came British-imposed censorship of the cable traffic as part of the war effort. The impact on the economic viability of America’s commercial sector was telling. Firms could no longer use “shorthand” in their cables, a practice that saved money (since cable fees were based on the number of words sent), or maintain proprietary secrets. Additionally, the amount of war traffic on the cable networks increased dramatically, causing delays in delivery of commercial messages due to backlogs. From a military perspective the oceanic cables were vulnerable to being physically cut and could also be exploited for intelligence by intercepting them in the ocean and listening to their signals. As the United States prepared to enter World War I, its vulnerability in the area of global communication became apparent. Significant effort, both prior to and during the war, went into establishing American-controlled intercontinental cabling and, failing that, to improve emerging radio technology to support the US war effort. Radio development struggled with the exigencies of wavelength distribution. Squabbling within the US government, principally between the Navy, State Department, and private industry, stymied efforts to move forward on a number of fronts. Additionally, post-war efforts to fix these problems seemed to collapse in the glow of victory.

The lessons learned from these experiences will be evident to today’s national security strategists. Interagency disagreements remain the bane of decisionmakers. Post-conflict “peace dividends” have always come back to haunt the United States. The capacity to move information, measured as bandwidth, is as important today as it was during WWI but still remains a limited, high-demand, and vulnerable resource. The electro-
magnetic spectrum is similarly constrained. Hackers disrupt Internet communications with impunity, and computers are attacked and exploited in military operations.

_Nexus_ will appeal to two particular groups: the pure historian and the student and practitioner of modern communication. Unfortunately, Winkler forgoes an opportunity to attract a much broader audience to his important message on two levels. First, the exhausting detail of the book, along with its repetitiveness and retrospective references to previous chapters, often left this reader lost. The 47 pages of endnotes are reflective of a level of detail that becomes obfuscation to an intelligent but nonacademic audience. Second, Winkler offers little analysis that projects the lessons learned forward to the present day in an effort to provide planners and strategists with a meaningful education. The conclusion is a succinct and valuable synopsis of the previous chapters, and the author does make one reference to the Internet (albeit in the form of an unanswered question) on the final page of the book. But all of the cyber-related analogies presented in this critique come from the reviewer as a student of the topic. As a result, _Nexus_ may be perceived as less of a work of strategic import and more of a detailed reference for researchers.

**China’s War on Terrorism: Counter-insurgency, Politics, and Internal Security.** By Martin I. Wayne. New York: Routledge, 2008. 196 pages. $140.00. **Reviewed by Dr. John D. Becker (LTC, USA Ret.),** former head of Asian studies at the US Air Force Academy and an adjunct professor in Norwich University’s diplomacy program.

Many images seized the world’s attention last summer at the Beijing Olympics. The spectacular opening ceremonies in the Bird’s Nest stadium. Michael Phelps’s tremendous performance in the pool, ultimately resulting in eight gold medals. Usain Bolt shattering the world records in both the 100- and 200-meter dashes and taking the title of the “World’s Fastest Man.” And, of course, the highly coordinated efforts of the Chinese team in winning 51 gold medals, the most top finishes by a single nation at the games.

As the excitement of the Beijing Olympics starts to fade from our memories, there are other lessons we can learn from China. In _China’s War on Terror_, Martin Wayne says those lessons encompass counterterrorism, such as how a nation can effectively confront an insurgency and what strategies and tactics can be best employed in the war on terrorism. He looks at those lessons in this short, insightful, and occasionally disjointed study of regional terrorism.

The author is a graduate of the University of Denver’s Graduate School of International Studies and was a China Fellow at the National Defense University. His book is broken into seven chapters, in addition to an introduction explaining methodology and approach. The subject matter includes China’s bottom-up approach to fighting terrorism, the insurgency in Xinjiang, issues of China’s political will, the changing use of force, grassroots institutions and security, and the war of ideas in
reshaping society in autonomous regions. In the conclusion, the effectiveness of China’s approach is analyzed, and an epilogue reflects upon the art of countering insurgency.

Wayne argues that the Xinjiang insurgency is an indigenous political competition within the Uyghur minority, and not simple unrest that has been exacerbated by external actors, such as al Qaeda. The author believes the Chinese have been successful in dealing with this insurgency due to their exercise of political will. The key elements of China’s political will to confront the uprising are the state, party, and populace. The Chinese also reached beyond the traditional use of the military in dealing with these insurgents, by changing the mix of forces used in confronting them. Making use of the People’s Liberation Army, People’s Armed Police, paramilitary Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps, and regional Han residents and immigrants, the government was able to work at various levels and introduce more than brute force to combat the insurgents.

The Chinese devoted other counterinsurgency resources to regain control of and rebuild the grassroots organizations of both the national government and the society at large. This rebuilding included purging the old leadership of those organizations; recruiting educated and capable replacement leaders, as opposed to simply the political faithful; and empowering those leaders with the ability to make decisions that supported local concerns. Lastly, the Chinese have been trying to win the war of ideas, by shifting the focus of Xinjiang’s population from the insurgents’ agenda to an alternative objective—a developing regional economy. That economy is bolstered by the development of political, religious, and educational practices in the region.

The book concludes by noting that there are lessons to be learned from the Chinese counterinsurgency. Those lessons include a need for early, repeated, and comprehensive action focusing on a bottom-up approach and drawing upon a cohesive strategy involving military and security forces, as well as intelligence agencies that support the nation’s insurgency goals. The national government also uses its grassroots structures to battle the insurgents and reclaim any losses that have been suffered. Ultimately, a nation has to be prepared to exercise its political will for the long-term, while reshaping its society through a war of ideas. It is only by demonstrating a willingness to take these steps that a nation like China can succeed against an indigenous insurgency.

A couple of critical comments regarding this book are appropriate. First, Wayne’s methodology is less rigorous than is normally the case in regional studies. Based on the author’s own fieldwork, it blends what he calls “formal and informal elements,” in essence networking with people across Xinjiang’s social spectrum and using basic surveillance and situational awareness. His research is based on the premise that “social knowledge is the key to understanding complex situations on which facts are murky and nonexistent.” Second, while this may be considered a form of qualitative, as opposed to quantitative, research, Wayne’s work lacks an ethnography. By eliminating even more generic consideration of sources, he puts the reader in the difficult position of not really knowing the basis for his analysis. He also makes the startling suggestion that facts can distract us from analysis, leading researchers to believe they know more than they really do. While this circumstance may be true at times, the given facts are
the basis for verification of any work. Playing fast and loose with the material, while saying “trust me,” is not satisfying to the thoughtful reader.

Even so, China’s War on Terrorism is useful in three ways. First, it directs our attention to the subject of counterinsurgency and serves as a good primer on its basic elements. Wayne’s writing in these areas is clear and concise. Second, the book serves to show us how the Chinese have approached the problems of insurgency in one of their distant regions. As Afghanistan has shown, insurgencies do not always occur close to home, and thinking about different ways to cope with them can be important. Third, this volume reinforces the rising importance of China’s role in the international system. Not only can we learn from the Chinese, we can also continue to learn about them.

**Napoleon’s Enfant Terrible: General Dominique Vandamme.**
362 pages. $34.95. **Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel Robert Bateman,** a strategist assigned to the Office of Net Assessment, Office of the Secretary of Defense.

It is not often that an author truly owes a debt of gratitude to the graphic artist who designed the book cover. This biography is one of those times. Noted Napoleonic scholar John Gallaher owes Tony Roberts, the designer of his book jacket, a bottle of the good stuff. The design is straightforward. Front and center, at the top, is the title. Nothing unusual there. In the middle is a portrait of General Vandamme. Again, nothing strange in that. But beneath the portrait is a stroke of genius, a single quote from Napoleon that will bring the casual bookstore browser to the purchase counter, book in hand: “If I had two Vandammes, I would have one shot. But I only have one and I keep him for myself because I need him and am unable to replace him.”

Indeed, after such a comment what need is there for a review? (Even if, ever the scholar, the author acknowledges that this quotation may be apocryphal.) Inside the book Gallaher draws his own parallel, comparing Vandamme to another fiery commander, George Patton. In this reviewer’s opinion that is a poor comparison. Set beside the General Vandamme who comes to life in this biography, Patton looks like the very model of a shy, demure, quiet, self-effacing, and well-liked professional.

In fact, there are some strong parallels, though Gallaher is too much of a polished writer to mention them. (Which is to say that he stays on topic and does not mix centuries.) Both men decided at an early age to become soldiers, and both had less than stellar academic careers at the outset. Vandamme spent two unsuccessful years at a military academy, at the end of which he just gave in and enlisted in the French Army of the Ancien Régime in 1788. By 1789 he was a sergeant in Martinique. Despite its connotations of comfortable duty, French Martinique in that era was not the vacation spot it is today. Vandamme then displayed another similarity to Patton. He presented the same strong-headedness, although not the restraint or patience, of that later officer. Failing to persuade the French Army to transfer him, Sergeant Vandamme simply
deserted his regiment, caught a ship to France, and reenlisted in another regiment. In a different time this switch might not have been possible, but in Revolutionary France the paperwork of the army was somewhat lacking.

In August of 1791, Vandamme began a rise even more meteoric than Patton’s in World War I, or decades later, World War II. Commissioned to raise a company from his hometown, Vandamme succeeded admirably. By the next summer he assumed command of five disparate companies, a pocket battalion that he led into combat in August 1793. He did well enough to earn a dedicated battalion command and the rank of lieutenant colonel that September. The next month, again in battle, he led his men (and those of neighboring units) so adroitly and heroically that by the end of the month he was promoted again. Dominique Vandamme, in October 1793, became a General of Brigade. (The French Army of the time had only two grades for generals, General of Brigade, the US equivalent of Brigadier General, and General of Division.) He was 22 years old.

At this point in the biography comes the most instructive material for military readers as Vandamme’s career began a long series of ups and downs. Again, like Patton, some of Vandamme’s problems were of his own creation. He was famous, for example, for his disdain for many of the officers and Napoleonic nobility appointed over him. This sentiment included relatives of Napoleon. Some of Vandamme’s tribulations were a byproduct of the times and the completely politicized nature of French military culture. Both aspects of the young general’s life offer cautionary lessons for the astute professional.

For those unfamiliar with the French Revolution a quick consultation of other sources might be advisable. In his introduction Gallaher says he intends to explain the broader context of events in order to make the book more accessible to the ordinary, nonspecialist reader. The fact is that even with these cursory efforts he fails to give enough background. In all likelihood Gallaher suffers from a syndrome most military officers can understand; too much familiarity with the subject matter at hand. Because he is so intimate with the material, the author finds it difficult to communicate some things to others who are not as well-versed. Even specialists in Napoleonic history might have difficulty following the author’s narrative.

Overall Gallaher’s book is best suited for readers who have a deep interest in the Napoleonic Wars. For such consumers this biography provides a wealth of details on the quasi-political “inside baseball” which wracked the French Army of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic eras. A general-interest reader would probably find the same material overly detailed and buried in minutia, largely boring, the cursory explanations of broader events confusing, and the lack of maps utterly maddening. Evaluate this book and make a decision on purchasing it accordingly.